Asian Conflicts Report The Geopolitics of Extremism: ISIS in Asia
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1-3 From the Editors by Carl Ungerer, Katy Oh Hassig and Caroline F. Ziemke-Dickens 4 Understanding the Dangerous “Indirect” Strategic Threat of ISIS: A Singaporean Perspective by Kumar Ramakrishna 5 Contesting the Space and Challenging the Terrorist Narrative by Thomas Koruth Samuel 6 Daesh and the Philippines: Distant but Virulent Inspiration by Charithie Joaquin 7 Indonesia’s Responses to Islamic State by Dina Afrianty 8 Advent of the IS: A Perspective from Pakistan by Khuram Iqbal 9 The Islamic State: India Isn’t Alarmed, Yet. by Suba Chandran Asian Conflicts Reports - august 2015 edition
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© Adem Salvarcioglu/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images
“Indonesian people read the holy book Quran as more than 50,000 Indonesian Muslims gathered in Solo, to protest against From the editorS the attacks of the Islamic state in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).” 1 by Carl Ungerer
Asia and Europe share a border, but not much else. Europe’s interest in Asian security dynamics is Although the Mongols invaded Eastern Europe, growing. Beyond the mechanised ritual of and Marco Polo made it to China, a common summitry and academic seminars, an increasingly assumption among policy makers and academics outward looking security community in Europe is alike has been that the security challenges and interested in a more nuanced and granular perspectives between these contiguous continents understanding of Asia. And, while Europe’s past have had little in common, and less to learn from is not necessarily Asia’s future, there are important each other. Past efforts to build academic and lessons for policy practitioners in the intersection policy bridges have been nascent at best. of nationalism and conflict prevention.
But today’s threats to global and regional security It is this growing confluence of interests and have no problem crossing international borders. outlook between Asia and Europe that gave From the rise of violent extremism to the threat impetus for the re-establishment of the Asian of pandemic diseases and cyber criminals, solutions Conflicts Report. The Geneva Centre for Security to security problems will overwhelm any national, Policy (GCSP), a leading centre for executive or indeed regional, effort to ‘go it alone’. education, research and dialogue at the heart Increasingly, as transnational threats become of international Geneva, has a mandate to explore simultaneously local and global, the challenge for global security with the broadest possible lens. countries across both Asia and Europe is to find We are pleased, therefore, to become the new points of common interest and opportunities for institutional home for the Asian Conflicts Report genuine security cooperation. (ACR), and are committed to building on the strong network of security scholars and practitioners that are the foundation of the
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3 wider international security community created CATR engagement was suspended in 2013 as a by the Council for Asian Terrorism Research (CATR). result of funding cutbacks from key supporting As my co-partners in this endeavour, I sincerely governments. However, in the face of this thank Katy Oh Hassig and our editor, Caroline challenging policy environment, CATR’s Board of Ziemke-Dickens, for their outstanding efforts over Directors remained committed to the promotion of the past decade to build up the CATR network, what they saw as a vital effort to engage in global and their dedication and commitment to seeing outreach and collaborative research. Although the return of the Asian Conflicts Report at GCSP. CATR symposia were no longer held, members of the CATR network remained in contact to share When Europeans cross over into Asia along the information and insights. The Geneva Centre Bosphorus Bridge in Istanbul, they are still required for Security Policy (GCSP) has now generously to pay a small toll. If the return on that investment provided a means of rejuvenating CATR’s mission. is greater cooperation and a deeper understanding Dr. Carl Ungerer, a former CATR board member of Asian security, then it is well worth the price. representing Australia and now Head of the GCSP’s Leadership, Crisis and Conflict Management Dr Carl Ungerer is Head of the Leadership, Crisis and Conflict Programme, is promoting the revival of the Asian Management Programme at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP). Conflicts Report. Recent events – from the lone wolf massacre in Norway and the ISIS-inspired attacks on journalists in Paris, to the shooting of coffee drinkers in Sydney and beach goers in Tunisia – clearly demonstrate that the threat from violent extremism is everywhere. The political and regional boundaries that once provided natural and institutional barriers to the spread of criminal, extremist ideologies, and other transnational threats are now history. The globalisation of crime and terrorism is here to stay. 2 For this reason, the scope of the new Asian by Katy Oh Hassig Conflicts Report will shift to a broader exploration of the links between the strategic and policy The Council for Asian Terrorism Research (CATR) challenges facing the Asia-Pacific and Indo-Pacific was founded in 2005 as a consortium of think regions on the one hand, and Europe on the other. tanks, academic institutes, and individual Combining the experience and analytical prowess researchers to promote research from diverse of the CATR network with the GCSP promises academic and cultural perspectives. Its mission to provide powerful new insights into emerging is to build a network of Asian researchers that transnational and trans-regional threats and combines specialist country-based expertise in challenges including, but not limited to, the spread terrorism and political violence, specialist of violent extremism. language and cultural skills, and career expertise Dr. Katy Oh Hassig is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the from a range of governmental and non- Brookings Institution and Asian Specialist at the Institute for governmental disciplines. From its original six Defense Analyses. member institutions, representing Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, and the United States, CATR’s membership grew to include twenty institutions from 15 nations across the Asia-Pacific and Indo-Pacific regions.
Between 2005 and 2013, CATR pursued its vision of producing high-quality, collaborative publications on topics related to terrorism and political violence in a series of bi-annual regional forums. At these symposia, experts engaged in serious and frank discussions on topics of shared concern, resulting in the publication of reports that provide regional and global policymakers with access to fresh perspectives on terrorism and other trans-national threats. Unfortunately,
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4 3 by Caroline F. Ziemke-Dickens
Welcome to Asian Conflicts Report 2.0. The first issue of the original Asian Conflicts Report, published in January 2009, was subtitled “Obama’s Asian Challenge”. In it, experts from across the Asia-Pacific region offered advice to a new American president concerning the likely challenges his administration would face in the years ahead. Among the policy messages included in that issue were: failure to dismantle the jihadist structure in Pakistan will raise the global threat level; Southeast Asia straddles key global trade routes, is home to important progressive Islamist traditions, and should not be placed on the strategic back-burner; the situation in Afghanistan will not improve unless and until the United States takes action against terrorist sanctuaries in Pakistan; a successful peace settlement and reconciliation in Sri Lanka could demonstrate that even the most intractable conflicts are resolvable; and that the rising tension in Northeast Asia will put increasing pressure on the strategic partnership between the United States and China.
In 2015, as we re-inaugurate the Asian Conflicts Report and President Obama enters the final months of his second term, we can look back and see how prescient the analyses in ACR 1-1 turned out to be. The failure to take early steps to dismantle jihadist strongholds in Pakistan has enabled the Taliban to reassert its influence in Afghanistan, brought Pakistan to the brink of failure, and forced the Obama Administration to pursue an operationally successful but politically damaging drone strike campaign in Pakistan’s tribal regions. Southeast Asia – and the South China Sea in particular – has become, as Robert D. Kaplan has called it, “Asia’s Cauldron” and the United States, after a decade of almost exclusive military and strategic focus on the Middle East, is struggling to reassert its influence across the region. Sri Lanka has peace, but reconciliation has been slower in coming. And Japan, in the face of increasing concerns over China’s more assertive military presence and North Korea’s nuclear program, is revising is post-World War II pacifist military stance.
