THESIS ADVISERRECOMMENDATION LETTER
This thesis entitled “SOUTH OSSETIA WAR: RUSSIAN FEDERATION DEFENSE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION ON GEORGIA AS RESPONDS TO SOUTH OSSETIA WAR 2008-2009” prepared and submitted by Jonathan Panaluan Damanik in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Art in International Relations in the Faculty of Humanities has been reviewed and found to have satisfied the requirements for a thesis fit to be examined. I therefore recommend this thesis for Oral Defense.
Cikarang, Indonesia
Recommended and Acknowledged by,
Hendra Manurung, SIP., MA.
Thesis Adviser
i
DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY
I declare that this thesis, entitled “SOUTH OSSETIA WAR: RUSSIAN FEDERATION DEFENSE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION ON GEORGIA AS RESPONDS TO SOUTH OSSETIA WAR 2008-2009” is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, an original piece of work that has not been submitted, either in whole or in part, to another university to obtain a degree.
Cikarang, Indonesia,
Jonathan Panaluan Damanik
ii
PANEL OF EXAMINER APPROVAL SHEET
The Panel of Examiners declare that the thesis entitled “SOUTH OSSETIA WAR: RUSSIAN FEDERATION DEFENSE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION ON GEORGIA AS RESPONDS TO SOUTH OSSETIA WAR 2008-2009” that was submitted by Jonathan Panaluan Damanik majoring in International Relations from the School of Humanities was assessed and approved to have passed the Oral Examinations on 10 February 2016.
Prof. Anak Agung Banyu Perwita, Ph.D.
Chair – Panel of Examiners
Drs. Teuku Rezasyah, M.A., Ph.D.
Examiner
Hendra Manurung, SIP., MA.
Thesis Adviser
iii
ABSTRACT
South Ossetia War: Russian Federation Defense Policy Implementation on Georgia as Responds to South Ossetia War 2008-2009
2008 was a dark period for South Ossetia. Sudden attack by Georgia on 7 August 2008 completely destroyed South Ossetia. During the attack, Georgia wounding civilians and Russian Federation peacekeepers. This military action provoked Russia to implement its defense policy. In implementing its defense policy, Russia has been criticized by the West, NATO and the US.This thesis will analyze the Implementation of Russian Federationdefense policytoward Georgia in reaction to South Ossetia War (2008-2009).
The research was done in the period of December 2016-April 2017, employing qualitative method to construct narrative and analysis from various news sources,journal, books, official document and statement. Most of the research was done at Adam Kurniawan Library.
Keywords: South Ossetia War, Russian Federation Defense Policy, Georgia Military Act, NATO Engagement, National Interest
iv
ABSTRAK
Perang Ossetia Selatan: Implementasi Kebijakan Pertahanan Federasi Rusia terhadap Georgia dalam Reaksi terhadap Perang Ossetia Selatan 2008-2009
2008 adalah tahun yang buruk untuk Ossetia Selatan. Serangan mendadak oleh Georgia pada tanggal 7 Agustus 2008 benar-benar menghancurkan Ossetia Selatan. Selama serangan tersebut, Georgia melukai warga sipil serta pasukan penjaga perdamaian Federasi Rusia. Aksi militer ini memprovokasi Rusia untuk menerapkan kebijakan pertahanannya. Dalam menerapkan kebijakan pertahanannya, Rusia telah dikritik oleh Barat, yaitu NATO dan AS. Tesis ini akan menganalisis Implementasi kebijakan Pertahanan Federasi Rusia di Georgia sebagai reaksi terhadap Perang Ossetia Selatan (2008-2009).
Penelitian dilakukan pada periode September 2016-April 2017, dengan menggunakan metode kualitatif untuk menyusun narasi dan analisis dari berbagai sumber berita, jurnal, buku, dokumen dan pernyataan resmi. Sebagian besar penelitian dilakukan di Perpustakaan Adam Kurniawan.
Kata kunci: Perang Ossetia Selatan, Kebijakan Pertahanan Federasi Rusia, Tindakan Militer Georgia, Keterlibatan NATO, Kepentingan Nasional
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The paper I write will not describe the content of my thesis, but more like the contents of my heart when creating the thesis. The contents are not sad, writing is fun, just enjoy. Most importantly this funny column is presented as a thank-you note to those who have given, supported, prayed, and a pile of passion to finish this Kitab Sutasoma a.k.a Thesis as well as end a period that is considered beautiful or maybe destroyed. First of all I thank my Lord God the most Holy Trinity because I still breath and still have some best chance, so I can make my parent proud of me, yes even though not much pride. Then for Dewa Jasin, my alternative god, thank you so much for being a joke of entertainers.
Next to my mother Elizabeth Lucy Siregar and my dad Adrianus Parlindungan Damanik, I want to say thank you very much, because both of you've given me chance, my first chance I can live this world especially live with a beautiful family and the second I can have the opportunity to school To scholars. Yes hopefully in the future I also have a greater chance to give more pride for both of you. Still in my family too, thanks to my two younger brothers Bonifacius Josua Naposo Damanik and Joseph Sahkuda Damanik, even though you all just say the spirit and not other thing more, but still thanks. Lol.
A thank you that is no less important must be given to all lecturers in the President University. There are two best lectures, first is Prof.Banyu and second is Sir Hendra Manurung. Thanks really both of them, yes it is not gently educated by both of them, it feels hard as thrown by tanker ship fresh from harbor, but because of them I can be strong in facing thesis defense. Continue also to other lecturers who I will miss, Sir Reza, Sir Indra, Sir Eric, Ma‟am Witri, Ms Izanna, and Ms Natasha. And In my opinion not only lecturers who I miss, I also will miss president university and all Cikarang also. Definitely after leaving Cikarang I believe I will miss. Hot place, not
vi nice place, harsh environment, and dusty, But here I am 4 years must study hard and know the world.
Furthermore for the friends a.k.a begajul muda the world's vanity challenger. Biggest thanks and respect for Richard Mattoali, 4-year roommate, 10 semester classmates, Internship friends, crazy friends together until the death come. Continue to friends from Kos Hijau Beseri aka The Nest of Green Rats, Luki, Danar, Achong, Andi, Irland, Gerald, Aryo, Diwang, Gilang, Ryan, soul of Moeza and soul number 4. Next for Budu Bagak who not came after I finished m thesis defense then only say congrats it also because I have to came to them, Remon, Daniel, Richard, Ridho, Hendra, Lily, and Monica. There are also families who claim to be family, Cosmic Family who already fervor fit again stupidity when I‟m not work for my thesis, ranging from Lae Elroy, Adit, Dharma, Sandro, Afdal, and plus-plus for Mustika, Anggita, Fadli, and Alex. Which is not less important than the beautiful Berries Family, thanks a lot for Conna, Bella, Milo, Gabby, Lily, Bryan, Indri, Alfin especially for the KFC Bucket. Then there is also a request called, from the Warsun, there are Alay, Bagus, Faris, Tuplo, Yogo, Jose, AA, and Teteh. Then also thanks really the Newbun boy who ask me to finished thesis faster so I can play to Jakarta early, Andika, Tigor, Alri, same Dodo. The last for those Unyu Supporter, she always give me spirit when I‟m down, Jesslyn Julia Tanty, thanks so much.
vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS THESIS ADVISERRECOMMENDATION LETTER ...... i
DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY ...... ii
PANEL OF EXAMINER APPROVAL SHEET ...... iii
ABSTRACT ...... iv
ABSTRAK ...... v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ...... vi
CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION ...... 1
1.1. Background of the study ...... 1
1.2. Problem Identification ...... 7
1.3. Statement of the Problem ...... 9
1.4. Research Objective ...... 9
1.5. Significant of Study ...... 10
1.6. Theoretical Framework ...... 10
1.6.1. Realism in International Relations ...... 10
1.6.2. Defense Policy ...... 12
1.7. Scope and Limitation ...... 13
1.8. Structure of Thesis ...... 14
1.8.1. Chapter I – Introduction ...... 14
1.8.2. Chapter II – South Ossetia War August 2008 ...... 14
1.8.3. Chapter III – Russia Defense Policy ...... 14
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1.8.4. Chapter IV – Russian Federation‟s Defense Policy Implementation on Conflict Resolution with Georgia ...... 15
1.8.5. Chapter V – Conclusion ...... 15
CHAPTER II SOUTH OSSETIA WAR AUGUST 2008 ...... 16
2.1. History between Russia – Georgia – and South Ossetia ...... 16
2.2. Georgia in USSR Era ...... 18
2.2.1. History of Georgia – South Ossetia War...... 21
2.2.2. Rose Revolution ...... 25
2.3. South Ossetia War ...... 28
2.4. Russia Military Forces ...... 37
2.5. Georgia Military Forces ...... 40
CHAPTER III RUSSIA DEFENSE POLICY ...... 46
3.1. National Strategic Concept ...... 47
3.2. Russia Defense Policy in 1990s ...... 50
3.3. Russia Military Doctrine 2000 ...... 51
3.3.1. Russian military doctrine before South Ossetia War ...... 53
3.3.2. Russian Federation military doctrine after South Ossetia War ...... 61
3.4. Russia Military Forces in 2008 ...... 65
CHAPTER IV RUSSIAN FEDERATION‟S DEFENSE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION ON CONFLICT RESOLUTION WITH GEORGIA ...... 70
4.1. Russia Involvement in South Ossetia War ...... 72
4.1.1. Russia before South Ossetia War ...... 72
4.1.2. Russia during South Ossetia War ...... 86
4.1.3. Russia after South Ossetia War ...... 96
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4.2. Russia Defense Policy Implementation ...... 103
4.2.1. Military aspect ...... 103
4.2.1.1. Russia Defense Budget ...... 106
4.2.2. Politic and Diplomatic Aspect ...... 109
CHAPTER V CONCLUSION ...... 111
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 115
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CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION
1.1. Background of the study
Республикӕ Хуссар Ирыстон or which we know as South Ossetia. South Ossetia is one of state in south Caucasus region. South Ossetia recognized as independent state by some country like, Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Nauru, Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh Republic and Transnistria1. South Ossetia has 3,900 km2 square kilometers territory2, with population over 53,000 people3. Tskhinvali is the capital city and Tskhinvali also city of administration of South Ossetia. South Ossetia purchasing power parity GPD US$ 15 million4. Small industry is the most contribute sector in South Ossetia Economic5. Even industry contribute on development of South Ossetia economic but South Ossetia economic still below average. For the fact that South Ossetia need 3,062 rubles a month in the fourth quarter of 2007 or 23.5% below Russia but South Ossetia income way smaller than Russia6. Other fact also says that Russia spend 10 billion rubles to restore South
1World Heritage Encyclopedia. “International recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.” World Heritage Encyclopedia. http://www.worldlibrary.org/articles/international_recognition_of_abkhazia_and_south_ossetia 2Helen Krag and LarshFunch. “South Ossetia."KafkasVakfi (Caucasus Foundation), n.d. http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/63/129.html 3Minority Rights Group International, “World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples – Georgia.” Minority Rights Group International, October 2011. http://www.refworld.org/docid/4954ce09c.html 4MamukaAreshidze, "Current Economic Causes of Conflict in Georgia", unpublished report for UK Department for International Development (DFID), 2002. Cited from Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia by International Crisis Group, 26.11.2006 Archived August 6, 2009, at the Wayback Machine. 5Dzhioeva, Fatima, “Cost Of Conflict: The Economic Aspect.” South Ossetian State University. http://scar.gmu.edu/sites/default/files/global-documents/cpp/cost-of- conflict/Fatima%20Dzhoieva_Eng%20.pdf 6Delyagin, Mikhail (March 2009). "A Testing Ground for Modernization and a Showcase of Success". Russia in Global Affairs. 1
Ossetia in 20087. That fact give us information to prove that South Ossetia still weak in economics.
Figure 1: Map of the Russia – Georgia War 2008 8 Georgia or საქართველო is one of state that fraction from USSR. Georgia independent on 9 April 1991. Tbilisi is Georgia capital city and by geographic location Georgia is one of Caucasus country which has 69.700 km2 territory that borderline with Russian Federation in North side, then Turkey, Armenia, and Azerbaijan in South. Georgia has 12 province, include South Ossetia, Ajaria, and Abkhazia as the breakaway region. Georgia is a country that apply semi-presidential
7Delyagin, Mikhail. "A Testing Ground for Modernization and a Showcase of Success". Russia in Global Affairs, March 2009. http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_12538 8 http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/georgia.pdf 2 republic in its government system. So that Georgia led by president and also prime minister. 84% of Georgia citizen ethnic is Georgian by number 4.5 million people with Georgian language as their national interest.9 Росси ска е ера и , or which we know as Russian Federation. Russia is one of state in south Caucasus region. Russia is the country which has largest surface territory in the world, Russia has 17,075,200 km2 square kilometers territory. Russia also the ninth most populous state with population over 146.6 million. Moscow is the capital city and Moscow also city of administration of Russia. Russia purchasing power parity GPD US$ $3.685 trillion or the big sixth in the world. Small industry is the most contribute sector in Russia Economic. Natural Gas and oil are contribute on development of Russia economic.10
The time after Soviet Union broke up, Russia and Georgia still has great relation, but since 2006 their relation being deteriorate by some conflict chain. The beginning of the worsening relation between those countries is when 2006 January Georgia stated that Russia has blowing up gas pipe line in Russia-Georgia Borderline. Georgia accuse Russia has been sabotaged the gas pipe line to distract the electricity from Russia to Georgia. Then the next case in 2006 March is Russia stopped mineral water and grape fruit import from Georgia by excuse Georgia product not standardized with Russian standard. Those countries relation worse until its climax in 2008 August. At the time Georgia tried to provoke Russia to start the conflict. By attacking the separatist of South Ossetia and Russia peacekeepers in South Ossetia, Georgia successful to provoke Russia to build a big conflict.
Brief history, since 1993 Georgia government did negotiation to 3 provinces region that want to breakaway which are South Ossetia, Ajaria, and Abkhazia but until 2008 there is no positive significant progress for Georgia government. South Ossetia as one of breakaway province has different story, as de facto since 1991
9 Georgia, https://www.cia.gov/library/publication/the-world-factbook/geos/gg.html 10 Russia, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html 3
South Ossetia is one of independent state republic in Caucasus region. But in other side by de jure South Ossetia not more than a province in Georgia. After Mikhail Saakashvili elected in Georgia presidential election 2004, Georgia government try to approach those three breakaway province. Saakashvili succeed to approach Ajaria as one of Georgia territory, then he also try to approach South Ossetia and Abkhazia to joint. Not only reconciliation of economic and the reformation of democracy, Georgia government also has purpose to united Ajaria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia as their priority.
In South Ossetia region conflict between Georgia government and Ossetian separatist frequently happen. In 1993, there is conflict between Ossetian separatist and Georgia government, and Russia government undertakes to mediate those party in peace treaty. At the time both party agree to bind in that peace treaty and agree to place Russia peacekeepers in both side to avoid conflict in the future. In 2008 Mikhail Saakashvili who been elected twice promised to end that conflict between South Ossetia, and Abkhazia. In South Ossetia side, there at least been 3 conflict like in 1991-1992, 2004, and 2006. And for Abkhazia there already 5 times in 1992, 1998, 2001, 2006, and 2008. Because of same target as independent state, South Ossetia, Abkhazia,and Transnistria (located in Moldova) agreed to recognize each other as independent state in 2006 November 17, even though there is no recognition from other independent state.
July 2008 the big conflict begin, Georgian army start to attack South Ossetia separatist. Then in 2008 August 7, Georgia decide to run their decisions are to take South Ossetia region from the separatist and also to eliminate South Ossetia separatist who not stand on Georgia government.1112 The operation of eliminating namely Clean
11 Emerson, Michael. "Post-Mortem on Europe's First War of the 21st Century." (PDF). Centre for European Policy Studies, August 2008 http://aei.pitt.edu/9382/2/9382.pdf 12Cachia, Joseph M. “Poor Georgia!” Countercurrents.org, 20 August, 2008 http://www.countercurrents.org/cachia200808.htm 4
Field Operation13. Because of that conflict there are so many victim in South Ossetia both separatist and civilian.
Georgia decision to eliminate South Ossetia been known by the international world. Some state actors see that decision as bad thing14. It be violation of human rights. One of country that consider that as violation of human rights is Russia. Russia As the emerging state in that region and neighbor state that border with South Ossetia which located on top of South Ossetia15, Russia senses to help South Ossetia to elucidate the problem. To resolve violation of human right problem that happen in South Ossetia Russia came with their military forces. Russian Federation who has placing its peacekeepers in South Ossetia sent more troops to protect that region from Georgia. To enter Georgia, Russian troops must pass Roki tunnel where connect South Ossetia and North Ossetia. After pass the tunnel Russian troops forced Georgian military forces to discharge its position from South Ossetia region.
From the culture perspective, Georgian ethnic in South Ossetia is the minority, then Ossetian ethnic which the majority wanted to joint with Russia especially in north Ossetia yet located in Russia territory. And the fact that before the conflict happen, Russian government already offer 70.000 South Ossetia people to move to Russia and change its nationality status. Majority of Ossetian in South Ossetia agree for that so that almost of them has Russian passport.
Since 7 august 2008 South Ossetia is in danger situation especially when Clean Field operation begin16. Georgia use its military power to eliminate South Ossetia when the clean field operation. Basically Clean Field operation have purpose
13 Roman, Kris. “South Ossetia. Operation “Clean Field”.” Rusmedia, August 30, 2008 https://eurorushomepage.wordpress.com/2008/08/30/south-ossetia-operation-clean-field/ 14 Georgia, Events of 2008. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2009/country-chapters/europe/central-asia-georgia 15 Helen Krag; LarshFunch. “South Ossetia."KafkasVakfi (Caucasus Foundation), n.d. http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/63/129.html 16 Emerson, Michael. "Post-Mortem on Europe's First War of the 21st Century." (PDF). Centre for European Policy Studies, August 2008 http://aei.pitt.edu/9382/2/9382.pdf 5 to eliminate South Ossetia militant. 17Georgia consider that the crisis in South Ossetia happen because of militant act. By artillery and aircraft fighter Georgia open the attack on South Ossetia and after that asymmetric warfare begin. Then the condition takes aside to Georgia and for the achievement, South Ossetia militant defeat easily.18
Problem that comes out is not because of the operation actually. It happen because of the mental of Georgia military personnel. Many of Georgia military personnel do not understand the rule of war which mean do not attack or violate civilian. 19Then because of it many on South Ossetia civilian die by Georgia armed forces, both intentionally and unintentionally. Tskhinvali, South Ossetia capital city is the silent witness of Georgia attack. The number of victims at most found in Tskhinvali. 20 As we knew, human rights is one of the things that should be uphold by all state even in war condition. Basically peaceful condition is a circumstances which all people coveted. 21One big factor that can support that condition is respect to human rights. By uphold human right mean no one violate others both physical and psychological.22
17 Roman, Kris. “South Ossetia. Operation “Clean Field”.” Rusmedia, August 30, 2008 https://eurorushomepage.wordpress.com/2008/08/30/south-ossetia-operation-clean-field/ 18Stolz, Vadim. “A TRAP FOR RUSSIA. U.S NEOLIBERALS AND UKRAINIAN FASCISTS BEHIND OPERATION “CLEAN FIELD”.” Лефт.Ру, http://left.ru/2008/10/stolz_en179.phtml 19 “Humanitarian Law Violations and Civilian Victims in the Conflict over South Ossetia.” Up In Flames, JANUARY 23, 2009 https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/01/23/flames/humanitarian-law-violations-and-civilian-victims- conflict-over-south 20 "List of Casualties among the Georgian Military Servicemen". Ministry of Defence of Georgia, 7 June 2012 https://web.archive.org/web/20120607052439/http://www.mod.gov.ge/index.php?page=- 10&Id=31&lang=1 21 “Maintain International Peace and Security” United Nation, http://www.un.org/en/sections/what-we-do/maintain-international-peace-and-security/ 22 Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf 6
1.2. Problem Identification
According to the book which The Guns of August 2008: Russia's War in Georgia by Cornell, Svante E. and Starr, S. Frederick, authors analyses that Russia involved in South Ossetia war in 2008 because of human right violation that happen in South Ossetia region23. The reason of the involvement of Russian Federation to join the war because of consideration about the location of South Ossetia that borderline with Russia24. South Ossetia proper located in the south side of Russia. Then Russia worried that the problem which happen in South Ossetia will be overspread to the Russia territory, so to prevent that problem overspread Russia decide to mediate South Ossetia War at the time.
In international world Georgia do not has many role and influence in politic or other factor, but if we see from NATO perspective Georgia seen as essential state especially for EU. Many European public believe that Russia military act in Georgia is one of Russia strategic to dominate oil in Europe. The base of that accusation because there is BTC (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan) oil and gas pipe in Georgia. As emerging power of that region, Russian government refuse that accusation, Russian government stated that their military act has purpose to protect Russian citizen who live in those conflict area.25
Rejection of Russia on accusation of NATO supported also by the fact which exist, that there Russian citizen with a large number living in South Ossetia become victims of Georgian military act in South Ossetia. The data say that there were already 70,000 citizen of South Ossetia, which Russia agreed a bid to become the citizen of Russia. And obviously if they had agreed to become Russia citizens. Russia
23 Svante E.; Starr, S. Frederick. “The Guns of August 2008: Russia's War in Georgia.” M.E. Sharpe, 1stjune, 2009 http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/6668107-the-guns-of-august-2008 24 Helen Krag and LarshFunch. “South Ossetia."KafkasVakfi (Caucasus Foundation), n.d. http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/63/129.html 25 International Crisis Group, Russia vs Georgia: The Fallout (Europe Report no. 195), Tbilisi/Brussel: ICG, @008 August 22, P. 12 7 as sovereign state must act based on its enactment, so military act in South Ossetia is to protect its citizens. That‟slogical reason of Russian Federation denied to the intention to take control of South Ossetia, precisely South Ossetia people who ask to join his brother in north Ossetia.
As the president of Russia Dmitry Medvedev said that Russia's military action has purpose to keep the peace in Caucasus region. As a neighboring country Russia will feel the need to uphold human rights in Georgia, especially South Ossetia. When South Ossetia situation worsened Russian Federation had sent its peacekeepers, which be the turning point that stated Russia is care on human right and pro in peace situation. On 8 August, 10 peacekeepers of Russian Federation has been killed by the attack of Georgian military forces were admitted to cripple Georgia separatists.26
In August 2008 Georgia military began to attack South Ossetia by the reason to cripple the South Ossetia separatists, but the fact that a military operation was also hurt civilians. Data obtained on the victims of the Georgia military attacks on South Ossetia in August, 2008 stating that there 1500 civilians became victims besides also 36 Russian troops were killed and 300 others wounded.
