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Russian-Estonian Relations After 2007: Cur- Rent Status and Development Prospects
International Studies, 2011, Vol. 13, No. 1, 11-21, DOI: 10.2478/v10223-011-0005-1 RUSSIAN-ESTONIAN RELATIONS AFTER 2007: CUR- RENT STATUS AND DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS Agata Włodarska ABSTRACT The article highlights the major points that have influenced relations between Russia and Estonia after 2007. These relations were rather poor during the post-Soviet period. The number of Russian people who lived in Estonia after gaining independence in 1991 exceeded 30%, which resulted in the very keen interest of Russia in Estonian politics. April 2007 created a new reality for rela- tions between the countries. The decision to move the statues of Second World War Soviet soldiers from main squares to cemeteries provoked negative reac- tions from Russians living in Estonia, but also infuriated leaders of the Russian government. As a consequence there were harsh verbal attacks from Moscow, the Estonian ambassador to Moscow was harassed, cyberspace attacks took place and traffic over the bridge in Narva, which is a key highway from Rus- sia, was blocked. The Estonian authorities know there is no point in maintain- ing conflict with Russia. The President of Estonia, Toomas Hendrik Ilves, has stressed that Estonia’s relationship with its biggest neighbour, Russia, can only get better. Russia plays an incredibly important role in the Estonian economy and tourist industry, according to Andrus Ansip, the Prime Minister of Estonia. KEY WORDS: Russian – Estonian relations, Bronze Soldier Night, cyber attacks in Estonia, The Estonian State Integration Programme, Russians in Estonia stonia is a country, which is strongly divided taking into consideration the is- Esue of ethnicity. -
London School of Economics and Political Science Department of Government
London School of Economics and Political Science Department of Government Historical Culture, Conflicting Memories and Identities in post-Soviet Estonia Meike Wulf Thesis submitted for the degree of PhD at the University of London London 2005 UMI Number: U213073 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Publishing UMI U213073 Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 Ih c s e s . r. 3 5 o ^ . Library British Library of Political and Economic Science Abstract This study investigates the interplay of collective memories and national identity in Estonia, and uses life story interviews with members of the intellectual elite as the primary source. I view collective memory not as a monolithic homogenous unit, but as subdivided into various group memories that can be conflicting. The conflict line between ‘Estonian victims’ and ‘Russian perpetrators* figures prominently in the historical culture of post-Soviet Estonia. However, by setting an ethnic Estonian memory against a ‘Soviet Russian’ memory, the official historical narrative fails to account for the complexity of the various counter-histories and newly emerging identities activated in times of socio-political ‘transition’. -
ABSTRACT Memory Wars and Metanarratives: the Historical
ABSTRACT Memory Wars and Metanarratives: the Historical Context of Linguistic Discrimination in Estonia Chanse E. Sonsalla Director: Adrienne Harris, Ph.D. In the 20th century, the country of Estonia was decimated, terrorized, and subjugated by the USSR. Estonians continue to redefine their national identity, but the process is complicated by the continued presence of ethnic Russians in Estonia. When 30% of a country's population speaks differently, thinks differently, and was once an enemy that instigated an era of terror, how does it rebuild? Language has been a polarizing issue between the ethnic Estonian and ethnic Russian populations as long as both have been present in Estonia. By investigating trends in language policy, this thesis explores the roots of tension between the two groups. The ultimate goal of the thesis is to provide insight into the pitfalls of post-conflict reintegration and the potential of language policy as a discriminatory instrument. APPROVED BY DIRECTOR OF HONORS THESIS: ____________________________________________ Dr. Adrienne Harris, Department of Modern Languages and Cultures APPROVED BY THE HONORS PROGRAM: ____________________________________ Dr. Elizabeth Corey, Director DATE: _______________________ MEMORY WARS AND METANARRATIVES: THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF LINGUISTIC DISCRIMINATION IN ESTONIA A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Baylor University In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Honors Program By Chanse E. Sonsalla Waco, Texas May 2019 TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... -
The Cyber Defence Unit of the Estonian Defence League
