CTC Sentinel Objective

november 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 11-12

Combating Terrorism Center at West Point CTC Sentinel Objective . Relevant . Rigorous

Contents Al-Qa`ida’s Center of Gravity

FEATURE ARTICLE 1 Al-Qa`ida’s Center of Gravity in a in a Post-Bin Ladin World Post-Bin Ladin World By Mitchell D. Silber By Mitchell D. Silber

Reports 4 Terrorist Threats to Commercial Aviation: A Contemporary Assessment By Ben Brandt 8 Militant Pathways: Local Radicalization and Regional Migration in Central Asia By Christopher Swift 11 Partners or Proxies? U.S. and Host Nation Cooperation in Counterterrorism Operations By Austin Long 14 Government Hardliners Gain Favor in Bahrain By Laurence Louër 16 Jamaatul Mujahidin Bangladesh: Weakened, But Not Destroyed By Animesh Roul 19 After Action Report: Combating Group Violence Abroad with Community- Based Approaches By Captain Karl P. Kadon, USMCR Colorado resident Najibullah Zazi, who plotted to bomb the New York City subway system, was recruited by al-Qaìda in Pakistan. group of men spend their These are critical questions. To truly 22 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity formative and early adult understand the nature of the threat 24 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts years in Western urban posed by the transnational jihad, led in settings such as London, the vanguard by al-Qaìda, it is essential AHamburg, Copenhagen, New York or to have a greater and more nuanced Sydney. They take the initiative to travel understanding of the genesis and overseas and then return to the West attempted execution of plots directed to launch terrorist attacks in the name against the West.1 Al-Qaìda core’s of al-Qaìda. Can this be considered an role should not be overestimated or About the CTC Sentinel al-Qaìda plot? What criteria determine underestimated, as important resource The Combating Terrorism Center is an that designation? What is the nature of allocation questions for Western independent educational and research the relationship between radicalized governments derive from the answers institution based in the Department of Social men in the West and the core al-Qaìda to these questions. It affects military, Sciences at the United States Military Academy, organization in the borderlands of intelligence, and policing activities that West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses Afghanistan and Pakistan? For it to be are dedicated to preventing the next the Center’s global network of scholars and identified as an al-Qaìda plot, does attack. In a sense, determining “where practitioners to understand and confront one of the plotters have to attend an al- the action is for the conspiracy” before contemporary threats posed by terrorism and Qaìda training camp or meet with an a plot is launched should drive Western other forms of political violence. al-Qaìda trainer, or can they simply be counterterrorism efforts. In military inspired by al-Qaìda’s ideology? terms, this would be akin to identifying what Prussian military theorist Carl The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government. 1 In this case, “West” refers specifically to Europe, North America, and Australia.

1 november 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 11-12 von Clausewitz called the “center of Creating the Local Network, Providing The “al-Qaìda preachers” in the West gravity,” or critical element of strength Inspiration were often Islamist-oriented political of al-Qaìda plots, to provide insights To determine if al-Qaìda core had asylum seekers from the Middle East, on how to thwart them. a role in the formation of the local with weak links to al-Qaìda core. They networks or “scenes” from which a did, however, provide a local context Dissecting 16 of the most important subgroup of men (cluster) emerged in which young men from varied jihadist terrorist plots launched against who subsequently became involved in a demographic and economic strata, the West since 1993 provides a deeper terrorist plot, it must be acknowledged seeking political and religious answers, and more precise understanding of that al-Qaìda could have influenced began to adopt al-Qaìda’s ideology the role that al-Qaìda core has had in the development of these local extremist and radicalize. The narrative of a “war jihadist plots over this time period— social networks in the West in two ways: against Islam,” the individual obligation or, the “al-Qaìda factor.” A variety of either actively through direct efforts to participate in militant jihad, and the criteria were assessed for the 16 plots like sending emissaries (“al-Qaìda rejection of Western democracy were examined in this article.2 These plots preachers”) abroad, or more passively doctrinal tenets of the worldview that include: 1993 World Trade Center through the spread of its ideology via was advocated. attack, 1999 Los Angeles International the internet and the creation of a heroic Airport (LAX) millennium plot, 2001 narrative that inspires individuals. These men created an environment that 9/11 attacks, 2001 shoe bombers’ plot, fostered gravitation to reactionary Islam 2002 Lackawanna cluster arrests, 2004 After examining the set of 16 plots, it is as well as politicization of these new Madrid train system attack, Britain’s clear that what was replicated in many beliefs. They brought politics into the 2004 Operation Rhyme and Operation Western cities (New York, London, mosque and called on members of the Crevice plots, The Netherlands’ 2004 Amsterdam, Copenhagen, Hamburg, congregation and Muslims in general Hofstad Group plots, Britain’s 2005 July Montreal, Toronto, Sydney/Melbourne to mobilize and come to the aid of their 7 and July 21 attacks, Britain’s 2006 and Madrid) demonstrated a passive fellow Muslims around the world. As transatlantic liquid bomb plot, Australia’s a result, over time these “al-Qaìda 2005 Operation Pendennis plot, Canada’s “In most of the cases, preachers” promoted travel overseas 2006 Operation Osage plot, Denmark’s to fight in a variety of places such as 2007 Operation Dagger plot and the 2009 individuals in the West Bosnia, Chechnya, Afghanistan and Iraq New York City subway plot.3 sought to travel overseas as well as other “fields of jihad” which now include Yemen and Somalia. To determine where the center of gravity to zones of conflict for lies for the al-Qaìda threat in a post-Bin the primary purpose of Linking with Al-Qaìda from the Bottom Up Ladin world, this article will examine Did a worldwide network of al-Qaìda al-Qaìda’s role, or lack thereof, in the training or fighting in recruiters spot promising individuals formation of the network in each of Afghanistan and ended up in the West, induct them into al-Qaìda, these 16 cases, as well as each network’s and direct them to al-Qaìda camps inspiration, recruitment, training and joining al-Qaìda more by in Afghanistan and Pakistan? Or did mobilization to violence.4 It finds that coincidence than design.” individuals take the initiative, mobilize, individuals in the West, rather than al- and seek out al-Qaìda to carry out Qaìda core, underpinned the majority their jihadist ambitions? Were there of these plots, as these men sought out al-Qaìda facilitators in certain cities? militant training overseas and then were role for al-Qaìda and a much more What was their role and who were redirected by al-Qaìda core operatives organic effort by local self-anointed “al- they? What role did travel to a “zone of to plot against targets in Western cities. Qaìda preachers” in the West.5 These conflict” play? The article concludes with an overall “preachers”—such as Ùmar Àbd al- assessment of the al-Qaìda threat in the Rahman in New York, Abu Hamza al- The case studies support a paradigm wake of key leadership losses recently Masri in London, or Abu Dahdah in of al-Qaìda plots against the West suffered by the group. Madrid—distributed literature at the that is underpinned by a “bottom up” mosque about the activities of Muslim process, driven by individuals in the militants in Algeria, the Palestinian West who radicalize and then take the Territories, Egypt, and Afghanistan, initiative to go overseas for training or including communiqués issued by to get into the fight. Although there may Usama bin Ladin. Furthermore, be local “fixers” in Western cities who they began to indoctrinate young have overseas links and can facilitate or Muslims who expressed interest in the enable an overseas connection, typically 2 This article is based on studies presented in the au- literature. they are not recruiters in the traditional thor’s forthcoming book, The Al Qaeda Factor: Plots sense of the word—they are not soliciting Against the West. The source material, which is presented 5 Although they are identified as “al-Qaìda preachers,” individuals from the top down on behalf in the book, includes legal documents, trial transcripts that does not mean that they were part of the al-Qaìda of an overseas terrorist organization. and media reporting. organization. They did, however, pursue the same ideol- Instead, they are an important node 3 Ibid. ogy as al-Qaìda today. Additionally, they may have had in a facilitation network with links to 4 Ibid. connections to al-Qaìda members. terrorist groups overseas. In only one

2 november 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 11-12 case, the Lackawanna cluster, did an al- This pattern of opportunistic al-Qaìda Frontier Province). Although there Qaìda member, Kamal Derwish, arrive recruiting of Westerners who had was some small-arms training for in town and as a result deliver recruits to arrived in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Westerners, explosives training was a the core organization in Afghanistan. and then convinced to target the West, key element of the curriculum. Accounts is a model that repeated itself in the from Westerners have described these In most of the cases, individuals in the 1999 LAX millennium plot, 2001 9/11 camps as melting pots of Afghan Taliban, West sought to travel overseas to zones attacks, 2001 shoe bombers’ plot, al-Qaìda, Pakistani Taliban, and of conflict for the primary purpose of Britain’s 2005 July 7 and July 21 attacks Kashmiri groups.8 Ongoing intelligence training or fighting in Afghanistan and 2006 transatlantic liquid bomb plot, gaps mean that these determinations and ended up joining al-Qaìda more Denmark’s 2007 Operation Dagger plot are difficult to make with complete by coincidence than design—al-Qaìda and the 2009 New York City subway core was not always their primary plot. Interestingly, although not part “Due to the rise of other destination. This pattern has persisted of the data set, this pattern was seen with the operational leaders of a number in the operations of al-Qaìda affiliates important nodes in al- of plots from 1998/1999 in Montreal (al-Qaìda in the Arabian Peninsula) Qaìda’s worldwide (Ahmed Ressam) and Hamburg and allies (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan) (Muhammad Àtta and the rest of the in the 2009 Christmas Day bomb plot network of allies and Hamburg cluster), during 2001-2006 and the 2010 Times Square plot. In affiliates, the threat from in London (Omar Khyam, Mohammed both of these cases, Western “would-be Siddique Khan, Mukhtar Ibrahim, warriors” Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab al-Qaìda-type terrorism Ahmed Abdulla Ali), Copenhagen and Faisal Shahzad took the initiative to has not ended. Rather, (Hammad Khurshid) and then New travel overseas and then were similarly York City in 2008 as demonstrated “recruited” and redirected once they it has devolved into an by the fortuitous connections made arrived in Yemen and Pakistan, expanded, diffuse network to al-Qaìda by Najibullah Zazi, Adis respectively. Medunjanin and Zarein Ahmedzay. of affiliates, allies and Al-Qaìda “Training” ideological adherents.” Recruitment on Al-Qaìda’s Doorstep In the 16 case studies examined, Rather than specifically recruiting conspirators from the West can be operatives in the West, al-Qaìda stratified among four different training core and other groups have been camp experiences, some directly linked certainty, but there is a high degree opportunistic and relied on whatever to al-Qaìda, others not. Conspirators of confidence that conspirators from batch of young Western volunteers from the 1993 World Trade Center the 2005 July 7 and 21 London metro was able to make it to South Asia and attack, 1999 LAX millennium plot, the attacks, the 2006 transatlantic liquid subsequently arrive at the doorstep of al- 9/11 attacks, the 2001 shoe bombers’ bombs plot, the 2007 Operation Dagger Qaìda-linked training camps (whether plot, Britain’s 2004 Operation Rhyme, plot in Copenhagen, and the 2009 New enabled by a facilitation network or Australia’s 2005 Operation Pendennis, York City subway plot all attended these familial links). Rather than using and the cluster from Lackawanna all types of al-Qaìda-associated training these motivated men on the battlefield attended one or more al-Qaìda facilities camps, most likely in FATA or Khyber against coalition forces, these “would- in Afghanistan. Until late 2001, al- Pakhtunkhwa Province in Pakistan. be warriors” with Western passports Qaìda core funded or controlled most were turned around and sent back to of the training camps in Afghanistan, For a few conspirators among the 16 their country of origin or another Western such as Khalden, al-Faruq, and Darunta. major operations covered, there was an country to carry out terrorist operations. Individuals who had traveled to evolutionary process to their training. Afghanistan for training before the fall They initially attended training camps Abdul Hadi al-Iraqi, al-Qaìda’s mili of the Taliban in 2001 likely trained in operated by Kashmiri groups that tary commander in Afghanistan, did an al-Qaìda core camp. Those camps, were allied with al-Qaìda—such as precisely that for the Operation Crevice however, were subsequently destroyed Harkat-ul-Mujahidin (Mohammed conspirators via his deputy. According by coalition airstrikes. While they Siddique Khan: July 7 London metro to one of the conspirators, “[Omar] were in existence, the range of training attack), Lashkar-i-Tayyiba (Dhiren Khyam had been told that, when he was the camps provided varied from basic Barot: Operation Rhyme), and Jaysh- in Pakistan, there was no room for him infantry training to more advanced i-Muhammad (Shane Kent: Operation to fight in Afghanistan and that what military training to improvised Pendennis)—before they were properly he should do is to carry out operations explosive device construction. vetted or able to make the links in the UK.”6 Ostensibly, it was Abdul necessary to attend an actual al-Qaìda Hadi al-Iraqi’s deputy who provided Following the destruction of these camp. this “suggestion” to Khyam on behalf of camps and al-Qaìda’s flight from Abdul Hadi.7 Afghanistan to Pakistan, makeshift camps were created in the Federally 6 Regina v. Omar Khyam et al., Central Criminal Court, Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) Old Bailey, London, 2006. and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province 8 Paul Cruickshank, “The 2008 Belgium Cell and FA- 7 Ibid. (formerly known as the North-West TA’s Terrorist Pipeline,” CTC Sentinel 2:4 (2009).

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Finally, there were plotters who plot and the TTP’s 2010 Times Square Terrorist Threats to traveled to Pakistan and received plot). training at militant camps run by al- Commercial Aviation: A Qaìda allies, such as Lashkar-i-Tayyiba Although al-Shabab in Somalia has Contemporary Assessment (Australia’s Operation Pendennis and not launched attacks against the West Canada’s Operation Osage) and Jaysh-i- to date, the attack in Uganda in 2010 By Ben Brandt Muhammad (The Netherlands’ Hofstad served as a proof concept of the group Group), but not al-Qaìda camps. to act outside of its primary theater of ten years ago, al-Qaìda utilized four One group of conspirators (Britain’s operations and may have been a preview U.S. commercial airliners to destroy the Operation Crevice) arranged with a of targeting selection to come.10 It has World Trade Center’s towers, damage local religious teacher to set up their already attracted to the cause diaspora the Pentagon, and kill close to 3,000 own paramilitary training camp for light Somalis, converts and other mobilized people. This attack spurred the United weapons. The men provided money, and Westerners from Toronto, Minneapolis, States to convert its counterterrorism the local teacher and his son were to Seattle, New Jersey, Chicago, London efforts into a sustained war on provide guns, food, tents, ammunition, and Melbourne. Also, LeT, TTP and the terrorism, resulting in the invasion and other training equipment.9 alphabet soup of other Pakistan-based of Afghanistan and Iraq, the capture jihadist groups to include Harkat-ul- or killing of hundreds of al-Qaìda Looking Forward Mujahidin (HuM), Jaysh-i-Muhammad members, and the eventual death of al- Today, in late 2011, with the recent (JM) and Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islam Qaìda chief Usama bin Ladin. There deaths of al-Qaìda chief Usama (HuJI) operate in the same sanctuaries has been extensive reflection in recent bin Ladin, top operational planner that al-Qaìda survived in and have months regarding the implications of Atiyah Abdul al-Rahman, and a already attracted Westerners to train Bin Ladin’s death and the Arab Spring steady attrition by arrest or death of and plot with them. How long will it be to al-Qaìda and its affiliated groups. senior core leadership, how should before other groups from Pakistan follow the changing nature of the al-Qaìda the lead of LeT with David Headley and Two critical issues, however, have been threat to the West be understood? the TTP with Faisal Shahzad and target partially sidelined as a result. How the West? has the terrorist threat to commercial Due to the rise of other important aviation evolved since the events of nodes in al-Qaìda’s worldwide In conclusion, as long as individuals 9/11? How have actions by the U.S. and network of allies and affiliates, the continue to radicalize in the West— other governments worked to mitigate threat from al-Qaìda-type terrorism whether it is New York, London, this threat? has not ended. Rather, it has devolved Hamburg or Toronto—and take into an expanded, diffuse network the initiative, mobilize and seek This article offers a thorough review of affiliates, allies and ideological out paramilitary training and the of recent aviation-related terrorist adherents. Since 2001, the core opportunity to fight overseas, al- plots, subsequent mitigation strategies, networked laterally with other like- Qaìda will continue to have a center of and current terrorist intentions and minded groups on the periphery who gravity in the West. The pattern of al- capabilities dealing with commercial were aligned ideologically and formed Qaìda-type plots utilizing redirected aviation. It concludes by offering three a loose coalition of allies and affiliates Westerners will continue, and steps security experts can take to reduce to include al-Qaìda in the Arabian thwarting them will require combined the terrorist threat to commercial Peninsula (AQAP), Tehrik-i-Taliban vigilance, commitment of resources aviation. Pakistan (TTP), Lashkar-i-Tayyiba and staying power of law enforcement (LeT), al-Shabab, and al-Qaìda in the and intelligence agencies. Aviation-Related Plots Since 9/11 and the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), among others. Regulatory Response Each group serves as a power center, Mitchell D. Silber is the author of the A number of al-Qaìda-affiliated plots node, or hub that has an informal and forthcoming book, The Al Qaeda Factor: sought to target commercial aviation loose relationship to al-Qaìda core. Plots Against the West and is the since 9/11. A sampling of these include As the core may continue to fade, other Director of Intelligence Analysis for the the “shoe bomber” plot in December nodes in the network will seek to raise New York City Police Department (NYPD). 2001, an attempt to shoot down an Israeli their profile and may even surpass the This article does not necessarily represent airliner in Kenya in 2002, the liquid core’s ability to project a threat outward the opinions of the New York City Police explosives plot against transatlantic against the West. Since 2009, some of Department. flights in 2006, the Christmas Day these affiliates and allies have already plot in 2009, and the cargo bomb plots begun to attract “would-be warriors” in 2010. Other prominent operations radicalized in the West who otherwise attempted or executed by Islamist might have attempted to join al-Qaìda extremists during this period include a core, but chose alternatives and then 2002 plot to hijack an airliner and crash were sent back to plot against the West it into Changi International Airport in

