SNIE 58-62

Relative Military Capabilities of Opposing Forces in

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Discover the Truth at: http://www.theblackvault.com ·APPROV£D FOR ~ELEASE DATE: JAN 2005 "SNIE 58-62 1:) ·Jf.\N 196~: 11. January 1962 , .. ,

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SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER'58-62

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RELATIVE -MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF

, " 'OPPOSING FORCES IN LAOS i

Submitted by the DmECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE The foUowfng Intelltgence organizations participated in the' preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence AgenC1/ ' and the Intelligence organ1zatfons Of the Departments 'of' State, 'Defense, the Army, the Nav1l. the Afr rorce, and The: , Joint Staff. Concurred in b1l the UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD on 11 January 1962. Concurring were The Director. of Intel­ ztgence and Research, Department Of State,' The Director, De­ fense InteZlfgence Age~.. the Assistant Chief of StaD for' Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of , NavalOperatfons (Intelligence), Department of the Navv;' the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the, D~rect.!'r ,I • for Intelligence, Joint $taQ; the Assistant to the ,§e,creta11/i 01 Defense, Special -Operations; and the Director Of ~he N~, tlonal Securit1l AgenC1/. The Atomic Energ1l Commis.~ion·Rep-' resentative to the USIB, and the Assistant DirectOr, Federal .­ Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside Of thefr jurisdiction. ..: . , , , ,(~ENTRAL INTELLIGENC~A9ENCY" ,.', '." , ' , i:.' :: ',: " DISSEMINATION NOTICE " ., ,.,! " .:. . . ", " . ., ' I . : . ,: _. ~ "" " " ,; l' i , . ".1. This estimate was 'disseminated by theCentra.1 Intelligence'Ag~hcY";'This copy..· ,( IS tor the information aIid lise. of .the recipient and of persons tinder'his jurisdictioll ,on .'; ~' , . , :' a to by ·:i :' 1,' need know basis., . "Additioria! essential disSemmatioIi' mayjbe',authorized the ... r,"- following 9fficials' within their-',respective departnlents. ':'" "":~",,' .",,': " ,:.' ': ;-: . ,.., 'j Bo. Director of Intelligence and Research, for the Depatt~eni of State " b. Director, ,Defense Int~lligenceAgency , . , . ',' ,', " ' ": '! ," . '.' .' ',;.. '. " . 'c. Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of,ltheArmy , , i . " d .. Assistant Chieiof ,NaVal Operations for In~elligence,for thet)~partment 9~ the' " "i , 'Navy .. ".,. ,', ',,' '... ", '. , .. , .,' '. ' ... I, , ~. -. i" , ", e; Director of Intelligel1ce,'UsAF, for the Deparpnentof the Air Force [, '. ,.' .,: :' i Director lor Intelligence. JointStaff, for The Jo~tStall.'. .-",' ~'." ; , ) : I '~'I , .'.. ,g: Director of 'Intelligence, AEC; f()r the: Atomic' Energy:. COmmisSiort' , I " . , " h.Assistant Dir~~r, FBI, for the Federal Bureau' of iriVestigatio~':: ' , ' . 1. 'Director' of '~SA for the National Security Agency.".'1 -:-.,' . ,.1 " ",I :- .;. :J'.: 'Assistant riirectorior Central'Ref~rence, CIA, for "aAy:otlier Dep'anmEmt:.:Or : ,. Agency . '" . ", _ .. r ...

2. ' y may be retained or destroyed by burning in accordance with appli~ble: I

, ~I • security regula . returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by arrangement With.' . ,II' i the Omce of Central Re e CIA.' ' , . I :\ t· \ W~_' ___L>'erseas, the overseas reCipients may retain it' " for a perl,od not in excess of one year. At tli of thiS period, the estima~e should. ,either be destroyed, returned to the forwarding agency, 0 . siqn should ,be reque.sted . of the forwarding, agency to retain it in accordance wi~h IAc.:.., 22 Juile 1953. " ' " , 4: .The title of this est~ate when used separately ftom the 'text, should1>e~~i1! FQK QIi:Ii!I~I4! USE ONJ,Y , I i i , I :' :i WARNING , I ! . ~, r··I t I I I, ... I I I, !

I." i DISTRIBUTION: " WhIte House i National Security Counell Department of state Department of Defense Atomic Energy Commission Federal Bureau of Investigation RELATIVE MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF OPPOSING FORCES IN LAOS

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the relative military capabilities of the government and antigovern­ ment forces now in Laos, assuming no change in the levels of aid and assistance that have obtained over the past several months.

THE ESTIMATE

1. Both government and antigovernment panies, provides stiffening and tactical guid­ forces have increased their strength and im­ ance in combat. Moreover, in the Meo tribes­ proved their capabilities during the cease-fire.1 men the government forces now have for the The government forces, which in May were first time an effective guerrilla force in the defeated, demoralized, and near collapse, have enemy's rear, an advantage previously enjoyed made relatively greater improvement. Their only by the antigovernment forces. regular army strength has increased from 2. At the same time, the antigovernment about 39,000 in May to 51,500, and their total forces have increased their strength from armed strength to over 71,000. Now they are about 20,000 at the time of the cease-fire to much better trained and equipped, and they about 34,000. This includes experienced have established some self-confidence. They have extensive technical, logistical, and com­ North Vietnamese cadres :who provide techni­ munications support from experienced US, cal and tactical support and about 3,500 regu­ Thai, and Filipino personnel. This has prob­ lar North Vietnamese combat troops held in ably provided the government forces impor­ readiness for the defense' of key areas or for spearheading attacks on gqvernment positions. tant advantages in supply and mobility. US The rate of improvement of the antigovern- encadrement of army units down to selected I battalions and, in some instances to com- ment forces has probably been slower than that of the government forces. Training fa- I