The Cyber Defence Unit of the Estonian Defence League Legal, Policy and Organisational Analysis Kadri Kaska, Anna-Maria Osula, LTC Jan Stinissen Tallinn 2013 Disclaimer This publication is a product of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (the Centre) and it represents the views and interpretations of the Centre. This publication does not represent the opinions or policies of NATO and is designed to provide an independent position. Third-party sources are quoted as appropriate and the Centre is not responsible for the content of the external sources referenced in this publication. The Centre assumes no responsibility for any loss or harm arising from the use of information contained in this publication. Copies of this publication may be distributed for non-profit and non-commercial purpose only. Contact NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence Filtri tee 12, Tallinn 10132, Estonia [email protected] www.ccdcoe.org 2 Contents INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................... 5 1. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND ....................................................................................................................... 7 NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY COLLABORATION IN ESTONIA ............................................................................................... 7 ESTONIAN DEFENCE LEAGUE .................................................................................................................................... -
AVIATION REGULATION of the ESTONIAN DEFENCE FORCES Regulation of the Minister of Defence Passed 18 October 2019, Entered Into Force 25 October 2019
NB! Unofficial translation AVIATION REGULATION OF THE ESTONIAN DEFENCE FORCES Regulation of the Minister of Defence Passed 18 October 2019, entered into force 25 October 2019 This Regulation is established on the basis of subsection 72 (3) of the Aviation Act. Chapter 1 General Provisions § 1. Scope and Area of Application (1) This Regulation establishes the requirements for the organisation of military aviation by the Estonian Defence Forces, including requirements for aircraft, the operation of aircraft, aviation security, military aviation facilities, military aviation personnel, and the procedure for investigating aviation accidents and incidents involving the aircraft of the Estonian Defence Forces. (2) This Regulation shall apply to all manned and unmanned aircraft entered into the Register of Military Aircraft. (3) This Regulation shall also apply to the armed forces of the Member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (hereinafter ‘NATO’) and other foreign countries, unless otherwise provided by an international treaty or some other international agreement. (4) This Regulation does not apply to temporary areas used for the take-off and landing of manned aircraft, unless otherwise specified in this Regulation. (5) Additional organisational specific requirements to this Regulation may be established by the Commander of the Estonian Defence Forces or a duly authorised person. § 2. Terms and Definitions The terms used in this Regulation shall be used in the following meaning: 1) ‘military aviation’ is one of the national -
Disinformation Campaigns
August 2016 w . c e p a o r g Winning the Information War Techniques and Counter-strategies to Russian Propaganda in Central and Eastern Europe A Report by CEPA’s Information Warfare Project in Partnership with the Legatum Institute Edward Lucas and Peter Pomeranzev I WINNING THE INFORMATION WAR Acknowledgments This report, “Winning the Information War: Techniques and Counter-Strategies in Russian Propaganda,” is produced under the auspices of the Center for European Policy Analysis’ (CEPA) Information Warfare Initiative. Co-authored by CEPA Senior Vice President Edward Lucas and Legatum Institute Senior Fellow Peter Pomerantsev, it is part of an ongoing effort at CEPA to monitor, collate, analyze, rebut and expose Russian propaganda in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Previous publications in this series provided an analytical foundation for evaluating the methods and aims of Russian propaganda. This report extends that research, examining how Russian propaganda is being employed across the CEE region, the perils it presents and actionable counter-strategies for addressing it. In preparing this report, the authors conducted an extended assessment of the existing record of Russian, English and Baltic language literature on the subject of information warfare. They solicited written inputs from, and conducted interviews with, members of the scholarly, academic and expert community who are investigating specific dimensions of Russia’s “new” propaganda. Additionally, the authors solicited written and conceptual inputs through -
Deterring Russian Aggression in the Baltic States Through Resilience and Resistance