(such as AQAP’s 2009 Christmas Day 10 In July 2010, two suicide bombers from al-Shabab Singapore, the 2002 El Al ticket counter attacked crowds watching the FIFA World Cup in Kam- shootings at Los Angeles International 9 Regina v. Omar Khyam et al., Central Criminal Court, pala, Uganda. One of the sites attacked was a restaurant Airport, the 2004 bombings of two Old Bailey, London, 2006. called Ethiopian Village. Russian airliners, the 2007 Glasgow

4 november 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 11-12 airport attack, a 2007 plot against Current Threats to Aviation Noordin Top to target commercial Frankfurt Airport by the Sauerland cell, Despite the strenuous efforts by aviation at Jakarta’s main airport, a 2007 attempt by extremists to target governments to harden commercial which included assistance from a former fuel lines at JFK International Airport aviation in the post-9/11 era, the number mechanic for Garuda Indonesia,3 this in New York, the 2011 suicide bombing of plots illustrates that al-Qaìda core, illustrates the primacy of the so-called at Moscow’s Domodedovo International its affiliates, and numerous other “insider threat” to aviation. Airport, and the 2011 shootings of Islamist extremist groups and self- U.S. military personnel at Frankfurt radicalized individuals maintain a high Although TSA and U.S. airports International Airport. level of interest in attacking aviation. currently conduct criminal and Despite the organizational disruptions terrorist database checks on In response to these incidents, the caused by the deaths of numerous potential airport, airline, and vendor U.S. government and many other senior al-Qaìda leaders in 2011, and employees who are to be granted countries have dramatically increased the current preoccupation of several access to secure areas, there are aviation security measures to prevent al-Qaìda affiliates with local conflicts, significant vulnerabilities in this or deter future attacks. Many of this ongoing interest in attacking approach,4 which has proven notably these measures are well known to aviation is unlikely to dissipate in the the public, including: the hardening long-term. Furthermore, the evolving of cockpit doors; federalization of tactics utilized in these various plots “AIT can be defeated by airport security screening staff and the lend weight to AQAP’s contention that concealing IEDs internally, creation of the Transportation Security government regulators suffer from Administration (TSA); deployment a lack of imagination in anticipating either by the frequently of federal air marshals (FAMs) and and mitigating emergent and existing discussed stratagem of federal flight deck officers (FFDOs) threats. As indicated by numerous aboard aircraft; implementation of new accounts, including the description surgically implanting detection equipment and methods, such of the cargo plot contained in Inspire, devices in a would-be as advanced imaging technology (AIT), terrorists constantly seek to analyze often referred to as “body scanners”; existing aviation security measures suicide bomber or by the increased amounts of screening for to probe for weaknesses and develop simpler route of secreting cargo; explosive trace detection (ETD), countermeasures. Terrorists’ ongoing full body “patdowns,” and behavioral efforts to study and defeat security are the device within a body detection officers (BDOs); enhanced further exemplified by the arrest of Rajib cavity.” scrutiny for visa applicants wanting to Karim, a former information technology travel to the United States; and the use employee at British Airways; prior to of watch lists to screen for terrorists to his arrest, Karim maintained an ongoing prevent them from boarding flights or dialogue with AQAP operative Anwar unsuccessful at stopping members of from gaining employment in airports or al-Àwlaqi and attempted to provide al- street gangs from gaining employment airlines. Àwlaqi with information on aviation and carrying out criminal activities security procedures.1 such as narcotrafficking, baggage Certain measures—such as invasive theft, and prostitution at airports patdowns, AIT scanning, inducing Therefore, despite government efforts nationwide. In 2010, an individual passengers to remove jackets, belts, to improve aviation security, a number named Takuma Owuo-Hagood obtained and shoes for inspection, and requiring of critical tactical threats remain. employment as a baggage handler for them to travel with minimal amounts of Delta Airlines, then promptly traveled liquid in their possession—have drawn Insider Threats to Afghanistan where he made contact widespread complaints regarding their Rajib Karim sought to stage a terrorist with the Taliban, reportedly providing inconvenience, as well as questions attack on behalf of AQAP, seeking to advice on how to effectively engage about their supposed efficacy. The become a flight attendant for British U.S. troops.5 reactive nature of many such measures Airways to stage a suicide attack. has been widely noted as well, with some He also attempted to recruit fellow The magnitude of this vulnerability security practices designed to counter Muslims (including a baggage handler is compounded because most airport highly specific attack techniques utilized at Heathrow Airport and an employee employees working in secure areas in past terrorist plots. Al-Qaìda in the of airport security) to stage an attack.2 do not undergo security screening Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) sarcastically Coupled with the aforementioned 2007 prior to entering their workspace due commented on this tendency in its JFK airport plot, which involved at least online magazine Inspire, rhetorically one airport employee, and a reported 3 “Terror Suspect Top Said Planning Attack on Airline – asking the U.S. government whether 2009 plot by Indonesian terrorist Indonesian Police Chief,” BBC, September 1, 2009. it thought the group had no other way 4 For example, it is difficult to conduct effective back- to conceal explosives after the TSA 1 “BA Worker to Stand Trial on Terror Charges,” CNN, ground screening on immigrants who have migrated to prohibited passengers from carrying March 26, 2010. the United States from countries with poor records sys- printer cartridges. 2 Vikram Dodd, “British Airways Worker Rajib Ka- tems. rim Convicted of Terrorist Plot,” Guardian, February 28, 5 Alissa Rubin, “Tangled Tale of American Found in Af- 2011. ghanistan,” New York Times, October 11, 2010.

5 november 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 11-12 to practical constraints. Additional In addition to the MANPAD threat, a explosives experts’ initial failure to measures, such as random screening significant variety of ranged weapons detect the devices used in the 2010 and security probes, are unable to could be used to target commercial cargo plot.12 AQAP has shown itself effectively mitigate this threat. The aircraft, particularly when taxiing to be particularly adept at concealing insider threat becomes markedly worse prior to takeoff or after landing. IEDs within electronic devices such as at non-Western airports in regions such Rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), for printers and radios, which it will likely as West Africa or South Asia, where example, are inaccurate at extended continue to use in the future. local authorities’ ability to effectively ranges; however, they have been used screen prospective airport employees is to shoot down rotary wing aircraft in ETDs and explosives detection dogs, frequently negligible due to incomplete combat zones, and have been used in at meanwhile, can be defeated by numerous or poorly structured terrorist and least one plot against El Al aircraft.10 countermeasures. For example, many criminal intelligence databases. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) used (though not all) ETD devices detect homemade mortars to attack Heathrow only two popular explosive compounds. Threats from Ranged Weapons Airport in the 1990s, while heavy anti- ETD equipment is also not designed to MANPADS, or man-portable air defense material sniper rifles such as the Barrett detect the components of improvised systems, have been described as a M82 fire .50 caliber rounds to a range incendiary devices (IIDs), making the growing threat to commercial aviation of more than one mile and have been use of these correspondingly attractive following the outbreak of Libya’s civil previously used by non-state actors, to terrorists. Lastly, IEDs can be sealed war in early 2011 and subsequent news such as the IRA and the Los Zetas drug and cleaned to degrade the ability of reports claiming that al-Qaìda in the cartel.11 ETD equipment to detect explosive Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has obtained vapors or particles.13 surface-to-air missiles.6 Some reports Evolving Threats from Explosive Devices suggest that missiles stolen from Libyan Terrorist groups, particularly AQAP, Nor is behavioral profiling likely to arsenals have spread as far as Niger, the have continuously refined their ability provide the solution to passenger- Gaza Strip, and the Sinai Peninsula. In to conceal improvised explosive borne IEDs and IIDs. Umar Farouk addition to AQIM, al-Shabab has been devices (IEDs) from security screening Abdulmutallab underwent two known to possess advanced MANPADS, equipment, as shown by the 2009 interviews by security staff prior to allegedly provided by Eritrea.7 Given Christmas Day plot, where a would-be staging his attack on Northwest Airlines that AQAP maintains ties to al-Shabab suicide bomber concealed explosives in Flight 253 in 2009. Similarly, a GAO and has reportedly taken over multiple his underwear, and the 2010 cargo bomb report examining the TSA’s use of BDOs military depots in Yemen following plot, where bombmakers hid explosives noted that the scientific community the outbreak of civil unrest there,8 it is in printer cartridges. is divided as to whether behavioral not implausible to assume that AQAP detection of terrorists is viable.14 could acquire additional MANPADS. Following the 2009 plot in particular, There are also reports that the Taliban TSA, foreign regulatory agencies, Threats Against Airline Facilities and Airports acquired MANPADS from Iran,9 making and some airlines sought to increase One aspect of aviation security that is it conceivable that elements of the group safeguards against passenger- or cargo- not frequently addressed is the potential sympathetic to al-Qaìda’s aims could borne IEDs by the deployment of AIT for terrorists to strike other aspects of provide al-Qaìda with MANPADS for and ETD equipment. IEDs, however, are aviation infrastructure beyond aircraft. a future attack. likely to remain a significant threat to Commercial airlines are highly reliant commercial aviation due to limitations upon information technology systems Although MANPADS are unable to in current screening technology. AIT to handle critical functions such as target aircraft at cruising altitudes, can be defeated by concealing IEDs reservations and crew check-in, a commercial aircraft would become internally, either by the frequently fact not lost upon Rajib Karim when vulnerable for several miles while discussed stratagem of surgically he suggested in correspondence with ascending and descending, particularly implanting devices in a would-be Anwar al-Àwlaqi that he could erase due to their lack of countermeasure suicide bomber or by the simpler route data from British Airways’ servers, systems. of secreting the device within a body thus disabling the airline’s website.15 cavity. Alternately, IEDs concealed Such an approach would mesh closely within complex electronic devices are with al-Qaìda core’s and AQAP’s 6 See, for example, “Qaeda Offshoot Acquires Libyan likely to defeat all but the most thorough stated aims of waging economic jihad Missiles: EU,” Agence France-Presse, September 6, visual inspection, as illustrated by 2011. 7 “Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia,” UN 12 “Failure to Find Airport Bomb ‘a Weakness,’ Expert Monitoring Group on Somalia, July 18, 2007. 10 Richard Cummings, “Special Feature: The 1981 Says,” BBC, November 1, 2010. 8 Fawaz al-Haidari, “Blast at Qaeda-Looted Yemen Bombing of RFE/RL,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 13 For details, see Brian Jackson, Peter Chalk et al., Ammo Plant Kills 75,” Agence France-Presse, March 28, February 9, 1996. Some news reports claim that Islamic Breaching the Fortress Wall (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2011. militants planned to target an El Al flight with rocket Corporation, 2007). 9 Declan Walsh, “Afghanistan War Logs: US Covered propelled grenades in Switzerland in 2005 as well. 14 “Aviation Security: Efforts to Validate TSA’s Passen- Up Fatal Taliban Missile Strike on Chinook,” Guardian, 11 Scott Kraft, “New IRA ‘Spectaculars’ Seen Stalling ger Screening Behavior Detection Program Underway,” July 25, 2010; “Afghanistan War Logs: Anti-Aircraft Peace,” Los Angeles Times, March 19, 1994; Samuel Logan, U.S. Government Accountability Office, May 2010. Missiles Clandestinely Transported from Iran into Af- “Los Zetas: Evolution of a Criminal Organization,” ISN 15 Alistair MacDonald, “U.K. Prosecutors Tie BA Em- ghanistan – US Report,” Guardian, July 25, 2010. Security Watch, March 11, 2009. ployee to Awlaki,” Wall Street Journal, February 2, 2011.

