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DEPARTMENTOF DEFENSE HEADQUARTERS,JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO U.S.NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, APOAE 09360

JTF-GTMO-CDR 8 December2006

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander,United StatesSouthem Command. 3511 NW 9lst Avenue. Miami,FL33172

SUBJECT: CombatantStatus Review Tribunal Input and Recommendationfor Continued DetentionUnder DoD Control (CD) for GuantanamoDetainee, ISN: US9SA-010015DP(S)

JTF-GTMO DetaineeAssessment

l. (S//NF) Personal Information:

o JDIMSA{DRC ReferenceName: Abd al-RahimHussein Muhammad Abdah al-Nashiri o Aliases and Current/True Name: SaeedAbdallah Oasemal- Mansouri.Abu al-Miqdad.Abu Bilal al-Makki. Muhammad Umr al-Harazi.al-Hajj Ahmad. MahlzoobOa'ed Sa'id al- Outabi.Eid al-Harbi.Eid A'yed Shannanal-Mo'abbadi. Muthib Thawab al-Mutayri. al-Ahnaf o Placeof Birth: Mecca. SaudiArabia (SA) o Date of Birth: 5 January1965 o Citizenship: Yemen (YM) o InternmentSerial Number (ISN): US9SA-010015DP

2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detaineeis in good health.

3. (S/NF) JTF-GTMO Assessment:

^. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommendsthis detaineefor ContinuedDetention Under DoD Control (CD).

b. (S/NF) Executive Summary: Detaineeis one of al-Qaida'smost skilled, capable,and prolific operational coordinators. Detaineereported directly to UBL and led his own al- Qaida group that was responsiblefor conducting operationsoutside of . Detaineehas been linked to as many as a dozen plots to attackUS and westem intereststo

CLASSIFIEDBY: MULTIPLESOURCES REASON:E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C) DECLASSIFYON: 20311208

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includethe successfulUSS COLE and M/V LIMBURG attacks. Detaineehas close connectionsto most senioral-Qaida members and a long history ofjihadist activity. JTF- GTMO determinedthis detaineeto be:

o A HIGH risk, ashe is likely to posea threatto the US, its interestsand allies. o A HIGH threat from a detention perspective. o Of HIGH intellisencevalue.

4. (S/NF) Account of Detainee'sTimeline:

The following section is based on a consolidation of several accountsfrom various significant individuals in order to assemblea feasible timeline.

a. (S//NF) Timeline from 1992 to 1997: From 1992to 1993,detainee fought in the Tajikistanjihadr wherehe met al-Qaidaoperative, Walid MuhammadSalih Bin Attash aka (Iftallad) aka (Silver), for the first time. The leader of detainee'sgroup during the trip was Hamzaal-Ghamdi, who had beenUsama Bin Laden's (UBL) bodyguardand a long-time jihadist.2 In 1993,detainee trained at al-Qaida'sJihad-Wal Campnear Khowst, Rfgnanistan (AF), where he met al-Qaida operative, for the first time.r Later in 1994, detaineeand Khallad met UBL in Jalalabad,AF, where the two of them stayedin a UBL guesthousefor a week. During that time, detaineelistened to UBL speakabout the coming battle with the US. Detaineeeventually returned to Saudi Arabia then traveled to Yemen while Khallad remainedin Afghanistan.a In 1995,detainee, Hamza al-Ghamdi and a 10-15member group were en route to northem Afghanistan to fight in the Tajik , but were unable to cross the border into Tajikistan. Detaineethen traveled to southem Afghanistan where he learnedUBL had returned from Sudan.t By late 1996,detainee wanted to leam the statusof some of his uncles who had gone to Afghanistan for jihad. He also wanted to know more about the Taliban. During this timeframe,while Harrzaal-Ghamdi was servingas one of UBL's bodyguards, detaineesaw UBL for the secondtime, in Kandahar, and listened to him speakabout the coming battlewith the US.6 In early1997, detainee stayed in Afghanistan,traveling back and forth from Kandahar to the front lines of and Jalalabad. Detainee said he fousht

' TD-3| 4/ 1I 500-04,TD-3 t4 I 1| | 64-03 'TD-314t38699-03 t to-ztqtqgSs3-oz oro-zutszzzg-oz t ro-z ur eqt77-03, TD -3 t4 I t7 348-04 " TD-3t4 I t] 348-04,TD-3 I 4t 52239-02