In its three-year run from 2009-12, the ACR encouraged our authors to be provocative and forward-looking, to challenge the analytical status quo, and when necessary, to highlight the © tropicalpixsingapore misperceptions and missteps that could undermine
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5 effective policies and strategies. ACR’s network of this spirit, for this inaugural issue, we asked several regional experts addressed a broad range of issues, of our previous authors to provide their insight including: national elections (Bangladesh, India), into the current and emerging implications of piracy (Somalia and the Straits of Malacca), on-line the transformation of violent extremism from the and lone wolf terrorism, changing violent jihadist old, frankly stodgy al-Qaeda focus on franchised strategies, the changing role of women in terrorist terrorism to a new, dynamic model led by, but organisations, leadership change and nuclear certainly not limited to, Islamic State. This new testing in North Korea, the emerging political breed of violent extremism focuses not only on crisis in Thailand, nuclear smuggling, radicalisation terrorism as tool to bring change in the distant in the Maldives, ethnic conflict and political unrest future, but also on creating an extremist army in Burma, Islamist extremism in Nigeria, the capable of capturing and holding territory and regional implications of NATO withdrawal from establishing a new Islamic caliphate, now. What Afghanistan, the rise of the Arab Spring, social our experts, from India, Indonesia, Malaysia, media and political change, and political stability Pakistan, the Philippines, and Singapore, clearly in the Southwest Pacific. The last issue was a show is that this new, more virulent version of special edition entitled “Spotlight on Obama’s violent extremism has the potential to change Reelection and the Pivot to Asia” that included the strategic landscape as fundamentally as did expert insights from Burma, Malaysia, Thailand, al-Qaeda on 11 September 2001, even in countries Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Australia. that, at present, seem relatively free from Islamic The message from across the region was also State influence. prescient: that maritime territorial disputes between China and the ASEAN nations will define Caroline F. Ziemke-Dickens, PhD, is an historian and global Asian security for the foreseeable future, that the security analyst working in Wellington, New Zealand. nations of the region would like to see the United States reassert its influence in the region by developing stronger, mutually beneficial bilateral relationships with regional powers, and that, while welcoming increased US presence as a balance to China’s rise, the states in The new Asian the region do not see the United States as a Conflicts Report reliable partner as long as remains committed it is preoccupied with the to the ACR’s original Middle East. mission: to present timely and relevant The new Asian Conflicts Report remains research and analysis committed to the on issues related to ACR’s original mission: peace and security in to present timely and the Asia-Pacific region. relevant research and analysis on issues related to peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region written by both established regional experts and new and emerging scholars, journalists, and analysts from around the world. Our new home with the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) untethers the ACR from the constraints of US policy and concerns, enabling us to explore an even broader and more challenging range of issues from a broader range of perspectives. It is our intention to provide a forum not only for new issues, but also for new ideas that challenge the conventional wisdom. Nothing is off the table. It is our hope that the Asian Conflicts Report 2.0 will break new ground, focusing not only on where we have been and where we are, but also on where we are going. In
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6 The ISIS threat is not confined, moreover, to the conflict zone in the troubled Middle East. Thanks 4 to globalisation and the social media, ISIS has had a serious impact on the security situation in UNDERSTANDING THE Southeast Asia as well. For instance, the Indonesian National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT) in December 2014 reported that 514 DANGEROUS “INDIRECT” Indonesians had joined the fighting in Iraq and Syria, while reports in early 2015 put the number STRATEGIC THREAT OF ISIS: of Malaysians joining ISIS at approximately 40. The Philippines is said to have about 200 recruits A SINGAPOREAN joining the organisation, although this figure is disputed. In February 2015, it was reported that PERSPECTIVE 110 Australians had travelled to join ISIS of whom by Kumar Ramakrishna 20 have been killed. There is understandable concern that, just as did a previous generation of Southeast Asian fighters that returned from the Summary: Afghan conflict in the 1980s to form al-Qaeda • ISIS represents the evolution and implementation - linked violent Islamist terrorist networks like of al-Qaeda’s extremist vision in a concrete Jemaah Islamiyah, the new generation of ISIS- political and military entity with the capacity trained Southeast Asians might set up a similarly and will to capture and hold territory in the dangerous alumni network.2 Middle East. • ISIS seeks to avoid military defeat in the Iraq/ Such fears are hardly misplaced. In March 2015, Syria region, destabilise and ultimately collapse the discovery of a home-made“chlorine bomb” the fragile “near enemies” of the Shia-aligned – comprising “several bottles and a detonator” regimes in Damascus and Baghdad, and erode – was discovered in the ITC Depok shopping mall the political will of the “far enemies” of Western in Jakarta, Indonesia, was just one ominous coalition countries to oppose it. development. While it failed to go off, it was the • ISIS has developed a slick and professional social first time such an attack hadever been attempted media strategy that has attracted followers in Indonesia, and senior police officials admitted around the world and convinced thousands that they had been “surprised” at the discovery. of Muslims – professionals as well as restless They added that the use of such a device was the youth – to travel to Iraq and Syria to fight for “signature of ISIS” – a similar device had been used ISIS. The draw is a romanticised vision of a new in a January car bomb attack on Kurdish forces in Islamic caliphate that downplays the violence Iraq - and suggested that returned Indonesian and sadistic cruelty that has characterised ISIS fighters from Syria were likely behind the incident.3 rule in Iraq and Syria. What is more disconcerting is that, since August • While the defeat of ISIS will necessarily involve 2014, ISIS has run a Malaysian-Indonesian unit a military campaign to force it out of its current called Khatibah Nusantara or the ISIS Malay strongholds in Iraq and Syria, it will also require Archipelago Unit, as well as a Malay-medium an effective soft-power campaign that directly academy for the education – and, tellingly, military challenges ISIS and its ideology on the battle training - of the children of Malaysian and ground upon which it has been most effective: Indonesian fighters. Significantly, the academy is social media. named after Abdullah Azzam, who had been the key ideological mentor of the late al-Qaeda leader The stunning battlefield successes and territorial Osama bin Laden, killed by US Navy Seals in gains of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) May 2011. Moreover, there has been a noticeable over the past year in the Iraq/Syria region have sent surge of Malay and Indonesianlanguage shockwaves around the world. US-led coalition material by ISIS online.4 airstrikes since September 2014 have slowed the ISIS advance somewhat. Still, the essential resilience Malaysia has been forced to react to the ISIS of the organisation in the face of military setbacks challenge. In April 2015 it was reported that was revealed in May 2015 with the capture of the 70 Malaysian army personnel had joined ISIS, a important Iraqi city of Ramadi and the Syrian city particular cause for concern given their operational of Palmyra.1 expertise and access to, weapons and explosives material. As of late April 2015, more than a hundred people had been detained by the
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7 Malaysian police. Of particular worry to law commanders apparently possess leeway in enforcement were several so-called “clean skins” conducting local operations in line with ground- without previous criminal records who were level realities. To be sure, ISIS comprises an unusual implicated in bomb plots targeting strategic and admixture of ideology and operational know-how: governmental interests in the Kuala Lumpur hard-line Islamic fundamentalists and disgruntled vicinity.5 and radicalised former Baathists officers who once led the Iraqi armed forces under the deposed This surge in ISIS-related activity has prompted Saddam Hussein regime.10 Kuala Lumpur to strengthen its legislative arsenal to cope with the threat. Hence in April 2015, the The ISIS conception of its deity is a fundamentalist Malaysian parliament passed the controversial one: punitive and supremacist, keen on rigid Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA), granting the observance of in-group/out-group boundaries. government powers to detain terrorist suspects As a result, fellow Muslims who disagree with ISIS, without trial. Some observers have criticised POTA.6 as well as Shia, Christians and other minorities, are The controversy revolves around the fact that the dehumanised as filth to be cleansed rather than Malaysians had repealed similar legislation in the parties to a dispute with whom parley is possible. form of the long-running and powerful Internal Such an extremist religious paradigm, perversely, Security Act just three years earlier. Nevertheless provides theological cover for the many thugs a senior Malaysian police official argued that – such as the notorious knife-wielding British stronger preventive legislation like POTA was militant Jihadi John - who have been drawn into needed to deal with ISIS. While intelligence per the movement and who indulge in rape, mutilation se was adequate, this could not always be turned and killing helpless civilians including women and into procedural evidence because witnesses did even young children for nothing more than the not always wish to testify in open court.7 vilest sadistic pleasure. The ideological- political frame that complements such a rigidly puritanical In the Philippines, concern centres on the peace theological vision is a version of Salafi jihadism, process in the south. Experts warn that failure which legitimates the to sign the proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law notion that Islam must This apocalyptic vision underpinning anautonomous Bangsamoro province dominate all comers, by – which would end the decades-long insurgency force if need be. is precisely why ISIS by Muslim separatists in the southern resource-rich leaders can be fully island of Mindanao – could result in more This apocalyptic vision is expected to pursue disgruntled Moro militants willing to nail their precisely why ISIS leaders territorial expansion 8 colours to the ISIS mast. can be fully expected beyond the Iraq/Syria to pursue territorial Singapore has not been spared from the ISIS threat. expansion beyond the region. While, as of March 2015, only two Singaporean Iraq/Syria region. Little families have been confirmed to be “involved” in wonder that they have sought to expand their Syria, the government is taking no chances. There influence into Afghanistan,11 Pakistan,12 as well as is much concern over religiously illinformed, anarchic Libya.13 Similarly motivated violent Islamist self-radicalised young Muslim Singaporeans falling entities such as Boko Haram in eastern Africa14 prey to the slick social media propaganda of ISIS.9 and the East Indonesian Mujahidin in Poso, eastern Indonesia have already pledged allegiance to ISIS and its caliphate.15 We are in short witnessing Understanding ISIS and its Game Plan the transmogrification What drives ISIS? There have been attempts to of global jihadism in ISIS represents the Iraq/Syria conflict make sense of the organisation, but what seems nothing less than relatively apparent is that ISIS seeks to create a zone – a development geographically demarcated Islamic political entity with potentially serious an evolutionarily that is potentially expansionist. The proclamation of worldwide implications. In advanced, noreresilient the Islamic Caliphate by the self-proclaimed Caliph, a nutshell, ISIS represents “mutation” of its Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi at the end of June 2014 nothing less than an rapidly fading evolutionarily advanced, was a strategic move. ISIS propagandists drew on al-Qaeda forebears. religious apocalyptic imagery to broadcast to moreresilient “mutation” Muslims worldwide that, with God’s support, ISIS of its rapidly fading would usher in the “end times”, which would al-Qaeda forebears.16 bring the final victory of Islam over its enemies. ISIS’s leadership is hierarchical, although lower-level
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8 The ISIS “Indirect” Strategy Examined element of the ISIS indirect approach has been to Like al-Qaeda, ISIS does not seek to directly engage promote “crowd-sourced”20 lone wolf or “wolf and defeat the armed might of its chief enemies: pack”21 terrorism by self-radicalised supporters in the “Jews and Crusaders” – Israel, the US and their Western and allied countries. This has a twofold coalition allies - as sketched out in Salafi jihadi effect: to internally destabilise target communities, narratives. Rather, ISIS has honed the original and to sow discord between Muslim and non- al-Qaeda “indirect” strategy of aiming at the true Muslim communities in multi-cultural societies. centre of gravity of the Western and allied In this way, ISIS hopes to foster an insalubrious coalition: its largely multicultural publics.17 milieu for the ISIS ideological virus to take hold and The political goal of the ISIS indirect strategy metastasise. The December 2014 Sydney hostage- appears to be to consolidate and opportunistically taking incident demonstrated the ISIS crowd- expand its self-proclaimed Islamic caliphate. To this sourced terror tactic all too well,22 and Malaysian end ISIS wants to avoid military defeat in the Iraq/ authorities have recently warned of potential lone Syria region, whilst destabilising and ultimately wolf attacks as well.23 collapsing the fragile “near enemies” of the Shia-aligned regimes in Damascus and Baghdad – and simultaneously eroding the political will of the Assessment “far enemies” of Western coalition countries to Southeast Asian countries with significant Muslim oppose it. Outside its area of operations in Iraq populations face a serious challenge from the latest and Syria, ISIS, in line with an indirect strategy, mutation of the al-Qaeda “superorganism” known emphasises primarily non-kinetic means of as ISIS. While “hard” law enforcement approaches expanding its power and influence. – such as imposing severe legal penalties for facilitating the travel of individuals or travelling While its kinetic means focus on avoiding military oneself to fight with ISIS – as well as intelligence defeat in the Iraq/Syria region whilst exchange within and between governments on ISIS opportunistically gaining territory where possible, logistics, funding and recruitment patterns in the ISIS seems to be investing more thought and effort region remain crucial, they will not be sufficient. into employing social media to attract followers worldwide to its religiously-legitimated quest of ISIS is selling an idea of the restored Islamic rebuilding the lost Islamic caliphate. For example, Caliphate that appears to have tremendous ISIS has 500 to 2000 followers “who tweet symbolic and emotional appeal to conservative extremist messages and update their Facebook Muslims in Southeast Asia and around the world. pages around the clock”. It has been suggested Hence “soft” measures need to be part of that the “average ISIS-supporting account has a counter-strategy. Improved governance in about a thousand followers, which gives the predominantly Muslim areas, particularly in group substantial reach”.18 Social media – Twitter, hotspots like Poso and Mindanao, are important. Facebook, Ask.fm etc. – a weapon al-Qaeda It is the social media war of ideas and perceptions, never really fully exploited, has truly been a force however, which is most critical. The war of ideas multiplier for ISIS. It has not only been untrained must include counter-ideological campaigns aimed novice Muslim fighters, but also trained military at vulnerable Southeast Asian constituencies and and law enforcement officers, professionals, promulgated by a judicious and nationally administrators, and even entire families, who have customised mix of suitable interlocutors - such been urged to conduct as progressive Muslim scholars and “formers” The skilful and highly a hijrah (migration) to - with a view to fighting the stock ISIS message. professionalised the caliphate to populate This strategy should include full and ruthless ISIS social media it and build up the exploitation of the myriad ways the high rhetoric “perfect” Islamic society and credibility of the ISIS leadership has been propaganda campaign – a message repeated by repeatedly contradicted by the vile deeds of has had profound the putative ISIS Caliph in many of their sadistic followers. impact even in May 2015.19 generally moderate Ultimately, though, it is hard to escape the Muslim societies The skilful and highly conclusion that the eschatologically symbolic professionalised ISIS territorial base of ISIS itself in the Iraq/Syria region like Malaysia and social media propaganda must be destroyed. This objective has to be Indonesia. campaign has had undertaken by a yet another geopolitically and profound impact even in religiously balanced and militarily effective coalition generally moderate Muslim societies like Malaysia of the willing. Former US Defence Secretary Robert and Indonesia. Meanwhile, another important Gates has criticised the Obama Administration
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9 for its “day-by-day” approach to the ISIS threat in Syria and Iraq and claims that “we don’t really have a strategy at all”.24 Unless the sustained political will can be found to construct such a coalition for winning not just the war but crucially the peace afterward - the serious threat posed to global security by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria will likely persist and even worsen.
