JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

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JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment S E C RE T // NOFORNI I 2O3IO72I DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA APO AE 09360 JTF-GTMO-CC 2l Julv 2006 MEMORANDUM FOR Commander,United StatesSouthem Command, 3511 NW 9lst Avenue, Miami,FL33172. SUBJECT: Recommendationfor ContinuedDetention Under DoD Control (CD) for GuantanamoDetainee, ISN: US9SA-000114DP(S) JTF-GTMODetainee Assessment 1. (S/NF) PersonalInformation: o JDIMSAIDRC ReferenceName: Yusef M Modaralz o Aliases and Current/True Name: Yusif Muhammad Mubarak al-Shihri. Abu al-Harith. Abdul Aziz. Abu Hakim al-Shihri. Yusef Mohammed Aziz SaadModarav o Placeof Birth: Riyadh. SaudiArabia (SA) o Date of Birth: 8 September1985 . Citizenship: Saudi Arabia o InternmentSerial Number (ISN): US9SA-000114DP 2. (FOUO) Health: Detaineeis in goodhealth. 3. (S//NF) JTF-GTMOAssessment: a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMOrecommends this detaineefor Continued DetentionUnder DoD Control(CD). If a satisfactoryagreement can be reachedthat ensurescontinued detention and allowsaccess to detaineeand/or to exploited intelligence,detainee can be TransferredOut of DoD Control (TRO). JTF-GTMO previouslyassessed detainee as Retain in DoD Control(DoD) on 10June 2005. b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detaineeis assessedto be a memberof al-Qaida. Detaineewas a memberof UsamaBin Laden's(UBL) former55th Arab Brigade who participatedin armedhostilities against US andcoalition forces. Detainee admits traveling to CLASSIFIEDBY: MULTIPLESOURCES REASON:E.O. 12958 SECTION 1.5(C) DECLASSIFYON: 20310712 S E C RE T / / NOFORN/ I 2O3IO72I S E C RE T // NOFORN I I 2O3IO72I JTF-GTMO-CC SIIBJECT: Recommendationfor Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for GuantanamoDetainee, ISN: US9SA-000114DP(S) Afghanistan (AF) to fight jihad and residing in two al-Qaida affiliated guesthouses. Detainee'sbrother was a major al-Qaidaspokesman who facilitatedthe movementof jihadists to Afghanistan via Iran. Given the opportunity to martyr himself, detaineewould do so without hesitation,probably involving the killing of US personneland/or allied forces. [ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT THIS DETAINEE IS AVAILABLE IN AN SCI SUPPLEMENT.I JTF-GTMO determinedthis detaineeto be: o A HIGH risk, as he is likely to posea threatto the US, its interestsand allies. o A MODERATE threat from a detentionperspective. o Of MEDIUM intelligencevalue. 4. (S//NF)Detainee's Account of Events: Thefollowing section is based,unless otherwise indicated, on detainee'sown account. Thesestatements are includedwithout considerationof veracity, accuracy,or reliability. a. (S/NF) Prior History: Sometimein 2000,rdetainee left school after he completed a portion of the 10'nyear at an educationalinstitute focusing on religious studies. Detainee then sold fruit, vegetablesand honey from a cart on the side of the road for approximately two monthsin Riyadh,Jeddah and Mecca, SA.t b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: Muhammadal-Qosi (NFD convinceddetainee to go to Pakistan(PK).3 Detaineeleft Medina, SA, and traveledvia Damascus,Syria (SY), and Tehran and Mashad, Iran (IR), to Pakistan. Abdul Aziz, a Saudi OIFI), met detaineeat the Pakistaniborder and accompaniedhim to Karachi,PK.4 (Analyst Note: Thereis no additional information on how thesetwo met or whether this was set up in advance.) c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: Detaineeand Aziz spenttwo and a-half monthsin Karachi at the Makki mosque. One day Aziz informed detaineethey were done in Karachi and it was their duty to participate in jihad with the Taliban in Afghanistan. In April 2001, Aziz andthe detaineetraveled to Kabul, AF, where they spokewith the Taliban and stated 'ooo1t4r<t02-04-2002 ' 000tt+ 30204Apr02. IIR 6 0340012 03 ' IIR 6 034 0012 03, Analyst Note: al-Qosi variants: Kousi and Kosi. rto-ltqlzls45-02,IIR6o34034502,IIR6034OOl203,AnalystNote: InTD-314127545-02,SaudiMinistryof Interior, General Directorate of Investigations (Mabahith) reported that detaineedeparted Saudi Arabia for Jordan on 25 September2000, which contradictshis claim in 000114 SIR 30-Mar-2002 that he left Saudi Arabia in April 2001. In IIR 6 034 0012 03, detaineealso later contradictedhimselfby saying that he left Pakistanand crossed into Afghanistanin April200l. 2 S E C R E T // NOFORNI I 20310727 S E C RE T //NOFORN I I 2O3IO72I JTF-GTMO-CC SUBJECT: Recommendationfor Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for GuantanamoDetainee, ISN: US9SA-000114DP(S) they wanted to fight. They were given directions to a Taliban guesthousein Kabul.5 At the Taliban guesthouse,the two were separated.Three days later the detaineeaccompanied three Arabs named Abu Mosaab, Khaled and Salmon, and approximately 30 Afghans to Mullah Thacker'scommand compound in Konduz, AF.o One and a half days later,_thedetainee and sevenAfghans were sent to an Arab unit on the front lines at Khwaja Ghar,' AF commanded by Abdul Salam8. Detainee spentapproximately four or five months at a support center close to the front. Abu Muath, detainee'scommander (NFI), gave the detaineeone day of training on grenadesand the Kalashnikov. Detaineetransported food and bullets to the front line and helpedbury the dead. Sometime after the 11 September2001 (9lII) attacks,the fighting on the front lines becameintense. Detaineeand his groupwere instructedby Gha{b, Salam's replacement,to withdraw from the front lines so they headedtowards Konduz.' 