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SNIE 10-2-61 Likelihood of Major Communist Military Intervention In SNIE 10-2-61 Likelihood of Major Communist Military Intervention in Mainland Southeast Asia 27 June 1961 This document is made available through the declassification efforts and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of: The Black Vault The Black Vault is the largest online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) document clearinghouse in the world. The research efforts here are responsible for the declassification of hundreds of thousands of pages released by the U.S. Government & Military. Discover the Truth at: http://www.theblackvault.com APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: JAN 2005 -(b) (3) , .~. ',', .. LIKELIHOOD OF MAJOR COMMUNIST MILITARY INTERVENTION IN MAINLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA THE PROBLEM To estimate Chinese Communist and North Vietnamese intentions regarding major military intervention in Southeast Asia over the next few months; and to estimate Communist reactions to the introduction of US military forces into Laos to hold the key Mekong River towns. l THE ESTIMATE A. Communist China and Laos its virtually exhausted foreign exchange re­ serves, made nearly $9 million available to 1. Chinese Communist interests are more di­ the rebels in January. Foreign Minister Chen rectly involved in Laos than are those of the Yi formally pledged aid to Sou vanna Phouma USSR, and the Chinese have appeared to take in February, and in April Souvanna expressed an even more obdurate line on Laos, at Geneva thanks to the Chinese for "their generous and and elsewhere, than has the USSR. However, selfless assistance" and indicated his accept­ the desire of the Chinese for an assertive Bloc ance of a Chinese offer to build a road in Laos. policy is probably largely satisfied by the mili­ for his government. The Chinese have prob­ tant and successful Communist course in ably sent a few military observers and advisers Laos. We see no evidence that Communist to the Communist forces in Laos. According unity and effectiveness regarding Laos are di­ to recent French evacuees from the Plaine des minished by differences between Moscow and Jarres, the Chinese Communists have opened Peiping. While the USSR has apparently a consular post there. played the major role in formulating this policy, it has probably accommodated the 3. The several Chinese "intervention" state­ views of Peiping and Hanoi; the three powers ments concerning Laos in recent months 2 apparently agree that Hanoi should act as have almost certainly been designed not only the principal implementing agent within Laos. to deter US intervention but to justify a major 2. Communist China's role in the Laos war Chinese military role if such a course is later has taken various forms. Ammunition of de~ided upon. However, on the basis of avail- Chinese origin has been captured in Laos from 'These threats have been generally ambiguous Pathet Lao/Kong Le forces. Peiping, despite and have been issued at times when the situation in Laos was such that there app~ared little likeli­ I The assumed US course of action here con­ hood of their having to be carried out. Additionally, sidered was provided for the purposes of this esti­ Peiping is tolerating situations which it earlier ~aid mate and is not intended to represent the full it would not, e.g., the remaining Chinese Nationalist range of possibilities. irregulars in Burma-Laos. 1 1;or~~;~';'::~L 2 able evidence, there is no indication of a gen­ greatly lessen Asian and African support for eral southward deployment of Chinese mili­ Peiping's world status aims, disrupt internal tary forces within China. We are aware of no revolutionary movements and Sino-Soviet re­ augmentation of regularly-stationed Chinese lations in the Southeast Asian countries, and ground forces in the southernmost provinces perhaps drive India fully into the Western or of the concentration of forces along the camp. border.:: Similarly, we are aware of no Chi­ 6. We believe that Communist China's eco­ , nese Communist Air Force bomber units pres- ." , nomic crisis and food shortages are more entIy stationed within effective combat range likely at this time to discourage, than to en­ of Laos, though redeployment to closer bases courage, a major military adventure in South­ could of coursc quickly take place. North east Asia. In view of the conflict and devasta­ Vietnamese air capabilities are extremely tion which might well accompany a Chinese limited; North Vietnam has no combat air­ invasion, Peiping's leaders would have no as­ craft, but a few Soviet transport and heli­ surance that they could easily obtain and ship copter aircraft may have been transferred to the rice surpluses of Burma, Thailand, Cam­ it. Certain North Vietnamese airfields are ap­ bodia, and South Vietnam to China. In any parently being improved, however, and Bloc event, these surpluses are now modest, cer­ jet combat aircraft could quickly be deployed tainly as compared to China's vast food needs, there. and it would take some time for Peiping to force greatly increased food production in B. Communist China and Southeast Asia these countries. 