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JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: CombatantStatus Review Tribunal Input and Recommendationfor Continued DetentionUnder DoD Control (CD) for GuantanamoDetainee, ISN: US9SA-010015DP(S)

with the Taliban againstthe United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (UIFSA), but was not a commander. Detaineecontracted malaria while visiting the front lines and becamevery ill so he returned to Kandaharwhere he again met UBL while staying at UBL's airport guesthouse.T

b. (S/NF) Timeline from 1998 to 2000: In 1998,after learningof his cousinJihad Harazi's suicidebombing of the US Embassyin Kenya, detaineejoined al-Qaida. By this time detaineecompletely agreed with UBL's messageto attackthe US. Oncehe joined al- Qaida, detaineetrained at Ibn al-Khattab's camp and trained on a variety of weapons. Sometimein 1998,detainee met privately with UBL and was introducedto the idea of attackinga westernvessel off the coastof Yemen. A week later,he traveledto Yemen.8 Around late-1998to early-1999,detainee fled back to Afghanistanafter learningthat Khallad was detainedby Yemeni authorities.n In late spring 1999, after six-to-sevenmonths in Afghanistan,UBL provided detaineewith $2,000USD to return to Yemen,purchase a boat, 'u and observethe travel of US Navy shipsand oil tankersoff the coast. Detaineecased the Red Seain a powerboatover the courseof three-to-fourmonths. In Septemberor October 1999,UBL recalleddetainee to Afghanistan,requesting a summaryof his findings. Detainee reportedhaving seenseveral oil tankers,but no US Navy shipsin the area... UBL then instructeddetainee to caseactivity in the Port of Aden, YM." In late November 1999,detainee flew back to Yemen, and,per UBL's instructions,met with Jamal Muhammad Ahmed Ali al-Badawi, a suspectin the COLE attack. In February 2000, after the attackon the USS THE SULLIVANS failed due to the explosives-ladenboat capsizing and sinking soon after it was launched,detainee returned to Afghanistan. Despite the setback,UBL told detaineeto try the operation again.l2 Upon returning to Yemen in September2000, detaineechose Hassan al-Khamiri and Ibrahim al-Thawr aka (al-Nebras)to be his suicideoperatives for the operationthat would eventuallyoccur againstthe USS COLE. Detaineereceived a phonecall from Khallad who told him that UBL wantedthem replaced. Detaineewas angry about this decision and went to Afghanistan immediately to talk to UBL and explain that changing operativeswould set things back. Prior to departing for Afghanistan, detaineegave his two operativesin Yemen instructions to carry out the attack on the next US warship that enteredthe port." Two-to-three weeks after detainee

' TD-3 t4 I 52239-02,TD-3 14t09 594-03 " TD-314/08879-04 ' to-: t+logazg-o+ t0 To3 ruI 52239-02,TD -3 t4 I 0887g -04 " TD-314104078-03 '2to-3t+/08819-04 t3tn-3r4/08879-04

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retumedto Afghanistan,USS COLE was attackedby his operatives.laDetainee met with UBL in November 2000,and following the meetingreturned to the front lines.rs

c. (S//NF) Timeline from 2001 to 20022 In January 200I, detaineetraveled from Karachi to Lahore, (PK), to recruit operativesfor a Strait of Hormuz (SoH) operation.l6In March or April 2001, UBL instructed detaineeto go to Karachi and researchthe availability and price of a large fishing boat for the SoH attack. UBL told detaineeto take Muhammad HasanGhulam Rabbani aka (Abu Badr al-Pakistani),ISN US9PK-001461DP(PK-1461), with him for assistance.Detainee and PK-1461 spenttwo weeksin Karachi collecting information before detaineeretumed to Afghanistan to adviseUBL that the boats they saw were expensiveand had mechanicalproblems. UBL instructed detaineeto retum to Karachi and looked for a fishing boat large enoughto hold two smaller boats. UBL provided detainee additional money and instructed him to begin searchingfor a ship; researchthe availability and cost of a small fishing boat; learn Karachi's boat registrationprocess; and studythe Port of Karachi's entry and exit proceduresusing fishing expeditionsas cover. UBL told detainee to take Umayr Bin Attash, ISN PK9SA-001456DP(5A-.1456), with him to Karachi. SA- ' 1456cooked and ran errandsfor detaineeand PK- I 461.' tnsteadof acquiringthe ship for the SoH operation in Karachi, detaineeultimately sent al-Qaida operativesto the UAE who thenpurchased a 300-400ton ship for the attacks.r8 On 11 September2001, detainee was recoveringin the LaiaqaHospital in Karachi following a tonsillectomy.reWhen he learnedof the attacksandthe pendingUS-led military response,he hurried his recovery and returned to the front lines in Afghanistan.2otn October 2001,detainee met with UBL in Kabul and was told to completethe SoH operationso he headedtoward Pakistan.2l Detaineetraveled to Kandahar around November 200122where he met with Khalid ShaykhMuhammad (KSM) to discussthe SoH operationand detainee's planned travel to Saudi Arabia and the UAE.23 Detaineethen traveled to the Zormatregion of Afghanistan2aand the mountainsbetween Kabul and Khowst, where he, Khallad, and Abu Faraj al-Libi fought under the command of Abdul Hadi al-Iraqi.25 Around