Kumar Ramakrishna is Head of Policy Studies in the Office of the Executive Deputy Chairman at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in the Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. He is the author of Islamist Terrorism and Militancy in Indonesia: The Power of the Manichean Mindset (Singapore: Springer, 2015).
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10 declaration of itself as a caliphate, Charlie Winter of the Quilliam Foundation raised the question that 5 Islamic State supporters have been actively posting over the social media, “Last year it was Mosul, this CONTESTING THE SPACE year it’s Ramadi, and where will it be next year?’26 Islamic State’s impressive material gains are AND CHALLENGING THE founded upon something far more insidious and dangerous: their systematic and sustained ability to TERRORIST NARRATIVE win the ‘hearts and the minds’ of people, especially by Thomas Koruth Samuel the youth, not only in their area of operations Governments, religious but around the world. organisations, and Summary: Given this, Governments, civil society all have • Governments, religious organisations, and civil religious organisations, a stake in preventing society all have a stake in preventing the spread and civil society all have of the poisonous ideologies of terrorist a stake in preventing the the spread of the organisations such as the Islamic State. All spread of the poisonous poisonous ideologies interested parties must commit to developing ideologies of Islamic of Islamic State and effective ways of challenging the terrorist State and other violent other violent extremist narrative and creating a powerful counter- extremist organisations. organisations. narrative, failing which, terrorists will continue Until and unless all to expand their influence. interested parties commit • Terrorist propaganda has been enormously to developing effective ways of addressing this effective because it presents a clearly stated challenge and mounting effective counter efforts, narrative based on straightforward assumptions, the Islamic State will continue to expand its appealing to those looking for simple answers influence. to complex questions. • An effective counter-narrative must directly President Obama, in his address to the United confront the terrorist narrative by demonstrating Nations in September 2014, spoke of the need to that violence is an ineffective strategy; that ‘contest the space that terrorists occupy’. He went terrorists are aware of the disconnect between on to further elaborate that the narratives and their actions and the accomplishment of their ideologies of groups such as Islamic State, stated goals; and that terrorists continue their al-Qaeda, and Boko Haram would ‘wilt and die’ violent course in pursuit of an agenda that has if they were ‘consistently exposed and confronted little to do with defending Muslims and and refuted’.27 alleviating their suffering, and, in fact, has caused tremendous harm and misery to the How, in practical terms, do we confront and very people they claim to be fighting for. subsequently contest the ‘space’ that terrorists • An effective counter-narrative strategy should occupy? also reassess our actions to honestly address the extent to which the grievances underlying We start by acknowledging that this is a serious the terrorist narrative might have some basis in problem. In May 2015, Ban Ki-moon, the United fact. Nations Secretary-General, warned that the flow of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) to Islamic State and other extremist groups had increased The need to contest the narrative space: alarmingly: 15,000 fighters from 80 countries in Since early 2014, the march of the Islamic State has November 2014 to 25,000 fighters from 100 been seemingly relentless. According to Aljazeera25, countries in mid-2015. This translates to a in March 2015, they captured Basra, in the Deraa staggering 70% increase.28 province in Syria. In April, they managed to capture and control most of Yarmouk, which is This increase may also indicate that the 8 km away from the centre of Damascus. In mid- contestation for the spaces that these terrorists May, they were said to be in control of 95,000 occupy at the psychological and ideological level square kilometres of land, or almost half of Syria. will also become increasingly challenging. Make no In Iraq, in mid-May, it was reported that they mistake: delegitimising an already entrenched idea captured the Iraqi city of Ramadi. Indeed, as we and challenging the status-quo (for in such near the first anniversary of Islamic State’s radical circles, fighting in Syria and Iraq is seen as
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11 the accepted norm) will be extremely daunting. Jones reiterates that, in the Indonesian case, the It will involve comprehensive efforts in addressing premise that ‘this is the way that you can actively the issues the terrorist ideologies raise by providing help your fellow Muslims’ functions as a strong and workable, sustainable and practical alternatives. effective recruiting strategy for the terrorists.33 Nevertheless it must be done, if we are to see credible progress in defeating the terrorists in The importance of this extremist narrative has led general and countering their narrative in particular. Frank Ciluffo to conclude that, “We’ve been fighting the wrong battle. The real centre of gravity of the enemy is their narrative”.34 What are they saying and why does it work? Schmid and de Graaf argue convincingly that while terrorism in the past was only seen through the The Counter-Narrative: Debunk and Negate lenses of political violence, there is now a need for Sir David Omand, the former director of Britain’s it to be understood in the context of ‘ Government Communications Headquarters communication and propaganda’. They posit that (GCHQ), noted in 2005 that “[we] badly need a terrorism is a ‘combination of both violence and counter-narrative that will help groups exposed propaganda’ to ‘advertise’ and convince others to the terrorist message make sense of what they of the group’s potential to cause ‘harm and to are seeing around them”.35 destroy.’29 This propaganda is then communicated as the basis of the terrorist narrative. Given the growing focus on challenging Islamic State’s increasingly effective extremist narrative, What is the story line that terrorists, including the what then are the issues that we need to consider Islamic State are advancing to attract, engage, when formulating a counter-narrative? radicalise and subsequently recruit people? The rhetorical arc of the terrorist narrative comprises Debunking and negating go to the core of a simple three-step progression: contesting the terrorist arguments, rhetoric and propaganda. Strategies to debunk and negate I. There are injustices occurring in many parts should, first, highlight the questionable of the world; achievements of the terrorists in terms of their own II. There is a need to act; and objectives: What have they done? What have they III. Violence is the only possible response.30 achieved? And do their ends really justify their violent means? This can be done in three steps. These straightforward assumptions appeal to those looking for simple answers to complex questions. First, it is important to identify the terrorist groups’ They have the added advantage of being partially stated political or religious agenda, such as true. Numerous innocent people all around the liberating people or groups from oppression by world have, in fact, suffered as a result of acts of foreign invaders or illegitimate regimes, injustice, cruelty and discrimination simply because establishing a religiously-based regime, ending of their race, religion or creed. discrimination, or establishing justice and equality.
In this context, terrorist propaganda throws down Second, an effective counter-narrative should the gauntlet in the form of two questions: compare these objectives with the actions the • After seeing and witnessing all that is happening terrorist groups have taken to achieve them: (suffering, humiliation and cruelty against indiscriminate bombings, beheadings of prisoners, targeted groups), can you choose to do and killing of civilians through suicide attacks, to nothing? name a few. • What will your response be to this tragedy? Third, an effective counter-narrative should analyze Harry Setyo R.,31 a former terrorist in Indonesia, the extent to which the terrorists’ actions have relates, based on his own experience, how indeed helped them achieve their objectives and terrorist recruiters draw potential recruits’ defend the vulnerable populations they claim to attention to the plight of suffering Muslims, and represent. Alex Schmid notes that, in al-Qaeda’s subsequently question them on their response case, the ‘actual record of behaviour is very much to such tragedies. Marhmudi Hariano alias Yusuf vulnerable when their lofty professions are highlights how as a young man, after exposure to measured against their actual performances.’36 such terrorist rhetoric, he felt compelled to defend Indeed, there is hard evidence that suggests that his fellow Muslims around the world from the more than 80% of the victims of al-Qaeda have suffering to which they were exposed.32 Sidney been Muslims.37 Islamic State’s record of killing
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12 fellow Muslims is almost certainly even worse. Thomas Koruth Samuel is Director of the Research and As a result, in part, of this disconnect, extremist Publication Division in the Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT) within the Ministry of Foreign groups like al-Qaeda and Islamic State are often Affairs of Malaysia. rejected by the very Muslims they claim to be fighting for.38 This needs to be highlighted.
At a minimum, such direct confrontation of the terrorist narrative demonstrates that the violence perpetrated by terrorists constitutes a tactically inferior and ineffective strategy. More importantly, however, it shows that, terrorists are actually aware of the disconnect between their actions and the accomplishment of their stated goals but continue their violent course in pursuit of their own vested, but unstated interests. This hidden agenda has little to do with defending Muslims and alleviating their suffering, and, in fact, This hidden agenda has caused tremendous has little to do with harm and misery to the defending Muslims and very people they claim to be fighting for. alleviating their suffering, and, in fact, That said, an effective has caused tremendous counter-narrative strategy harm and misery to the should also reassess very people they claim our actions to honestly address the extent to to be fighting for. which the grievances underlying the terrorist narrative might have some basis in fact. We need to entertain the possibility that at times our actions have created grievances upon which terrorists have capitalised in advancing their self-serving agenda of indiscriminate violence.
