After the guns fall silent Sustainable peace analysis and risk mapping for post-conflict Angola
Development Workshop – Angola
supported by
International Development Research Centre (IDRC) Netherlands Institute for Southern Africa (NIZA) Christian Aid (UK)
Luanda – March 2006 Contents
1 Introduction 1.1 Problem statement 1.2 Objectives
2 Angola: 40 years of rapid change 2.1 Late colonial period social change 2.2 Social change during conflict 2.3 Post-conflict: achievements and questionable assumptions
3 Key issues for post-conflict reconstruction 3.1 Migration and social geography 3.2 Institutions 3.3 Livelihoods 3.4 Poverty and vulnerability
4 Analysis of conflict risks
5 Mitigating conflict risks
6 Recommendations for external players
References
Annexes
2 After the guns fall silent: Sustainable peace analysis and risk- mapping for post-conflict Angola
1 Introduction
This report is based on a assessment of post-conflict Angola by Development Workshop, carried out in 2004 and 2005 through a review of existing recent research and situation reports, interviews with key informants, visits to four Provinces1 and localised case studies in these four Provinces.
The aims of the report are to create awareness of the challenges of creating a sustainable peace in Angola and create an awareness of the issues, opportunities and constraints for Angola four years after the ceasefire of April 2002.
1.1 Problem statement
Violent conflict in Angola ended in early 2002 after almost 40 years of conflicts2, though a situation of “not peace but not war” continues in Cabinda Province between the Angolan army (FAA) and separatist movements. The “Luena Memorandum” of April 2002 between the FAA and the military wing of UNITA re-initiated the Lusaka peace protocol of November 1994, and led to the incorporation of some UNITA troops in the national army, the effective demobilisation of the rest of UNITA troops, civilian administration and free movement throughout the country, the abandonment of camps by displaced people and the return of refugees from neighbouring countries. It has been widely recognised however that major challenges remain in the achievement of a true and sustainable peace for Angola, as in almost all post-conflict contexts. The post-conflict transition involves a large number of processes (economic, social and political) that have to be carried out under difficult circumstances. In Angola, physical, human and social capital has been lost during a long-term conflict. There are thus enormous challenges in transforming the cease-fire into a sustainable peace and in ensuring that the country does not, once again, lapse into violence.
It has also been recognised that progress with the various post-conflict processes has been uneven, and that a lack of progress with the key post-conflict transition processes could have important implications for creating a sustainable peace. It is widely recognised (internationally and nationally) that there is only a short “window of opportunity” after the end of open conflict in which to do create a sustainable peace.
Development Workshop recognised that is was important to understand progress with the post- conflict processes, and their viability and sustainability, and to identify any problems with implementation of these processes. Development Workshop recognised that it is particularly important to monitor progress, and to understand the dynamics of and challenges to peace, in areas distant from the capital where the challenges are greatest, where the capacity to implement some of the post-conflict processes is probably weakest and where a lack of progress may go unnoticed. Only if progress is monitored, and the dynamics of and challenges to peace understood, will it be possible to advocate actions that support peace-building.
Development Workshop also recognised that is was important to understand more about what had happened during the years of conflict. There is an increasing realisation that chronic and prolonged conflict causes important socio-political and socio-demographic transformations, ranging from changes in household structure and domestic gender relations, to the reorganization of local community authority and institutions. These local social processes in turn affect peace- building and reconstruction efforts. As much attention needs to be paid in reconstruction efforts to local social relations and institutions as to national reconstruction and rebuilding state-level
1 Zaire, Huambo, Moxico and Benguela 2 Twenty-seven years of conflict between Independence and 2002, during which there were some short periods of peace, preceded by fourteen years of Independence struggle mainly affecting the extreme east and north of Angola.
3 institutions. Local social relations can be affected by conflict and the post-conflict environments, and they have an impact on peace-building and reconstruction. As much attention needs to be paid in peace-building to unresolved tensions within society as to resolving conflict between national-level parties who are contesting state power. Rebuilding national institutions will not necessarily reconstitute fragmented, disrupted, and significantly transformed societies. For social reconstruction it is necessary to understand more about how the fundamental building blocks of society, such as community and household level relations and organisation, are transformed by prolonged and chronic conflict, and how these transformations affect efforts to assist the transition from conflict to peaceful development.
Therefore during 2004 and 2005 Development Workshop has been carrying out an assessment of post-conflict Angola, the outlook for sustainable peace and future risks. This has been done through a review of existing recent research and situation reports3, interviews with key informants, visits to four Provinces4 and localised case studies in these four Provinces. The main categories of information that have been collected, analysed and organised in a useful form are:- - the main post-conflict processes (such as population movements linked to return of refugees, closure of camps for displaced people and demobilisation of UNITA soldiers) - the state of infrastructure and the existence of plans to rehabilitate that infrastructure - the functioning of infrastructure or social services and plans to make it more functional - the functioning of local administration and community structures - the vulnerability of the population, according to social grouping and geographical location - the existence or risks of conflict, latent or open, in communities or between communities or outsiders.
Field studies were carried out in four provinces representing different geo-social regions of Angola. These were chosen to demonstrate a range of different settlement and reintegration issues. This permitted the mapping of a range of risk situations where different configurations of actors come into contact with each other in their attempts to reintegrate at the end of the war. Research in Huambo, Benguela and Moxico was carried out by the Development Workshop team with grants from Christian Aid and NIZA5. IDRC6 has supported the extension of the study to Zaire province in Northern Angola. The field research was supplemented with documentation research which draws upon, largely unpublished, ‘grey’ documentation produced by Development Workshop and other partners drawing on research from other provinces including Kuando Kubango, Kwanza Sul, Lunda Sul and Uige. The World Bank has supported the desk research.
1.2 Objectives
The overall aim of this research project was to create awareness of the challenges of creating a sustainable peace in Angola and create an awareness of the issues, opportunities and constraints for Angola four years after the ceasefire of April 2002.
The objectives were to examine the impact of the prolonged and chronic conflict in Angola and of the processes that have occurred since the end of the conflict, and from this assess what needs to be addressed after such a long-running conflict and what support Angola requires in post-conflict period.
3 Such as the World Food Programme’s Vulnerability Assessments, situation reports of various UN agencies, provincial profiles produced for the Government’s reconstruction programmes, Government plans for infrastructure rehabilitation, vulnerability studies carried out for the Social Action Fund and research being carried out for the NGO Land Network about land conflicts. 4 Zaire, Huambo, Moxico and Benguela 5 The Netherlands Institute for Southern Africa 6 International Development Research Centre’s office for Eastern and Southern Africa in Nairobi.
4 This has been done by examining some of the processes that have occurred over the last 40 years in Angola, from the last years of the colonial period, which were years of rapid change, through the years of conflict and the first four years of the post-conflict period. These processes are examined in Section 2 of the report, which covers brings together recent information about the impact of the war on the population, and on processes such as re-integration and normalisation. It questions assumptions that are often made about the return of displaced people, re-integration and normalisation and suggests that these processes are far from complete. It questions the assumption, implicitly made in many post-conflict situations, that the end of conflict in itself is sufficient to lead to the resolution of social issues that arose during the conflict.
Section 3 of the report examines more closely a number of key issues, namely migration and social geography, local institutions, livelihoods and vulnerability. Section 4 is a Conflict Risk Analysis: it examines the implications of the various process and the key issues for human security and risks of future conflicts. Section 5 is about mitigating conflict risks: it makes recommendations for organisations that are providing support to Angola in the post-conflict period.
5 2 Angola: 40 years of rapid change
The current context of Angola is the result of many years of rapid economic and social change in Angola, throughout the era of effective colonial occupation (beginning at the end of the 19th Century) and post-Independence. Social and economic change accelerated at the end of the colonial era and Angola changed rapidly between 1961 and 1975. Yet there is a lack of information of the various social and economic changes in Angola,
This report will begin by examining some of the processes of change that have taken place in Angola. It will then go on to examine some of their implications: for poverty, vulnerability, access to resources, institutions and conflict risks.
2.1 Late colonial period social change
There were significant social changes in Angola in the pre-Independence period, particularly the last 15 years of the colonial era. Although the pre-Independence war was limited to eastern and northern border areas, it led to significant population movements. There was a mass migration of people in 1961 from the north of Angola, mainly to Kinshasa and other areas of the Congo (now the RDC), because of the violent reaction of the Portuguese colonial power to the uprisings in the north at that period. There were also movements of population in Moxico Province during the 1960s and 1970s due to the guerrilla war (which may have been small-scale but had local effects).
During this period there were also significant population movements for economic reasons, both forced migration (the “contract”) and voluntarily. The inhabitants of the Central Plateau (the Ovimbundu) were particularly likely to migrate, and surveys now show that their language, Mbundu, is found in most Provinces of the country. The central coastal areas of Angola (such as Benguela) are now considered to be part of the area of the Ovimbundu, which was not the case 100 years ago. Young people have been particularly likely to migrate, as they have perceived rural social institutions as holding them back from economic advancement. Surveys in rural areas (such as those by Rede da Terra7) indicate in many areas groups of people from other areas (particularly the Central Plateau) living in rural communities. These are often people who migrated (or whose parents migrated) during the colonial era and have been unable to return.
Integration into the colonial economy also caused significant social changes, particularly in the centre of the country. Customary institutions were drawn into the colonial administrative system and land tenure systems became more individualised and less communal8. The economy and the customs of the Ovimbundu as described by Childs9 (based on field studies in the 1940s and 1950s in the Central Plateau) had been significantly transformed by the 1970s. Change was less rapid however in areas where the colonial economy had not penetrated so much, such as the southern pastoral areas and the extreme east of Angola.
7 Rede da Terra, 2005 8 Pacheco, 1991 and Pacheco, 2001 9 Childs, 1949
6 2.2 Social change during conflict
Large areas of Angola were insecure during the conflict, effectively controlled by neither side. Richardson10 describes these as UNITA “pillage zones” which UNITA did not control and regularly raided. However they were not effectively protected or fully administered by the Government either, and the army or police might also loot them. Some people fled from these areas, either before being affected directly by conflict or afterwards, some were forcibly removed from these areas by the army or local authorities, while others were unable to flee from these areas.
There were also areas described by Richardson as UNITA’s “tax zones”. These were areas that were under UNITA’s control for several years. UNITA provided few services in these areas11 but did offer some protection and peasant farmers were able to remain in these areas and farm. However those living in “tax zones” had to provide food and labour to UNITA. From 1998 onwards until the end of the war, UNITA was under increasing pressure due to international sanctions and from the Government army, and its demands became heavier and it was less able to provide protection. The population became directly affected by incursions of the army, and some were forced to flee or had their houses destroyed. Some were forcibly removed by the army from the war zones.
The most visible impact of the prolonged post-Independence conflict has been population displacement, and much of the literature produced during the years of war focused on the displacement of population. There was little research about what happened in the conflict zones themselves. Displaced people are those who fled, or were forcibly removed, from conflict areas. Several million12 people were displaced because of war during the period 1975 to 2002. Field research shows, however, that for the people concerned there are issues that are just as important as displacement:
- dramatic loss of assets - forced recruitment and abduction of children - dispersal of families and communities - planting of land-mines - destruction of infrastructure - further weakening of customary institutions.
People who were able to flee from conflict areas before they were attacked were often able to conserve their assets, and were able to move to areas where there was more support (or possibly they left potential war zones because they had better contacts in the towns or knew of other opportunities); those who fled after being affected by war were less likely to have conserved their assets, and those who were forced to move by the army or local authorities were least likely to conserve their assets as they were usually asked to leave without notice. Recent research in Huambo Province13 found that just over a half of children (aged 8 to 21) had moved house at some time, almost always for some reason due to conflict. More than a third of these had moved more than once. But, more importantly, two-thirds of children reported that their house had at some time been destroyed in armed conflict, accompanied by loss of family assets. Three-quarters of children had either been displaced due to armed conflict or had their house destroyed. Since the end of the war in 2002 it has become clear that substantial numbers of children, both male and female, were kidnapped by UNITA in conflict areas and forced to be porters, camp- workers and eventually combatants. Escape was almost impossible, and release only came in 2002, by which time many were already adults. In the attacks in which they were captured, adult family members were often killed or forced to flee. After kidnap, children were separated from siblings and moved over long distances to guerrilla bases. These children therefore have lost
10 Richardson, 2001 11 As described by Richardson, UNITA provided services mainly to its core supporters, in Jamba and in Huambo (1993-4), Bailundo (1994-1999) and Andulo (1994-1999) when these were under UNITA’s control. 12 OCHA estimated that there were 4 million internally displaced persons plus another 457,000 refugees at the time of the cease-fire in April 2002. 13 Christian Children’s Fund research in 2004 about children in conflict
7 contact with family members. Kidnapped girls often have had children, who they bring up unsupported. These young people have few assets and no social networks to support them. They rarely are able to remember an “area of origin”, do not know the location of their original family and community, and have few resources to pay for travel back to their home areas14.
In some cases communities have been displaced together, as a group, from conflict zones. They have decided to move together, or were forced to move by the Government. But in many other cases, displacement has meant the dispersal of communities, especially where this occurred in the midst of conflict. This has led to the breakdown of rural community structures.
2.3 Post-conflict: achievements and questionable assumptions
Since the ceasefire of April 2002 there have been many achievements. Angola was the first country to transform the United Nations’ Guiding Principals for Internally Displaced People (IDPs) into national legislation. Almost 4 million Internally Displaced People were free to move at the end of the war. Refugees living in neighbouring countries were free to return (estimated as numbering 457,000). Over 100,000 UNITA ex-combatants were disarmed and demobilised by mid – 2003 in a programme managed almost entirely by the Government of Angola. UNITA transformed itself from a military movement into a parliamentary opposition party.
However there is still insufficient information about the return to normality since 2002 and some statements made are based on questionable assumptions. The macro-level data about returning or re-settling populations does not reveal the complexity of population movements and re-integration strategies, and masks the fact that there are groups of people who are not following the assumed movements of population and that some of these are groups are ignored in re-integration programmes and are in situations of high vulnerability15
While it is true that there were some spectacular movements of displaced people returning to their places of origin in 2002 and 2003, these appear to be people who were displaced in the last phase of the war (1998 to 2002) and had been displaced to areas close to their area of origin: they had not lost the skills of farming or the social contacts with their area of origin. Not all the 4 million displaced people and 457,000 refugees have in fact returned to their areas of origin: statements such as “in 2003-2004, 4 million displaced people returned to their areas of origin” are commonly made16 but there is not in fact sufficient data to support statements of this kind, which appear to assume that all displaced people who were free to move did so. A survey in Huambo Province shows that 40 % of those who were displaced have not returned to what they consider to be their area of origin17. All surveys in rural areas suggest that the population of rural settlements is very much below what it was before the war. IN rural settlements there tend to be more women than men and there are more older people18.
As is the case with DDR19 programmes in many other countries, there is also little information about the resettlement and re-integration of former UNITA combatants following their disarmament and demobilisation. Re-integration programmes took more than two years to get underway after the ceasefire in Angola. There are strong indications that, while some of the demobilised have returned to rural areas, many of the demobilised have not gone to their “areas of origin” and remain in peri-urban and municipal areas. This is because they no longer have an “area of origin” (having
14 Christian Children’s Fund research on kidnapped children 15 For example refugees who return spontaneously to Angola because the official process is too slow, under-age soldiers, single women who were living with UNITA. 16 For example in the “Interim Strategy Note for the Republic of Angola” of the World Bank” of January 2005, but also made in other official documents. 17 Christian Children’s Fund research in 2004 about children in conflict 18 Rede da Terra, 2005. Also field studies for this research 19 Programmes of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re-integration of former combatants
8 been combatants for a considerable period of time during which their original communities have been transformed and dispersed) and because they wish to avoid potential conflicts in areas where they may be viewed with suspicion. There are special challenges for those who were forcibly recruited as underage soldiers, for females and for the large numbers of handicapped ex- combatants. Many of these have received no direct benefits (because the assumption was made that they were part of families) and because of long delays in re-integration programme for vulnerable groups. These groups are particularly likely to have lost contact with their original community, which may have been destroyed or dispersed at the time that they were kidnapped.
Where ex-UNITA combatants have gone back to rural villages in their areas of origin, the evidence is that they have obtained land and the re-integration has not provoked conflict. Those who have not returned to these areas appear to have feared that they would not be well received, so have gone elsewhere to avoid conflict. They have been away for a long time and do not expect to be able to make a living from agriculture. Others no longer identify with an “area of origin” and have decided to try to make their living elsewhere, where there are other opportunities or where they have made some social contacts. This applies particularly to those who were kidnapped by UNITA during the war: they have lost contact with their families, or their families were killed at the time when they were kidnapped. They were moved long distances around the country. Some were as young as ten and were unable to identify their areas of origin.
There have been refugees from Angola in Zambia and the RDC for more than 20 years. Angolan refugees in neighbouring countries have also been free to return since 2002. Official statistics indicate that 80% of the estimated number of refugees (457,000) had returned by the end of 2005. However 42% of those who are shown in official UNHCR data as having returned are classified as spontaneous, unassisted returns and there is no information of how and where they have returned to Angola. Field research in Moxico and Zaire Provinces shows that return to areas of origin in border regions devastated by war is problematic. “Areas of origin” frequently are inaccessible (due to land mines or damaged infrastructure, such as in the south of Moxico Province) and/or lack services. Many areas of Moxico Province have been uninhabited for since the early 1980s (when UNITA extended its influence northwards to the Benguela Railway, the railway ceased operating and there were battles involving the Cuban and South African armies), and re-establishing services, infrastructure and rural livelihoods will be a long-term process. The majority of those who returned from Zambia to Moxico Province were still, in 2005, living in makeshift settlements around the main settlements. These returnees report that there are many Angolans who are still in Zambia, despite pressure to return, because they are aware of the difficult conditions for resettlement and re-integration in Moxico Province, their main “area of origin” 20.
Population movements continue towards peri-urban areas of the main cities in the post-conflict period, more than outweighing the movement from peri-urban to rural areas, and most of the displaced who migrated to urban areas appear to have decided to stay there, at least for the time being. These field studies for this research show that there are significant numbers of people living around cities and small towns: some are ex-soldiers from UNITA, others are displaced people who were displaced to those areas, and others are displaced people who are making a return to rural areas in stages. Interviews with such people indicate that they are trying to maintain their former livelihood strategy while exploring the possibilities of developing a rural livelihood strategy: they have begun to build a house in a Provincial town while still having family in a coastal city and while exploring the possibility of moving to a rural area eventually. The field studies for this research show that there are still people living in some former IDP camps: they may not be the original IDPs from those camps, but appear to be people from various origins who have not found it possible to effectively resettle and re-integrate anywhere else.
Interviews with people in small towns, peri-urban areas and former IDP camps indicate a large
20 Returned refugees who were interviewed in Moxico Province reported that they had been told that they could, and should, return to Angola and that the camps would close. There have also been international press reports to the same effect. However official sources claim that refugees took the initiative to return to Angola, and that there had been no pressure on Angolans to leave the refugee camps in Zambia.
9 number for reasons for not immediately returning to rural areas. Interviews in rural areas confirm that these are barriers to effective resettlement in rural areas. There are severe difficulties of re- establishing a rural survival strategy: there is a lack of oxen, ploughs, axes, hoes, seeds and fertilisers; access to services is poor; much effort is required to bring land back into cultivation, the marketing opportunities and lacking. People who are impoverished do not have the means necessary to invest in re-establishing themselves in a barely functioning rural economy.