'o TD-314105653-03, TD-3 l4108879-04 " TD-3r4105653-03 'uto-314/09 594-03 " TD-314111991-03,TD-314138975-02, Analyst Note: SA-1456is thebrother of KhalladBin Atrash. 't TD-314/38682-02 'n TD-3r4138 682-02 'oTD-3r4/05653-03 2t to4tqrcg5t5-03 22 tn4lqrcg515-03, TD-314129818-03,Analyst Note: I1TD-314129878,the senior al-Qaida members reportedly met in Zormatin December2002, but thesemeetings are assessed to havetaken place in December2001 vice 2002. " TD-3r4r 12068-03, TD-3 t4 138532-02 'o TD-3 | 4r 095l 5-03, TD-3 | 4I 2987B -03 " TD-3r4r o3l4 I -03,TD-3 t4l I 3836-03

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November/December2001, Abu Zubaydah traveled to Zormat for an informal meeting with most of the al-Qaida leadershipincluding KSM, Abu Muhammad al-Masri, Abu Tayyib, Abu Yasir al-Jazaii, and Sayf al-Adel.26 By December,detainee was still inZormatmeeting with his mujahid associatesKhallad, Abu Faraj al-Libi, and KSM planningfor more attacks.2T Around January 2002, Abu Zubaydah facilitated detainee'stravel to Bannu, PK,28 from Birmal, AF, with a group of 10-15mujahideen.'n During Januaryor February2})z,detainee visited PK-1461 in Karachi and togetherthey helpedfacilitate the travel plans of out of Afghanistan.'" Detaineestayed at a housewith Khallad and his brother,SA-1456, for severaldays, then provided the houseto Abdu Ali al-Hajj Sharqawi aka (Riyadh the Facilitator),ISN PK9YM-001457DP(YM-1457). While at this house,KSM and Khallad discussedtryrng to help his associatesin Pakistanflee to their home countries.3rMeanwhile, KSM put togethera training programfor assassinationsand kidnappings32as well aspistol and computer training. The training was not intended to preparethe participants for any specificoperation but to keepthe residentsof the safehouses occupied. KSM told the men to prepareto departfor other countriesas,soon as possible and that they shouldplan and executesmall operationsagainst the US." In March 2002, detaineetraveled to the Arabian Peninsulavia Indonesiaand Baneladesh. He then traveled between Qatar, Oman, the UAE, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia.3aWniG in Dubai in March 2002,detainee contacted and met with SanadYislam al-Kazimi. ISN US9YM-001453DP(YM-1453), who he askedto casethe road from UAE to Yemen,via Oman. Detaineetold YM-1453 that he intendedto use a truck to transportexplosives along this route and wantedYM-1453 to report on the sec-uritysituation to includethe presenceof roadblocksand the level of securityat the borders." While detaineewas in Dubai, Khallad telephonedhim on approximatelythree occasions: first to advisehim that the Moroccancell memberswho were casingfor the SoG operationneeded money; second,to tell him that Saudi national Zayd al-Khayr had called with an offer to acquire prepaid telephonecards from Indonesia;third, to tell him that Yemeni cell memberWalid al-Shaybaneeded someone with explosivesexpertise to placeexplosives in a boat for the Yemen operation.36tn April 2002, detaineevisited Qatar; he attemptedto enter Saudi Arabia, but was denied entry.

2uTD-314r5t970-02 27 ro3 ur 03r4 I -03,TD-3 l 4/0951 5-03, TD-3 I 4I lgt 55 -04, TD -3 t4ln 500-04 " TD-31 4/ 49853-02, TD-3 l411 0 I 33-03,TD-3 I 4/11 500-04 2n to3 u r 257go-03, TD-3 t4 l2zzg4 -02 t^0. TD-3 | 4I og5I 5-03, TD -3 14 I 24552-02 '' TD-3l4l11500-04 " rD4 r4rtor 33-03,TD-3 14t39587 -02 " TD-314/06945-03 34To3rurc7rc2-03 " tD-3t4r+8167-03 'u TD-3l4lOll62-03,AnalystNote: The Yemenioperation is assessedto referto the attackon the M/V LIMBURG.

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Detaineetherefore retumed to Dubai and halted work on the SoH operation.3TTwo months after the SoH operation was abandoneddetainee began planning for the Port Rashid operation.roln June 2002,detainee was in Dubai to find and sell the ship acquiredby MuhammadAhmad Haza al-Darbi,ISN US9SA-000768DP(5,{-763) for the abortedSoH operation;however, he could not-locatethe ship. In July 2002, detaineerented an apartment in Dubai and met with YM-1 4533eregarding the procurementof explosives for the Port Rashidoperation. They alsowent to the Dubai flyrng club to checkon pilot lessons.a0In September2002, after about a month in Saudi Arabia, detaineeretumed to Dubai to review the Port Rashid project and received word from Abu Hajir that plans for the attack on the US Embassyin Riyadh were continuing(NFI).ot In October 2002,Abu Shahidcalled detaineeto celebratethe successfulMA/ LIMBURG attack and to advise that he was redirecting all his attention toward attacking the US Embassyin Sanaa,YM.42

5. (S/NF) Capture Information:

a. (S/A{F) On2I November 2002,senior US officials told the pressthat detaineewas capturedin the UAE earlier in the month and was in US custody.a3

b. (S) Property Held: None

c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 4 September2006

d. (S/NF) Reasonsfor Transfer to JTF-GTMO: Detaineewas transferredto JTF- GTMO to faceprosecution for terroristactivities against the .

