Unger, Leonard.Toc.Pdf
Total Page：16
File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb
The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project AMBASSADOR LEONARD UNGER Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy Initial interview date: May 10, 1989 Copyright 1998 A ST TABLE OF CONTENTS Background Office of eographer Negotiating peace treaties Territory of Trieste Southeast European Affairs 1948-1950 ).S. attitude towards Balkans in post-,ar era Italy.s 1948 elections Trieste 1950-1952 Duties of Political Ad0isor American-British relations Naples1 Italy 1952-1952 3ob responsibilities Ambassador Thompson.s negotiating skills Thailand 1958-1952 Appointment as DC7 Importance of SEATO ).S. interests in Thailand Importance of Straits of 7alacca and Sunday Thai political situation 8aos 1952-1954 Appointment Political situation Ho Chi 7inh Trail ).S. pressure to keep 8aos neutral eneral 9ouprasith.s coup attempt President 9ennedy and 3ohnson Embassy Staff 1 Far Eastern Affairs 1955-1957 North Vietnam.s infiltration into Cambodian territory ).S. in0ol0ement in Vietnam Relations between State and Defense departments Role of CIA Thailand 1957-1972 ).S. in0ol0ement in Thailand Political situation Chinese minority Narcotics trade Taiwan 1974- 1979 Changing ).S. relations to Taiwan Taiwan.s leadership Demonstration at Taipei Airport Vice President Bush Comparing ).S. presidents INTERVIEW ": Mr. Ambassador, how did you become interested in foreign affairs' )N ER: I started my career in ,ashington as a geographer and with emphasis on problems in the )nited States1 at an organization then going called the National Resources Planning Board. ": This is when' )N ER: I came down to ,ashington directly from college. raduated in the spring of 1929 from Har0ard. I was a geography concentrator1 a rather unusual field1 at least for Har0ard it was. But I was sent down to a geographer who was working at the National Resources Planning Board1 as well as to some people in the Department of Agriculture who were working in similar fields. The geographer was ilbert ,hite who was working closely also with a political scientist named 3ohn 7iller in the National Resources Planning Board. They were working on de0elopment problems all focused on the )nited States. This was an era of national planning1 national resources planning1 industrial planning1 planning for agricultural de0elopment1 that kind of thing. But it initially focused on the 2 )nited States. I was in this work for a period of years. This agency I'm speaking about was the National Resources Planning Board. ": (hich came under whom' )N ER: It was directly under the President. It was the President's uncle1 Frederick Delano who was Chairman of the Board1 and Charles Eliot1 who was the acti0e head of the organization and the head of the Board of o0erseeing go0ernors that included a number of prestigious people. In those days1 before ,orld ,ar II1 planning initially meant something deri0ed from city planning and landscape planning. They had only begun to deal with planning in the broader sense that it took on with the National Resources Planning Board and with some other ).S. o0ernment agencies. This was one of the high moments of the New Deal1 you know1 when this kind of thing was new and de0eloping. It1 of course1 was cut short as ,orld ,ar II began and as ).S. in0ol0ement in the war grew. So a lot of that acti0ity was curtailed and e0entually terminated. 7any of the people in0ol0ed in it1 myself included1 were mo0ed into the international field. I was asked to come o0er to the State Department to work in the Office of the eographer. The Officer of the eographer1 at that time1 was working out a whole series of essentially post-war plans for use by the people who would ultimately be attending a peace conference and working out a post-war peace arrangement. At this point1 the )nited States was not e0en in the war. ": (hat were we thin)ing about' How did we view the war' I mean this was before we came into it. (ere we loo)ing toward an ultimate Allied victory' )N ER: Yes. There had been lend lease and there had been the transfer of destroyers to the British. There was no Auestion where Franklin Roose0elt stood and his Administration1 namely1 totally sympathetic with the Allied war against the ABis. Of course1 this was a hundred times magnified when the )nited States itself became in0ol0ed immediately after Pearl Harbor. So a lot of this planning was taking place. Thinking back to post-,orld ,ar I1 and the studies that were de0eloped by a 0ery well known 3ohns Hopkins professor1 who was a geography professor and later became President of 