The lack of secondary education opportunities in rural areas is a key factor for those whose children have had access to education while they were displaced, and the quality of education declines markedly away from urban areas. All services and infrastructure are poor in rural areas, and in particular in the more remote eastern and northern areas where refugees are trying to re- establish themselves.
In many cases people who have been displaced or been with UNITA have been away for long periods, up to 25 years, and lived in distant areas and have married people from distant areas: these have sometimes brought their spouses with them from other areas of the country. It is unrealistic to expect that they will return to their areas of origin, especially those whose area of origin is the Central Plateau where there is competition over land. They may have lost the knowledge for small-scale farming and have lost contact with relatives in their area of origin. Some have developed a survival strategy in another area and, although this may be unsatisfactory and not offer many opportunities for accumulating assets, it is less risky than trying to develop a new one in an unknown area. There are significant numbers of people from the Central Plateau in Kuando Kubango and Moxico Provinces. These have been there since before 1975, or are from families who were encouraged by UNITA to follow them when they retreated from Huambo in 1976. These people seem unlikely to return to the Central Plateau, even though they are in competition for land and other resources from local people.
Demobilisation
In 2002, 34 Quartering Areas (or Gathering Areas) were set up to accommodate UNITA troops and to permit the incorporation of some into the Government army and to permit the demobilisation of the majority21. Attached to each Quartering Area was an area for wives, children and other dependents of UNITA soldiers (Family Gathering Areas). The process of registration and demobilisation took longer than originally anticipated, but these ‘Areas’ were closed in 2003 and all UNITA troops were effectively demobilised22.
While some former UNITA soldiers have undoubtedly returned to “areas of origin”23 there are indications that many have not. Having been in the army for many years (and the data suggest that 60% had been recruited before 1991 and a quarter had been recruited before 1980)24 there are many who have lost contact with their areas of origin. They do not know what their reception is likely to be. The only way of making a living in their area of origin would be from farming, which they have not practiced for many years. Much of the food that UNITA consumed during the war was stolen from farmers’ fields or by attacking lorries or towns, and it was only in the secure bases in the extreme east of the country that UNITA cultivated on a large scale25. Many of the demobilised former-UNITA soldiers have settled in and around towns and cities26. Data from IRSEM27 suggests that quite large numbers have settled in the administrative areas around District towns. Interviews with demobilised former-UNITA soldiers in small towns indicate that, while they were in the Quartering Areas, they visited the surrounding areas and in this way located
21 The number quoted in reports varies as some large Quartering Areas were later divided, and some Quartering Areas do not occur on all lists. 22 For more detailed information about this process see Porto and Parsons, 2003. 23 Development Workshop, 2004 is a study of demobilised UNITA soldiers who have gone to rural areas and their access to land. This indicates that there are some former UNITA soldiers who have gone to rural areas in Huambo Province and have managed to access land to cultivate (though in small quantities) but only if they have close family ties to the village. The report suggests that there are others who have lost their links with rural areas, have not been able to access land and have therefore gone to urban areas. 24 Development Workshop, 2004 25 Richardson, 2001. Stavrou, 2005. Interviews for this research. 26 In a few cases demobilised former-UNITA soldiers have created new settlements close to their Quartering Area (such as Chiteta in Huambo Province) but the sites of most Quaterng Areas and surrounding areas are now empty. 27 The Government body responsible for support to demobilised soldiers
10 relatives. They rarely visited the area where they were born, or where they had lived when they were recruited, as this was often too far away. If they did manage to go there, they usually found nobody. It was more usual to find a relative or friend in a town and this person would help them to re-integrate socially and economically. Alternatively people who managed to locate no relatives or friends got off the lorry from the Quartering Area in the first town that it stopped as “it seemed as good a place as any”28.
Other reasons mentioned for not returning to rural areas include the possibility of conflicts in areas of origin, and the fear of investing too much in a return to a rural area before the elections planned for 2006. The experience of many people has been that transitions where power is contested (such as 1975 and 1992) leads to conflicts and in those conflicts they are likely to lose their assets and livelihoods, so it is prudent to wait and see what happens in the elections before investing too much.
There has been a significant reduction of international aid to Angola and humanitarian assistance has not been transformed into aid to resettlement or re-integration. Field studies show how little outside assistance there has been. The family is a much more important source of assistance than any official aid agency, and those who have lost track of their families face significant difficulties.
“Vulnerable groups” and demobilisation
There were large numbers of dependents (women and children) in the Family Areas alongside the Quartering Areas. It was assumed by those responsible for the demobilisation that these were all dependents of soldiers. Demobilisation benefits were supplied to soldiers only and it was assumed that those in the Family Areas would indirectly benefit through being dependents29. All those under-18 were considered as dependents or as “minors accompanying soldiers” even though some of them had directly participated in combat and many more had transported material during the war and worked in soldiers’ houses. Interviews subsequently with women and those under-18 suggest that there were some who did not benefit from the demobilisation package, even indirectly. There were young people who had been
28 Interviews for this research in Bocoio and Katchiungo. 29 Very small numbers of women were considered as soldiers and received benefits directly.
11 kidnapped who did not have a family and who were abandoned by the soldier that they were accompanying when he left the Quartering Area. Some soldiers had several wives and abandoned some of them on leaving the Quartering Area.
There are some women and young people who were with UNITA who did not go through the Quartering Areas because they assumed that they would receive no benefits. And there are also some who, during the last phases of the war when UNITA was under a great deal of pressure, managed to escape or were “recuperated by the Government Army”. In a few cases, interviews indicate, young people were found at the end of the war by their original families who went looking for missing relatives in the Quartering Areas and refugee camps in Zambia and the towns close to the war zones (such as Luena and Menongue, in Moxico and Kuando Kubango Provinces respectively, where many of those who escaped or were found by the Government army were sheltering at the end of the war): in fact it is remarkable how much effort some families made after the end of conflict to try to locate missing relatives. However it is likely to have been only relatively wealthy families who were able to travel by aeroplane and car to do this, and there were many in these places who were not found by relatives.
Re-establishment of agricultural production
Interviews by Development Workshop in Huambo, Benguela, Zaire and Moxico showed that the amount of land cultivated is small and that there are significant difficulties in re-establishing farming. This is confirmed by the surveys by Rede da Terra30.
Development Workshop (2004) estimates that the amount of land being cultivated by those who have been demobilised in Huambo Province is very limited. Half have less than two hectares, which would seem to be the absolute minimum for survival. The actual amount being cultivated seems to be less than one hectare.
Clearing land that has been uncultivated from many years is difficult. There is a shortage of seeds, and they are poor quality. There is a shortage of oxen and agricultural tools, and there are no services of information and advice. In the central plateau soil fertility is low. There are few programmes that provide systematic support to re-establishing agricultural production.
It is other family members who provide credit to enable those who are re-establishing themselves to begin to trade. It is mainly through the family that land is accessed in rural areas (except in some of the more sparsely populated areas of the south and east of Angola where there is an abundance of land and village institutions will make land available to people from outside the community, though in these areas the demand for land is low because of the vast distances from markets and services and the difficulties of obtaining inputs). There are few indications of official assistance to people to re-settle and re-establish themselves, and various indications that aid agencies and the Government of Angola believe that this can happen spontaneously. Although in 2002 and 2003 there were some statements by the Government and aid agencies that suggested that they would make land available for resettlement at 500 sites in 384 Comunas (for people who prefer not to return to an “area of origin”) the indications are that this has only happened in very few places. There are also few indications of any particular assistance to areas that were identified in the UN Appeal for Transitional Assistance as requiring support because of the large numbers of people expected to return and the lack of services and infrastructure. There are thus few mechanisms to assist the considerable number of people who, realistically, are unlikely to return to an area of origin. And the assistance for those who do return to areas of origin appears to have been extremely limited in relation to their loss of assets and the level of destruction of infrastructure. People who try to resettle by their own efforts find significant barriers to re-integration: access to assets such as land is limited for those who are not native to an area and do not have family ties to an area. Other types of assistance, such as loans or information, are mainly provided by the extended family and interviewees report little assistance from the State, NGOs, churches or communities. Those who resettle away from their
30 Rede da Terra, 2005
12 areas of origin tend to be marginalised and particularly vulnerable31.
Thus while the context in Angola has been transformed since 2002, it would be misleading to say that there has been a return to “normality”. The very terms “normality” and “re-integration” are questionable in a country like Angola where there are few remains of a framework into which people can re-integrate. There are still many people in Angola who have not “returned”: and there are significant numbers of people (both those who have returned and those who have not) who have not resettled and re-integrated (economically, socially or psychologically). Many people who are trying to re-establish themselves say something like: “We are no longer displaced people, but we are living just like displaced people”.
Humanitarian agencies and Government often focus on displacement and, as a result, make unrealistic assumptions about “re-integration” when conflict ends and people are free to return to the “areas of origin” and about Both of these assumptions need to be questioned. Agencies have underestimated the complexity, time and resources needed to invest in post-conflict transition.
Reasons for slow return and resettlement by displaced people32
Many displaced people mention that they have bad memories of the violence that occurred when they fled, and that they associate this with the places where it occurred and prefer not to return there. Many others said that they are waiting until the national elections (planned for 2006) have passed before they decide where they are going to settle; they fear that the elections will create conflict and, having lived through a great deal of conflict that has led to a heavy loss of assets, they do not want to invest again until they sure of greater stability.
People who were displaced lost most of their assets and resources, and do not have enough to rebuild their lives in a rural area. They do not have enough food to live until the next harvest, and they do not have enough money to buy sufficient seeds and tools. The amount of aid from the State or from international agencies is very limited. Some of those who did return to rural areas have come back to spend time in former IDP camps to do odd jobs to earn money as they cannot survive just from agriculture in rural areas. Also people who were displaced, and have lost their assets, often do not have enough money to pay their transport to their “area of origin”.
Those interviewed say that they continue to face uncertainty: there are no clear government plans, and no agreed plan with international donors. Individuals are expected to “re-integrate” but they are expected to re-integrate into a severely damaged economy and have not received clear information about what plans they are supposed to re-integrate with. They have faced considerable uncertainty throughout the war and now prefer not to take their own risks.
A major reason given for not returning to rural areas is poor public services. While public services are poor everywhere, they are slightly better in the towns. Schools in urban areas are more likely to have material and furniture.33 Another common response is that those who have been away from their area of origin for a long time do not know if they have any family in their “area of origin” or if they will be welcome there. In Huambo Province it is only though purchase or inheritance that someone will acquire land in a rural area as communities and community leaders do not have land to allocate. Some are reluctant to return to the places where they were born and from where they were kidnapped because they fear that they will enter into conflict with others (including members of the extended family) if they try to reclaim their land or other assets.
It is also commonly reported that people are reluctant to return to rural areas because they have received reports about accusations of witchcraft in such areas. In the circumstances of rural areas where the health
31 See particularly Yngstrom, 2005, on the exclusion of people resettling from outside the area. The exclusion from access to land to non-natives is most accentuated in areas such as parts of Huambo Province where there is a shortage of land. In Lunda Sul or Moxico it appears that village leaders will allocate land to those from outside the area, though this tends to be land at some distance from a road or settlement. However in these areas economic re-establishment is hindered by an even greater distance to markets and services and even greater lack of inputs. 32 Semi-structured interviews for this research. Also Personal communication with Christian Children’s Fund regarding research in 2004 about children in conflict. 33 Personal communication with Christian Children’s Fund regarding research in 2004 about children in conflict. Results show that the number of children in secondary education in Huambo is much less further away from the city, and that schools away from the city are much less likely to have furniture and educational material.
13 services are deficient, and where poverty, illness and death are common, an explanation is sought for these phenomena in witchcraft. People are reluctant to move back to these areas for fear of being accused of bringing bad luck to the area. This appears to be particularly so when there is also some dispute about reclaiming assets. Reports from rural areas suggest that there are very few conflicts between people who stayed in rural areas with UNITA and those who fled to government areas. Yet various interviews suggest that some people have avoided going back because they fear that there might be conflicts: conflicts are few because those who might provoke conflicts avoid going back.
3 Key issues for post-conflict reconstruction
The processes of change over the last 40 – 50 years in Angola raise a number of key issues for post-conflict reconstruction.
3.1 Migration and social geography
Population movements have created new forms of settlement that are different from the cohesive, homogeneous, “traditional” rural communities implied by the “return to areas of origin” model. Care is therefore required with the concept of community. There are various types of “communities” throughout the country. Post-conflict reconstruction needs to take into account the fact that, in many cases, the level of social capital is low, and that there area also some cases where there are clear social divisions: different social groups may be in competition or certain groups may be excluded and vulnerable.
As will be discussed below, it is informal, customary institutions at the community level that have been most important for managing local access to resources and managing conflicts. These have their origins in cohesive, homogeneous, “traditional” rural communities. Institutions are weakest where this form of community does not exist. Customary institutions at the community level have “traditional” references that can exclude certain groups, such as women, young people and those perceived as being from outside the community. This presents a challenge for reconstruction.
Much of the migration that has been common in Angola for 40-50 years is unlikely to be reversed. People from Central Plateau are found throughout Angola34. They have migrated in search of work and been displaced by war throughout this period. They are unlikely to return to an area where they no longer have family ties, where there is a shortage of land and where access to land is only available through purchase or through inheritance35.
The population of cities and small towns is still growing. In these places there are people from a wide range of origins and they usually state a preference for the less intense social relations in these areas. Such settlements are heterogeneous, in terms of ethnicity and identity. People in these areas say that their relations with their neighbours are “neither good nor bad”. Often they report that they prefer the less intense social relations of such areas: they avoid too much contact with the rest of the community, “so as to avoid intrigue”. They believe that if they had too many close links with neighbours this would create shocks based on differences in former political allegiances.
In rural areas there are cohesive, homogeneous, “traditional” rural communities, inhabited only by people who are descendants of the original population of that area and belonging to one ethnic group. But there are also rural communities where there are obvious fault lines between different social groups. For example, in many settlements in Zaire Province there are people from Bengo Province and from the Central Plateau who were brought to the north of Angola to work after 1961
34 VAM, 2004a. The database shows that the language of the Centreal Plateau is spoken in a wide range of Provinces away from the Central Plateau. 35 CCF research on kidnapped children includes cases where young people were kidnapped and have lost contact with their family; their parents were originally from the Central Plateau but were living in another place and had in turn lost contact with their areas of origin.
14 when the local people had fled various origins36. A Development Workshop study37 shows that in 2004 there is a wide range of languages spoken in the villages sampled in Huambo Province as some settlements that appear to have been used for re-settlement of people from a wide are in the past. In some settlements there are women who have come to the area as wives of demobilising soldiers. The surveys by Rede da Terra38 indicate that frequently settlements in the north of Angola have people who have come from other areas as migrant workers in the colonial period and are unlikely to return.
In other cases, such as near to Luena (Moxico Province), there are groups of residents, displaced people and returned refugees living in close proximity because the conditions have not been created for them to return to an area where they can resettle. There are also cases where migration in search of work (for example to the diamond areas or to villages where casual agricultural work is available) has led to settlements with people from the area and outside. This also includes migration to Angola from neighbouring countries because of economic crises in neighbouring countries and the perception that Angola, with its oil and diamonds, is a land of opportunity. Despite periodic “operations” to remove illegal migrants they continue to return because there are no regular mechanisms to effectively control this form of migration.
The social divisions within communities are not necessarily ethnic divisions. People of the same ethnic group have in some cases developed different identities. Returning refugees and displaced people (particularly the former) have acquired new skills and habits (and identities) while being away. Refugees have often had opportunities not available to those who stayed. They have learnt new languages and skills. Those returning to the north of Angola have learnt French and Lingala and may have little experience in Portuguese and Kikongo. They have been exposed to, and adopted, new values in the country of exile, and who have adopted attitudes to livelihoods and the informal sector nor the economy that are more prevalent in the RDC than in Angola.
Some returning refugees from Zambia have formed cohesive communities, with high levels of social capital, even though their ethnic origins are different. Shared experiences over many years in the camps in Zambia, and habits of joint discussion and problem resolution, have led to them learning each other’s languages and learning to work together. They had educational opportunities, received new skills from aid programmes, learnt new languages and developed group cohesion despite their disparate origins. There are thus cases of divisions within communities between “residents” and “returnees” from the same ethnic group.
3.2 Institutions
It is well-known that there is a link between violent civil conflict and weak institutions. While there is latent conflict in all societies, “conflicts become violent and grow into war when society and governments are unable to resolve these conflicts”39. Conflict then further weakens institutions by breaking-up communities, deepening mistrust and preventing the State from functioning in an accountable manner to distribute resources and manage conflicts. Post-conflict reconstruction therefore involves rebuilding institutions. “One factor is clear: the primacy of institutions”40. This requires an understanding of exiting institutions and how they have been affected by conflict.
36 Development Workshop field studies for this research. The original population in Zaire Province fled in the early 1960s when the colonial regime tried to concentrate them in settlements where they could be more easily controlled, or to force them to work on Portuguese-owned farms. Labour was brought from the Central Plateau or from Bengo Province to work on Portuguese-owned farms. These groups of labourers, or their descendents, have not returned to their “areas of origin” and are unlikely to. However there has been a return of descendents of those who sought exile in the DRC. This has created highly heterogeneous communities. 37 Development Workshop, 2004. 38 Rede da Terra, 2005. 39 Page 78 of Joseph Hanlon “Roots of civil war: tick all of the above” in Hanlon and Yanacopulos, 2006 40 Page 159 of Tony Addison and S Manssob Murshed “The social contract and violent conflict” in Hanlon and Yanacopulos, 2006
15 In Angola, the field studies for this research and other studies41 have shown that rural customary institutions have survived. They still have an important role in managing local resources and in managing conflicts within communities, and appear to maintain considerable legitimacy to regulate village life. Specific customs and nomenclature vary between areas but a common feature is an accountable and democratic local council representing the main interests in the settlement (known as the Njango in Mbundu) as well as an individual leader (usually known as the soba in most areas, though the original name varies between areas).
However there are also clearly a number of weaknesses. Firstly the linkage between the soba and the colonial administration (and later the post-Independence State) has weakened their legitimacy: in practice they have not been able to obtain support from formal external institutions through their contact with the local administrations, while they have had to transmit orders and information coming from outside. Secondly, as noted above, population migration has led to heterogeneous communities: there are excluded groups (women, young people, and outsiders) in some communities or groups who do not feel that the customary leadership represents them. Legitimacy, based on customary values, has been challenged by those from other groups. There is also a rejection of customary institutions by some younger people or by those who are returning from the cities or from exile.
Thirdly, intuitions of community mutual assistance have declined in importance in Angola even in rural areas. They have declined in importance as individual and family land tenure has grown in importance over communal tenure. Rural institutions of mutual assistance are rarely reported except in the pastoral areas (south of Lubango, Huila Province) and in Kuando Kubango Province42. Community mutual assistance is of little importance in urban and peri-urban areas because of the heterogeneity of the population, who no longer have social links that are the basis of trust and reciprocity for such mechanisms.
What are institutions?