6. (S/NF) DetaineeThreat:

a. (S) Assessment: Detaineeis assessedto be a HIGH risk, as he is likely to posea threat to the US, its interestsand allies.

b. (S//NF) Reasonsfor Continued Detention: Detaineeis one of the highest-ranking, most skilled, and dangerousal-Qaida operativescaptured to date. He has a proven ability to

3tTD-3 l4109515-03 'r tD -3| 4r 07 | 62-03,TD-3 I 4/095I 5-03, TD-3 I 4/I 383 6-03, m -3| 4I 39022-03 'n To4 rurcg5I 5-03,TD-3 t4 I tl 280-03 n'TD-3r4107162-03 ot TD-314r07162-03 o'TD3uro7t62-03 o'TERR-005 -022-2oo4,TD-3t4t22893-05,ICC DAILy TERRoRISMsuMMARy 22-Nov-2002, GMP20040602000010

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plan and carry out attacksagainst the US, its interestsand allies, is linked to as many as a dozenplots to attackUS and western interests. Detaineemasterminded the October 2000 attack againstthe USS COLE and the October 2002 attackagainst the merchantvessel (M/V) LIMBIIRG. From at leastApril2001, detaineedirected maritime and land-basedterrorist attacks,many targeting US military interests,to include (but not limited to) a plot to sink a US warship or tanker in the Strait of Hormuz (SoH) intended to block the Strait; a plot using an explosives-filled airplane againstwestern warships at Port Rashid, Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE); a plot to blow up the US Embassyin Sanaa,YM; maritime attacksin the Red Seaand off the coastsof al-Hudaydahand Aden, YM; and a disrupted maritime operationtargeting US, United Kingdom (UK), and other NATO ships and submarinesin the Strait of Gibraltar(SoG). Detaineehas direct, long-termlinks to most senioral-Qaida membersand is a long term participantin militant jihad.

o (S//II{F) Detaineeis one of al-Qaida'smost skilled and capableoperational coordinatorswho headedhis own al-Qaida group comprisedmostly of Saudisand Yemenis. His cell was responsiblefor conductingsuicide and sabotageoperations outsideof Afghanistan.aaDetainee explained that he dealtdirectly with UBL without any intermediaries.Detainee and KSM mutually agreedto avoid eachother's operationsjust in caseeither was arrested.asDetainee has been considered more seniorin al-Qaidathan KSM and did not have to answerto anyoneregarding financial matters and the spending of al-Qaidamoney.ou Detainee is so dedicatedto jihad that he reportedlyreceived injections to promote impotenceand recommendedthe injections to others so more time could be spenton thejihad (ratherthan being distractedby women).47 o (S/A{F) Detaineeconceived, planned, organized,and led numerousplots againstUS interestsand allies including the successfulattacks on the USS COLE and FrenchM/V LIMBLIRG. o (S/A{F) Detaineewas the senior operative who mastermindedand coordinated the USS COLE attackin Yemen.a8 . (S/A{F) According to detainee,at a private meetingin Afghanistanin 1998, the original idea for the attack on the USS COLE was relayed to him directly by UBL. The objectivewas to attacka US or westernoil tankeroff the coastof Yemen. Detaineetraveled to Yemen a week later and his teambegan the process of assemblingthe necessarycomponents, such as a boat and explosives,and beganthe requisitetraining and surveillance.ae

oorD 4 I 4I 16930-02,TD-3 | 4t34532-02 ot TD-3r4rt6245-04 ouTD-314/38975-02 o7IIR 6 0440068 02 ot TERR-005-022-2004,ANTITERRoRISM FoRCE pRoTECTIoN 22-Nov-2002 onTD-314/08879-04

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' (S/A{F) Fawazal-Rabii aka (Furqanal-Tajiki),s0 an operativein the USS COLE attack, reported that the attack was authorized and funded by I-JBL, planned by the detainee,.andcarried out by Hassanal-Khamiri and Ibrahim al- Thawr aka (al-Nebras).'' . (S//lrf; Detaineestated the USS COLE suicidebombers, Hassan and Nebras, were chosenbecause Hassan knew the areaand Nebrascould operatethe boat.s2 o (S/A{F) Before successfullyattacking the USS COLE, detaineeorganized and attempteda similar attackon the USS THE SULLIVANS. The mission failed becausethe boat with the explosives capsizedand sank after it was launchedfor the attack.s3 o (S/A{F) Detaineeplanned the successfulsuicide attack on the French oil tanker M/V LIMBIIRG,S4as requested by UBL.ss o (S/AfD Detaineeadmitted that he was involved in a plan to attack oil tankers in the Arabian Gulf/SoH using suicideoperatives in six-to-sevenmeter-long explosive- laden boats. Detaineeplanned to lower smaller boats into the seafrom a larger boat and have them attack tankers. Detaineesaid that the other al-Qaida personnel involved in the operationwere 5,4.-768and four Yemenis: Salman,Abu al-Shahid, Musab, and Gharib. Detainee statedthat UBL first talked to him about the plan in Afghanistan in April or May of 2001 and they talked about it again in Afghanistan in October2001. Detaineealso statedthat the operationwas canceledbecause of problemscommunicating _with UBL and the inability to acquirethe necessary explosivesfrom Pakistan.to . (S) 5A-768 confirmedhis participationin this operationwhen he admitted that he purchaseda boat for a terrorist attack at the direction of detainee. The vesselwas to be utilized againstan oil tankerin the SoH.s7 ' (S/AIF) 5A-1456 reportedthat PK-1461 knew of a largetransport ship and a plan by detaineeto conduct an attack againstUS shipping, probably in the SoH. SA-1456thought the ship might be usedas a mother ship and would deploy smallervessels located in or on the ship using a crane. Once deployed,the