4. A major Chinese Communist military inter­ vention in Southeast Asia in the near future C. North Viefnam and Southeast Asia is extremely unlikely. The Chinese leaders 7. North Vietnam has committed clandestine almost certainly estimate that such action cadres, specialists, and certain military units would result in military involvement with the to the war in Laos. At the same time it has US on a major scale. Apart from their own been carrying out certain transport and mili­ reluctance to run this risk, the USSR would tary construction programs within North Viet­ almost certainly bring strong pressure on nam, such as transloading and transshipping them to prevent such a course, partly because facilities, and airfield, road, and rail construc­ of the risks and partly because of the unfavor­ tion, which have resulted in marked improve­ able effects for Bloc policy elsewhere. ment in logistical support facilities. There 5. An overt invasion would be out of character has also been marked improvement in cer­ with the present trend of Communist China's tain of these facilities in key border areas of policies towards Southeast Asia. Despite oc­ North Vietnam-China. As a result, during casional tough talk, Peiping has gone to the coming year there will be a sizable increase great lengths to project the image of its in North Vietnamese dcfensive capabilities and "reasonableness" there, and to this end has in North Vietnam's already considerable capa­ pursued a fairly soft course in the past year bilities to bring its force to bear in Southeast or so especially towards Burma, Cambodia, Asia. However, the initiation of this buildup and Indonesia. It is probable that Chinese antedates the 1960-1961 hostilities in Laos, leaders would consider that overt aggression and though possibly accelerated by these in Southeast Asia would shatter this effort, events, appears to be part of a continuing, long-term development of logistic, defensive, "It should be noted, however, that the Chinese and offensive capabilities. We see no evidence Communists probably have the capability to deploy to indicate an imminent shift from subversion a ground force of one or two divisions along the border with Laos-North Vietnam without immediate and paramilitary activity to major military US detection. Our ability to detect air force deploy­ intervention in Laos or South Vietnam. In ments is somewhat better. present circumstances, and especially in view 3 of the progress of present North Vietnamese forces were introduced into Laos to keep the tactics in these countries, we consider such key Mekong River tOWll:~ from falling to Com­ a shift unlikely. munist military-subversive encroachment, the Bloc reaction would be strong. There would D. The Communists and Geneva be an intense political and propaganda cam­ 8. The Communists almost certainly believe paign, in the UN and worldwide, to brand the US an "aggressor" and to attempt through that they are in a commanding position at these means to forc~ US withdrawal. Addi­ Geneva. Their military strength in Laos tional North Vietnamese forces would be in­ grows daily and the likelihood of US military intervention seems to them less and less. trod~ced into Laos, probably unacknowledged, Thus, they believe that they can insist on a to stiffen Communist forces there. Commu­ nist-directed military operations would prob­ settlement at Geneva which will pave the way ~bly be intensified throughout the countryside for a takeover of Laos by political means. At m an effort to restrict RLG-US control to the the same time, they have been strengthening Mekong towns. US supply and communica­ the position of the Communist and pro-Com­ munist forces with more arms, aid, and con­ tions lines would be harassed, and Commu­ nist agen ts would probably undertake terrorist solidation of control. They probably calcu­ and sabotage activities within the Mekong late that if the conference collapses, the West will still be reluctant to intervene militarily ~owns. Depending on the size and apparent to prevent an extension of Communist control ll1tent of the US intervention, it is possible in Laos. They might estimate that in any ~hat North Vietnamese forces would be overtly mtroduced into Communist-controlled areas case they could forestall Western military in­ tervention by moving rapidly to seize most of of Laos, but we believe these forces would not attempt to drive the US troops from the the remaining areas of Laos. Mekong towns or otherwise seek direct en­ 9. The Communists almost cert,ainly would gagement with US forces. finally accept a settlement involving a Sou­ vanna Phouma government with Communist 11. If US actions and statements led the Com­ representation, believing that such a govern­ munists to believe that the US forces were ment would serve to advance the Communist threatening Communist-controlled areas, and cause in Laos.
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