Base on Kremlin.ru when interview of Russia president Dimitri Medvedev at the time state that Russia believe their act to resolve the problem that happen in South Ossetia is their responsible. He believe Russian Federation has responsible to restore peace in Caucasus region and Fending off foreign influences in CIS States. As we know that in 2008 Georgia did the military act by eliminate Ossetian in South Ossetia. At 8 August 2008 Georgia start attack South Ossetia, that attack caused many of Russian citizen and 10 of Russia peacekeepers killed. As great country Russia felt compelled to uphold human right in their neighbor state which is Georgia. Russian military forces believe that act is shape of defending law and order to protect Russian citizens. Russian Federation placed its peacekeepers in South
26 “Interview with Russian Television Channels.” Kremlin, Moscow, December 24,2008 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/2602 8
Ossetia area to protect that region from Georgia. Roki tunnel is the only way to enter Georgia, after pass the tunnel Russian troops forced Georgian military forces to discharge its position from South Ossetia region.27
1.3. Statement of the Problem
The Statement of the problem of this research is: How did Russian Federation implement its Defense Policy on Georgia as Responds to South Ossetia War (2008-2009)? 1.4. Research Objective
This thesis has purpose to find the answer from the question using scientific methods. In this research the writer choose to use the methods of exploratory and diagnostic research studies. According to C.R. Kothari on his book Research Methodology: Methods and Techniques, he stated that exploratory research studies used to gain familiarity with a phenomenon or to achieve new insight into it, while diagnostic research studies used to determine the frequency with which occurs or with which it is associated with something else28.
Therefore, in accordance with the explanation above, this research objective is to find out and gain more understanding about why Russian Federation did Engagement towards South Ossetia during South Ossetia war. The analysis about Russian Federation Defense Policy Implementation on Georgia as Responds to South Ossetia War 2008-2009
27 “Interview with Russian Television Channels.” Kremlin, Moscow, December 24,2008 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/2602 28 C.R. Kothari. “Research Methodology: Methods and Techniques.” New Age International Publishers, 2004 http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/15826312-research-methodology 9
1.5. Significant of Study
This research is mean to give valuable knowledge, information, and solution for the reader, the significant of study is provide analysis and data for the reader related to perspective of Russian Federation by Its defense policy toward Georgia in Response to South Ossetia War 2008-2009.
1.6. Theoretical Framework
The main theories which will covers in this thesis research are; Realism as paradigm with neo-realism as theory, foreign policy theory, and defense policy theory. Political realism paradigm is the most appropriate concept that can describe Russian Federation Defense Policy Implementation on Georgia as Responds to South Ossetia War 2008-2009
1.6.1. Realism in International Relations
Realism has dominated study of international relations by emphasizing on security competition and war among great powers over the past fifty years. Realism is an approach to international relations that has emerged gradually through the work of a series of analysts who have situated themselves within, and thus delimited, a distinctive but still diverse style or tradition of analysis29. Realism is shaped by human nature and the absence of international government. "Human nature has not changed since the days of classical antiquity" (Thompson, 1985). Realism is described as dominant theory to analyze International Relations. It is called as dominant because until the cold war, no other theory could compared and challenged its assumptions. Even though liberal scholars believe that liberal theory aims to establish peace and stability that will reduce escalation and conflict, this theory is finally being questioned since the case of Brexit from European Union.
29 Jack Donnelly, "Realism and International Relations", United Kingdom: Cambridge University, 2000. 10
According to the founding father of Neorealism or structural realism, Kenneth Waltz, structural realism emphasize that the structure of the system causes states to compete for power but that states should not strive to maximize power, instead, they should aim to control an “appropriate” amount of power30. By means, State can apply defensive realism in which they will react in order to respond other actions by other State that threaten this particular State. He believes that the concept of human nature is purely hypothetical. On his book – Theory of International Politics – human nature can cause both war and peace at the same time. Waltz explains two conception of structural realism that international system, which is anarchic, is inevitably. First, there is no higher authority than the state itself and no world government. On the other words, international system has shaped State to do self-help in order to protect its state and power politics. According to Kenneth Waltz (1979), in his book “Theory of International Politics” he assumes realism theory that:
“States who struggle for power are simply following the dictates of the international system in order to survive in an international order where there is no global leviathan to offer them protection31.”
Secondly, distribution of capabilities or power is varies, in which each State has different function and it is differentiated according how much power the state possess. By means, the importance of distribution of power emphasizing how the State should behave in order to react such other actions that may harm the State itself. Moreover, neorealism recognized two main State actors which are hegemony power and great powers, while the weak states should bandwagoning or aligning with great powers in order to survive in international system. It is quite different with classical realism that does not believe in the power of international institution. Neorealism believes the power of international institution could become the tool for a State to
30 John J. Mearsheimer (2006), Realism, The Real World And The Academy. Retrivied from http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/StructuralRealism.pdf on September 1, 2016 31 Kenneth Waltz, 1979, The Theory of International Politics, chapter 1. Retrieved from: https://www.press.umich.edu/pdf/9780472099818-ch1.pdf on September 10, 2016 11 gain more power, for instance the existence of the United Nations of Security Council (UNSC).
Hence, Waltz believes that international system shaped by anarchic that leads to self-help in order to protect the state itself. Contrary to the conventional wisdom then Morgenthau‟s classical realism cannot be seen as a strict first image theory and Waltzian neorealism is not a purely systemic theory32.
1.6.2. Defense Policy
The first concept used in this thesis writing is Defense Policy. Defense Policy is a formulation of strategies which provide a code of conduct, as defined by senior executive leadership, with the intention to influence and determine, action, decision, and other matters which relate to the military affairs and its actions. These strategies are in line with the nation‟s security interest. To put it simply, it is a program which consist of „ends‟ and „mean‟, formulated for the purpose of fulfilling the national security concerns and its defense objectives (Tagarev, 2006).
Defense policy requires the establishment of the defense white paper to be acknowledged as a guideline for the action, values, and principles of the states. States release its defense white paper to create the guideline for the national defense policy projection, and also to inform other states about its action plan, whether it is for cooperation or threat.
Defense Policy aims to strengthen, secure, and defend a State's national interests in order to respond sense of national identity and perception of threats that might harm the State‟s interests. Defense policy is a political function; that is, a choice to use state-sanctioned violence or the threat of violence to advance some particular communal goal.
32 An Article Entitled "Comparing and Contrasting Classical Realism and Neorealism" by ArashHeydarian P. (2009) retrieved from: http://www.e-ir.info/2009/07/23/comparing-and- contrasting-classical-realism-and-neo-realism/ on September 11, 2016. 12
The term of defense policy applied to prevent any kind of threats such as but not limited to threats from other nations, non-state groups, including force as an instrument of policy abroad. The defense policy is a form of political concept, in which it is the nature of State to prepare as well as develop armed forces in order to achieve national objective. This kind of approach is derived as part of national security policy to maintain peace and stability as well as the political entity of the State, which reflects the state policy in the military domain. The trigger of the concept of defense policy is as follow:
1. It can be analyzed by who trigger the conflict. For instance from the level of government (national, state, local), functional role (political officials or military commanders), internal actors (organizations, rebellions), and external actors (other States) 2. Threat perception that drove by State's neighbors and vice versa that might jeopardize a State‟s national interests one with another or there are unresolved historical conflicts 3. Maintain an industrial base that might lead to military potential 4. Military development in order to uphold State‟s national interests 1.7. Scope and Limitation
Several areas are covered by this research is on Russian Federation Defense Policy Implementation on Georgia as Responds to South Ossetia War 2008-2009 which is the military act that Engagement South Ossetia region. Moreover, this analysis also talk about Russia defense policy and the national interest of Russian Federation in South Ossetia to protect its citizen, fending off foreign influences and keeping peace in South Ossetia.
Second area is about level of analysis of this research, the level of analysis of this research is the scope of domestic which Russia defense policy and national interest on South Ossetia war. This area would lead this analysis to the main point of
13 the research about the basic purpose of Russia involvement in South Ossetia War in 2008.
The third area of this analysis is about conflict and policy of Russia since 2008 - 2009. And there some brief history of relation between those three actors since 1922. Meanwhile, this research analysis does not cover areas, such as Georgia and Russian Federation foreign policy after South Ossetia war 2008.
1.8. Structure of Thesis 1.8.1. Chapter I – Introduction This chapter aims to introduce the whole content of the thesis briefly. This chapter contains sub-chapter such as: Background of Study; Problem Identification; Research Question; Significance of Study; Theoretical Framework; Literature Review; Definition of Terms; Scope and Limitation and; Thesis Structure. By reading this chapter, the readers are expected to have basic understand and knowledge on what the thesis is all about. This chapter also intends to provoke the readers have further reading on the thesis content. 1.8.2. Chapter II – South Ossetia War August 2008 This chapter will give a further analysis on the history of relation between Russia – Georgia – South Ossetia, where the pattern of interaction between Russia with South Ossetia and Georgia a lot of turmoil. A broad picture of Russia as the largest and influential nation in Caucasus which has a long history with Georgia and South Ossetia could be seen in this chapter two. The writer will analyze the historical conflict that happened between those three countries. Then there is four sub-chapter, which are Georgia in USSR era, history of Georgia – South Ossetia War, Georgia – South Ossetia post USSR, and Rose revolution. . This chapter later on would highlight this situation could turmoil conflict history between those three countries. 1.8.3. Chapter III – Russia Defense Policy This chapter will give a brief explanation about Russian Federation defense policy which called Russian Federation Defense Policy: Military Doctrine. And also
14 in this chapter 2 will discuss about Russia‟s national interest. One of the core interests of Russia is the need to protect the citizen and maintaining world peace is the main interest of Russian Federation, as stated in its defense policy. There also military component of Russian Federation and the weapon and equipment. 1.8.4. Chapter IV – Russian Federation’s Defense Policy Implementation on Conflict Resolution with Georgia The fourth chapter contains Conflict analysis of the South Ossetia War. The conflict analysis in this chapter is the main content of the entire thesis. The chapter will be divided into two ways of discuss, the first way is elaborating by the time line of Russia involvement in South Ossetia War 2008 and second way is by every policy that Russia apply and implement when South Ossetia War 2008. By the time line of Russia involvement will be divided into three section, and those all are, first of which is the involvement of Russia before the South Ossetia war, the second about the engagement of the Russian Federation during the South Ossetia war, and the third about Russia's role after the Ossetia conflict. In the third section will also be explained about NATO's view on the South Ossetia War. Then in second way by Russia policy that implement will be divide into 2 section, first is from military aspect, and second by politic and diplomatic aspect. There also elaborating of Russia military defense budget. 1.8.5. Chapter V – Conclusion This is the last chapter of the conclusion of this thesis writing. Any recommendation or suggestion that may be useful for further research related to this thesis topic; why Russian Federation Defense Policy Implementation on Georgia as Responds to South Ossetia War 2008-2009 will be elaborated in this chapter.
15
CHAPTER II SOUTH OSSETIA WAR AUGUST 2008
2.1. History between Russia – Georgia – and South Ossetia
Brief history of Georgia, Georgia is one of Transcaucasia region in east side of Black Sea. In north side of Georgia there is Russia, Armenia and Turkey in Georgia South side. Tbilisi is Georgia capital city and by geographic location Georgia is one of Caucasus country which has 69.700 km2 territory. 84% of Georgia citizen ethnic is Georgian in the number of 4.5 million. Georgia state history was come from Colchis kingdom from 3rd century, Georgia independent in 1918 but was part of USSR since 1922 until 1991. Then Georgia be the one of state fraction of USSR that independent in 9 April 1991. Georgia has 12 province, include South Ossetia, Ajaria, and Abkhazia as the breakaway region. Georgia is a country that apply semi- presidential republic in its government system. So that Georgia led by president and also prime minister.33
Base on ethnic factor, South Ossetia and Georgia has different history and language. South Ossetia descendant come from Indo-European which is Iran. The similarity between Ossetian ethnic and Georgian just because they has long history of interaction.34 Because of that south Ossetia want to secede from Georgia and South Ossetian also want to merge with North Ossetian which mean South Ossetia must be a part of Russia. By geographic location South Ossetia and North Ossetia separately by Caucasus Mountains. Local historian claimed that Ossetian descendant been live in that region since 5 century and make Ossetian nation. Then in 1774 that nation joined and be one part of Russia kingdom. So from that statement be the fact that south Ossetian has willingness and pro to join Russia than be a part of Georgia.
33 Georgia, https://www.cia.gov/library/publication/the-world-factbook/geos/gg.html 34 Paula Grab, “The View from Abkhazia of South Ossetia Ablaze”, Central Asia Survey, Vol. 28 No 2, June 2009, Routledge, p. 235-246. 16
USSR break away in 1991 and there is 15 successor states of it. Those 15 state is Russia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Even though USSR been break away be 15 states, Russia as the biggest power of them still call the 14 states as Near Aboard. Near Aboard states mean Russia recognize the independent of those state, but in other side Russia believe those state still depend of Russia as the center because of relation history for a hundred years. So that even disintegration of USSR implement peacefully, but there is a big potential of conflict happen from the successor states and other international actor that try to influence and intervene those country.
Same like other communist country ex-Soviet Union Countries or state, Georgia also sustained economic crisis in early independence. The most region that felt those impact is South Ossetia. Rose revolution in 2003 reform Georgia, Mikhail Saakashvili who replace Eduard Shevardnadze as president change Georgia way of govern it state. Even the reformation happen to the democracy, many of foreign investor won‟t investment in Georgia, so the impact is Georgian economic sector was not grow.
After Mikhail Saakashvili elected in Georgia presidential election 2004, Georgia government try to approach those three breakaway province. Saakashvili succeed to approach Ajaria as one of Georgia territory, then he also try to approach South Ossetia and Abkhazia to joint. Not only reconciliation of economic and the reformation of democracy, Georgia government also has purpose to united Ajaria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia as their priority.
There at least been 3 conflict like in 1991-1992, 2004, and 2006 in South Ossetia region between Ossetian separatist and Georgian government, And in Abkhazia side there already 5 times in 1992, 1998, 2001, 2006, and 2008. Because of same target as independent state, south Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Transnistria (located
17 in Moldova) agreed to recognize each other as independent state in 2006 November 17, even though there is no recognition from other independent state.
And in 7 august 2008 South Ossetia is in danger situation especially when Clean Field operation begin35. Georgia use its military power to eliminate South Ossetia when the clean field operation. Basically Clean Field operation have purpose to eliminate South Ossetia militant. 36Georgia consider that the crisis in South Ossetia happen because of militant act. By artillery and aircraft fighter Georgia open the attack on South Ossetia and after that asymmetric warfare begin. Then the condition take aside to Georgia and South Ossetia militant defeat easily.37
2.2. Georgia in USSR Era
One of conflict that happen in Near Board Russia region is between Russia and Georgia. This region is located in Caucasus Mountain area is part of Russian Empire territory in 1801. In 1917 after revolution in Russia Empire by Bolshevik this region ever has its own freedom as state until 1921. In 1922 Soviet Union established and claimed Georgia as part of it.38 At the first time those region stand as Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic and in 1936 some part break away and be Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic. Georgia has special autonomy right from USSR than other soviet state republic. Education level and living standard of Georgian people has higher level than other state, and Georgia also looks more independent than Moscow in term of country that can retained its identity and
35 Emerson, Michael. "Post-Mortem on Europe's First War of the 21st Century." (PDF). Centre for European Policy Studies, August 2008 http://aei.pitt.edu/9382/2/9382.pdf 36 Roman, Kris. “South Ossetia. Operation “Clean Field”.” Rusmedia, August 30, 2008 https://eurorushomepage.wordpress.com/2008/08/30/south-ossetia-operation-clean-field/ 37Stolz, Vadim. “A TRAP FOR RUSSIA. U.S NEOLIBERALS AND UKRAINIAN FASCISTS BEHIND OPERATION “CLEAN FIELD”.” Лефт.Ру, http://left.ru/2008/10/stolz_en179.phtml 38 Svante E. Cornel, Autonomy and Conflict: Ethnoterritoriality and Separatism in the South Caucasus – Cases in Georgia, Dissertation for Ph.D. Uppsala University, Sweidia, 2002, P. 142. 18 nationalism spirit in history of USSR.39 Special status be given to Georgia after Lavrenty Beria step into government in Stalin era.
Figure 2: Soviet Annexationtoward Georgia 192140
Just like Stalin, Beria also come from Georgia and ever been the chairman of Communist party of Georgiain 1931, his career continued to rise until he was appointed as head of the NKVD (NarodnyyKomissariatVnutrennikh del)41 in 1938. Beria used his position as one of the people closest to Stalin to make Georgia a power base; the result is the position of Georgia that is relatively free from the repressive
39Ibid 40 http://www.geoarmy.info/rus/1921.htm 41 Soviet Secret Agent which then turned into KBG (KomitetGosudarstvennoyBezopasnosti ) and is changed again to the FSB (Federal'nayaSluzhbaBezopasnosti). 19 policies such as the Soviet collectivization of agriculture and "cleansing" of the society bourgeois elements as well as counter revolutionary.42
After Stalin and Beria death, everything changed Georgia. There are negative reactions by Georgian people in respond to the speech made by Khrushchev. This reaction arises due to a very strong image of Stalin in Georgia so that Krushchev's speech is not only regarded as an insult to Stalin, but also against the whole people Georgia.43 One month after the speech, the people of Georgia commemorateStalin by demonstration anti-Soviet massively in Tbilisi and other cities. This actionwas successfully controlled by Moscow. Anti-riot troops Soviet consisting of non- Georgian personnel. Soviet troops attack the protesters and causing hundreds of deaths.44 This disastertriggered the rise of nationalism in Georgia. Anti-Russian groups led by figures such nationalist Zviad Gamsakhurdia and Merab Kostava. Gamsakhurdia will play a very important role in the process of Georgia's independence from the United Soviet.45
Between 1960 and the end of 1970Georgian nationalist groups are increasing. In April 1978, around 5,000 students in Tbilisi protest the government's plan to amendment the constitution of Georgia. The amendment was about replace Georgian language with Russian language and other languages as the official language of Georgia. Faced with these protests, Minister Eduard Shevardnadze decided to cancel the plan. For the first time in the history of the Soviet Union, government sets policy by public opinion.46 This eventencouragethe nationalism of Georgian people. After Moscow provide an opportunity for democratization in 1987, nationalist activists in
42 Ibid. P. 145 43 Svante E. Cornell, Small Nations and Great Power, P. 139 44 Ibid. P. 140. 45 Cornell, Autonomy and Conflict, P. 147. 46 Cornell. Small Nations and Great Powers. P. 142 20
Georgia establish organizations that prepare the independence of Georgia through a promotional campaign culture, language and national identity Georgia.47
2.2.1. History of Georgia – South Ossetia War
1989 has actually been a conflict between Georgia and Ossetia ethnic because of very high nationalism between them. When 1917 Revolution, Georgia was under the rule of the Mensheviks who opposed the Bolshevik in Moscow. Because Bolshevik weak position Menshevik declare the independence of the Democratic Republic of Georgia on May 26, 1918. Georgia officially secede from the Soviet Union and South Ossetia formal legally separated with North Ossetia. People of South voiced his desire to join with North Ossetia, but it is interpreted by Tbilisi in support of the Bolshevik group.48
Ethnic conflicts began to be seen in 1918 until 1921, many moment that seen by ethnic Ossetian did independence movement. In 1920 the people of South Ossetia who supported the Bolshevik troops from North Ossetia launched anactionand brutally put down by the army of the government of Georgia.49 Menshevik sent troops and regular troops into Tskhinvali to stop the violence. As a result of that, about 5,000 ethnic Ossetia died and more than 13,000 civilians died from starvation and disease. In 1921 the Soviet army attacked Georgia, then the autonomous region of South Ossetia inserted into Georgia. This incident created distrust situation between South Ossetia and Georgia until today.
Treaty by Soviet Union in 1922 stated, South Ossetia received status as an autonomous region and still under the administration of Georgia. This decisionwas not accepted by both parties. People of South Ossetia demanding equal treatment with North Ossetia (which gained a higher status that is autonomous republic) while
47 Ibid. p. 146 48 International Crisis Group, Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia (Europe Report No. 159), Tbilisi/Brussels: ICG, 26 November 2004. p. 3. 49Op.cit. Cornell. P. 141. 21 the people of Georgia felt that South Ossetia is a foreign entity whose creation is none other than the implementation of a political " Divide and rule" by Russia against Georgia.50
Figure 3: Map of the Ethnic deployment in Caucasus51
During the Soviet era, the relationship between ethnic with Ossetian ethnic Georgian less going well and always rivalry between the two. Ethnic Georgia considers that the ethnic Ossetian who live in South Ossetia do not deserve the
50Loc.cit. International Crisis Group. P. 3. Divide and rule is a combination of political strategy, military, and economic aimed at gaining and maintaining power by breaking the large group into smaller groups are more easily conquered. 51 http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/commonwealth/ethnocaucasus.jpg 22 benefits gained in the field of the economy, but on the other they do not benefit in politics when compared to their brothers who are in the territory of Russia (North Ossetia) and people in Abkhazia.
A movement which calls itself Ademon Nykhas, formed in 1988 to foster unity of the people in order to achieve the independence of South Ossetian. They tried to raise the status of South Ossetia into the Autonomous Republic in the territory of Georgia. On November 10, the city council SOAO (South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast) filed a petition to change its status to become Autonomous Republic, but this was rejected by Georgia.52
In addition, the language problem also creates new problems. In 1989 the government established Georgian language as the official language of government in all regions of Georgia, is no longer using the Russian language which then makes Ossetian demonstrate for Ossetian ethnic language as their official language in South Ossetia. Both sides had several times tried to defuse the conflict with organizing a public forum attended by both parties, but in the end it was a cause of conflict casualties.
During the Gorbachev leadership of the relationship between Georgia and South Ossetia facing a serious problem. An incident that occurred on April 9, 1989, that sparked the Georgian nationalist movement, it also sparked similar movements in South Ossetian. During the spring and summer of 1989, Georgia and South Ossetia engaged in a "war of laws" that when Tbilisi issued regulations specifying the language of Georgia as the only official language throughout the country and South Ossetia responded with issuing regulations specifying the language Ossetian as an official language in the region.53 This “war of laws” resulted conflict in the ethnic level which caused many casualties on both sides.
52 Ibid. p. 4 53 Cornell. Small Nations and Great Powers, p. 153 23
On November 10, South Ossetia unilaterally declared unite with North Ossetia, which is in the territory of Russia. The next day Georgia state that does not recognize the attitude of South Ossetia and stated that South Ossetia is part of Georgia administration. The conflict between Georgia with South Ossetia began on November 23, 1989. At that time along with Gumbaridze and Gamsakhurdia led about 15,000 people to Tskhinvali for talks protect ethnic Georgia in South Ossetia. This group successfully held in the Georgian-South Ossetian border by a combination of the people and Ossetian militia and one regiment of the Soviet army, made Gamsakhurdia and Gumbaridze did not enter the territory South Ossetia. This detention incident eventually led to conflicting and caused 6 deaths, 24 minor injuries and 140 others received serious treatment.54These events encourage Ademon Nykhas to send a petition to Moscow with the aim of reunification of South Ossetia with North Ossetia, but the petition is not addressed, because Moscow is facing bigger problems.55During the early 1990s, the relationship between Georgia with South Ossetia tend to be unstable because of the political elite of Georgia was involved in a dispute about the country's future. But in August 1990 the tension in relations between the two countries increased again after the Georgian parliament adopted a new regulation that does not allow the participation of regional parties in the legislative elections to be held in October 1990. This regulation effectively preclude Ademon Nykhas or other local organizations to have a voice in parliament.56
In elections in October 1990 Gamaskhurdia elected as head of the Parliament of Georgia, ethnic Georgia in South Ossetia was given more rights. Gamaskhurdia voters also many from Abkhazia and South Ossetia.57According to Georgia, South Ossetia exploited by Russia to create an unstable situation in Georgia. South Ossetia and Abkhazia is actually just wanted to secede from Georgia because they differ with Georgia. To achieve its objectives the area asking for the support of Russia, where
54Ibid. 55Ibid. p. 154 56Ibid. 57Ibid. 24 they feel different ethnicities with Georgia. The Georgian government has always suspected that the presence of separatists in South Ossetia have the support of Russia, especially when the two regions are set Russian as the main language spoken.
