AVOIDING THE PLAGUE: AN ASSESSMENT OF US PLANS AND FUNDING FOR COUNTERING BIOTERRORISM Robert Sherman Thinking Center for Strategic Smarter and Budgetary Assessments About Defense CSBA CSBAonline.org Avoiding the Plague: An Assessment of US Plans and Funding for Countering Bioterrorism By Robert Sherman April 2007 ABOUT THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) is an independent, nonpartisan policy research institute established to promote innovative thinking and debate about national security strategy and investment options. CSBA’s goal is to enable policymakers to make informed decisions on matters of strategy, security policy and resource allocation. CSBA provides timely, impartial and insightful analyses to senior decision makers in the executive and legislative branches, as well as to the media and the broader national security community. CSBA encourages thoughtful participation in the development of national security strategy and policy, and in the allocation of scarce human and capital resources. CSBA’s analysis and outreach focuses on key questions related to existing and emerging threats to US national security. Meeting these challenges will require transforming the national security establishment, and we are devoted to helping achieve this end. The author of this report, Robert Sherman, served as Technology Area Manager for the Chemical Biological and Radiological Technology Alliance 2003–2005. Previously, he served as the Strategic Security Director of the Federation of American Scientists, as the State Department’s Deputy Chief Landmine Policy Negotiator, and as a national security staffer for the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee and various Members of Congress. He created the current U.S. National Landmine Policy. Currently, he is Chief Operating Officer of Terra Segura International. Mr. Sherman would like to thank Mathew Meselson of Harvard University and his wife, Jean Guillemin, for their deep and invariably accurate insights, and Jonathan Tucker for his invaluable, authoritative and intense contributions. Raphael Dell Ratta of RANSAC, Alan Pearson of the Arms Control Center, Brad Smith of the University of Pittsburgh Center for Biosecurity, and various former colleagues at the State Department provided key insights and data points. CSBA’s Vice President for Budget Studies, Steve Kosiak, provided guidance and editing throughout the research and writing process. 1667 K Street, NW Suite 900 Washington, DC 20006 Tel. 202-331-7990 Fax 202-331-8019 http://www.CSBAonline.org Contents Executive Summary ........................................................ i Prevention ..................................................................... iii Defense ........................................................................ iv Attacking Bioterrorist Targets ........................................... vii Strengthening US efforts to combat bioterrorism ............... viii Chapter 1: Overview of Bioterrorism Threat ................... 1 Lethality ........................................................................ 2 Medical Treatment and Other Countermeasures ................... 6 Acquisition and Employment ............................................ 8 Acquiring the Biological Agent ......................................... 10 Manufacturing the Agent ............................................. 11 Stabilization of the Agent ............................................ 12 Dispersing the Agent ................................................... 13 Contagious Diseases ................................................... 15 Comparison with Other WMD ........................................... 18 Offense-Defense Balance ................................................ 20 The Historical Record and Future Prospects ....................... 22 Is a Mass-Casualty Bioterrorist Attack Likely? .................... 24 Hope for the Best, Prepare for the Plausible ...................... 26 Federal Funding for Counterbioterrorism Programs ............. 31 Approaches to Combating Bioterrorism ............................. 34 Chapter 2: Preventing Bioterrorism ............................. 39 Facilities and Personnel Security ...................................... 42 Recommendations ...................................................... 45 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) ............................. 49 Recommendations ...................................................... 51 Export controls ............................................................. 54 Recommendations ...................................................... 58 Threat Reduction Programs ............................................. 59 Recommendations ...................................................... 66 Chapter 3: Defending Against Bioterrorism .................. 68 Medical Countermeasures ............................................... 69 Physical Protection ..................................................... 71 Vaccines and Therapeutics ........................................... 73 Facilitization .............................................................. 80 Detection and Characterization Systems ........................... 83 Structural, Organizational and Other Challenges ................ 85 Dark Winter and Other Bioterrorism Exercises ................ 85 Hurricane Katrina and Other Natural Disasters ................ 92 Recommendations ...................................................... 93 Chapter 4: Attacking Bioterrorist Targets .................... 99 Military Challenges ....................................................... 101 Political challenges ....................................................... 102 Recommendations ....................................................... 104 Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) .............................. 109 Conclusions ................................................................ 111 Glossary ..................................................................... 115 Executive Summary The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, sparked grave concern that the United States might be struck by terrorists armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Typically, policymakers and analysts include nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological weapons in this category. Of these WMD, biological agents may pose the greatest danger. Like nuclear weapons, biological weapons can, under the right circumstances, cause massive casualties. Compared to nuclear weapons, however, biological weapons may be substantially easier to acquire. To be sure, the ease with which a terrorist group could acquire and effectively use biological weapons to inflict mass casualties has been overstated by some. Moreover, for practical reasons many terrorist groups (and perhaps most of the largest and most capable groups) may be disinclined to employ any weapon to cause mass casualties. Nevertheless, for planning purposes, it is prudent to assume that, in the foreseeable future, one or more terrorist groups will acquire the means to use biological weapons to cause mass casualties, and be inclined to launch such an attack. Biological weapons consist of toxins, non-contagious and contagious bacteria and viruses, and, potentially, genetically-engineered “designer” agents. The most dangerous—though, in the near-term, probably least likely—biological weapon would be a contagious, highly virulent designer agent. In order to combat the threat posed by bioterrorism, the United States is pursuing an approach consisting of the following three elements: • Preventing terrorists from acquiring biological weapons or the means of effectively employing those weapons to cause mass casualties, through non-military means; i • Defending against a terrorist attack with biological weapons, once it has been launched, through the use of various measures capable of detecting, protecting against, and mitigating the effects of such an attack; and • Attacking and destroying terrorists’ biological warfare capabilities through preventive or retaliatory operations. Altogether, federal spending directly related to preventing and defending against a possible attack with biological weapons currently (fiscal year 2007) amounts to about $8 billion a year. This represents an increase of some 330 percent in real (inflation-adjusted) terms from the level of funding provided for these programs and activities prior to the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Far more is spent annually acquiring and supporting the kinds of military capabilities that might be used to conduct an attack against a bioterrorist site. However, since almost all of these capabilities would also be used to carry out combat operations against the many other targets the US military might be required to strike, these costs cannot reasonably be attributed solely to combating bioterrorism. Adopting a multifaceted approach to combating bioterrorism makes sense. However, current policies, programs and activities do not, in some cases, adequately address the challenge posed by bioterrorism, either as that threat exists today or as it is likely to develop in coming years. It should be possible to address some of these gaps and shortfalls by shifting resources both within and between different program areas. In part, this is because a significant amount of waste and inefficiency appears to have accompanied the rapid increases in biodefense funding that occurred in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. But substantially improving U.S.