3ohns Hopkins. CAmbassador )nger later identified this man as Isaiah BowmanD. Anyway1 the State Department had the records of the studies made at that time1 and the plans that were made for the Treaty of Versailles and all of the 0arious economic and territorial pro0isions of that sort. So prior to the )nited States becoming in0ol0ed in the war directly1 this kind of planning was mo0ing ahead and studies were being brought up to date. Then1 of course1 it took on a much more specific and much more immediate aspect once the )nited States was in0ol0ed. 2 I was sent o0er to the old State Department building. A group of us were in0ol0ed in this acti0ity. ,e were asked to be eBcused from direct military ser0ice because it was felt that this was something that was reAuired to be done. Those of us who had been in0ol0ed in it1 by that time for Auite a number of months1 should continue and get this done against the day when the war was won and people would be sitting down for peace negotiations. So I was in0ol0ed in that. The first meetings of the Foreign 7inisters took place1 first in 8ondon and then in Paris1 and led in the summer of 1945 to the negotiations for the Treaty of Paris. I was at each one of the negotiations there. ": (hat were your particular responsibilities' )N ER: I was pretty much low man on the totem pole. I was doing research on boundary problems1 on economic functioning. In other words1 if a new boundary was to be drawn1 as it was drawn between Yugosla0ia and Italy1 between Italy and France1 between Italy and Austria--those happened to be the areas that I was most in0ol0ed in1 as well as some of the Balkan situations--the Auestion was1 what kind of a boundary could be drawn that would do least 0iolence to ethnic situations but at the same time also not be an economic nonsenseE ": Did you have any sort of imperatives that were wor)ing there' At your level, people say, "(ell, never again will we do this. (e saw the mista)es." (ere there certain things that, at least, in your thin)ing, that we,ve really got to avoid this or that' )N ER: Oh1 yes. There was a great deal of feeling on the part of people who had studied the Treaty of Versailles and all the related treaties that some 0ery grie0ous errors that had been committed. Of course1 one such case was the economic burden put on ermany1 but also some of the territorial decisions were considered mistakes. For eBample1 whate0er any American may ha0e felt1 the Yugosla0s ob0iously felt bitter that the head of the Adriatic had been lost--the two good outlets to the sea1 namely1 Trieste and Fiume1 which had been taken o0er Cillegally1 in the case of FiumeD after ,orld ,ar I1 taken o0er by Italy. The Yugosla0s felt that this was territory1 including the territory going north all the way up into the Alps1 that was inhabited by Yugosla0 people and it should be ceded to Yugosla0ia. They felt the Port of Trieste was a natural for them and that it should be ceded to them as their major outlet. Also1 they felt that the population in Trieste was either Yugosla01 or Yugosla0 con0erted to Italian after ,orld ,ar I. So these were all the kinds of issues. ": How about the -erman.spea)ing people up at the Italian.Austrian border' )N ER: Right1 like the Alto Adige1 FTrento e Trieste and all of that. ,ell1 to jump ahead a little bit1 when the war in Europe had come to an end1 a Four- Power Commission was established Cin 1945 or early 1945D1 British1 French1 American and Russian to 0isit1 in anticipation of a peace conference1 the Italian-Yugosla0 and 4 Austrian border areas. The task was to consult the population and come to a conclusion as to where the new boundary should be drawn. ,hen e0erybody on that Commission got to 8ondon and then subseAuently mo0ed o0er to Paris for the Peace Conference1 needless to say1 the Russians drew a line far to the west1 practically out on the Venetian plain. The Americans1 on the other eBtreme1 drew a line that was only a little bit west of what had been the post-,orld ,ar I boundary. The French were closer to the Russians. The British were closer to the Americans. But there were four lines. )ltimately1 after a great deal of negotiation in Paris1 and sending further groups out to in0estigate specific situations1 the decision was made--as you can read it in the Italian Peace Treaty--to set up a Free Territory of Trieste which would be an independent entity1 neither under Yugosla0ia nor under Italy. I'm trying to remember precisely why that solution was ne0er realized. It was to go ahead and a go0ernor was to be appointed1 but with the 1948 elections impending in Italy it became a 0ery sensiti0e political issue.