On December 9, 1990 South Ossetia held its own elections. Two days later the South Ossetian parliament chose to be under the authority of Moscow. South Ossetia declared independence from Georgia and the action taken by Gamsakhurdia to annul the election results on December 9, by removing the status of autonomous oblast of South Ossetia and declared a state of emergency in the region. Gamsakhurdia then ordered the blockade of the South Ossetia and formally launch a war Georgia-South Ossetia when he ordered his troops to occupy Tskhinvali in January 1991. 58The Government of Georgia decreed a state of emergency in the region and raised the army commander in the country of Georgia to serve as mayor of Tskhinvali,
2.2.2. Rose Revolution
For more than 10 years, since 1992, South Ossetia enjoy its de facto independence by establishing a system of government like a sovereign state. The conflict with Georgia can be ruled out in the era of Eduard Shevardnadze. At the time Shevardnadze make Georgia closer to Europe and America and move away from Russian influence. These efforts produced results, where the status of Georgia in the late '90s as the biggest recipients of US aid. During the Shevardnadze administration, Georgia received a total of US $ 1 billion to implement programs of democratization and economic development.59
In the Presidential elections in 1995 and 2000 Shevardnadze and CUG alleged election fraud in 1999. 76. The dissatisfaction with Shevardnadze's leadership led to the strengthening of an opposition group led by Zurab Zhvania, Nino Burjanadze and Mikhail Saakashvili. These three people are former high-ranking officials and
58Loc.cit. International Crisis Group. p. 4 59Cornell. Small Nations and Great Powers. p. 342 25
Georgia are clashed with each other.60 Zhvania is head of the Parliament of Georgia in 1995-2001 and Burjanadze become members of parliament for two terms before replace Zhvania as chairman. Meanwhile Saakashvili is a lawyer and former member of the CUG appointed Shevardnadze as Minister of Justice in 2000.61 They then build an alliance to fight the CUG as the National Democratic Movement (NDM) in the next legislative elections are held in early November 2003.
In those elections, Shevardnadze committed fraud and manipulation. The election results were announced by the government in contrast to the calculations made by foreign and local independent observers. NDM denounced that fraud and mobilize supporters to hold mass public protests. During two consecutive weeks the streets of Tbilisi and the front page of the Georgian parliament was filled by the people who demanded that the government recognize the victory of NDM. On November 22, Saakashvili lead the masses to storm the parliament building and led to Shevardnadze left the room Burjanadze.62 The next day Shevardnadze and leaders NDM meeting initiated by Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov to seek a peaceful solution to the crisis. The results of that meeting was the resignation of Shevardnadze formally, which is then followed by the implementation of the Presidential elections in January 2004. This election was won unanimously by Saakashvili to get 96 percent of the vote. His victory strengthened after the legislative election rehearsal held in April won NDM by winning the support of 67 percent of the total vote.63
Substitution of power from Shevardnadze to Saakashvili's Western media called the Rose Revolution for the actions of the protesters were handing out roses to the security forces guarding the parliament building. Saakashvili is seen as a reformer and anti-corruption crusader who is able to bring change to Georgia after 11 years
60Svante E. Cornell, Georgia after the Rose Revolution: Geopolitical Predicament and Implications for U.S. Policy, the Strategic Studies Institute, February 2007, p. 7. 61Loc.cit, International Crisis Group. p. 6-7. 62Ibid. p. 9-11 63International Crisis Group, Georgia: Sliding toward Authoritarianism? (Europe Report No. 189). Tbilisi/Brussels: ICG. 19 December 2007. p. 1. 26 under the rule of Shevardnadze weak and corrupt. Mikhail Saakashvili who at that time was 36 years old when he became president, filling his administration with people who are relatively young, so that the impression of dynamic and active governance to make change for the better in Georgia.64
After officially served as president of Georgia, Saakashvili is committed to implement the reforms in economic and political fields, build Georgia into a strong state and democratic, and establish closer ties with the West. One of the efforts to forge closer relations among others to apply for membership of NATO and the European Union, but without disturbing the good neighborly relations with Russia.65 In addition, he also stated his pledge to restore the territorial integrity of Georgia, which returns to the Governments of Georgia South Ossetia.
In May 2004, Saakashvili began trying to take over the government of South Ossetia by ordering the police and Special Forces (OMON, Otryad Militsii Osobogo Naznacheniya/Special Police Unit) to carry out operations against smuggling in the region of South Ossetia. Smuggling is a major problem for Georgia, but for South Ossetia who do not have an established trading system, causing smuggling is the most effective way to obtain needed items for daily living.66 The Georgian Special Forces deployed in several areas of conflict and conduct raids on illegal goods and close the "black market" in Ergneti.
With the presence of forces that are not included in the command of the JPKF, the government and the people of South Ossetia regard this as preparation for Georgia to "unfreeze" the conflict that has been "frozen" for 12 years. Georgian forces back clashed with South Ossetian militia, and in July and August 2004, these clashes
64Loc.cit. p. 2 65Loc.cit. p. 3 66Loc.cit. p. 10 27 became limited war after the two sides conduct small arms fire and mortars in the conflict zone.67
The conflict this time was taken by the President of Georgia, Mikhail Saakashvili to the international world by accusing Russia of being behind this conflict. In front of supporters, Saakashvili said that the conflict in South Ossetia is actually a problem between Georgia with Russia. Since then, relations between Georgia and the Russian became much worse. The war in August 2008 is the end of this worsening relationship. In August of this, precisely on the 8th morning, the Government of Georgia decided to resolve the problems in South Ossetia with a massive assault to the Tskhinvali region. Russia is already anticipating, directly into South Ossetia through the Roki tunnel that connects between North Ossetia and South Ossetia. This was the first military intervention carried out by Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
2.3. South Ossetia War
In this chapter conflict that happen between Russian Federation and Georgia focusing on South Ossetia War, even at the time conflict also happen in Abkhazia. South Ossetian Separatist been there to separate South Ossetia from Georgia since 1989.68 By de Facto South Ossetia been proclamation it‟s independent since January 19, 1992 and join North Ossetia under Russian Federation, but Georgia confront the legality of South Ossetia independent.69 In 2006, South Ossetia ever been Referendum with 90% of South Ossetian people choose to breakaway from Georgia, but international system do not claim it.70
67BertilNygren, The Rebuilding Greater Russia: Putin‟s Foreign Policy Toward the CIS Countries, London: Rountledge, 2008, p. 145-147 68 Resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Georgian SSR on the decisions of the twelfth session of the Council of People's Deputies of the South Ossetian Autonomous Region of the twentieth convocation 69 A Brief History of South Ossetia .Kommersant № 97 (2936) 70 Staging 'Alternative Choice' for S.Ossetia , Online Magazine - Civil Georgia, November 7 of 2006 28
The situation in South Ossetia is also deteriorating due to the conflict involving Georgian, South Ossetian militia and Russian peacekeepers. This situation lasted until Saakashvili decided to solve the problem of South Ossetia for good by ordering a ground assault on Tskhinvali on August 8, 2008 in the morning.71 Russia certainly has anticipated this action and sent troops to Georgia through the Roki tunnel that connects North and South Ossetia. By this action then start the first military attack by Russia after the Soviet era ended. The war between Georgia with Russia began on August 8, 2008 when Georgian forces began to enter the city of Tskhinvali, the South Ossetian capital with the aim of taking over the territory as part of the government of Georgia in the South Ossetia region. According to OSCE, who was watching the situation in Tskhinvali claimed that South Ossetian side did not make shots or offensive.72
On August 9, 2008 Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili issued a decree declared a state of war and state of emergency for 15 days in response to the deployment of the Russian Federation to South Ossetia on August 8, 2008.73 Saakashvili also reiterated that Georgia will never take off one inch from its territory. Whatever happens, Georgia will not approve the action of the separation of the territory of Georgia, and any actions that could undermine the democratic system of Georgia. Georgia at that time also had the support of the West in the act. One proof of the involvement of the West was the discovery of a satellite constellation in conflict areas abandoned by Georgian forces. Georgia does not have a constellation of satellite equipment, so that the findings could prove the existence of Western aid to provide data to Georgia via satellite constellation.
According to Russia, the entry of Russian forces into Georgian territory is meant to protect the troops who served as peacekeepers (within the framework of
71 Georgians have already in Tskhinvali (Rus.) , «REGIONS.RU/Novosti Federation" (08.08.2008 11:36). 72Champion, Marc (2008-12-19). "British Monitor Complicates Georgian Blame Game". The Wall Street Journal. 73 http://edition.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/europe/11/07/georgia.clashes/index.html?iref=mpstoryview 29
CIS) as well as local residents, the majority of the holders of Russian passports. Russia accused the Georgian attack into South Ossetia on August 6, 2008 which killed Russian peacekeepers and the civilian population of South Ossetia is a form of genocide.
Georgia's first attack on the capital of the South Ossetia Republic launched on August 7, 2008.74 This attack is the sign for South Ossetia, Russia and Georgia that the bloody war in the Caucasus region will begin. Bounded on a 1992 peace treaty, Russia dared to take steps in military interference to Southern Ossetia.75 Russian military intervention in the South Ossetia War greatly changed the military position of Georgia as the best military in the Caucasus region, a major downfall for the Georgian military was seen on 11 August 2008.
After the rose revolution in 2003 Mikhail Saakashvili sought every means to restore Abkhazia and South Ossetia back to Georgia.76 One of the ways that he envisaged during the time in his administration was to strengthen the Georgian army with the main objective against the separatists of those both countries. In its military establishment Georgia seeks to cooperate on a large scale with the US and NATO in advancing its military system. Because of this situation Georgia changed their military style to be full of western characteristic. In addition, a huge US funding injection also helped Georgia in raising its military budget. For the first time Georgia is the first country in the world that can grow military spending up to 33 times from the previous budget or about 1 billion US $ in 2007-2008.77 The increase in Georgia's military budget is the one of the largest among Saudi Arabia, Oman and North Korea.
74 Emerson, Michael. "Post-Mortem on Europe's First War of the 21st Century." (PDF). Centre for European Policy Studies, August 2008 http://aei.pitt.edu/9382/2/9382.pdf 75 Cvetkovski, Nikola. "The Georgian – South Ossetian Conflict". Danish Association for Research on the Caucasus. 76 Wolff, Stefan. Georgia: Abkhazia and South Ossetia, University of Nottingham. https://pesd.princeton.edu/?q=node/274 77 MilitaryBudget.org, Georgian Military Budget, MilitaryBudget. http://militarybudget.org/georgia/ 30
The Georgian military device is a device made by the Soviet Union, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, western and Israel. While the experience of Georgia military troops is very limited, Georgia military troops experience only reinforce troops in Iraq conflict it also as supporting force on US troops.78
In the process of strengthening the Georgian military, Saakashvili also campaigned for Georgia's military power to the world. In its military campaign, Georgia shows their military strength, which is western and mainly US. In the military parade it was clearly seen Georgia troops using US uniforms. Along the streets of Tbilisi Georgian soldiers paraded with US weapons and ornaments, which are the new face of Georgia that has reformed into a western group in the US outline.
After much development of the abilities experienced by the army of Georgia, following advanced weapons and modern warfare equipment makes Saakashvili feel confident. Feeling Georgia has been able to stand up against South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Saakashvili is planning to launch a massive military offensive into these two areas. Finally in August 2008 the bloody conflict erupted by Georgia party as the side who started the war.79
The attack on South Ossetia is not spontaneous. For several days in early August, Georgia appears to have secretly concentrated a large number of troops and equipment (2nd, 3rd and 4th Infantry Brigades, Artillery Brigade, elements of Infantry Brigade 1, at separate places in The tank town of Battalion Tank was stationed with a total of nine light infantry and five tank battalions, up to eight artillery battalions plus special forces and Interior Ministry troops all, up to 16,000 people) on the Georgian border in the South Ossetia conflict zone.80 On August 7, at 22:00, Georgian troops began the attack with artillery bombing at Tskhinvali, the
78 Kilner, James (8 August 2008). "Georgia says to withdraw 1,000 soldiers from Iraq". Reuters. 79Georgians have already in Tskhinvali (Rus.) , «REGIONS.RU/Novosti Federation" (08.08.2008 11:36). 80Svante E.; Starr, S. Frederick. “The Guns of August 2008: Russia's War in Georgia.” M.E. Sharpe, 1stjune, 2009 31 capital of South Ossetia, and the next day there were attacks to paralyze the towns of Tskhinvali and other South Ossetia regions.81 At 8 am on 8 August, Georgia's infantry and tanks entered Tskhinvali and there was a fierce battle between Georgia troops with South Ossetia troops and Russian peacekeepers stationed in the city.82
After the Georgia attack on Southern Ossetia, the Russian government did not remain silent. Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev decided to conduct military intervention in the form of peacekeeping operations in the Southern region of Ossetia. This military operation was aimed at preventing more destruction that could be done by the Georgia troops in the Southern Ossetia region. Then on that day, three tactical battalions from the 135th, 503th and 693th Motor Rifles Regiment of the 19th Rifle Motorcycle Division of the Army 58th in the North Caucasus Military District was placed in a ready-to-combat formation in the Southern Ossetia region. At the end of the day, the Russian army managed to clear the area around the districts of Kverneti, Tbeti and Dzari, and to the west of Tskhinvali.83
Direct military intervention of Russia made the army of Georgia have no chance at all to win the battle at Tskhinvali. Before that the Russian army also had difficulties in the mobility of their troops toward Southern Ossetia. Things like the transportation routes of the Caucasus Mountains became a major obstacle for Russia. Roki tunnels and narrow mountain lanes into the mainline of Russia to enter South Ossetia are the main obstacles of the Russian army. On 9 August, fighting between Georgia and Russia occurred, Georgia used counter-attack tactics as well as tactical ambush.84 This attack is considered effective because the Russian side is quite fooled
81 REGIONS.RU/Novosti Federation (2008). Georgians have already in Tskhinvali, Russia. 82Barabanov, Mikhail (2008). "The August War between Russia and Georgia". Moscow Defense Brief. Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, Moscow. 83 Regions.ru/Novosti Federation (2008). Georgians have already in Tskhinvali, Russia. 84 Pukhov, Ruslan (2010) "The Tanks of August". Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, Moscow. 32 and injured. In this attack the army of Georgia succeeded in wounding the commander of the 58th Army Lieutenant General A. Khrulyov.85
Early in the day of the 10th of August the military of georgia succeeded in occupying the main city ossetia South of Tskhinvali. At that time the Southern ossetia troop as well as the russia peacekeeping troop were hit back and out to the north of South ossetia. But by midday it all turned, after the Russian aid troops came with an accumulation of up to 16,000 personnel of georgia beaten back from Tskhinvali. At night the georgia troops actually had departed from Tskhinvali and had fled South
South of ossetia, Tskhinvali had been completely occupied by russia and Southern ossetia troops. In this battle the georgia artillery was completely destroyed and many military posts of Georgia were abandoned.
On the night of August 10, Russia deployed six tactical regiment groups (135th, 503th and 693th Motor Racing Regiments from the 19th Rifle Motor Division of North Ossetia, 70th and 71st Energy Rifle Regiment of 42nd Rifle Motor Division of Chechnya, And a mixture of the 104th and 234th Special Forces Regiment from the 76th Air Force Pskov Division), 45th Squad Regiment and 10th and 22nd Special Forces Brigades, as well as air and artillery forces significant. Two Chechen companies from the Zapad and Vostok Battalions and the tactical group of the 98th Ivanovo Air Division tactical, were sent to the battle area as well. The number of Russian troops in South Ossetia reached about 10,000 men and 120 tanks.
The main target of the Russian air force is the military means throughout Georgia. The air strikes that Russians do are in the form of bombing. All combat equipment that Russia uses are the Su-24M Fighter bombers, and the F-25 Su-25 fighter, and the Tu-22M3 Backfire long-range bombers. In addition to political considerations Russia has not deliberately attacked Georgian infrastructure, transport,
85 Части 58 армии полностью освободили Цхинвали от грузинских военных (in Russian). Russian Ministry of Defence. 33 communications or industry, or other government buildings. The total loss for the Russian Air Force is a Tu-22M3 long-range bomber, a Su-24M Fencer frontier bomber, a Su-24MR Fencer E reconnaissance aircraft, and four Su-25 fighter aircraft. In addition, the Russian Army launched a short-range ballistic missile 15 Tochka-U (SS-21) against military targets and some new Iskander long-range ballistic missiles (SS-26).
After losing control over much of South Ossetia, Georgian troops began to regroup in Gori. Meanwhile, Georgian units and artillery continued to attack Tskhinvali mildly in some areas of South Ossetia, and showed fierce opposition in several places in Georgia. However, at the end of August 11, South Ossetia was completely cleared of Georgian troops, and Russian units had moved to Georgia the following morning, building a 25-km demilitarized support zone to prevent further artillery attacks on South Ossetia.86
After fierce clashes with Russia, which lasted from August 8th Georgia military defense finally collapsed. Since 12 August Georgia army began to retreat and fled to the city Gori.87 And after being pressed by the Russian military, many of the Georgia soldiers retreated to Tbilisi. Along the road to Tbilisi there are many artillery and ammunition left behind by the army of Georgia.
At noon on August 12, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev decided to stop the active phase of the peace enforcement operation.88 That night, Saakashvili signed an early ceasefire agreement that French President Nikolas Sarkozi had just brought from Moscow. The Russian formation is concentrated along the Southern border of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, using partial control of the demilitarized zone. Meanwhile, active attacks on Georgian territory to capture and destroy Georgian
86 Barabanov, Mikhail (2008). "The August War between Russia and Georgia". Moscow Defense Brief. Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, Moscow. 87 Ibid 88 Kramer, Andrew E.; Barry, Ellen (2008). "Russia, in Accord With Georgians, Sets Withdrawal". The New York Times. 34 weapons, and demilitarize the Georgian armed forces, he added. From August 13 to 15, Russian troops entered Gori and Senaki and began to seize Georgian military base. Other Russian disarmament units are within 20 km of Tbilisi. This all happened in the context of complete paralysis of the demoralized Georgian Army.89 Other than the Georgian government and their military commander did not believe in a ceasefire agreement with Russia. The remaining Armed Forces Army units (including the 1st Infantry Brigade rushing back from Iraq) are preparing to protect the northern part of Tbilisi, fearing that there will be a Russian attack on the capital.
At the end of August, the Russian armed forces clarified about their urgency of the Southern Ossetia war, in its clarification the Russian military suffered official losses of 71 dead, five POWs (including two pilots) and 356 others injured. However, these figures do not include the loss of the Ossetia troops and the various volunteers in the South Ossetia troop and volunteers are estimated to be up to 150 dead. Russian and Ossetia troops lost several infantry tanks and combat vehicles. Losses to the Georgian side are unclear, but it is estimated that over 500 people were killed and up to 1,500 people injured, with more than 100 POW (although Russians have admitted taking only 15).
Georgia has completely lost its naval power and air defense system. According to his clarification, the Russians managed to capture and destroy most of the army's arsenal. The Russians confiscated 150 units of Georgia's heavy weapons, including 15 BMP infantry fighters, 65 T-72 tanks, several dozen personnel carriers, vehicles, weapons and SAM systems. Russia seized large numbers of cars and light weapons, including the American M4A3 carbines, as well as many Georgian tanks, armored vehicles, and weapons have also been destroyed in the battle against Russia.
Saakashvili's decision to attack South Ossetia not only ended in total failure, but Georgia suffered heavy military defeats and huge material losses. The
89 Barabanov, Mikhail (2008). "The August War between Russia and Georgia". Moscow Defense Brief. Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, Moscow. 35 sophisticated and modern armed Georgian army certainly did not meet the ambitious expectations of its leaders. While Georgian army leaders who had adequate levels of military training and persistence at the tactical level, at a higher command level, the Georgian Army's performance did not produce satisfactory results. The persistence of Georgians in South Ossetia can be explained by ethnic motivation. But once ethnic motivation is lost, soldiers quickly lose their fighting spirit and this is clearly the cause of defeat. The harsh mental pressure of the conflict has turned into panic and demoralization when confronted with a clearly superior enemy. The Georgian Army unit's orders cannot maintain discipline, and lose control when under pressure and when its communications are attacked is the moral weakness of the army of Georgia. The widespread sense of the futility of fighting against the mighty Russian Army might also have caused a moral collapse.
Overall, the Saakashvili regime develops Georgian military capacity in a reasonable way, showing a remarkable interest in the armed forces. From a technical point of view, the focus on obtaining heavy artillery, self-propelled, multiple launch rocket systems and air defense systems has proved entirely justifiable, and it is precisely these weapons that inflict the greatest damage on Ossetia and Russian forces, along with night vision, Modern, radio-technical reconnaissance and electronic warfare equipment. In this category, the Georgian Army is even better prepared than the Russian Army. The emphasis given by Western military instructors on individual soldier training also seems to be paying off. But, overall, the Georgia Army needs more time to mature. Saakashvili's hasty decision to throw this army into a premature battle, which led to a confrontation with the Russian Armed Forces, led to his decisive death.
About the performance of the Russian Armed Forces, the speed of Russia response was clearly unexpected, not only by the Georgians, but by the West as well, not to mention a few negative observers within Russia itself. Three tactical battalion groups in stand by status entered South Ossetia in a matter of hours. Within three
36 days, a powerful alignment of forces and equipment was assembled under very difficult natural circumstances, capable of effective action and inflicting quick defeat on a numerically equivalent enemy. Russian forces may have shown deficient of consistency at the tactical level, but their power over the forces of Georgia in terms of capabilities and combat effectiveness cannot be denied. Russia has verified that Russia military forces have ready units for combat operations, as well as an effective military command.
The traditional habits of the Russian army are the weakness of the Russian Army's way of warfare, such as night operations, reconnaissance, communications, and back support, remain as before, despite the enemy's weakness. This does not contribute much in the South Ossetia War. There is no doubt that these issues should be examined as the first priority for the Russian military. The victory of Russian military over the Georgian Army during the peace-enforcement operation of August 2008 should not be a cause for euphoria in Moscow, but this victory supposes to be a motivation for Russia to accelerate its military transformation and the mass procurement of modern armaments for the Russian Armed Forces.
2.4. Russia Military Forces
Since its independence after the Soviet Union collapse, Russia never did military action. Freezing Russian military in less than one decade includes Russia need to re- regenerate its military strength. During the administration of Dmitry Medvedev in 2008 there was war of Georgia, when it is the first time Russia fought a war and test its military capabilities. Georgia war is divided into two regions, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. But more centered on South Ossetia War for more serious offenses occurred there.