6 november 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 11-12 against the West. The operational to the Haqqani network near Kabul airports while failing to acknowledge control centers operated by air Airport and claimed that the group had the significantly greater threat posed carriers are another significant point planned to use the caches to stage an to flights arriving or departing from of vulnerability, which conduct the assault on the airport.18 The actions of foreign airports; and it has failed to be airlines’ flight control, meteorology, activist groups—such as Plane Stupid, transparent with the American people and emergency management functions. which has breached perimeter fencing that certain threats are either extremely Despite their criticality to flight at UK airports so that activists could difficult or beyond the TSA’s ability to operations, these control centers are handcuff themselves to aircraft in a control. Furthermore, the adoption of protest against the airline industry’s cumbersome aviation security measures carbon emissions19—demonstrate the in the wake of failed attacks entails a “Aviation security viability of such an attack in the West financial burden on both governments regulators should as well.20 and the airline industry, which has not gone unnoticed by jihadist also work to improve The trend toward attacking airports propagandists and strategists. While the quality of threat rather than aircraft has likely been the U.S. government has spent some $56 driven by a number of factors, billion on aviation security measures information shared particularly increased checkpoint since 9/11, AQAP prominently noted with airlines, which screening measures and terrorists’ that its 2010 cargo plot cost a total of growing emphasis on decentralized, $4,900.21 is frequently dated, small-scale attacks on targets of irrelevant, or inaccurate.” opportunity. Firearms will likely With this in mind, there are several prove to be a key component of future measures that could be undertaken to attacks, given their relative ease of use improve U.S. aviation security. First, compared to explosives, as well as their policymakers must recognize the timely rarely heavily guarded, meaning that a wide availability in the United States collection and exploitation of intelligence team of attackers equipped with inside and many other countries. This trend will always be the most effective means knowledge could temporarily shut down was exemplified by the 2011 Frankfurt of interdicting terrorist threats to the global operations of a major air attack, which was conducted by Arid aviation, whether by disrupting terrorist carrier, particularly if backup facilities Uka, an employee at the airport’s leadership in safe havens, breaking up were to be targeted as well. postal facility, who shot and killed nascent plots, or preventing would-be two U.S. soldiers at a bus at the terrorists from boarding aircraft. The Another threat to commercial aviation terminal. Although deployment of successful exploitation of intelligence is the increasing number of plots and plainclothes security personnel and gathered from the Bin Ladin raid in May attacks targeting airports themselves quick reaction teams can help ameliorate 2011 has likely done far more to defend rather than aircraft. There have been the impact of attacks on airports, their commercial aviation from al-Qa`ida two significant attacks staged at ease of execution and the impossibility than the use of advanced imaging international airports thus far in 2011 in of eliminating all airport queues (be equipment and patdowns. Frankfurt and Moscow. Attacks against they for drop-off, check-in, security airports have been planned or executed screening, baggage claim, or car rentals) Second, the TSA and other aviation using a variety of tactics, such as make this tactic a persistent threat. security regulators must increase firearms, car bombs, suicide bombers, their liaison with the airline industry and hijacked aircraft. The targets have Required Steps to Improve Aviation Security regarding the development of risk included airport facilities such as fuel Given the breadth and complexity of mitigation strategies, as airlines are lines, arrival halls, and curbside drop- threats to commercial aviation, those far more aware of the vulnerabilities off points. Terrorists could also breach who criticize the TSA and other aviation inherent to commercial aviation, as well perimeter fencing and assault aircraft security regulatory agencies for reactive as the practical constraints on proposed on runways, taxiing areas, and at gates. policies and overly narrow focus appear security measures. This tactic was used during the 2001 to have substantial grounding. Three Bandaranaike airport attack in Sri particularly serious charges can be levied Third, rather than increasing spending Lanka, when a team of Black Tigers16 against the TSA: it overemphasizes on screening equipment and employees used rocket-propelled grenades and defending against specific attack vectors deployed in the United States, the antitank weapons to destroy half of Sri (such as hijackings or passenger-borne TSA and other regulators should Lankan Airlines’ fleet of aircraft.17 More IEDs) at the expense of others (such as instead provide financial support for recently, Afghan authorities announced insider threats or attacks on airports); airlines attempting to improve security the discovery of arms caches belonging it overemphasizes securing U.S. for their overseas operations. This could include subsidizing background 16 The Black Tigers were a specially selected and trained 18 Matt Dupee, “NDS Smashes Haqqani Network Plots group of suicide operatives deployed by the Liberation in Kabul,” The Long War Journal, July 31, 2011. 21 See, for example, Bruce Riedel, “AQAP’s ‘Great Ex- Tigers of Tamil Eelam during their insurgent campaign 19 See, for example, Helen Carter, “Plane Stupid Demo at pectations’ for the Future,” CTC Sentinel 4:8 (2011). For in Sri Lanka. Manchester Airport Increased Emissions, Court Hears,” details on the $56 billion, see Ashley Halsey III, “GOP 17 Celia W. Dugger, “Rebel Attack on Airport Shocks Guardian, February 21, 2011. Report: TSA Hasn’t Improved Aviation Security,” Wash- Leaders of Sri Lanka,” New York Times, July 25, 2001. 20 Ibid. ington Post, November 16, 2011.

7 november 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 11-12 checks on airlines’ international Militant Pathways: reports of Taliban fighters recuperating employees and vendors, paying for Local Radicalization and in Tajikistan’s southern Khatlon armed guards at ticket counters, Province to the discovery of Pakistani helping upgrade security for airlines’ Regional Migration in bombmakers north of Dushanbe, there computer networks and control centers, Central Asia is growing evidence that prior patters and paying for the deployment of ETD of emigration and exile have developed screening equipment. Aviation security By Christopher Swift into more fluid migrations between regulators should also work to improve Central Asia and the Afghanistan- the quality of threat information shared on july 2, 2011, a bomb scare in the Pakistan theater.6 With insurgents with airlines, which is frequently dated, northern Tajik city of Isfara mobilized expanding their operational reach and irrelevant, or inaccurate. security officials across Tajikistan’s tempo across northern Afghanistan, Sogd Province.1 The incident, coming these trends may herald the gradual Most importantly, the TSA and less than a fortnight after the arrest merger of conflict systems throughout policymakers must publicly of local BBC correspondent Urunboy South and Central Asia. acknowledge that it is impossible Usmanov for alleged ties to Hizb al- to successfully protect every aspect Tahrir (HT),2 encapsulates the growing This article examines the linkages of commercial aviation at all times. apprehension toward radical and between local radicalization and Intelligence gaps will occur, watch lists militant movements across Central regional migration in three stages. will not always be updated, scanners Asia. First, it briefly describes the IMU’s will fail to detect concealed items, exile from Uzbekistan and subsequent and employees will become corrupt Such vigilance reflects Isfara’s unique evolution into a transnational or radicalized. As politically painful history. Long regarded as Central syndicate. Second, it discusses how as such an admission may be, it is Asia’s spiritual homeland, the Fergana Tajikistan’s religious revival fostered essential to scale back bloated security Valley emerged as an incubator for Salafist infiltration and government measures that add significant expense militant movements in the wake of the repression. Third, it examines how and inconvenience to commercial Soviet Union’s collapse.3 Isfara, by ethnic strife in Kyrgyzstan is alienating aviation without materially reducing comparison, was known for Islamic and radicalizing that country’s Uzbek risk. The TSA’s leadership has begun to fundamentalism even during the height minority. The article concludes by take small steps in this direction, such of secular Soviet rule. This reputation evaluating how each of these profoundly as a current pilot program designed still persists today. From residents local developments resonate with— to prescreen travelers to facilitate flouting the Tajik government’s recent and ultimately contribute to—broader expedited screening, but more must be ban on children attending mosques, to notions of global jihad. done to ensure that commercial aviation the alleged infiltration by the Islamic remains both secure and commercially Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), this Uzbekistan: Exile and Evolution viable. sleepy city on the Fergana Valley’s First conceived as the Adolat Party southern edge is widely regarded as a in 1991, the IMU sought to depose Ben Brandt is a director at Lime, a political regional hub for Islamist extremists.4 Uzbekistan’s secular regime and risk consultancy based in the United Arab impose an Islamic state.7 Yet unlike Emirates. Prior to joining Lime, he worked The role of these hubs of militancy is their contemporaries in the Arab as a threat analyst for a major U.S. airline, evolving. Until recently, communities world, the movement’s leaders were as well as at the New Jersey Office of like Isfara were net exporters of “as much a product of Soviet culture Homeland Security and Preparedness. Mr. Islamic militancy. Driven by failure at as Islam.”8 Absent strong doctrinal Brandt holds an MA in Security Studies home and the promise of glory abroad, and organizational foundations, Juma from Georgetown University. the IMU and its allies have transited Namangani and Tahir Yuldashev Tajikistan on their way to Afghanistan were unable to mobilize—much less and Pakistan’s tribal areas.5 Recent consolidate—significant popular support. developments, however, indicate a more By 1992, the Uzbek government complicated migration pattern. From had crushed the nascent Islamist insurrection and imposed strict state 1 By the time the author arrived in Isfara on July 3, 2011, control over mosques, seminaries, and 9 the city’s bazaar was teeming with police, border guards, other religious institutions. and other Tajik security officials. 2 “Vokunishi Bi Bi Ci ba bozdoshti khabarnigorash,” Ra- dio Ozodi, June 15, 2011. 6 Personal interview, senior international counterterror- 3 Vitaly V. Naumkin, Radical Islam in Central Asia: Be- ism official, Dushanbe, Tajikistan, June 2011. tween Pen and Rifle (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 7 Einar Wigen, Islamic Jihad Union: Al-Qaeda’s Key to the 2005). Turkic World? (Kjeller: Norwegian Defence Research Es- 4 Personal interview, Tajik professor of Islamic history, tablishment, 2009). Khujand, Tajikistan, July 2011. 8 Adeeb Khalid, Islam after Communism: Religion and Poli- 5 Ikbol Mirasaiov and Alisher Saipov, “Ex-Gunmen of tics in Central Asia (Berkeley, CA: University of California the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan Claim that their Press, 2007). Movement is No More,” Fergana.ru, April 3, 2006. 9 Naumkin.

8 november 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 11-12

The IMU soon found new purpose in radicalized Uzbeks seeking refuge and splinter group known as the Islamic the Tajik Civil War. Forced into exile revenge against the Islam Karimov Jihad Union (IJU) organized a series of and shaped by their experiences in regime. By February 1999, a newly targeted bombings in the Uzbek cities neighboring Uzbekistan, Namangani emboldened IMU was bombing targets of Bukhara and Tashkent. In 2005, and Yuldashev saw the conflict between in the Uzbek capital of Tashkent. By the IMU bombed the Tajik Ministry Tajikistan’s former Communist regime June of that year, it launched the first of Emergency Situations in Dushanbe and the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) of two armed incursions from northern in two separate operations. A prison as a front in a global struggle between Tajikistan into Kyrgyzstan’s Batken and break in Kairakum, Tajikistan in secular authoritarianism and resurgent Kara Suu provinces.12 January 2006 was also attributed Islam. By joining the UTO, Namangani to the IMU, as were the May 2006 and Yuldashev found a sanctuary for These operations served separate skirmishes with customs officials along their forces while continuing their but related ends. By supporting the Tajikistan-Kyrgyzstan border.15 The campaign against the unholy legacies of the consolidation of Taliban rule in organization’s activities spread south Soviet imperial rule.10 Afghanistan, the IMU laid the foundation as well. In November 2006, Pakistani for future campaigns into neighboring officials broke up an alleged IMU cell The IMU’s perception of a regionalized, Uzbekistan. By infiltrating southern in Islamabad following a failed rocket pan-Islamic struggle against apostate Kyrgyzstan, it sought to mobilize that attack on parliament, the presidential regimes helped transcend the ethnic, country’s indigenous Uzbek population administration, and the headquarters of linguistic, and historical differences and gain new footholds in the Fergana the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).16 that distinguished these Uzbek exiles Valley.13 With Uzbeks constituting 14% from their Tajik counterparts. It also of the population in Kyrgyzstan’s Batken The IMU also widened its list of “embedded” the movement within Province and 28% in Osh Province, the prospective targets, with Yuldashev the UTO command structure, with object was to develop staging areas that issuing personal threats against the Namangani serving as a deputy to would allow the IMU to continue low- presidents of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, UTO Chief of Staff Mirzo Aiyoev. level operations while simultaneously and Kyrgyzstan.17 He issued a similar The IMU’s military contribution to improving the movement’s long-term threat to Pakistani authorities in the Tajik Civil War proved marginal, prospects. January 2008, citing the July 2007 however. Operating in the remote raid on Islamabad’s Lal Masjid (Red Tavildara Valley, Namangani’s forces The IMU suffered heavy losses during Mosque) and renewed operations never exceeded more than two or three the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan, by Pakistan Army units in the platoons (80-120 men total) during the including the death of Namangani tribal areas as grounds for jihad. entire course of the war.11 during fighting in the northern city of By 2010, Yuldashev had further Kunduz. Driven into a third exile in expanded his organization’s target Diverging interests gradually com- Pakistan, the movement splintered into set by harmonizing his objectives pounded these deficiencies, particularly three factions. The first demilitarized, with al-Qaìda’s. “Our goal is not as the perceived commonalities between returning to Central Asia and quietly only conquering Afghanistan and the IMU and UTO began to collapse. reintegrating into Uzbek society. The Uzbekistan,” he declared in an online Frustrated with the UTO’s moderate Is- second abandoned jihad and emigrated video message. “Our goal is to conquer lamism and enraged by its 1997 power- to Iran, Turkey, and other countries the entire world.”18 sharing agreement with the Tajik gov- in the greater Middle East. The third ernment, Namangani’s forces decamped element deepened its engagement in the Tajikistan: Radicalization and Syndicalization for Afghanistan and aligned themselves al-Qaìda-Taliban alliance, adopting Similar patterns still drive with the ascendant Taliban regime. Pakistan’s tribal areas as a new front in radicalization and militant migration. their transnational struggle. Working Like their early counterparts from This second migration proved and sheltering alongside their ethnic Uzbekistan, radicalized Uzbeks are transformative. Augmenting Taliban Pashtun counterparts, they launched abandoning ethnic enclaves in northern forces gave the IMU a sanctuary and a new campaign against the Western- Tajikistan and southern Kyrgyzstan support structure. Collaborating with backed Afghan government.14 for the Afghanistan-Pakistan theater.19 al-Qaìda’s infamous 055 Brigade Tajikistan’s porous borders and weak immersed it in transnational financial, The IMU’s operations in the ideological, and operational networks. Afghanistan-Pakistan theater coincided 15 “Review of the Listing of Seven Terrorist Organisa- Comprised of foreign fighters and with an increasingly decentralized and tions,” Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, integrated into the Taliban army, this diffuse pattern of regional violence. Parliament of Australia, August 2005. elite formation helped regularize and In March 2004, for example, an IMU 16 Nichol; “Al Qaida Ally ‘Behind Islamabad Rocket professionalize Namangani’s forces. Plot,’” Reuters, November 5, 2006. It also provided a network of training 12 Jim Nichol, Central Asia: Regional Developments and 17 Roger McDermott, “IMU Issues New Threat to Cen- camps eager to receive new waves of Implications for U.S. Interests (Washington, D.C.: Con- tral Asian Leaders,” Centralasia-SouthCaucasus.com, gressional Research Service, 2009). September 18, 2006. 10 Personal interview, Akhbar Turanjonzoda, former 13 Stéphan Lefebvre and Roger McDermott, “Russia and 18 Florian Flade, “Deutsche Islamisten feiern ihre ‘Mär- deputy prime minister of Tajikistan and deputy UTO the Intelligence Services of Central Asia,” International tyrer,’” Die Welt, January 12, 2010. commander, Kofamikhon, Tajikistan, July 2011. Journal of Intelligence & Counterintelligence 21:1 (2008). 19 Personal interview, senior Sogd Province counterter- 11 Ibid. 14 Mirasaiov and Saipov. rorism official, Khujand, Tajikistan, July 2011.

