JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA APO AE 09360

JTF-GTMO-CDR 2 June 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 9lst Avenue, Miami, FL 33172

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000030DP (S)

JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

1. (S) Personal Information:

JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Ahmed al-Hikimi

Current/True Name and Aliases: Ahmed Umar Abdullah al- Hikimi, Abu Hamam al-Jawah, Ashayba, Abu Hamman al- Gadi , Nadir Omar Bin Sadun, Ahmad Umar Abu Ala A Haraym

Place of Birth: Taiz, Yemen (YM)

Date of Birth: 1972

Citizenship: Yemen

Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9YM-000030DP

2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is on a list of high-risk detainees from a health perspective. Detainee is in overall good health. However, detainee has a history of Antisocial Personality Disorder diagnosis with several admissions to the Behavior Health Unit for violent behavior and self harm attempts. No issues with this disorder noted since November 2007. Regardless, detainee is followed regularly by Behavior Health Unit for this condition.

3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment:

a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) on 1 April 2007.

b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is a member of al-Qaida and a bodyguard for Usama Bin Laden (UBL). Detainee fought for the Taliban on the front lines against the

CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES REASON: E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C) DECLASSIFY ON: 20330602

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JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000030DP (S)

Northern Alliance and participated in armed hostilities against US and Coalition forces in Afghanistan as a member of the 55th Arab Brigade.1 Detainee stayed at several al-Qaida- associated facilities and was captured with a group referred to as the Dirty 30, which included UBL bodyguards and a suspected 20th 11 September 2001 hijacker. Detainee and other members of the Dirty 30 attended a religious institute known for extremist recruitment in Yemen and in Afghanistan. Detainee continues to demonstrate extremist behavior at JTF- GTMO and is likely to reestablish his membership to al-Qaida if released. JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be:

A HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies

A HIGH threat from a detention perspective

Of MEDIUM intelligence value

c. (S//NF) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee’s assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be

annotated by ¡ next to the footnote.)

Updated detainee’s capture information

Additional pocket litter items reported but not held at JTF-GTMO

Additional reporting identifying detainee as a bodyguard

Removed statement that detainee “trained” at the al-Faruq Training Camp because source actually stated detainee dropped by for a visit en route to the front line.

Added reporting describing detainee as advisor to another detainee

Additional information regarding detainee’s time at UBL’s Tora Bora Mountain Complex

Additional information regarding the Shaykh Muqbil Bin Hadi al-Wadii aka (Shaykh al-Wadi) and the al-Dimaj Institute

Information regarding detainee’s continuous acts of extremist behavior

4. (U) Detainee’s Account of Events:

The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee’s own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.

a. (S//NF) Prior History: Detainee completed the seventh grade and then worked as a taxi driver in Yemen. Detainee is single and has an older brother named Muhammad Umar

1 Analyst Note: The 55th Arab Brigade served as UBL’s primary battle formation supporting Taliban objectives, with UBL participating closely in the command and control of the brigade. IZ-10026 had primary operational command of the 55th Arab Brigade, serving as UBL’s military commander in the field. For additional information see 55th Arab Brigade 01-FEB-1998, FBI 3540-01548-026-0015, and DIA CAR 55th Arab Brigade 18-SEP-2001.

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JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000030DP (S)

Abdallah al-Hikimi, who left for Asia in approximately 1990 to pursue commercial opportunities.2

b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: In January 1999, detainee met an individual named Ahmad al-Ajami. Al-Ajami advised detainee he could become a better Muslim by teaching the Koran to children. Detainee sold his taxi business and used a portion of the revenues to bribe an official to change his passport year of birth from 1972 to 1969, thus making him ineligible for mandatory military service. Detainee then traveled by taxi to the village of Dimaj, YM located near Sadah, YM. While at Dimaj, Shaykh al-Wadi informed detainee of dawa (missionary work) and that he should travel to either Bangladesh or Afghanistan (AF) to assist Muslims to learn the Koran and to teach. Detainee decided to travel to Afghanistan. Al-Wadi encouraged detainee to preach, but advised detainee not to fight in Afghanistan because the violence was “Muslim on Muslim.”3 Al-Wadi gave detainee the equivalent of $1,100 US for travel expenses to Afghanistan. As detainee made arrangements for his trip, Pakistani authorities turned down his request for a visa. An unidentified associate advised detainee to obtain a waiver for medical treatment. Detainee bribed doctors to fabricate a sinus problem as justification for the medical visa. In January or February of 1999, detainee departed Sanaa, YM and traveled to Khowst, AF via Karachi, Quetta, and Miram Shah, Pakistan (PK). Upon arrival in Khowst, detainee met an Afghan named Muhammad Khan who served as detainee’s interpreter.4