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In this conflict Russia mobilized a lot of their military regiments and corps:
1. 58th Army a. 19th Motorized Rifle Division 135th Motorized Rifle Regiment, 429th Motorized Rifle Regiment, 503rd Motorized Rifle Regiment, 693rd Motorized Rifle Regiment, 481st Air-Defense Missile Regiment, 292nd Self-propelled Artillery Regiment, 141st Independent Tank Battalion, 239th Reconnaissance Independent Battalion, 1493rd Independent Engineer Battalion, and 344th Independent Maintenance Battalion b. 42nd Motorized Rifle Division 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment, 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment 50th Self-propelled Artillery Regimen, 417th Reconnaissance Independent Battalion, "Vostok" Battalion, and "Zapad" Battalion 2. 76th Division Assault Air a. 104th Air Assault Regimen b. 234th Air Assault Regimen 3. 98th Division Airborne a. 217th Airborne Regimen 4. 10th Independent Spetsnaz Brigade 5. 22nd Independent Spetsnaz Brigade 90
Russian Commander in charge in South Ossetia War was,
1. Colonel-General AleksanderZelin91 2. Lieutenant-Colonel SulimYamadayev92 3. Colonel-General Sergey Makarov93
90 Svante E.; Starr, S. Frederick. “The Guns of August 2008: Russia's War in Georgia.” M.E. Sharpe, 1stjune, 2009 91Mladenov, Alexander “Su-25 'Frogfoot' Units In Combat” 92 “СулимаЯмадаевавидели в окрестностяхЦхинвали”, Lenta.Ru, 12.08.2008 38
1. Lieutenant-colonel Timerman Konstantin Anatolievich94 2. Lieutenant General A. Khrulyov95
The total number of Russian forces in South Ossetia reached about 10,000 men and armed with 120 tanks T-72B (M), T-72B T-62M. Russian Aircraft and Helicopter are, Su-24M Fencer frontal bombers, and Su-25 Frogfoot attack planes, and the Tu- 22M3 Backfire long-range bombers, Mi-8MTKO,0020Mi-24. Russian ground vehicle are, BMP-1, BMP-2, BTR-80, BMD-2, BRDM-2A, MT-LB, AND 15 Tochka-U (SS- 21)and a few new Iskander (SS-26).
58th Army of the North Caucasus Military District is one of the largest combined arms formations and combat-ready armed forces of Russia. The army was formed in 1995. To protect the southern borders of Russia. The army has extensive experience in resolving complex crises. In particular, the army division provides carrying out counter-terrorist operation in the North Caucasus, participated in the liberation of hostages in Beslan. 70000th part of the 58th Army is more than twice the number of the Georgian armed forces. The army's arsenal are 609 tanks, almost two thousand infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, 125 mortars and guns, 190 units Grad and 450 anti-aircraft systems, as well as 120 aircraft and 70 helicopters.
Not alone, others who assist Russia is South Ossetia with 3000 troops and armed at least 20 tanks and 25 ACS, an unknown number of militia and volunteers. Soldiers Abkhazia 5 thousand. Personnel and an unknown number of employees of internal troops.
93 Presidential Decree of 18 August 2008 № 1244 "On awarding Russian servicemen of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation state awards" (УказПрезидентаРоссийскойФедерацииот 18 августа 2008 года № 1244 “О награждениигосударственныминаградамиРоссийскойФедерациивоеннослужащихВооружѐнных СилРоссийскойФедерации”) 94 http://www.warheroes.ru/hero/hero.asp?Hero_id=9877 95Barabanov, Mikhail “The August War between Russia and Georgia” 39
2.5. Georgia Military Forces
After 4 years of leading georgia, on 8 August Mikhail Saakhasvili for the first time made a declaration of war against Russia. In his confession Mikhail saakhasvili states that Russia has attacked and wants to seize the south Ossetia from georgia by military act through rocky tunnel on the border of the Russian-Georgian state. In this war decision Mikhail Saakhasvili deployed his army consisting of many regiments and military corps with up to 18,000 Troops.
In this conflict Georgia mobilized a lot of their military regiments and corps:
1. 1st Infantry Brigade 11th Light Infantry Battalion, 12th Light Infantry Battalion, 13th Light Infantry Battalion 14th Armored Battalion, Artillery Battalion and, logistics Battalion 2. 2 nd Infantry Brigade 21st Light Infantry Battalion, 22nd Light Infantry Battalion, 23rd Light Infantry Battalion, 24th Armored Battalion, Artillery Battalion and, logistics Battalion 3. 3 rd Infantry Brigade 31st Light Infantry Battalion, 32nd Light Infantry Battalion, 33rd Light Infantry Battalion, 34th Armored Battalion, Artillery Battalion and, logistics Battalion 4. 4 th Infantry Brigade 41st Light Infantry Battalion, 42nd Light Infantry Battalion, 43rd Light Infantry Battalion, 44th Armored Battalion, Artillery Battalion and, Logistic Battalion 5. 5 th Infantry Brigade 51st Light Infantry Battalion, 52nd Light Infantry Battalion, 53rd Light Infantry Battalion and, 54th Armored Battalion 6. 1 st Artillery Brigade Self-propelled Artillery Battalion, MRL Battalion and, MRL Battalion 7. Independent Armored Battalion 8. Independent Light Infantry
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9. Battalion Independent Air-Defense Battalion 10. Independent Engineer Battalion 11. Independent Signals Battalion96
Georgian Commander in charge in South Ossetia War was,
1. Davit Kezerashvili97 2. Zaza Gogava Ivane98 3. Ivane Merabishvili 99 4. David Nairashvili 100 5. Mamuka Kurashvili101
In recent years, Georgia has steadily increased its military power for the last 5 years, Tbilisi, 30 times increased military spending. Officially, this was due to the desire of Georgia to join NATO.
According to the Russian Defense Ministry official statistics, in recent years, Georgia has purchased 206 tanks, 186 armored vehicles, 79 artillery shells, 25 helicopters, 70 mortars, 10 anti-aircraft missile systems, eight drones. Most of the weapons the country has received from NATOIncluding four warplanes. Total of georgian troops is 7 thousand men in South Ossetia. The number of armed forces is 29 thousand people (2000 of them were in Iraq at the beginning of the war) and an unknown number of employees of internal troops. Earlier 2008, Georgia refused from Kalashnikov assault rifles in favor of the automatic rifles of the American M-4 production.The composition of ground forces include tanks T-55, T-54 and T-72, as well as BMP, BRDM, BTR-70 and 80. In addition, the ground forces is armed with a
96 Svante E.; Starr, S. Frederick. “The Guns of August 2008: Russia's War in Georgia.” M.E. Sharpe, 1stjune, 2009 97 "Georgian defense, foreign ministers fired". The Associated Press. 98 New Army Chief of Staff Appointed. Civil Georgia. November 4, 2008 99 Interior Minister Briefs on IDP Housing Plans. Civil Georgia. September 13, 2008 100New Chief of Air Forces Appointed. Civil Georgia. March 22, 2007 101 Tbilisi: Georgia is not going to attack Tskhinvali - all misled contused general. NEWSru (28 October 2008) 41 variety of howitzers and mortars, mainly Czech production.On arms of the Air Forces of Georgia are made Mi-24 "Iroquois", the Su-25T, Su-25, the Scorpion, the MiG-21, L-159 ALCA, the An-2 and others. Georgia's air defense troops equipped with anti- aircraft missile systems "Strela-10" of various modifications, self-propelled anti- aircraft ZSU-23-4 "Shilka" anti-aircraft guns, anti-aircraft missile systems S-125 ( "Neva").
Time Event Explanation
August 1, There was an explosion in South Wounding 2 Georgian police 2008 Ossetia102 officer
August 2, Conflict between South Ossetia Russia peacekeepers also engage in 2008 Separatist and Georgia Armed this conflict, South Ossetia Forces103 President state ready to strike back Georgia
August 7, Georgia attack South Ossetia104 Georgia accused South Ossetia 2008 triggered Georgia army to attack
August 8, Mutual claim between Georgia Georgia accuses Russia of 2008 and South Ossetia about South provoking Georgia to attack South Ossetia region105 Ossetia. Russia has denied the allegations and threatened to strike back.
102Интервьюфранцузскойгазете “Фигаро”. http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/2072 103Ibid 104 The West Begins to Doubt Georgian Leader, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,578273-2,00.html 105 CBSNEWS, http://www.cbsnews.com/elements/2008/08/12/in_depth_world/timeline4342593.shtml 42
August 8, Russian Armed forces entered 2008 Georgia territory106
August 9, Declaration of war by Georgian President of Georgia declare a state 2008 President107 war
August 9, Georgia shooting of Russia Georgia claim has shooting 2 of 2008 Aircraft108 Russia Aircraft
August An attack on Tbilisi109 Bomb attacks have occurred near 10, 2008 the military air base in Tbilisi
August Criticism of US President and The US president stated that Russia 10, 2008 Secretary of the British against the should not respond to such attacks Russian attacks in South with military aggression. 110 Ossetia British Foreign Secretary condemned the Russian attack far beyond South Ossetia.
August Georgia claimed that the Russian Russia denies attacking civilians in 10, 2008 attack had killed 130 people and the territory of Georgia. injured more than 1,000 civilians111
106Ibid 107Ibid 108 Georgia declares 'state of war' over South Ossetia, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/aug/09/georgia.russia2 109 Day-by-day: Georgia-Russia crisis. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7551576.stm 110Ibid 111Ibid 43
August Submission of a peace agreement Georgia filed a peace agreement on 10, 2008 by Georgia112 Russia, and will withdraw all of its troops. Russia does not see any signs of ceasefire by Georgia, so ask all Georgian troops out of South Ossetia.
August French Foreign Minister came to In a state of war, the French 11, 2008 Georgia113 Foreign Minister to come to Georgia to mediate between Russia and Georgia for a ceasefire.
August disarmament Demand by Russia Russia requested the Georgian army 11, 2008 114 which numbered 1500 people in Zugdidi for disarmament. Georgia refuses to disarm.
August The European Commission called 11, 2008 on Russia to stop all military action on Georgian territory115
August President of France and the Sarkozy visited Moscow to seek 12, 2008 French Foreign Minister visit ceasefire between Russia and Moscow116 Georgia
August Russia agree to ceasefire117 Russia agreed to carry weapons and
112 Loc. Cit. Timothy L. Thomas 113 Loc. Cit. Day by Day: Georgia-Russia Crisis 114Ibid 115Ibid 116Ibid 44
16, 2008 to withdraw all of its troops to the positions before the conflict.
August Russia will start withdrawing all 17, 2008 of its troops on August 18, according to the agreement that was signed118 August Placement of Russian Russia will put peacekeepers in the 19, 2008 peacekeepers troops in conflict buffer zone area border of Georgia area119 and South Ossetia August Cessation of the NATO-Russia NATO states cannot make relations 19, 2008 relationship120 with Russia as well. North Atlantic Council (NAC) has expressed concern for the territorial integrity of Georgia. August Reprimand EU and the US to EU and USA strike against Russia 20, 2008 Russia121 because it does not fully carry out the peace agreement signed on 16 August 2008. They urged Russia to withdraw all of its troops on Georgian territory. August Cessation of the NATO-Russia 21, 2008 Military Cooperation122
Table 1: Chronology of the conflict in August 2008 in South Ossetia
117 Day by Day: Georgia-Russia Crisis, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7577150.stm 118Ibid 119Ibid 120Ibid 121Ibid 122 Day-by-Day: Georgia-Russia Conflict, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7577122.stm 45
CHAPTER III RUSSIA DEFENSE POLICY
Defense Policy is a formulation of strategies which provide a code of conduct, as defined by senior executive leadership, with the intention to influence and determine, action, decision, and other matters which relate to the military affairs and its actions. These strategies are in line with the nation‟s security interest. To put it simply, it is a program which consist of „ends‟ and „mean‟, formulated for the purpose of fulfilling the national security concerns and its defense objectives (Tagarev, 2006).
Then according to Sarkesian, William and Cimbala, defense policy is part of government policy especially with regard to the formulation and implementation of national military strategies to create an environment favorable for the military and the national interest.123 Moreover, defense policy by definition is a program for defending a country against its enemies.124
Defense Policy aims to strengthen, secure, and defend a State's national interests in order to respond sense of national identity and perception of threats that might harm the State‟s interests. Defense policy is a political function; that is, a choice to use state-sanctioned violence or the threat of violence to advance some particular communal goal.
Defense policy require the establishment of the defense white paper or military doctrine to be acknowledged as a guideline for the action, values, and principles of the states. States release its defense white paper or military doctrine to create the guideline for the national defense policy projection, and also to inform other states about its action plan, whether it is for cooperation or threat.
123Sarkesian, Sam C., William, John Allen & Cimbala, Stephen J. 2008 US National Security Policymakers, Process & Politics, 4th ed. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publisher, p.5. 124 World Web Online, as retrieved from http://www.wordwebonline.com/search.pl?w=defense+policy 46
As successor to the power of the Soviet Union, until now Russia feels it is important to be a leader in the Commonwealth Countries the former Soviet Union, namely the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent State), Russia has always emphasize mastery (control effect) against the former Soviet Union, both in the region eastern Europe and central Asia. Eurasia is a geographical orientation (geopolitical) important for Russia. Russia wants to regain the status of great power and became the opposition of the US unilateralism and its allies in NATO. Great power will be achieved when Russia run their foreign policy that wary of geopolitical rivalry and also able to maintain the Eurasian region.
Many fact say that security of a country depends on the effectiveness of the national defense policy and the security principles that adopt by the state system. The importance of this policy is to ensure the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and prosperity, then stability of politic, economic, social, cultural, and also military interests. Each country has their own national interests. The use of military force is to determine the views that threaten the national interest.The national interest which later became the basis for making the National Security Concept (NSC). Russia's security strategy explained that the Russian Federation use elements of the country such as the military, diplomacy, economics, international treaties, and other tools in achieving its national interests. The security strategy to help prevent the threat from the outside. The security strategy is then poured into a document and the most important is military doctrine. Military policy realized in defense policy based on military doctrine.
3.1. National Strategic Concept
About National Strategic Concept Russia, the Russian National Strategic Concept which was unveiled on 10 January 2000 describes many of their military concepts. At the National Strategic Concept Russia there are four chapters that cover the state's behavior, how and why Russia to achieve the state's interest in military
47 matters. In the first part of Russia stated about how Russia behaves on the global community. In the second part of Russia give info on what are the national interests of Russia. In the third Russia told about anything that could threaten Russia, and the fourth chapter Russia expressed about how where Russia ensure the security of his country.
In this chapter the author will try to elaborate on all the National Strategic Concept Russia relating to the protection of people, peacekeeping Russia, as well as foreign threats to the state of Russia.
In chapter 2 of the national interest Russia, through the National Strategic Concept is the Russian government stated that the national interests of Russia in the military sphere is as a protection of the independence, sovereignty, and the country's territorial integrity, to prevent military aggression against Russia and its allies, to ensure peaceful conditions , democratic development of the country. As well as the last paragraph National Strategic Concept also mentions the most important component of the national interests of Russia are the protection of individuals, society and the state from terrorism, including internationally, and emergency natural and man-made disasters and their consequences, and in time of war from the dangers arising from hostilities or because of war.
II. НациональныеинтересыРоссии НациональныеинтересыРоссии в военнойсферезаключаются в защитееенезависимости, суверенитета, государственной и территориальнойцелостности, в предотвращениивоеннойагрессиипротивРоссии и еесоюзников, в обеспеченииусловийдлямирного, демократическогоразвитиягосударства. ВажнейшимисоставляющиминациональныхинтересовРоссииявляют сязащиталичности, общества и государстваоттерроризма, в томчислемеждународного, а такжеотчрезвычайныхситуацийприродного и техногенногохарактера и ихпоследствий, а в военноевремя - отопасностей, возникающихприведениивоенныхдействийиливследствиеэтихдейств ий.
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II. The national interests of Russia Russia's national interests in the military sphere are to protect the independence, sovereignty, state and territorial integrity, to prevent military aggression against Russia and its allies, to ensure conditions for a peaceful, democratic development of the state. The most important components of the national interests of Russia are the protection of the individual, society and the state from terrorism, including international, as well as from emergency situations of natural and man-made disasters and their consequences, as in war time - from the dangers arising from hostilities or as a result of these actions125. In this section, Russia feels that the protection of the integrity of a country is very important especially from foreign intervention that capable to interrupting the pattern of the people attitude of the state. In addition, in this paragraph also mentioned that the protection of civilians is the main thing for the country because civilians is one of the major components of the interests of the Russianstate. IV.ОбеспечениенациональнойбезопасностиРоссийскойФедерации Содействиеурегулированиюконфликтов, включаямиротворческуюдеятельностьподэгидой ООН и другихмеждународныхорганизаций. IV. Ensuring the national security of the Russian Federation Promoting conflict resolution, including peacekeeping operating under the auspices of the UN and other international organizations.126
In another part of the NSC is the Russian government also stated that the military will be involved in maintaining world peace. Russia will seek to promote any resolution of the conflict in the global community anywhere in order to maintain world peace. Additionally in order to maintain any peace, Russia will always conduct military operations under the auspices of the United Nations and other international organizations. It is listed in chapter four of Ensuring National Security Russian Federation.
The defense policy of a country not only include National Strategic Concept, it also contains a military doctrine. Military Doctrine is a picture of a country on the
125 National Security Concept of the Russian Federation(approved by Presidential Decree of 17 December 1997 № 1300/in the Decree of the President of Russian Federation amended on January 10, 2000 № 24/revised 11 April 2008 ) https://web.archive.org/web/20080411222235/http://www.scrf.gov.ru:80/documents/1.html 126 Ibid. Chapter 4 49 way of a perspective view of the state through the military. Through military doctrine to be seen what can be termed as a threat, does a country take the threat, as well as the way the country to overcome the threat.
As with other major powers Russia also has a military doctrine. Russian military doctrine is the Russian military point of view on the threat that bothers their independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and prosperity, then stability of politic, economic, social, cultural, and also military interests like terror from outside and inside.
3.2. Russia Defense Policy in 1990s
Russian Doctrine development began in 1990s. After the outbreak of the Soviet Union, the Russian military organization seen in the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent State (CIS), an organization that contains from countries of the former Soviet Union which would be under Russian influence. CIS is a combination of the armed forces of each of the 35 member states. Although Russia has a very big role, but the organization still has a fleet of its own arsenal, separate from the Russian armed forces. This then makes Russians feel the need to formulate a military doctrine that legalized in 1992.127 The doctrine is at the beginning of the Russian Security policy, which is different from the security and defense policy of the Soviet Union period.
In the 1990s, the development of military policies contain about Russia's role in conflict resolution and involvement in military cooperation with the CIS (guarantees to Russian citizens in other CIS countries.) If required by the common uses of nuclear power, the deployment of the army and other forces outside the territory of Russia and the perceived threat of anti-Western.
127 Deputy of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). May 2007. http://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/cis.pdf. 50
On approval of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation In accordance with paragraph "I" of Article 83 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and subparagraph 2 of paragraph 2 of Article 4 of the Federal Law "On Defense" paragraph of s t a n o I decree: 1. To approve the military doctrine of the Russian Federation. 2. To declare invalid the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of November 2, 1993 N 1833 "On Main Provisions Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation "(Collected Acts of the President and The Russian Federation, 1993, N 45, Art. 4329). 3. This Decree shall enter into force on the day of its official publication.128
In the 90s Russia Military doctrine is based on the laws of Association regarding the constitution and the legal defense of the Russian government. The Basic Purpose of making the manufacture of Russian military doctrine is to validate the presidential decree onNovember2, 1993 number 1833 about Russian military objective. Where in military doctrine is explained clearly and openly what the purpose and usefulness of the Russian military. Clarity Russian military functions that global public question was answered through this Russian doctrine.
Specifically, the development of the doctrine in 1990 accompanied by worsening relations with the West were represented by their interference in the west of the interior of Russia, related to their military blocs and alliances, attempt to block Russia's interests in the resolution of international security issues, as well as skeptical about their enemies surrounding it. NATO is regarded as an enemy coming from outside. Throughout 1990 Russian military realize that the ability of the armed forces must be increased because the Russians are faced with domestic and regional armed conflicts
3.3. Russia Military Doctrine 2000
Basically Military Doctrine serves binding policy makers at the strategic level to the field operator implementers to ensure the attainment of the objectives of the
128 Abolished - Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of 05.02.2010, N 146 http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?docbody=&firstDoc=1&lastDoc=1&nd=102065541 51 military organization. So the military doctrine also a reference to the military of a nation in order to achieve the main goal of the military. Such as wars and other military operations, according to military doctrine it is one way for military organizations to achieve objectives such as calming warring parties or even banish the threat from other countries.
In any democratic country the military doctrine has a purpose, the purpose of military doctrine is to keep the civilian government to remain in the right position in order to maintain a national interest of a country. On the other hand for the civil, military doctrine also binds the military to be in control. In this case the military doctrine must not restrict the movement of the military in the context of protecting the national interests of the country.
In the development of Russia has created a lot of the concepts and rules about the military. One of them is a military doctrine that has been formed after the breakup of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991. In fact the draft military doctrine of Russia was made in 1992, but not yet signed by President Yeltsin because they are still characterized by the Soviet Union and does not match with the Russian nation. In further developments in November 1993 Russia establish a new military doctrine. There is no significant difference from the draft doctrine in 1992 with the doctrine that established in 1993. There are two striking differences from both the military doctrine. The first thing is about the Russian threat perception from the Western block and the second about the dangers of internal war that may occur in the region of Russia.
After the development of the military doctrine of Russia in the 2000s was very unbelievable. In Russia's military doctrine tells the story of Russia's desire to advance its military capabilities such as the modernization of weaponry and military equipment. Apart from that there other striking thing in the Russian military doctrine states that Russia disagrees and criticizes the United States as a country of residence
52 that dominates the world. According to Russia in its military doctrine, the role of the unipolar superpower and dominant in international relations has violated the principles of the United Nations about“all countries are equal or equivalent”.
In this subchapter will be told when the development of the Russian military doctrine before South Ossetia War and after the South Ossetia War occurred.
3.3.1. Russian military doctrine before South Ossetia War
One of Russia's foreign policy there during the reign of Vladimir Putin is to promote the interests of Russia as a great country and a country that has a great influence in the international community to improve the country's defense, safeguard the sovereignty and unity of the country and has a strong position, so as to support domestic developments.129 In 2000, Putin started his policy by signing the new document's security later published as a National Security Concept (NSC) in January 2000.130 When Vladimir Putin took over as president of Russia in 2000, he faced a military vacuum conditions. Ships do not sail, planes do not fly, and the weapons are not ready for immediate use. Putin then took the main task in stabilizing the Russian military. Military modernization policy in terms of defense began the reign of President Vladimir Putin that the Russian defense doctrine shaped the year 2000 up to the latest in 2010. Military Doctrine in 2000 that contains the basic policy of the Russian defense and the use of nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear weapons or WMD (Missile Defense Weapon) on the critical condition of the Russian national security situation.
During the reign of Putin, Russia has once again demonstrated its power which had been lost during the breakup of the Soviet Union. He managed to reform in various fields and promote economic growth in Russia very quickly and in a
129Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “KontseptsiyaVneshneiPolitikiRossiskoiFederatsii,” 2000, http://lm.mid.ru/ns-osndoc.nfs/ 130 Arms Control Association. 2000. Russia‟s National Strategy Concepthttp://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_01-02/docjf00 53 relatively short time. This is done by performing the nationalization of oil and gas companies in Russia. In addition, Russia also benefited from the soaring price of oil at that time. In 2007, Russia has even managed to pay off all its foreign debt.131 The rapid growth of the economy makes Russia can modernize the defense sector. The results of the economic development of Russia is shown by the re-operation of bomber aircraft patrolling around the border of Russia and the Russian attack to South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
Russia has a security doctrine that was first published in 2000. This doctrine contains an emphasis on nuclear retaliation in case of nuclear attack. In April 2000, Russia stipulates that security threats Russia take the form of intervention in the internal affairs of the Russian Federation, An effort to disregard Russia's interests in resolving international security issues, the expansion of military blocs and alliances, the placement of foreign troops (without the UNSC sanctions) to territory that borders Russia, and preparing for the Russian armed forces that can be used in strategic areas outside the territory of Russia.