The Qatar International Academy for Security Studies (QIASS), in its report entitled Countering Violent Extremism: The Counter Narrative Study, pointed to the need for ‘dealing with local and regional issues’ as ‘the starting point for countering the narratives of violence.39 These local and regional issues often stem from double standards between what we say and what we actually do. It is absolutely vital that, in confronting the terrorist narrative, we close the ‘say-do’ gap.40 As Ralph Waldo Emerson succinctly put it, ‘What you do speaks so loudly, that I cannot hear what you say.’
Conclusion Hillary R. Clinton, the former American Foreign Secretary, candidly noted in 2011 during a Senate Testimony, that “we are in an information war, and we are losing”.41 Until and unless we rethink our strategy on countering the narrative of the terrorists, we may not only lose the information war, but the war itself.
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13 Variously known as Daesh (or al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Sham), the Islamic State of Iraq 6 and Levant (ISIL), and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), the group has most recently DAESH AND THE re-branded itself as Islamic State (IS) to reflect its conquest and control of territories in Iraq and Syria. US President Barack Obama countered that “ISIL is PHILIPPINES: not Islamic . . . and [is] certainly not a state.” Other governments, such as those of France and Iraq, DISTANT BUT VIRULENT prefer the term Daesh, the acronym of the group’s Arabic name, which also mean “to trample down INSPIRATION and crush”. by Charithie Joaquin In the Philippines, the group is commonly known as ISIS or IS – the names used by international and Summary: local media. While there is widespread consensus • At the international level, concern is widespread that Islamic State is a potential threat to regional that if even a small fraction of the estimated and global security and stability, it remains 30,000 to 50,000 foreign recruits currently something of an enigma in the minds of Filipinos. fighting with Islamic State return home as Main sources of information on Daesh are the trained and indoctrinated guerrilla fighters, media and government. Television and radio are they could unleash a new era of widespread the most accessible media as access to extremist violence. information through online sources and social • While The Muslim extremist Abu Sayyaf Group media is limited, especially among poor Muslim (ASG) and Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters communities in Maguindanao, Sulu, and Balisan (BIFF) in the Southern Philippines have pledged in the Southern Philippines. allegiance to Islamic State, meaningful operational and ideological links appear to be How real is the threat posed by Daesh to the weak or non-existent. Philippines? What is the connection between • The Philippine government’s strategy seeks to Daesh and local groups such as the ASG and the isolate the ASG and BIFF from the global BIFF? What counter measures are being terrorism narratives and networks, focusing undertaken to limit the influence of Daesh? instead on their detrimental role as “spoilers” in internal peace process between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Daesh as a Potential Threat Front (MILF). Though Daesh traces its roots from al-Qaeda and • Even in the predominantly Muslim South, the fighters from Afghanistan, it differs from al-Qaeda Philippine culture, with its emphasis on strong in some fundamental ways. Unlike al-Qaeda, Daesh and close family ties makes the prospect of seeks to capture and hold territory and maintain fighting and dying for a distant Islamic caliphate a strong standing army. Its scope of operations unappealing. is directed, for now, • The appeal of Daesh’s call to arms may further exclusively to the Middle As terrorism expert Dr degrade as the peace process with the MILF East. While al-Qaeda Daniel Byman puts it: advances towards favourable outcomes. claimed ideological al-Qaeda is like the sovereignty over the Muslim umma – inspiring “boring father” while Introduction lone wolf terrorists and Daesh is the “cool”, The violent extremist group Daesh, better known planting sleeper cells exciting son. as Islamic State, has caused alarm and panic to attack the far enemy around the world. According to Filipino terrorism in the West – Islamic expert, Rommel Banlaoi, it has become the “most State boasts of carving out a caliphate – the ideal violent extremist jihadist armed group”. Armed Islamic state – in territories captured from the groups in the Philippines, namely, the Abu Sayyaf near enemies, corrupt regimes in Iraq and Syria. Group (ASG) and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom The rise of Islamic State has inspired a handful of Fighters (BIFF), have released short videos declaring lone-wolf attacks in the West. But its real success that they pledge allegiance to Daesh. has come through its ability to entice thousands of foreign fighters, mostly young men (but also young women), to travel to Iraq and Syria to fight for the
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14 caliphate. As terrorism expert Dr Daniel Byman puts “will be isolated . . . will be become useless, it: al-Qaeda is like the “boring father” while Daesh irrelevant and they will lose in this fight”. But this is the “cool”, exciting son. does not mean that Islamic State, and its ideology, do not present a challenge to Philippine security. Daesh reportedly has between 30,000 to 50,000 fighters in Syria and Iraq with 20,000 from the President Benigno Aquino III, speaking to foreign Arab world. How much threat do returning foreign media during his state visit to Germany in fighters pose to their communities when they September 2014, explained the likely nature of the finally return home? Will they, like the mujahideen connection of Daesh to ASG and the BIFF, stating who returned from Afghanistan in the 1990s, that: sow the seeds of a new age of violent ideological extremism? “The Philippines still faces the same problems: terrorist groups like the Abu Sayyaf and the While Daesh propaganda videos romanticise the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters which are experience of joining the fight in Iraq and Syria, doing basically the same things, but now the reality that most volunteers face is very attributing it to their joining IS, which doesn’t different. Many volunteers are neither militarily necessarily mean that they are IS.” equipped nor properly trained to pursue their dream of slaughtering as many enemies as President Aquino’s statement underscores the possible. Others are relegated to support roles, government’s nuanced threat assessment, which churning the propaganda machine and providing seeks to disentangle the ASG and BIFF from the logistical support for fighters and fresh recruits. global terrorism narratives and networks. This is Some return bitter, having failed to find much glory significant especially within the context of the on- in the “Islamic State”. They discover that there going peace process between the government and is no “Caliphate”, but only small and constantly the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The MILF shifting pockets of territory temporarily controlled has disowned the BIFF, once part of its military arm. by Daesh. Some volunteers, especially women, are Both the ASG and the BIFF are considered spoilers sold as slaves and women are abused in most in the peace process. There have been unfortunate ways and allegations that they are harboring terrorists. These foreign fighters some have publically have the potential to acknowledged their In January 2015, a violent clash between the spread Daesh tactics mistake and expressed Special Action Forces (SAF) of the Philippine such as beheading the desire to return National Police (PNP) and elements of the MILF home. and BIFF ensued in Tukanalipao, Mamasapano, and kidnapping. Maguindanao, MILF-controlled areas. The In places like the Yet, a few foreign operation was intended for SAF to serve warrants Philippines, they fighters return battle- of arrest to high-ranking terrorists, Malaysian have the theoretical tested, highly skilled and Zulkifli Abdhir aka Marwan and Ahmad Akmad potential to change radicalised. Some are Usman aka Abdul Bassit Usman. It resulted to the embraced as “heroes” by death of 44 SAF officers, about 23 from the MILF the configuration of their communities. When and BIFF, and several civilians. The incident elicited civil wars or internal they return, they may join strong public opinion against the GRP-MILF peace conflicts. existing groups, thereby process especially because the MILF was perceived further radicalising them; as insincere and harboring terrorists. or they may create a new radical group. In either case, these foreign fighters have the potential Marwan, one of the Federal Bureau of to spread Daesh tactics such as beheading and Investigation’s (FBI) most wanted terrorists, was kidnapping. In places like the Philippines, they shot inside a nipa hut and confirmed dead by the have the theoretical potential to change the FBI after examination of his DNA. A bomb expert, configuration of civil wars or internal conflicts. he was the leader of the Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia, part of the central command of Jemaah Islamiya (JI), and co-founder of the Khalifa Islamiya A Distant But Virulent Inspiration Mindanao. In April 2015, General Gregorio Catapang, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Abdul Bassit Usman also a bomb making expert Philippines (AFP), maintained that no returning was head of BIFF’s Special operations Group and Daesh militants were operating in the country. He had alleged links with ASG and JI. In May 2014, he further warned that those who fight against peace was killed in a chance encounter with the MILF in
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15 Maguindanao. Many experts view this as an effort reach. ASG and BIFF, in contrast, have limited on the part of the MILF to show sincerity and boost online presence and, thus, lack Daesh’s glitzy the peace process. But the concern is growing that propaganda machine. They have not released any Daesh ideology is gaining influence among some materials espousing, clarifying or enticing others Philippine Muslims in a way that could destabilise to support Daesh’s ideologies and do not promote a delicate peace process. Daesh in any meaningful way.
Since May 2014, videos have been circulating in Though Daesh’s videos may be accessible in social media of men speaking in local dialect, the Philippines, the invitation to join Daesh and Filipino, and Arabic declaring support and loyalty become a suicide bomber is likely to fall on deaf to Daesh and its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. ears. Thus far, there have been no cases of suicide The individuals’ faces are usually hidden and a bombers in the Philippines. Perhaps because the black flag is used as backdrop. One of the videos Filipinos are known to be among of the world’s shows ASG senior leader Isnilon Hapilon pledging happiest people, with a culture of strong and close bay-ah to Baghdadi promising to “obey him on family ties, the prospect of sacrificing oneself in the anything which our hearts desire or not and to name of a distant Islamic Caliphate may hold little value him more than anyone else”. The BIFF has appeal. also declared allegiance to Daesh. The strong ties between ASG and BIFF, which There have been other disturbing events. In July maintain a tactical alliance in pursuit of mutually 2014, Australian-born Musa Cerantonio, a beneficial goals, may also undermine the Christian convert to Islam who has been using recruitment efforts of Daesh. The two groups have social media to encourage terrorism and urge common members and share use of training Muslims to join the jihad in Syria and Iraq, was facilities and experts. captured in Cebu, in Southern Philippines. Cerantonio has been identified by terrorism ASG has long been considered a bandit group, experts, as one of the world’s leading cheerleaders largely devoid of any ideological moorings. It is for Islamic State. known more for its penchant for criminal schemes such as kidnapping for ransom, beheading and In October 2014, there were reports of Daesh extortion than for any Islamist ideological purity. members in Zamboanga City recruiting students ASG’s bai-yah to Baghdadi may be its tactic of to fight for Islamic State for two months with the aligning itself with the latest “cool” kid in the promise of Php70,000.00 as a joining bonus. block to be seen as virulent to earn “pogi points”. Recently, the military has confirmed reports that “Pogi” is a colloquial term that translates to “good five Malaysian fighters had penetrated Mindanao looks”. It attempts to reclaim public attention to be and are now fighting with the ASG. What remains able to attract fresh recruits and generate financial unconfirmed is if these foreign fighters are support. affiliated with Daesh. The Philippine government strategy may also be a Given the pressure it is under from local rebels, factor. The government has taken care to isolate combined with the relative lack of Daesh influence these local armed groups and decimate or totally in the country, the prospect of the Philippines neutralise them. Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin sending support to the US campaign against Daesh said that the military is continuously tracking is slight, despite the earlier government declaration down the armed bandits. The ASG and the BIFF of support. have been the target of an all-out offensive by the AFP in Maguindanao. The military has confirmed reports that 36 ASG rebels had been killed and Counter Measures 78 wounded in the period January to March 2015. While both the ASG and BIFF have openly pledged allegiance to the Daesh, it remains uncertain The Southern Philippines, where the majority whether they are receiving funds from the terrorist of the country’s Muslim population is located, group. Apart from one unverified report, no includes most of the country’s poorest provinces. Filipinos are known to have joined Daesh’s fight The population, for the most part, lacks access in the Middle East. Why not? to basic services like health and education. There is no equitable access to resources. Social mobility Daesh uses an attractive recruitment process and is difficult, and the perception of the relative offers potential recruits rosy prospects. Its expert deprivation of the people in the region is further use of social media has exponentially enlarged its sharpened in the light improving access to
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16 information. International borders in the region are porous and largely uncontrolled. Access to illicit firearms trafficking is widespread and private armed groups proliferate, especially in the areas of Maguindanao, Sulu and Basilan.