9 november 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 11-12 security apparatus facilitate these flows, from worshipping in mosques.27 As militarization that ultimately turned rendering the Tajik Interior Ministry in other Central Asian countries, them into victims. (MVD) and State Committee for National these approaches marginalize quietist Security (SCNS) increasingly reliant on Muslims while cloaking HT and the Kyrgyzstan: Ethnic Conflagration former UTO field commanders to locate IMU with a measure of legitimacy that Pathways to radicalization in and eliminate insurgents.20 Official they might not otherwise possess.28 Kyrgyzstan follow a different pattern. corruption and narcotics trafficking Like their neighbors across Central also play a role, often enabling the The September 3, 2010 car bombing Asia, Kyrgyz citizens have experienced movement of money, militants, and of an MVD garrison in Khujand, progressive Islamization during the munitions from Fergana to Afghanistan, Tajikistan is a case in point. Marking last two decades. In 1996, for example, and vice versa.21 the first confirmed suicide attack in 55.3% of ethnic Kyrgyz and 87.1% of Tajikistan, the incident killed one ethnic Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan openly These migratory flows are not limited to police officer and injured another identified themselves as Muslims.34 By Uzbeks. Influenced by foreign Salafist 25.29 Local officials characterized the 2007, however, one poll showed that ideologies, a small yet significant perpetrator, Akmal Karimov, as a those figures rose to 97.5% and 99.1%, number of ethnic Tajiks are entering violent criminal who initially embraced respectively.35 Political uncertainty the fray.22 Most of these militants terrorism for financial reasons. From appears to havve shaped this revival. are young, unmarried, and with few their perspective, Karimov’s attack Faced with the persistent weakness economic prospects.23 Most have reflected the deepening nexus between of schools, courts, and other public been harassed or persecuted for their criminal and terrorist syndicates across institutions, religious institutions outwardly Islamic dress or habits.24 the broader region.30 assumed greater influence in Kyrgyz Notably, most possess little to no society. formal religious education.25 In this International observers tell a different sense, the population most vulnerable story, however. According to one This nominal Islamization has not to radicalization in contemporary account, Karimov was an overtly devout produced the same patterns of state Tajikistan appears to share several Muslim suspected of membership in repression and religious radicalization key characteristics with their militant HT.31 Detained and allegedly tortured witnessed elsewhere in the Fergana counterparts in the West.26 Alienated by an elite MVD counterterrorism Valley. Grounded in a more open from society and indoctrinated outside unit in Khujand, Karimov and his and pluralistic society, Islam was the public sphere, individuals recruited brother reportedly fled to Afghanistan generally viewed as an integral element into radical syndicates such as HT or and sought refuge with the IMU.32 of national identify, rather than an militant movements such as the IMU Radicalized by their experiences, alternative or threat to it. Instead, embrace Islam as an alternative to Karimov allegedly sought bomb-making the problem lies in the alienation and (rather than an element of) their ethnic training from the IMU to exact revenge isolation of the country’s indigenous or national identity. on the same unit that once detained Uzbek population—a population that and humiliated him.33 Against this constituted 14.3% of all Kyrgyz nationals Conflating the militant with the devout backdrop, Karimov’s victimizers may in the 2009 census.36 Framed by the exacerbates this social and ideological have inadvertently instigated a process July 2010 riots in Osh and mounting dislocation. Wary of renewed civil of radicalization, migration, and allegations of Uzbek separatism, ethnic war, the government of Tajik President rather than religious factors are driving 37 Emomali Rahmon routinely associates 27 Personal interview, Said Umar Husaini, IRPT deputy militant migration. traditional Islamic leaders with the director, Dushanbe, Tajikistan, June 2011; “Tajikistan Islamic Renaissance Party (IRPT), Bans Youth from Mosques and Churches,” al-Arabiya, These tensions should not be the UTO’s successor and Tajikistan’s August 3, 2011. understated. More than a year after main opposition group. Wary of 28 Founded by Palestinian jurist Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani the riots, Uzbeks in Osh reported Salafist infiltration, Rahmon’s regime in 1953, Hizb al-Tahrir, also transliterated as Hizb-ut- harassment, theft, and even has imposed restrictions on religious Tahrir, is a pan-Islamic political party that advocates the extrajudicial execution by the Kyrgyz 38 training, limited the number of religious political unification of Muslim countries and the restora- security services. Officials from institutions, and even barred children tion of the caliphate. Generally regarded as a non-violent Kyrgyzstan’s National Committee for Islamist movement in the West, the party is designated State Security (UKMK), in turn, allege 20 Personal interview, senior international counterter- as a terrorist organization in the Russian Federation and a radical Islamist conspiracy aimed at rorism adviser, Dushanbe, Tajikistan, June 2011. throughout Central Asia. 21 Personal interview, independent Tajik journalist, 29 Farangis Najibullah, “Suicide Car Bomber Hits Tajik 34 Eric McGlinchey, Islamic Revivalism and State Failure Washington, D.C., May 2011. Police Station,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Sep- in Kyrgyzstan (Seattle, WA: National Council for Eurasian 22 Personal interview, independent Tajik journalist, Du- tember 3, 2010. and East European Research, February 2009). shanbe, Tajikistan, June 2011. 30 Personal interview, senior Sogd Province counterter- 35 Ibid. 23 Personal interview, senior Tajik imam, Khujand, Ta- rorism official, Khujand, Tajikistan, July 2011. 36 “Natsionalnyi Sostav Naseleniya,” National Statistical jikistan, July 2011. 31 Personal interview, United Nations official, Khujand, Committee of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, 2009. 24 Ibid. Tajikistan, July 2011. 37 Personal interview, former grand mufti of southern 25 Ibid. 32 Ibid. Kyrgyzstan, Osh, Kyrgyzstan, July 2011. 26 Personal interview, senior Tajik conflict specialist, 33 Personal interview, United Nations official, Khujand, 38 Personal interview, Uzbek human rights lawyer, Osh, Dushanbe, Tajikistan, June 2011. Tajikistan, July 2011. Kyrgyzstan, July 2011.

10 november 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 11-12 separating Batken, Kara Suu, and Jalal- Khujand demonstrated, IMU-trained Abad provinces from the Kyrgyz state.39 militants are now operating hundreds of Partners or Proxies? These fears resonate among Kyrgyz kilometers away from the movement’s U.S. and Host Nation nationalists, who frame Uzbek violence sanctuary in Pakistan’s tribal areas. The Cooperation in as evidence of the IMU’s attempts to same was true in the short-lived Rasht create a Central Asian caliphate.40 Valley insurgency, which witnessed the Counterterrorism return of former Tajik field commander Operations The veracity of these allegations is Mollo Abdullo from exile in Afghanistan difficult to determine, particularly earlier that same year.44 In both By Austin Long when viewed through the lens of mutual instances, militants transformed by wars suspicion and political recrimination. abroad took direct action against their since 2001, the United States has Far more clear, however, are the political and ideological adversaries at cooperated extensively with many reported effects of ethnic strife within home. The result is something akin to state and non-state forces to conduct Uzbek enclaves. According to UKMK the “wandering mujahidin” that shaped counterterrorism operations. The forms Chief Keneshbek Dushebyaev, as the evolution of Middle Eastern jihadist of cooperation have varied as have the many as 400 young Uzbek men fled syndicates in the wake of the Soviet mechanisms and components of the U.S. Kyrgyzstan for IMU training camps in Afghan war. government used to train and support Pakistan following the July 2010 riots.41 these forces. Affiliation with banned Islamist groups Cognizant of these threats, Kyrgyz is also on the rise, with HT leaders officials are rushing to secure their These forces, and the means to support in Kara Suu advocating a revolution southwestern frontier, particularly in the them, have been important but not widely to depose the pro-Western apostate Uzbek enclaves straddling Tajikistan’s understood. Yet gaining an accurate regime in Bishkek and replace Kyrgyz Isfara district and Kyrgyzstan’s Batken picture of U.S. involvement with partner chauvinism with Shari`a law.42 Province.45 Tajikistan’s National Guard, and proxy forces is essential since in turn, is building a new training center these forces have trade-offs in terms of Resonant Effects at Qaratogh with a $3.1 million grant strengths and weaknesses. Some host Conditions in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan from U.S. Central Command.46 These nation forces are partners, who work produce two distinct pathways to measures underscore the seriousness for their own government and therefore militancy. The former generates many of the situation, as well as growing may have interests that diverge from of the same tensions between secular apprehension regarding the prospect those of the United States. Others are authoritarianism and radical Islamism of a U.S. withdrawal from neighboring proxies, paid directly by the United that animated the IMU more than Afghanistan.47 States and therefore working primarily two decades ago. The latter isolates for it. Yet proxies may lack the authority and marginalizes an ethnic minority, Checkpoints and border guards are only and legitimacy of host nation partner thus encouraging it to find new allies part of the solution, however. While forces. Without a clear way to think and avenues abroad. The net effect both measures may be necessary from a about these trade-offs, policymakers is similar, however. Although each practical perspective, neither confronts will be unable to effectively compare pathway reflects its own unique the repression that radicalizes believers and contrast forces to choose the best indigenous drivers, militants from in Tajikistan. Nor can they resolve host nation force (or set of forces) for a both countries continue to converge the alienation and recrimination particular counterterrorism challenge. with the small yet steady flow of that perpetuate ethnic discord in radicalized Muslims from Uzbekistan Kyrgyzstan. Absent concerted efforts This article is intended to provide itself.43 In this manner, fundamentally to address the domestic drivers of an overview of some of these efforts local resentments resonate with—and radicalization in each country, efforts and a framework for comparing and ultimately contribute to—regional to curb militant migration on a regional contrasting the different forms that patterns of terrorism and resistance. basis seem unlikely to succeed. counterterrorism cooperation can take. It concludes with a specific focus on These same pathways may also Christopher Swift is a fellow at the Afghanistan. facilitate foreign infiltration. As the University of Virginia’s Center for National September 2010 suicide bombing in Security Law and author of the forthcoming Framing Counterterrorism Cooperation book, The Fighting Vanguard: Local Counterterrorism cooperation can 39 Personal interview, senior UKMK intelligence officer, Insurgencies in the Global Jihad. broadly be divided into three categories. Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, July 2011. The first is intelligence sharing and legal 40 Personal interview, senior Ata-Zhurt Party parlia- coordination between the United States mentarian, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, July 2011. 44 Personal interview, senior Tajik security analyst, Du- and other countries, which includes such 41 “The Head of Kyrgyzstan’s Security Service Talks shanbe, Tajikistan, June 2011. efforts as thwarting terrorist financing about the Creations of the Islamic Movement of Kyrgyz- 45 Personal interview, former UKMK district command- through improved sharing of financial stan,” Fergananews.ru, May 3, 2011. er, Osh, Kyrgyzstan, July 2011. intelligence. The second is assistance 42 Personal interview, senior HT spokesperson, Kara 46 Haidar Shodiyev, “U.S. Embassy Renovates Tajiki- from the United States, which includes Suu, Kyrgyzstan, July 2011. stan’s National Training Center,” Asia Plus, July 7, 2011. the provision of equipment and training 43 Personal interview, Uzbek security specialist, Wash- 47 Personal interview, senior UKMK intelligence officer, to military and security services of ington, D.C., May 2011. Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, July 2011. a host-nation. The exemplar here is

11 november 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 11-12 the State Department’s Office of Anti- operations.2 In Iraq, Afghanistan, and As Congressional Research Service Terrorism Assistance, which assesses Yemen there have been additional analyst Nina Serafino notes, “…DOD a state’s needs for law enforcement specific authorizations to fund security generally has trained and equipped capabilities for counterterrorism and forces, some or all of which have been foreign military forces under State then provides appropriate training. The used to support counterterrorism Department Title 22 authority and third is operational cooperation, where partner forces.3 through State Department programs… U.S. personnel work alongside forces Section 1206 is the first DOD global from a host-nation in the actual conduct The second type is a proxy force, which train-and-equip authority since the of counterterrorism operations. is defined as an irregular force that is not passage of the Foreign Assistance Act a component of the host nation’s regular of 1961, which placed oversight for This article focuses on the third security force and works principally military assistance with the Secretary category, where U.S. personnel are (though perhaps not exclusively) for of State.”7 In other words, DoD gained present in at least a direct support role— the United States. Proxy forces will the ability to support partners directly at a minimum, providing intelligence likely be working with either Central rather than via a mechanism under State and planning assistance alongside those Intelligence Agency (CIA) officers or Department authority. Similarly, 1208 forces if not actually accompanying them U.S. SOF. Unlike partner forces, the authority gives DoD an authority to on missions. It further focuses on the existence of proxy forces will seldom be support proxy forces that has previously subset of that category where the United acknowledged openly. been primarily under the CIA. Further, States is substantially paying for the 1208 authority does not appear to host nation forces in question (in other Until recently, such proxy forces would acquire the high level oversight involved words, a substantial assistance mission principally have been paid for with in CIA covert action program, such as a along with operational cooperation). CIA funds under the authority of a presidential finding. This subset is still expansive, including presidential finding for covert action. crucial operations against al-Qa`ida The first finding supporting covert There are positives and negatives to and its affiliates in Yemen, Afghanistan, action for counterterrorism was signed both partner and proxy forces. Partner and Iraq. by President Ronald Reagan in 1986 forces have the advantage of being and has no doubt been modified and recognized elements of a host nation There are two principal types of forces updated extensively since 2001.4 Since security apparatus, which gives them within this subset of host nation forces 2005, however, an additional source authorization to conduct approved that U.S. personnel directly support of funding has (at least potentially) operations in that host nation. and for which the U.S. Treasury pays. been the Department of Defense under Depending on the laws and policies The first is a partner force, which can “1208 authority.” 1208 authority, also of the host nation, this can provide be defined as a regular component of named for the relevant section of an them with broad powers of arrest, the host nation’s military or security authorization act, allows use of funds surveillance, and the use of lethal force. services that conducts combined to support “foreign forces, irregular They can also call on other elements of operations with U.S. personnel.1 forces, groups, or individuals” who the host nation government to support Partner forces for counterterrorism work with SOF for counterterrorism their operations (at least potentially). operations will likely be working with purposes.5 The limit of 1208 funding U.S. special operations forces (SOF), has risen from $25 million annually to Partner forces, however, have the although non-SOF may be involved as $45 million annually in FY11.6 drawback of being controlled by the well (such as intelligence specialists). host nation government. If there is While the operations of these units may The change in how partner and proxy substantial alignment in host nation be classified, their existence is generally forces are paid since 2001 is significant and U.S. interests, this is not a major acknowledged as they do represent a as it represents a shift of authority from problem, but if the two diverge it can component of the host nation’s military the State Department and CIA to DoD. lead to serious difficulties. Moreover, or security forces. the close association with U.S. personnel 2 See the discussion in Nina Serafino, “Security Assis- may make the host nation government Partner forces are frequently paid tance Reform: ‘Section 1206’ Background and Issues for suspicious of the partner force. directly out of Department of Defense Congress,” Congressional Research Service, March 3, (DoD) funds due to modifications to 2011. Iraq provides an unfortunate example post-2001 defense appropriations bills. 3 These are the Iraqi Security Forces Fund, the Afghan of this drawback in the form of General Most notable has been the so-called Security Forces Fund, and Section 1205 of the FY11 Na- Nomon Dakhil, the commander of “1206 authority” named for Section 1206 tional Defense Authorization Act, which authorizes sup- the Iraqi Ministry of Interior’s elite of the Fiscal Year (FY) 2006 National port to Yemeni Ministry of Interior counterterrorism Emergency Response Brigade. General Defense Authorization Act, which gave forces. Dakhil’s unit was a major partner force for DoD the authority to train and equip 4 On the original finding, see Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The U.S. SOF conducting counterterrorism foreign forces for counterterrorism Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden, from operations in Iraq. They had a high the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Pen- opinion of the general, who one SOF guin, 2004). commander noted was “an outstanding 1 For general problems with partner forces, see Daniel 5 Serafino. Byman, “Friends Like These: Counterinsurgency and the 6 See Section 1201 of the FY11 National Defense Autho- War on Terrorism,” International Security 31:2 (2006). rization Act. 7 Serafino.