c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: Detainee and Muhammad Khan spent approximately eight months traveling around the country and teaching. While detainee regularly interacted with the Taliban, detainee was never recruited for military training or militant operations. Detainee eventually expended his funds and returned to Yemen in late 1999 to work and save money for a second trip to Afghanistan. Detainee returned to Khowst in February 2001, reuniting with Muhammad Khan to continue teaching the Koran.5

5. (U) Capture Information:

a. (S//NF) Detainee was captured by Pakistani forces on 15 December 2001 while attempting to cross the Afghanistan-Pakistan border near Parachinar, PK after fleeing from UBL’s Tora Bora Mountain Complex. Detainee was captured with a group of 31 other Arab al-Qaida fighters referred to by US intelligence reporting as the Dirty 30, most of whom are assessed to be UBL bodyguards and other members of UBL’s security detail.6 Pakistani

2 000030 302 06-APR-2002, TD-314/50613-01, section G; TD-314/28984-02, Analyst Note: Detainee claimed Singapore or Malaysia as possible locations. See 000030 MFR 13-MAR-2002. 3 000030 302 06-APR-2002, 000030 302 21-OCT-2002 4 000030 302 06-APR-2002, 000030 302 07-JUN-2002, 000030 302 21-OCT-2002, TD-314/28984-02 5 000030 302 06-APR-2002, 000030 302 07-JUN-2002, 000030 302 21-OCT-2002, TD-314/28984-02 6 Bodyguard Profile INTSUM 23-OCT-2006, IIR 6 034 1131 03, IIR 6 034 0847 03, TD-314/50461-03

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JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000030DP (S)

authorities transferred the group to a prison facility in Peshawar, PK where they were held for 15 days.7 On 26 December 2001, Pakistani authorities transferred detainee from Peshawar to US custody at the Kandahar Detention Facility, AF.8

b. (S) Property Held:

Watches Casio Model F-91W watch9 Q&Q model El Light black

Though not held at JTF-GTMO, the following items were reportedly in possession of detainee at the time of capture:10 500 Saudi riyals11 1,000 Pakistani rupees12 $100 US13

c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 16 January 2002

d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: Detainee’s file does not indicate why he was transferred to JTF-GTMO. However, he was likely transferred due to suspicion that he was a UBL bodyguard.

6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee’s Account: Detainee’s story about traveling to Afghanistan to teach the Koran to children is not credible based on detainee’s lack of religious education and credentials. According to Muhammad Yahya Muhsin al-Zaylai, ISN US9SA- 000055DP (SA-055, transferred), the Pakistani warden of the prison where the Dirty 30 were first held instructed the group to say they were in Afghanistan to teach the Koran and to study religion when they are interrogated by US forces. Majid Mahmud Abdu Ahmad, ISN US9YM-

7 000027 302 18-MAR-2002, 000045 302 19-MAY-2002, IIR 6 034 0053 05, 000045 MFR 10-APR-2002, IIR 6 034 0304 02 8 TD-314/00845-02 9 000026 MFR 24-APR-2002, IIR 6 034 1606 03, Casio Watch Electronic Analysis Report, Analyst Note: This model of watch has been linked to al-Qaida and other terrorist groups in the use improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Reports indicate that al-Qaida distributed Casio watches to students in the watch timer course included in explosives training. 10 TD-314/50613-01 section G 11 Analyst Note: Approximately $133 US. 12 Analyst Note: Approximately $17 US. 13 Analyst Note: Detainee was noted as captured with a $100 bill in 000030 302 10-JUL-2003. Detainee was questioned regarding the $100 bill and he responded facetiously it “possibly” came from UBL and acknowledged it had “gotten him in a lot of trouble.” In 000252 302 20-JUN-2003, ISN US9YM-000252DP reported LY-212 gave $100 US bills to all the Arabs in a prison near Parachinar. However, the bill is not listed in the JTF-GTMO master pocket litter index, and its current disposition is unknown.