50 AnalystNote: Fawaz,deceased as of I October 2006,is thebrother of JTF-GTMOdetainee Salman Yahya HassanMohammed Rabeii. ISN US9YM-000508DP. tt TD-3r4136314-03 tt to-3r4/38699-03 t' TD-314108 81 9 -04,TD-3 I 4/0801 9-04 soro3ruB$ 14-03 s5 tO-3 t+/08690-03,Analyst Note: The M/V LIMBURGwas bombed off theYemeni coast on 6 October2002. tu TD-314/06945-03,TD-ir4r26go5-04,TD-314 r38682-02,TD-314/09515-03, TD-314 nrggt-03 tt IIR 6 034 loo3 03

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smallerships would attackUS ships. SA-1456believed the ship was locatedin the UAE.58 o (S/A{F) The Port Rashidoperation was the successorto detainee'saborted SoH plot. The operationinvolved hijacking an airplanefrom a local airfield, loading it with explosives and then flying it into a western warship docked at Port Rashid.se Detaineeexplained that he had plannedto instructYM-1453 to obtain explosivesfor use in the Port Rashid operation from Yemeni al-Qaida cell leaderAbu Shahid and to deliver the explosivesto the runway located at the Dubai flyt.rg club.60 . (S/AIF) According to YM-1453, detaineeinstructed him to scoutthe route from Yemen to the UAE and mentioned that a truck would eventually transport explosivesalong the route,hidden under produce or fish. Detaineehad YM-1453 fly over the proposedoperating area and took aerial photographsofal-Sharka Airport, UAE.6I . (S/AIF) KSM confirmedthe plans,which had beendevised by detaineeto target US aircraft carriers in Port Rashid, were to be executedby January2003. After detainee'sanest, the targetschanged to include US ships near Kuwait and Qatar.62 o (S/A{F) As of spring2002, a.l^-Qaidawas planning terrorist operationsagainst the US and UK Embassiesin Sanaa.o' The late Abu Hafs al-Masri aka (Muhammad Atef) selecteddetainee as one of two al-Qaidamembers to organizethe mechanics and logistics of the attacksagainst the US Embassyin Sanaausing an estimatedone ton of TNT; however, the attack was delayed due to the glII attacks.6aOperatives from detainee'scell proposedto acqu-ireassault rifles and explosivesand attackeither the US or the UK Embassyin Sanaa.ot . (S/A{F) Detaineeapproved the proposalagainst the embassiesin principal. Detaineeexpressed his interest in simultaneousoperations against as many embassiesas possible,but he instructedthat they attemptsingle or multiple attackson the embassiesin the priority order of US, UK, France,and Cuba. The attackswere to occur using Russian-manufacturedrockets and bombs. A small amount of detainee'sfunding was used for the purchaseof munitions for the

t8To-314131835-02 tnTERR-oo5 -022-2004 uoro3ur278l3-03 ut001453 sIR 01-ocr-2004, TD-314/08690-03 ut lD-314112984-03,Analyst Note: US aircraftcarriers are too largeto makeport callsat PortRashid, but they r-r^rakeport callsat JebelAli, alsoin the UAE. ", TD-314104879-03,ANTITERRORISM FORCE PROTECTION MESSAGE 28-FEB-2004, TD-314121827-04 uoTD-314/01604-02 65tr-3t+/00537-03