Institutions are rules or norms that govern behaviour in economic, social and political systems and organisations, and so reduce uncertainty in exchange, transactions or cooperation. They are intrinsically linked to enforcement mechanisms. Institutions are sets of working rules that govern the way in which society functions, along with the mechanisms and organisations that monitor and enforce these rules43.
“Institutions are stable, value, recurring patterns of behaviour. “They are complexes of norms and behaviours that persist over time by serving collectively valued purposes. Institutions can be concrete and specific like a nation’s central bank or quite diffuse and general such as the institution of money.”44 They can be modern or customary; international, national or local; have an organisational form, involve various organisations or be diffuse; be formal or informal.
Institutions reduce uncertainty: if rules are widely accepted then it is more likely that people will follow the rules so individuals can plan their own actions on the assumption that others will follow the rules. The rules of the game create expectations of how people will behave to each other, thus reducing the costs of interaction and increasing the benefits. This will have beneficial economic effects: people will invest more when there is less uncertainty about the behaviour of others. High levels of trust characterise societies with strong social contracts and functioning institutions. When this is not the case, people are reluctant to interact with others in ways that exposes them to others’ opportunistic behaviour. Monitoring and accountability are integral parts of strong institutions: institutions work when those involved can clearly see that other parties are acting according to the rules and that there will be sanctions against those who do not follow the rules.
41 Rede da Terra, 2005 42 VAM, 2004a. Results from the database. 43 Ostrom, 1990 44 Page 8 of Uphoff, 1986.
16 The terms “institution” and “organisation” are sometimes (erroneously) interchangeably. Some organisations are institutions (such as a central bank or the courts). But there are institutions that are not organisations (such as “the law”) and organisations that are not institutions.45
Institutions exist at various levels, from the family up to the State. The “social contract” and the “rule of law” are institutions at the level of a nation. They define the relations between rulers and ruled, how national income will be used and distributed, the strategy for development, and how conflicts (differences in interest between different groups and areas) will be managed. “High levels of trust characterise societies with strong social contracts46.” Weak institutions can reflect weak institutions throughout society. Institutions At a local level include customary, village institutions but also more modern ones such as cooperatives or development associations.
Working rules may or may not closely resemble formal laws. Where they do, one can say that society is governed by the rule of law. However in many societies there are strong and legitimate working rules that do not closely resemble the formal laws: many of these are customary local institutions for management of local natural resources. They are strong and legitimate because they are well-known to all those affected by them, and they have worked successfully for many years (or even centuries) in regulating access to local natural resources. They work well in situations where it is clearly defined who is affected by them and what geographical area they include. They can be weakened when there is growing interaction across the boundaries, or when there is movement of people in or out of their area or there is some discontinuity in their operation (conditions that are often provoked by prolonged violent conflict).
Fourthly, many people report that there is a lack of information about matters that affect their lives (such as HIV/AIDS, drugs and alcohol, parenthood, family planning, how to deal with unwanted sexual attention, how to deal with latent conflicts and witchcraft accusations, how to effectively run a micro-business, how to communicate effectively without being aggressive or being too passive). The formal educational system is not equipped to provide this information, but neither are “traditional” educational channels (community leaders, village elders, parents, grandparents). Customary institutions are perceived as having difficulty in fulfilling the traditional educational role as they are not informed about issues in a rapidly changing society. This is one of the reasons for rejection of customary institutions by younger people.
What leads to weak institutions?
Colonial institutions, in all colonies were focused on the colonising country and had the objective of controlling resources for the benefit of the colonisers. There have been few opportunities in Angola for adjusting institutions to reflect the end of the colonial period. Colonial era laws continue to be enforced, in some cases, even if they no longer fit the current context, because nothing else has been created. The prolonged violent conflict has distracted attention from the building of institutions.
One of the objectives of the type of warfare to which Angola was subjected in the 1980s (Low Intensity Conflict) is to weaken institutions and trust in institutions. In the years since Independence the weakness of national institutions has led to a resurgence of customary institutions (that have managed local affairs in the absence of an effective State). There has also been a rise of other informal institutions, such as the informal urban land market that operates at the margin of the law. The fact that the rules of the game of such informal institutions are not completely clear to all those involved creates uncertainties and lack of trust. People who have migrated into urban areas from rural areas, or have resettled in areas where they did not live before have had to learn the rules of the game in the new area. There are also uncertainties caused by the overlap between formal and informal rules.
While customary community institutions have had an important role in managing conflicts within communities, they often find it difficult to deal with conflicts with outside parties. They have difficulty in dealing with conflicts over access to resources that lie between communities or when formal
45 Page 8 of Uphoff, 1986. 46 Page 139 of Tony Addison and S Manssob Murshed “The social contract and violent conflict” in Hanlon and Yanacopulos, 2006.
17 sector institutions claim access to local resources. These are new issues for which customary institutions do not have experience, but the lack of capacity of the State to regulate and coordinate, and the particular weakness of local administrations, means that there is an institutional gap at this level with neither customary nor modern institutions having adequate capacity.
State institutional capacity has been weakened by the chaotic transition from colonial rule and the effects of prolonged, chronic conflict since then. The State has had difficulty in creating a “social contract”47. In particular local administrations are weak, and are seen as weak and as ineffective in dealing with contemporary challenges. This can be seen most clearly in relation to institutions for land tenure, planning and management. The administrative capacity barely exists for recording and arbitrating land tenure rights. This is a due to the lack of trained staff and lack of materials, but also due to poor communications between the State organisations involved, especially between local, Provincial and national levels. There is a low level of trust in such institutions, as they are not transparent and it is unclear how decisions are taken48.
The weakness of official institutions has meant that the informal markets in land and the informal economy have developed with informal institutions, new sets of rules and mechanisms to manage and regulate them. These are unsatisfactory as they are usually unaccountable and lack transparency. However simply removing them is not a solution: they continue to be useful while official institutions do not effectively manage and regulate the economy.
Weakening of the family as an institution
There has been no recent, systematic study of the family as an institution in Angola but there is some evidence that it has also been affected by the social change of the last 40 years. Population movements due to war, temporary or permanent migration (mainly by men) to seek work, marriages outside of the ethnic group of area, the larger number of men (due to war deaths and emigration) and the trend away from the extended family appear to have made the family more unstable. It has been difficult to maintain extended families (and the reciprocal duties of uncles to nephews and nieces, for example) if extended families have moved in different directions or significant numbers of people have been killed, or when some family members have been in an armed group for many years. The extended family has more difficulty in carrying out its role of stabiliser of marriage relations. It is quite common for women to be abandoned, or to be the de facto bread-winners of the household. While the family has been very important in providing assistance to its members in difficulty (given the lack of other institutions to provide this aid) this has meant that those with weak family linkages are left highly vulnerable.
3.3 Livelihoods
Formal sector employment is now scarce in Angola. In the colonial era, particularly after 1961, formal sector employment was important. Peasant farmers in many areas included formal employment in their livelihood strategies49. It is common to hear calls for the Government of Angola to “create employment” though in the short tern it is unrealistic to expect formal sector employment to reach the level of the late colonial era. Formal sector employment at present can be divided between low-skill and low-income, or higher-skill and higher income. The State is an important source of low-skill and low-income employment. The low incomes mean that other family members who are involved in informal trading provide the bulk of the family income. International agencies and companies are important sources of high-skill and high-income employment. People with skills are in demand, and can also sell their skills overseas. This means that the State has difficulty in
47 “When a society operates according to widely accepted rules of the game we say that it has a viable social contract.” “The rules of the game create expectations of how people will behave towards each other, thereby reducing the costs and increasing the benefits of their interaction.” Page 138 of Tony Addison and S Manssob Murshed “The social contract and violent conflict” in Hanlon and Yanacopulos, 2006. See Chatham House, 2005, about the social contract in Angola. 48 Development Workshop, 2004 49 In Huambo Province, seasonal migration to the coffee areas or fish factories was common, while still farming. Similarly farming at weekends was linked to working in the factories of Huambo city during the week. The Benguela Railway was an important source of employment between Benguela and Moxico.
18 retaining highly skilled staff: skilled people within State institutions are concentrated in the capital and the Provincial capitals where conditions are better (though they are lacking in the capitals of remote Provinces). State services at the Municipal and Comuna level are provided by poorly trained staff.
Survival strategies therefore depend on the opportunities that people can create for themselves and thus on the various types of capital available (financial, human and social). Large numbers of people have lost their assets during the conflict and have had few opportunities for replacing them. They also have few skills. Families try to improve their livelihoods by putting various family members to work (or by giving responsibility to children or old people for home-based activities allowing women to work outside the home). Children are more likely to work outside the home when the family is poor: this is essential for survival, but does not overcome the initial inequality: families where a child works continue to be poorer than those where no children work.
In rural areas, peasant farming is a livelihood strategy. However research by Rede da Terra and other NGOs suggests that peasant farming faces significant difficulties in most areas, such as the lack of inputs and difficult access to markets. In almost all cases, farmers are only cultivating a small part of their potential land and yields are low. In only one case studied by Rede da Terra was a community achieving a successful livelihood through farming (reaching food self-sufficiency and building the asset base) and this was because it had access to remittances from young people who had migrated to urban areas and had access to a pool of cheap, casual labour in an ex-IDP camp nearby. Small-scale farmers also require assistance to adapt their farming to present-day conditions: in Uige Province many farmers depended on coffee production, which they expected to become viable again with the end of conflict but the market for coffee no longer exists; in the Central Plateau soil fertility declined because of the intensive production and use of fertilisers in the late colonial period, so yields are now low while population pressure remains high and new systems of production need to be developed.
The difficulties of making a living from peasant agriculture mean that there is a tendency for people of rural areas to also develop other livelihoods and survival strategies. These often depend on access to, and extraction of, other natural resources. The extraction stone and sand for building materials, or of wood for sale, or for transformation into charcoal and subsequent sale, is a common livelihood strategy especially in areas near towns or where there is some transport available to urban areas. This has led to depletion of woodlands in these areas, which tend to be the areas where there was less woodland to begin with.50 Income from sale of wood or charcoal appears to be low, as barriers to entry to this occupation are low and many families include it in their livelihood strategy, leading to abundant supply and low prices.
In both rural and urban areas, large numbers of people survive through casual labour. In rural areas these include work on other people’s fields or collecting wood or building materials. In urban areas this includes carrying goods in markets or odd-jobs in people’s houses. In all cases the income from casual labour is low (about one dollar per day): the barriers to entry are low which implies intense competition between those seeking work. Certain groups are disadvantaged in this competition to find casual work: women with accompanying children are less likely to be employed because the children interrupt the work or cause a disturbance so single women with children who have lost contact with the rest of their family are less frequently employed and appear to barely survive51.
In both rural and urban areas a common livelihood strategy is informal trading. This is considered to be a better survival strategy than casual labour and sale of charcoal, but requires some capital investment and still generates low returns. There are various levels of trading, depending on the volume and value of goods handled, and the distance over which goods are traded. Access to
50 There is little extractive use of woodland resources in Moxico Province, despite the large areas of woodland, because of its remoteness from areas of demand. 51 Girls who were kidnapped during the war, have lost contact with their families but have had children and then abandoned by their partner, are one of the groups in this category. There appear to be a significant number of such cases.
19 more lucrative trading opportunities depends on access to financial capital, for the goods and for the means of transport and for access to locations where larger volumes can be bought and sold. Displaced people who fled after their assets were destroyed tend to enter the informal trading sector at a low level, with small amounts of capital lent by family members or close friends. Those who migrated before losing their assets have tended to be able to enter the informal trading sector at a higher level with more capital. The large number of people with few assets and skills means that large numbers of people turn over small amounts of low value goods, and thus generate low returns. There is intense competition among those involved in trading in low-value goods, which diminishes the returns. However generally trade is perceived as providing a better income, and have better long term opportunities, than farming or even some forms of formal employment. The perception is that trading will allow, eventually, accumulation of capital that will give access to more lucrative trading opportunities, while at present it is perceived that farming will not permit accumulation of assets and capital.
The large numbers of people who have been involved in trade as a survival strategy have as a result accumulated important skills. This applies particularly to women, who have been particularly important in informal trading. (Women have gone to work in the market while men have maintained formal employment, even if badly paid, to maintain the social networks and possible long-term benefits of remaining within the formal employment system.) Informal traders who have begun to trade over longer distances also appear to have developed considerable skills of negotiation and identifying of market opportunities, and to be better prepared to develop internal trade networks (when transport improves) than formal sector traders who have tended to rely on imports and preferential access to credit and foreign exchange.
Casual labour, peasant farming, sale of natural resources and most informal sector trading are survival strategies and not livelihood strategies. They are barely sufficient for subsistence and do not allow any accumulation of assets.
Huambo Province (from interviews with village leaders)
Cutting and selling firewood, or making charcoal, are important ways for staying alive. There are lots of people doing it, so it’s a buyers’ market and prices are low. But people don't have much alternative, so you find more and more people cutting wood. The remaining forest is some distance from the villages, and might belong to other villages. Village leaders spend quite a lot of time dealing with the conflicts between villages that this creates.
20 3.4 Poverty and vulnerability
The lack of material assets and the availability of only poorly-paid survival strategies mean that poverty levels are high. A representative survey of Huambo Province indicated that half of all children had only meal the day before and a quarter have no boots or shoes52. Large numbers of people are surviving on $1 to $1.50 per day.
The primary cause is material vulnerability caused by the destruction of productive assets during the war, the difficulties of re-accumulating assets and poor access to basic infrastructure and services. Surveys in rural areas show how dramatic has been this loss of assets53. This affected not only people who were displaced but also people whose home was destroyed but stayed in the same area. It is now clear that since the end of the war there has been very little possibility of rebuilding those assets. Those who have returned to rural areas, or stayed there all along, are usually only cultivating small areas because they lack tools and seeds. Few are producing enough food to cover their needs, even less to rebuild their assets.
Access to services and infrastructure is difficult throughout the country. The Government of Angola ’s Provincial Profiles and the WFP Vulnerability Assessments indicate the level of degradation of essential services, as well as the regional disparities. Distances to the nearest hospital can be more than 100 kms in the eastern Provinces. The quality of service (quality of teacher, availability of medicines and school furniture and books, availability of 5th class or certain treatments) declines away from the main Provincial centres (or in the case of Zaire Province between the coastal areas and the interior parts of the Province). Services often have to be paid for, either officially or unofficially, which restricts access. Access is not only unequal but also inequitable, in that it appears that those with most needs have poorer services. There is some evidence that those who are poorer are also more likely to be sick and to use health services more (even though they have to be paid for). The cost of health services often means that poor people have to seek loans to pay the costs54. Poor access to health services causes loss of income and considerable expenditure during sickness.
Improvements to infrastructure and services since 2002 have been much less than was originally expected. Provincial Governments have been provided with few funds, and it is unclear that they have the capacity to effectively manage and use what they did receive. The expected international aid has not materialised. Logistics continue to create difficulties for improving access to services in remote areas, though most of the areas prioritised in the UN Transitional Appeal because of poor services and large numbers of returnees are remote. There is a fragmentation of responsibilities, which tends to mean that none of the actors take responsibility for overcoming the main barriers (such as bad roads)55. There is a risk that the inequalities between areas will increase as a result and that the low level of services in resettlement areas will continue, accentuating the difficulties in resettlement.
There are also social and institutional dimensions to vulnerability. The main sources of assistance for re-integration have been social networks, particularly the family. Access to land and credit depends on these social networks. Resident families are also impoverished and are often not in a position to assist members of the family who arrive and attempt to re-establish themselves, and those who have lost those networks are particularly vulnerable. There are considerable numbers of people who have lost contact with their families and are attempting to re-establish themselves without this source of assistance.56 Given the lack of other sources of assistance, they have great
52 CCF research on kidnapped children 53 see CARE, 2004a, Pacheco, 2001 and the information Rede da Terra, 2005. 54 Those whose survival depends on odd jobs report that they may be advanced money by an employer who they know to cover health costs, but then have to work several days without payment to repay. It is unclear how they manage to eat in these cases, given the low pay and their absolute lack of savings. 55 While several organisations, such as NGOs and oil companies, are engaged in producing school furniture for Zaire Province, there are extreme difficulties in distributing to the interior of the Province where the majority of returning IDPs and refugees are trying to resettle. 56 Research into the kidnapping of children during the war suggests that there may be considerable numbers, who are now no longer
21 difficulty in re-establishing themselves and end up with a very low income survival strategy such as casual labour. In general, the processes of re-settlement and re-integration appear to have hardly begun, leaving many people in a situation of high vulnerability.
Those who live in eastern and southern areas of the country appear to have easier access to sources of social capital: there are more likely to be supportive community institutions of mutual assistance. But this is counterbalanced by the lack of access to services in these remote areas.
The weak institutional framework means that there is an unclear framework of law and rules. This creates uncertainties, which discourages investment and increases transaction costs in the informal economy. There has also been a loss of human capital: skill levels are low and motivational questions affects those who have suffered traumatic events during conflict.
children, who were forcibly recruited and deliberately separated from other members of their family or whose family was killed in the same attack. Furthermore many were too young, when kidnapped, to have references as to their area of origin. They are among the groups of people who are trying to re-establish themselves around cities and small towns, often surviving on casual labour.
22 4 Analysis of conflict risks
This section examines the implications of the various process and the key issues for human security and risks of future conflicts. It is partly based on an analysis of actual conflicts in four Provinces (Benguela, Moxico, Huambo and Zaire), chosen to demonstrate a range of different settlement and reintegration issues. It is also based on the analysis of the factors that usually create conflicts.
Social geography (in particular groups of people with different identities and values), weak institutions (and the lack of means for dialogue between different groups and a lack of experience of creating patterns of cooperation between groups) and high levels of poverty and vulnerability (leading to intense competition ofr access to resources) create particular problems for post-conflict reconstruction and also create future conflict risks. Conflict is the “result of parties disagreeing about the distribution of material or symbolic resources and acting on the basis of these perceived incompatibilities57.” The intense competition for resources between groups of people with different identities and values and with few means of dialogue, and the weak institutional framework, create future conflict risks in Angola.
There have been very few incidents of open, violent conflict in Angola since 2002 although there are indications that this is because individuals try to avoid open conflict, knowing from experience that violent conflict has left them more vulnerable.
What is conflict?
The following definition of conflict is used in this report:
“Conflict is the result of parties disagreeing about the distribution of material or symbolic resources and acting on the basis of these perceived incompatibilities.” “Conflict occurs when two or more parties believe that their interests are incompatible, express hostile actions or take action that damages other parties’ ability to pursue their interest. It becomes violent when parties no longer seek to attain their goals peacefully, but resort instead to violence in one form or another.” (FEWER, 2004).
Violent conflict is the resort to physical or psychological force to resolve a disagreement. It is used to describe acts of open hostility. Latent conflict is used to describe situations of tension that may escalate into violence (FEWER, 2004).
In this report conflict does not necessarily mean violent conflict. It is not an analysis of the prolonged violent conflict that ended in 2002, nor is it based on actual incidents of open, violent conflict post-2002, though these have been used as a guide to the presence of underlying conflicts. It is an examination of the risks of conflict based on an analysis of factors that are likely to cause conflict.