Research Report C O R P O R A T I O N STEPHEN J. FLANAGAN, JAN OSBURG, ANIKA BINNENDIJK, MARTA KEPE, ANDREW RADIN Deterring Russian Aggression in the Baltic States Through Resilience and Resistance Introduction The governments and citizens of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—the Baltic states—are subject to daily Russian strategic information operations and propaganda activities that are part of campaigns designed to undermine trust in their institutions, foment ethnic and social tensions, and erode confidence in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) KEY FINDINGS collective defense commit- ■ Total Defense and Unconventional Warfare (TD/UW) techniques and ments. These three countries forces can support deterrence, early warning, de-escalation, defense are also vulnerable to low-level, against invading forces, and liberation from occupation during the hybrid, and full-scale attacks by course of a hybrid or conventional conflict. Russian special operations and ■ Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are committed to enhancing the size and regular military forces deployed capabilities of their national guards and reserve forces and increasing close to their borders. In light whole-of society resilience and resistance efforts. All three countries of these concerns, and given are improving and expanding their small special operations forces. the imbalance between Russian ■ The United States, other NATO allies and partners, and the European and NATO conventional forces Union could take further concrete steps to support the development deployed in the Baltic region, of Baltic TD/UW capabilities by strengthening cooperation on crisis these governments and others management, intelligence sharing, civilian resilience, and countering Russian information warfare and hybrid attacks. -
Deterrence Dilemma in Latvia and Estonia: Finding the Balance Between External Military Solidarity and Territorial Defence
Journal on Baltic Security , 2017; 3(2): 29–41 Research Article Open Access Māris Andžāns, Viljar Veebel* Deterrence Dilemma in Latvia and Estonia: Finding the Balance between External Military Solidarity and Territorial Defence DOI 10.1515/jobs-2017-0005 received September 30, 2017; accepted October 14, 2017. Abstract: While potential threats from Russia and NATO collective defence commitments are similar for Latvia and Estonia, both countries have adopted different approaches in the balancing exercise between territorial defence and military solidarity. Notwithstanding their differences, both are by their nature fully non-aggressive – without room for pre-emptive initiatives, extra territoriality or asymmetrical tools. Given that in a case of a hypothetical large-scale conventional attack both countries would almost entirely have to rest on the allies, external military solidarity is essential. Until the Ukraine crisis, both offered more military solidarity towards their NATO allies than the latter offered to them. As the result of the Ukrainian crisis, allies became more military-solidary with the Baltic nations, especially having established the Enhanced Forward Presence, while Estonian and especially Latvian contributions to international missions and operations dropped. Therefore, it is suggested that both countries increase their efforts to the allied international endeavours. Keywords: deterrence dilemma, military solidarity, Latvia, Estonia, NATO. 1 Introduction Russia’s aggression against Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine since 2014 have clearly demonstrated that Russia is ready to use military force against its neighbours. Due to these and other reasons arising from historical experience and Russia’s present behaviour, both Latvia and Estonia rank its neighbour, namely Russia, as the main source of potential threats across different sectors of national security. -
Russia's Use of Cyber Warfare in Estonia, Georgia and Ukraine
Bard College Bard Digital Commons Senior Projects Spring 2019 Bard Undergraduate Senior Projects Spring 2019 War of Nerves: Russia's Use of Cyber Warfare in Estonia, Georgia and Ukraine Madelena Anna Miniats Bard Colllege, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.bard.edu/senproj_s2019 Part of the Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Commons This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License. Recommended Citation Miniats, Madelena Anna, "War of Nerves: Russia's Use of Cyber Warfare in Estonia, Georgia and Ukraine" (2019). Senior Projects Spring 2019. 116. https://digitalcommons.bard.edu/senproj_s2019/116 This Open Access work is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been provided to you by Bard College's Stevenson Library with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this work in any way that is permitted by the copyright and related rights. For other uses you need to obtain permission from the rights- holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license in the record and/or on the work itself. For more information, please contact [email protected]. War of Nerves: Russia’s Use of Cyber Warfare in Estonia, Georgia and Ukraine Senior Project Submitted to The Division of Global and International Studies of Bard College By Madelena Miniats Annandale-on-Hudson, NY May 2019 Miniats 1 Abstract ________________________________ This project examines how Soviet military thought has influenced present day Russian military doctrine and has evolved to include cyber warfare as part of the larger structure of Russian information warfare. -
Baltic Visions and Dilemmas of Territorial Defence After 16 Years In