But the Philippine government has recognised that military solutions have their limitations. The Philippine military may decimate the known ASG and BIFF members, but if legitimate underlying grievances are not addressed, the violent extremist ideology of Daesh, or any similar group, may inspire radical movements in the Philippines.
Of particular concern is the growing number of teenagers between the ages of 14 and 17 joining ASG with the potential of becoming more radical and fundamental as they mature. Exposed to virulent ideas, indoctrinated in the extremist tradition of returning Afghan fighters, and trained in guerrilla warfare, the upcoming generation of young Philippine Muslims have the potential to transform into “real mujahideen” if the region’s legitimate grievances are not addressed.
In what is fast becoming a war of attrition, Daesh desperately needs warm bodies to join its fight in Iraq and Syria. Its propaganda campaign aims to recruit volunteers to travel to the Middle East to become suicide bombers and cannon fodder to help sell its ideology. At present, these are not prospects that appeal to Filipino Muslims, even for ASG and BIFF members. The appeal of Daesh’s call to arms may be even less appealing as the peace process with the MILF advances towards favourable outcomes. There is optimism that with the creation of a Bangsamoro autonomous region, the legitimate grievances that fuel violent extremism will be addressed, perhaps undermining Daesh’s presence and influence in the region once and for all.
Prof Charithie Joaquin is Chief of the Academic Affairs Division at the National Defense College of the Philippines (NDCP).
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17 anger and condemnation of acts of brutality on social media such as Facebook and Twitter. Banners 7 and flyers posted in public spaces in villages and towns across Indonesia also repudiate Islamic State INDONESIA’S RESPONSES and its agenda: ‘Tolak ISIS – NKRI Harga Mati’ or ‘Reject ISIS, The Unitary Republic of Indonesia is the price of death’, and, ‘NKRI YES, ISIS No’ or ‘Yes to TO ISLAMIC STATE the Unitary Republic of Indonesia, No to ISIS’. by Dina Afrianty While likely Government-sponsored, these banners send a clear message reminding Indonesians not to Summary: be deceived by Islamic State’s appeal for the • A clear consensus has emerged among creation of an Islamic caliphate. Indonesian Indonesia’s government, Muslim organizations, authorities are playing the nationalism card, and public opinion rejecting the Islamic State, effectively arguing that support for IS will threaten its agenda, and the brutality of its campaign to national unity. Indonesian authorities have establish an Islamic caliphate in Syria and Iraq. repeatedly warned that the ISIS agenda is not in • Seeing the initial government response as line with Indonesia’s national Pancasila ideology weak,Muslim organizations took the lead in and presents a threat to Indonesia’s cultural and urging the government to prevent Indonesians religious diversity. (Berger 2014: Perdani and Ina, from traveling to Iraq and Syria to fight with 5 August 2014) Islamic State, and to ban those currently there from returning to Indonesia to avoid a repeat of Indonesia’s experience with returning Muslim Civil Society Leads the Way “Afghan jihadis” through the 1990s and early This unity between the state and key Muslim civil 2000s – culminating in the 2002 Bali bombing. society organisations regarding the threat posed • President Joko Widodo has, since taking office by Islamic State appears in October 2014, announced a number of steps to have emerged only to prevent Islamic State ideology from taking The Indonesian following the declaration government was root in Indonesia, including travel bans to and of the caliphate in mid from Syria and Iraq, monitoring of Indonesians 2014, and the release of previously seen as living and traveling elsewhere in the Middle East, a video of an Indonesian being too soft. and revision of Indonesia’s prison jihadi calling for fellow deradicalization programs. Indonesian Muslims to join ISIS. The Indonesian • Steps in recent years to incorporate conservative government was previously seen as being too soft. religious parties into the political mainstream and the ensuing increase in public piety have As Berger (2014) put it, the Indonesian largely robbed advocates of Islamic State’s government showed little interest in responding to radical agenda of a recruiting base and paved the threat ISIS posed to a peaceful Indonesian Islam the way for a strong, anti-Islamic State during the first half of 2014. ISIS flags appeared consensus. among other Islamic religious symbols at pre- electionpublic rallies in the major street close to the Presidential Palace in Jakarta. Groups allegedly The anti-Islamic State Consensus sympathetic to Islamic State organized a number With local and international media continuing to of religious gatherings around Indonesia allegedly. report on the violence and brutality of ISIS For example, a group calling itself the Islamic Sharia (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) – including killing Activists Forum (FAKSI) organised a public both Muslims and non-Muslims and destroying gathering to show support to ISIL at the Syarif Islamic historical sites including the tomb of the Hidayatullah State Islamic University (UIN) campus Prophet Jonah – Indonesian Muslims have rejected mosque in the outskirts of Jakarta. (Perdani, the call made by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader 8 August 2014) The event triggered immediate of ISIS, for Muslims to join the war to create an public outcry when it was reported that this group Islamic caliphate. used the event to take an oath and pledge loyalty to IS. (Trisna, 7 August 2014) The Muslim public This rejection of IS spans government policy and opinion condemned athorities for allowing the the spontaneous response of individuals and, event to take place at the State Islamic University, importantly includes a wide range of Muslim known as a center of moderate Islam, and organisations. Indonesians have posted their demanded a crackdown on FAKSI. The State
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18 Islamic University’s administration subsequently Widodo declared that his government will stated that it would not let the campus be used for prevent Indonesians from travelling to Syria or Iraq. radical teachings or the promulgation of IS He has subsequently announced plans to monitor ideology. (Perdani, 8 August 2014) Moderate the movements of Indonesian citizens living in the Indonesian Muslims also questioned the Middle East and reinvent the prison deradicalisation government’s commitment to standing up against program for convicted terrorists. Lastly, the the spread of ISIL radical influence when the Police, government has expressed its commitment to under pressure from some Indonesian Islamits, working with traditional Islamic educational laid charges of blasphemy against the Editor of institutions – pesantren and madrasah – as well the English Newspaper, the Jakarta Post, following as religious leaders and Muslim organizations publication of a cartoon depicting ISIS militants to promote a tolerant and moderate Islam. executing prisoners on 3 July 2014. The Islamists perceived the cartoon, which was intended to The Indonesian government also recently criticize Islamic State’s the use of Islamic symbols announced that it will revoke the passports in the violent and brutal of Indonesians who have travelled to Syria and Abu Bakar Baasyir, the execution of IS prisoners, Iraq and prevent their return to Indonesia. former leader of as insulting to Islam. (The Jakarta Post, 16 January 2015) Tedjo Edhy Purdjanto, Minister for Political, Legal and Security Jemaah Islamiyah who These incidents Affairs, announced that ‘We (the Government) is currently in prison demonstrate that some will revoke the passports of those who plan to for involvement in the Indonesian Islamists go abroad to join ISIS and those who are already Bali Bombings, has believe ISIS is fighting abroad with ISIS. They cannot be allowed to come declared his allegiance for a legitimate Islamic home’. (The Jakarta Post, 16 January 2015) In the cause, and is, thus, government’s view, allowing foreign fighters to to ISIS. worthy of support. return to Indonesia would give them the Abu Bakar Baasyir, the opportunity to influence other Indonesian Muslims former leader of Jemaah Islamiyah who is currently and inspire them to violent, radical and extremist in prison for involvement in the Bali Bombings, has acts in a tragic replay of Indonesia’s experience declared his allegiance to ISIS. The response with fighters returning from the conflict in to IS has been far from uniform, even among Afghanistan in the early 1990s. Many of these Indonesian Islamic radicals. Baasyir’s own group, returnees contributed directly to the rise of violent JI, has split over his pledge to IS. One detrimental extremism and numerous terrorist acts in effect of this split within Islamist ranks is that he Indonesia, including the 2002 Bali bombing. links and lines of communication between radicalized individuals/groups and potential Islamic A range of Muslim organisations have strongly State recruiters are likely to remain murky. This lack supported the government’s position on IS. The of clarity as to radical loyalties could actually Indonesian Government applauded a statement complicate the law enforcement effort as made by the National Ulama Council (Majelis compared to the response during the early 2000s. Ulama Indonesia or MUI) in August 2014 that ISIL is a violent and radical movement that has tarnished the image of peaceful Islam and that The Government Response its movement clearly stands against Islam. In an President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono condemned official statement, the Chairman of MUI, Professor IS in August 2014, following the release of a video Din Syamsuddin called upon ‘Islamic organisations showing ISIL militants beheading US Reporter to step up their vigilance and to guard against James Foley in August 2014, charging that what ISIL efforts to use them’. (Perdani, 8 August 2014) ISIL has done to Islam is an embarrassment. The MUI demanded that the government ban (France-Presse, 21 August 2014) At the same time, ISIS ideology to prevent its influencing Indonesian Commander of the Armed Forces, General Muslims. The Ulama Council also declared the Moeldoko announced that his office would work ISIS radical campaign to create an Islamic ummah with the pesantren community to reintroduce as counter to Pancasila and, thus, a threat to the pancasila into the pesantren curricula. unity of the Republic. As in other areas of public (Berger 2014) policy (such as blasphemy) there is little separation between MUI and Government policy. Indonesia’s new President, Joko Widodo, has taken more concrete action against ISIS campaigns to The two largest Muslim-based civil society recruit Indonesians to join the conflict overseas. organisations - Muhammadiyah and Nahdhatul Upon coming to office in October 2014, President Ulama – issued similar characterizations of the