Conflictual relations are those where the parties perceive only incompatible goals. Co-operative relations are those where the parties seek mutually beneficial outcomes. This requires communication channels, and institutions that have the capacity to perceive and work for mutually beneficial interests, or that can help those involved to see their mutual interests and negotiate for such an outcome
57 FEWER, 2004
23 Civil society organisations that have been concerned with conflict resolution in Angola have hypothesised that the most likely source of conflict would be in communities that had been divided by conflict, and in which people who had been living with the two sides in the conflict were resettling together. Research in rural communities where this resettlement of people from the two sides has happened indicates little conflict. In part this reflects the effort made by civil society organisations to promote peaceful resettlement, and in part it reflects the fact that people who have resettled together have not been concerned by identification with one party or another. Research also indicates that in many rural communities community organisations have continued to exist to manage and resolve conflicts and manage access to resources.
However it is important to note that there are limits to these informal mechanisms. While those who have resettled in rural areas may report no problems in doing so, there are indications that many people have not returned to these areas because they fear conflicts in these areas. There are also indications that many of the demobilised from UNITA have not gone to their area of origin because they are concerned about how they will be received if they do go back there. Many of the demobilised and the displaced have resettled in cities or small towns and appear to prefer the greater anonymity that is possible in such areas. Their comments indicate that they prefer to avoid too much contact with their neighbours in such areas (Leão, personal communication).
The indications are that people do not have full confidence in social institutions in resolving conflicts. Accusations of witchcraft are reported to be common in many rural areas, which are often taken as an indicator of a breakdown in institutions. Many people still have arms and, although at present arms appear to be little used, they say that they keep them as insurance for the future (Leão, personal communication).
Another limit to such informal mechanisms is that they are most effective in communities that have a long history and are homogeneous. Such mechanisms have a tendency to marginalise people from outside the community (so there are many reports of people who have resettled from other areas of the country not having the same access to resources and to community institutions). They are based on traditional references, and so have a tendency to give low priority to women and young people (though there are also indications that this is changing in soma places). Such informal institutions are less common in peri-urban areas or in the new settlements that have developed where people come from a number of different origins. Such informal institutions work best within communities and are less useful in managing conflicts between neighbouring communities and where there are conflicts between local communities and outsiders.
Thus, while the level of reported conflict is low for a post-conflict country, there are future conflict risks. At present there is a strong tendency to avoid conflict, and to make every effort for conflict not to become violent: people are aware that the main effect of violent conflict for more than 30 years has been to leave them with few assets and struggling to survive. However this avoidance of conflict may not last. While respondents to interviews mention few present conflicts, they consider that there might be future conflicts58.
58 Development Workshop, 2004
24 Conflict has been noted:
- within families - within communities - between neighbouring communities - between communities and outside interests - between regional and national interests - between national and outside interests
Within families there can be conflicts between the various wives that one man may have acquired during the war years or between different members of an extended family over access to land when one member has been away for some time and then reclaims it. The weakening of the extended family, and the difficulty of some communities in providing support to families, are also factors.
Within communities, tensions are manifested through increasing numbers of accusations of witchcraft59, exchanges of insults and cases of domestic violence. Some informants consider that the lack of channels to deal with feelings of resentment about vulnerability or inequality leads to diversion of these feelings into exchanges of insults with neighbours and cases of domestic violence
There can be conflict between neighbouring communities such as where different communities have been exploiting one area of woodland for charcoal (reported in Huambo Province) or are forced to obtain water from the same source (reported around Luena and in Zaire Province). Cutting wood (for sale as firewood or as charcoal) has become an important survival mechanism and this has led to people cutting wood outside their own communities (in the land of other communities or in land between communities). This is most noticeable in Huambo Province where the amount of woodland has already diminished and where the difficulty of survival from other means is most acute. It also occurs where Institutions are weak for managing conflicts between neighbouring communities and where neighbouring communities have different identities (such as between resident, displaced and returnee communities in Moxico Province)
Conflict and weak institutions
There is always, in all societies, latent conflict: disagreements about the distribution of resources between different parties always occur. In most societies there are mechanisms for settling these disagreements without resorting to violence. In fragile states, particularly in post-conflict countries, these mechanisms (or institutions) are weak and there is a risk that latent conflicts get out of hand and become open and violent conflicts (though it is impossible to predict whether this will happen and when)60. Latent conflicts are however also a block to development, even if they do not develop into violent conflict: various parties who need to work together to achieve a development goal fail to do so because they have conflictual, hostile relations and lack means to develop co-operative relations that are necessary to achieve a common goal.
There are risks of conflict between local communities and outside interests. Examples include:-
- between artesenal fishing communities and industrial fishing (reported in Benguela and Zaire Provinces)61
59 Accusations of witchcraft are often made against people who have more assets than their neighbours; being unable to explain rationally how, for example, two demobilised soldiers have returned with different size “demobilisation kits” or have more assets than the resident population, the accusation is made that they must have obtained their wealth through some supernatural powers 60 The World Bank Conflict Analysis Framework recognises that violent conflict is possible when there are no established norms and mechanisms for dealing with differences of interest (World Bank, 2002). 61 This is an example of the effect of weak institutions at the formal, State level for regulating access to resources. The transition to a market economy in the 1990s was not accompanied by the creation of institutions that could regulate access to resources between local
25 - local communities and outside interests exploiting forest resources - over access to land between local communities and outside interests (as shown in the study of Kwanza Sul for Rede da Terra)62 - where outsiders are attracted to employment opportunities in an area (such as where there area oil or diamonds) and complete with local people
There are risks of conflict between national and regional interests (such as in Cabinda and the Lundas, which are still highly militarised areas) where local interests dispute the terms on which national interests have access to the valuable oil and diamond resources.
Rural land as a conflict risk?
Customary institutions have survived and manage local level conflict over land successfully within communities Official institutions that manage land allocation among communities and between informal and formal sectors are, on the other hand, weak and have a very low level of capacity to register land titles. As yet most rural communities have difficulty in cultivating all their land and interest by commercial interests in large-scale farming is as yet low. Access to rural land is a potential but not yet a widespread area of conflict. There is a risk that conflict may increase when the commercial demand for land with access to urban or municipal markets clashes with peasant and small scale untitled users of land
The new Land Law gives some protection to customary land access, but it is unclear how it will delimit areas of customary land systems and how these will interact with formal land titling. There is also a lack of clarity of which local institutions will be involved, and there is a risk that the State will deal only with the individual (the Soba) leading to a lack of transparency to the rest of the community.
Risks of conflict over land are highest around the main cities (such as Luanda) where land of very high value for formal economic activities is at present occupied by informal housing and economic activities, but where there are no effective mechanisms for re-allocating land without creating conflict. Risks of conflict over rural land are lower in the short-term because the agricultural economy is developing only slowly, but there are longer-term risks when access to inland agricultural areas improves and outside interests are attracted to agriculture63.
and global private interests. Fishing communities say that it was in the mid-1990s that conflicts developed with industrial fishing; in the 1908s it was rare for industrial fishing boats to come close to the shore and State institutions would take measures if they did, but this is no longer the case. 62 This is another example of the effect of institutions at the formal, State level for regulating access to resources. One weakness is the poor communication and collaboration between different levels of the State institutions, associated with their hierarchical relations: as the Kwanza Sul study shows, land parcels over a certain size are allocated as concessions at the national level but information is rarely sought about whether this land is at present occupied and by whom, and local levels of Administration do not see it as their responsibility to make representations when land is allocated that is already occupied. In cities, land is often allocated by the Provincial Government without the knowledge of the Municipal and Comuna administrations, even though officially requests should start at the Comuna level and only work upwards after site visits by local level officials, and this creates overlapping claims. 63 There is competition for land in urban areas and other places where the formal economy is developing. Peace has meant a revival in the formal economy, which is seeking to occupy land occupied by informal housing or informal economic activities in urban areas or where there is a strong presence of the oil industry (such as the coats of Zaire Province). There is competition for land in the diamond areas between farmers and those seeking to occupy the land to look for diamonds.
26 Urban land as a conflict risk?
Economic growth has been stronger in the cities since 2002. The operation of the market means that formal private sector economic growth is in competition for land with informal markets and housing. Government institutions for land management and urban planning are weak. The actors involved have very different values and interests, and few forms of dialogue and negotiation.
There is little understanding about communities’ livelihood and survival strategies among groups outside the communities (whether they be national players or external ones). The informal housing market and the informal economy in urban areas are perceived as a problem by elite groups, rather than as a necessary means of survival that have developed over the last 30 years due to the inadequacy of formal structures. (Elite groups include not only the Government but also the opposition parties, parts of civil society and those in the formal economy.) Governance structures tend to having little capacity to deal with such issues conflicts, or as conceptualising situations them in a way that obscures them64. The achievement of peace has led to an aspiration by these elite groups that “order” be recreated and that the “anarchy” of the informal economy and settlements be dealt with. There is also an impulse from outside interests for Angola to “re-establish the rule of law” (for example to have clearer land laws to permit foreign investment). This in turn has led to a desire among elite groups for the kind of order that was believed to exist in the late colonial period, the only period of order and stability that is available as a reference.
Future conflict risks are therefore not due to the historic conflict, which was linked to a split in the national elite: the elite appear to be reconciling while becoming more remote from their party members. Future risks of conflict are linked to
- access to resources: there is intense competition for resources, both natural resources (land, wood, oil, diamonds65, fishing) and others (such as jobs, training courses)66
- differences in identity, for example where two groups with clearly different identities are competing for the same resource. There may be some political or ethnic undertones to these differences in identity, but the main differences in identity are usually due to other factors.
- the lack of institutions to mediate this access, or by overlapping claims due to informal mechanisms (developed due to the lack of practicality of the formal ones) being in conflict with formal ones.
The institutions that regulate access to resources, and resolve conflict about access, are weak. In the absence of effective State institutions, access has been regulated by informal or customary mechanisms. The status of these is unclear in a context where the State is attempting to recreate formal, uniform systems. It is unclear to what extent, for example, the State recognises land tenure granted through informal or customary mechanisms, even though the vast majority of land holding was obtained through such mechanisms.
The factors that are likely to contribute to conflict in the long-term are as follows. Angola is a low- income oil producer, where people have “unrealised expectations of the benefits of being in an oil- rich country” (Myers, 2005). In countries where oil production is less than 25 barrels per year per
64 For example, Government documents about land tend to highlight the low population density in Angola as a whole and downplay the existence of land scarcity in parts of the central highlands or in urban areas, which are precisely the areas to which foreign investment is being attracted without policies to deal with the resulting competition for land. 65 Though information about this is difficult to obtain, as diamond areas are relatively closed and those involved are unwilling to provide information 66 Fishing people on the coast of Zaire Province report an influx of people from agricultural settlements attempting to make a living from fishing. When private companies arrive in an area there is often competition for the jobs between local people, people who migrate spontaneously from other areas and those specifically brought in by the company. The lack of social infrastructure also leads to competition for access. Examples include the competition for access to wells between neighbouring villages in various parts of the country (where wells have become unusable or the population has increased)
27 person (and in Angola it is 24 barrels per year per person) there are “raised expectations that are not met. …. Petroleum is good for countries with lots of it and a small population …. but bad for human development in less developed countries with an annual production level of under 25 barrels per head. ……. Where people have unrealised expectations of the benefits of being in an oil-rich country, conflict follows and a vicious cycle develops.” The amount received in oil revenues raises expectations, damages governance and damages the non-oil economy but is not enough to eradicate poverty. At this level of production per head, exposure to oil price volatility is acute, leading to further instability (Myers, 2005). In Angola, there is a growing feeling of disenchantment among the middle-class, that progress since the end of conflict has been much slower than expected. This, linked to the acute competition for resources so as to survive, appear to be future sources of conflict.
Identity and conflict
There is a latent conflict between different groups of residents, displaced people and returning refugees who are living around Luena. The main source of conflict is their competition for access to water, land, health services, jobs and the small amount of aid that is made available.
Returning refugees from Zambia have a different identity as they have learnt English and have adopted other cultural signs from Zambia. Each perceives the other to have obtained advantages that they do not have: residents see IDPs and refugees as receiving official aid while they get none, even though residents have often suffered acute loss of assets and have not had the same opportunity to accumulate assets that those who fled had; residents see refugees as having received access to better training opportunities in exile; refugees who arrived last perceive IDPs as having been resettled in better locations with better access to land and water; refugees and IDPs perceive residents as having better linkages to local power structures and information, and to institutions that regulate access to resources; refugees and IDPs also feel that they are not receiving the assistance that they were led to believe they would receive before they returned.
Returning refugees from RDC in Zaire Province have a different identity as they have learnt French and Lingala and have adopted other cultural signs from the RDC. Local people perceive them as having an advantage in dealing with aid agencies and as deliberately moving to settlements where aid agencies are working. Returning refugees perceive local people as trying to exclude them from benefits of development projects.
The tendency to avoid conflict may diminish with time: promises may be made that are not met, such as during the elections67
There are vast regional differences in access to services and markets and employment (such as between coastal regions and the interior even within a Province such as Zaire) and such differences (that are difficult to overcome in the short-term) come to be perceived as forms of systematic discrimination between different areas and their inhabitants.
Conflict in Kuando Kubango Province
Despite the vast area of Kuando Kubango Province, there is a limited amount of agricultural land. People from the Central Plateau migrated with UNITA in the post-1976 period and settled in Kuando Kubango, and are unlikely to return to the Central Plateau. Some of these then fled to Zambia as refugees, as did some of the original residents of the region. Government institutions are weak in a remote Province.
The return of refugees to Angola and the end of the war have led to conflict over the limited amounts of agricultural land and access to water. People from the Central Plateau are numerous and other groups fear that they will dominate the Province.
67 Unrealised promises are also common because of the weak capacity for communication and collaboration between different parts of the State apparatus
28 There is a risk that the Government of Angola will try to remove informal economic actors from areas of economic attraction so as to make space for attracting foreign investment in a formal economy. This appears to be the plan in the diamond producing areas, where Government of Angola plans are to reduce the number of people working in artesenal diamond mining from 300,000 to a few thousand, who would be concentrated on the margins of larger mines. This would eliminate an important source of labour-intensive employment. Meanwhile, however, the expansion of diamond mines is slow due to investor reluctance. There is also a certain risk that the Government of Angola will attempt to clear certain areas around the large cities where the informal sector (housing and trade) occupies land that might be attractive to formal sector investment, with the same effect of eliminating labour-intensive employment without the certainty that a similar number of livelihoods can be created in the formal sector.
The reliance on local, informal institutions for conflict resolution and resource management (which has developed during the years of war) implies a need for the State to attempt to integrate them into a formal system. This process is not without its risks, given the weakness of formal institutions and the possibility that informal institutions will be weakened without successfully creating formal ones.
There is risk of conflict if the re-establishment of the rule of law in practice means adopting laws and procedures based on foreign models that do not take into account the actual mechanisms that people are using today, or that destroy people’s survival strategies. There is risk of conflict if the “establishment of order” moves ahead more quickly than the creation of accountable institutions to manage this.
Elections and conflict
Many respondents to surveys say that they fear that elections will be a trigger of conflict. This is because previous occasions when power has been contested (1975 and 1992) have led to violent conflict. There is a low level of confidence in the social institutions that should regulate conflict on such occasions, and elections are perceived as giving access to a control of a State with weak institutions that can be a source of patronage without responsibility. There are sporadic reports of violent conflict around political events, which ought to be monitored in the run-up to elections. Political organising is also perceived by many Angolans as the occupation of territory and denying it to opposing parties: thus the establishment of offices with their flags is perceived as an important part of political organising. Many local people genuinely are fearful of such activities, as the risks of it becoming violent appear to them to outweigh any possibility that it will lead to more responsive, accountable government.
Angola has been “destabilised” by many decades of war with, as a result, weakened social structures and large-scale movements of population that bring different groups (with different identities and levels of assets) in contact with each other; while this was justified by outside actors in the past as being the price of bringing democracy to Angola, the final result has been a society with one dominant social power and without the mediating institutions necessary for transparency and accountability and for discussing ways to address the enormous needs of re-settlement, re- integration and reconstruction.
Conflict between national and outside interests There are also a number of cases of conflict between national and outside interests. Foreign companies, for example in the oil industry, have little awareness of their effects on the surrounding areas. There are resentments at the “fence-line” where the contrast between impoverished communities and company compounds is highest. Foreign companies use other foreign companies as their suppliers and seem unaware that this causes resentment among local companies and workers about the lack of linkage between the resource industries and the local economy. They rarely have policies to assist local companies to build capacity to be suppliers.
29 Foreign embassies and donors seek to influence Angolan policy. They seem unaware that this can create conflict, because of an Angolan perception that outside interests have often been wrong in the past about Angola and that outside interests have little information about the Angolan reality and are promoting their own interests. Advice from outside is often perceived as contradictory or badly developed. While it is true that much Angolan Government policy is based on inadequate information and models, much foreign advice is based on the model of a transition country that is reluctant to open up its economy and society. Foreign advice does not take into account the colonial nature of many of the models used by the Angolan elite and the need for building of local institutional capacity.
5 Mitigating conflict risks
Angola was described, for many years, as a complex emergency. A complex emergency leads to a complex post-emergency situation. The current situation in Angola is the result of many years of rapid economic and social change in Angola. Reconstruction implies dealing with a complex set of inter-related questions, while the capacity to deal with these questions has been weakened and habits of been developed of short time horizon planning.
The challenges of creating a sustainable peace in Angola imply dealing with the key issues which can be a block to development and create future conflict risks. The effects of a long-running conflict are profound. “Normality” does not return as soon as forty-year conflict ends. The effects include heavy losses of material, human and social capital, which cannot be replaced rapidly at the end of conflict. Unless these are addressed, there is a risk of renewed conflict. They imply building resilience and capacities that have been lost, physical, human and social organisational capital.
Conflict risks could be addressed by attempting to reduce the economic vulnerability of the majority of the population, by addressing the gap between rich and poor and the gap in wealth between different regions, by assisting in the development of livelihood strategies and reduce their competition for resources. They could be addressed by helping to build links between different population groups and outside players so that they can understand each other’s values and outlook. And they could be reduced by building on links between groups so as to develop accountable institutions that manage the relations between different stakeholders.
Conflict sensitivity
Conflict sensitivity involves understanding the context of a development intervention and monitoring it, especially in cases where conflict is expected or there has been recent conflict. It implies looking at development interventions through a human security lens rather than an economic lens, and is required in situations where governance is weak and economic growth increases disparities and tensions.
It requires an awareness that development can reduce poverty and thus address issues of conflict, but it can also contribute to conflict. This may involve compromises, with the emphasis shifting towards reducing vulnerability rather than simply boosting growth and production. Reducing risks and vulnerability to external shocks may take precedence over efficiency and production targets.
Addressing conflict risks implies “conflict sensitivity”. Development usually aims to reduce poverty and so to prevent conflict, as poverty is one of the causes of conflict, but it is now also recognised that development sometimes contributes to conflict. In situations where institutions are weak, economic growth increases disparities and tensions, conflict is expected or there has been recent conflict, conflict sensitivity is required. Conflict sensitivity involves understanding the context of a development intervention and monitoring it, and looking at development interventions through a human security lens rather than an economic lens. This may involve compromises, with the emphasis shifting towards reducing vulnerability rather than simply boosting growth, efficiency and production targets.