1 Estimated strengths cilities available to the antigovernment forces are limited and many of the new troops, par­ Government Forces Antigovernment Forces ticularly those under Kong Le and KhaJ1l Regular Army.. 51,500 Pathet Lao 19,000 Auto Defense .. 11,000 Kong Le 6,000 Ouane, are probably inadequately trained. Meo Guerrillas. 9,000 Kham Ouane There has been evidence Of some friction be­ TOTAL .... 71,500 (Phong Saly) 4,000 tween the Kong Le and Kham Ouane forces - on one hand and the Patl'iet Lao on the other ese cadres .. 1,600 due to inequities in the distribution of supply North Vietnam- ese combat and jealousy concerning command responsi­ troops ... 3,500 bilities in certain areas. This dissension, and TOTAL .... 34,100 lowered morale in some Kong Le units, has

1 2 contributed to the slower rate of improve­ of adversity. Among the antigovernment ment by the antigovernment forces as a whole. forces, morale has not heretofore been a criti­ The antigovernment forces have received con­ cal weakness. The Pathet Lao have main­ siderable additional equipment from the Bloc tained discipline and a relatively high degree since the cease-fire. Most important is the of effectiveness over a number of years, in recent arrival in the Plaine des Jarres area times of adversity as well as success. Their of 40-50 PT-76 light amphibious tanks, prob­ morale is probably good~ Among the Kong ably manned by North Vietnamese crews. We Le and Kham Ouane forces, however, morale believe the most effective use of these tanks appears spotty and probably only a few of would be for the defense of the Plaine des these units would perform well. The morale Jarres. Outside this area their use would be and combat capability of,the North Vietnam­ limited by terrain to main roads. It is also ese forces probably remain good. possible that they could be used in support 4. Major factors in the present military situa­ of operations against major lowland objec­ tion are the changes which have occurred tives, if a protected debouchment had pre­ since the cease-fire in the deployment and the viously been made.2 missions of the opposing sides. The govern­ ment forces, with greatly reduced territory 3. In the past there has been wide variation to control, can concentrate their strength and in capabilities among the units on both the maintain some reserves for emergency. Their government and antigovernment sides. This lines of communication are much shorter and, is still the case; each has its poor and its elite in general, reasonably dependable. The anti­ units, making difficult any overall assessment government forces, by seeking to control of relative capabilities. The critical weak­ large and widely separated areas in Laos, have nesses of the government forces in the past increased their logistics problems, lessened have been their lack of motivation, unstable their mobility and diffused their strength. morale, and poor leadership at all echelons Their rear areas have poor lines of lateral com­ of command. Recent successes in patrol munication, and some of those are under har­ activity and small-scale attacks, as well as assment by the Meo guerrillas.. formalized training of officers and NCOs, have 5. The terrain and difficulties of conducting increased the self-confidence of government conventional military operations in Laos are troops and resulted in improved leadership by such that it has always been relatively easy the commanders. However, the retrained and to deny control of territory to an enemy. We re-equipped government forces have not yet do not believe that either side has the capa­ had a significant test, even in a localized skir­ bility to destroy the other or even to take mish, and their steadfastness under the strain over and hold key territory in the hands of of serious combat is still uncertain. There the other. If either side were to initiate a have been periods in the past when their mo­ concentrated offensive, it could probably make rale appeared high in times of relative quiet or considerable initial gains at almost any point success, but deteriorated quickly in the face it chose to attack. How long and how well

2 Weapons in the hands of the government forces it could sustain its advance or retain control capable of stopping the PT-76 amphibious tank are: of what it occupied wou[d depend in large 2.36 inch. . .. Rocket Launcher 400 part upon the extent to which, and the man­ 3.5 inch ... Rocket Launcher 750 ner by which, the opposing force chose to chal­ 57 mm ...... Recoilless Rlfle 300 lenge it. 75 mm Recoilless Rifle 38 75 mm ...... Pack Howitzer . 12 6. On this baSis, we believe that if the anti­ 105 mm ...... Howitzer .. 25 M-24 ...... Tank ... 19 government forces were to concentrate an at­ Grenade Launcher.. 7,800 tack upon an important government strong­ Antitank Mine 16,700 hold (including almost anyone of the major 3 towns along the Mekong) they could probably 7. In short, we believe that the government succeed but could not hold it against a deter­ forces would have a slight edge if fighting mined counterattack by government forces. were resumed on a pattern comparable to Similarly, we believe that the government that prior to the cease-fir~ but intensified as a forces could make initial gains against anti­ consequence of the streng.thening of both sides government forces on the Tha Thom-Xieng over the past several months. This edge would Khouang perimeter or, with even greater ef­ be increased during ensuing months if the fectiveness, in southern Laos. If defeated by conditions of relative quiet which have pre­ sustained government attack, the Pathet Lao vailed during the cease-fi~e continue and if re­ and Kong Le troops would quickly revert to cent rates of improvement in the two sides are guerrilla tactics of the type they have so suc­ continued. We continue ito estimate that the cessfully employed in the· past and could antigovernment forces have the greater capa­ continue to contest government authority over bility for guerrilla warfare. We also believe that if the antigovernment position should be wide areas of the country. We believe that in endangered or if the are~s considered critical this event the government forces could not es­ by the Communists were threatened by the tablish firm control over presently held Com­ government forces, the antigovernment forces munist territory, particularly in such critical would be quickly and effectively reinforced areas as the Plaine des Jarres and Nhomma­ from North Vietnam to th~ degree necessary to rath-Mahaxay, and the Tchepone area. protect the threatened area.