In the reign of Dmitry Medvedev, he added a few things in Russian Defense policy, one of the policies is to create external conditions that allow the process of modernization in Russia, transformation and innovation in the field of economy, strengthen relations between peoples, strengthen the system of the constitution, rule of law, democratization, human rights protection and ensure Russia's active role in the international world.132 With the programs launched by the Medvedev, Russia is predicted in the next few years may be one of the major players in the international community, although they received various criticisms of human rights and democracy in Russia.
Base on Russian Federation Military doctrine in Mar 31, 2008 that ratified by Dmitry Medvedev. In Russian Federation military doctrine Chapter 1 Article 5,
131Simon Saragih. BangkitnyaRusia. Jakarta: Kompas Group. 2008 132Jeffery Mankoff. Russian Foreign Policy. Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Inc. 2009. p. 33. 54
Chapter 1 Article 10 Point A, stated that Russian Federation protect its citizen freedoms and lawful interests in foreign countries. If any foreign countries violence that military doctrine Russian Federation assume the act as main external threat. Besides the Russian Federation in its military doctrine states will participate in the maintenance of peace in this world. The statements contained in Russia military doctrine on Chapter 1 Article 1, Chapter 1 Article 7, Chapter 1 Article 10 Point A and Chapter 2 Article 14, Chapter 2 Article 15, Chapter 2 Article 16, and Chapter 2 Article 17 point D133 (ВОЕННАЯ ДОКТРИНА РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ (утв. УказомПрезидента РФ от 21 апреля 2000 года N 706)/MILITARY DOCTRINE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (App. Presidential Decree of 21 April 2000 N 706))
ВОЕННАЯ ДОКТРИНА РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ ВОЕННО-ПОЛИТИЧЕСКИЕ ОСНОВЫ 1. Состояние и перспективыразвитиясовременнойвоенно- политическойобстановкиопределяютсякачественнымсовершенс твованиемсредств, форм и способоввооруженнойборьбы, увеличениемеепространственногоразмаха и тяжестипоследствий, распространениемнановыесферы. Возможностьдостижениявоенно- политическихцелейнепрямыми, неконтактнымидействиямипредопределяетособуюопасностьсо временныхвойн и вооруженныхконфликтовдлянародов и государств, длясохранениямеждународнойстабильности и мира, обусловливаетжизненнуюнеобходимостьпринятияисчерпывающ ихмердляихпредотвращения, мирногоурегулированияпротиворечийнараннихстадияхихвозникн овения и развития. MILITARY DOCTRINE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION MILITARY AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS 1. Status and prospects of the development of modern military-political situation are determined by a qualitative improvement in the means, forms and methods of warfare, increasing its spatial extent and severity of the impact, spread to new areas. The ability to achieve military and political objectives indirect, non-contact operations predetermines the particular danger of modern wars and armed
133MILITARY DOCTRINE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (App. Presidential Decree of 21 April 2000 N 706) https://web.archive.org/web/20080331064729/http://www.scrf.gov.ru:80/documents/33.html 55
conflicts for peoples and nations, for the maintenance of international peace and stability, and makes it vitally necessary to take exhaustive measures to prevent them, the peaceful settlement of conflicts in the early stages of their emergence and development.134
For Russia the impact of a war can be very disrupting the stability of a country. Disturbed stability in a country could be very dangerous threat in every sector. Whether political, economic, and social stability will be disrupted when a disturbed state. Therefore, in the military doctrine Russia Chapter 1 Article 1 states that the military should act for the purpose to maintain the stability of the Mother landRussia. One of the things that can disrupt the stability of the state is unpeaceful condition in neighbor countries. To avoid the bad things that can happen to the Russian state, the Russian military can run the preemptive strategy for any threat in order to maintain a peaceful condition of the neighboring country.
5. Основные внешние угрозы: Дискриминация, подавление прав, свобод и законныхинтересовгражданРоссийскойФедерации в иностранныхгосударствах. 5. The main external threats: Discrimination and the suppression of the rights, freedoms and lawful interests of Russian citizens to foreign states.135
Protection of the citizens is the one of the duties of a state. Both inside and outside the territory, the state is obligated to protect all the rights of its citizens. Like Russian Federation, Russia argued that the rights and freedoms of its people are the main ones that Russia will protect them even if they located outside the territory. According to Russian military doctrine when the rights and freedoms of citizens harassed by other countries when they located outside the region, it would be a threat to Russia as set out in Chapter 1 Article 5.
7.ОбеспечениевоеннойбезопасностиРоссийскойФедерацииявляетсяв ажнейшимнаправлениемдеятельностигосударства.
134Ibid Chapter 1 Article 1 135Ibid Chapter 1 Article 5 56
РоссийскаяФедерациярассматриваетобеспечениесвоейвоеннойбезоп асности в контекстестроительствадемократическогоправовогогосударства, осуществлениясоциально-экономическихреформ, утвержденияпринциповравноправногопартнерства, взаимовыгодногосотрудничества и добрососедства в международныхотношениях, последовательногоформированияобщей и всеобъемлющейсистемымеждународнойбезопасности, сохранения и укреплениявсеобщегомира. 7. Ensuring military security of the Russian Federation is the most important area of the state. The Russian Federation considers ensuring its military security in the context of building a democratic state of law, the implementation of socio-economic reforms, establishing the principles of equal partnership, mutual cooperation and good neighborliness in international relations, consistently shaping an overall and comprehensive system of international security, the preservation and strengthening of world peace.136
In chapter 1 article 7, the state Russia stated that the military is a tool of the state to make the state may have a democratic law, military help reform the social and economic, military can establish the principles of equal partnership and mutual cooperation in good neighborliness in international relations , Consistently military could be a tool of the government to form a whole and comprehensive in relation to the state, and military as the enforcement system of international security, the preservation and strengthening of world peace. Because of this Russia found military must have the capability of maintaining international security by establishing and empowering of peacekeeping troops in the area of global conflict.
10. Основноесодержаниеобеспечениявоеннойбезопасности: А) В мирноевремя: Обеспечениебезопасности и защитагражданРоссийскойФедерацииотвоенныхугроз. Обеспечениеготовности к участию (участие) в миротворческойдеятельности. 10. The main content of military security: A) In peacetime: Security and protection of Russian citizens from military threats.
136Ibid Chapter 1 Article 7 57
Ensuring readiness to participate (participating) in peacekeeping activities137
Russian Federation military doctrine describes the use of the military. In chapter 1 article 10 point A, Russia explained that the military has uses in the two conditions, the first is when the state in peace condition which the country does not feel the threat and the second is when the state in war condition (threatened). According to the Russian Federation military doctrinethere are several function of military, First of all, the functions of the Russia Army in the peace condition is to protect their citizens from the threat of foreign military.When peacetime danger does not come from enemy states but rather from unexpected parties are like terrorists and separatists. Therefore, the Russian military still has a duty to protect its citizens even in a state in peace condition. Moreover Russia military is also prepared to maintain world peace through peacekeeping troops.Peacekeepers Russia is a special unit in the form of the Russian government adapted to the principles of the UN as well as Russian federal law about safeguarding world peace.138
II. ВОЕННО-СТРАТЕГИЧЕСКИЕ ОСНОВЫ 14. ЦелипримененияВооруженныхСилРоссийскойФедерации и другихвойск: Воперацияхпоподдержанию и восстановлениюмира - разведениепротивоборствующихсторон, стабилизацияобстановки, обеспечениеусловийдлясправедливогомирногоурегулирования. II. Military-Strategic Foundations 14. The objectives of the use of the Russian Armed Forces and other troops: In peacekeeping and peace restoration operations - disengage the warring factions, to stabilize the situation, providing the conditions for a just and peaceful settlement.139
In chapter 2 Article 14, Russia military doctrine focuses on the basic of their military strategy. Russia government believe that, Russia military has several purposes. One of its aim is to maintain and restore peace in global sphere. In this
137Ibid Chapter 1 Article 10 Point A 138“United Nations Peacekeeping Operations” Part 3 Chapter 6 P. 63 139Ibid Chapter 2 Article 14 58 strategy Russia will try to disengage from the factions in conflict, in addition to the Russia military is also trying to stabilize the conflict. To stabilize the condition of the conflict, Russia would be willing to participate as a mediator in the conflict by providing the enabling conditions for the warring parties to resolve the problem. This military strategy clearly in Russia military doctrine in chapter 2 article 14.
15. Основные формыпримененияВооруженныхСилРоссийскойФедерации и другихвойск: Миротворческиеоперации. 15. The main ways of utilizing the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops: Peacekeeping operations.140 Russia one of the world's major countries with strong military power. After the Soviet Union ended Russia is a country that gets the greatest legacy of the Soviet Union force. One form of visible strength of this country is its military power and sophisticated weapons from the Soviet Union era. According to the Russian federation in its military doctrine states that in order to maximize the Russian military will use the Army to maintain world peace. Clearly in chapter 2 article 15, the main ways of utilizing the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops is by Peacekeeping operations.
16. ВооруженныеСилыРоссийскойФедерации и другиевойскадолжныбытьготовы к отражениюнападения и нанесениюпораженияагрессору, ведениюактивныхдействий (какоборонительных, так и наступательных) прилюбомвариантеразвязывания и ведениявойн и вооруженныхконфликтов, в условияхмассированногопримененияпротивникомсовременных и перспективныхбоевыхсредствпоражения, в томчислеоружиямассовогоуничтожениявсехразновидностей. ОдновременноВооруженныеСилыРоссийскойФедерациидолжныобес печитьосуществлениеРоссийскойФедерациеймиротворческойдеяте
140Ibid Chapter 2 Article 15 59
льностикаксамостоятельно, так и в составемеждународныхорганизаций. 16. The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and other troops should be ready to repel attacks and defeating the aggressor, and conduct active operations (both defensive and offensive) under any scenario of starting and waging of wars and armed conflicts in the conditions of massive use by the enemy of modern and advanced combat weapons, including weapons of mass destruction of all types. At the same time the Russian Federation Armed Forces must ensure the implementation of the Russian Federation peacekeeping operations both independently and as part of international organizations.141 In chapter 2 article 16 of the Russian military doctrine believes that Russian troops are always ready to deflect and counter to the enemy that threatens the country's sovereignty. Armed Forces of Russia will mobilize all their weapons, and using weapons of mass destruction if necessary. But this will be balanced with the movement of world peacekeeping operations. The world's peace-keeping can be done by unilaterally or independently and in cooperation with other international organizations.
17. Основные задачиВооруженныхСилРоссийскойФедерации и другихвойск: Г) Воперацияхпоподдержанию и восстановлениюмира: Выполнениезадач в операцияхпоподдержанию и восстановлениюмиравозлагаетсянаВооруженныеСилыРоссийскойФ едерации. Дляподготовки к выполнениюэтихзадачвыделяютсяспециальноназначенныесоединени я и воинскиечасти. Наряду с подготовкой к применениюпопрямомупредназначениюониобучаютсяпоспециальной программе. РоссийскаяФедерацияосуществляеттыловое и техническоеобеспечение, обучение, подготовкуроссийскихконтингентов, планированиеихприменения и оперативноеуправлениеими в соответствиисостандартами и процедурами ООН, ОВСЕ и СодружестваНезависимыхГосударств. 17. The main tasks of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops: D) The maintenance operations and the restoration of peace: Perform tasks in the maintenance and restoration of peace operations rests with the Russian Federation Armed Forces. To prepare for these tasks are allocated specifically designated units and formations. Along with the preparation for the use for its intended purpose, they are trained in a special program. The Russian Federation implements logistic and
141Ibid Chapter 2 Article 16 60
technical support, training, preparation of Russian contingents, the planning of their implementation and operational management in accordance with the standards and procedures of the United Nations, the CFE and the Commonwealth of Independent States.142 In maintaining world peace Russian troops have been prepared in various ways, either in training, technical, and strategic military planning. All this readiness adjusted to the rules and principles that apply in the standard UN procedures, CFE and CIS. Therefore, Russia's peacekeepers must be able to carry out their peacekeeping operations. The entire Russian military operations will go hand in hand and in accordance with the programs of international organizations. Russia believes the military program in accordance with international standards, casualties and losses can be minimized.
3.3.2. Russian Federation military doctrine after South Ossetia War
Basically the Russian military doctrine that legalized on 21 November 2008 is nearly the same as the military doctrine adopted on 20 April 2000. There is no fundamental difference in this military doctrine. Military doctrine in 2008 also stated that Russia fully protect Russian sovereignty. The difference in this military doctrine is about how Russia viewed the threats that jeopardize its sovereignty.
Differences seen in the new military doctrine that NATO is about to give military support to the countries of ex-CIS who recently joined NATO, such as Georgia. In the South Ossetia War, the Russian government saw that the danger that Russia come from CIS countries themselves. Many Russian citizens living in the CIS countries, and when the CIS countries are switching from Russia and NATO support would be an obstacle and a threat to Russia to protect the people who are in the country.
As explained in any military doctrine of Russia during this time, Russian military believes that all countries within international organizations are the same and
142Ibid Chapter 2 Article 17 Point D 61 equal. This perspective makes Russia criticized the US as a country that dominates the world and other international organizations, one of them NATO.Case on articleRussian security engagement with NATO by Roy Allison, explained that Russia believes that NATO itself is not characterized Europe again, the attitude of most NATO member-states supposed to be Europe, and now NATO has been dominated by the attitude of the US as the strongest.143
II. ВОЕННО-СТРАТЕГИЧЕСКИЕ ОСНОВЫ 14. Цели применения Вооруженных Сил Российской Федерации и других войск: в крупномасштабной (региональной) войне в случае ее развязывания каким-либо государством (группой, коалицией государств) - защита независимости и суверенитета, территориальной целостности Российской Федерации и ее союзников, отражение агрессии, нанесение поражения агрессору, принуждение его к прекращению военных действий на условиях, отвечающих интересам Российской Федерации и ее союзников; II. Military-Strategic Foundations 14. The objectives of the use of the Russian Armed Forces and other troops: In large-scale (regional) war, if unleashed by a state (group or coalition of states) - the protection of the independence and sovereignty, territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and its allies, repel aggression, defeating the aggressor, forcing him to cease hostilities on terms meet the interests of Russia and its allies.144 In chapter 2 article 7 states that the Russian military doctrine, there was a conflict within the scope of regional Russia unresolved and remains a threat to Russian sovereignty. One conflict that is considered threatening is conflict areas bordering with Russia such as neighboring Georgia. In this case the Russian government would take the military path as problem solving. Russian government will not hesitate to declare war if it is really dangerous Russian state. Conventional weapons or nuclear weapon will be used when the condition of the conflict is very threatening.
143Allison, Roy. “Putin’s Russia and the enlargement Europe: Russian security engagement with NATO” p.98 144MILITARY DOCTRINE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (App. Presidential Decree of 21 April 2000 N 706) https://web.archive.org/web/20080331064729/http://www.scrf.gov.ru:80/documents/33.html 62
1. ВОЕННО-ПОЛИТИЧЕСКИЕ ОСНОВЫ 5. Основные внешние угрозы: территориальные претензии к Российской Федерации; вмешательство во внутренние дела Российской Федерации; попытки игнорировать (ущемлять) интересы Российской Федерации в решении проблем международной безопасности, противодействовать ее укреплению как одного из влиятельных центров многополярного мира; наличие очагов вооруженных конфликтов, прежде всего вблизи государственной границы Российской Федерации и границ ее союзников; создание (наращивание) группировок войск (сил), ведущее к нарушению сложившегося баланса сил, вблизи государственной границы Российской Федерации и границ ее союзников, а также на прилегающих к их территориям морях; расширение военных блоков и союзов в ущерб военной безопасности Российской Федерации; ввод иностранных войск в нарушение Устава ООН на территории сопредельных с Российской Федерацией и дружественных ей государств; создание, оснащение и подготовка на территориях других государств вооруженных формирований и групп в целях их переброски для действий на территориях Российской Федерации и ее союзников; нападения (вооруженные провокации) на военные объекты Российской Федерации, расположенные на территориях иностранных государств, а также на объекты и сооружения на государственной границе Российской Федерации, границах ее союзников и в Мировом океане; действия, направленные на подрыв глобальной и региональной стабильности, в том числе путем воспрепятствования работе российских систем государственного и военного управления, на нарушение функционирования стратегических ядерных сил, систем предупреждения о ракетном нападении, противоракетной обороны, контроля космического пространства и обеспечения их боевой устойчивости, объектов хранения ядерных боеприпасов, атомной энергетики, атомной и химической промышленности, других потенциально опасных объектов; враждебные, наносящие ущерб военной безопасности Российской Федерации и ее союзников информационные (информационно- технические, информационно-психологические) действия; дискриминация, подавление прав, свобод и законных интересов граждан Российской Федерации в иностранных государствах; международный терроризм . 1. POLITICAL-MILITARY 5. The main external threats are:
63
territorial claims against the Russian Federation; interference in the internal affairs of the Russian Federation; attempts to ignore (infringe) the Russian Federation's interests in resolving international security problems, to oppose its strengthening as one of the most influential centers of a multipolar world; the existence of seats of armed conflict, primarily close to the Russian border and the borders of its allies; the creation (buildup) of groups of troops (forces), leading to disruption of the existing balance of forces near the state border of the Russian Federation and those of its allies, as well as in areas adjacent to their territories of the seas; expansion of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of the Russian Federation's military security; the introduction of foreign troops in violation of the UN Charter on the territory adjacent to the Russian Federation and friendly states; creation, equipping, and training on the territories of other states of armed groups with a view to transferring them for operations on the territory of the Russian Federation and its allies; attacks (armed provocations) in the Russian Federation military installations located on the territory of foreign states, as well as the objects and buildings at the state border of the Russian Federation, and the borders of its allies in the World Ocean; actions aimed at undermining global and regional stability, including by hampering the work of Russian systems of state and military control, at disrupting the functioning of strategic nuclear forces, warning systems for missile attack, missile defense, space control and ensuring their combat stability, storage facilities nuclear weapons, nuclear energy, nuclear and chemical industries, and other potentially dangerous objects; hostile and detrimental to the Russian Federation's military security and its allies information (information-technical, information-psychological) operations; discrimination and the suppression of the rights, freedoms and legal interests of Russian citizens to foreign states; international terrorism.145
Then in chapter 2 article 8 Russia's military doctrine to explain about what is known as external threats to the sovereignty of Russia. Russia clearly and publicly stated that NATO is one of the major threats for Russia, as NATO been strengthen themilitary of the countries that bordering with Russia. It becomes frightened for the Russian government and can be described as the threat perception. In some passages
145Ibid Chapter 1 Article 5 64 say their violations of international law from NATO to bring tools to combat and military strengthen the countries bordering with Russia.
Besides the placement of foreign soldiers in the region bordering Russia and its allies became a direct threat to Russia. As in the South Ossetia War that occurred in 2008, Russia saw so many NATO intervened in the conflict. Described in Konflik Georgia dan Rusia di Ossetia selatan pada bulan Agustus 2008 by Ali Wibowo Laksono that NATO was convincing Georgia to attack people and Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia regions.146
Other forms that threaten Russia in this case also conveyed, such as the placement of missiles on the border of Russia and its allies, claiming territory of Russia and its allies, the provision of weapons technology warheads for the country side by side with Russia and its allies, conflict regional armed Russia and its allies, a violation of the UN charter and international law, the terrorists and armed extremists in the world.
3.4. Russia Military Forces in 2008 Which we know, Russia is one of the world's strongest nations. Russia as state has war capacity number 5 in the world. According to Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov after the war, Russian Federation has 1.2 million active frontline personnel and 2.3 million active deserve personnel.147 Base on increase in Russia's military budget data from SIPRI, shown that Russian Military Budget steadily increased since 2001. Russia military budget will be elaborate more in chapter fourth. This increase in defense budget Russia uses to renew and manufacture their defense equipment. Previously this was a few branches of the Russian army in 2008.
The Ground Forces or Sukhoputnye voiska in Russia is the largest branch of the Russian army. The main mission of the Russian army is to repel enemies who come
146Laksono, Ali Wibowo. “Konflik Georgia dan Rusia di Ossetia selatan padabulanAgustus 2008”. FISIPUI, Universitas Indonesia, Jakarta 2012p. 81 147 Moscow Defense Brief #4, 2008 p. 21-24 65 by land. In addition, the Russian army branch is also required to be able to protect the territory of the Russian State from the coming attack. In a state of war the army of the Russian army is certain to have combat readiness and be able to provide cover for other branches for the victory of Russia. The Ground Forces has eight arms of service: motor rifle, tanks, artillery and rocket troops, air defense forces, special corps, military units, and company logistics.148
The Aerospace Forces and can also be referred to as Vozdushno-kosmicheskie sily. The Aerospace Forces has the responsibility to protect the integrity of the State of Russia from all threats and aggresions from airspace and outer space. In addition The Russian Aerospace Forces is also equipped with conventional weapons and nuclear weapons. In a state of war The Aerospace Forces Russia will have the role of support forces that facilitate movement and assault in a military operation so that the Russian army can reach the target. The army of The Aerospace Forces Russia has 2 branches The Aerospace Forces, the branches are, Air Force and also Space Forces149
The Navy’s that called also VMF Rossii by Russian government has overall task is to defend Russia territory especially in water territory, in other side Russian federation Navy also have to able to wage combat on the oceans and the seas and in coastal waters. Russian federation Navy also certainly can strike enemy objects and forces with both nuclear and conventional weapons. And there also 2 branch of Russian Navy, which are Naval Infantry and Naval Aviation. 150
The Strategic Missile Forces (Raketnye voiska strategicheskogo naznacheniia) are an arm of service of the Armed Forces. Their mission is nuclear deterrence of aggression and destruction of strategic enemy targets. In 2016, the Strategic Missile Forces comprised a force command and three missile armies, with a total of 12
148 Thornton, Rod. (2011). MILITARY MODERNIZATION AND THE RUSSIAN GROUND FORCES. SSI Monograph 149 D. Boltenkov, A. Gayday, A. Karnaukhov, A. Lavrov, V. Tseluiko (2008). Russia's New Army, Center of Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, Moscow 150 Ibid 66 divisions (Ministry of Defence 2016k). They are equipped with both road-mobile and silo-based strategic nuclear missiles. The composition of the warheads and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in the table below. Command and control issues are discussed in the following section, together with the other nuclear forces.151
Types of Equipment Total Thanks 23000 Armored Fighting Vehicles 805 Armored Personnel Carriers 9900 Towed Artillery 13585 Self-Propelled Guns 6010 Multiple Rocket Launch Systems 4350 Mortars 6100 Aircraft Carriers 1 Destroyers 15 Submarines 61 Frigates 19 Patrol & Coastal Craft 72 Mine Warfare Craft 41 Amphibious Craft 22 Major Combat Ships 120 Combat Aircraft 2,118 Helicopters 1520
Table 2: Russian Federation Military Equipment152
151 Ibid 152 (2008).Russia. Global Fire Power 67
Russian NATO Lau Year Warheads Total no. designation designation nche deployed x yield of rs (kilotons) warhead s ICBMs RS-20V SS-18-M6 46 1988 10 x 460 Voievoda Satan 500/800 (MIRVs) RS-18 SS-19-M3 20 1980 6 x 400 120 Stiletto (MIRVs) RS-12M SS-25 90 1988 1 x 800 90 Topol Sickle RS-12M1 SS-27- 18 2006 1 x 800 18 Topol-M Mod1 (mobile) RS-12M2 SS-27- 60 1997 1 x 800 60 Topol-M Mod1 (silobased) Total ICBMs 307 1 040 ? ~600 SLBMs RSM-50 SS-N-18 2/32 1978 3 x 50 96 M1 (MIRVs) Stingray RSM-54 SS-N-23 6/96 2007 4 x 100 384 320 Sineva M1 5/80 (MIRVs) Total SLBMs 11/1 768 76 ~560 8/12 8 Bomber Tu-95 MS6 Bear 27 1984 6 x AS-15A 162
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H6 ALCMs or bombs Tu-95 MS16 Bear 30 1984 16 x AS- 480 H16 15A ALCMs or bombs Tu-160 Blackjack 13 1987 12 x AS- 156 15B ALCMs, AS-16 SRAMs or bombs Total bombers ~70 798 ~60 670 Total ~550 ~2600 >49 ~1800 5 Table 3: Estimated Russian nuclear weapon as of early 2008153
153 Kristensen & Norris 2016: 126, 130. 69
CHAPTER IV RUSSIAN FEDERATION’S DEFENSE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION ON CONFLICT RESOLUTION WITH GEORGIA
Russian Federation must defend its sovereignty and national interest through it defense policy. Russia stated that the one factor that is able to compromise the Russia defense is external attacks from conflict neighbor‟s state. Therefore, in the interest to protect Russia national territory will try to be active in maintaining world peace, especially in the Caucasus region. This thesis also discusses about the dynamics relations between those three actors who involved in the South Ossetia War. They are Russia, Georgia, and South Ossetia. It‟s all about the involvement and role of Russian Federation in the South Ossetia War.
