CONFLICT in LAOS the Politics of Neutraliczation
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CONFLICT IN LAOS The Politics of Neutraliczation Arthur J. Dammen Revised Edition ;11"', ' , \ \) "I') / ' ", , " '" I I ) , ' , ' , ) ". /j I: ,\,' ~ I I II ' \ PRAEGER PUBLISHERS ".' <)" New York· Washington· London' , ) 'J '/ RETURN TO NEUTRALITY • 167 166 • CONFLICT IN LAOS not a resignation from office; it was simply a delegation of powers to be repelled at all costs but the individual soldiers wanted no re-} to General Sounthone Pathammavong, the senior army officer in sponsibility for any bloodshed. This explains the wide distances be-,11 Vientiane. tween opposing forces, the heavy dependence on mortar and artilleryi "~I After a last-minute effort to bring about a meeting near Vientiane fire, and the absence of hand-to-hand fighting. of Colonel Kouprasith and General Sounthone, Prince Souvanna The battle was preceded by an abortive countercoup led by tho!; Phouma turned his black l'eugeot sedan toward the airport for the commander of the Vientiane Military Region, Colonel Kouprasitij' last time. Without making any further statement, he left Vientiane Abhay. Taking advantage of the approach of the Phoumist troop~~: so~ shortly before six in the evening and landed in the Cambodian he and his men on the morning of December 8 effected a capital of Phnom Penh about two hours later, a voluntary exile. from their Chinaimo camp, where they had been more or lessi confined since August. They forced Kong Le and his red-armband~ The Die Is Cast men to withdraw westward, and seized control of the capital witij., little resistance. In leaflets distributed to the populace, the colonePl' Quinim Pholsena, Souvanna Phouma's senior remaining Cabinet soldiers, who wore white armbands, claimed that their countercou minister, slipped out of Vientiane on the morning of December 10 aboard a Soviet Ilyushin transport bound for Hanoi. In twenty was aimed at forestalling a Pathet Lao takeover rather than ag; . I Souvanna Phouma, for whom Kouprasith declared his full sup four hours in the North Vietnamese capital, he made a firm deal Kong Le and his men established a temporary headquarters with the Russians: In exchange for a formal alliance between Kong II the airfield, where the Prime Minister visited just before nightf Le's troops and the Pathet Lao, the Russians would airlift into Laos He had already paid a call on Kouprasith and now had the plel arms and supplies for the resistance against General Phoumi's I of both men to hold their respective positions until daybreak. American-supplied troops. in the morning, red armbands were everywhere. Under cover The Russians, seeing the opportunity afforded them by the pos II night, Kong Le's men had moved in and had occupied the to'~ sibility of supporting Souvanna Phouma and his able military once again, without so much as firing a shot. Whether Koupras~~ commander, Kong Le, against the imminent attack of the Phoumist rebels, apparently arrived at their decision in a week of urgent men had me~ely abandoned their untenable posi~ions volu~ta~y ~'1 consultations in Moscow at the beginning of December. Quinim's had been dnven from them by the threat of senous fightmg IS clear. They returned to the Chinaimo army camp, where signature merely formalized the bargain. awaited a more opportune moment to strike against Kong Le. The alliance with the Pathet Lao would permit Kong Le to with For Souvanna Phouma, the situation had deteriorated so b; draw his men, with their jeeps, trucks, and armored cars, safely into that he despaired of a solution. His last shred of hope that the hinterland should the Phoumists capture Vientiane. The airlift Pathet Lao and Savannakhet factions might still come to te of Soviet supplies, especially food and gasoline, would permit with him as a conciliator, disappeared on December 9. Kong Le's men to continue operating as a fighting force even though they were cut off from American supplies, and the provision Several planeloads of Savannakhet troops dropped on the e~, . I em outskirts of the town had rendezvoused with Kouprasith, gi' of heavy weapons would give them a capability equal to that of the rise to wild rumors, all untrue, that General Phoumi might la' Phoumists. For the Pathet Lao, the airlift meant a share in Soviet weapons and ammunition, enabling Prince Souphanouvong to re his impending offensive that very night. In the empty hallways of the building that housed his o· equip his guerrillas for regular combat operations. The entire com Souvanna Phouma found a typist to peck out a final commu~,"" plexion of the Laos confrontation had changed. declaring in effect that the end had come: "By reason of the sil On the runway at the Vientiane airport by the afternoon of tion created by the misunderstanding that has arisen between ,December 11, in