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JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000030DP (S)

000041DP (YM-041), also reported the Koran-teaching cover story was false. Detainee persistently maintains his cover story throughout his detainment despite evidence to the contrary. Detainee repeatedly lies about his associations to known al-Qaida associates, such as Hamza Salim Umar Bin Salim al-Qaiti aka (Hamza al-Qaiti) and Shaykh al-Wadi. Detainee’s stated activities during trips to Afghanistan are uncorroborated and extremely vague. It is apparent from his placement at locations such as UBL’s airport complex in Kandahar, and from his inclusion in a group of UBL bodyguards with UBL in his Tora Bora Mountain Complex, that detainee has considerable associations left to exploit. He denies receiving any training and refuses to answer even the most mundane question if he perceives it to be part of an interrogation, which indicates he has some counter-interrogation training. Detainee continues to withhold all information of intelligence value, demonstrating his continued support to extremism.

7. (U) Detainee Threat:

a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies.

b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: Detainee is a member of al-Qaida and a former UBL Bodyguard. Detainee was in the company of UBL and his bodyguards in UBL’s Tora Bora Mountain Complex and participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces as a member of UBL’s 55th Arab Brigade. Detainee stayed at and visited several Taliban and al-Qaida affiliated Training Camps and guesthouses, one of which was run by a known Yemeni terrorist and current fugitive from Yemeni and US authorities, Hamza al- Qaiti. Detainee probably attended an institution in Yemen tied to radical Islam and was recruited by Shaykh al-Wadi. Detainee continues to demonstrate extremist behavior at JTF- GTMO and is likely to reestablish his membership to al-Qaida if released.

Detainee is a member of al-Qaida and a UBL Bodyguard. (S//NF) Yasin Muhammad Salih Mazeeb Basardah, ISN US9YM-000252DP (YM-252), identified detainee as a UBL bodyguard who fought in Tora Bora and befriended Hassan Muhammad Ali Bin Attash, ISN PK9SA-001456DP (SA-1456).14 (S//NF) Mohamedou Ould Slahi, ISN US9MR-000760DP (MR-760), stated Abd al-Bin Muhammad Bin Abess Ourgy, ISN US9TS-000502DP (TS-502), and Abd al- Latif Nassir, ISN US9MO-000244DP (MO-244), informed him detainee was a bodyguard for UBL.15 (S//NF) Arkan Muhammad Ghafil al-Karim, ISN US9IZ-000653DP (IZ-653), photo-identified detainee as a member of al-Qaida and UBL’s group due to detainee’s

¡000252 FM40 26-SEP-2006 15 IIR 6 034 1262 04, Bodyguard Profile INTSUM 23-OCT-2006

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JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000030DP (S)

association with the “Kandahar Airport group.” 16 (Analyst Note: Though IZ-653 emphasized it was “well known” that anyone who associated with the Kandahar airport was “automatically associated as being a member of UBL’s group.” IZ-653 did not provide an explanation for this relationship or detail how detainee was linked to the group.)

(S//NF) IZ-653 is probably referring to UBL’s Airport Complex, located near the Kandahar airport. The Complex was comprised of multiple houses for UBL, his wives, respective families, and approximately ten to fifteen security guards with their families. 17 UBL and Abu Muhammad al-Masri (the commander of al- Faruq) commonly used the Complex for meetings with al-Qaida officials.