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19 threat from Islamic State ideology. Kyai Hasyim media. Some elements of Indonesian civil society Muzadi, former Chairman of the Nahdhatul Ulama, have expressed concern over what they see as an the largest Muslim Based Organisation (MBO), increasing Islamic conservatism in public policy and condemned ISIL as un-Islamic and warned growing influence of an alliance of conservative Indonesian Muslims against its promotion of and radical organisations. While the Government violence, adding that its campaign to promote has always maintained vigilance against the threat Islam was not appropriate to the situation in of Islamic terrorism, inspired at least in part by a Indonesia. He said ‘ISIS is a new phenomenon in historical fear of secessionist threats, the threat the Middle East, which is by no means appropriate represented by IS clearly marks a development to Indonesian conditions’. (The Jakarta Post, beyond any previous experiences with radicalism 4 August 2014) He then warned the government and extremism. It seems, also, to be forging an that the infiltration of radical ideology has been unprecedented consensus among the diverse made easier since the reform era with the players in the Indonesian political landscape. establishment of various new Muslim organisations. Dr Dina Afrianty is currently a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Institute for Religion, Politics, and Society (IRPS) at Australian Catholic University in Melbourne. She is affiliated with the nternational Relations Department at the Syarif Hidayatullah Political Reform and the anti-Islamic State State Islamic University in Jakarta. Consensus This general consensus between Government, Muslim public opinion, and the major Muslim organisations regarding the influence of Islamic State marks a major departure from Indonesia’s References: earlier responses to extremism. This may, in part, Pernadi, Y and Ina P 2014 ‘Government bans be the result of Indonesian political reforms in support, endorsement of ISIL’, The Jakarta Post, 5 recent years. Radical August 2014, retrieved on 20 May 2015 from
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20 Amir Rana’s informative piece entitled “What ISIS and the ‘caliphate’ mean for Pakistan”43 discusses 8 the differences between al-Qaeda and the IS and why Khurasan region (areas comprising Pakistan ADVENT OF THE IS: and Afghanistan) is so important to local, regional, and global jihadi forces. According to various interpretations of Islamic text, before the end A PERSPECTIVE FROM of time an Islamic army with black flags would emerge from this region and win the first defeat PAKISTAN against non-believers, finally reaching Eela (the Dr. Khuram Iqbal al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem) where they will raise their flags.44 The use of black flags by a number of militant organisations operating from this region Summary: is, in fact, a well-thought-out decision to seek • Islamic State is building a network of allies and religious justification for their existence.45 Rana supporters in Pakistan, but tension between IS argues that territorial gains made by the IS are and the Taliban leadership in Afghanistan has, serving as a morale booster for Pakistani jihadi so far, limited its extent. outfits. • Indian government efforts to play IS infiltration of Pakistan to their advantage may backfire. Abdul Basit, a researcher associated with the IS ambitions to expand its influence into South International Centre of Political Violence and Asia has the potential to destabilise Indian-held Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) in Singapore, has Kashmir. Kashmir-centric groups are under in summarised how policy makers and local militant creasing pressure to resume attacks in Indian- outfits perceive IS in Pakistan.46 He has classified held Kashmir in order to protect their exclusive militant responses to the Middle Eastern terrorist sphere of influence from IS encroachment. organisation into three broad categories; first, • Alliance with IS offers local jihadis an those who have openly denounced IS (al-Qaeda opportunity for “rebranding” to appear strong in Indian Subcontinent and the core Tehrik-e- and relevant. Taliban Pakistan); second, those who welcomed the IS with open arms (splinter groups of the TTP A threat assessment using the “Adversarial such as Jamaatul Ahrar and Jundullah-Pakistan); Analysis” framework confirms satellite presence and, third, those who prefer to “wait and see”. of the Islamic State (IS) in Pakistan. Adversarial Kashmir-centric religious nationalist militant outfits Analysis incorporates a close examination of a including Lashkar-e-Tayeba and Jaish-e-Muhammad group’s intentions (gauged through ideological fit in this category. disposition, and past activities), capabilities (measured through quality and quantity of fighters, Saima Khan attributes IS’s ingress to infighting training facilities, financial status, and weaponry) and fragmentation within the TTP and anticipates and opportunities (assessed through vulnerability that an ideological link is expected eventually to of the targeted community, overall security translate into an operational partnership.47 Such environment, and composition of the support an alliance, she postulates, can pit the Pakistani base). Application of this framework demonstrates Taliban against the Afghan Taliban, who are that local threat groups – hitherto operating under battling IS in neighbouring Afghanistan. But the the umbrella of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) – key question is: why would Pakistani Taliban opt seem to be using the IS brand to stay relevant after to dump a near and time-tested ally for a far, suffering considerable operational and ideological unpredictable and discredited ally? Afghan Taliban setbacks as a result of Operation “Zarb-e-Azb”:42 enjoy more popular support and credibility in a countrywide military, intelligence and law Pakistan than IS, which is seen by majority of enforcement campaign aimed at eliminating Pakistanis as tyrannical and whose violence is militants’ infrastructure and support network. mainly directed against fellow Muslims with no clearly defined objectives. As the clashes between Since the IS is still in a formative phase in Pakistan, IS and the Afghan Taliban rage on in neighbouring scholarly work on the subject is scarce. But a Afghanistan, Pakistani Taliban will come under number of Pakistani newspaper columnists and tremendous pressure from Mullah Omar to clarify counter-terrorism analysts have scaled the level their position and reassert their loyalties. of threat and concur that the group is operating through proxies, although the nature of the Shujaat Bukhari, a veteran Kashmiri journalists, operational links have yet to be established. asks “why would the IS head to Kashmir?”48
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21 He is of the view that an IS hoax is being exploited chance to rebuild and rebrand in order to appear by New Delhi to legitimise the disproportionate strong and relevant. If the IS establishes footholds Indian Army presence in Kashmir and the in the region, factional bloodshed can rage on. continuation of the controversial Armed Forces The reports hinting Special Powers Act (AFSPA), and to discredit the an emerging alliance It is the confusion and Kashmiri struggle for self-determination. Bukhari’s between Iran and the distrust among major assertions are corroborated by official Indian Afghan Taliban could also South Asian nations response to IS’s aspirations to acquire a nuclear motivate more sectarian that will create more bomb, possibly from Pakistan, and smuggle it to elements within space for a group like the US.8 While leading observers of global Pakistan to support the terrorism dismiss the ISIS nuclear ambition as one IS. But more than the IS to infiltrate and that “beggars belief”,49 the Indian Defence actual presence of IS in flourish. Minister backed the ISIS claims,50 most probably South Asia, it is the with an intention to malign Pakistan and discredit confusion and distrust among major South Asian its nuclear program. Such a gross exaggeration by nations that will create more space for a group like Indian officials regarding an issue that concerns IS to infiltrate and flourish. Indian official response regional and global security will not do any good to the arrival of IS strongly suggests that the policy- to international efforts aimed to understand and makers in New Delhi are either unable or unwilling combat the ISIS. to grasp the post-9/11 shifts in the regional militant landscape whereby these non-state actors have Daesh, as the ISIS goes While the likelihood that developed a momentum of their own. Any venture by its Arabic name, ISIS will acquire nuclear of the IS in Indian-held Kashmir can place India and suffers from an image weapons has clearly been Pakistan on the verge of war and both countries overemphasised, lack the crisis mitigation capacity to effectively problem in South Asia. Kashmir’s critical forestall such a scenario. importance for regional jihadi outfits may not be. Daesh, as the ISIS goes by Dr. Khuram Iqbal holds a PhD in Policing, Intelligence and its Arabic name, suffers from an image problem in Counter-Terrorism from Macquarie University, Australia. He is currently serving as the Focal Person for Centre of South Asia. In this context, Kashmir offers the Excellence on Counter-Terrorism at National Defence University, opportunity to emerge as the protector of Pakistan oppressed Muslims. For radicalised youth that seeks the excitement of war, the lure of IS is much stronger than the LeT, which is now attempting to redirect its cadres’ energies towards social welfare services under the banner of Falah-e-Insaniyat Foundation (Humans Welfare Foundation). If the IS is able to launch one symbolic attack in Indian- held Kashmir, it would have Lashkar-e-Tayeba and Jaish-e-Muhammad by the throat. Anticipating such a scenario, Kashmir-centric groups are under tremendous internal pressure to resume attacks in Indian-held Kashmir in order to avoid large-scale defections, maintain organisation cohesion, and protect their exclusive sphere of influence from IS encroachment.