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proposedembassy attack. The grouphad discussedthe use of briefcasebomb attacksas a contingencyplan.66 . (S/AIF) Detaineewas involved in a plot involving smuggling vehicles and explosives from Oman to Yemen, possibly indicating plans to attack with my_ltiple vehicle-bomeimprovised explosive devices (VBIED's) in Yemen or Oman."' (Analyst Note: This line of reportingmay have come from detainee'sinstructions to YM-1453 to deliver explosivesfrom Yemen to the UAE for the Port Rashid operation.) o (S/A{F) Between December2001 and May 2002, planning was underway to identify potential US and Israeli targetsin (or near) Morocco for a SoG attack. In December200T, two Saudi nationals approacheddetainee inZormat and offered to identify potentialUS and Israelitargets in Morocco.6s Detaineeconfided in one of the Saudi nationals,Hilal al-Assiri, that he had been thinking for sometime about executing an operation againstNorth Atlantic alliance submarinesin the SoG and askedAssiri to monitor ship movements,rent an apartment,and buy a boat in order to be ready whenever detaineecontacted him to start the operation.6e . (S/AIF) Detaineeadvised the operativesthat he had personally chosenthe UK military basein Gibraltar to be the target for the operation. Detaineeexplained he had seena news documentaryon the baseand thought it was a good target. Detaineeprovided the operatives$10,000 USD for living andpreliminary operationalexpenses and instructedthem to conduct extensivesurveillance of the base. Abu Hijah, who had many friends in the Moroccan fishing industry, was instructedto leasea fishing boat to use as cover for the surveillance activity. Once the surveillancereport and operationalplans were complete, detaineewas to submit the reportto UBL for final approval.T0 . (S/A{F) In May or June 2002, KSM learnedof the disruptedplan to attack the military basein Gibraltar and was upsetwith detaineeas KSM had no idea that any such planning was underway or that any operativeshad been directed to Morocco in support of any such plan. In turn, Sayf al-Adel was upsetwith KSM as he also was unawareof the plan and assumedKSM had directed it without coordinatingwith him." (Analyst Note: This demonstratesdetainee operated separatelywithin al-Qaidafrom KSM and Sayf al-Adel's operations.)

ouTD-314/01554-03 ut ANTITERRoRISMFoRCE pRoTECTIoN 22-Nov-2002 ut TD-314/16245-04,TD-314/01869-03; Analyst Note: While TD-31 4101869-03 is wrinen as though detainee is a third-person,according to TD-314/16245-04,TD-314/01869-03 is a reportfromdetainee. u' TD-3r4r24552-02, TD-3 t4t 12998-03,TD-3 14 I 32216-02 'o TD-3r4101869-03 " TD-3r4n2068-03

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JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT:Combatant Status Review Tribunal Input andRecommendation for Continued DetentionUnder DoD Control(CD) for GuantanamoDetainee, ISN: US9SA-010015DP (S)

o (S/A{F) According to Abu Zubaydah,detainee and KSM had a plan for another attackin the US after 11 September2001. He notedthat the plan was blessedby IIBL sometimeafter the 9ll1 operations. Abu Zubaydahstated that, in his opinion, UBL wantedthe impact of this attackto be greaterthan thoseof 11 September200I. With that in mind, Abu Zubaydah believed that the plan called for either car and/or truck bombstargeted against large and/or tall buildings,in a 9/1l-style attack. Abu Zubaydahstated that the explosiveswill be manufacturedfrom chemicals,noting that "are such explosives easyto make," and identified the tN building as an almost certain target.'" o (S/A{F) Detaineemay have evaluatedpotential operationsin South Korea and the Philippines. In Afghanistan,in late 2001, detaineehad seenanother al-Qaida member'spassport which held a visa for SouthKorea. Detaineehad askedthat operative to temporarily surrenderhis passportso Khallad could make a copy of the SouthKorean visa stamp. The day after the al-Qaidamember gave Khallad his passport,he saw a high quality copy of the SouthKorean visa stampon nylon-like paper,which he believedwas usedto make a stampof the visa." ' (S/AIF) Abu Zubaydah said detaineewas planning an operation in Asia, not in the US as was previouslyreported.Ta o (S/A{F) In August 2002, Abu Hurayrah, brother of Ali Yahya al-Rimi, ISN US9YM-000167DP(YM-167), proposedto detaineea plan to attackUS aircraft in Oman using surface-to-airmissiles (SAMs). Abu Hurayrahclaimed he had acquiredmoney for the purchaseof the missiles. Detaineeinstructed Abu Hurayrah to travel to Yemen and buy as many weaponsand explosives as he could with the funds. In early October, Abu Hurayrah telephonedhim in Dubai from Yemen and indicated that weap-onsand explosiveswere not as easyto acquire in Yemen as once " had beenthe case. o (S/A{F) KSM encourageddetainee to conduct small operationsagainst US targets in Saudi Arabia, such as ambushesof US personsin automobilesand kidnappings of US citizens.T6 ' (S/A{F) A senior al-Qaida member said that during an unspecified timeframe detaineeand two Saudi cell memberscame upon a man whose car had broken down alongsidea road in Saudi Arabia. The cell membersinitially thought the man was a US citizen and wantedto kill him. When the cell membersdiscovered the man was not a US citizen,his life was spared.77

'' TD-3r4t16584-02 '3 to-3t+lo3o43-03 74to-314t03233-05 " TD-3r4rt1724-03 76ro4t+t06945-03 " tD-314102524-03