¡ (S//NF) Detainee was in the company of UBL and his bodyguards in UBL’s Tora Bora Mountain Complex and participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces as a member of UBL’s former 55th Arab Brigade. (S//NF) Ahmad Khalfan Ghailani, ISN US9TZ-010012DP (TZ-10012), an al- Qaida member and a key suspect in the US Embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998, stated detainee served in a logistical support role to Arabs (assessed to be UBL’s 55th Arab Brigade) assigned to the front lines north of Kabul. TZ-10012 claimed detainee would deliver supplies to the front lines in the mountains once a week and would also transport troop rotations to the front line area. According to TZ- 10012, Nashwan Abd al-Razzaq Abd al-Baqi, aka (Abdul Hadi al-Iraqi), ISN US9IZ- 010026DP (IZ-10026), was in charge of the Arabs on the front lines.18 (S//NF) YM-252 stated he lived and fought with detainee in the Taloqan area of Northern Afghanistan in mid-2001 for approximately one month. Detainee and YM- 252 lived at a safe house owned by Hamza al-Qaiti.19 Detainee left the area about one week after the 11 September 2001 attacks and traveled to Kabul, AF and then to Jalalabad, AF. In Jalalabad, detainee transported clothing and supplies from Jalalabad to Tora Bora, which he continued until the initiation of the bombing of Jalalabad. Detainee then fled to Tora Bora and fought in the Wadi Mahghan valley region in Afghanistan.20 YM-252 further described detainee as a friend and advisor to al-Qaida explosives trainer, Awad Khalifah Muhammad Abu Bakr Abu Uwayshah al-Barasi, ISN US9LY-000695DP (LY-695).21 (Analyst Note: LY-695 led an Arab group in Taloqan which fought for UBL’s 55th Arab Brigade.22)

16 IIR 6 034 1329 03 17 IIR 4 201 0845 06, IIR 4 201 2114 06, IIR 6 034 0124 05, TD-314/09060-03 18 TD-314/42540-05 19 000252 SIR 31-DEC-2004, IIR 6 034 0993 03, 000252 302 17-MAR-2003 20 IIR 4 201 0847 05, 000252 302 17-MAR-2003, IIR 6 034 1427 03, 000252 FM40 23-FEB-2005 21

¢000252 FM40 05-APR-2005 22

¢IIR 6 034 1267 03, IIR 6 034 0128 05, IIR 6 034 1267 03, IIR 6 034 1313 03, 000079_KBS_19-OCT-2005, IIR 6 034 0128 05

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JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000030DP (S)

(S//NF) IZ-653 also reported detainee fought against the Northern Alliance north of Kabul and served as a driver on the Taliban lines.23 (S//NF) Suspected 11 September 2001 20th hijacker, Muhammad Mani Ahmad al-Shalan al-Qahtani, ISN US9SA-000063DP (SA-063), identified detainee from Tora Bora.24 (Analyst Note: SA-063 was captured with detainee.) (S//NF) Detainee was captured after fleeing from hostilities at UBL’s Tora Bora Mountain Complex along with the other members of the Dirty 30.25

(S//NF) SA-063, who also traveled and was captured with the group, stated they were the first to leave UBL’s Tora Bora Mountain Complex and traveled to Pakistan after UBL left them.26

(S//NF) YM-252 stated “if you were in Tora Bora, you were not innocent. You were there to fight.”27

¡ (S//NF) Detainee stayed and visited several Taliban and al-Qaida affiliated training camps and guesthouses, one of which was run by a known Yemeni terrorist and current fugitive from Yemeni and US authorities, Hamza al-Qaiti.28 (S//NF) Rida Fadhil al-Walili, ISN US9EG-000663DP (EG-663, transferred), recognized detainee from the al-Qaiti Guesthouse in mid-2001.29 (S//NF) TZ-10012 commented detainee was a close associate of a Yemeni named Hamza al-Qaiti. TZ-10012 reportedly saw Hamza several times in Kabul and Kandahar and stated sometimes detainee and Hamza were together when detainee drove the route to the mountains. TZ-10012 said Hamza was with IZ-10026, but broke away and started his own group in 2000.30

(S//NF) Hamza al-Qaiti is a Yemeni national and a veteran of militant operations in Bosnia and Afghanistan, and operated a guesthouse in Kabul that supported fighters on the front lines. Al-Qaiti is also known for establishing a training camp for extremists, which competed with UBL’s camps. Sharqawi Abdu Ali al-Hajj, aka (Riyadh the Facilitator), ISN PK9YM-001457DP (YM- 1457), stated al-Qaiti had splintered from al-Qaida. Al-Qaiti reportedly fled to Iran, where YM-1457 thought he had been arrested.31

23 IIR 6 034 1330 03, 000653 302 25-JUN-2003, IIR 6 034 1331 03, 000653 FM40 28-JUL-2003 24 000063 MFR 14-APR-2004 25

¢IIR 6 034 1131 03, IIR 6 034 0847 03, Bodyguard Profile INTSUM 23-OCT-2006 26 000063 SIR 14-APR-2003, IIR 6 034 0847 03 27