12 november 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 11-12 partner.”8 The general, however, was Partners and Proxies in Afghanistan In terms of proxy forces, the United arrested in 2011 on corruption charges, According to unclassified sources, States has not acknowledged the which some have deemed more political the United States is making extensive existence of any inside Afghanistan. than actual, after his unit targeted use of both partners and proxies for The CIA, however, has been widely Shià extremists in southern Iraq. After counterterrorism in Afghanistan. In reported to operate proxy forces his arrest, targeting of Shià militias by terms of partner forces, the first is known inside Afghanistan, allegedly known his unit decreased while attacks on U.S. as the Afghan Partner Unit (APU) to as Counterterrorism Pursuit Teams.15 forces by those militias are reported to U.S. Joint Special Operations Command These teams have been described as have increased.9 (JSOC). Little has been publicly revealed “one of the best fighting forces in about this unit, but in Senate testimony Afghanistan” and are alleged to be both Proxy forces, conversely, owe loyalty former JSOC commander Admiral William well paid and well motivated.16 not to the host nation government but to McRaven described it as an Afghan special themselves and to the United States, in operations unit “…that went on target with Yet the problems with both partner that order. This makes them potentially the JSOC forces forward to ensure that we and proxy forces observed in Iraq more responsive to U.S. direction if had an Afghan that was, if you will, going and elsewhere appear to be present they are well managed, advised, and through the door first, that was making in Afghanistan. Partner forces face paid. The negative, however, is that first contact with the locals, in order to ongoing protests about their use in they lack the clear authorization to use make sure that we kind of protected the so-called “night raids,” operations force or collect intelligence that host culturally sensitive issues or items that conducted at night to detain terrorist nation security forces have. This can were on target.”11 suspects. These raids are perceived cause friction with the host nation. by many Afghans as unjust or at least Indeed, there is potential for conflict While the capabilities of the APU are poorly informed, which results in between host nation security forces not known, Admiral McRaven rated needless civilian deaths and detentions. and the proxy force if the United States them as “top notch.” This is reinforced In the future, the Afghan government is unable to effectively manage that by the fact that operators from the APU could reduce or suspend partner force relationship. were apparently aboard the helicopter cooperation with the United States carrying JSOC personnel that was as a result.17 Conversely, the United Iraq presents examples of this shot down in Wardak Province in Nations has severely criticized DET 90 drawback as well. Beginning in 2005, August 2011. This was alleged to be treatment of detainees, which may make U.S. personnel began to support an immediate reaction force (IRF) it politically difficult for U.S. leaders tribesmen and former Sunni insurgents responding to other JSOC personnel to continue cooperation with it in the against al-Qaìda in Iraq (AQI). These in an intense ground engagement. It is future.18 irregulars came to be called the sahwa unlikely that APU personnel would be (awakening), or Sons of Iraq. While brought along on such a mission if they Proxy force problems, such as friction they were effective in combating AQI in were not well regarded by JSOC.12 with host nation security forces, have some instances, they were themselves also apparently occurred. In 2009, a targeted as terrorists by Iraqi security In addition to the APU, U.S. SOF have unit known as the Kandahar Strike forces.10 partnered with Afghan National Army Force—allegedly supported by the Commandos and Ministry of Interior CIA—confronted the police in Kandahar An additional advantage to proxy forces Provincial Response Companies (PRCs) city after one of the brothers of a is plausible deniability if they are used to conduct counterterrorism operations. strike force member was arrested. The for politically sensitive missions. An These units are regionally or provincially confrontation turned violent and the example of this would be cross-border focused and conduct operations other Kandahar provincial chief of police was action into a third country where than just counterterrorism. Both killed.19 terrorists have sought haven. If the are regarded as highly capable for proxy force is discovered, it at least counterterrorism operations.13 Finally, does not have the direct overt ties to the the Afghan National Directorate of

United States of either U.S. personnel Security’s Counterterrorism Department Custody,” United Nations Assistance Mission Afghani- or a U.S. partner force. 90 (DET 90) is reported to partner stan, October 2011. with international special operations 15 Bob Woodward, Obama’s Wars (New York: Simon and forces to conduct counterterrorism Schuster, 2010) was the first and most detailed account. 14 operations. 16 Luis Martinez, “US Official Confirms CIA’s 3,000 Man Army in Afghanistan,” ABC News, September 22, 11 William McRaven, transcript of U.S. Senate Armed 2010. Services Committee meeting, June 28, 2011. 17 Dion Nissenbaum, “Afghanistan War: US Night Raid 8 Tim Durango, Duraid Adnan, and Yasir Ghazi, “U.S. 12 Sean Naylor, “NSW Source: Crash ‘Worst Day in our Sparks Protest Over Civilian Deaths,” McClatchy News- Loses Ally as Iraqi General Waits for Trial,” New York History,” Army Times, August 6, 2011. papers, April 29, 2010. Times, July 27, 2011. 13 See, for example, “Commandos from the ‘Sun’ Gradu- 18 “Treatment of Conflict Related Detainees in Afghan 9 Ibid. ate,” press release, International Security Assistance Custody.” 10 See, for example, Richard Oppel, “Mistrust as Iraqi Force, May 10, 2010; Debra Richardson, “COIN in Prac- 19 Dexter Filkins, Mark Mazzetti, and James Risen, Troops Encounter New U.S. Allies,” New York Times, tice,” Infantry 99:2 (2010). “Brother of Afghan Leader Said to Be Paid by C.I.A.,” July 16, 2007. 14 “Treatment of Conflict Related Detainees in Afghan New York Times, October 27, 2009.

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Conclusion protest the king’s decision to modify Both partners and proxies are likely Government Hardliners the constitution, which curtailed the to be necessary in the continuing Gain Favor in Bahrain powers of parliament, al-Wifaq decided campaign against al-Qaìda, to participate in elections four years particularly in troubled regions By Laurence Louër later in 2006. Its main goal was to like Iraq, Afghanistan, and Yemen. insert itself into the halls of power in In Afghanistan particularly, the beginning in tunisia in late 2010, civil the hope of influencing at least part drawdown timeline laid out by unrest swept through the Arab world, of the decision-making process. It President Barack Obama means leading to the fall of longstanding also participated in the 2010 elections that these forces will assume even authoritarian governments in Tunisia, despite gerrymandering, government greater importance. Policymakers Egypt and Libya. In Bahrain, a sustained pressure and full-fledged fraud that, must be cognizant of the strengths campaign of civil disobedience began in 2006, prevented it and its allies and weaknesses of these two different on February 14, 2011. By March 14, from gaining the absolute majority of modes of operational cooperation. the joint military force of the Gulf seats. From that point forward, it was Overreliance on one at the expense Cooperation Council (GCC) entered clear that it had consciously decided to of the other can mean that the U.S. Bahrain to help the Al Khalifa Sunni participate within the regime’s rules. government will lack options as ruling dynasty restore internal order. situations rapidly evolve (such as the Since that operation, Bahrain appears This shift in al-Wifaq’s strategy political landscape in a host nation). At to be on the verge of entering a vicious was the result of its analysis1 that the same time, coordination between cycle of repression and protests as the geostrategic context was highly these different forces (and their riots between civilians and the police unfavorable to Bahrain’s transformation U.S. partners) must be vigorously are multiplying in Shià villages. The into a genuine democracy. There are two maintained to prevent the emergence latest unrest is similar to the uprising key reasons for this. First, Bahrain’s of friction and potentially fratricide of 1994-1999, when Bahrain was the dependence on Saudi Arabia makes between them. theater of continuous violence that it highly unlikely that any genuine only ended with the arrival to power alteration of dynastic rule will occur. Austin Long is an Assistant Professor at the of the current king, Hamad bin Isa Al The course of events in 2011 confirmed School of International and Public Affairs and Khalifa. To end the unrest, the new king this assessment, as the fate of the civil a Member of the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute promised a set of political and economic uprising was ultimately decided in of War and Peace Studies at Columbia reforms in 2001 called the National Riyadh. Since the British withdrawal University. He was previously an Associate Action Charter. Yet the crushing of from the Gulf in 1971, Bahrain’s ruling Al Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation. demonstrations in 2011 could mean the Khalifa family view the Al Sauds as the While at RAND, he served in Iraq as an end, or at least postponement, of many last resort guarantors of their survival analyst and adviser to Multinational Force- of these reforms. in power. Additionally, Saudi Arabia Iraq’s Task Force 134/Detention Operations plays a critical role in the archipelago’s and the I Marine Expeditionary Force (2007- Although the constitutional monarchy economic strength since the majority 2008). In 2011, he served in Afghanistan as promised in the National Action of the Bahraini state budget relies on an analyst and adviser to Combined Forces Charter of 2001 never came to be, the revenues of the Abu Sa‘fa oil well, of Special Operations Component Command- socioeconomic component of the reform which Bahrain and Saudi Arabia share Afghanistan. program went rather far, especially its sovereignty. The oil well is entirely labor market regulations. Far from being operated, and hence controlled, by the politically neutral, the socioeconomic Saudi oil company ARAMCO. reform caused a change in the power coalitions in the kingdom, with the main Second, the Bahraini regime is opposition party, the Shià al-Wifaq, supported by the United States, siding with the reformist faction of the rendering any full-fledged regime ruling dynasty against the old guard change difficult. Al-Wifaq understands and its supporters in the private sector. the priority of the U.S. administration, which is Bahrain’s stability to both This article explains the recent shift safeguard its Fifth Fleet headquarters in the balance of power in Bahrain. as well as to avoid the possible spillover To be prepared for how the political of Bahraini disturbances to the oil- environment may change in Bahrain in rich GCC neighbors. As al-Wifaq the months ahead, understanding this views the situation, the United States changing power dynamic is essential. would be ready to support concessions from the regime to the opposition, The Cooptation of Al-Wifaq but Washington would disapprove of The change in the power equation in overt confrontation. This is the exact Bahrain began when the country’s main

opposition party, al-Wifaq, was coopted 1 This assessment has been expressed to this author at into the parliament. Having boycotted various occasions during fieldwork in Bahrain since the 2002 parliamentary elections to 2002.

14 november 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 11-12 sequence of events that played out in support it granted the reform, al-Wifaq to power, King Hamad has struggled 2011. Moreover, in the eyes of some U.S. mobilized its strong networks among to gain independence from his uncle analysts, the experience of extensive the trade unions to fight the resistance Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa, who he Iranian interference in Iraq after the of the private sector by establishing had no choice but to maintain in the Shià opposition gained power makes the trade unions as de facto monitoring office of prime minister—a position he al-Wifaq’s identity as a Shià Islamic organizations of the implementation has held since independence in 1971. movement an impediment to complete of the new labor law. In some private The strongman under his father’s trust. companies, trade unions went as far reign, Khalifa is a businessman who as to enroll many of the expatriate has many interests in real estate in To combat the perception that it is a workers. Bahrain and abroad. He is said to be the sectarian party, al-Wifaq has tried to unavoidable intermediary and bribe- present itself as a national movement Tension in the Dominant Coalition: The Private taker in any big project developing in seeking unity among various segments Sector, the Crown Prince and the Hardliners the country and, as such, is the main of the population, while at the same This unprecedented level of cooperation intermediary between the dynasty and time retaining its status as the primary between al-Wifaq and the government the business community. He is hated representative of the Shià population aroused the anger of the private sector. by the opposition, who consider him in Bahrain, building on networks of A pillar of the dominant coalition at as a partisan of the iron fist, which he mobilization previously established least since the oil boom of the 1970s, implemented during the uprising of the by the older Shià Islamic movements, it has developed in the shadow of the 1990s. most notably al-Da`wa.2 In parliament, state, benefiting from state spending, one of al-Wifaq’s main agendas was the restrictive commercial law and The private sector has found the prime the advancement of the socioeconomic the pro-employer labor law. Yet the minister to be their best ally in fighting reforms started in 2006 by Crown socioeconomic reforms that are ongoing the labor market reform. Thanks to him, Prince Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa, of since the enthronement of King Hamad they obtained a significant reduction which an important element was the so- in 1999 are progressively cutting back its in the level of the tax on expatriate called “labor market reform.” advantages. In 1999, a new commercial workers. They overtly praised Khalifa law allowing 100% foreign direct for his wise and moderated approach The aim of the reform was to tackle investment ended a key mechanism in the affair, with many going as far unemployment which, on the eve of of protection against international as saying that he should be the main the 2011 uprising, many observers competition. The labor market reform person in charge of running Bahrain’s deemed was as high as 20% despite the put a financial burden on companies, affairs,3 hardly an allusion to the shift government’s insistence that it averaged which many businessmen deemed of power to Crown Prince Salman 4%. To encourage nationals to work unbearable. They are also adamantly that was sanctioned in 2008 when his in the private sector rather than the against the still pending project of father granted him and his Economic saturated public sector, it sought both reforming health care financing which, Development Board the control of 16 to improve the professional training if adopted, will oblige employers to pay ministries.4 This view, it should be of Bahraini nationals and to render health insurance to their expatriate noted, was held by both Sunni and Shià less attractive to employers the cheap workers. businessmen, being the reflection of the and compliant expatriate laborers, corporate ethos of the private sector who occupy the majority of the private In brief, the full implementation of beyond the different ethno-religious sector’s jobs. To increase the cost of socioeconomic reforms necessitates identities of its individual members. expatriate labor, a tax on expatriate a complete change of culture for the employees was imposed on companies, national business community, which Power Implications which was transferred to a fund for many businessmen are unwilling to In this context, the Saudi-led domestic professional training. It also accept. They saw the cooperation intervention in Bahrain on March 14, created unemployment insurance, between the government and al-Wifaq 2011 was not only to end the uprising, financed through taxation on employees in the framework of the labor market but it also threw support behind the and employers. reform literally as treason, blaming the prime minister’s faction, reversing the opposition for having fabricated the ascendant move of the crown prince The labor market reform quickly gained issue of unemployment from beginning whose attempt at keeping the door of the support of al-Wifaq, which saw it as to end and the government for having dialogue open was probably deliberately a way to legitimize its participation in believed them. In the eyes of many halted by Riyadh.5 The uprising and parliament and win over a significant businessmen, there is no unemployment the conditions of its repression also part of the audience of the non-coopted in Bahrain in the sense that those who opposition groups, most notably al- claim to be unemployed do not want, 3 These details are based on the author’s interviews with Haqq (the Right), of which many among nor are they able, to work in the private Bahrain’s business community in October 2010. its rank-and-file are unemployed young sector. 4 Steven Wright, Fixing the Kingdom: Political Evolution men and women. Besides the political and Socio-Economic Challenges in Bahrain (Doha: Center Their resistance has intertwined for International and Regional Studies, 2008). 2 For more details on the history of Shià political Islam with the dynamics of intra-dynastic 5 Caryle Murphy, “Bahrain Becomes Flashpoint in Rela- in Bahrain, see Laurence Louër, “The Limits of Iranian factionalism that have been fostered tions Between US and Saudi Arabia,” Global Post, April Influence Among Gulf Shià,”CTC Sentinel 2:5 (2009). after succession. Since his arrival 13, 2011.