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JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT:Combatant Status Review Tribunal Input andRecommendation for Continued DetentionUnder DoD Control(CD) for GuantanamoDetainee, ISN: US9SA-010015DP (S)

o (S/A{F) Detaineewas reportedly involved in an operation targeting Ras Tanura Port, a major petroleumfacility in SaudiArabia.78 o (S/A{F) Detaineehas ties to numeroushigh-level al-Qaida leaders, some of most significantare below listed: o (S/A{F) Detaineeworked directly for UBLTeand pledgedbayat (an oath of allegiance)to him.80 Detaineebelieved he was being pushedby UBL to continue planningaggressive operations after 11 September2001 againstUS interestsin the Arabian Gulf region without much regard for his own security.8l Detaineesaid that he spokeopenly with UBL and,if he thoughtIIBL was wrong, he would tell him so. Detaineesaid if UBL wantedhim to participatein an operation,it would be incumbent upon UBL to convince detaineethe operationwas important to their carrse.82 o (S/AID Abu Hafs al-Masri aka (Muhammad Atefl: KSM reported that UBL placeddetainee in chargeof operationsin Yemen,which was isolatedfrom KSM's and Muhammad Atef s operationsalthough Muhammad Atef was the one primarily in chargeof all operations.83 o (S/A{F) Detaineeand KSM met in Kandaharand were both in Zormatwith many other senioral-Qaida members in December2001.84 Detainee also met with KSM on three different occasionsin late February 2002 in Karachi and met with 9/11 planner, RamziBin al-Shibh,ISN US9YM-010013DP(YM-l0013), at oneof the meetings.8s o (S/A{F) AbuZubaydah reported that detaineeis an al-Qaida operative who reported directly to UBL. Abu Zubaydah stateddetainee headed his own al-Qaida group comprisingmost Saudisand Yemenis,which was responsiblefor conducting operationsoutside of Afghanistan,similar to KSM.86 Abu Zubaydahhas known detaineesince 1993,87and addedthat it was well known detaineehas excellent contactswithin both the Yemeni tribes and Yemeni security services. Thesecontacts providedtravel documentsand cover for extremists.s8lAnalyst Note: Thesecontacts contributeto detainee'srisk if he is handedover to Yemeni officials.)

tt ANTITBRRORISMFORCE pRoTECTIoN 22-Nov-2002 'n TD-3r4t03387-03 80 tD-3 r4l13597-03 t' TD-3t4108690-03 t'tD-314n6245-04 t' TD-3r4135339-03 84 ro4ruDg878-03, TD-314112068-03,TD-314 138532-02,Analyst Note : In TD-31412g878,the senior al-Qaida membersreportedly met in Zormatin December2002, but thesemeetings are assessed to havetaken place in December2001 vice 2002. 85to-314/06945-03 tu rD4qn6g3o-02 87to-3t+t49853-02 88to-314/33916-02

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JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT:Combatant Status Review Tribunal Input andRecommendation for Continued DetentionUnder DoD Control(CD) for GuantanamoDetainee, ISN: US9SA-010015DP(S)

o (S/AIF) Al-Qaida military operationscommander, Sayf al-Adel: detaineethought that al-Adel servedal-Qaida in an administrative function, such as taking care of matters for UBL and running a guesthouse.Detainee said he first met al-Adel in 1995when al-Adel was in chargeof the guesthousein Jalalabad.8e o (S/A{F) Al-Qaida planner, Walid Muhammad Salih Bin Attash aka (Khallad) aka (Silver), ISN US9YM-0 100 1 4DP (YM- 100 I 4), assisteddetainee in facilitating mujahideen,eOplanning operations,el and detaineeconsidered him a friend.e2 o (S/AIF) Hamza al-Ghamdi, a former UBL bodyguard and longtime jihadist, was in chargeof a guesthouseand training for al-Qaida in Kabul.e3 Detaineeand al- Ghamdi fought in the Tajikistanjihad togetherin the early 1990's.ea o (S/A{F) JihadHarazi aka(Azzam), who was a suicidebomber in the 1998US Embassybombing in Kenya, was detainee'scousin." As a result of learningof his cousin's successfuloperation, detainee j oined al-Qaida.e6 o (S/ {F) Ibn Shaykh al-Libi reported that detaineeand Khallad servedtwo roles in al-Qaida; as operationalplanners and emergencypoints of contact for operatives deployedto conductattacks.eT o (S/AfF) Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi: Detaineelast saw al-Hadi late in 2001 in the Zormat areaof Afghanistan when al-Hadi wanted to stay and fight the US. Detainee said that al-Hadi only answeredto UBL and Muhammad Atef.er Detaineefought under his command.9e o (S/AID Detaineemet Ramzi Bin al-Shibh in Karachi while meeting with KSM but did not have any interest in him. According to detainee,al-Shibh was a new affiliate without an operationalrecord. (Analyst note: This could be an indication that detaineedid not know al-Shibh'srole in the 9ll1 attacks.)rO0 o (S/AfD Detaineefirst saw SulaymanAbu Ghayth shortly after the attack on the USS COLE. Detaineedescribed Abu Ghayth aspreviously being an of a mosquein Kuwait beforebecoming associated with UBL. Detaineealso saidAbu

tn TD-314n6245-04 eoto-3 t+/03504-03 nt TD-3r4r52240-02 n2To-3t4/08879-04 nt TD-3I411348-04,IIR6 0340863 02, IIR 6 034o2g7 05,IIR 6 034 079602 n4TD-314t38699-03 nt ro3 Ar t r 6r4-os,TD-3 r4r328i 1 -03 nuTD-3r4r52239-02 nttD-314/0832i-02 n*TD-3r4r3go2o-03 eeto4uro3l41-03 tooTD-3r4/06945-03