¢000252 SIR 31-DEC-2004 28 Analyst Note: The guesthouses/safe houses are used by the Taliban and/or al-Qaida to house individuals for the purpose of training at Taliban or al-Qaida training camps. 29 TD-314/25881-02 30 TD-314/42540-05 31 IIR 6 034 0059 05, Analyst Note: A variant of Qaiti includes Qaeeti. Other reporting corroborates after leading a group of Arabs to Konar province, AF al-Qaiti visited a safe house in Iran, and possibly fled to Uzbekistan. See IIR 6 034 0395 05 and 000553 KB 05-12-2002. Reporting also indicates al-Qaiti formed his own splinter group based in Kabul, but still visited Kandahar. See TD-314/08570-03, TD-314/36901-03.

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JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000030DP (S)

(S//NF) SA-063 reported detainee was present at a guesthouse in Kandahar.32 (S//NF) TZ-10012 identified detainee as using the alias Abu Hammam. TZ- 10012 first met detainee at the al-Faruq Training Camp in Kabul in 1999.33 (Analyst Note: This placement chronologically correlates with detainee’s alleged initial missionary trip to Afghanistan.) (S//NF) Variations of detainee’s name and alias were found on a document recovered from raids on suspected al-Qaida guesthouses in Pakistan. This list identifies the contents of detainee’s trust account as a passport, ID cards, and photographs.34 (Analyst Note: Such lists are indicative of an individual’s residence within al-Qaida, Taliban, and other extremist guesthouses, often for the purpose of training or coordination prior to travel to the front lines or abroad. Trust accounts, also referred to as safety boxes or safety deposit boxes, were simple storage compartments such as envelopes or folders that guesthouse administrators used to secure the individual’s personal valuables, such as passports and plane tickets. These items were entrusted to the guesthouse until completion of training or other activity.)

(S//NF) Detainee probably attended an institution in Yemen tied to radical Islam and was recruited by Shaykh al-Wadi. (S//NF) Detainee admitted Shaykh al-Wadi provided him the funding for his travel to Afghanistan.35 (Analyst Note: Shaykh al-Wadi was the founder of the al- Dimaj Institute which served as the predominant Salafist style school within Yemen. While the institute engaged in religious studies, it also facilitated the recruitment and training of extremist elements.36)

¡ (S//NF) Select students were often taken from the al-Dimaj institute to train in the military arts at the Wadi al-Jubarah training camp. This training included instruction in firearms, bomb-making, and assassination. Students were recruited from the al-Dimaj institute to participate in violent militant operations.37

¡ (S//NF) Shaykh al-Wadi was one of the most influential Yemeni Islamic leaders who preached and financed jihad. Shaykh al-Wadi’s followers declared their willingness to follow UBL, who himself was strongly influenced by the anti- Western ideas of Shaykh al-Wadi.38

¡ (S//NF) Other assessed al-Qaida members captured with detainee who were also influenced by Shaykh al-Wadi include YM-041, Uthman Abd al-Rahim Muhammad Uthman, ISN US9YM-000027DP (YM-027), Abd al-Qadir Hussayn

32 000063 MFR 14-APR-2004 33 TD-314/42540-05 34 TD-314/47683-03, number 8; TD-314/42895-02, number 8 35 000030 302 13-JAN-2003, 000030 302 06-APR-2002, TD-314/50613-01 36

¢DIMAJ Institute Expansion INTSUM 01-JUN 2005, TD-314/28801-02, IIR 6 034 1286 03 37

¢IIR 4 240 0941 08 38 GMP20010211000089, TD-314/12546-01

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al-Mudhaffari, ISN US9YM-000040DP (YM-040), and Ali Ahmad Muhammad al-Razihi, ISN US9YM-00045DP (YM-045).39