30 Dealing with social divisions involves building on the work that Angolan civil society organisations have developed, encouraging dialogue within communities in the post-conflict environment. There is a need to extend it to help create dialogue between the many different parts of a fractured society, between neighbouring communities and between the State and citizens. This involves recognising that some of the most acute social divisions are in most logistically difficult and remote areas like Kuando Kubango and Moxico.
Institutional development is a major challenge in post-conflict contexts and there are few guidelines for this process. States with weak institutions have difficulty in reforming and building their own institutions, and outside help will be required. External players should avoid large-scale institutional reform, as there are significant risks, but they could take opportunities to build institutional capacity and accountability at the local level. For example local level projects, such as basic service provision, provide an opportunity for strengthening local-level institutions: in fact the development of institutions are vital for their success as they are important resources in a resource-poor environment and require well thought-out structures of rules and accountability for their management. This will require bringing the various stakeholders together, helping them to develop rules for the management of the service as well as accountability and sanctions’ mechanisms.
Rebuilding Institutions
There is a growing consensus that institutional building and regeneration is a fundamental part of post- conflict reconstruction and of the agenda for fragile states. “The avoidance of war and the fostering of economic progress both require institutional building and regeneration.68”.
Institution building implies that those involved (those who plan to cooperate or to carry out transactions or exchange) define the actions that they plan and the rules that will govern them. It then implies monitoring the rules and applying sanctions
There have been recently (since 2002) some recent efforts to re-establish the rule of law, such as the new Land Law. The risk of these efforts, however, is that the new “rule of law” does not take into account the existing customary and informal institutions that continue to function because they are adapted to the local context and are seen locally as having legitimacy.
68 Tony Addison and S Manssob Murshed “The social contract and violent conflict” in Hanlon and Yanacopulos, 2006.
31 Local level institution building
Although there is a growing consensus that institutional building and regeneration is a fundamental part of post-conflict reconstruction and of the agenda for fragile states, there is much less clarity about how this can be achieved and what the role of external agents should be in assisting this process. The consensus is that institutional regeneration is best if it is “home-grown” and fits the local context. It is also clear that institutional regeneration is a long-term process, and to some extent requires experimentation to develop functioning institutions that fit the local context. It is probably unhelpful for outside commentators to call for the recreation of the rule of law and a social contract, as if these are easily achievable, short-term processes. External advice to Africa in the 1970s and 1980s downplayed the role of institutions except the role of the market, which was assumed to function best with a minimal presence of State institutions: only slowly has outside advice begun to concede the importance of institutions and the role of the State for economic development. There may be a lack of will by Angolan political leadership to create accountable institutions, but there is also a lack of capacity for what is in fact a complex task.
“Institutions define the superstructure within which policy is conducted, and therefore determine the efficacy of mechanisms for conflict resolution and policies that promote economic progress.” “There is no one-size-fits-all policy for all nations in war, or in danger of war. Externally imposed policies for democratisation, say in Iraq, are fraught with difficulties.” “Many [multi-party democracies] have slid back into autocratic practices even when periodic elections are held. One reason for this decline could be that these new democracies and the institutional framework and social contract sustaining them are not entirely home grown”69. This is an argument for external agents avoiding trying to create national-level institutions.
However external agents could assist institutional regeneration by being clearer in their discourse about the importance of institutions. At a local level, they could assist by recognising the importance of institutions for local level projects. Building local infrastructure, such as a school or health post, is not only a question of physical building but also a question of building the institutions to manage and maintain it. Rules are required to define what the Government provides, what the local community provides, how this is monitored, and how sanctions are applied if there is a failure by one or other party. These rules need to be created at the outset, before any investment is made. Investment by those directly involved, and not just by an aid agency, is more likely if the rules are agreed first. There is a role here for those with conflict- resolution skills. Institutions will probably need to be built across the divides between different communities and different interest groups: this will require some mediation skills to help to bridge the gap in interests and perceptions between the various parties.
External agents could also assist institutional regeneration by being clearer about the need for institutional regeneration and what it involves. They should not imply that it is an easy task.
The new Land Law offers an opportunity for institution building through pilot projects that could test how customary and informal rights could be brought within the framework of a national Law, what State capacities are required, how they can be developed, what the costs would be and how these could be supported. Recognition by Government of Angola of the need to strengthen local administrations and for them to work in collaboration with local civil society, both customary civil society at the community level and the more modern forms of civil society, also offers an opportunity. Pilot projects, including components of practical local development, can assist the process of learning-by-doing in making customary and informal institutions more transparent, accountable and inclusive; and in improving dialogue between the State, civil society and citizen; and in improving the performance, transparency and accountability of the State at the local level.
69 Page 159 of Tony Addison and S Manssob Murshed “The social contract and violent conflict” in Hanlon and Yanacopulos, 2006
32 Building institutions in post-conflict African Economies70
Institutions are the “rules of the game”, the constraints (both formal and informal) on political, social and economic activities, such as access to resources, contracts, property. Institutions are altered by conflict and weak institutions can lead to conflict. Institutions are an area of intervention for resilience but research on practical policy interventions for institutions building is at an early stage.
Institution-building and capacity issues were not emphasised by the World Bank reforms of the 1970s and 1980s. The role of the State, in these reforms, was planned to reduce. If the State was corrupt it was better to get rid of the State. Thus by the 1990s many African States had reduced institutional capacity. The evidence is now supportive of the important role of institutions in promoting growth. But institutional change is incremental and path-dependent.
In the absence of a strong State and formal rules, a dense social network can lead to the development of a fairly stable informal structures that help to organise activities. But the risk of this dynamic is that trust, and economic activity, remains only within one group.
There are practical constraints on the implementation of institutional reform. Human capital is usually not available for complex legal reforms. An alternative strategy is a “rules-first” strategy. This involves introducing simple rules that can be easily applied and monitored, and using them to show the importance of rules and institutions.
These processes could involve traditional donors, who have begun to develop spaces for local government to dialogue with local people, and it could also involve non-traditional donors such as international oil companies. Because of their difficulties in areas such as the Niger Delta in Nigeria, where they have suffered the consequences of the lack of trust and lack of accountability between local people and local levels of government, oil companies appear to be beginning to understand the need to help to develop dialogue between local people and the local-level State and to improve the performance, transparency and accountability of the State at the local level.
Finally there is a need for the systematic collection of information throughout Angola that will permit a deeper understanding of post-conflict dynamics and the monitoring of change. Previous information systems that provided information about the acute emergency are being closed with no clear replacement. While there are now more one-off studies in Angola there is little continuing monitoring of the post-conflict evolution. It cannot be assumed that “normalisation” will occur at the end of conflict: processes need to be monitored and on this basis risks need to be assessed.
Institutional development is a major challenge in post-conflict contexts, and external players should be aware that institutional weakness is an important constraint in Angola. States with weak institutions have difficulty in reforming and building their own institutions, and outside help will be required. However external players should not attempt large-scale institutional reform, as there are significant risks in this. They could take opportunities to build capacity and accountability at the local level. For example local level projects, such as basic service provision, provide an opportunity for strengthening local-level institutions: in fact the development of institutions are vital for their success as they are important resources in a resource-poor environment and require well thought- out structures of rules and accountability for their management. As much attention needs to be paid to how such projects are managed and maintained as to the infrastructure or service itself. This will require bringing the various stakeholders together, helping them to develop rules for the management of the service as well as accountability and sanctions’ mechanisms.
The new Land Law offers an opportunity for foreign assistance in learning-by-doing and in a realistic, incremental approach to developing and formalising the mechanisms of establishing land rights and providing formal titles. This could be based on what has been done elsewhere, and on a realistic review of what worked best in Angola in the past, taking into account the changed circumstances. But more importantly, pilot projects could test how customary and informal rights
70 Based on Aron, 2002.
33 could be brought within the framework of a national Law, what State capacities are required, how they can be developed, what the costs would be and how these could be supported.
Another opportunity is offered by the desire by the government of Angola to tackle the low capacity of local administrations. There appears to be recognition by Government of Angola of the need for local administrations to work in collaboration with civil society, both customary civil society at the community level and the more modern forms of civil society. This implies a great deal of dialogue between new State organs and local people, which rarely exists at present, and that they have the financial and other resources to manage activities and pressurise higher levels of Government to carry out actions relevant for local development. It implies bringing customary institutions within an overall framework, while modernising them and while avoiding that they serve to exclude certain groups. Pilot projects, including components of practical local development, can assist the process of learning-by-doing in making customary and informal institutions more transparent, accountable and inclusive; and in improving dialogue between the State, civil society and citizen; and in improving the performance, transparency and accountability of the State at the local level. These processes could involve traditional donors, who have begun to develop spaces for local government to dialogue with local people, and it could also involve non-traditional donors such as international oil companies. Because of their difficulties in areas such as the Niger Delta, where they have suffered the consequences of the lack of trust and lack of accountability between local people and local levels of government, oil companies appear to be beginning to understand the need to help to develop dialogue between local people and the local-level State and to improve the performance, transparency and accountability of the State at the local level.
Finally there is a need for the systematic collection of information throughout Angola that will permit a deeper understanding of post-conflict dynamics and the monitoring of change. The future of information systems that were set up pre-2002 to provide information about the acute emergency is uncertain as the emergency has ended, but it is unclear whether any new forms of government or UN information systems will be created. There has been a marked increase in the number of research studies carried out in Angola about vulnerability, conflicts or particular topics (such as land rights), but these are one-off studies and there is not guarantee that they will be followed-up or that the situations that they reveal will continue to be monitored. It cannot be assumed that “normalisation” will occur at the end of conflict: processes need to be monitored and on this basis risks need to be assessed.
6 Recommendations for external players
The effects of a long-running conflict are profound. “Normality” does not return as soon as forty- year conflict ends and the need for international does not cease. A thirty year complex emergency could lead to a thirty year post-conflict period that is equally complex. Looking for solutions will be important, not expecting ready-made solutions to emerge. This has implications for the Government of Angola, which has at present a low capacity for finding solutions to these complex problems71; and for international agencies which tend to have a low institutional memory about the countries in which they work due to rapid staff turnover and project-based activities.
The effects include heavy losses of material, human and social capital, which cannot be replaced rapidly at the end of conflict. Unless these are addressed, there is a risk of renewed conflict. Although Angola does have access to resources (such as oil-backed loans) it has access to sufficient resources (taking into consideration the level of destruction) and whether it has the expertise to address all post-conflict needs. International assistance should not cease when conflict ends: although needs are less clear at the end of conflict, needs continue to be significant. A post-conflict transition programme needs to focus on reducing communities’ vulnerabilities, building households assets and individual’s skills, and rebuilding of institutions.
71 The institutional memory in the colonial era was in Lisbon. There has been no window of opportunity to develop one in Angola post- Independence.
34 The level of international assistance to Angola has decreased since 2002. The emergency coordination mechanisms are disbanded without creating new ones adapted to the new challenges. Although “traditional donors” have not given a clear rationale of why they have not transformed their pre-2002 humanitarian aid into reconstruction assistance, they sometimes refer to the fact that normality has returned with the end of the war and that Angola has access to other forms of assistance.
It also seems that foreign assistance to Angola is being made conditional on reforms, such as those that would reduce corruption. Following the conditionality route could lead donor agencies to withdraw from Angola. It is recommended that they try to avoid this, as there are significant risks in not addressing Angola’s needs. An analysis that Angola is rich but most of its population is poor needs to be deepened because
- this is common in low-income oil producers, which in practice do not have the resources to meet the expectations generated by oil production
- other capacities, besides the financial capacity, are required for development in a post-conflict situation.
Making aid for reconstruction dependent on reforms is unlikely to be effective in this case. Angola has access to other forms of finance that are more likely to be used on localised, or prestige, projects rather than on the providing widespread support to the development of people’s survival mechanisms throughout the country. While it is correct to bring into the open the question of corruption, there are various difficulties with a strategy of conditionality. The first is that it assumes that there is one, obvious route to reform and that there are instant answers to the key questions. This creates the risk that the Government of Angola looks for instant solutions to complex questions.
Democracy and resource rents72
There are increasing numbers if resource-rich developing countries (such as Angola). Conventional wisdom is now that significant income from natural resources (resource rents) reduces economic growth. Resource rents undermine governance and are linked to bad economic policies and dysfunctional state behaviour. It is therefore important to understand, theoretically and empirically, how democracy and resource rents are likely to interact.
The evidence is that electoral competition reduces economic growth in the presence of resource rents. Stronger institutions enhance economic growth in the presence of resource rents. Countries with bad institutions suffer a resource curse. Resource booms create perverse political incentives that elections do not counteract. Elections do not counteract patronage, and may encourage it.
Reform is difficult not only because there are vested interests, but also because
- there may not be a clear reform path - reform requires coordination between different Government institutions and a variety of outside interests, while the capacity for coordination is low - reform involves risks and could involve conflict - it is now accepted, by agencies such as the World Bank, that it is difficult for countries that are in situations like those of Angola, to reform themselves without considerable assistance from outside - the resources required not just financial but of knowledge and organisational skills73.
72 Based on Collier and Hoeffler, 2005. Also Robinson, Torvik and Verdier, 2002 73 While land titling would increase certainty about property rights, for example, it cannot be achieved in the short-term given how much effort would be required to create the administrative infrastructure for effective land titling. Reform programmes proposed by outside agencies should not include such proposal without a realistic assessment of what would be required and how long it would take.
35 Foreign assistance agencies are promoting pro-poor growth, which implies priority to small-scale, informal, labour-intensive local economic actors and, in the current situation of Angola where the majority of the population depend on informal economic activities for survival, implies strengthening the present survival strategies of the poor even when these are informal, of very low return and may be perceived as being illegal (because they operate outside the existing legal framework). Pro-poor growth needs to be broadly-based: it cannot provide opportunities for a few people and hope that they trickle down, because the number of very poor is so great and providing resources for a few is likely to create competition and conflict over those resources. Pro-poor growth needs to always bear in mind: who is excluded. However foreign assistance agencies are also at the same time promoting large-scale, capital intensive external investment, that concentrates resources and hopes that eventually it will trickle-down. Calls for reform from outside thus lack clarity about what “pro-poor growth” actually is74.
Similarly, foreign assistance agencies are calling for Angola to strengthen the rule of law, while at the same time suggesting that the economy of Angola is over-regulated. This is confusing for Angolan officials. International advice tends to point out what is lacking (such as the rule of law) but is less specific about how it might be rebuilt. The issue is not how much regulation there is: it should avoid weakening the State or reducing what the State does in one area in the hope that this will lead the State to work more efficiently in other areas. The issue is that regulation needs to be more appropriate and to be based on what exists rather than what is imagined to exist. Much regulation dates from the colonial period, and has as its basis a discriminatory society; much colonial-era regulation aimed to restrict African (informal) economic activity. It is inappropriate for a post-Independence society and one where the majority of economic activity is informal, where such activity is the main survival strategy of the population and where the dynamism in informal sector could be the basis for future economic development. However the late colonial period is the last period of stability in Angola, and it is therefore tempting for Angolan decision-makers to try to recreate some of the conditions of that period (even though the seeds for later instability were being sown and recreating the conditions of more than 30 years ago is unrealistic). This is unconsciously encouraged by international advice that portrays the need for reform as being the need to move away from post-Independence ways of thinking and portrays the difficulties of Angola as being due to the post-independence period (and decision-makers trained in Eastern Europe)75. If international agencies wish to encourage reform, they need to recognise that there may not be a clear, pre-determined route to reform. Development of a number of alternative scenarios may assist Government of Angola to explore the implications of various options. There will also need to be a considerable amount of “learning-by-doing”. This implies that international agencies will need to deepen their knowledge of Angola, and have an institutional memory of the problems, the attempted solutions and their results.
There will need to be a depth of knowledge, so as to avoid jumping to conclusions and avoid making facts fit into a framework that is derived from elsewhere or from theory. It will be necessary to understand the details and the nuances of the complex situation in Angola. It is encouraging that programmes such as LICUS have been developed that show that international agencies do attempt to work in complex situations such as Angola and do recognise that this may even mean that the institutions change their working methods so that they have better knowledge and better institutional memories. It is encouraging that, with the increasing focus on poverty reduction and the realisation that the world is currently not on track to meet the UN’s Millennium Development Goals by 2015, the spotlight is turning more and more on the world’s lower income oil exporters, which are mainly in sub-Saharan Africa. It is encouraging that some international advice now recognises that weak states (states such as Angola with weak institutions) have difficulty in reforming themselves. However the risk with such programmes is that they focus on the Millennium Development Goals and how services can be delivered to meet these goals: there is thus a
74 Proposals such as those to allow the currency to devalue may create the conditions of pre-1996, where devaluation accelerated causing social instability. There are many other conditions that need to be met before local production will be strong enough to take advantage of a devaluation of the currency. 75 The lack of vision of intermediate solutions, such as the tendency to see development as involving a jump from hoes to tractors, is as much a product of the dualism of the colonial era economy as it is the product of the influence of the former Soviet-bloc.
36 possibility that they will focus on mechanisms that deliver services (even if they by-pass State structures) rather than focus on dealing with the institutional vacuum (which is admittedly a more difficult issue).
Outside economic players need to develop their awareness of what is happening beyond their own “fence-line”. They need to be aware that their presence can contribute to conflict, through resentment about the lack of employment opportunities for local people or contracts for local companies, or resentment about the contrasts between conditions within the fence-line, in the immediate surroundings (where sometimes companies support social projects) and more distant areas. Such resentment exists in Zaire Province due to the contrast between the coastal areas (where there oil companies are installed) and the interior where access is difficult and social infrastructure is scarce. Outside economic players should consider support to social development over a wide area (and not in the immediate area of their installations) and should consider business support services so that local companies can compete for supply contracts and develop linkages with the local economy.
Conflict resolution projects in Angola have had some successes in assisting social re-integration in the last three years, but agencies involved with such projects should be aware that there are now wider needs. There is a need to go beyond short-term conflict-resolution activities, which often deal with immediate acute conflicts. The risks of future conflict in Angola are long-term and mitigating them requires dealing with deeper issues: reducing the competition for resources that is behind the conflict, helping different groups (internal and external) to understand each other’s values.
Agencies involved with conflict resolution will need to consider how they will assist local development programmes in developing their capacity for conflict sensitivity, and how to assist them to develop the wider range of skills that are implied by linking local infrastructure and livelihood development with building of social capital and conflict resolution. Agencies involved in economic development will need to develop, or bring in, other skills (in conflict sensitivity and resolution, and in institution building).
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41 Annex 1 Zaire - Women in the family, the community and the market place.
The Bakongo are the dominant ethnic group in Zaire province. A predominant cultural aspect of most Bakongo clans is the tradition of matrilineal lineage; meaning that inheritance and titles are transmitted - through the mother - to the son of the sister and not from father to son. By the end of century XIX the matrilineal Bakongo society was considered to be one of the remaining vestiges of a wider tradition of matriarchal societies in Central Africa. Today the Bakongo practice of transmission through the mother leaves the woman as a transference “vehicle” of goods and authority but without retaining any power herself. However the Bakongo culture grants the women, a central place in its social as well as symbolic organization, since it is explicitly recognized her central charge as the producer and reproducer, meaning, she is the one responsible for sustaining the family – growing and cooking the food and regenerating and maintaining the lineage and caring for the children.