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JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: CombatantStatus Review Tribunal lnput and Recommendationfor Continued DetentionUnder DoD Control (CD) for GuantanamoDetainee, ISN: US9SA-O10015DP(S)

Ghayth was UBL's spokesmanand he was always with UBL and Ayman al-Zawahii. Detaineelast saw him in Kabul a week prior to the coalition invasionof the city.101 o (S/A{F) Detaineehas connectionsto JTF-GTMO detainees(not all JTF-GTMO detaineeswho are tied to detaineeare listed here, only those significance): o (S/A{F) Detaineeidentified Salim Ahmed Salim Hamdan, ISN US9YM- 000149DP, as a driver and bodyguard for I-IBL in Afghanistan who began working for UBL after UBL left Sudan.'" o (S) Humud Dakhil Humud Said al-Jadani,ISN US9SA-000230DP,reported that detaineewas very dangerousand very seniorin al-Qaida.l03 o (S/AID FaezMuhammad Ahmed al-Kandari,ISN US9KU-000552DP,traveled with detaineeand both were facilitated by Abu Zubavdahfrom Peshawar.PK. to Afghanistanin April 2000.104 o (S/AfD 5,{-768 worked for detainee,most notably on the SoH operation,lOsas well as the Port Rashidl06and SoG operations.r0T o (S/AIF) YM-1453 receivedinstructions from detaineeto scoutthe route from Yemen to the UAE'. in which YM-1453 was to transportexplosives for the Port Rashidoperation.ros o (S/A{F) SA-1456,Khallad's brother,cooked and ran errandsfor detainee.rOe o (S/A{F) YM-I457 reported that in late200I, he arrived in Karachi to assistArab fighters. Upon arriving in Karachi,he moved into detainee'shome and immediately beganto seekfunds to supportthe muhajideenand their travel to Afghanistan.rl0 o (S/AIF) PK-1461 worked for detaineerrrand was responsiblefor facilitatingthe travel of detaineein Karachi. PK-1461 drove detaineearound Karachi, purchased things for him and was alwayswith detaineesince he did not speakUrdu.l12 o (S//ltIF) Detaineeparticipated in militant jihad in the following locations: o (S/A{F) TajikistanfromIgg2to 1993.rr3 o (S/A{F) Chechnya;detainee arrived there in Decemberlgg4.tt4

'o'TD-3 r4l38699-03 totTD-3t4122g93-05 'o'IIR 6 0340323 05 tonTD-314106461-03 tot TD-3 14 r 378l 0-03,TD-3 1 4/ I 383 6-03, TD-3 I 4I 26905-04 touTD-314r02552-03 rotTD-3 r4r47202-02 to' TD-3r4/27813-03,TD-314t48167-03, 001453 sIR 0t-ocr -2004,001453sAR 04-DEC-2002 to' TD-3l4ll 199I -03,TD-3141 43326-02 It0 TD-3r4r 045 84-04, TD-3 14i I 01 33-03 "t TD-314/25875-03,TD-3 l4l33000-05 tt2TD-3r4138975-02 t " TD-3r4lr l 500-04,TD-314t tt t64-03 t'o TD-3 | 4I | | 614-05, TD -3 14 I3 6521-04, TD-3 I 4I 5 tg | 4 -04

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o (S/A{F) Azerbaijan;detainee stayed at a guesthouseowned by Ibn al-Khattab.rls o (S/A{F) Afghanistan.ir6 . (S/Alrf; Detaineetrained at JihadWal camp,near Khowst.rrT . (S/AIF) Detaineetrained at Khaldancamp.tts . (S/AVry Detaineetrained on explosivesat al-Faruq.lle ' (S/A{F) Detaineetrained at Ibn al-Khattab'scamp afterjoining al-Qaida.120

c. (U//FOUO) Detainee's Conduct: Detaineedetention threat level is assessedas HIGH basedon a DoD initial 90-dayobservation. nE*!/,!'"*L^, fr/ n-nnnvB. HARRIS, JR. 6t ttrPny U RearAdmiral, US Navy $ynf CovWX Commanding

"t TD-314lr 1 614-05, TD-3 14119840-05 ttuTD-314n7348-04 tt7TD-3r4r49853-02 t" TD-314/06467-03 ttnTD-3r4106467-03 '20TD-3r4r52239-02

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