15 november 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 11-12 entailed a rapprochement between the Jamaatul Mujahidin Yet the JMB threat to Bangladesh has prime minister and the two main hard not been eliminated. While the group line figures of the dynasty who have Bangladesh: Weakened, has been dramatically weakened, there been on the rise since at least 2009: the But Not Destroyed are new concerns that it is attempting army commander, Khalifa bin Ahmed Al to reconstitute itself, especially in Khalifa, and his brother, the Royal Court By Animesh Roul Bangladesh’s northeastern districts.6 Minister Sheikh Khalid bin Ahmed Al In January 2011, members of an Khalifa.6 The opposition considers the jamaatul mujahidin bangladesh alleged “JMB suicide squad” issued latter as having become the strongman (JMB), an indigenous terrorist group threats to assassinate Bangladeshi of the regime in recent years. Before founded in 19981 and committed Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and to the uprising, they would only dare to establishing an Islamic state in blow up Chittagong Central Jail and murmur his name. Considering him as Bangladesh through violence, stormed the Chittagong court building unless particularly potent and harmful, they onto South Asia’s jihadist scene with authorities safely released detained said he was the main supporter of the a synchronized, country-wide bomb JMB cadres.7 As of October, Bangladeshi sectarian Sunni groups that have since assault on August 17, 2005.2 The authorities have arrested at least 25 gained visibility during the uprising as group detonated approximately 460 JMB cadres in 2011,8 indicating that the vanguard of counterrevolution. bombs within a 30-minute period at the group has been building support in 300 locations in 63 of the 64 districts various madrasas and urban ghettos in In recent months, there have been in Bangladesh.3 Later in 2005, JMB and around the capital Dhaka as well increasing signs that the hardliners targeted the country’s judiciary—court as Mymensingh, Jamalpur, Rajshahi, altogether are doing everything buildings, judges, and government Jhalakati, and Naogaon districts.9 There in their power to counter many of officials—with suicide attacks in an are also cases where individuals with the decisions made by the king effort to intimidate authorities into ties to JMB became involved in more to appease the opposition.7 This releasing around 400 JMB suspects transnational terrorist plots, such as the results in an incoherent policy from arrested after the August countrywide case of British Airways employee Rajib the government. On the one hand, blasts.4 Karim who was drawn into the orbit of it causes the opposition to trust the al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula’s government less. On the other hand, Shortly after the incidents, authorities (AQAP) Anwar al-`Awlaqi. both the opposition and the reformist apprehended more than 700 suspected faction of government know that they members of JMB and its affiliate party, need each other to keep the balance of Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh power weighted in their favor. The way (JMJB). In March 2007, the Bangladeshi 6 There are reports of JMB operatives regrouping in dif- that these power coalitions evolve in government executed a number of JMB’s ferent areas of Chittagong in the guise of rickshaw-pull- the coming months will be critical to leaders, including its chief, Shaikh ers, masons and day laborers and involved in recruiting deciphering the situation in Bahrain. Abdur Rahman. Today, six years after new members to reorganize the organization. See “JMB the audacious terrorist attacks of 2005, Regrouping in Chittagong: Hunt on to Nab Local JMB Dr. Laurence Louër is research fellow at Sciences Bangladesh’s elite counterterrorism Commander Masum,” Daily Sun [Dhaka], December 20, Po. Paris, where she is posted to the Centre d’Etudes agency, the Rapid Action Battalion 2010. et de Recherches Internationales (CERI). She (RAB), claims to have neutralized JMB’s 7 “JMB Threatens to Kill Hasina,” Daily Sun, January is editor-in-chief of the quarterly peer-reviewed core and substantially reduced the risk 6, 2011. The attack, however, failed to materialize. This 5 journal Critique International. Dr. Louër it poses. was not the first time JMB threatened or schemed to at- was a permanent consultant at the Direction de tack political leaders. JMB had plotted attacks on both la prospective of the French Ministry of Foreign Sheikh Hasina of the Awami League and Khaleda Zia Affairs. She is an Arabist and specializes in Middle of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party in mid 2009, using East affairs. She is the author of To Be an Arab 1 JMB has been operating since 1998 as a front for the militants from India. It also listed second rung leaders of in Israel (London, Hurst/New York, Columbia lesser known al-Mujahidin. Some sources claim that it both political parties as their targets. See “Islamist Mili- University Press, 2007), Transnational was founded in Palampur of Dhaka division by Sabir tants Planned to Kill Hasina, Khaleda: Report,” Press Shia Politics: Political and Religious Qazi. According to other sources, JMB was formed by Trust of India/OutlookIndia.com, August 6, 2009. The Networks in the Gulf (London, Hurst/New Abdur Rahman and Asadullah Ghalib in Jamalpur, Dha- detained acting chief of JMB, Anwar Alam, disclosed to York, Columbia University Press, 2008), and ka division. Its first documented act of violence was the investigators in July 2010 that JMB has a hit list of 12 top Shiism and Politics in the Middle East assassination of Monir Hossain Sagar, the author of Nari political figures, mostly from the ruling Awami League (London, Hurst/New York, Columbia University Tumi Manush Chhile Kobey, in 2000 for the alleged inde- Party. See “JMB Planned to Kill 12 Politicians: Arrested Press, forthcoming 2012). cent remarks about Allah and the Prophet Muhammad. Acting Chief Discloses ‘Hit List’ to Interrogators,” Daily JMB gained public prominence after accidental bomb Star, July 15, 2010. blasts in Dinjapur in February 2003. 8 This statistic was compiled by the author from open 2 “459 Blasts in 63 Districts in 30 Minutes,” Daily Star sources, especially from Daily Star coverage of JMB start- [Dhaka], August 18, 2005. ing from January 2011. 3 Surprisingly, only two people were killed, but nearly 9 The September 23, 2011 arrest of five JMB cadres who 6 Patrick Cockburn, “Power Struggle Deepens Divisions 100 people sustained minor to moderate injuries. had in their possession jihadist literature and other in- among Bahraini Royal Family,” Independent, September 4 JMB perpetrated at least four suicide operations within criminating documents from Aramnagar Kamil Madrasa 27, 2011. a span of one month. in Sarishabari of Jamalpur district reveals the grassroots 7 Ibid. 5 “JMB Neutralized,” Daily Star, August 17, 2011. existence of JMB.

16 november 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 11-12

This article assesses JMB’s current JMB’s actual cadre strength is a JMB female cell.21 If accusations that strength, which is based on unknown. After the 2005 serial blasts, the group has a female suicide squad interrogations from recently arrested Bangladeshi law enforcement agencies prove true, it would not be a complete operatives. It also examines the group’s identified 8,096 JMB members, of which surprise; in 2004, JMB established a transnational linkages to show how JMB 2,000 were allegedly part of the group’s women branch with around 10-12 women remains a resilient terrorist group despite “suicide squad.”15 As of January 2011, in each cell, although they were mostly government efforts to destroy its top authorities had arrested more than responsible for da`wa activities and leadership and organizational efforts. 1,500 JMB members, along with a few religious teachings—not violence.22 top leaders.16 Based on this assessment, JMB’s Current Strength there could still be thousands of JMB Transnational Outreach In May 2010, authorities arrested members operational.17 One reason Although JMB is considered an JMB’s current leader, Maulana Saidur for the discrepancy could be that the indigenous group seeking to establish Rahman, himself a former member police account appears to count active an Islamic state in Bangladesh, its of Jamaat-i-Islami Bangladesh (JIB). members, volunteers, sympathizers or operational capabilities are not limited Authorities found in his home a “huge accomplices. to the country. Evidence shows that JMB cache of bomb-making materials, operatives along with its leaders nurtured firearms and ammunition.”10 Police Today, JMB continues to recruit new ambitions to have transnational ties, also raided the home of JMB’s military members. Before the 2005 crackdown, primarily for fundraising and logistics. chief, where they found an explosives JMB appeared to mostly recruit from belt usually worn by suicide bombers. madrasas and mosques in the country. JMB’s past contacts with the UK-based Subsequent interrogations revealed that Yet this has become more difficult Bangladeshi diaspora community in “hardliners had taken over the reins of due to police monitoring. Therefore, general, and ties to the banned al- JMB,” suggesting that the group was JMB has been using the internet and Muhajiroun group in particular, plotting a series of explosions in Dhaka social networking forums to recruit are well known.23 To raise funds for to attract new recruits to its cause.11 new members online, luring university jihadist activities in Bangladesh, Following leads from Maulana Saidur, students to its fold. In late March direct communication between al- police arrested a number of top leaders 2011, RAB personnel arrested JMB’s Muhajiroun’s Omar Bakri and JMB chief in July 2010 in Bogra, Joypurhat and propaganda chief, Abdul Ghani, the Abdur Rahman was coordinated by two Gaibandha districts. One of the arrested outfit’s chief coordinator of recruitment al-Muhajiroun members identified as men and acting chief, commander and training, Abu Huraira (also known Sajjad and Habibur Rahman, who were Anwar Alam (also known as Bhagne as Shams), and their coordinator of both UK-based Bangladeshis.24 It is not Shahid), revealed that JMB is operating training, Ashrafuzzaman. All of the clear whether these ties exist today, but according to a new “10-year master men were in their 20s. Laptops, jihadist JMB likely maintains some links to the plan” to achieve its goal of establishing literature and training guides were Bangladeshi diaspora community in the an Islamic state in Bangladesh.12 seized from the operatives.18 According United Kingdom. to investigators, Shams was working JMB’s chief, Maulana Saidur, told with information technology experts Since its founding, JMB formed ties interrogators that the group had 400 in Hizb al-Tahrir at many university with transnational militant groups such full-time members across the country as campuses to recruit new members as HuJI and Lashkar-i-Tayyiba (LeT) of May 2010, as well as a military wing for their respective outfits by using for training and funding purposes. capable of launching large-scale attacks different websites such as Yahoo LeT operative Mufti Obaidullah, with an existing arsenal of explosives, and Facebook.19 JMB also appears to who had close ties with JMB’s senior homemade bombs and grenades.13 be increasingly recruiting from elite operative Hasanuzzaman Hasan, once Those numbers, however, conflict with schools and universities.20 told interrogators that his task was comments from Zahidul Islam Sumon to organize jihad in Bangladesh in (also known as Boma Mizan), a JMB There are also concerns that JMB has cooperation with HuJI-Bangladesh explosives expert who was arrested a female “hit squad” trained to execute in 2009. According to Mizan, JMB grenade attacks. In early 2009, police has 100 Eshar (full-time members in arrested a number of alleged JMB female 21 In early 2009, reports emerged regarding JMB’s fe- charge of a particular area), 500 Gayeri militants, accusing them of belonging to male hit squad headed by fugitive Razia Sultana. For Ehsar (part-time members) and around details, see “Trained Female JMB Militants Appear on 1,000 general members and 2,000 April 25, 2010. Scene for First Time,” Daily Star, February 21, 2009. Also 14 supporters. 15 “Anti-Terrorism Unit in Police Soon,” Daily Sun, Janu- see, “Seven More Hauled Up in Hunt for JMB Jihadis,” ary 3, 2011. Media Bangladesh/Independent, February 22, 2009. 10 “JMB Chief Saidur Held,” Daily Star, May 26, 2010. 16 Ibid. 22 “The Threat from Jamaat-ul Mujahideen Bangla- 11 “Depleted JMB Targets Dhaka, Detained Militants Tell 17 Ibid. desh.” Detectives,” Daily Star, May 27, 2010. 18 “RAB Arrests 4 Suspected JMB Operatives in City,” 23 Ibid. 12 “JMB Planned Countrywide Pre-Poll Attacks,” bd- New Age Bangladesh, April 1, 2011. 24 Sajjad and Habibur Rahman, both from al-Muhajir- news24.com, July 16, 2010. 19 Ibid. One Facebook page allegedly run by HT sympa- oun, reportedly provided £10,000 to JMB for establish- 13 “Hardliners Take Over JMB: Detained Chief Tells In- thizers denied HT-JMB links. ing bases for arms production in Bangladesh. Some of terrogators,” Daily Star, May 29, 2010. 20 “The Threat from Jamaat-ul Mujahideen Bangla- the funds were used in the August 2005 serial bombings. 14 “JMB Finds Friends in Outlawed Parties,” Daily Star, desh,” International Crisis Group, March 2010. For details, see ibid.

17 november 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 11-12 and JMB operatives.25 It is also known as those planned by al-Qaìda. Rajib British Airways] is it possible to get a that LeT helped and facilitated JMB’s Karim in the United Kingdom serves as package or a person with a package on recruitment drive in India, especially the best example of this threat. Rajib, board a flight heading to the US?” Rajib in the northeastern and southern parts an alleged member of JMB, lived in the reassured, “I can work with the bros to of the country. The interrogations United Kingdom and was employed find out the possibilities of shipping a with Maulana Saidur revealed that as as an information technology expert package to a US-bound plane.”32 Ten of 2010 JMB has managed to establish with British Airways. Rajib’s activities days later, however, UK authorities a significant presence in neighboring involved raising money and making arrested Rajib, who eventually received West Bengal (India), especially in propaganda videos for JMB. Yet Rajib a 30-year prison sentence. Malda, Nadia and Murshidabad districts eventually came under the influence with around 25 Indian and Bangladeshi of AQAP operative Anwar al-Àwlaqi, Conclusion members. The Indian wing provides the charismatic Yemeni-American At first glance, JMB’s strength and logistical support as well as guns and preacher based in Yemen and involved activities inside Bangladesh appear bomb-making equipment.26 in a number of terrorist plots against depleted, especially following the arrests the United States. of senior leaders. It would be incorrect, LeT was instrumental in sending however, to assume that the group has Bangladeshi operatives for training in Rajib’s brother, Tehezib Karim, and been neutralized. The Rapid Action Pakistan, working through such groups two other unidentified Bangladeshis, Battalion has yet to tackle JMB’s jihadist as JMB and HuJI.27 There are also cases possibly JMB members, reportedly met ideology and grassroots support, which of JMB members traveling to Pakistan al-Àwlaqi in Yemen in December 2009 has helped the organization survive to engage in fighting there. Confessional and shared information about Rajib as against the ongoing security offensives reports of JMB’s explosives expert well as his position at British Airways.30 and investigations. The biggest concern Boma Mizan shed some light on how One can assume that they used the JMB is that JMB will spearhead a conglomerate one JMB operative, Shahed, traveled to name to help establish credibility and of different jihadist groups and actors in the Swat Valley in Pakistan to “embrace commitment to the jihadist cause. In Bangladesh in the years ahead. martyrdom” through fighting against the subsequent e-mails between al-Àwlaqi military during the height of Operation and Rajib, al-Àwlaqi expressed As the case of Rajib Karim demonstrates, Rah-e-Rast in April-May 2009.28 excitement that Rajib worked for one of there is also the risk of radicalized the world’s biggest airlines. Rajib wrote members of JMB joining more JMB operatives are active in Europe al-Àwlaqi that he “worked very hard transnational terrorist groups such as as well. In September 2010, Jhenaidah in painting myself as a liberal Muslim.” al-Qaìda. JMB’s ties to the Bangladeshi district police arrested a German diaspora community in the United expatriate identified as Faruk Ahmed Although Rajib hated non-Muslims Kingdom warrant concern. In the case Aruj for his alleged link with JMB. Faruk in the United Kingdom, al-Àwlaqi of Rajib Karim, however, it does not had been living in Germany for the past expressed to Rajib that an attack against appear that the JMB governing body two decades working as a manager of the United States was al-Qaìda’s had knowledge of the Karim brothers’ a fast food chain, and he was a core “highest priority.” To redirect Rajib, plan. Yet regardless of whether JMB’s member of a mosque in Germany.29 al-Àwlaqi wrote, “Our highest priority governing body approves of such is the US. Anything there, even on a transnational attacks, the ideology The Case of Rajib Karim smaller scale compared to what we may they instill in their members makes it Yet the issue of most concern to do in the UK, would be our choice.”31 inevitable that some cadre will seek to Western counterterrorism agencies is join other terrorist groups or cells that JMB members who become involved Rajib then attempted to switch jobs are committed to attacking Western in international terrorist plots, such within British Airways, seeking a interests. position as a cabin crew member. He was rejected, however, because he had Animesh Roul is a New Delhi-based analyst 25 “Hasan Had Links with Obaidullah,” Daily Star, July not worked for the airline long enough. with expertise on radical Islam, terrorism, 20, 2009; Jai Jai Din [Dhaka], November 26, 2010. Al-Àwlaqi asked Rajib, “With the and security issues in South Asia. He is a 26 “Bangladeshi Terror Outfit Running Camps in India,” people you have [other employees at founding member and presently the executive CNN-IBN, June 21, 2010. director of research at the New Delhi-based 27 Known Lashkar-i-Tayyiba operatives such as Abdul Society for the Study of Peace and Conflict, Karim Tunda and Mufti Obaidullah facilitated JMB’s re- 30 One independent investigation in Bangladesh found an independent policy research organization. cruitment and training in India and Pakistan in the past. that JMB could establish links with al-Qaìda in Yemen He has written scholarly and investigative For details, see “Their Sinister Presence,” The Star 9:40 through a religious research organization called the Re- papers for Terrorism Monitor, World Islamic (2010). For India’s Intelligence Bureau’s observation, search Centre for Unity Development (RCUD), where Almanac, and NBR Analysis, among others. see “Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen, Lashkar’s New Cat’s Paw Tehezib Karim’s father-in-law is the chairman. At least Mr. Roul is the recipient of the MacArthur Against India?” Rediff.com, December 29, 2010. another three Bangladeshi youth were detained in Ye- Foundation’s Asia Security Initiative 28 “JMB Planned to Kill, Foil Polls, Hasina, Khaleda men along with Tehezib for their links with al-Qaìda. Blogger award in 2009 and 2010. were Prime Targets; About Dozen Operatives from India For details, see Tipu Sultan, “RUCD Terrorist Group’s Hired to Execute Bloodshed Plot,” Daily Star, August 6, Sponsor, Coordinator,” Prothom Alo [Dhaka], March 2, 2009. 2011. 29 “Expat Arrested on Charge of Link with JMB,” Daily 31 Andrew Carey, “British Airways Worker Guilty of al- 32 Bill Chappell, “British Jury Convicts Airline Worker in Star, September 17, 2010. Qaeda-Linked Terror Plot,” CNN, February 28, 2011. Bomb Plot,” National Public Radio, February 28, 2011.