The maximum IS can To conclude, a consensus offer to local jihadis of sorts exists among is “rebranding”, and Pakistani counter- terrorism experts and this is what Pakistani policy-makers that Taliban groups the maximum IS can desperately need. offer to local jihadis is “rebranding”, and this is what Pakistani Taliban groups desperately need. These groups had been pushed to the brink of collapse by Operation Zarb-e-Azb, but the arrival of IS gives them a
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22 second largest Muslim population in the World (after Indonesia) is not really alarmed about the 9 threat from Islamic State. Perhaps, there is a the islamic state: concern, but certainly not an alarm. Why? Why India is not alarmed INDIA ISN’T ALARMED, YET. When the report of four men from a small town by D. Suba Chandran in Maharashtra joining the Islamic State became public in August 2014, the issue of Indian youths joining the ISIL made the headlines. There were Summary: also reports in social media of youths joining or • So far, the Indian government has downplayed wanting to join the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. the danger from returning Indian foreign Few arrests have been made, however, and despite fighters. Compared to other (particularly occasional reports, the issue seems to have European) countries, the number of Indian subsided subsequently. Muslims fighting with Islamic State is miniscule. • A recent history of low participation by Indian The following factors could be account for the Muslims in global extremist networks like government (and to an extent even social) al-Qaeda and IS gives the Indian security underplaying of the threat from Islamic State establishment cause for cautious optimism. in India. • India’s relatively stable and inclusive political processes provide outlets for Indian Muslims First, the number of youths who have joined the to pursue their agendas peacefully. Islamic State so far from India, as a percentage of • India’s secular institutions, particularly its total Muslim population and the Indian population education system, also provide a brake on is negligible. When compared to other countries, extremism. for example the UK, Germany, France and other • Given the size of the Indian Muslim population, European countries, the number of Indian Muslims however, even a miniscule percentage of it joining Islamic State is becoming radicalised could be disastrous. The seen as an irrelevent Indian participation in threat today comes not from the ISIL or the trickle. Islamic State or other al-Qaeda, but from the infiltration of Salafist radical organisations, religious figures – many from Saudi Arabi – Second, the recent such as al-Qaeda, has who increasingly challenge Sufi nature of history of global terror Islam in India. networks and Indian always been negligible. participation in them has, largely, been a positive story. Indian Introduction participation in Islamic State or other radical Despite confirmed reports about few Indian organisations, such as al-Qaeda, has always been citizens joining the Islamic State in Iraq, the Indian negligible. Even within South Asia, while the government is not alarmed and has not annual congregation organised by the parent undertaken any substantial measures on the issue. organisation of the Lashkar-e-Toiba in Pakistan Some countries in Europe and elsewhere have attracted Muslim youths from the region and from become alarmed and are taking political and legal other parts of Asia (for example, Indonesia), there steps to address the issue of their citizens joining is no record of Indian Muslims taking part in such ISIL. Besides addressing the issue of foreign fighters radical networks – either at the regional or global at national and international levels, these levels. Perhaps, the recent history of Indian Muslims countries are also now focussing on addressing not being a part of any trans-national terrorist security issues that would emerge on their return networks provides a sense of confidence to the as well as addressing the larger issue of domestic State. radicalisation. Both preventing radicalisation and de-radicalisation have become the primary focus Third, the intelligence apparatus in India has of these countries as a counter strategy towards remained secular and strong in addressing the meeting the ISIL threat. radical and extremist threat. Except for their covert support to separatist organisations in Sri Lanka For its part, ISIL since announced the formation during the 1980s, the intelligence organisations of the Islamic State, there have been few threats in India have not used non-State actors as strategic made against India. India, despite having the tools, as has Pakistan. Not only the intelligence
A PUBLICATION BY THE GENEVA CENTRE FOR SECURITY POLICY (GCSP) Asian Conflicts Reports - august 2015 edition
23 organisations, but the entire security apparatus by radical organisations that contribute to the including the military and para-military in India radicalisation of young minds. have pursued a strong course of action against non-State actors. Non-State actors, both at the The constitution of India provides adequate space national and global levels, are not perceived as for religious institutions to function and manage a tool in domestic politics or in foreign policy their own affairs. From running educational strategy vis-a-vis another country. As a result, institutions to managing their own social structure unlike in Pakistan and Afghanistan, there have – religious minorities in India – Sikhs, Muslims and been no strong connections between the State and Christians – have sufficient legal and social space, global radical networks. It was these connections, that have been protected by the Supreme Court of during the 1990s in Afghanistan with al-Qaeda, India. and since the 1980s, in Pakistan, with Taliban, al-Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Toiba/Jaish-e-Mohammad, Sixth, Indian society has enough space for that created the space for international networks everyone within its fold. In this context, two great to recruit and train local youths. social domains of India, almost treated as a religion in themselves – Cricket and Bollywood – have Fourth, political stability and continuity in India, created a huge space within which all Indian when compared to other countries in the region, communities meet. The Indian film industry – have played a crucial role in keeping the process perhaps the biggest in the world in terms of fan of radicalisation in check. Citizens lacked the following today is led by the Khan triumvirate – motivation to get connected with international Sharukh Khan, Salman Khan and Aamir Khan. networks such as al-Qaeda and ISIL. Unlike in Pakistan and Bangladesh, civil-military relations All three have a huge fan following cutting across in India have been positive and constitutionally regional and religious lines all over India. Similarly, guaranteed. The military plays a role as defined by Indian Cricket, one of the biggest sports industries the Indian Parliament and does not encourage or at the global level, also has sufficient space for support any local groups vis-a-vis political parties, everyone. thereby keeping away from the larger political process. Political parties also do not have a vested At the political level, there is no constitutional interest in supporting any non-State actors. provision excluding any Indian citizen from becoming the President and Prime Ministers of India’s internal political process, the peaceful India based on their religion. Election of Abdul change of governments, and the government’s Kalam and Manmohan Singh as the President and ability to govern have been better than the rest Prime Minister of India were not only guaranteed of South Asia. Elections have been held regularly constitutionally, but also accepted socially and and the government transitions have been regular politically by the entire society. For the Muslim and peaceful. Despite the problem of corruption youths in India, there are enough icons in the and the inability of institutions, the State in India country to emulate. Neither bin Laden nor remains functional. More importantly, the State Baghdadi elicit attraction or serve as role models. provides adequate space for minorities at political, social and religious levels. Seventh, the nature of Islam and the Muslim leadership in India acts as a cushion vis-a-vis Fifth, the educational structure in India, despite radicalisation. The Sufi nature of Islam in India strong criticisms, has been an asset both at the provides for a composite culture that is not only government and private sector levels. From the tolerant, but also attracts other individuals from University Grants Commission (UGC) at the other communities. For example, the shrine of the national level to nursery schools in remote areas Sufi saint Moinuddin Chishti in Ajmer near Jaipur of the country the secular education remains in Rajasthan attracts devotees from different competitive and affordable. The religious communities and from different parts of India. educational institutions also have to compete and While the Ajmer Sharif is famous and attended by provide an acceptable alternative to parents. As a devotees from all over the world, there are similar result, despite teaching of religious strictures and shrines all over India. From Baba Ghulam Shah’s theology, school systems either run by the State shrine near the Line of Control (LoC) in Jammu or by others including religious organisations, the & Kashmir to the dargah in Ervadi along the coast curriculum remains modern, competitive and in Tamil Nadu, the country is dotted with Sufi secular. In its neighbourhood, the failure of shrines that act as a great agent of moderation and mainstream education has been the primary reason centres of inter-faith coordination. Along with the for the expansion of educational institutions run teachings of these great saints, the predominant
A PUBLICATION BY THE GENEVA CENTRE FOR SECURITY POLICY (GCSP) Asian Conflicts Reports - august 2015 edition
24 public faith in them acts as a deterrent from any later have played a role in radicalising a small radical ideologies finding space in India. Muslim section of the Muslim population. The formation political and religious leadership in India, while led of Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) and by different schools, is also equally moderate. the Indian Mujahideen (IM) were a case in point. Though these movements have subsequently Eighth, unlike in other countries with large Muslim declined, either as a result of government action or populations, few global issues such as Palestine due to lack of popular support, the formation and and Bosnia have become a rallying points for the the operations of these radical groups do underline Muslim youth in India. While well aware of global the reality that the lack of threat cannot be taken developments, the majority of Muslim youth have enirely for granted. not been influenced to an extent that they would want to take up arms and fight for a larger cause. Second, more than the threat of the Islamic State This is helped by the fact that India has remained (or al-Qaeda), the slow but steady onslaught of neutral in most of these international issues. radical ideology with its roots in Saudi Arabia remains a cause for concern. While the elder Though untested, many believe that the Indian generation remains attached to the Sufi Islam, Parliament has been sensitive to its Muslim the possibility that segments the younger population and has avoided taking sides or sending generations Might be influenced by the Wahabi/ troops to any of those conflict regions. Salafi ideology cannot be totally ruled out in India. Pockets of India, which have links with Apart from regional and international conflict, even the Gulf countries in West Asia, especially Saudi the separatist violence in the predominantly Muslim Arabia, through contact with migrant workers Kashmir Valley not evoked widespread Muslim returning from jobs in the Gulf region, do face a radical sentiment against the State across India. threat. Along with the In most of the European States, the conflict in remittances, there is a The threat today Palestine, Bosnia and ironically even J&K have flow (though a trickle) of become a factor in domestic radicalisation, but a new ideology ino India. comes not from the India has remained insulated from the global ISIL or the al-Qaeda, conflicts involving Muslims. Given the size of but from the radical the Indian Muslim ideology trying to find Finally, social media and related communication population, even a space in Indian society systems which have been blamed for the miniscule percentage of radicalisation and international recruitment of it becoming radicalised and undermine the young people to ISIL and other violent extremist could be disastrous. Sufi nature of Islam in groups have not played a negative role in India. The threat today comes India. Not yet. not from the ISIL or the al-Qaeda, but from the radical ideology trying to find space in Indian society and undermine the Sufi Should India not be worried? nature of Islam in India. So, is the threat from the ISIL totally unfounded in India? India will have to protect its heritage and history and ensure that foreign ideologies and conflicts do If the above set of explanations does make a case, not undermine its social cohesion. Instead of it should be seen in terms of its applicability to fighting it abroad, it will have to protect and most of the Muslim community in India, which safeguard what it has inside. should be an overwhelming majority. D. Suba Chandran is Director at the Institute However, the threat of a small number getting of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS), New Delhi. radicalised cannot be totally discounted. The following factors would underline, why India should begin to consider appropriate actions, even if the threat does not yet justify alarm.
First, in terms of sheer numbers it may be insignificant, or even totally miniscule, but there are a few pockets of radicalised youth. The demolition of the mosque in Ayodhya in 1992, followed by a communal riot in Gujarat ten years
A PUBLICATION BY THE GENEVA CENTRE FOR SECURITY POLICY (GCSP) Asian Conflicts Reports - august 2015 edition
25 END NOTES
1 - Ian Black, “Seizure of Palmyra and Ramadi by Isis 9 - Azim Azman, “Friends and family need to be on reveal gaping holes in US jihadi strategy”, The Guardian, the lookout against ISIS radicalization”, The New 21 May 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/ Paper, 18 April 2015, http://news.asiaone.com/news/ may/21/seizure-of-palmyra-and-ramadi-by-isis-reveal- singapore/friends-and-family-need-belookout- gaping-holes-in-us-jihadi-strategy against-isis-radicalisation#sthash.HDQjn0kW.dpuf (accessed 22 May 2015). (accessed 21 May 2015).