5. (S/NF) CaptureInformation: a. (S/AIF) After two weeks in Konduz, Gharib informed detaineethat Mullah Thacker had ordered a withdrawal to Kandahar,AF. Detainee and others traveled in cars and trucks to Mazar-E-Sharif, AF, where Northem Alliance commanderDostam's men stoppedthe trucks and orderedthe fighters to sunendertheir weapons. They were then escortedto the Qala-I- Jangiprison. Detaineewas at the Qala-I-Jangiprison during the uprising.t0 When US and coalition forcesregained control of the prison,detainee was escortedto Sherberghanprison. Detaineewas a prisoner there for a month and a half. Detaineewas subsequentlyhanded I over to US forces at the Kandahar detention facility.i t IIR 6 034 0012 03, IIR 6 034 l32g 04, Analyst Note: Assessedto be the Dar al-Amn guesthousein Kabul, which acted as the main staging area for fighters moving to Taliban front lines. u IIR 6 034 0012 03, Analyst Note: Mullah Thacker was a Taliban sub-commanderunder al-Qaida commanderAbd al-Hadi al-Iraqi. 7 Analyst Note: khwaja Ghar variant: Khawajaghal " IIR 6 034 0012 03, Analyst Note: Abdul Salam, aka (Abd al-Salaamal-Hadrami) aka (Muamar Said Abud Dayan) an al-Qaida facilitator and sub-commanderunder Mullah Thacker, was killed while fighting on the front lines. Seealso 000078302 l5-SEP-2002,IIR 2 340 6362 02, IIR 6 034 147403, IIR 6 034 0265 02. n IIR 6 034 0012 03, Analyst Note: Gharib is Gharib al-San'ani (variant Gareeb),who detaineereported took Abdul Salam'splace when he was killed and who was also in charge of the headquartersat the Omar Saif Center and responsiblefor distributing ammunition to the front line commanders. See also IIR 6 034 0207 06, IIR 6 034 0077 03, IIR 6 034 0673 02, IIR 6 034 0692 02. 'o 000114sIR 24-Feb-2003,IIR 6 034 034502 and IIR 6 034 001203, Analyst Note: In FBI-302 ISN 128 271wfi2, GhalebNasser, ISN US9YM-000128DP(YM-128), reportedthat he saw the detaineeat the Qala-I-Jangiprison along with one of his brothers. "IIR6034001203,00114DA4l37,AnalystNote:.. InllR23406T1602c,detaineeislistedaseithermissingor killed at the Qala-I-Jangi Fortress in Mazar-E-Sharif, conoborating his presencethere. 3 S E C R E T // NOFORNI / 2O3IO72I S E C R E T // NOFORNI I 2O3IO72I JTF-GTMO-CC SUBJECT:Recommendation for ContinuedDetention Under DoD Control(CD) for GuantanamoDetainee, ISN: US9SA-000114DP(S) b. (S) Property Held: o InternationalCommittee of theRed Cross (ICRC) Card #083936, name of Yusuf Mhdl2 c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 16 January2002 d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide informationon the following: o Personalitiesand replacementoperations of the Arab elementthat supportedthe NorthernTaliban forces(assessed to be referringto UBL's 55tnArab Brigade) 6. (S/NF) Evaluation Of Detainee's Account: Detaineeis historically uncooperative during debriefings, and his truthfulness is often in doubt. He has failed to provide any explanationfor the period between September2000 and February 2001 and has contradicted himself (e.g.,left SaudiArabia in April 2001,spent two and a half monthsin Pakistan,yet arrivedat the Afghan border in April 2001.) Detainee'stravel and timeline affordedhim the opportunity to attendtraining at al-Faruq, which he probably completedprior to supporting the Taliban and al-Qaida on the front lines. Many of detainee'saliases are very common, and without more identifytng information no associatedactivities can be connectedspecifically with the detainee. 7. (S//NF)Detainee Threat: a. (S) Assessment: It is assessedthe detainee poses a HIGHrisk, as he is likelyto pose a threat to the US. its interestsand allies. b. (S//NF) Reasons for Gontinued Detention: Detaineeis assessedto be a member of Al-Qaida. Detaineewas an armedcombatant in UBL's former 55thArab Brigadewho admittedly traveled to Afghanistan to participate in jihad. He spent severalmonths on the front lines of Afghanistan fighting againstthe Northern Alliance and probably participated in hostilitiesagainst US and coalition forcrcs.Detainee's brother was an al-Qaidafacilitator in Iran. Detaineehas expresseda desire for martyrdom. Detaineeoccupied al-Qaida guesthouseswhile traveling to the front lines. 12 Analyst Note: Mhd is short for Muhammad. 4 S E C RE T / / NOFORN
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