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After Action Report: This article draws on personal Gaining the support of community Combating Group Violence experiences from deployments to leaders has yielded the greatest Iraq and Afghanistan while serving domestic success in Cincinnati, a city Abroad with Community- in a partnered role, and argues that torn by years of racial tension and Based Approaches a community-based approach similar group related homicides. The Cincinnati to a program that has seen success in Initiative to Reduce Violence (CIRV) is By Captain Karl P. Kadon, USMCR Cincinnati, Ohio, may work in any a multiagency community collaborative theater of operations, despite economic, program initiated in 2007 by Lieutenant one of the fundamental tenets of social and political differences. Colonel James Whalen of the Cincinnati counterinsurgency is recognizing that Police Department, Professor David specific problems within specific areas Making Rational Choices Kennedy of John Jay University’s Center require unique solutions. Despite this, “Bounded rationality” is the topic of for Crime Prevention and Control, there are several concepts at the core Reinhard Selten’s sociological study of and Dr. Robin Engel of the University of a community collaborative approach criminal networks and the invocation of Cincinnati, in response to a 300% to reducing group-related violence that of rational choice as a crime reduction increase in Cincinnati homicides during transcend borders, mainly because tool. The bulk of Selten’s argument an eight year period from 1998-2006. criminals, terrorists, and law-abiding is based on the premise that violent CIRV precisely targets the city’s most citizens alike are all goal-oriented.1 They offenders usually have no clear, stable active violent offenders by putting have a vision in their minds of “how life objectives, and that their socioeconomic them on notice that “the rules have is supposed to be for me.” Options made circumstances often cause them to changed,” and promises swift and sure available to them by society typically make compulsive, ends-based decisions consequences for not only them but dictate the means by which people selected from seemingly fixed sets the entire group with whom they are achieve their goals in life. According of alternatives.4 For a violent crime affiliated should they continue to violate to Ronald Clarke, the best means by deterrence program to be successful, the law, especially laws concerning which a society can prevent crime it must control this set of alternatives, illegal drug and firearms possession and from occurring is to selectively remove and present them in a logical, use. CIRV complements this promise by those illicit options from the locale, focused manner to a target audience offering identified violent offenders a so that the only rational choice for the of those most susceptible to violent chance at reform through pre-packaged would-be criminal is one less harmful criminal activity. Focused deterrence employment or education programs. to themselves and to the community initiatives that operate based upon In the five years since its inception, at large.2 It is up to the community to these principles have fostered trust the CIRV strategy reduced group and remove such constraints or “forced in communities where historically gang related homicide more than 30% options” that create inherently negative there was tremendous mutual mistrust and group and gang related shooting situations. It is precisely this focused between security providers and the offenses by more than 10%.6 deterrence approach that theaters like community. Social scientists have Iraq and Afghanistan require. The demonstrated that the vast majority of Oriented Policing in Violent Crime Places: A Randomized United States must find and target the violent crime is perpetrated by a small Controlled Experiment,” Criminology 37:3 (1999); specific category of crime that it seeks group of individuals whose actions David M. Kennedy, Deterrence and Crime Prevention: to remove as an available means to an negatively impact their community- Reconsidering the Prospect of Sanction (New York: 3 end. at-large. Strategies that combine Routledge, 2008); David M. Kennedy, “Pulling community leader buy-in with a more Levers: Chronic Offenders, High-Crime Settings, robust social networking capability that and a Theory of Prevention,” Valparaiso University both identifies and accurately targets Law Review 31:2 (1997); Andrew W. Papachristos, individuals within this small group of Tracey L. Meares, Jeffrey Fagan, “Attention Felons: active offenders have been empirically Evaluating Project Safe Neighborhoods in Chicago,” demonstrated to successfully reduce Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 4:2 (2007); violent criminal activity in a variety of Lawrence W. Sherman, Patrick R. Gartin, and Michael 5 1 The inspiration for this concept came from Captain U.S. cities. E. Buerger, “Hot Spots of Predatory Crime: Routine Daniel Gerard of the Cincinnati Police Department, who Activities and the Criminology of Place,” Criminology 27:1 proposed the application of the CIRV concept in the Iraqi 4 Reinhard Selten, Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive (1989); David Weisburd, Nancy A. Morris, and Elizabeth theater of operations prior to the author’s deployment to Toolbox (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2001). R. Groff, “Hot Spots of Juvenile Crime: A Longitudinal Anbar Province, Iraq in 2009. The domestic application 5 Anthony A. Braga, “Serious Youth Gun Offenders and Study of Arrest Incidents at Street Segments in Seattle, of CIRV was the brainchild of Professor David Kennedy the Epidemic of Youth Violence in Boston,” Journal of Washington,” Journal of Quantitative Criminology 25:4 at John Jay College of Criminal Justice. Gretchen Peters Quantitative Criminology 19:1 (2003); Anthony A. Braga, (2009); David Weisburd and Lorraine Green Mazerolle, contributed to the development of this article by provid- Glenn L. Pierce, Jack McDevitt et al., “The Strategic “Crime and Disorder in Drug Hot Spots: Implications ing extensive advice and more than a decade of subject Prevention of Gun Violence Among Gang-Involved for Theory and Practice in Policing,” Police Quarterly 3:3 matter expertise on the Afghan theater of operations. Offenders,” Justice Quarterly 25:1 (2008); Anthony A. (2000). 2 Ronald V. Clarke, “Situational Crime Prevention,” in Braga, David M. Kennedy, Elin J. Waring et al., “Problem- 6 Robin S. Engel, Marie Skubak Tillyer and Nicholas Building a Safer Society: Strategic Approaches to Crime Pre- Oriented Policing, Deterrence, and Youth Violence: An Corsaro, “Reducing Gang Violence Using Focused De- vention (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995). Evaluation of Boston’s Operation Ceasefire,” Journal of terrence: Evaluating the Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce 3 David Kennedy, “Pulling Levers: Getting Deterrence Research in Crime and Delinquency 38:3 (2001); Anthony A. Violence (CIRV),” University of Cincinnati Policing In- Right,” National Institute of Justice Journal 236 (1998). Braga, David L. Weisburd, Elin J. Waring et al., “Problem- stitute, 2011.

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Despite the success of CIRV, this author Sitting Down With the Enemy in Sangin enforcement community. The Afghan was initially skeptical that the concepts The situation in Sangin was bleak. The National Security Forces (ANSF) in in this domestic program could reduce district center was in a much earlier Sangin would need to come together into enemy influence in an active combat stage of development than was al- a common forum and talk to the senior zone. Yet in the subsequent months of Qa’im; the only prosecutor had fled village leadership with a single voice, deployment, it became clear that the in August, and no one had ever been as both the leaders of the local Afghan enemy thrived off its ability to “create brave enough to take a position as police force and the Afghan Army and maintain” sectarian violence within judge. There were no means by which battalion had shown their corrupt sides a population, and to use those divisions to enforce the law locally through the that November, when each man publicly to achieve its own objectives. judicial process, and enemy influence demanded to know the identities of the seemed omnipresent. Over the past locally-based contractors whom the Common Problems few years, the International Security Marine Civil Affairs team had hired Immediately upon deploying in the Assistance Force (ISAF) had poured to rebuild the war-torn district, and late summer of 2010 to Sangin district, millions of dollars into Sangin in more importantly how much they Helmand Province, Afghanistan, as the form of equipment, supplies and were being paid. Both organizational the Civil Affairs Team leader for 3d munitions, and had sacrificed dozens of leaders would have to overcome their Battalion, 5th Marines (3/5), I was British and U.S. Marines and soldiers in personal desires for cash before the paired closely with Afghan forces. I the district, without much to show for Alikozai9 elders would hear them. met with and mentored the district it. Extreme instability and volatility was governor on a daily basis and began to still the rule rather than the exception. Second, whatever the course of action, recognize patterns similar to those from communicating these consequences my deployment to al-Qa’im, Iraq in In November 2010, the political to the target audience in a consistent, 2009. In al-Qa’im, the relative strength situation came to a head when a group of accurate and direct manner was of the tribal system had given rise to a village elders who had been nominated paramount to success. What the fractured law enforcement community by the Taliban Civil Commission and community leaders wanted was to and a judiciary unwilling to act in the the senior Taliban command element of reconcile their differences with a face of pressure from corrupt shaykhs. an 80 square kilometer area commonly government that would reciprocate by Apart from self-interested community referred to as the Upper Sangin Valley recognizing the legitimate influence they leaders, al-Qa’im lacked the economic (USV) traveled to the district center, commanded as elders. Working together infrastructure to create enough seeking an audience with the district with the Afghan district governor, the viable, legal alternatives to smuggling governor. The USV had recently Afghan Army battalion commander and weapons.7 The primary problems were: been the subject of a heavy-handed the Sangin district chief of police, we interdiction campaign by First Recon developed a common picture of how to 1. The lack of a forceful, legitimate, Battalion, First Marine Division approach the Alikozai delegation and unified message from the local security (Forward) the month prior, and the set clear expectations as to what each forces to the citizens; elders knew that certain areas of could anticipate. It is important to note 2. The lack of a consistent, unified, Sangin that were cooperating more that this common picture was developed empathetic, positive message that readily with the Afghan government mainly from Afghan minds, rather than capitalized on the values and virtues and its Marine counterparts were from American or British doctrine. with which Sunni Muslims were able to receiving infrastructural development identify; projects, as well as protection from 3. High unemployment and illicit foreign Taliban forces who had been activity stemming from the lack of in the area planting bombs for years. licit employment alternatives with They knew that it was time for them to 9 The Alikozai tribe is one of three major tribes in Sangin comparable salaries. come to the table. district, the other two being the Ishaqzai and Noorzai, and one of several more in northern Helmand Prov- These were the same societal problems If we expected to make any progress ince. While Ishaqzai outnumbered the other two tribes that existed prior to the implementation with this Taliban-nominated in Sangin, the Alikozai had held the majority of political of Cincinnati’s initiative. They also delegation, three rules would power in the region for several years, as they held close existed in Sangin, and in each venue they apply. First, we would have to ties with the former district governor, Helmand provin- desperately needed to be addressed. provide meaningful and predictable cial governor, and the provincial chief of the National consequences for individuals and Directorate of Security (NDS), Afghanistan’s federal law 7 Although the previous Iraqi government had built their associates who continued to enforcement and intelligence collection agency. Since 8 and maintained several state-owned entities in the al- perpetrate violence. To accomplish the unseating of the former Alikozai district governor Qa’im region, the current government of Iraq lacked the this objective, Sangin would need of Sangin, the tribe had turned to illicit narcotics traf- economic resources to allocate funding to these major both a functioning justice system ficking and production, following in the footsteps of the sources of legitimate employment in the rural Western and a unified message from the law other two subordinate tribes. The Ishaqzai and Noorzai Euphrates River Valley. Phosphate plants, textile plants, had closer ties to the Quetta shura Taliban, due to their and mineral mines had all been major sources of employ- 8 Robin Engel, S. Gregory Baker, Marie Tillyer et al., lack of political leverage in the district, and so the Aliko- ment, but when presented with a lack of licit alternatives, “Implementation of the Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce zai were the best positioned for reconciliation with the the primary source of area illicit income became an inter- Violence (CIRV): Year 1 Report,” University of Cincin- Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in national weapons smuggling ring. nati Policing Institute, April 14, 2008. late 2010.

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The delegation would meet with the between the two sides occurred for by the Marines of the real power held “power brokers” (the Afghan government about three weeks from late December by the elders and major landholders and security forces leadership in Sangin into early January, and eventually within the affected community, and district) and with Marine leadership our Afghan partners achieved one of an understanding that the native considered senior enough to represent the largest security agreements seen powerbrokers on both sides were Helmand Province. At this meeting, in Afghanistan to date. What made driven by economic interests, especially which was similar in its approach to the agreement so influential were the in this economically depressed country, the engagement technique used by concessions made by both sides. There which meant whatever rational Cincinnati’s program, the Afghan and was a period of two weeks in December solution we proposed would have to ISAF representatives would take a during which 3d Battalion, 5th Marines be more advantageous than its illicit balanced approach to reconciliation. took an “operational pause,” halted its alternative. Each side would recognize the other’s patrolling efforts, and put additional perspective: the Alikozai wanted to constraints on its rules of engagement, The cultural and political differences of defend themselves against the Taliban, all in a gesture of goodwill and faith Afghanistan do not rule out community- and they wanted their communities to toward the elders who were risking based approaches to group violence be left alone by ANSF and ISAF; they their lives each time they traveled to the reduction. As long as self-interest also wanted help refurbishing their district center to meet with the Afghan remains the predominant cultural and extensively damaged but vital canal government leadership. In exchange, social bond, the use of honor, shame, network, which supplied the lifeblood the elders promulgated messages of employment and education incentives, of their agrarian economy.10 Conversely, peace throughout their villages and combined with the allure of gaining ANSF and ISAF wanted to extend Afghan promised to have local men dig up the political capital, will continue to drive government influence over the entire previously emplaced IEDs. Further, the success of the focused deterrence USV. The latter was going to happen the two former Taliban commanders approach anywhere it is applied. one way or another, whether through who were natives of the USV began discussion or violence. The Marines had meeting with the district governor and Captain Karl Kadon served as the Civil already demonstrated their willingness the Marines in an effort to register their Affairs Team leader in charge of the to methodically clear enemy forces fighters as local defenders on the side governance and economic development from every square inch of any village in of the Afghan government. Eventually, missions in Sangin district, Helmand Sangin, and this was a harrowing fact the Alikozai leadership would send Province, Afghanistan with 3d Battalion, 5th in the eyes of the Alikozai, who knew delegates to the district center to Marines and 3d Battalion, 7th Marines from ISAF and ANSF were coming to their represent the USV in the newly formed September 2010 to March 2011. He worked backyard next. Interim District Community Council, with the Sangin district governor, village which was the representative body that elders, ANSF and ISAF partners to produce When the delegation of elders finally would bring them funding for projects the first series of peace talks ever held with arrived in the district center in like those needed to refurbish their the Alikozai tribe, resulting in arguably the December, they were ready to talk. canal networks. largest peace agreement between the Taliban The Marine and Afghan leadership and the Afghan government since the start of knew they had the upper hand in Not About Winning Hearts And Minds Operation Enduring Freedom. His previous terms of hard power, but the Alikozai The process of achieving relative social deployment was as an intelligence adviser to knew they had the soft power choice stability in the USV succeeded not the Iraqi Army in al-Qa’im district, Anbar of alliance with either the Quetta because ISAF was pouring money into Province, Iraq in 2009, after graduating shura Taliban or the Afghan district small-scale “hearts and minds” projects from the University of Notre Dame. He government. Sporadic meetings to dig wells and build schools. Rather, is currently a captain in the Marine Corps it was the facilitation of sustained, Reserves, and a senior consultant with Booz 10 For years, the uniquely fertile Sangin Valley, which is genuine relationship-building between Allen Hamilton. fed by a dense network of canals, has been prime ground the fledgling government and its for drug cartels to grow poppy and marijuana. With the citizens, and the constant struggle to highest density of poppy production in Helmand, Mullah achieve the consent of the governed Omar’s Quetta shura Taliban likely finances a substantial that took place over several months and portion of its criminal activity with money earned from several deployments. The same societal the heroin that originated from the poppy that abounds problems exist in Sangin as they do in in Helmand Province, particularly in the fertile fields of al-Qa’im and Cincinnati. ISAF and Sangin. U.S. General Stanley McChrystal highlighted the ANSF eventually understood that only influence of the Quetta shura Taliban in 2009, focusing a small segment of the population was on their active subversion of the government of Afghani- actually bankrolling and directing stan through the financing and direction of several shad- most of the violent acts in Sangin, ow governments in the country. One of the reasons for and that it would take time and the extensive level of violence witnessed by the British sustained commitment to achieve true military from 2006-2010, and by the U.S. Marines since partnership with those most at risk for July 2010, is likely the Quetta shura Taliban’s interest in group violence within the community. maintaining control over this critical component of its il- Development of this level of trust licit income. required an unprecedented recognition