Therefore Russian Federation should implement its defend policy toward in order to solve conflict that happen between Russian Federation and Georgia on South Ossetia. There will be three part of time of Russia defense policy implementation toward South Ossetia War. First is Russia defense policy implementation before the conflict, second is when the conflict begins, and third is after the Ossetia conflict happen.
Base on second chapter, South Ossetia Separatist been there to separate South Ossetia from Georgia since 1989.154 History explained that South Ossetia been proclamation it‟s independent since January 19, 1992 by de Facto and join North Ossetia under Russian Federation, but Georgia confront the legality of South Ossetia
154 Resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Georgian SSR on the decisions of the twelfth session of the Council of People's Deputies of the South Ossetian Autonomous Region of the twentieth convocation 70 independent.155 In 2006, South Ossetia ever been Referendum with 90% of South Ossetian people choose to break away from Georgia, but international system do not claim it.156
After a lot of conflict in South Ossetia for a long time, as a neighboring country russia attempted to reconcile the atmosphere by implementing the regulations there. Implementation of these regulations affect the interests of russia mainly in protecting its people and also avoid the influence of the US through NATO continuously entrance toward the CIS. One implementation of russia defense policy is the most prominent is the placement of joint peacekeepers forces in the South Ossetian region which is the main conflict area. The establishment of joint peacekeepers forces is an agreement between Georgia, Russia and South Ossetia in 1992.157
Defense policy Russian Federation Georgia implementation
Before the war Active Active
During the war Active Active
After the war Active Not Active
Table 4: Defense implementation by Georgia and Russian Federation. Table was edited by the writer.
Base on my analysis, this table will provide data about how active Russia and Georgia in way to implement its defense policy in South Ossetia war. As we know
155 South Ossetia (1992), Independence from Georgia and connection to Russia Direct Democracy. Georgia 156 "99% of South Ossetian voters approve independence". Regnum. November 13, 2006. Archived from the original on September 30, 2007. Retrieved November 27, 2006. 157 Russia in Global Affairs, Vol.6 No.4, October–December 2008. 71 that Russia has more active, since before the war start Russia been prepared its military base on its military doctrine. Beside that Georgia wouldn‟t implement its defense policy after the war because Russia troops had been seizing its military base. More analysis about the implementation of both Russia and Georgia defense policy would discuss in this thesis.
4.1. Russia Involvement in South Ossetia War
4.1.1. Russia before South Ossetia War After the proclamation of Kosovo's independence, when the process of international recognition of the former Autonomous Territory of Yugoslavia was under way, Putin and Saakashvili met for the last time as president. In the meeting, Putin declared there will probably be upheavals in Georgia in the future.158 Putin also said will make a good relationship with Georgia. Putin will strengthen the export and import with Georgia, but exports and imports will be carried out with the disputed region of Georgia which are Abkhazia and South Ossetia. after that president putin also said that the right to give a statement about the disputed areas is russia, not the US or NATO even Georgia itself. it will be the same as the independence of Kosovo.159 March 1, 2008 the Russian General Vasily Lunev, a former deputy army commander in the Siberian Military District and a former military commissioner of the Perm region, was appointed Minister of Defense of South Ossetia.160 March 11, Colonel-General Sergei Makarov was appointed chief of staff of the North Caucasian
158 meeting with President Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia Bureau of MPs August 24, 2008, http://www.president.gov.ge/?l=E&m=0&sm=1&st=0&id=2721 159 Address by Mikheil Saakashvili before the parliamentary commission of November 28, 2008 http://www.parliament.ge/print.php?gg=1&sec_id=1329&info_id=21678&lang_id=ENG ; Georgian pundits comment on results of Putin- Saakashvili meeting, 24 Saati, 28 February 2008. 160 Herpen, Marcel H. Van, (2015). Putin's Wars: The Rise of Russia's New Imperialism, Rowman & Littlefield, London. 72
Military District (SCWO), 31 May he became commander of the North Caucasus Military District.161 The NATO summit in Bucharest on April 3-4, 2008, denied Georgia and Ukraine to provide an action plan to prepare for membership. Putin sent a letter to Bagapsh and Kokoity, promising to take "substantive steps" to lift the sanctions, and the establishment of diplomatic relations between Russia and the two republics.162 April 8 Lavrov said that Russia "will do everything in its power to prevent the admission of Georgia and Ukraine into NATO,”163 Chief of the Russian General Staff Yury Baluyevsky added that "we will do all the (necessary) to prevent the entry of Georgia into NATO." Later, speaking to a group of NATO forces, he bluntly warned them of the possibility of the invasion of Georgia in 2008, his interlocutors that statement was not taken seriously "and is regarded as a splurge".164 A radical decision was made April 16, 2004 Russian President instructed the federal government and regional authorities to establish direct relations with the de facto authorities in Sukhumi and Tskhinvali. The Georgian government has indicated that Putin's order is legally equivalent to a full Russian annexation of two Georgian regions.165 EU, OSCE, NATO, the United States, Britain, France, Germany denounced Putin's decision and called on him to abandon his.166 This call was ignored by Russia. April 20, 2008 the Russian MiG-29, rising from an air base in the Abkhazian town of Gudauta, shot down a Georgian unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), and then
161 Federation, Russia. (2008). Russia: Biographies, Photos of RF Armed Forces Leadershi. Moscow Rossiyskoye Voyennoye Obozreniye , Moscow. https://fas.org/irp/dni/osc/RFarmedforces.html 162 Georgian Speaker slams Putin for liaising with separatist leaders, Mze TV, 4 April 2008, (BBC Monitoring). 163 Moscow will not allow the entry of Ukraine and Georgia into NATO. - RIA "News", April 8, 2008, http://en.rian.ru/russia/20080408/104105506.html 164 John Vinocur, Georgia is a focal point in US-NATO Russian Tension, in New York Yimes, 4 May 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/05/world/europe/05iht-politicus.html ? pagewanted = 2 165 Vladimir Socor, Russia Moves toward open annexation of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 18 April 2008. 166 Russia criticized over Abkhazia, BBC News, 24 April 2008. 73 went north into Russian airspace. A camera mounted on a Georgian drone, recorded the attack and managed to send a video to the ground. Georgia accused Russia of military aggression, Russia has rejected this accusation. But the investigation carried out in Georgia (UNOMIG), the United Nations Observer Mission, confirmed that the attack was made by a Russian fighter.167 According to the resolution number 3314 of the UN General Assembly on December 14, 1974 took place the attack became clear, confirmed by international observers act of aggression.168 From that moment we can say that Russia started the war against Georgia. The Russian-Georgian war of low intensity continued until July 28. During the week of May 4, Russian troops shot down several Georgian drones. Head of the Main Directorate of Combat Training and Service of the Russian Armed Forces troops, General Vladimir Shamanov said on May 6 that the Russian army will no longer allow aircraft to fly over the Georgian conflict zones.169 In violation of the agreement on the CIS peace-keeping operations in April 2008, Moscow began to place in Abkhazia part of Novorossiysk Airborne Division. In early May, they were further assigned to three anti-aircraft missile systems "Buk", fourteen howitzer D-30, ten 122-mm multiple rocket launchers BM-21, 20 anti-tank guns, 120 ATGM, two helicopters, and sent 180 Russian technicians professionals to serve these weapons systems.170 Russian Black Sea Fleet in April and May spent eight exercises in which worked out amphibious landings. May 1st Russian troops in Abkhazia, established additional unauthorized roadblocks in Tkvarcheli and Ochamchira districts. A week later, Moscow confirmed that the number of its forces
167 Vladimir Socor, UN mission confirms Georgia, rejects Russian version of air clash, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 27 May 2008. 168United Nations General Assembly (1974). Definition of Aggression, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX). 169 Svante E. Cornell, S. Frederick Starr (2015). The Guns of August 2008: Russia's War in Georgia, Routledge, London. 170 Speech by David Kezerashvili in front of the parliamentary committee October 27, 2008 [http://www.parliament.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=1329&info_id=21926] 74 in Abkhazia has been increased from 1997 to 2542 soldiers.171 According to Georgian sources, the number of Russian troops in Abkhazia has reached 4000. May 14, Sergei Bagapsh appealed to Russia with a request to establish in Abkhazia permanent military presence.172 His idea was immediately supported the commander in chief of the Russian Air Force Alexander Zelin.173 In early May, the Russian Defense Ministry has called on the former military training of pilots of military helicopters that had experience of flying in mountainous terrain. May 14, 2008 began the 17-day exercise for the newly designed flyers in Nalchik in the Air Force.174 Key Stage combat deployment began on May 26, when Abkhazia was posted casing Russian railway troops numbering 400 people for the restoration of 54-kilometer railway line linking the port of Sukhumi, Ochamchire in the vicinity of the Abkhaz-Georgian demarcation line.175 Three new hangars for airplanes and ammunition were hurriedly built on Bombora air base near Sukhumi. By 6 June several new Russian combat aircraft Su-25 and Su-27 landed at the base in Gudauta. At the same time Zelenchukskaya mountain infantry brigade SCWO beginning of the 10-day exercise with the aim of "working off of actions in unfamiliar territory and away from places of permanent deployment." Shortly afterwards, the Georgian authorities detained a group of Russian peacekeepers in Zugdidi district on the Georgian side of the Abkhaz-Georgian demarcation line and confiscated 20 anti- tank missiles and other heavy weapons, prohibited to be deployed in the conflict zone. In response, the Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Russian General Alexander Burutin promised bloodshed if Georgia will confiscate Russian weapons
171 Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation threatens to increase peacekeepers in the Georgian- Abkhazian conflict - to the ultimate limit, http://www.newsru.com/russia/08may2008/minobor_print.html 172 Sokhumi is ready to host the Russian military base, http://www.regnum.ru/news/999755.html?forprint 173 Russian Air Force Commander: "The possible establishment of a Russian military base in Abkhazia would help to improve the quality of protection of the state border», http://www.regnum.ru/news/1000830.html?forprint 174 Mountain training pilots of Army Aviation, http://mil.ru/info/1069/details/index.shtml?id=42837 ; http://milkavkaz.net/forum/viewtopic.php?t=135&postdays=0&postorder=asc&start=15 175 http://palm.newsru.com/russia/03jun2008/medsaak.html
75 since, according to him, the Russian "peacekeepers" have the right to open fire.176 In an interview with the newspaper "Resonance" Pavel Felgenhauer said the decision to go to war against Georgia has been taken, and predicted that military action is likely to begin in August,.177
On the last day of June the forces of the North Caucasus Military District, together with the Federal Security Service troops began the seven-day "maneuvers in a wooded mountainous area near the border with Georgia." On the same day Bagapsh closed Abkhazian-Georgian border along the Inguri River and Russia's military vehicles with 250 soldiers on board left from the Russian city of Sochi, and went to the Abkhaz port Gagra.
In May 2008, Russia launched authorities intensified to South Ossetian. June 30, 2008, at the end of his 10-day trip to South Ossetia, known for its ties to the Russian army and security services Aleksandr Dugin declared: "Russia decided to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia. For all this, you are perfectly prepared. If Russia recognizes the independence of South Ossetia and to introduce its not peacekeeping and border forces, the question of taking Georgia into NATO will be removed from the agenda. Until December we have to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia ".178 A few days later he explained the situation to the Russian public, "Ossetians are waiting for war. The country is ready for war. All the male population mobilized. All people who care about the fate of Russia, especially the young people who want to show their patriotic qualities - that's where we should go, in Ossetia.
176 Russian General to Georgia: Russian peacekeepers' patience running out, International Herald Tribune, 19 June 2008. 177 Russia starts a war against Georgia in August, presumably. - P. Felgenhauer, http://www.apsny.ge/news/1213985330.php 178 Alexander Dugin: "We came as supporters of the independence of South Ossetia and will leave its fanatics», http://sojcc.ru/rus/1148.html 76
There is the possibility to fight with arms against our global fundamental enemies - against NATO, against the Americans'.179
2, 8 and 17 July Ossetian information agency "Osinform" published article Zaur Alborov, in which he described in detail the parts of the part of the 58th Army in the "future operations to compel Georgia to peace".180 July 2 the news agency "Rosbalt" published an interview with the Minister of Defense of Abkhazia Merab Kishmaria, in which he stated that "his troops enough weapons, anti-aircraft guns and aircraft" and that "the Abkhazian army taught Russian instructors. This time I get to the Kutaisi ".181 July 3, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Abkhazia Sergey Shamba in an interview with "Nezavisimaya Gazeta" has warned that Abkhazia "can not guarantee that will not start a war." The very next day the site "Kavkaz-Center" confidently predicted that the Russian attack on Georgia in August 2008 .: "Putin has made a political decision on war with Georgia even before Medvedev was elected president of Russia. Intensive preparation for war has been going on for several months ".182On the same day, July 4, Kokoity of South Ossetia announced a general mobilization, but in the evening he was forced to reverse its decision. The next day, the chief editor of Forum.msk.ru Anatoly Baranov, who was on a trip to the North Caucasus, said that the war with Georgia has never been so close, and that "the army wants to fight".183
July 6 forces of the North Caucasus Military District began exercises "Caucasus Frontier 2008". July 7, exactly a month before the start of the war, both the
179Ossetians wait War: Alexander Dugin about the situation in South Ossetia [http://geopolitica.ru/Video/7/] 180 http://osinform.ru/dijest/6785-gruzija-provodit-razvedku-boja-na.html ; http://osinform.ru/dijest/6785-gruzija-provodit-razvedku-boja-na.html ; http://osinform.ru/analitic/6994-juzhnaja-osetija-khronika.html 181 Abkhazians warn to capture Kutaisi, Kavkaz- Center, 4 May 2008, http://www.kavkazcenter.com/eng/content/2008/05/04/9551.shtml 182 Moscow to launch war operations against Georgia in late August Kavkaz Center, 5 July 2008, http://www.kavkazcenter.com/eng/content/2008/07/05/9984.shtml 183 "Russia is on the verge of the Great Caucasian War." - Anatoly Baranov [http://forum.msk.ru/print.html?id=496351] 77
Russian peacekeeping battalion in South Ossetia and Abkhazia both began fortification of their positions.184
On the same day in Abkhazia Additional Russian anti-aircraft missiles and heavy weapons were deployed, and the four Russian warplanes violated Georgian airspace over South Ossetia. It is noteworthy that the Russian Foreign Ministry for the first time publicly acknowledged the invasion, explaining that this was done "in order to cool the hot heads".185 July 10 Bagapsh and Kokoity were called to Moscow for consultations with the Russian leadership. Commander in chief of the North Caucasus Military District, General Sergei Makarov promised further military support of Russian peacekeepers in the Georgian territory.
Throughout the summer, Georgia and the international community has repeatedly made proposals to start and conduct of bilateral and multilateral negotiations with a view to finding a peaceful solution to conflicts in both directions. Among them were proposals made by the Georgian government (the whole of July until 7 August), USA (July 8), Germany (July 14, July 18, July 25, July 30 and 31 July), the European Union (July 19, and 22-24 of July), the OSCE and Finland (July 25 and July 30). However, all these proposals were rejected by the leaders of Russia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
While Georgia and the international community is ready to offer a peaceful, July 15, 2008 troops of the North Caucasian Military District began large-scale military exercises "Caucasus-2008" with the participation of more than 8,000 military ground forces, internal troops and the FSB, including 700 pieces of equipment, with the support of Air Force and the Black Sea fleet. Lieutenant-General Yuri Netkachev, has long commanded the army in the North Caucasus, and later served as deputy
184 Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia enhance combat readiness, Itar-Tass, 7 July 2008 (BBC Monitoring); Konstantin Timerman. Our guys did not die so that we gave up. - "Izvestia", October 2, 2008 [http://www.izvestia.ru/russia/article3121131/]. 185 Russia confirms its aircraft intruded into Georgia, Civil Georgia, 10 July 2008, http://www.civilgeorgia.ge/eng/article.php?id=18748 .
78 commander of the Group of Russian Forces in the Transcaucasus, he said that the number of troops on maneuvers officially understated so as not to invite them to a large number of international observers ".186 The aim of the exercises holding "operation to enforce peace" was announced.187 The exercise participants distributed leaflets entitled "Warrior! Know a potential enemy! ", With a description of the main characteristics of the Georgian armed forces.
July 18, air assault regiment of 76th Pskov Airborne Division took up positions on the Roki and Mamison passes through the Main Caucasian ridge, and airborne regiment Volgograd motorized infantry division was transferred to the Krasnodar Territory.188 July 20th motorized infantry battalion with 14 armored personnel carriers entered the lower part of the Kodori Gorge. Three days later, the 135th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 19th-Vladikav kazskoy motorized infantry division replaced the Pskov paratroopers on the Roki Pass. July 25 special medical detachment deployed a field hospital "Tarskoe" that can take a daily 300 wounded. "At the request of local authorities," the hospital remained in place after the end of the exercise to "render locals consultative and diagnostic aid", as stated in the official press service of the Ministry of Defense.189 The next day, the construction Ugadangi base was officially completed near Java.
It is a frank statement of intent were the words of the head of North Ossetia, Teimuraz Mamsurov, who promised to July 26, readers of "Nezavisimaya Gazeta" that the Russian troops' will to Georgia to protect Russian citizens and peacekeepers help. At the northern portal of the Roki Tunnel worth armored vehicles, including tanks. They are housed in demonstrative purposes, but they are not there just to be.190
186 http://www.ng.ru/regions/2008-07-18/1_peacemakers.html . 187 Caucasus 2008 site of the Russian Ministry of Defense, July 15, 2008, http://www.mil.ru/eng/1866/12078/details/index.shtml?id=47629 188 Chang, Felix K. (August 2008). "Russia Resurgent: An Initial Look at Russian Military Performance in Georgia". Foreign Policy Research Institute. 189 http://www.mil.ru/info/1069/details/index.shtml?id=48946 190 "Nezavisimaya Gazeta", July 26, 2008 79
Two days later, "Ogonyok" magazine reported that from 45 to 50 railway cars and tanks were transported to the Gali district on the Abkhaz-Georgian border; trains were night and day.191 An unnamed colonel "peacekeeping force" said that weapons and ammunition were brought into Abkhazia as "that last for several years of conflict." "What will it be, I feel that something is", - he added.192 Finally, on July 30, six days ahead of schedule, the Russian military railway workers finished repairing the railroad Sukhumi-Ochamchire.193 Preparations for war came to an end. It could begin.
March 1, 2008 Russian appointed Minister of Russian General Vasily Lunev, a Defense of South Ossetia. former deputy army commander in the Siberian Military District and a former military commissioner of the Perm region, was appointed Minister of Defense of South Ossetia.
March 11, 2008 Russia Appointed chief of staff Colonel-General Sergei of the North Caucasian Makarov was appointed chief of Military District staff of the North Caucasian Military District (SCWO)
May 31, 2008 Colonel-General Sergei Makarov became commander
of the North Caucasus Military
191 Russia deploys more military hardware in Abkhazia, Georgia says, Rustavi- 2 TV, 6 July 2008 (BBC Monitoring). 192 Pavel Sheremet. Abkhazia: no peace, no war, no rest ... - "Spark", # 31, 2008 [http://www.ogoniok.com/5057/18/] 193 Russia embarked on the conclusion railway troops from Abkhazia, http://www.lenta.ru/news/2008/07/30/railroad/_Printed.htm 80
District
March 4, 2008 Parliament of South Ossetia and Abkhazia establish
March 7, 2008 parliament of South Ossetia and Abkhazia ask Russia,CIS and the UN to recognize their independence
March 6, 2008 Russia unilaterally finally Russia unilaterally finally came came out of the sanctions out of the sanctions regime regime in CIS summit against Abkhazia entered the CIS summit January 19, 1996 Russian authorities have begun to resume economic, financial, trade, transport contacts with the de facto authorities of Abkhazia.
March 13, 2008 The State Duma of Russia in a The report on the development closed session discussed a of strategies to achieve the report prepared by the Russian independence of Abkhazia and secret services and Ministry of South Ossetia. Foreign Affairs.
March 21 2008 Russia adopted a special The resolution is about resolution supporting the requests of the two republics on the International Recognition.
April 3-4, 2008 The NATO summit in NATO denied Georgia and
81
Bucharest Ukraine to provide an action plan to prepare for membership.
April 16, 2008 Russian President give the federal government and instruction about South Ossetia regional authorities to establish and Abkhazia direct relations with the de facto authorities in Sukhumi and Tskhinvali.
April 17, 2008 Russian soldiers with heavy 300 Russian soldiers deployed in weapons arrived at the military Ochamchire in Abkhazia. base
May 14, 2008 Russian Soldier exercise for the 17-day exercise for the war preparing newly designed flyers in Nalchik in the Air Force
May 26, 2008 Railway worker and combatant 400 Russian soldiers deployed to deployment be worker and combatant
June 6, 2008 Russian Soldier exercise for Zelenchukskaya mountain war preparing infantry brigade SCWO beginning of the 10-day exercise
June 29, 2008 Soldier deployment The North Caucasus Military District, the Federal Security Service troops deployed in a wooded mountainous area near the border with Georgia."
2, 8 and 17 July, Ossetian information agency Osinform, published article Zaur report about Russian army Alborov, in which he described
82
2008 operation target in detail the parts of the part of the 58th Army in the "future operations to compel Georgia to peace".