The women’s importance is symbolically acknowledged through the demand of an “Nkamalongo” (offering) at wedding times, in the form of goods offered by the groom’s family to the bride’s family, sometimes wrongly considered as a “bride price”. The goods are considered a compensation to the bride’s family, since they will “loose” a woman who will henceforth be under the husband’s family’s responsibility but also producing inside his family (the Bakongo culture also retains this aspect of a patriarchal society, meaning, the wife goes to live in the husband’s house or on his lands).
The Bassolongo, a sub-group or clan of the Bakongo from the Soyo region, are patrilineal, meaning, their family descendance follows from father to son. There are some indications that this difference demonstrates an erosion of the Bakongo tradition still practiced widely in the rest of Zaire province95.
Despite the Nkamalongo and the recognition of the central position of the women in the society, power is not shared equitably in the family nor in the community. If power is measured by the share of decision-making and influence in the family group, women lack control and the distribution of goods and resources is uneven. Women’s weight of opinion in family meetings and above all, transmittance of inheritance and titles is weak. These responsibilities are basically assumed by the men of the family or clan. To an extent the role of “elder women” provide a counterbalance and they exercise a role in managing family affairs. Elder women are able to make their voices heard in family meetings, and their opinions carry considerable weight.
Currently changes are happening in Bakongo culture which affect the role of women. These changes are due to social disruption and migration due to the war over the last several generations and due to the urbanization process that is changing all African societies. Other important factors are the expansion and consolidation of the National State, which counterbalance clan and ethnic allegiances. Most importantly the growth of the market economy associated to the “globalisation” most recent moment, which accelerates these transformations.
Women’s roles are changing with the growth of urbanisation and the migration of populations to cities and towns. The entrance of women into the urban labour market is a key factor even though their integration is often incomplete. Women are present in significant numbers in the informal markets of the municipal towns such as Soyo and provincial capital- Mbanza Congo. Their involvement in the informal market place guarantees them an increasing autonomy regarding their income earning and managing their family affairs. Within the family economy, they continue to assume the domestic expenses for food and children’s education96. The presence of women in the labour market (formal or informal) allows her, besides the income, the creation of her own networking relations, out from the familiar sphere. The continuing demand for women to maintain responsibility for household domestic activities often prevents them from investing sufficient time and resources in their businesses. In order to develope their enterprises into major businesses women would need to dedicate most of the day and also separate their domestic expenditures from their business accounts.
Another female activity space is found in the churches. Families give great importance to the church, which is a dominant community space. The internal structures of churches (women’s groups, female or youth choirs) are important spaces for women who can exercise their autonomy in such organizations and achieve decision making roles. This space for community exchange
95 An important indication of this is the Bassolongo habit of retaining feminine surnames such as Isabel, Rosa etc. This is reminiscent of the older matrilineal tradition still practiced in other parts of the province. 96 It is necessary to stress that the women presence in the informal markets follows also a tradition of sectors of the Kongo society of commerce dedication, since the pre-colonial period, that used to involve both men and women.
42 outside of the family sphere is also relatively outside the control of men or family patriarchal influence. Churches can provide starting points for community networking and female participation in the broader social issues and activities.
Women play a fundamental role in the basic transmission of cultural norms and moral frameworks to children, specially the teaching of the maternal language, assuring the continuity of the traditional or familiar base institutions. While women play important roles as teachers in the formal educational system, young girls and teenagers are usually the first ones to abandon school in order to help or either substitute their mothers, in the domestic activities, in detriment to their education97.
In interviewing youth it is observed that there are strong gender differences between girls and boys with regard to mobility and social ascension. Girls have a low level of decision making power and they experience strong pressures from family hierarchies above them. They are consequently penalized in their studies. They are often obliged to take up activities in the labour or informal market economy at early ages. Girls are often disadvantaged in their access to formal education. Even the number of girls who register at the beginning of a school year is normally eroded by at least 20% over the year due to drop-outs because of premature pregnancies.98 There are obstacles for girls to have more equal chances for social development and barriers for them to perform more prominent social roles in the community.
97 Testimonials from women and youth interviewed complained about being the first to be penalized when family emergencies occurred and additional labour was required for household duties or livelihood activities. 98 Teenage pregnancy is exacerbated by traditional taboos against sexual education in the family and the school.
43 Annex 2:
SITUACAO POS-CONFLITO NA PROVINCIA DO MOXICO 24 Fevereiro a 03 Marco 2004
Apresentado por Amândio Albano Mavela Margarida Ulisavo 7 de Marco de 2005
1. Metodologia a. Amostra Os Termos de Referencia da pesquisa definem de forma geral as variaveis principais e as categorias que deviam servir de base para o processo de seleccao da amostra, mas nao quantifica a amostra em estudo. A equipa de pesquisa em colaboracao com o facilitador de terreno o Senhor Domingos Fernando Caieie optou dentro das categorias definidas (deslocados internos, regressados, desmobilizados, comunidades, entidades do Estado e organizacoes da sociedade civil) quantificar a amostra. Desta feita, foram programadas 19 entrevistas e feitas 18 no total, sendo 1 Secretariado Provincial do partido politico (UNITA), 4 instituicoes do estado (IRSEM, Gabinete de Apoio as Administracoes Locais, MINARS e o Governo Provincial na pessoa do Vice-Governador para a Esfera Economica e Social), 2 instituicoes religiosas (Salesianos do Dom Bosco e a Igreja Bom Deus), 3 autoridades do poder tradicional, 3 coordenadores de bairros, 1 ONG angolana (CAPDC), 1 ONG estrangeira (LWF), 1 agencia das Nacoes Unidas (ACNUR), 1 casal de regressados a dois anos e 3 grupos focais (35 Mulheres, 30 jovens e 20 homens adultos)99. Todas entrevistas foram conduzidas na cidade do Luena, designadamente nos bairros sede, no Kapango, Havemos de Voltar (Kawango 2 e 3) e nas instalacoes do CAPDC. Por outra, foi importante a diversidade intelectual, socio-economica e cultural dos entrevistados que permitiu avaliar o grau de accoes levadas a cabo por diferentes actores existentes na provincia. Alguns casos podem ate ser parte de uma analise mais cuidada para a elaboracao de estudos de caso de pessoas bem sucedidas e mal sucedidas do processo de reintegracao. Um caso de estudo bem sucedido pode obter da entrevista tidas com o jovem William, tecnico agricola que chegou ao pais a dois anos. Um exemplo mal sucedido foi da estoria duma senhora acompanhado pelo CAPDC. No contacto com os grupos focais no campo de reassentamento do bairro “Havemos de Voltar” deu para observar o nivel de vida que essas pessoas tem no campo de reassentamento, que no nosso entender pode ser tambem mais um caso de analise para as futuras pesquisas. b. Metodologia Basicamente a metodologia usada cingiu-se em entrevistas semi-estruturadas, grupos focais, a observacao espontanea, reflexoes diarios para cruzar os pontos que achamos importante para analise e a consulta de documentacao. Foi usado um roteiro de perguntas semi-estruturadas para orientar as questoes chaves a ser debatidas nos encontros. Separamos grupos por sexo e idade (ex: homens separados de mulheres e jovens – rapazes e raparigas-, assim consecutivamente); Previamos trabalhar com um minimo de 12 a 15 pessoas por grupo focal, mas acabamos com
99 Alguns sobas entrevistados ocupavam dupla funcao mas que e importante na definicao da Amostra da pesquisa. Por exemplo, no campo de resseantamento dos regressados Zambia (Kawango 3), no encontro com as autoridades do poder tradicional no Kawango 2 e Kapango houve sempre a presenca de um coordenador ou a mesma pessoa no caso do regedor de Kawango 2 ocupar a funcao de regedor e coordenador do bairro.
44 tendo uma media de 25 pessoas por grupo. Previamos que o numero total de participantes nao devia exceder 45 pessoas. Mas acabamos tendo mais pessoas porque a realidade local nao permitiu controlar o numero de pessoas interessadas a participar do encontro100. Para evitar que as autoridades influenciem e monopolizem os pontos de vistas das pessoas na comunidade, preferimos reunir com os lideres tradicionais separadamente dos outros grupos. Essa experiencia permitiu que as pessoas na comunidade explicarem-se sem cogitações e constrangimentos de pessoas de hierarquicas no seu seio. No encontro com as autoridades tradicionais levamos oferta simbolica como forma de respeito a cultura local. Usamos um informador chave que conhece as pessoas, o ambiente local e as organizacoes que operam na provincia de modos a ganhar confianca no trabalho com os grupos.Usamos em alguns casos um interprete para lingua local que permitiu a comunicacao entre os entrevistadores e os entrevistados. No final atribuimos uma compensacao para o informador chave e que esteve na organização dos encontros. Foram elaborado relatorio especifico sobre a deslocacao.
2. Analise do contexto da Província do Moxico (Guida) Pareceu-nos ser um gabinete com uma acção mais policial que pedagógico. - As perspectives de William faz acreditar que ele percebe que a produção alimentar na província do Moxico e aqui muito baixa. - Capa localmente e combustível. - Dados fornecidos verbalmente pelo soba do bairro e não confirmados oficialmente. - Idem. - A pessoa que nos recebeu no campo segurava um manual de estatutos do MPLA. - Luena e uma área saturada e por isso não tem serviços. Os empregos são muito poucos, as áreas de cultivo soa limitados (esgotaram). O mercado saturado e em si já pequeno. - Talvez a suspeita de aliciamento dos refugiados seja pelo facto desses passarem pelos postos fronteiriços onde os serviços de emigração e fronteiras registam o movimento das pessoas que entram para pais. Por outro lado existe outro registo feito pelos oficiais do MINARS antes dos regressados irem para os centros de acolhimento. - Talves se trate do sentido de cidada nia vinculado com a militancia politica. - Embora seja contradicao a afirmacao de que os militantes e ex-militares da UNITA sao habituados ao trabalho por isso sao sujeitos a espera de caridade por outra da-nos sensacao de que em determinados casos a UNITA gostaria ver seus quadros e ex-militares a permanecerem nos centros urbanos. - Talves haja tambem aqueles que nao estejam dispostos a seguirem para locais de enquadramento sem que estejam criadas as minimas condicoes de trabalho. - Sera a manifestacao dos espirito de dependencia ou fracas iniciativas? - Na optica da UNITA a posicao Kamunzaguinza e um termo para exprimeir um sentimento exclusao entre os encontrados e os chegados. Por exemplo os deslocados do Luau e Kamanongue sao chamados de Kamuzaguinza. Exemplo Kamuzanguinza do Kamanongue, de Kazombo, etc. - A falta de incentivos no meio rural (escolas, empregos, hospitais, meios de comunicação a social, diversão, etc) não atrai as pessoas, sobretudo a camada jovem para essas áreas. - Saber conviver com as minas. CAPDC. a. Conflitos armados b. Processos de paz c. Económico O Moxico e uma das províncias do país com uma imensa extensão de terra e inestimáveis
100 Das diferentes experiencias no uso desse metodo em comunidades com grande gama de problemas socio-economico, mostraram que a presenca duma pessoa externa e sempre vista com expectativa para solucao imediata dos seus problemas. Disto podemos tirar duas licoes; a dependencia das pessoas pensarem que sem um elemento externo para solucionar seus problemas, elas nao podem sobreviver; a dificuldade dos actores na provincia em resolver necessidades de tantas pessoas com poucos recursos em muito pouco tempo.
45 potencialidades de recursos naturais. O Moxico representa quase um quinto da extensão de todo o território nacional. Como potencialidades, o Moxico possui rios permanentes que podem ajudar o processo de desenvolvimento da província. Contudo as distancias entre uma localidade a outra e de um rio a outro sao muito grandes, o que dificulta o aproveitamento racional deste recurso hídrico. Um exemplo apresentado que deveria facilitar o processo de reintegração dos cidadãos que chegam, seria a abertura de pontos de água (poços e cacimba). d. Sócio – Cultural e. Institucional
3. Estado das infraestruturas básicas A variante infraestruturas veio ao debate com as diferentes institucoes e organizacoes com a finalidade de perceber que tipo de insfraestruturas, o seu estado fisico actual, a sua funcionalidade de modo a servir de base para o processo de reintegracao dos grupos. a. Infraestruturas Sociais
Sao infraestururas sociais aquelas que de prestacao de servicos sociais basicos as comunidades, tais como escolas, centros medico/hospitais, fontes de abastecimento de agua, energia, comunicacoes e transportes. Dois cenarios se desenham ao avaliar o estado de conservacao das infraestruturas ao nivel da provincia do Moxico, as do Luena e comunas proximas e dos municipios mais afastados que mais sofreram os efeitos da guerra.
Na sede e um pouco mais servida em infraestruturas, designadamente as administrativas, habitacionais no centro da sede, escolares e sanitarias relativamente recebem mais atencao do que resto da provincia. Porem, como acontece com as restantes cidades do pais, a periferia (peri- urbano), apresenta quase num estado de abandono. Estas infraestruturas permitem algum nivel de prestacao de servicos as populacoes, embora com limitacoes. Comparativamente ao abastecimento de agua e energia o quadro mais desolador. As populacoes recorrem aos pocos de agua (cacimbas), para se abastecerem. A cidade capital e servida pelo rio Luena, mas a sua exploracao nao esta sendo efectiva para abastecer a maior parte da cidade. As populacoes peri- urbanas sao as que mais sofrem com esta situacao. Como recurso abrem pocos descobrtos ao longo do rio e consomem esta agua sem tratamento. Ha exemplos em que estes pocos sao fontes de conflito entre os residentes e os que chegam, como acontece com a populacao da area do Kawango, bairro Havemos de Voltar. Citando uma das senhoras regressada no bairro Havemos de Voltar, “So podemos cartar agua depois dos donos terem tirado”.
Nas areas de reintegracao existem preocupacoes especificas que tem a ver com a inexistencia de servicos de educacao, saude e saneamento, tais como escolas, postos medicos e latrinas. E para o efeito fazem recurso ao Hospital Central do Luena onde sao cobrados 100 kwanzas por uma consulta e uma receita para comprarem medicamentos no mercado informal.
Grande parte do interior da provincia a situacoa e dramatica. A titulo de exemplo, a parte sul da provincia, foi nos dito que as “as condicoes sao mais precarias nos municipios das Bundas e Luchazes, tudo esta partido. Os administradorews comunais e seus adjuntos vivem em tendas e /ou em casa de pau-a- pique”. Apenas cerca de 30 % das sedes municiapsi tem escolas e centros medicos. b. Vias de acesso A provincia e servida por uma rede rodoviaria e por um troco ferroviario. A rede rodoviaria tem quatro saidas primarias designadamente, Luena - Saurimo, Luena – Bie (por terra batida), Luena – fronteirra do Luau- Cazombo e Luena –fonteira LumabalaN’guimbo-Cazombo e Luena – Lumbala N’guimbo – Kuando Kubango. O troco ferroviario e um prolongamento da CFB em direcao a fronteira do Luau para as RDC e Zambia. Existem outras vias aquelas que ligam as sedes municipais e comunais e destas para as aldeias.
46 Estas vias de acesso apresentam um estado de degracao avancado, a contar com as informacoes obtidas a partir dos diferentes actores. A via de para Bie e de dificil acesso por ser de terra batida. Por vezes, e usada pelos pequenos comerciantes. A via Luena – Bie entre outras ofereceu maiores dificuldades para o encaminhamento dos regressados as suas zonas de origem. O acesso rodoviario mais usado e o de Luena – Saurimo e dali para Luanda e Luena- Muconda e dali para o Luau. As restantes vias estao condicionadas pela reabilitacao das estradas, pontes, desminagem e na estacao chuvosa pelas cheias das chanas. A situacao agrava-se ainda mais a medida que se vai avancando para as partes remotas da provincia.
Os Municipios aos sul da provincia sao mais dificeis de circulacao devido as mas condicoes das vias de acesso. Como exemplo (a via Luena / Lumbala Nguimbo que sao de 400 km precisa-se 2 dias de viagem usando vias alternativas passando pela estrada Luena- Kuito-Kangamba ou via area. Em termos do estado da estarada, a ligacao terrestre directa para este municipio nao e ma, mas o seu uso esta condicionado tambem reparacao e desminagem de mais de 10 pontes, partidas e minadas durante o conflito. Outro exemplo dado foi da circulacao Luena Cazombo 101 pide-se tambem utilizar a RDC como via alternativa.
A via do Luena – Kamanongue - Luau - Kazombo e dificil nos tempos de estacao chuvosa. Para se ir ao Luau e preciso entrar pela Mukonda nas Lunda Sul. Tambem para ir ao municipio de Luchazes leva-se dois dias. As agencias das Nacoes Unidas consideram essa via de bastante acidentada. E Cangamba e considerada e tida como sendo uma zona vermelha tanto do ponto de vista alimentar como pelo levantamento do estado das vias nessa localidade, porque so se chegou ali nos finais do ano 2004.
Por exemplos caracterizam estes pequenos comerciantes e camionistas que fazem trajecto nessas vias como sendo herois102. Quanto ao troco ferroviario, diziamos que era servido pelo CFB103. A sua inoperancia constitui um factor impeditivo do desenvolvimento porque ainda se encontra inoperante, com efeitos negativos para os processos de reassentamento e reintegracao, assim como a reabilitacao de infraestruturas. Reabilitacao das infraestruturas: Ao nivel do Governo da Provincia existem planos para a reabilitacao das infraestruturas. Mas convem realcar que a recuperacao completa das infraestruturas degradadas e destruidas pela guerra podera levar ainda muito tempo e com muitas dificuldades devido aos reduzidos recursos disponiveis a provincia.
Como exemplo:
A via Luena-Lumbala N’guimbo e critica, com muitos rios, pontes partidas e minas. E um troco de mais de 400 km, com muitos rios apresenta mais de 20 pontes partidas. A via alternativa que hoje e usada e muito longa e leva mais tempo (dois dias de viagem). O troco Lumbala Kakengue - Cazombo tem 13 rios com pontes todas partidas. O mesmo acontece com a via Luau - Kazombo via Mukonda, Lunda Sul. E o troco Luau – Luacano – Lumeji – Cameia por causa das enchentes das chanas no tempo chuvoso. Na estacao chuvosa os rios enchem e as pontes estao partidas.
Existe um protocolo entre o Governo e o PAM para a reabilitacao das pontes na via Luena -
101 Cazombo dista cerca de 519 km do Luena 102 Comparando as informacoes do director do MINAR e dos Chefes de Deptos deste Gabinete, permite-nos dizer que o estado actual das vias saos mais dificeis para as viaturas de maior porte, mas que pode ser usadas as ligeiras com traccao a 4 rodas.
103 Esta via foi construida no tempo colonial tendo sido um factor de desenvolvimento de Angola e dos paises visinhos nomeadamente a republica do Congo ex-Belga (hoje RDC) e da Rodesia do Norte actual Zambia. Paralizado desde os anos 80 a quando do recrudecimento do conflito armado em Angola, encontra-se num estado avancado de degradacao. Isso, influenciou negativamente a circulacao das pessoas, mercadorias e bens entre o litoral e o leste.