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vests underneath police uniforms and group also threatened to “retaliate Recent Highlights in armed with grenades and pistols with soon.” – CNN, October 10; Washington Post, Terrorist Activity silencers walked into the police station October 10 in al-Baghdadi around 9 a.m.…Because October 1, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): the gunmen were wearing police October 9, 2011 (SOMALIA): Thousands NATO officials announced that uniforms, they were not searched.” of Mogadishu residents packed into international forces in Afghanistan The attack killed approximately four a stadium to protest al-Shabab for its captured Haji Mali Khan in Paktia people, including a local police chief. October 4 suicide bombing that killed Province on September 27. Khan has – AP, October 3; BBC, October 3 more than 100 people. According to the been identified as a senior commander New York Times, “It was one of the largest for the Haqqani network in Afghanistan. October 4, 2011 (SOMALIA): An al- rallies in years in Mogadishu.” – New He is also the uncle of Haqqani network Shabab suicide bomber driving a truck York Times, October 9 leader Sirajuddin Haqqani. – BBC, packed with explosives killed more October 1 than 100 people in a massive blast in October 11, 2011 (GLOBAL): Al-Qaìda Mogadishu. The bomber detonated his chief Ayman al-Zawahiri appeared in October 1, 2011 (KENYA): Six Somali explosives at a checkpoint outside a a new video message, praising Libyan gunmen stormed a home on the island Mogadishu compound housing a number rebels for seizing Tripoli. He urged of Manda on Kenya’s northern coast, of government ministries, including Libyans to adopt Sharià (Islamic law), kidnapping 66-year-old, wheelchair- the Education Ministry. According to and warned, “The first thing that this bound Frenchwoman Marie Dedieu. the Associated Press, the bomber “was NATO will ask of you is to relinquish The recovering cancer patient and a [school] dropout who had declared your Islam…Be careful of the plots of quadriplegic, who had lived on Manda that young people should forget about the West and its henchmen while you for years, was taken by boat to Somalia. secular education and instead wage are building your new state. Don’t allow – Reuters, October 13 jihad.” – Los Angeles Times, October 4; AP, them to deceive you and steal your October 6 sacrifices and suffering.” – AFP, October October 2, 2011 (INDONESIA): 12; Telegraph, October 12 Authorities in Indonesia announced that October 5, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): they arrested one of the country’s most A NATO airstrike killed a senior October 11, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): A wanted Islamist militants, identified commander in the Haqqani network, roadside bomb killed Abdul Wali, the as Beni Asri, during the previous week identified as “Dilawar.” The commander deputy head of Kandahar Province’s in the town of Solok in West Sumatra was a “principal subordinate” to Haji Zhari district, along with six of his Province. Asri is accused of helping to Mali Khan, the top Haqqani network bodyguards. – AFP, October 11 plot a suicide bombing in a church in the commander in Afghanistan who central Java city of Solo on September was captured by coalition forces on October 11, 2011 (PAKISTAN): Militants 25, 2011. He is also wanted for his role September 27. According to Reuters, fired two rockets at a rally led by in a suicide attack at a mosque in a “NATO also said that Dilawar helped the governor of Pakistan’s Khyber police compound in Cirebon, West Java, foreign militants move into Afghanistan Pakhtunkhwa Province, killing one in April 2011. – Voice of America, October 2 and had links with both al Qaeda and person. Governor Masood Kasur was not the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.” injured in the attack, which occurred October 3, 2011 (UNITED STATES): – Reuters, October 5 in Orakzai Agency of the Federally U.S. President Barack Obama said that Administered Tribal Areas. – Reuters, a terrorist attack on the scale of 9/11 October 5, 2011 (YEMEN): A U.S. drone October 11 would be “very difficult” for al-Qaìda strike killed five al-Qaìda-linked to achieve in the next two years. – AFP, militants in southern Yemen’s Abyan October 11, 2011 (KYRGYZSTAN): October 3 Province. – AP, October 5 Security forces in Kyrgyzstan said that they foiled a plot by al-Qaìda-linked October 3, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): October 7, 2011 (IRAQ): The U.S. State militants to disrupt the country’s A suicide bomber killed at least one Department offered a $10 million reward upcoming presidential elections civilian in Kandahar city. – AFP, October 3 for information on the whereabouts of scheduled for October 30. The plot, Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali Badri, the reportedly organized by the Islamic October 3, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): leader of al-Qaìda in Iraq. – Los Angeles Movement of Uzbekistan and the A suicide bomber wearing an army Times, October 7 Islamic Jihad Group, included ethnic uniform detonated his explosives at Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, Uighur, Tajiks and a an Afghan Army garrison in Kandahar October 9, 2011 (GLOBAL): Al-Qaìda Kazakh who had trained in camps in city, killing one guard. – AFP, October 3 in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) Afghanistan and Pakistan. – Reuters, confirmed the deaths of Yemeni- October 11 October 3, 2011 (IRAQ): Between four American cleric Anwar al-Àwlaqi as and six militants disguised as police well as Samir Khan, who were both October 12, 2011 (UNITED STATES): officers attacked a police compound killed in a U.S. airstrike on September Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who in al-Baghdadi, Anbar Province. 30. AQAP’s statement said that while attempted to detonate a bomb on a According to the Associated Press, the United States killed al-Àwlaqi, it U.S. airliner on Christmas Day 2009, “Four insurgents wearing explosives “cannot kill his ideas.” The terrorist pleaded guilty in a Detroit courtroom. “I

22 november 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 11-12 intentionally carried an explosive device October 15, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): invasion?...Your attack to us means on Flight 253 for the US tyranny and Taliban fighters launched a surprising your skyscrapers will be destroyed, your oppression of Muslims,” Abdulmutallab attack in the Panjshir Valley, assaulting tourism will disappear. We shall inflict told the courtroom. He described the a U.S. base. All four militants were on you the same damage you inflicted explosives packed into his underpants killed, as well as two civilians. According on us. You have to see what happened as “a blessed weapon to save the lives of to Reuters, it was the first time in the to the other aggressors, like (Uganda innocent Muslims.” – Guardian, October 12 10-year U.S.-led invasion that a suicide President Yoweri) Museveni and his bomber struck in Panjshir. – al-Jazira, country when they invaded us. We hit October 12, 2011 (IRAQ): A suicide October 15; Reuters, October 15 them in their country.” – AP, October 17 bomber in a vehicle attacked a police station in Baghdad’s Karrada October 15, 2011 (KENYA): Kenya’s top October 18, 2011 (SOMALIA): A suicide neighborhood, killing 13 people. – AP, security officials said that Kenyan forces bomber in a vehicle detonated explosives October 12 would pursue militants into Somalia in near two government ministries in the future. The statement follows the Mogadishu, killing at least three people. October 12, 2011 (IRAQ): A suicide kidnappings of two Spanish aid workers – Reuters, October 18; New York Times, bomber in a vehicle attacked a police on October 13 and the abductions of October 18 station in Baghdad’s mainly Shià British and French women in recent neighborhood of Hurriya, killing nine weeks. According to the Associated October 19, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): people. – AP, October 12 Press, “The plan to pursue fighters A roadside bomb killed five Afghan inside Somalia signals a huge change in soldiers in Herat Province. – AFP, October 13, 2011 (PAKISTAN): U.S. Kenya’s approach to the security threat October 19 drone strikes killed 10 militants, posed by the lawless state of Somalia. including a commander in the Haqqani While the African countries Uganda October 19, 2011 (SOMALIA): The network, in both North and South and Burundi each have thousands of French government announced that Waziristan agencies in the Federally troops fighting al-Shabab militants Marie Dedieu, who was kidnapped from Administered Tribal Areas. – AFP, in Mogadishu, Kenya has not actively Kenya by Somali militants on October October 13 engaged in the fight.” – AP, October 15 1, has died in captivity. The exact date and circumstances of her death are not October 13, 2011 (KENYA): Suspected al- October 16, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): known. – New York Times, October 19; BBC, Shabab gunmen abducted two Spanish Three suicide bombers attacked the October 19 female aid workers at Kenya’s Dadaab convoy of Paktia Province Governor refugee camp. According to Reuters, the Juma Khan Hamdard in Gardez. One October 20, 2011 (UNITED STATES): incident marked “the third abduction police officer and a civil servant were A U.S. court convicted two Minnesota of Westerners in Kenya by attackers killed in the attack, but the governor women of conspiring to funnel money linked to Somalia in a month.” – Reuters, escaped injury. – Washington Post, to the al-Shabab terrorist group in October 13 October 16 Somalia. The women were both U.S. citizens of Somali descent. – AP, October 14, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): A October 16, 2011 (SOMALIA): Hundreds October 20 suicide bomber in a vehicle killed three of Kenyan soldiers entered Somalia, police officers at a border checkpoint in bombing and strafing al-Shabab October 20, 2011 (LIBYA): Muàmmar Spin Boldak, Kandahar Province. – AP, positions along the border. According Qadhafi, Libya’s dictator for 42 years, October 14 to a Kenyan official, “They’re going all was killed by revolutionary fighters the way to Kismayo. We’re going to in his hometown of Sirte. – ABC News, October 14, 2011 (PAKISTAN): Two clear the Shabab out.” – New York Times, October 20 separate U.S. drone strikes killed Abu October 16 Miqdad al-Masri and Abd al-Rahman October 23, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): al-Yemeni, two al-Qaìda veterans, in October 17, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): A Security guards shot to death a suicide Pakistan’s tribal region. – Washington suicide bomber targeted a provincial bomber who was trying to assassinate Post, October 27 chief of Afghanistan’s intelligence Afghan Interior Minister Bismullah agency, the National Directorate of Khan. The incident occurred in Parwan October 14, 2011 (YEMEN): A U.S. drone Security (NDS), in Faryab Province. Province. – AFP, October 23 strike reportedly killed Egyptian-born The explosion killed a child and injured Ibrahim Banna, identified as the media the NDS official. – AFP, October 17 October 23, 2011 (ALGERIA): Suspected chief for al-Qaìda in the Arabian al-Qaìda in the Islamic Maghreb Peninsula (AQAP). The same strike October 17, 2011 (SOMALIA): In militants kidnapped three European aid also killed Abdul-Rahman al-Àwlaqi, response to the Kenyan military’s move workers—two Spanish and an Italian— the son of deceased Yemeni-American into Somalia, al-Shabab threatened at a refugee camp in western Algeria. cleric Anwar al-Àwlaqi. AQAP later Kenya with suicide bombings similar to – Telegraph, October 23 denied al-Banna’s death. – Los Angeles the terrorist attack in Kampala, Uganda Times, October 16; ABC News, October 19; AFP, in July 2010. As stated by an al-Shabab October 30 spokesman, “We say to Kenya: Did you consider the consequences of the

23 november 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 11-12

October 24, 2011 (IRAQ): Gunmen in a city, near the national museum.” – New CTC Sentinel Staff speeding car shot at a police checkpoint York Times, October 29; Reuters, October 30 in Baghdad, killing two policemen and Editor-in-Chief two civilians. – AP, October 24 October 29, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): Erich Marquardt A militant wearing an Afghan Army Senior Editor, CTC October 25, 2011 (PAKISTAN): A bomb uniform killed three Australian soldiers killed the leader of an anti-Taliban and an Afghan interpreter in southern Editorial Board militia in Lower Dir District of Khyber Afghanistan’s Uruzgan Province. – USA COL Michael J. Meese, Ph.D. Pakhtunkhwa Province. – CNN, October Today, October 29 Department Head 25 Department of Social Sciences (West Point) October 29, 2011 (TURKEY): A female October 26, 2011 (PAKISTAN): A suicide bomber killed two people in COL Cindy R. Jebb, Ph.D. suspected U.S. drone killed 13 Pakistani Bingol Province in southeastern Turkey. Deputy Department Head Taliban militants in South Waziristan – BBC, October 29 Department of Social Sciences (West Point) Agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. – Reuters, October 28 October 29, 2011 (SOMALIA): A team of LTC Liam Collins suicide bombers and gunmen disguised Executive Director, CTC October 26, 2011 (PAKISTAN): as soldiers attacked an African Union A suspected U.S. drone killed base in Mogadishu. The number of approximately 22 Pakistani Taliban casualties was not clear. According to militants in North Waziristan Agency press reports, “the two suicide bombers of the Federally Administered Tribal blew themselves up near the entrance Areas. – Reuters, October 28 to the compound, then more armed attackers jumped over the walls.” Al- October 27, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): Shabab militants claimed that one of Contact Taliban fighters attacked the U.S.-run the suicide bombers was a Somali- Combating Terrorism Center Camp Nathan Smith base in Kandahar American. – AP, October 29 U.S. Military Academy city, killing at least one Afghan civilian. 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall Two of the assailants were killed. – Voice October 30, 2011 (SOMALIA): Kenyan West Point, NY 10996 of America, October 27; Washington Post, fighter jets bombed al-Shabab targets in Phone: (845) 667-6383 October 27 the Somali town of Jilib, killing at least Email: [email protected] 10 people. – Voice of America, October 30 Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ October 27, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): A suicide bomber in a vehicle attacked October 31, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): A * For Press Inquiries: (845) 667-6383 Combat Outpost Pul, a U.S. military suicide bomber in a vehicle attacked a base, in Kandahar city, killing one checkpoint in Kandahar city, killing four Afghan civilian. – Washington Post, people and damaging a United Nations October 27 building. After the explosion, gunmen stormed into the area and seized control October 27, 2011 (PAKISTAN): A of a building; Afghan and NATO forces support suspected U.S. drone killed five eventually secured the area. – CBS News, The Combating Terrorism Center would Pakistani Taliban militants in South October 31 like to express its gratitude to its financial Waziristan Agency of the Federally supporters, for without their support and Administered Tribal Areas. – Reuters, October 31, 2011 (KAZAKHSTAN): A shared vision of the Center products like the October 28; Voice of America, October 28 suspected suicide bomber detonated CTC Sentinel could not be produced. If you explosives near the offices of the Atyrau are interested in learning more about how October 28, 2011 (PAKISTAN): A city’s prosecutors, police and national to support the Combating Terrorism Center, suicide bomber killed a senior police security committee. There were no please visit http://www.ctc.usma.edu or call official, Ajmer Shah, as well as his casualties other than the death of the Kristin Sorenson at West Point’s Association aide in Nowshera District of Khyber bomber. – RFE/RL, December 1 of Graduates at 845-446-1561. Pakhtunkhwa Province. – CNN, October 28

October 29, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): A suicide bomber in an explosives-laden vehicle attacked a NATO armored shuttle bus in Kabul. The blast killed at least four U.S. soldiers, eight American The views expressed in this report are those of civilian contractors, a Canadian the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, soldier and four Afghans. According the Department of the Army, or any other agency to Reuters, “The assault on the ISAF of the U.S. Government. convoy took place late in the morning in the Darulaman area in the west of the