July 2, 2008 The news agency "Rosbalt" In the interview Merab stated published an interview with the that "his troops enough weapons, Minister of Defense of anti-aircraft guns and aircraft" Abkhazia Merab Kishmaria and that "the Abkhazian army taught Russian instructors. This time I get to the Kutaisi ".
July 6, 2008 Russian Soldier exercise for Forces of the North Caucasus war preparing Military District began exercises "Caucasus Frontier 2008"
July 7, 2008 Russian peacekeeping battalion A month before the start of the began fortification of their war, both the Russian positions. peacekeeping battalion in South Ossetia and Abkhazia both began fortification of their positions.
July 7, 2008 Russian anti-aircraft missiles Russian anti-aircraft missiles and and heavy weapons were heavy weapons were deployed, deployed and the four Russian warplanes violated Georgian airspace over South Ossetia.
July 10, 2008 Russia called South Ossetia Bagapsh and Kokoity were Called to Moscow for
83
and Abkhazia representative. consultations with the Russian leadership. Commander in chief of the North Caucasus Military District, General Sergei Makarov promised further military support of Russian peacekeepers in the Georgian territory.
July, 2008 Georgia and the international These proposals were rejected community has repeatedly by the leaders of Russia, South made proposals to start and Ossetia and Abkhazia. conduct of bilateral and
multilateral negotiations
July 15, 2008 Russian Soldier exercise for North Caucasian Military war preparing District began large-scale military exercises "Caucasus- 2008" with total troops more than 8,000, including 700 pieces of equipment, with the support of Air Force and the Black Sea fleet. Lieutenant-General Yuri Netkachev, has long commanded the army in the North Caucasus,
July 18, 2008 Russia positioned its troops. Air assault regiment of 76th Pskov Airborne Division took up positions on the Roki and Mamison passes through the
84
Main Caucasian ridge, and airborne regiment Volgograd motorized infantry division was transferred to the Krasnodar Territory.
July 20, 2008 Russia positioned its troops. 20th motorized infantry battalion with 14 armored personnel carriers entered the lower part of the Kodori Gorge.
July 23, 2008 Russia positioned its troops. 135th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 19th-Vladikav kazskoy
motorized infantry division replaced the Pskov paratroopers on the Roki Pass.
July 25, 2008 Russia positioned its medical Special medical detachment troops. deployed a field hospital "Tarskoe" July 30, 2008 Russia finished railroad six days ahead of schedule, the Sukhumi-Ochamchire. Russian military railway workers finished repairing the railroad Sukhumi-Ochamchire. War Preparation complete.
Table 5: Timeline before South Ossetia War
85
4.1.2. Russia during South Ossetia War
The situation in South Ossetia is also deteriorating due to the conflict involving Georgian, South Ossetian militia and Russian peacekeepers. This situation lasted until Saakashvili decided to solve the problem of South Ossetia for good by ordering a ground assault on Tskhinvali on August 8, 2008 in the morning.194 Russia certainly has anticipated this action and sent troops to Georgia through the Roki tunnel that connects North and South Ossetia. By this action then start the first military attack by Russia after the Soviet era ended. The war between Georgia with Russia began on August 8, 2008 when Georgian forces began to enter the city of Tskhinvali, the South Ossetian capital with the aim of taking over the territory as part of the government of Georgia in the South Ossetia region. According to OSCE, who was watching the situation in Tskhinvali claimed that South Ossetian side did not make shots or offensive.195
On August 9, 2008 Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili issued a decree declared a state of war and state of emergency for 15 days in response to the deployment of the Russian Federation to South Ossetia on August 8, 2008.196 Saakashvili also reiterated that Georgia will never take off one inch from its territory. Whatever happens, Georgia will not approve the action of the separation of the territory of Georgia, and any actions that could undermine the democratic system of Georgia. Georgia at that time also had the support of the West in the act. One proof of the involvement of the West was the discovery of a satellite constellation in conflict areas abandoned by Georgian forces. Georgia does not have a constellation of satellite equipment, so that the findings could prove the existence of Western aid to provide data to Georgia via satellite constellation.
194 Georgians have already in Tskhinvali (Rus.) , «REGIONS.RU/Novosti Federation" (08.08.2008 11:36). 195Champion, Marc (2008-12-19). "British Monitor Complicates Georgian Blame Game". The Wall Street Journal. 196 http://edition.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/europe/11/07/georgia.clashes/index.html?iref=mpstoryview 86
According to Russia, the entry of Russian forces into Georgian territory is meant to protect the troops who served as peacekeepers as well as local residents, the majority of the holders of Russian passports. Russia accused the Georgian attack into South Ossetia on August 8, 2008 which killed Russian peacekeepers and the civilian population of South Ossetia is a form of genocide.197
Georgia's first attack on the capital of the South Ossetia Republic launched on August 7, 2008.198 This attack is the sign for South Ossetia, Russia and Georgia that the bloody war in the Caucasus region will begin. Bounded on a 1992 peace treaty, Russia dared to take steps in military interference to Southern Ossetia.199 Russian military intervention in the South Ossetia War greatly changed the military position of Georgia as the best military in the Caucasus region, a major downfall for the Georgian military was seen on 11 August 2008.
After the rose revolution in 2003 Mikhail Saakashvili sought every means to restore Abkhazia and South Ossetia back to Georgia.200 One of the ways that he envisaged during the time in his administration was to strengthen the Georgian army with the main objective against the separatists of those both countries. In its military establishment Georgia seeks to cooperate on a large scale with the US and NATO in advancing its military system. Because of this situation Georgia changed their military style to be full of western characteristic. In addition, a huge US funding injection also helped Georgia in raising its military budget. For the first time Georgia is the first country in the world that can grow military spending up to 33 times from the previous budget or about 1 billion US $ in 2007-2008.201 The increase in
197 Peter Roudik. "Russian Federation: Legal Aspects of War in Georgia". Library of Congress. 198 Emerson, Michael. "Post-Mortem on Europe's First War of the 21st Century." (PDF). Centre for European Policy Studies, August 2008 http://aei.pitt.edu/9382/2/9382.pdf 199 Cvetkovski, Nikola. "The Georgian – South Ossetian Conflict". Danish Association for Research on the Caucasus. 200 Wolff, Stefan. Georgia: Abkhazia and South Ossetia, University of Nottingham. https://pesd.princeton.edu/?q=node/274 201 MilitaryBudget.org, Georgian Military Budget, MilitaryBudget. 87
Georgia's military budget is the one of the largest among Saudi Arabia, Oman and North Korea. The Georgian military device is a device made by the Soviet Union, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, western and Israel. While the experience of Georgia military troops is very limited, Georgia military troops experience only reinforce troops in Iraq conflict it also as supporting force on US troops.202
In the process of strengthening the Georgian military, Saakashvili also campaigned for Georgia's military power to the world. In its military campaign, Georgia shows their military strength, which is western and mainly US. In the military parade it was clearly seen Georgia troops using US uniforms. Along the streets of Tbilisi Georgian soldiers paraded with US weapons and ornaments, which are the new face of Georgia that has reformed into a western group in the US outline.
After much development of the abilities experienced by the army of Georgia, following advanced weapons and modern warfare equipment makes Saakashvili feel confident. Feeling Georgia has been able to stand up against South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Saakashvili is planning to launch a massive military offensive into these two areas. Finally in August 2008 the bloody conflict erupted by Georgia party as the side who started the war.203
The attack on South Ossetia is not spontaneous. For several days in early August, Georgia appears to have secretly concentrated a large number of troops and equipment (2nd, 3rd and 4th Infantry Brigades, Artillery Brigade, elements of Infantry Brigade 1, at separate places in The tank town of Battalion Tank was stationed with a total of nine light infantry and five tank battalions, up to eight artillery battalions plus special forces and Interior Ministry troops all, up to 16,000
http://militarybudget.org/georgia/ 202 Kilner, James (8 August 2008). "Georgia says to withdraw 1,000 soldiers from Iraq". Reuters. 203Georgians have already in Tskhinvali (Rus.) , «REGIONS.RU/Novosti Federation" (08.08.2008 11:36). 88 people) on the Georgian border in the South Ossetia conflict zone.204 On August 7, at 22:00, Georgian troops began the attack with artillery bombing at Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia, and the next day there were attacks to paralyze the towns of Tskhinvali and other South Ossetia regions.205 At 8 am on 8 August, Georgia's infantry and tanks entered Tskhinvali and there was a fierce battle between Georgia troops with South Ossetia troops and Russian peacekeepers stationed in the city.206
After the Georgia attack on Southern Ossetia, the Russian government did not remain silent. Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev decided to conduct military intervention in the form of peacekeeping operations in the Southern region of Ossetia. This military operation was aimed at preventing more destruction that could be done by the Georgia troops in the Southern Ossetia region. Then on that day, three tactical battalions from the 135th, 503th and 693th Motor Rifles Regiment of the 19th Rifle Motorcycle Division of the Army 58th in the North Caucasus Military District was placed in a ready-to-combat formation in the Southern Ossetia region. At the end of the day, the Russian army managed to clear the area around the districts of Kverneti, Tbeti and Dzari, and to the west of Tskhinvali.207
Direct military intervention of Russia made the army of Georgia have no chance at all to win the battle at Tskhinvali. Before that the Russian army also had difficulties in the mobility of their troops toward Southern Ossetia. Things like the transportation routes of the Caucasus Mountains became a major obstacle for Russia. Roki tunnels and narrow mountain lanes into the mainline of Russia to enter South Ossetia are the main obstacles of the Russian army. On 9 August, fighting between Georgia and Russia occurred, Georgia used counter-attack tactics as well as tactical
204Svante E.; Starr, S. Frederick. “The Guns of August 2008: Russia's War in Georgia.” M.E. Sharpe, 1stjune, 2009 205 REGIONS.RU/Novosti Federation (2008). Georgians have already in Tskhinvali, Russia. 206Barabanov, Mikhail (2008). "The August War between Russia and Georgia". Moscow Defense Brief. Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, Moscow. 207 Regions.ru/Novosti Federation (2008). Georgians have already in Tskhinvali, Russia. 89 ambush.208 This attack is considered effective because the Russian side is quite fooled and injured. In this attack the army of Georgia succeeded in wounding the commander of the 58th Army Lieutenant General A. Khrulyov.209
Early in the day of the 10th of August the military of georgia succeeded in occupying the main city ossetia South of Tskhinvali. At that time the Southern ossetia troop as well as the russia peacekeeping troop were hit back and out to the north of South ossetia. But by midday it all turned, after the Russian aid troops came with an accumulation of up to 16,000 personnel of georgia beaten back from Tskhinvali. At night the georgia troops actually had departed from Tskhinvali and had fled South
South of ossetia, Tskhinvali had been completely occupied by russia and Southern ossetia troops. In this battle the georgia artillery was completely destroyed and many military posts of Georgia were abandoned.
On the night of August 10, Russia deployed six tactical regiment groups (135th, 503th and 693th Motor Racing Regiments from the 19th Rifle Motor Division of North Ossetia, 70th and 71st Energy Rifle Regiment of 42nd Rifle Motor Division of Chechnya, And a mixture of the 104th and 234th Special Forces Regiment from the 76th Air Force Pskov Division), 45th Squad Regiment and 10th and 22nd Special Forces Brigades, as well as air and artillery forces significant. Two Chechen companies from the Zapad and Vostok Battalions and the tactical group of the 98th Ivanovo Air Division tactical, were sent to the battle area as well. The number of Russian troops in South Ossetia reached about 10,000 men and 120 tanks.
The main target of the Russian air force is the military means throughout Georgia. The air strikes that Russians do are in the form of bombing. All combat equipment that Russia uses are the Su-24M Fighter bombers, and the F-25 Su-25
208 Pukhov, Ruslan (2010) "The Tanks of August". Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, Moscow. 209 Части 58 армии полностью освободили Цхинвали от грузинских военных (in Russian). Russian Ministry of Defence. 90 fighter, and the Tu-22M3 Backfire long-range bombers. In addition to political considerations Russia has not deliberately attacked Georgian infrastructure, transport, communications or industry, or other government buildings. The total loss for the Russian Air Force is a Tu-22M3 long-range bomber, a Su-24M Fencer frontier bomber, a Su-24MR Fencer E reconnaissance aircraft, and four Su-25 fighter aircraft. In addition, the Russian Army launched a short-range ballistic missile 15 Tochka-U (SS-21) against military targets and some new Iskander long-range ballistic missiles (SS-26).
After losing control over much of South Ossetia, Georgian troops began to regroup in Gori. Meanwhile, Georgian units and artillery continued to attack Tskhinvali mildly in some areas of South Ossetia, and showed fierce opposition in several places in Georgia. However, at the end of August 11, South Ossetia was completely cleared of Georgian troops, and Russian units had moved to Georgia the following morning, building a 25-km demilitarized support zone to prevent further artillery attacks on South Ossetia.210
After fierce clashes with Russia, which lasted from August 8th Georgia military defense finally collapsed. Since 12 August Georgia army began to retreat and fled to the city Gori.211 And after being pressed by the Russian military, many of the Georgia soldiers retreated to Tbilisi. Along the road to Tbilisi there are many artillery and ammunition left behind by the army of Georgia.
At noon on August 12, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev decided to stop the active phase of the peace enforcement operation.212 That night, Saakashvili signed an early ceasefire agreement that French President Nikolas Sarkozi had just brought from Moscow. The Russian formation is concentrated along the Southern border of
210 Barabanov, Mikhail (2008). "The August War between Russia and Georgia". Moscow Defense Brief. Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, Moscow. 211 Ibid 212 Kramer, Andrew E.; Barry, Ellen (2008). "Russia, in Accord With Georgians, Sets Withdrawal". The New York Times. 91
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, using partial control of the demilitarized zone. Meanwhile, active attacks on Georgian territory to capture and destroy Georgian weapons, and demilitarize the Georgian armed forces, he added. From August 13 to 15, Russian troops entered Gori and Senaki and began to seize Georgian military base. Other Russian disarmament units are within 20 km of Tbilisi. This all happened in the context of complete paralysis of the demoralized Georgian Army.213 Other than the Georgian government and their military commander did not believe in a ceasefire agreement with Russia. The remaining Armed Forces Army units (including the 1st Infantry Brigade rushing back from Iraq) are preparing to protect the northern part of Tbilisi, fearing that there will be a Russian attack on the capital.
At the end of August, the Russian armed forces clarified about their urgency of the Southern Ossetia war, in its clarification the Russian military suffered official losses of 71 dead, five POWs (including two pilots) and 356 others injured. However, these figures do not include the loss of the Ossetia troops and the various volunteers in the South Ossetia troop and volunteers are estimated to be up to 150 dead. Russian and Ossetia troops lost several infantry tanks and combat vehicles. Losses to the Georgian side are unclear, but it is estimated that over 500 people were killed and up to 1,500 people injured, with more than 100 POW (although Russians have admitted taking only 15).
Georgia has completely lost its naval power and air defense system. According to his clarification, the Russians managed to capture and destroy most of the army's arsenal. The Russians confiscated 150 units of Georgia's heavy weapons, including 15 BMP infantry fighters, 65 T-72 tanks, several dozen personnel carriers, vehicles, weapons and SAM systems. Russia seized large numbers of cars and light weapons, including the American M4A3 carbines, as well as many Georgian tanks, armored vehicles, and weapons have also been destroyed in the battle against Russia.
213 Barabanov, Mikhail (2008). "The August War between Russia and Georgia". Moscow Defense Brief. Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, Moscow. 92
Saakashvili's decision to attack South Ossetia not only ended in total failure, but Georgia suffered heavy military defeats and huge material losses. The sophisticated and modern armed Georgian army certainly did not meet the ambitious expectations of its leaders. While Georgian army leaders who had adequate levels of military training and persistence at the tactical level, at a higher command level, the Georgian Army's performance did not produce satisfactory results. The persistence of Georgians in South Ossetia can be explained by ethnic motivation. But once ethnic motivation is lost, soldiers quickly lose their fighting spirit and this is clearly the cause of defeat. The harsh mental pressure of the conflict has turned into panic and demoralization when confronted with a clearly superior enemy. The Georgian Army unit's orders cannot maintain discipline, and lose control when under pressure and when its communications are attacked is the moral weakness of the army of Georgia. The widespread sense of the futility of fighting against the mighty Russian Army might also have caused a moral collapse.
Overall, the Saakashvili regime develops Georgian military capacity in a reasonable way, showing a remarkable interest in the armed forces. From a technical point of view, the focus on obtaining heavy artillery, self-propelled, multiple launch rocket systems and air defense systems has proved entirely justifiable, and it is precisely these weapons that inflict the greatest damage on Ossetia and Russian forces, along with night vision, Modern, radio-technical reconnaissance and electronic warfare equipment. In this category, the Georgian Army is even better prepared than the Russian Army. The emphasis given by Western military instructors on individual soldier training also seems to be paying off. But, overall, the Georgia Army needs more time to mature. Saakashvili's hasty decision to throw this army into a premature battle, which led to a confrontation with the Russian Armed Forces, led to his decisive death.
About the performance of the Russian Armed Forces, the speed of Russia response was clearly unexpected, not only by the Georgians, but by the West as well,
93 not to mention a few negative observers within Russia itself. Three tactical battalion groups in stand by status entered South Ossetia in a matter of hours. Within three days, a powerful alignment of forces and equipment was assembled under very difficult natural circumstances, capable of effective action and inflicting quick defeat on a numerically equivalent enemy. Russian forces may have shown deficient of consistency at the tactical level, but their power over the forces of Georgia in terms of capabilities and combat effectiveness cannot be denied. Russia has verified that Russia military forces have ready units for combat operations, as well as an effective military command.
The traditional habits of the Russian army are the weakness of the Russian Army's way of warfare, such as night operations, reconnaissance, communications, and back support, remain as before, despite the enemy's weakness. This does not contribute much in the South Ossetia War. There is no doubt that these issues should be examined as the first priority for the Russian military. The victory of Russian military over the Georgian Army during the peace-enforcement operation of August 2008 should not be a cause for euphoria in Moscow, but this victory supposes to be a motivation for Russia to accelerate its military transformation and the mass procurement of modern armaments for the Russian Armed Forces.
August 8, Russia deployed its troops in three tactical battalion groups from 2008 South Ossetia. the 135th, 503rd and 693rd Motor Rifle Regiments of the 19th Motor Rifle Division (based in Vladikavkaz) of the 58th Army of the North Caucasus Military District were deployed.
August 8, Russian forces clear the zone Russian troops cleared the area as
94
2008 around Kverneti, Tbeti, and far as possible to the western edge Dzari districts of Tskhinvali
August 9, First battle between Ossetian 2008 forces with Russian forces versus Georgian forces in the region of Tskhinvali
August 10, Georgian Forces attack Ossetian forces and Russian 2008 Tskhinvali peacekeeping battalion to retreat to the northern Tskhinvali city
August 10, Ossetian forces and Russian Georgian Forces retreat to the 2008 forces fight back Southern Tskhinvali city
August 10, Ossetian forces, with the support 2008 of Russian divisions, took Tamarasheni, Kekhvi, Kurta, and Achabeti.
August 10, Russia deployed 10,000 men and 2008 120 tanks to South Ossetia
August 10- Russia's Air Force carried out sorties using Su-24M Fencer frontal 11, 2008 attacks on military targets all bombers, and Su-25 Frogfoot attack across Georgian territory planes, and the Tu-22M3 Backfire long-range bombers
August 11, South Ossetia was completely 2008 cleared of Georgian forces
August 12, Russian units had moved into Russian establishing a demilitarized
95
2008 Georgia buffer zone as much as 25 km wide to prevent any further artillery attacks on South Ossetia
August 12, Russian President Dmitry 2008 Medvedev decided to cease the active phase of the peace- enforcement operation
August 13 Russian paratroops deployed to Russian paratroops destroying to 15, 2008 Poti, almost all of the docked ships and boats of the Georgian Navy, and took away a quantity of valuable military equipment
August 15, Russian forces entered Gori and Russia troops seize Georgia's 2008 Senaki military bases.
Table 6: Timeline before South Ossetia War
4.1.3. Russia after South Ossetia War "EU monitors working in areas adjacent to South Ossetia and Abkhazia have been reporting a buildup of Georgian military units and Special Forces near the borders with South Ossetia and Abkhazia and our 'technical devices' have also recorded this.Provocations also occur sporadically. We are concerned by this."
Sergey Lavrov - Russian Foreign Minister214
The South Ossetia War triggered many international responses to the Russian Federation. Both the negative and positive responses from the international world are responded by the Russian federation in accordance with Russian international policy. The response came mostly from western countries such as the EU and NATO. Many
214"Moscow worried by Georgian buildup near South Ossetia, Abkhazia". RIA Novosti. 23 January 2009. 96 meetings were held between the leaders of the nation attended by Russia to solve the problems of the South Ossetia War. Some of the meetings were like the Russia-EU meeting on August 15, 2008; Summit in Dushanbe on August 28, 2008; And Meeting Russia-Abkhazia-South Ossetia on September 17, 2008.
4.1.3.1. NATO Engagement
Russia party had expected NATO would definitely interfere in the South Ossetia War. The main cause of this NATO engagement is the Alliance's New Strategic Concept approved since 1991 by Europe's Security Organization. The Alliance's New Strategic Concept clearly states that there are two general conclusions, that the first substitution of the region will not change the functionality of the NATO security system but rather affirms the existence of NATO. Secondly, not only for NATO itself, NATO also expressed an opportunity for NATO in its strategy sheet to disseminate its influence in terms of defense and security.
“First, the new environment does not change the purpose of the security function of the Alliance (NATO), but rather underlines their enduring validity, and second, on the under hand, is that the changed environment offers new opportunities for the Alliance to frame its strategy within a broad approach to security.”
Alliance’s New Strategic Concept215
In the first conclusion it is clear that changes in the environment in the European region since the end of the cold war will not alter the function of the defense of military security alliance, so that at the time of the South Ossetia War the NATO party also felt it had the right to participate in maintaining security. But this "security" statement may change after the second conclusion of the Alliance's New Strategic Concept. In the second conclusion of the Alliance Party stated that the changes that occurred after the cold war ended make NATO get a chance to spread its influence in the form of another state military.
215 Tome, L. J. R. L. (2010), Russia and NATO’s Enlargement, NATO Research Fellowship Programme Final Report. 97
There is also another basis for NATO to intervene in the South Ossetia war case. At the November 1991 Rome Summit, NATO stated in its document about the fundamental Security task, the main principle in the fundamental Security Tasks was their reason for interfering in the South Ossetia war. It is creating a defensive environment in Europe, especially in emerging democracies. With NATO protection, no country can interfere with or threaten the developing country.
“To provide one of the indispensable foundation for a stable security environment in Europe, base on the growth of democratic institution and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any European nation or to improve hegemony through the threat or use of force”
Fundamental Security Task of Alliance’s New Strategic Concept216
This is also evident in the actions of NATO in addressing the Russian Military act in South Ossetia. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, who at the time served as NATO's Secretary-General, declared that Russia had "direct violation" on UNSC Resolution on Georgia which about Russia recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In an international community, the Georgian Saakashvili president appealed to the West especially NATO to challenge "Russian aggression" in the strongest possible terms.