full view of American observers, olive-drab Ily tary factions in the Vientiane region, the Government is obli ushins were unloading six 10S-mm. howitzers complete with am delegate all its civil and military powers to the High Comm, lllunition and North Vietnamese gun crews to man them (neither the Army effective at 9 A.M. today, December 9, 1960, in or~,'f kong Le nor the Pathet Lao had any cannoneers). General Sounthone, finding himself incapable of steering the preserve security and the functioning of public services." TlrlS\l:~ 170 • CONFLIer IN LAOS The Vientiane radio station had gone off the air, and the cable office had shut down as soon as the fighting began. Now the only links with the outside world were the American, British, and French embassies. Ambassador Brown remained in the U.S. Embassy throughout the fighting. Several streets away at the Settha Palace. Hotel, Soviet Ambassador Abramov had taken shelter, and he, too,'-i, remained throughout the battIe. (Afterward he flew to Bangkok 9. aboard a British military aircraft and thence to Phnom Penh.) A',l mile-high column of black smoke rose into the cloud-studded,,(J blue tropical sky over the crippled town. '1' Two Prime Ministers On December 16, Kong Le's troops, inferior in numbers and;; armament despite the Soviet deliveries, began an orderly with-"~ drawal from the western end of the town, taking all their military) equipment with them. Seventy-six hours after the first shot had\~ been fired, the last Kong Le paratrooper trudged out of the town.i~ It was an ironic twist of fate that Eisenhower, whose immediate A strange quiet settled over the littered streets of the capital.~ objective on assuming the Presidency in 1953 had been to ex Not until forty-eight hours after the end of the fighting did ~!! tricate the United States from the Korean War, spent his last days leaders of the Revolutionary Committee, General Phoumi an in office wrestling with another critical situation in Asia. Prince Boun Oum, make their appearance. While stilI in Savan, In late December, 1960, the President's top diplomatic, military, nakhet, the headquarters of the Revolutionary Committee, the' and intelligence advisers began a series of White House meetings had laid the groundwork for forming their own government. to review the situation in Laos after six years of consistent United Forty deputies out of the total fifty-nine in the National A States support of anti-Communists. This was the picture that con sembly had arrived in Savannakhet by December 1,1. Next day, th' fronted them: majority met in session to pass a vote of censure against thl The Pathet Lao forces, which had numbered a few hundred Souvanna Phouma Cabinet. This was followed shortly by a ro poorly armed guerrillas at the 1954 cease-fire, had increased to proclamation from Luang Prabang entrusting the Revolution several thousand; moreover, they had gained as allies the crack Committee with the "temporary conduct" of the Kingdom's paratroopers of Captain Kong Le, who had been driven out of fairs. Vientiane but not defeated and who possessed brand-new Ameri At his refuge in Cambodia, Souvanna Phouma spoke bitter" can weapons taken from the capital's warehouses. The Soviet against the United States. In an interview, he said of Ambassa! Union had posted an ambassador to Laos and was openly running Parsons, a man with whom he had never had good personal an airlift from North Vietnam to supply weapons, ammunition, and lations:!,\ food to Kong Le and the Pathet Lao. The United States had He understood nothing about Asia and nothing about Laos. The 4;' alienated Souvanna Phouma and committed itself to support a sistant Secretary of State is the most nefarious and reprehensible;'; largely military government that was avowedly anti-Communist men. He is the ignominious architect of disastrous American ~ and thus had no claim to the magic mantle of "neutrality." Mean toward Laos. He and others like him are responsible for the red" While, Souvanna Phouma, clinging to that mantle and claiming still shedding of Lao blood.3 'i) to be the legal Prime Minister, had been befriended by the Com The next day in Washington, a new Administration was) munist powers. Effective authority was being exercised in his name augurated. Soon it would face the same agonizing decisil" by Quinim Pholsena, who was much less favorably disposed to the whether or not to send American troops to Indochina-that' West and frankly anti-American. been faced by the Eisenhower Administration in 1954. In short, the American policy of attempting to contain Com a The New York Times, January 20, 1961. munist expansion in Laos by inadequate ground action (supporting 171 TWO PRIME MINISTERS • 185 184 • CONFLICT IN LAOS the Kong Le-Pathet Lao forces along the Royal Road. The AT-6's Vietnamese Cadres were not used against the airlift's llyushin-14's.