47 Lumbala N’guimbo. Neste protocolo o PAM vai reabilitar 3 pontes metalicas de maior dimensao e o governo provincial vai reabilitar pontes de menor dimensao usando o material local (madeira). Um dos argumentos e de que o Governo vai contar com o envolvimento das brigadas das FAA. Existe outra accoes em curso tem o envolvimento da empresa Kutunga na reabilitacao da estrada Luena – Leua. Do mesmo esta previsto a reabilitacao do CFB faz parte dos planos do Governo Central 104. A reabilitacao do CFB conta com a intervencao dos chineses ate mais ou menos finais de 2006. Por isso as pessoas acham que estas accoes virao absorver uma grande parte dos jovens sobretudo os desmobilizados porque:
A reabilitacao exigira antes um processo de desminagem do CFB e das estradas. Isso vai envolver muita gente sobretudo a mao de obra nao qualificada e talvez alguma qualificada de acordo com a capacidade. Obviamente que a mao de obra nao qualificada sera toda local.
Depois da reabilitacao as estacoes ao longo da linha ferrea precisarao de muito pessoal.
Naturalmente isto, impulsionara outros empreendimentos de construcao ao longo do troco. A reabilitacao e o funcionamento do CFB e visto na provincia como fonte de emprego para a grande maioria dos jovens. Portanto a CFB podera ser a segunda fonte de empregos porque podera ser reabilitadas as escolas, hospitais, oficinas, cantinas, centros medicos, administracao, etc. Deram exemplo de no passado ter sido maior fonte empregos e das trocas comerciais entre o litoral e o leste do pais.
Uma das citacoes de um entrevistado ilustram bem as expectativas da provincia sobre a importancia da reabilitacao do CFB: “Todas estas accoes vao criar muitos empregos ao lado da agricultura. Teremos de formar muita gente para ter capacidade resposta a estas actividades. Embora havera a necessidade de cooperar com outras provincias do pais”.
Outras intervencoes de organizacoes parceiras do Governo, nomeadamente ONGs e Igrejas estao implementadas visando fornecer servicos as pessoas nos nos processos de reassentamento e reintegracao.
Por como exemplo, as accoes da Federacao Luterana Mundial (LWF) estao viradas para a reabilitacao de infraestruturas designadamente postos de saude e casas para emergencia. Faz reabilitacao de escolas e casas para professores. Faz reabilitacao do antigo sistema de captacao de agua.
Os padres Salesianos do Dom Bosco trabalham nas construcao e reabilitacao de escolas e sistemas de agua em muitas comunidades na provincia. Construiram 4 postos de saude que alguns destes entregaram ao Governo.
4. As acções de desminagem Moxico e uma das provincias mais minadas no pais. Uma das referencias diz-nos que existem minas postos anarquicamente e nao se conhece a sua localizacao exacta por falta de mapas de localizacao. Muitos dos seus actores estao desaparecidos da provincia. Existem planos de desminagem com prioridades para as vias de acesso e areas previstas para assentamentos. Para alem do Estado a provincia conta com ONGs vocacionadas para a desminagem como MAG,
104 Eles acham que a reabilitacao deste empreendimento esta muito lento. Deram exemplo dos esforcos feitos na troco Catumbele Cubal, do Huambo ao Bie, mas questionam-se do atraso em relacao a reabilitacao do troco Luena Luau. Devido a esses atrasos, os entrevistados acham que existem ma vontade das pessoas responsaveis por esse projecto de reabilitacao.
48 Ajuda Popular da Noruega (APN) e ATC. Outras accoes estao ligadas a sensibilizacao contra os perigos de minas. Pode se notar tambem uma colaboracao tanto ao nivel das comunidades como entre as instituicoes do governo e organizacoes da sociedade civil (OSC).
Foi apontado como participacao das comunidades, o exemplo duma esposa de ex-militar que conhecia da localizacao de um paiol de armamento e foi informar ao MAG o que permitiu a sua destruicao. Outro cidadao ex-militar queria utilizar um espaco de terra para a actividade agricola, mas descobriu que a area estava minada. Para resolver problema comunicou a MAG e esta demorou a dar resposta. Cansado de esperar e porque conhecia as tecnicas de desminagem retirou as minas (11 no total), por iniciativa propria. Foi aludido que a desminagem e um processo oneroso e moroso contraiamente a minagem. Apesar dos esforcos de desminagem pelas entidades vocacionadas com o apoio das instituicoes do governo, mesmo assim continua haver desconfianca de minas ao longo das estradas principais. Visando reduzir os casos de accionamento de minas, as organizacoes de desminagem e outras ONGs realizam acoes de educacao contra o perigo. Provavelmente por esta razao se afirma que os casos de accionamento de minas reduziram consideravelmente.
5. Formas de organização comunitária existentes (Guida) Conjunto de pessoas que vivem na mesma comunidade, partilham objectivos e Conjunto de pessoas que vivem na mesma comunidade partilham objectivos e interesses comuns a volta dos quais se organizam com a finalidade de resolverem os problemas que a comunidade enfrenta e nos limites da comunidade. As organizações comunitárias podem ou não ser legalizadas. As formas de organizações comunitárias podem ser:
Endógenas – aquelas emanam da própria cultura da comunidade. Surgem por sua própria iniciativa sem influências externas. Ex. Njango.
Exógenas – surgem por influência dos agentes externos. Ex. associações de pescadores do Bita Tanque e Funda. a. Tipos b. Papeis e funcionamento c. Sustentabilidade d. Influencia das instituições do estado nas estruturas tradicionais
6. Processos de reassentamento e reintegração dos deslocados, regressados e ex-militares (Guida) a. Processos de reassentamento Por reassemento entendemos como sendo aquele processo pelo qual tanto os desmobilizados, deslocados e refugiados são alocados um espaço físico onde organizam a sua vida, ou seja, onde deverá ocorrer o seu processo de reintegração. Por reassentamento entendemos um processo imediato para resolver os problemas básicos que servem para criar condições de reintegração. Desta maneira as entrevistas feitas tiveram por finalidade perceber como este processo está a decorrer por forma a satisfazer as necessidades básicas dos três grupos de cidadãos. Das informações obtidas a partir de diferentes actores, nomeadamente instituições do Estado e religiosas, autoridades tradicionais e ONG nacionais e internacionais, grupos focais comunitários e pessoas singulares consultadas, foi possível recolher os seguintes dados:
Em relação aos desmobilizados Moxico é a província que teve a maior concentração de desmobilizados para serem encaminhados para as suas zonas de origem e para serem
49 reassentados. Segundo dados do organismo a fim o Moxico esperava receber 1 810 desmolibizados para reassentar. Porém, estes dados foram se alterando com o tempo devido a situação de que no momento de fazer a movimentação das pessoas para as zonas inicialmente identificadas, na realidade não foi assim. A dinâmica de movimento é relativamente grande, de tal modo que, a instituição do Estado a fim, está a realizara um novo levantamento para determinar com exactidão o número e a localização dos ex-militares integrados na vida civil. São tidas como áreas de maiores reassentamento de ex-militares o Alto Zambeze com cerca e 235 e o Luau com 406. um número consideravelmente grande permaneceu nas antigas áreas de acolhimento e outros foram para as suas províncias de origem e algumas áreas da província, sobretudo, fixaram- se em zonas peri-urbanas das cidades vilas Luena, Lucusse, Luau e Alto Zambeze. Muitos desmobilizados originários de Huambo e Bie ficaram no Luena e outros ficaram nas ex-areas de aquartelamento da Chicala I e II. Outros ainda foram para as províncias de Huíla, Bié, Huambo e Benguela. 100 famílias foram se fixar na área de Makondolo105.
Refugiados: Em 2003 foram repatriados cerca de trinta um mil pelo processo organizado e trinta e seis mil espontaneamente, em 2004, regressaram cerca de trinta e quatro mil e espontaneamente trinta mil cidadãos. Deste número a maioria é mulheres e crianças. Ficaram ainda cerca de vinte e três mil refugiados dos quais poucos mais de mil estão da RDC, que poderão ser repatriados todos em 2005. os restantes estão na República da Zâmbia.
Deslocados:Em relação ao deslocados a grande parte deles estão já reassentada nas suas zonas de origem no interior da província. E outros regressaram às suas províncias de origem. Porém, existem ainda cerca de 20 000 deslocados nos campos de acolhimento, dos quais 5 000 pretendem regressar as áreas de origem e 15 optaram por ficar na província do Moxico. Os 15 000 que querem permanecer ali, estão localizados em Katokola, Luchazes, Sakange, Lumbala Sakassange, Enana. Para aqueles que optaram por ficar não têm direito aos kits de reintegração, pois eles já os receberam no local de acolhimento. Em Camanongue o governo provincial apenas conseguiu reinstalar 100 famílias em dois anos.
Tanto os ex-militares, os deslocados como os refugiados e foram apontadas como razoes de não regresso as áreas de origem, alguns factores como sejam a falta de estabilidade económica naquelas áreas, pessoas que tenham constituído uma nova família e o parceiro não pretende sair dali, a insegurança em saber se ainda tem familiares na área, o medo da adaptação aos hábitos e costumes da área e o medo de vinganças por motivos políticos que não tenham sido resolvidos.
Este processo encontra ainda muitas dificuldades de movimentação das pelas pela falta de transporte, difícil acesso às localidades, pelas razões já apontadas em capítulos anteriores. Por no processo a retirada das pessoas para as áreas de reassentamento tem se optado pelo transporte aéreo principalmente para as áreas de Lumbala Nguimbo e o Luena para as províncias de Bié, Huambo e Huíla. Em alguns casos os refugiados que trazem alguns bens seus, estes ficam.
b. Processos de reinserção A reintegração é um processo mais complexo que compreende aspectos psico-sociais, económicos, morais e culturais. O processo de reintegração começa com o processo de reassentamento e tem seguimento até que o cidadão se sinta efectivamente membro integrante daquela comunidade. Por isso, tem muito a ver com o processo de uma nova socialização naquela comunidade. Este processo passa pela mudança de atitudes e assumir de novos comportamentos, fruto de um processo de novas aprendizagens. Para isto, se exige a compreensão, a participação e aceitação da comunidade onde ocorre o processo de reassentamento. Tal como refere o quadro legal para o reassentamento e regresso das populações directamente afectadas pela guerra, vulgo, deslocados e refugiados, os governos provinciais têm responsabilidade de criar as condições básicas para o regresso, reassentamento e
105 Makondolo foi uma das áreas de exploração de diamantes que apoiou a maquina de guerra da UNITA durante o conflito armado. Como estratégia do partido UNITA de controlar a exploração de diamantes criou uma associação, cujo objectivo era tanto quanto dúbio. Infelizmente as tentativas de continuar com essa actividade por parte da UNITA ficou frustrado porque os diamantes estão difíceis de encontrar.
50 por conseqüência de reinstalação destes grupos. Significa dizer que era necessário assegurar a programação, e realização de todo o processo, que inclui desde o domínio da necessidade de regresso das pessoas, a identificação das terras para o reassentamento, a segurança dos locais, a reposição da administração do Estado, o regresso e reinstalação/reassentamento propriamente dita com atribuição de kits de reinstalação, à reabilitação de infraestruturas, até a assistência dos serviços sociais básicos (educação, saúde, água e saneamento), à alimentação, tendo uma particular atenção para as crianças e para a educação comunitária. Obviamente o mesmo se pode dizer em relação aos desmobilizados, como um terceiro grupo resultado dos acordos de natureza político-militar, visando o fim dos conflitos armados. Por outro lado as OSC têm também um papel fundamental a desempenhar não só na providencia dos meios materiais, mas sobretudo, na necessidade de desencadear um processo didáctico que permita a reintegração efectiva dos cidadãos. b.1) Reintegração económica Para as pessoas hoje na condição de os desmobilizados ou regressados sejam reintegradas efectivamente na sociedade, é indispensável a criação de condições materiais básicas para recomeçar a vida nas novas zonas de vivência.
Algumas populações reassentadas obtiveram terra para reiniciar a sua vida agrícola. Algumas dessas terras são obtidas a partir de familiares existentes na área, ou de outras de boa fé cedem espaços como uma maneira de solidariedade. Mas, a grande parte dos casos é de facto não existirem lugares de reassentamento e reintegração distribuídos e protegidos pelo governo. Uns poucos enfermeiros conseguiram obter uma colocação para trabalhar, embora uns ainda não tenham começado a sua actividade, pelo facto de não terem ido para as áreas de colocação. Outros poucos mas, os mais ousados conseguiram empregos nas ONGs, com vantagens para os regressam da Zâmbia pr falarem inglês. Os desmobilizados vão beneficiar de projectos financiados pelo Banco Mundial e GoAl, através do Programa Geral Desmobilização e Reintegração (PGDR), estando já aprovados como parceiros credíveis de implementação os Salesianos do D. Bosco e a Federação Luterana Mundial. Em termos de números de pessoas realmente reintegradas não existe ainda um conhecimento exacto e talvez mesmo não haja ainda um consenso formado.
Outrossim, algumas ONGs nacionais e estrangeiras, participam ao lado do governo provincial, com acções concretas para apoiar os reintegrandos a recuperar a sua actividade económica, assim:
Os Salesianos de D. Bosco, a LWF e o CAPDC estão a promover a produção agrícola através da disponibilização de sementes e ferramentas agrícolas. A LWF ainda treina as comunidades em técnicas agrícolas com vista a melhoria da produção. Estas organizações excepto os Salesianos têm programas de concessão de micro-credito. O CAPDC concede o micro-crédito para pequenos negócios sobretudo para as mulheres, por serem estas as que mais asseguram a sobrevivência dos agregados familiares e incentiva a criação de animais de pequeno porte. A LWF optou pelo crédito agrícola e de forma rotativo. Enquanto isso, a OIM está a trabalhar com os ex-militares num projecto de pesca artesanal no alto Zambeze. Para aquelas pessoas que conseguiram beneficiar destas acções a sua situação económica começa a mudar, aumenta gradualmente o sua renda familiar.
Não obstante estas iniciativas de apoio aos reintegrandos, a situação não é tão animadora. O contexto do moxico mostra-nos que os reintegrandos vivem ainda em condições de penúria e desolação a partir do momento que chegam á áreas de reassentamento. Estas situações agudizam-se muito mais quando a sua chegada ocorre em tempo impróprio de produção agrícola, isto é, fora da campanha agrícola. Segundo informações colhidas a partir dos entrevistados, as pessoas que chegam são assistidas durante apenas três meses. No entanto, o período requerido para que a pessoa tenha algo para sobreviver é de no mínimo seis meses. Isso, leva a que antes do tempo de colheita, as pessoas estejam a passar por uma de escassez alimentar.
51 As informações recebidas de diferentes entrevistados com maior destaque para os directamente afetadas pela situação, atestam que há uma certa morosidade no atendimento das pessoas para que possam começar uma actividade socialmente útil e poderem desta forma criar suas condições econômicas básicas. Citamos um dos entrevistados “O processo de reintegração é lento e com prevalência de pequenas bolsas em certas áreas da província. Muitos militares foram já reassentados, mas apresentam dificuldades na recuperação económica”. Casos há em que as pessoas não tiveram logo uma oportunidade de terra para cultivar, quadros há formados com diferentes profissões, mas o mercado local não tem capacidade de resposta. Estas pessoas estão ganhando a capacidade de produzir alternativas de sobrevivência, alguns abaixo do seu estatus social (estiva de produtos nos mercados, pequenos negócios de produtos alimentares, produção de carvão, produção de pequenos produtos do campo etc). Outros contam com o apoio das suas famílias e não esperam pelo governo da província. b.2) Reintegração Sócio – Cultural Por reintegração sócio-cultural queremos entender o processo de reintegração que procura proporcionar as condições de segurança social, o acesso aos serviços sociais básicos como a educação, saúde, água, habitação, energia, comunicações, recreação e desporto, ...bem como a capacidade que estes cidadãos tenham adquirido para a sua inserção e/ ou reinserção cultural. Acesso aos serviços sociais básicos: Apesar da sede da província, o Luena terem mais capacidade de prestar serviços ainda está muito longe de satisfazer as populações e a situação agrava-se à medida que nos afastamos das sedes provincial e municipais. Os cidadãos na condição de regressado, retornados e desmobilizados têm ainda mais dificuldades de acesso aos serviços socais básicos. Grande parte destas pessoas é camponesa e obviamente, está a ser reassentada nas comunidades mais afastadas dos centros urbanos (periferia e no meio rural). apenas 30% das sedes municipais têm escolas e postos médicos. Grande parte das sedes municipais e comunais não tem infraestruturas habitacionais, nem para acomodar os funcionários públicos os seus administradores, nem para as populações, muito menos para os que regressam. Alguns vivem em tendas e/ ou casas de pau-a-pique.
Nesta senda também o governo da província, algumas instituições religiosas e algumas ONG presentes na província, nomeadamente a LWF, o CAPDC, os Salesianos de D.Bosco, JRS, estão a promover acções que visam garantir e aumentar o acesso à educação, saúde e água as pessoas que regressam, para facilitar a sua reintegração social. A LWF está envolvida na promoção de programas de apóio as parteiras tradicionais, de educação para a saúde com vista a capacitar os regressados para os cuidados primários de saúde, desde a sensibilidade até ao ensino prático das técnicas de tratamento de água, visando a prevenção doenças como malarias, Doenças Diarréicas Agudas (DDA) e as Doenças Transmissíveis Sexualmente (DTS), o VIH/SIDA. O CAPDC, , acções que vão desde a sensibilização até ao ensino dos cuidados . Ensina a comunidade sobre o aproveitamento de água. Cria grupos de água e saneamento para velarem por essas infraestruturas.
Na questão de educação cívica e direitos humanos. Faz sensibilização sobre a reconciliação nacional e a paz, resolução de conflitos, aconselhamento e treinam os activistas motivadores comunitários. Os motivadores comunitários são o elo de ligação entre as comunidades e a LWF. Colaboram nessa área diferentes grupos comunitários incluindo as igrejas.
Kawango - No entanto elas disseram que tem no seu seio pessoal treinadas como enfermeiras. Outras questao levantada tem haver com a falta tambem de uma escola. As poucas crianças que estudam percorrem grandes distancias para chegarem a escola para crianças residentes. Buscam agua no riacho Kasuku a 2 kms. as populações reassentadas para conseguirem alguns bens de primeira necessidade como o sal, óleo, sabão deslocam-se ao Kuito percorrendo distancias acima de 100 km a pe. O comercio nessas e feito a base de permuta de produtos do campo como mel e carne seca. E outros que não conseguem fazer tais deslocações continuam a consumir comida sem sal Quanto as infraestruturas sanitárias Eles também disseram que nao teem posto de saude embora tenha
52 pessoas formadas nessa area no seu seio. Nao tem latrinas. O que eles pediram a ACNUR e uma clinica movel ou qualquer coisa semelhante para consultas e tratamento pelo menos duas vezes por semana. Sanitarias + : Falaram de falta de apoio medico-medicamentosa logo que deixaram o centro de acolhimento Dom Bosco onde recebiam assistencia gratuita atravez da JRS.
Para os regressados informou que a lingua constituiu uma barreira para a sua reintegracao. A mairia dos regressados expressa-se em ingles e em linguas nacionais locais (cokwe, luvale, mbunda, luxaje, umbundu e nganguela) e infima parte fala dificilmente o portugues. Para ajudar estas pessoas a JRS – Servicos Jesuitas para os Refugiados, estabeleceram um curos intensivo de lingua portuguesa na fronteira do Luau.