As the response to the Russia military act in South Ossetia, 27 August 2008, NATO sent his warship towards the black sea. Although according to the US Navy NATO warships only come to provide humanitarian assistance, as well as role training with Romania and Bulgaria. Still, this really threatens the existence of Russia because of the armed military ships that have the capacity to threaten Russian sovereignty. The presence of NATO warships in the black sea became an alert for Russia on the advice of Russian General Anatoliy Nogovitsyn.
216 Tome, L. J. R. L. (2010), Russia and NATO’s Enlargement, NATO Research Fellowship Programme Final Report. 98
4.1.3.2. Russia Action
Beside attend international conference with disputing State parties and the mediating countries, Russia also declared statements to the international community establish international treaties, mobilizes aid, and giving sanctions to the Disputing parties. Here are some implementations of Russia's defense rules after the South Ossetia War.
To resolve the conflict between Georgia and Russia, French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who served as President of the EU met and held talks with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev on August 15, 2008. From that meeting, it was agreed 6 (six) principles, which are:217
1. There will be the use of violence in any form; 2. Stop all disputes is happening; 3. Granting access to humanitarian aid; 4. Georgian forces must be withdrawn at the position before the previous one; 5. The withdrawal of Russian troops from the conflict back to the level before the conflict. Russian peacekeepers was to be placed in areas of conflict to maintain peace in the region; 6. The future and measures to ensure security in South Ossetia and Abkhazia will be discussed in an international discussion.
On August 21, 2008, Abkhazia parliament asked Russia government for recognition of independence of Abkhazia.218 And because of international demand Russia promised to withdraw the entire peacekeeping force in the territory of Georgia on August 22, 2008.219 Then on August 26, 2008, Russian Federation recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. By President Medvedev decision,
217Loc.Cit. International Crisis Group 218Day-by-Day: Georgia-Russia Conflict, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7577122.stm 219Ibid 99
Russian Federation formally recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. by the full support of Parliament of the Russian Federation at the request of the Parliament of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, issued a decree stating the recognition of the independence of South Ossetia as independent states.. Beside that President Medvedev also accused Saakashvili has conducted genocide in South Ossetia.220
On September 9, 2008, diplomatic relations between Russia and South Ossetia were established. At the time Foreign Minister of South Ossetia Murat Dzhioev and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov exchanged letters to the Russian Foreign Ministry in Moscow.221 After that President Dmitri Medvedev signed treaties with the breakaway enclaves South Ossetia and Abkhazia on committed Moscow to defend them from any Georgian attack On September 17, 2008.222 And then on September 25, 2008, President Medvedev signed a decree on appointing Russia's first ambassador to South Ossetia, Elbrus Kargiev.223
The Russian government through President Dmitry Medvedev, made a formal statement to the military attacks carried into the territory of Georgia, the content of the statement are:224
1. The leaders of Georgia is responsible for acts of violence against citizens of South Ossetia over the past 15 years; 2. Attacks against Russian citizens and military personnel stationed in South Ossetia as peacekeepers must be repaid;
220http://document.kremlin.ru/doc.asp?ID=47560 221 Solovyev, Vladimir (2008). "Freshly Recognized". Kommersant. 222 Kremlin (2008). Russia signed Treaties on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with the Republic of Abkhazia and the Republic of South Ossetia today in the Kremlin. Kremlin.ru, Moscow. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/1439 223 Kremlin (2008). Dmitry Medvedev appointed Russia's ambassadors to the Republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Kremlin.ru, Moscow. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/1855 224 Hans-Henning Schröder, “„A Short, Victorious War? ‟Russian Perspectives on the Caucasus Crisis”, in Hans-Henning Schröder (ed.), The Caucasus Crisis: International Perceptions and Policy Implications for Germany and Europe, SWP-Berlin Research Paper No. 9, November 2008, p. 7. 100
3. The leaders of Georgia launched its attack on South Ossetia solve the problem completely, and Russia has an obligation to prevent aggression and genocide against the population of South Ossetia; 4. Russia act to defend its citizens who are attacked on the basis of Article 51 of the UN Charter on self-defense (self-defense).
The conflict between Georgia with Russia revived concerns about the occurrence of a "new Cold War" between Russia and the West, especially NATO members. This concern was denied among others by Richard Sakwa saying that bipolarization and ideological confrontation that became hallmark of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union had become a thing of the past, and that in fact the term "Cold War" is "a metaphor for a relationship that is basically tinged tension that cannot be resolved through the framework worldview of each party but through a process of rethinking by both."
In the Joint Declaration of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), August 28, 2008 Summit in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, SCO welcomed the six principles of settlement of the conflict in South Ossetia and support Russia's active role in promoting peace and cooperation in the region. SCO countries expressed concern with regard to the tensions surrounding the South Ossetia issue and urge the relevant parties to resolve the conflict through dialogue and peaceful negotiations. SCO countries affirmed the principles of respect for the territorial integrity of a country and efforts to protect the unity and territorial integrity of the country.225
In an interview after the conflict between Georgia and Russia in August 2008, Medvedev said five things that become the main base of Russia's foreign policy, also called Medvedev doctrine, among others:226
225“Russia-Georgia tensions still high one year on from conflict”, http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/europe/08/07/goergia.background/index.html?iref=allsearch 226 Friedman, George. (2008). The Medvedev Doctrine and American Strategy, Strartfor Worldview. 101
1. Russia to run its foreign policy in accordance with international law is now applicable in relations between countries.
2. This world must be multi-polar. Russia does not want the world is governed by a certain force.
3. Russia does not want confrontation with any country, and Russia intends to establish good relations with every country.
4. Russia's main priority is to protect its citizens wherever they are and protect its interests abroad. Russia has threatened to act firmly against anyone who threatens its citizens.
5. Russia has an interest in a particular area, where in the region there are countries that are already established good relations with a country that has historically special relations, in particular the CIS member states.
Through the interview, President Medvedev reiterated that Russia in carrying out its foreign policy is always appropriate and comply with applicable international law. What if Russia violates it will be ready to be given sanctions, either by the international community and the United Nations. Furthermore, Russia also does not want any one strength that dominates the world. It can be interpreted that the United States currently is one of the strengths or polar world, should have a balance so as not to dominate the world. Russia is considered able to play some power or polar itself as a counterweight to the United States.
The aftermath of the conflict left the Russia-Georgia relationship to distance themselves. On 19 January 2009, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed a law making it illegal to sell, supply, or transfer military production to Georgia, and
102 prohibiting the use of Russian railways, waters, and airspace for military co-operation with Georgia.227
4.2. Russia Defense Policy Implementation
4.2.1. Military aspect As I‟ve been explained in this chapter about Russian Federation Involvement in South Ossetia War before that Russian federation done it‟s military act in Georgia to prevent threat to Russian federation sovereignty. Base on Russian Federation Military Doctrine, Russian Federation divided treat in some category, one of them is Conflict external near Russian border. To repel all these threats Russia will do 3 ways based on its military doctrine, those three things are
Combat Exercises or Preparation of combat, preparation of war prepared by russia for Russian troops ready to face the opponent. With the preparation of russia troops will provide more results in the most efficient way. Dengn so victory will be achieved more easily. This is explained in the Russian federaton military doctrine on chapter 2 article 17 which says that:
Perform tasks in the maintenance and restoration of peace operations rests with the Russian Federation Armed Forces. To prepare for these tasks are allocated specifically designated units and formations. Along with the preparation for the use for its intended purpose, they are trained in a special program. The Russian Federation implements logistic and technical support, training, preparation of Russian contingents, the planning of their implementation and operational management in accordance with the standards and procedures of the United Nations, the CFE and the Commonwealth of Independent States.228 This is also seen in the implementation of Defense Policy Russia at the time of South Ossetia war, which are:
May 14, 2008, the 17-day exercise for the newly designed flyers in Nalchik in the Air Force for war preparing,
227 Longari, Marco (2009), No more arms for Georgia – Medvedev. RT, Moscow 228Ibid Chapter 2 Article 17 Point D 103
June 6, 2008, Zelenchukskaya mountain infantry brigade SCWO beginning of the 10-day exercise for war preparing, July 6, 2008, Forces of the North Caucasus Military District began exercises "Caucasus Frontier 2008" July 15, 2008 , North Caucasian Military District began large-scale military exercises "Caucasus-2008" with total troops more than 8,000, including 700 pieces of equipment, with the support of Air Force and the Black Sea fleet. Lieutenant-General Yuri Netkachev, has long commanded the army in the North Caucasus,
Combating enemy, any dispute will surely leave the victim, this situation will threaten the security and peace of the world. For that reason the Russian government will repel the situation with its peacekeeping troops. The placement of soldiers and military action that the Russian army carried out was based on military doctrine chapter 2 article 16, which is:
The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and other troops should be ready to repel attacks and defeating the aggressor, and conduct active operations (both defensive and offensive) under any scenario of starting and waging of wars and armed conflicts in the conditions of massive use by the enemy of modern and advanced combat weapons, including weapons of mass destruction of all types.229 This is also seen in the implementation of Defense Policy Russia at the time of South Ossetia war, which are:
April 17, 2008, Russian soldiers with heavy weapons arrived at the military base. 300 Russian soldiers deployed in Ochamchire in Abkhazia. June 29, 2008, Soldier deployment. The North Caucasus Military District, the Federal Security Service troops deployed in a wooded mountainous area near the border with Georgia."
229Ibid Chapter 2 Article 16 104
July 7, 2008, Russian anti-aircraft missiles and heavy weapons were deployed Russian anti-aircraft missiles and heavy weapons were deployed, and the four Russian warplanes violated Georgian airspace over South Ossetia. July 18, 2008, Russia positioned its troops. Air assault regiment of 76th Pskov Airborne Division took up positions on the Roki and Mamison passes through the Main Caucasian ridge, and airborne regiment Volgograd motorized infantry division was transferred to the Krasnodar Territory. July 20, 2008, Russia positioned its troops. 20th motorized infantry battalion with 14 armored personnel carriers entered the lower part of the Kodori Gorge. July 23, 2008, Russia positioned its troops. 135th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 19th-Vladikav kazskoy motorized infantry division replaced the Pskov paratroopers on the Roki Pass. July 25, 2008, Russia positioned its medical troops. Special medical detachment deployed a field hospital "Tarskoe" August 8, 2008, Russia deployed its troops in South Ossetia. three tactical battalion groups from the 135th, 503rd and 693rd Motor Rifle Regiments of the 19th Motor Rifle Division (based in Vladikavkaz) of the 58th Army of the North Caucasus Military District were deployed. August 8, 2008, Russian forces clear the zone around Kverneti, Tbeti, and Dzari districts Russian troops cleared the area as far as possible to the western edge of Tskhinvali August 10, 2008, Ossetian forces and Russian forces fight back Georgian Forces retreat to the Southern Tskhinvali city August 10, 2008, Ossetian forces, with the support of Russian divisions, took Tamarasheni, Kekhvi, Kurta, and Achabeti. August 10, 2008, Russia deployed 10,000 men and 120 tanks to South Ossetia August 10-11, 2008, Russia's Air Force carried out attacks on military targets all across Georgian territory sorties using Su-24M Fencer frontal bombers,
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and Su-25 Frogfoot attack planes, and the Tu-22M3 Backfire long-range bombers
Disarmament of the enemy, after the war or conflict ends the Russian army will disarm the enemy. Disarmament must be avoided in more disputes, as possession of weapons and combat means will provide an opportunity for the enemy to attack. This task is clearly written in the Russian military doctrine chapter 2 article 14, namely:
In peacekeeping and peace restoration operations - disengage the warring factions, to stabilize the situation, providing the conditions for a just and peaceful settlement.230 This is also seen in the implementation of Defense Policy Russia at the time of South Ossetia war, which are:
August 12, 2008, Russian units had moved into Georgia. Russian establishing a demilitarized buffer zone as much as 25 km wide to prevent any further artillery attacks on South Ossetia August 13 to 15, 2008, Russian paratroops deployed to Poti, Russian paratroops destroying almost all of the docked ships and boats of the Georgian Navy, and took away a quantity of valuable military equipment August 15, 2008, Russian forces entered Gori and Senaki. Russia troops seize Georgia's military bases.
4.2.1.1.Russia Defense Budget Since the Soviet Union Collapse, Russia as a State that inherited most of the Union's soviet forces also felt the crisis. But by the end of the 90s the Russian economy had improved and got out of the turmoil after the crisis that hit the Soviet Union to Collapse. The start of President Vladimir Putin served as Russian government began to take into account their military situation that had long fallen asleep and frozen since the outbreak of the Soviet Union. In 2000 the Russian army received an additional budget of up to 141 billion rubles. The amount of budget
230Ibid Chapter 2 Article 14 106 continued to increase in 2001. Reportedly in 2001 the Russian military budget increased almost 200% or 219 billion rubles.231
Not only in the early 2000s, Russia also increased its military budget. In 2007 the Russian government imposed a new system based on the decision of Russia's new defense minister Anatoly Serdyukov.232 In this new system, Russia is trying to suppress the growth of its personnel and allocate their military funds to other sectors in addition to high paying salaries and personnel allowances. Russian military funds are more allocated for the renewal of military technology as well as their military support facilities. Russia feels they need to further improve the quality of their defense to be able to play in the international world. Until 2016 Russia will continue to run this new system in order to maximize their military quality.
Russia's defense minister before Anatoly Serdyukov, Sergei Ivanov also insists Russia is doing a lot of reforms in its military sector. The purchase of weapons and the renewal of military defense means is the largest expenditure for the Russian government. So the total expenditure of the Russian government in developing of its military quality from 2007 until 2008 is 240 billion US dollars.233 Some military equipment and equipment purchased and upgraded are:234
1. 31 ships for the Navy, including new aircraft carriers; 2. arms for 40 tanks, 97 infantry and 50 airborne battalions; 3. new TOPOL-M (SS-27) ICBMs; 4. the Yarts land-based ballistic missile; 5. the Bulava sea-launched ballistic missile;
231 International Institute for Strategic Studies (1959). The military balance : an annual assessment of global military capabilities and defence economics. Routledge. London. 231. YEGÓROV, IVÁN (2008). Serdyukov's radical reform. RBTH. Moscow.
233 Global Security. Russian Military Budget. globalsecurity.org 234 Ibid 107
6. the X-102 airborne missile; 7. a new version of the Iskander-M ballistic missile, capable of carrying multiple warheads; 8. a fourth Borey-class strategic nuclear submarine (the first was scheduled to go into service after 2008); 9. a new TU-160 Blackjack bomber, and modernization of existing TU-160 and TU-95 Bear bombers; 10. a full fleet of new generation fighters by 2012-2015 (the SU-34 Fullback which was in production and scheduled to replace the SU-24 Fencer frontline bombers). 11. deployment of a second S-400 air defense system near Moscow in 2008.
Russian Federation Military Expenditure 45000 40000 35000 41423 37698 30000 34633 25000 31293 27536 20000 25123 26338 22679
US$ US$ Million 15000 10000 5000 0 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Military Expenditure 22679 25123 26338 27536 31293 34633 37698 41423
Figure 4: Russian Federation Military Expenditure235 From the data above that shown us a sharp increase in the Russia military budget. In just 3 years, Russia added US $ 10 billion to military expenditure. And there are many weapons that are updated and developed by the Russian government. In addition, the program is considered capable of adding military quality Russia also
235 SIPRI, SIPRI Military Expenditure Database. STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE 108 felt effective. Due to the increasing of this defense budget, the effect was felt when Russia implemented its defense policy toward Georgia to resolve south of Ossetia war in 2008.
At the 2008 Ossetia south war, Russian troops with better capacity and quality gained victory. Support by new war tools such as a new version of the Iskander-M ballistic missile that is capable of carrying multiple warheads is the result of a 2007 military program launched by Russia's defense minister Anatoly Serdyukov.
4.2.2. Politic and Diplomatic Aspect Russia considers each of their allies valuable and must be protected, so one of its defense policy implementations is to engage in international diplomatic relations in support of its allies. In its implementation, the Russian government not only supports and protects its allies, but the Russian government also promotes peaceful conditions, it is clearly written in the Russian federation defense policy, which is: The Russian Federation considers ensuring its military security in the context of building a democratic state of law, the implementation of socio-economic reforms, establishing the principles of equal partnership, mutual cooperation and good neighborliness in international relations, consistently shaping an overall and comprehensive system of international security, the preservation and strengthening of world peace.236 This is also seen in the implementation of Defense Policy Russia at the time of South Ossetia war, which are:
March 6, 2008, Russia unilaterally finally came out of the sanctions regime against Abkhazia and South Ossetia entered the CIS summit January 19, 1996 March 21 2008, Russia adopted a special resolution , The resolution is about supporting the requests of the South Ossetia and Abkhazia on the International Recognition.
236Ibid Chapter 1 Article 7 109
April 16, 2008, Russian President gives instruction to the federal government about South Ossetia and Abkhazia the, so federal government and regional authorities to establish direct relations with the de facto authorities in Sukhumi and Tskhinvali. July 10, 2008, Russia called South Ossetia and Abkhazia representative. Bagapsh and Kokoity were Called to Moscow for consultations with the Russian leadership. August 15, 2008, To resolve the conflict between Georgia and Russia, French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who served as President of the EU met and held talks with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. August 26, 2008, Russian Federation recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. August 28, 2008 Summit in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, SCO welcomed the six principles of settlement of the conflict in South Ossetia and support Russia's active role in promoting peace and cooperation in the region. On September 9, 2008, diplomatic relations between Russia and South Ossetia were established. September 17, 2008, President Dmitri Medvedev signed treaties with the breakaway enclaves South Ossetia and Abkhazia on committed Moscow to defend them from any Georgian attack On. September 25, 2008, President Medvedev signed a decree on appointing Russia's first ambassador to South Ossetia, Elbrus Kargiev. 19 January 2009, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed a law making it illegal to sell, supply, or transfer military production to Georgia, and prohibiting the use of Russian railways, waters, and airspace for military co- operation with Georgia.
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CHAPTER V CONCLUSION
For Russia's security of its citizens is very important. Protecting the rights and obligations especially maintains the survival of its citizens from the threats that come one of the main interests of the Russian federation. As we know Russia is the largest and strongest Soviet Union fraction country. Great capability that Russia has makes Russia to have a sense of great responsibility. Not only for itself but also for Russia allies which mean ex-Soviet Union country. One of the main interests of Russia in the Caucasus region is to maintain the political stability of western or US influence which is considered bad or negative impact.
As a writer I really like this topic and chose it as my topic thesis because of the many features in the unique characteristics of Russia. This unique character of Russia shows in every implementation of its laws both inside and outside the state, in the way it relates internationally and in the way Russia responds to foreign threats such as armed conflict. Russia's stern and hard character that has been embedded since the time of the Russian empire became an interesting thing for me in discussing the issue of conflict in South Ossetia.
In this thesis I also explained about Russian defense policy. The defense policy discussed in this thesis is the military doctrine federation of Russia which was released on the decision of the president of Russia on 21 April 2000 number 706. The main points of military doctrine included in this thesis are the views of Russia on the interests of the State of Russia. Russia national interest was explained by the Russian military doctrine. Base on Russia military doctrine, Russia's primary interest is maintaining the security and order of the world both within and outside of its country. One of the ways of Russia in achieve its national interest is by protecting its citizens wherever they are even in other countries. 111
In Russian Federation military doctrine Russia also explains what so-called threats to the Russian State. Russia includes every form of threat that the military and the Russian government can more easily clarify incoming threats, whether in disturbing, or very dangerous form, in terms of low priority or high priority.
Apart from the threat and the main interest of the State to protect the people, the Russian federation also explain some of the military defense strategy they will use in terms of dealing with the threat. For some dangerous threat, Russia state will use its nuclear weapon.
The military doctrine that explains the protection of the people for the citizens of Russia is on military doctrine of the russian federation about military and political foundations chapter 1 article 5, it is clearly stated that Protection of the citizens is the one of the duties of a state. Both inside and outside the territory, the state is obligated to protect all the rights of its citizens. Like Russian Federation, Russia argued that the rights and freedoms of its people are the main ones that Russia will protect them even if they located outside the territory. According to Russian military doctrine when the rights and freedoms of citizens harassed by other countries when they located outside the region, it would be a threat to Russia as set out in Chapter 1 Article 5.
Moreover the form of threat that Russia categorizes in some form. On the military doctrine on military doctrine of the Russian Federation about military and political foundations chapter 1 article 5 that release on 2009. Then in chapter 1 article 5 Russia's military doctrine to explain about what is known as external threats to the sovereignty of Russia. Russia clearly and publicly stated that NATO is one of the major threats for Russia, as NATO been strengthen the military of the countries that bordering with Russia. It becomes frightened for the Russian government and can be described as the threat perception. In some passages say their violations of international law from NATO to bring tools to combat and military strengthen the countries bordering with Russia. \
112
Know the previous event where Kosovo out of Yugoslavia, even though Russia denounced Kosovo, but NATO and US support so Yugoslavia obliged to release Kosovo and also international recognition for such a small area. Same like US statement to Kosovo, Russia will strongly recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia as a sovereign nation in the international world. And finally on the 16th of April 2008 Russia establish direct relation with South Ossetia and Abkhazia. After Russia recognition to south Ossetia there are some low level conflict broke out between South Ossetia and Georgia government which did not approve the actions of the two regions. And in the end of the small conflict between South Ossetia and the Georgian government was the massive attack that Saakashvili government brought to south Ossetia on the night of August 7, 2008, and this was a major trigger for the South Ossetia war.
After the attack was launched by Georgia, Russia directly implements its defense policy against Georgia. The main objective of Russia is to protect its citizens who work and live in the South Ossetia region. The Georgian attack also killed several Russian peacekeeping troops that stationed in southern Ossetia as an agreement between Georgia, South Ossetia and Russia. In implementing its defense policy Russia has deployed at least 10,000 personnel. In this war Georgia had surpassed Russia by wounding one of the Russian combat commanders. But it is because all the Russia troops has not gathered due to the difficult mobilization, the transfer of personnel through the Roki tunnel And the steep mountain is Russia's main obstacle. After all the soldiers arrived in the city of Tbilisi and the war situation turned around. Until the 12th of August the southern region of Ossetia belonged to the southern Ossetia government with the help of Russian troops aimed at maintaining the peace of the region.
After the battle ended, NATO came as mediators tried to mediate the conflict between Georgia and Russia. In the process of mediating many new agreements signed by each side to resolve South Ossetia dispute. Russia as the main party
113 pledged not to continue the assault, as Russia's responsible State also gave aid to southern Ossetia as the victim of a Georgian assault aiming to ground South Ossetia. On the other side of Georgia as losing party and a country which started the war sparked required paying damages to South Ossetia in the clarification of Russia after the war.
When we examine according to the neo realism perspective that states that the actor who can engage in the international world directly is the State, and the State as the main actor has power over the way he takes action. The action referred to in this case is the manner in which a State relates or attitudes to another State. For the example, about what Russia do towards Georgia in response to Georgia's attack on the region of South Ossetia. It is clear that Russia‟s desire to protect its country's interests as protecting its citizens is one of the processes of self-defense. This form of self-defense is not a spontaneous attitude, but an attitude that has been endorsed by the State of Russia as stated in its defense policy or more specifically the military doctrine of the Russian federation. Based on the military doctrine that Russia has he will implement the laws he has on every issue that Russia encounters and this is clearly illustrated through the defense policy theory.
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