2 - Elliot Brennan, The Interpreter, 5 March 2015, 10 - Kumar Ramakrishna, ‘ISIS: Its Indirect Strategy http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/05/How- Explained”, 20 May 2015, should-we-respond-to-ISIS-in- http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/isis-its-indirect-strategy- Southeast-Asia.aspx?COLLCC=651738223&COLL explained-part-1/ CC=732768703& (accessed 22 May 2015). I am grateful to RSIS colleague (accessed 21 May 2015). At a meeting on 15 July 2015 Professor Ahmed Hashim for information on the ISIS at the National Security Council in Manila it was military structure. suggested that press reports giving a figure of 200 Philippine ISIS recruits is too high. 11 - “ISIS reportedly teams up with another terror organization as they move in on Afghanistan”, 3 - “Police: Syria Returnees Tied to Depok Chlorine FoxNews.com, 20 May 2015, http://www.foxnews.com/ Bomb”, Agence France-Presse, 25 March 2015, politics/2015/05/20/isis-reportedlyteams- http://thejakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/news/police-syria- up-with-another-terror-organization-as-move-in-on/ returnees-tied-depok-chlorine-bomb/ (accessed 22 May 2015). (accessed 21 May 2015). 12 - Mubasher Bukhari, “Pakistan Arrest Local ISIS 4 - Zakir Hussain, “ISIS posts footage of boy-trainees Commander”, Al Arabiya News, 21 January 2015, from South-east Asia”, The Straits Times, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/asia/2015/01/21/ http://www.straitstimes.com/news/asia/south-east-asia/ Pakistan-arrests-local-ISIScommander-.html story/isis-posts-footage-boy-traineessouth- (accessed 22 May 2015). east-asia-20150317#sthash.2imSuZ4o.dpuf (accessed 21 May 2015). 13 - Ulf Laessing, “ISIS is Moving into Ghadafi’s Hometown in Libya”, Business Insider, 21 May 2015, 5 - “Malaysia vs ISIS: A timeline of recent arrests linked http://www.businessinsider.com/r-gaddafis-home-town- to the militant group”, The Straits Times, falls-to-islamic-state-in-anarchic-libya- http://www.straitstimes.com/news/asia/south-east-asia/ 2015-5?IR=T& story/malaysia-vs-isis-timelinerecent- (accessed 22 May 2015). arrests-linked-the-militant-group-2#sthash.9VrDuUyp. dpuf 14 - “ISIS Welcomes Boko Haram’s Allegiance and (accessed 21 May 2015). Plays Down Coalition ‘Victories’”, The Guardian, 12 March 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/ 6 - Bridget Welsh and Zachary Abuza, “Draconian Laws’ world/2015/mar/12/isis-welcomes-bokoharams- False Sense of Security”, bridgetwelsh.com, allegiance-and-plays-down-coalition-victories 15 April 2015, http://bridgetwelsh.com/2015/04/ (accessed 22 May 2015). draconian-laws-false-sense-of-security/ (accessed 21 May 2015). 15 - Zakir Hussain, “Jakarta Nabs Four Foreigners with ‘ISIS Connection’”, The Straits Times, 7 - Sumisha Naidu, “New anti-terror Bill was needed, 15 September 2014, http://www.stasiareport.com/ says top Malaysian counter-terrorism the-big-story/asiareport/indonesia/story/jakarta-nabs-4- official”, Channel NewsAsia, 7 April 2015, foreigners-isis-connection-20140915 http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/ (accessed 22 May 2015). new-anti-terror-billwas/1770180.html?cx_ tag=similar#cxrecs_s 16 - Ramakrishna, ‘ISIS: Its Indirect Strategy Explained”. (accessed 21 May 2015).
8 - Welsh and Abuza, “Draconian Laws’ False Sense of 17 - For a seminal discussion of indirect and direct Security”. strategies, see General Andre Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy, translated by Major-General R.H. Barry (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965).
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18 - Dina Temple-Raston, “How to Take the Internet 29 - A.P. Schmid, J. de Graaf, Violence as Back from ISIS”, The New Yorker, 7 May 2015, Communication: Insurgent Terrorism and the http://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/how-to-take- Western News Media (London: Sage, 1982), p. 14; the-internet-back-from-isis Alex P. Schmid, “Terrorism as Psychological Warfare”, (accessed 21 May 2015). Democracy and Security 1, No. 2 (2005), pp. 127-136.
19 - “Profile: Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi”, BBC News, 30 - Thomas Koruth Samuel, Reaching the Youth: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27801676 Countering the terrorist Narrative, Monograph published (accessed 22 May 2015). by the Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter- Terrorism (SEARCCT), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20 - David Malet, “Our new era of crowdsourced Malaysia, 2012. terrorism”, The Drum, 19 September 2014, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-09-19/malet-our- 31 - Harry Setyo R., Interview by Author. new-era-of-crowdsourced-terrorism/5754818 (accessed 22 May 2015). 32 - Marhmudi Hariano alias Yusuf, Interview by Author.
21 - Carol Matlack, “Self-Sponsored Terror: Were the 33 - Sidney Jones, Interview by Author. Charlie Hebdo Killers in a ‘Wolf Pack’?”, Bloomberg.com, 8 January 2015, 34 - A. Ripley, “Reverse Radicalism”, http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2015-01-08/ TIME, 13 March 2008, werecharlie-hebdo-killers-in-a-wolf-pack-the-new-way- http://content.time.com/time/specials/2007/ of-terrorism article/0,28804,1720049_1720050_1722062,00.html. (accessed 22 May 2015). 35 - Frank Furedi. Invitation to Terror: The Expanding 22 - “Sydney cafe attack: Hostage taker not on terror Empire of the Unknown (London: Continuum, 2007) watch lists”, Foxnews.com, 16 December 2014, p. 87. http://www.foxnews.com/world/2014/12/16/sydney- cafe-attack-portrait-emerges-gunmanman- 36 - Alex P. Schmid , al-Qaeda’s “Single Narrative” haron-monis/ and Attempts to Develop Counter-Narratives: The State (accessed 22 May 2015). of Knowledge, International Centre for Counter- Terrorism (ICCT) Research Paper, January 2014 23 - Amy Chew, “Malaysia ‘at risk of lone-wolf attacks’”, The Straits Times, 3 April 2015, 37 - Robin Wright, The Islamists are Coming. The Middle http://www.straitstimes.com/st/print/3702373 East: They’ve Arrived (Washington DC: Woodrow (accessed 21 May 2015). Wilson Center, 23 August 2012), http://www.wilsoncenter.org/islamists/home?utm_ 24 - Black, “Seizure of Palmyra and Ramadi”. source=newsletterandutm_medium=emailandutm_camp aign=ww_08_23_12. 25 - Diana al Rifai, ‘Activist group says ISIL now controls half of Syria’, Aljazeera, 22 May 2015. 38 - Aaron Y. Zelin, “al-Qaeda in Syria: A Closer Look http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/05/isil-expands- at ISIS (Part II)”, Policy Watch 2138, 11 September syria-territory-palmyra-capture-150521133817603.html 2013, http://washin.st/14LTvkC.
26 - ISIL drive in Iraq, Syria gains momentum as 39 - Qatar International Academy for Security Studies, anniversary nears, 21 May 2015, The National. Countering Violent Extremism: The Counter http://www.thenational.ae/world/middle-east/isil-drive-in- Narrative Study (September, 2013), p. 192. iraq-syria-gains-momentum-as-anniversary-nears 40 - Naureen Chowdhury Fink and Jack Barclay, 27 - ‘Remarks by President Obama in Address to the Mastering the Narrative: Counterterrorism Strategic United Nations General Assembly’, Office of the Press Communications and the United Nations (Center on Secretary, The White House, 24 September 2014, Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, 2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/ http://www.globalct.org/publications/mastering-the- 2014/09/24/remarks-president-obama-address-united- narrative-counterterrorism-strategic-communicationand- nations-general-assembly the-united-nations/.
28 - ‘At debate, UN and Security Council Renew Pledge 41 - Michael Pizutto, Alter-Messaging: The Credible, to Counter Foreign Terrorist Fighters’, UN News Sustainable Counterterrorism Strategy (Goshen, Centre, 29 May 2015, Indiana: Center on Global Counterterrorism http://www.un.org/apps/news/story. Cooperation, May 2013), asp?NewsID=51005#.VXcikU2Jhdg http://www.globalct.org/publications/alter-messaging- the-credible-sustainable-counterterrorism-strategy/.
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42 - Zarb-e-Azb translates into the strike of the sword 49 - Jenny Stanton, “ISIS claims it is ‘infinitely’ closer to of Prophet Muhammad buying a nuclear weapon from Pakistan and smuggling it into the US”, Daily Mail, 22 May 2015, 43 - Amir Rana “What ISIS and the ‘caliphate’ mean for http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3093244/ISIS- Pakistan” Dawn, 03 July 2014, claims-infinitely-closer-buying-nuclear-weapon-Pakistan- http://www.dawn.com/news/1116799 smuggling-US.html
44 - Sunan nisai(The book of Hadith) volueme 5, page 50 - Anthony Glees, director of the Centre for Security 245 and Intelligence Studies at the University of Buckingham, cited in Jenny Stanton, “ISIS claims it is ‘infinitely’ closer 45 - For a detailed discussion pls see Husain Haqqani, to buying a nuclear weapon from Pakistan and “Prophecy & the Jihad in the Indian Subcontinent” smuggling it into the US”, Daily Mail, 22 May 2015, Hudson Institute, 27 March 2012, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3093244/ISIS- http://www.hudson.org/research/11167-prophecy-the- claims-infinitely-closer-buying-nuclear-weapon-Pakistan- jihad-in-the-indian-subcontinent smuggling-US.html
46 - Abdul Basit “Is IS a threat to Pakistan?” Express 51 - Alexander Sehmer, “Isis could obtain nuclear Tribune, 28 February 2015, http://tribune.com.pk/ weapon from Pakistan, warns India”, The Independent, story/845316/is-is-a-threat-to-pakistan/ 31 May 2015, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/ 47 - Saima Khan, “Prospect for an ISIS-TTP Alliance” india-warns-isis-could-obtain-nuclear-weapon-from- Express Tribune, 09 December 2014, pakistan-10287276.html http://tribune.com.pk/story/803590/prospects-for-an-is- ttp-alliance/09 December 2014
48 - Shujaat Bukhari, “Why would ISIS go to Kashmir?” The Friday Times, 24 October 2014, http://www.thefridaytimes.com/tft/why-would-isis-go-to- kashmir/
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