(S//NF) Detainee continues to demonstrate extremist behavior at JTF-GTMO and is likely to reestablish his membership to al-Qaida if released. (S//NF) Ghaleb Nasir Awadh al-Bayhani, aka (Yarmuk al-Tabuki), ISN US9YM- 000128DP (YM-128), reported detainee committed self harm as a joke and demonstration of support. Detainee wrapped the sheet around his neck after the guards took Muhammad Hamid al-Qarani, ISN US9CD-000269DP (CD-269) out of his cell.40 (S//NF) Ali Abd al-Motalib Awayd Hassan al-Tayeea, ISN US9IZ-000111DP (IZ-111), was informed by detainee he had been approached and recruited by the three detainees who had committed suicide.41 (S//NF) On 17 May 2008, detainee was reported ordering fellow detainees to “stop singing that song, we will sing it on Monday when our brothers leave.” 42 (Analyst note: It was assessed he meant planned suicide attempts.) (S//NF) Abd al-Hakim Abd al-Karim Amin Bukhari, ISN US9SA-000493DP (SA-493, transferred), identified detainee as a member of the al-Azariqah group (a group trained in depriving themselves of food.) that are here in GTMO.43 (Analyst Note: Detainee’s comments and behavior indicate he views his detention as a continuance of jihad against US forces, and suicide of a detainee would therefore be justifiable under the guise of martyrdom.)

c. (S//NF) Detainee’s Conduct: Detainee is assessed as a HIGH threat from a detention perspective. His overall behavior has been non-compliant and hostile to the guard force and staff. Detainee currently has 456 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS with the most recent occurring on 12 May 2008, when he was in possession of contraband. He has 134 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction for assault with the most recent occurring on 16 April 2008, when he urinated on the guard force. Other incidents for which detainee has been disciplined include inciting and participating in mass disturbances, failure to follow guard instructions and camp rules, inappropriate use of bodily fluids, unauthorized communications, damage to government property, attempted assaults, assaults, provoking words and gestures, exposure of sexual organs, and possession of food and non-weapon type contraband. On 12 January 2008, detainee was reported to be in possession of a potential weapon consisting of a piece of foil made into a point. In 2007, he had a total of 125 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction and 125 so far in 2008.

39 IIR 6 034 1440 04, TD-314/50977-02, IIR 6 034 0046 03, IIR 6 034 0406 02, 000045 302 19-MAY-2002, IIR 6 034 0304 02 40

¡000128 SIR 06-NOV-2007 41

¡000111 SIR 06-JUN-2007, 000111 SIR 07-JUN-2007 42

¡ JTF_GTMO_JDG_INTSUM_2008 05 17 (2) 43

¡000493 SIR 27-APR-2007

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JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000030DP (S)

8. (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:

a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of MEDIUM intelligence value. Detainee’s most recent interrogation session occurred on 10 October 2007.

b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Detainee is a committed extremist with direct and indirect access to several key extremist personalities. Detainee was associated with Shaykh al-Wadi and Hamza al-Qaiti. Reporting identified detainee at the al-Faruq Training Camp, on the Kabul front lines in 1999, at the Kandahar Airport Complex, and in UBL’s Tora Bora Mountain Complex during 2001. No reporting indicates detainee served in a leadership or operational planning capacity.

c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee should have knowledge concerning operations on the front lines, as well as various guesthouses throughout Afghanistan. Detainee may also possess knowledge concerning logistical support to enemy troops in UBL’s Tora Bora Mountain Complex region and information on the al-Dimaj Institute. Detainee can possibly provide specific and unique biographic information on Hamza al-Qaiti, as well as other high-level al-Qaida and Taliban members who were co-located with detainee in Afghanistan.

d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:

Human factors and foreign influence threats

Biographics for key warfighters and prominent civilian leadership in CENTCOM AOR

Al-Qaida personalities, logistics, recruitment, training camps, and guesthouses

The front lines in Afghanistan to include personalities and logistics

UBL’s Tora Bora Mountain Complex

Terrorist travel facilitators

Terrorism: Radicalization factors Al-Dimaj Institute and its associates, personalities, curriculum, teachings, and associated organizations

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JTF-GTMO-CDR SITBJECT:Recommendation for ContinuedDetention Under DoD Control(CD) for GuantanamoDetainee, ISN US9YM-000030DP(S)

9, (S) EC Status: Detainee'senemy combatantstatus was reassessedon 4 November 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant.

Rear Admiral, US Navy Commanding

- Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessmentcan be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College October 2001 guide Intelligence Warning Terminology.

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