Todas estas dificuldades afectam negativamente a dinâmica do processo de reintegração, levam as pessoas a terem identidades virtuais e conseqüentemente frágeis e logo tratados com desdém
i. Institucional No nosso entender existe diferenciacao na ajuda humanitaria que se prestou no periodo da Guerra pos-eleitoral 1997 a 2002 e aqueles se vem dando ao periodo depois do entendimento do Luena. Talves a situacao esteja relacionada com alguns factores tais como: fraca coordenacao entre os organismos e instituicoes envolvidas (UN, GoA e doadores); simultaneadade dos processos de reassentamento e reintegracao (regressados, deslocados e ex-militares); Generalizacao ou agravamento da situacao humanitaria em todo o pais; Mutacao das politicas dos doadores quanto a assistencia humanitaria. Para a comunidade internacional Angola deixou de ser prioridade apos o fim do conflito armado.
LWF: A primeira e a reabilitacao de infraestruturas designadamente postos de saude e casas para emergencia. Faz reabilitacao de escolas e casas para professores. Faz reabilitacao do antigo sistema de captacao de agua.
A segunda e da saude preventiva. Apoiam as parteiras tradicionais. Fazem educacao para a saude para prevenir doencas como malarias, DDR e as DTS. Ensinam a comunidade sobre o aproveitamento de agua. Criam grupos de agua e saneamento para velarem por essas infraestruturas.
A terceira area promovem a agricultura. Distribuem sementes e treinam as comunidades em tecnicas agricolas. Cedem micro-credito agricola. O micro-credito e rotativo.
Finalmente o processo de reintegração é visto por alguns entrevistados como sendo vicioso (conotado com aproveitamento fáceis em lugar dos verdadeiros beneficiários e com o fenômeno “gasosa” e o paternalismo)
Como grande dificuldade de recuperacao de infraestruturas e prestacao de servicos basicos as populacoes e a insuficiencia de verbas alocadas as administracoes que ronda nos 50 a 150 mil Kwanzas. Por isso, as populacoes reassentadas para conseguirem alguns bens de primeira necessidade como o sal, oleo, sabao deslocam-se ao Kuito percorrendo distancias acima de 100 km a pe. O comercio nessas e feito a base de permuta de produtos do campo como mel e carne seca. E outros que nao conseguem fazer tais deslocacoes continuam a consumir comida sem sal. c. O processo de reintegracao...
53 Quanto ao reassentamento: Moxico recebe maior parte dos regressados106 com destinos para Cangamba e Luau. Nas palavras do director a provincia recebeu em 2003 31 000 do programa organizado e 36000 expontaneos. Antes destadata ja haviam chegado expontaeamente 60 000. Em 2004, 32 00 regressaram de forma organizada e 33 000 expontaneamente.
Reintegracao: o processo e lento e com prevalencia de pequenas bolsas em certas areas da provincia (de que bolsas de trata?). Muitos militares foram ja reassentados, mas apresentam dificuldades na recuperacao ecomonmica.
Para os regressados informou que a lingua constituiu uma barreira para a sua reintegracao. A mairia dos regressados expressa-se em ingles e em linguas nacionais locais (cokwe, luvale, mbunda, luxaje, umbundu e nganguela) e infima parte fala dificilmente o portugues. Para ajudar estas pessoas a JRS – Servicos Jesuitas para os Refugiados, estabeleceram um curos intensivo de lingua portuguesa na fronteira do Luau.
Existe dificuldades da nova geracao dos refugiados da Zambia que regressaram ao pais de identificar as terras de origem dos seus progenitores. Esse facto e tambem ligado ao desconhecimento das culturas da terra. Existe forte tendencia de connotar as pessoas regressados da Zambia de serem militantes da UNITA. A falta de lugares de reassentamento distribuidos e protegidos pelo governo resulta em grandes tensoes. Essa dificuldade leva as pessoas a terem identidades virtuais e consequentemente frageis e logo tratados com desdem. Os erros na nomeacao de delegados da UNITA em locais onde sao supostos terem um recorde actos criminosos durante o conflito armado. Esta o ex. Do Kazombo que depois se estendeu para o Luacano e Luau onde mais de 60 casas e uma viatura da UNITA foram destruidas. Existe dificuldades de aplicacao das leis em vigor e tambem o governo nao tem alternativas para resolucao dos conflitos.
7. Relacionamentos nas comunidades de reassentados e reintegrados (Mavela) a. Solidariedade social A situacao de reintegracao e mais complexa se comparada com as informacoes entusiasticas por parte das instituicoes que mostram que as relacoes nas intercomunais entre os que chegam e encontrados sao sempre amenas. Isto demonstra um pouco a insuficiencia das autoridades afins de acompanhar na sua plenitude a vida do regressado. Exemplo acompanhar o regressado desde o repatriamento, reassentamento, reabilitacao e reintegracao.
b. Conflitos Esta expressão e normalmente usada para designar situações de exclusão e discriminação social, que quase sempre se pode interpretar como sendo processo que envolvem mecanismos de corrupto. - Esta situação esta sendo referida por muitas pessoas o que mostra que o processo de reintegração tem limitações que podem afectar o regresso dos que ainda não se decidiram a vir. Ao mesmo tempo isto poderá provocar uma fuga de potenciais quadros formados no exterior. Nos ficamos indagados com o facto de que enquanto o país se queixa da falta de quadros, outros de arroguem impedir a reintegração desses no mercado do emprego, sobretudo aqueles que não
106 Nao ha um consenso que define o termo regressado. Na provincia do Moxico algumas entidades oficiais optam pelo termo para se referir aos desmobilizados e ex-deslocados e tambem o que veem de fora do pais. O termo retornado refere-se unicamente aos que haviam se refugiado nos paises visinhos. Esta designacao e aceite pelas pessoas antes refugiadas porque apresenta um sementimento de inferior de discriminacao e estigmatizacao que conduzem ao emprego de outros termos ofensivos como (Zambiano, UNITA, caes e bois). Ao ser usados pelas entidades oficiais estes termos se nao eternizam pelo menos afectam negativamente o processo de reintegracao social e por conseguinte a autoestima destes cidadaos.
54 estudaram no ocidente. c. Mecanismos de resolucao Pode se perceber que os conflitos intercomunais no pos-guerra no Moxico, nao se resolvem pelo facto de haver uma intervencao pontual dum determinado organismo da sociedade mas que seja parte de um conjunto de factores que condicionam a sobrevivencia da parte mais vulneravel. Colocar o ex do bairro Havemos de Voltar (regressados da Zambia). d. Papel das autoridades tradicionais na prevenção e resolução de conflitos
8. Antecipações dos pesquisadores Neste capitulo apresentamos as nossas percepções sobre os diferentes aspectos abordados durante a pesquisa. O que pretendemos é dar o nosso ponto de vista nesses aspectos, numa perspectiva de contribuir para a análise mais profunda deste estudo. O contexto pos-conflito na província do Moxico e ainda desafiador a contar pelas enormes dificuldades logísticas e de coordenação entre diferentes órgãos do Estado e das organizações da sociedade civil. O Moxico é uma das que sofreu gravemente com o conflito armado de todas épocas da história de Angola. Fraca coordenação entre instituições e organizações para prestar informações claras as populacoes constitui um dos grandes obstaculos aos diferentes processos ligados a regressados, deslocados e desmobilizados. Reunem consensos as questoes ligadas a degradacao de infraestruturas, fraca capacidade de resposta as exigencias que os processos impoem e a simultaneidade dos processos (regressados, deslocados e desmobilizados). Existem descrepancias em relacao a questoes de relacionamentos nas comunidades entre os que chegam e os encontros e o decurso dos processos em si.
8.1 Das infraestruturas básicas
Fazendo uma análise comparativa das infraestruturas básicas e vias de acesso nota-se que existe discrepâncias entre o Luena e do resto da província. Embora sejam insuficientes as infraestruturas básicas, tais como escolas, hospitais e pontos de água, Luena parece ser mais bem servido enquanto que as localidades onde ocorre o reassentamento e reintegração estão praticamente desprovidas de serviços básicos as populações. Esta situação afecta negativamente o processo de reintegração dessas populações e que poderão estar também na origem de alguns conflitos de concorrência aos presumíveis recursos.
Anterior ao conflito interno (guerra civil) o Moxico se beneficiou de uma rede rodoviária embora não sofisticada e de uma linha ferroviária, o CFB, de âmbito internacional que permitiram a ligação da província com outros pontos do país e com o exterior. No contexto actual, a nossa percepção é de que o acesso a quase todas as localidades da província é difícil em todas as épocas do ano, agravando-se ainda mais na época das chuvas. Isto é resultado da degradação das estradas, cheias das chanas, destruição das pontes e da presença de minas ao longo das vias. Por outro lado, paralização do CFB durante o conflito armado em Angola torna-se um dos factores impeditivos do processo de reintegração dos três grupos e de todas as populações afectadas pela guerra.
8.2 Desminagem
55 Apesar do fim da guerra, as minas constituem um problema para o desenvolvimento da província do Moxico. As agências das Nações Unidas consideram que a província é uma zona de risco porque continua apresentar as chamadas zonas vermelhas. Os esforços das organizações de desminagem e sensibilização existentes na província continuam a terem dificuldades na localização exacta das zonas minadas e por conseguinte de decidir por onde começar. A via Luena – Lumbala Nguimbo e o troço ao longo do CFB são exemplos mais evidentes. Por outra nos pareceu que as entidades governamentais manifestam uma certa dependência nos serviços prestados pelas ONGs internacionais para desminagem das zonas vitais para o desenvolvimento económico da província. Pareceu ainda que essa debilidade esteja ligada com a planificação centralizada dos recursos que podem ser usados na desminagem a partir de Luanda.
8.3 Formas de Organização comunitária Tanto pelo contacto que tivemos com as comunidades e das instituições do Estado e das OSC, pareceu-nos que as comunidades apresentam uma escassez de organizações comunitárias (associações cívicas, clubes, cooperativas, etc). As únicas que existem a esse nível são as instituições do poder tradicional, as organizações de carácter partidárias e da sociedade civil e religiosas. Quanto ao papel das instituições do poder tradicional, parece não reunir consensos no seio das instituições estatais da forma como estas devem envolverem-se na resolução de conflitos de ordem política ao nível das comunidades. Dentre os entrevistados alguns acham que os papéis das autoridades do poder tradicional resumem-se na resolução de problemas de natureza cultural, como feitiçaria, enquanto outros sao de opinião que o seu papel seja mais alargado para accoes de mediacao de conflitos, mas com limites no ponto de vista juridico. Por exemplo à intervenção da Rainha Nhakatolo no conflito foi apontado como exemplo onde o seu papel devia ser enfatizado. Contudo as autoridades do poder tradicional são aquelas que ainda detêm uma legitimidade junto das suas comunidades. Porem, ao assumir os papeis que são reservados aos coordenadores de partidos politicos nas comunidades, reduz o seu poder influenciador junto do Estado e influenciam tambem de algum modo as iniciativas locais. Quanto as organizações de carácter partidárias nos pareceu que ao nível das comunidades começa haver um contra-peso ao partido no poder. A presença por exemplo do Partido Renovador Social (PRS) em todas as comunidades rurais com um certo protagonismo, simboliza de certa forma as mudancas paulatinas ao nivel da consciencia da fruto da paz militar instalada no pais. As organizações religiosas continuam a desempenhar um papel importante para moralização da sociedade, bem como programas de natureza social. Porem, pareceu-nos que algumas organizações da sociedade civil navegam perdidas na “estratosfera” sem capacidade de discernir o presente e sem horizontes. Talvez a melhor inserção dessas organizações enquadra-se no ditado popular segundo o qual, “quem não sabe onde esta, não pode saber para onde vai. E quem não sabe para onde vai não sabe o que encontra”. Por isso, enfatizamos que essas organizacoes nao deveriam ter apenas um papel morabilizador (evangelizacao), mas sobretudo na busca de solucoes materiais e sociais das populacoes necessitadas.
8.4 Reassentamento e reintegração Nos diferentes contactos tidos deu para deduzir que não existe um consenso na designação dos regressados. Na província do Moxico algumas entidades oficiais optam pelo termo para se referir tanto aos desmobilizados e ex-deslocados e também o que vêem de fora do país. O termo retornado refere-se unicamente aos que haviam se refugiado nos paises vizinhos. Esta designação nao e aceite pelas pessoas antes refugiadas porque apresenta um sentimento de inferioridade, discriminação e estigmatização que conduzem ao emprego de outros termos
56 ofensivos como (Zambiano, UNITA, cães e bois). Ao ser usados pelas entidades oficiais estes termos se não eternizam a condicao de regressado, pelo menos afectam negativamente o processo de reintegração social e por conseguinte a auto - estima destes cidadãos. Percebemos ainda que existe um entendimento diferenciado dos processos de reassentamento e reintegração nas diferentes instituições e organizações. No nosso entender reassentamento é o processo pelo qual tanto os desmobilizados, deslocados e refugiados são alocados um espaço físico onde organizam a sua vida, ou seja, onde devera ocorrer o seu processo de reintegração. Reassentamento entendemos por um processo imediato para resolver os problemas básicos que servem para criar condições de reintegração. A reintegração é um processo complexo que compreende aspectos psico-sociais, económicos, morais e culturais. Este processo passa pela mudança de atitudes e assumir novos comportamentos, fruto de um processo de novas aprendizagens. Para isto, se exige a compreensão, a participação e aceitação da comunidade onde ocorre o processo de reassentamento. As instituições do Estado e as Organizações da Sociedade Civil têm um papel fundamental a desempenhar não só na providência dos meios materiais, mas sobretudo, na necessidade de desencadear um processo didáctico que permita a reintegração efectiva dos cidadãos. Sendo assim, no Moxico os processos de reassentamento e reintegração dos grupos de deslocados, regressados e desmobilizados apresentam uma certa complexidade. Existem alguns factores que influenciam o desenvolvimento harmonioso desses processos: A sua grande extensão geográfica ate os últimos momentos da ocupação colonial, Moxico não beneficiou de um grande nível de desenvolvimento de infraestruturas excepto o CFB. Associa-se a isto o acentuado grau de degradação das infraestruturas físicas e das próprias comunidades como um conjunto de pessoas e de relações sociais, por ser uma das mais fustigadas pela guerra. A simultaneidade dos processos de reassentamento e reintegração dos três grupos, designadamente desmobilizados, deslocados e regressados, não permitiu que se criasse a condição básica que se servissem de base para acudir as necessidades desses grupos. Para alem disso, há a preocupação por parte da sociedade em organizar o mais depressa possivel o processo eleitoral para 2006. As estratégias adoptadas para normalização do período pos-conflito, aceleram a concorrência para o usufruto dos limitados recursos alocados para acudir as necessidades básicas das populações que não deslocaram e das que chegam. Ligado a isto o facto da débil gestão desses magros recursos. A adopção de políticas que não permitem o adequado aproveitamento das terras e dos recursos hídricos em beneficio das populações, limita duma forma geral a criatividade das populacoes em empenhar-se com mais seriedade nas actividades produtivas. Nossa percepção sobre o que esta acontecer com o processo de reintegração e ainda dificil de perceber. Por isso, julgamos que a noção segundo a qual o desenvolvimento começa em casa, parece que é algo que só está na mente dos órgãos de decisão de políticas mas que não é partilhada com as populações beneficiárias.
8.5 Relacionamentos
Os relacionamentos nas comunidades dependem de como estão estruturadas as relações humanas, sócio-económicas e com a postura das lideranças. No nosso entender e que as relações entre os que chegam e os encontrados nem sempre são de solidariedade, camaradagem e harmonia, conforme espelha o espírito de reconciliação nacional. Em certos casos ficou visível a manifestaçoes discriminatórias e de exclusão em relação aos reintegrados,
57 especialmente os regressados dos países vizinhos.
Em resposta desta discriminação começam a surgir sentimentos de insegurança, nostalgias e a perca de auto-estima. Como conseqüência o desinteresse para com os valores patrióticos, o desvio das ambições para a realização pessoal e a reabilitação psico-emocional. Por isso, pensamos que isto pode animar outros comportamentos negativos como intolerância, a revolta, a fraca cooperação nos processos comunitários que podem complicar os processos de consolidação da paz, reconciliação nacional, democratização e conseqüentemente incentivar a fuga de quadros.
Percebemos ainda que o agravamento das condições econômicas das populações locais tem ligação com a forma como os relacionamentos se processam nas comunidades. No caso da província do Moxico a situação agrava-se pelo facto de que dos poucos recursos existentes para atender as populações locais acrescentam-se as necessidades de mais três grupos. Isto no nosso ver, é uma brecha para a concorrência de vários grupos a busca de recursos de consumos face à reduzida oferta de bens e serviços.
Das observações feitas e daquilo que nos deram a conhecer durante as entrevistas, nossa apreciação é que o país ainda está a viver uma crise estrutural. Partindo do princípio de que a actual Lei Constitucional limita a tomada de decisão no nível local. Esta situação tem efeitos na forma como os processos para atender as populações se desencadeam. A título de exemplo, nos pareceu que os órgãos do Governo Provincial não podem ter uma decisão incisiva nos planos elaborados pela província.
Ao nível das comunidades as lideranças, sobretudo do poder tradicional aparecem a jogar dois papeis que se contendam entre si. De forma positiva eles são factor de estabilização comunitária na gestão e resolução de conflitos que emergem nas diferentes relações sociais. De outra forma, as autoridades do poder tradicional podem ser factores de desestabilização do processo de paz e de reconciliação nacional quando não são capazes de fazer o distanciamento político ao seu papel de líder comunitário.
9. Anexos Programa diario 5ª feira (tarde): encontro informativo com o sr. Freitas e membro governo para apresentacoes e assuntos chaves; 6ª feira (alternado): ACNUR, IRSEM e MINARS para assuntos e indicacao dos grupos focais para sabado; Sabado (manha e tarde): encontro com 3 grupos focais de jovens, mulheres e homens; Domingo (tarde): encontro com pelo menos 3 ou 4 lideres tradicionais. Termos de Referencia Conhecer o processo de reintegracao dos refugiados, deslocados e desmobilizados. Pequeno historial da area ou comunidade (grupo); Avaliar e conhecer o tipo de apoio que tem sido prestado a esses grupos; Avaliar o que tem sido feito para a recuperacao de infra-estruturas (estradas, pontes, sanitarias, educativas, administrativas, culturais e outras); Avaliar os efeitos das minas e o engajamento das autoridades no processo da desminagem; Saber o grau de relacionamento entre os regressados e resistentes/encontrados. Saber como as pessoas se chamam entre si quando se refere a deslocados,
58 refugiados e desmobilizado reintegrado. saber tipos de conflitos e mecanismos locais de resolucao. Outros de tipos de conflitos e suas causas. O papel das autoridades tradicionais na sua resolucao; Saber as formas de organizacao existentes nessas comunidades (OCBs, autoridades do poder locais – sobas, curandeiros, feiticeiros, igrejas, etc). O papel das autoridades na vida das comunidades. Tarefas imediatas Reforcas contactos com o Freitas para novas reservas no hotel, regresso para 2ª Feira com a Gemini, encontros as pessoas na provincia e compra de refrescos; Comprar cartao UNITEL para o telemovel da sr. Margarida que e assistente de pesquisa; Pedir a administracao da DW para providenciar credenciais a sr. Margarida e Mavela.
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