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Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 Part 7 of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 is concerned with the security of dangerous substances that may be targeted or used by terrorists. These substances are listed in Schedule 5 of the Act. The Schedule was amended in 2007. The current list is shown below and includes viruses, rickettsiae, fungi, bacteria, toxins and animal pathogens. The toxins are also included in HAZDAT. The provisions set out in Part 7 (and Schedules 5 and 6) place an obligation on managers of laboratories and other premises holding stocks of specified disease-causing micro-organisms and toxins to notify their holdings, and to comply with any reasonable security requirements which the police may impose. It also requires managers of laboratories and other premises, on request, to furnish the police with details of people with access to the dangerous substances held there. The Secretary of State is given power to direct that a named individual must not be allowed access to such disease strains or the premises in which they are held. Reporting etc, is co-ordinated through the University Health and Safety Unit. VIRUSES Chikungunya virus Mobala virus Congo-crimean haemorrhagic Monkey pox virus fever virus Mucambo virus Dengue fever virus Murray Valley encephalitis Dobrava/Belgrade virus virus Eastern equine encephalitis Ndumu virus virus Nipah virus Ebola virus Omsk haemorrhagic fever Everglades virus virus Getah virus Polio virus Guanarito virus Powassan virus Hantaan virus Rabies virus Hendra virus (Equine Rift Valley fever virus morbillivirus) Rocio virus Herpes simiae (B virus) Sabia virus Influenza viruses (pandemic Sagiyama virus strains) Sin Nombre virus Japanese encephalitis virus St Louis encephalitis virus Junin virus Tick-borne encephalitis virus Kyasanur Forest virus (Russian Spring-Summer Lassa fever virus encephalitis virus) Louping ill virus Variola virus Lymphocytic choriomeningitis Venezuelan equine virus encephalitis virus Machupo virus West Nile fever virus Marburg virus Western equine encephalitis Mayaro virus virus Middleburg virus Yellow fever virus RICKETTSIAE Coxiella burnetii Rickettsia prowazeki Rickettsia rickettsii Rickettsia typhi (mooseri). BACTERIA Bacillus anthracis Francisella tularensis Brucella abortus Multiple-drug resistant Salmonella paratyphi Brucella canis Mycobacterium tuberculosis Brucella melitensis Salmonella paratyphi A, B, C Brucella suis Salmonella typhi Burkholderia mallei (Pseudomonas mallei) Shigella boydii Burkholderia pseudomallei (Pseudomonas Shigella dysenteriae pseudomallei) Shigella flexneri Chlamydophila psittaci Vibrio cholerae Clostridium botulinum Yersinia pestis Clostridium perfringens Enterohaemorrhagic Escherichia coli, serotype 0157 and verotoxin producing strains FUNGI Cladophialophora bantiana Cryptococcus neoformans TOXINS TOXIN - CAS NUMBER Abrin Modeccin toxin Shiga and Shiga-like toxins Abrin - 1393-62-0 Shiga toxin DNA (Escherichia coli strain KY-019 clone Botulinum toxins pKTN1054 Shiga-like toxin SLT-II subunit A Botulin D - 93384-46-4 gene plus Shiga-like toxin SLT-II subunit B Botulinum toxin A - 93384-43-1 gene) - 153834-56-1 Botulinum toxin B DNA (Escherichia coli strain KY-019 clone Botulinum toxin F pKTN1054 Shiga-like toxin SLT-II subunit A gene) - 153834-58-3 Clostridium botulinum toxin DNA (Escherichia coli strain KY-019 clone pKTN1054 Shiga-like toxin SLT-II subunit B gene) - 153834-60-7 Clostridium perfringens toxins DNA (Escherichia coli strain TK-051 clone Clostridium botulinum neurotoxin pKTN1050 Shiga-like toxin SLT-II subunit A Clostridium perfringens, epsilon toxin gene plus Shiga-like toxin SLT-II subunit B Clostridium perfringens, type A enterotoxin gene) - 153834-57-2 DNA (Escherichia coli strain TK-051 clone Conotoxin pKTN1050 Shiga-like toxin SLT-II subunit A Conotoxin - 123210-68-4 gene) - 153834-59-4 Verotoxin 1 (Shiga shigella B subunit) - Modeccin 620190-09-2 Modeccin - 65988-88-7 Staphylococcal enterotoxins Ricin Staphylococcal enterotoxin A (Staphylococcus Ricin - 9009-86-3 aureus gene SEA) - 915245-87-3 Staphylococcal enterotoxin B (Staphylococcus Saxitoxin aureus aureus strain COL gene seb) - 811333- Saxitoxin - 35523-89-8 16-1 Staphylococcal enterotoxin C-bovine (Staphylococcus aureus host cattle gene sec- Any reference to a micro-organism or toxin bov) - 349587-80-0 includes: Staphylococcal enterotoxin E (Staphylococcus aureus) - 197981-85-4 (a) any genetic material containing any nucleic acid sequence Tetrodotoxin - associated with the pathogenicity of the Tetrodotoxin - 4368-28-9 micro-organism or - for the coding of the toxin; and Viscum Album Lectin 1 (Viscumin) Viscum Album Lectin 1 - 83590-17-4 (b) any genetically modified organism containing any such sequence. Volkensin toxin Volkensin toxin - 91933-11-8 Any reference to a toxin includes subunits of the toxin. ANIMAL PATHOGENS African horse sickness virus Lumpy skin disease virus African swine fever virus Newcastle disease virus Bluetongue virus Peste des petits ruminants virus Classical swine fever virus Rift Valley fever virus Contagious bovine pleuropneumonia Rabies and rabies-related Lyssaviruses Foot and mouth disease virus Rinderpest virus Goat pox virus Sheep pox virus Hendra virus (Equine morbillivirus) Swine vesicular disease virus Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) as Vesicular stomatitis virus defined in Annex I(2) of Council Directive 2005/94/EC(a) Any reference to a micro-organism includes: (a) intact micro-organisms; (b) micro-organisms which have been genetically modified by any means, but retain the ability to cause serious harm to animal health; (c) any nucleic acid derived from a micro- organism listed in this Schedule (synthetic or naturally derived, contiguous or fragmented, in host chromosomes or in expression vectors) that can encode infectious or replication competent forms of any of the listed micro- organisms. .
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