Zaleski, K., Sliwa, Z., & Veebel, V. (2020). Baltic visions and dilemmas of Journal territorial defence after 16 years in NATO. Journal of International Studies, 13(4), of International 184-196. doi:10.14254/2071-8330.2020/13-4/13 Studies © Foundation Baltic visions and dilemmas of territorial of International Studies, 2020 defence after 16 years in NATO © CSR, 2020 Papers Scientific Krzystof Zaleski WSB University, Dabrowa Gornica, Poland [email protected] Zdzislaw Śliwa Baltic Defence College, Tartu, University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia [email protected] Viljar Veebel Baltic Defence College, Tartu, University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia [email protected] ORCID 0000-0002-9122-0134 Abstract. The concepts of development of territorial defence forces and capabilities Received: are different within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and are June, 2020 1st Revision: closely linked with specific characteristics of respective nations. Moreover, it is October, 2020 linked with historic circumstances, culture, composition of society and other Accepted: specific domains. Changes in the internal and international security environment December, 2020 are further affecting decisions about selecting specific defence and deterrence models. The security on the Eastern Flank of the NATO has progressed visibly DOI: after 2014 events in Ukraine, causing investments into Estonian, Latvian and 10.14254/2071- Lithuanian territorial defence as a recognition of their value to support their 8330.2020/13-4/13 armed forces. The aim of the current research is to analyse the ongoing evolution of territorial defence forces of three Baltic countries in broader regional perspective in light of changed threat perception and risk assessments. -
National Defence Strategy Estonia
National Defence Strategy Estonia Estonia’s new National Defence Strategy replaces the previous document from 2005. It stipulates that, although there are no existential threats to the NATO Member States’ security, the global and regional security environment is becom- ing more dynamic and more unpredictable. New threats and challenges have emerged, while traditional security issues have not disappeared. In this rapidly evolving security environment, the most serious potential threats to Estonia derive from hybrid and combined challenges and from a combination of internal and external developments. Therefore, national defence can no longer be limited to military defence alone. Only a comprehensive approach to defence can guarantee a country’s security. Based on this central idea, the 2011 National Defence Strategy stipulates that all major Estonian state authorities shall participate in national defence, thus com- bining military forces with non-military capabilities. Estonia’s defence policy is based on two intertwined pillars: the promotion of international security, including strong relations with its allies and the credibility of NATO’s collective defence mechanism; and the strengthening of Estonia’s own initial defence capability to ensure the sustainability of the State and its institu- tions in all possible scenarios. All state authorities related to national defence are responsible for their respective competence both in peacetime and in case of war. Thus, close interagency coope- ration and comprehensive yet flexible command and -
The War of the Monuments in Estonia: the Challenges of History and the Minority Population
REPORT FROM THE ÅLAND ISLANDS PEACE INSTITUTE Rapport från Ålands fredsinstitut The War of the Monuments in Estonia: the Challenges of History and the Minority Population Vadim Poleshchuk E T Å U L T A I T N S D N S I F E R C E A D E S P I N S S D T N IT U LA T T IS HE ÅLAND No. 1-2009 Vadim Poleshchuk, Mag. iur., Legal Advisor-Analyst, Legal Information Centre for Human Rights (LICHR), Tallinn, Estonia. He is dealing predominantly with legal and political aspects of minority protection in Estonia and Latvia. Among his recent publi- cations are: “Estonia – In Quest of Minority Protection”, in S. Spiliopoulou Åkermark et al. (eds.) International Obligations and National Debates: Minorities around the Bal- tic Sea, The Åland Islands Peace Institute, 2006 (co-authored with J. Helemäe); “Esto- nia”, in C. Mudde (ed.) Racist Extremism in Central and Eastern Europe, Routledge, 2005; “The Baltic States before European Union Accession: Recent Developments in Minority Protection”, in A. Bloed et al. (eds.) European Yearbook of Minority Issues, vol. 2, 2002/2003, Martinius Nijhoff Publishers, 2004 (co-authored with B. Tsilevich). The War of the Monuments in Estonia: the Challenges of History and the Minority Population Vadim Poleshchuk Proof reading: Sarah Stephan Report from the Åland Islands Peace Institute Rapport från Ålands fredsinstitut No. 1-2009 ISSN 1797-1845 (Printed) ISSN 1797-1853 (Online) ISBN 978-952-5265-34-7 (Printed) ISBN 978-952-5265-35-4 (Online) Published by the Åland Islands Peace Institute PB 85, AX-22101 Mariehamn, Åland, Finland Phone +358 18 15570, fax +358 18 21026 [email protected] www.peace.ax This report can be downloaded from www.peace.ax © The author, 2009.