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Building Security in the Persian Gulf THE ARTS This PDF document was made available from www.rand.org as CHILD POLICY a public service of the RAND Corporation. CIVIL JUSTICE EDUCATION Jump down to document ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT 6 HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that NATIONAL SECURITY POPULATION AND AGING helps improve policy and decisionmaking through PUBLIC SAFETY research and analysis. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY SUBSTANCE ABUSE TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY Support RAND TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE Purchase this document WORKFORCE AND WORKPLACE Browse Books & Publications Make a charitable contribution For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore the RAND National Security Research Division View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND PDFs to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND PDFs are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions. This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND monographs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. building security in the persian gulf RobeRt e. HunteR Approved for public release; distribution unlimited NATIONAL SECURITY RESEARCH DIVISION This report results from the RAND Corporation’s continuing program of self-initiated research. Support for such research is provided, in part, by the generosity of RAND’s donors and by the fees earned on client- funded research. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Hunter, Robert Edwards, 1940- Building security in the Persian Gulf / Robert E. Hunter. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 978-0-8330-4918-6 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Security, International—Persian Gulf Region. 2. Persian Gulf Region—Strategic aspects. I. Title. JZ6009.P35H86 2010 355'.0335536—dc22 2010017767 The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. R® is a registered trademark. Cover photo: NASA, Visible Earth (http://visibleearth.nasa.gov/) © Copyright 2010 RAND Corporation Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Copies may not be duplicated for commercial purposes. Unauthorized posting of RAND documents to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND documents are protected under copyright law. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit the RAND permissions page (http://www.rand.org/ publications/permissions.html). Published 2010 by the RAND Corporation 1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050 4570 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-2665 RAND URL: http://www.rand.org To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002; Fax: (310) 451-6915; Email: [email protected] Preface The United States is now in the process of reducing its force presence in Iraq, and there is a December 31, 2011, deadline for final withdrawal. This process is being very care- fully planned and executed, and considerable effort and analysis have gone into it.1 Less well considered and planned is what happens afterward, not just in Iraq but in the region of the Persian Gulf, particularly in regard to regional security. This is not only shortsighted: It could have a serious impact not just on the region but also on major U.S. (and allied) interests in the Persian Gulf and vicinity. It is now well understood that, when the U.S.-led Coalition invaded Iraq in March 2003, not enough thought and planning had gone into what would need to be done after the conflict. With this experience as background, it is important that the same not happen again regarding other critical issues in the region. Many important questions will need to be answered about what should happen next. This work addresses several such questions that are related not to specific aspects of the endgame within Iraq itself but rather in the surrounding region. At the same time, rather than concentrating on immediate tactical questions, it primarily takes a longer view, focusing not so much on the drawdown of U.S. and Coalition forces as on what could be done in the medium to long terms to help foster security in the Persian Gulf region as a whole. Thus, in addition to considering some short-term factors, this work develops criteria and parameters for a new security structure for the region of the Persian Gulf. This work has two primary goals. The first is to determine and develop means for increasing the chance of achieving long-term security within the Persian Gulf and envi- rons (as far west as the Levant and as far east as Iran and, in some regards, Afghanistan and Pakistan). The second, within the context of fully securing U.S. interests and those of its allies and partners, is to reduce the long-term burdens imposed on the United States in terms of (1) military engagement and the financial cost of providing security; (2) risk, including to U.S. forces; and (3) opportunity costs, especially in relation to East and South Asia, the Russian Federation, and management of the global economy. 1 For an assessment conducted outside the U.S. Department of Defense on the process of withdrawing forces from Iraq, see Perry et al., 2009. iii iv Building Security in the Persian Gulf Furthermore, such a security structure could serve as a sort of firebreak to help pre- vent normal stresses and strains from escalating to a level of tension or conflict at which none of the parties gains and all may lose. This is a cost-benefit analysis that concludes that, in the common interest, certain behavior should be ruled out of bounds to pre- vent it from spiraling out of control. In developing such a new security structure, it will of course be necessary to factor in developments in Afghanistan and Pakistan, given that what happens there will have a significant impact not just on Iran but also both on other countries in and concerned with the Persian Gulf and on overall U.S. interests in and perspectives on the entire region of the Middle East and Southwest Asia. The entire region must be dealt with in terms of all its interconnections—holistically, as it were. The termstructure is used here advisedly. The alternative is to consider only a system of security, which is the sum of all the factors that describe the existential qual- ity of security—say, within a region—however these factors have developed and what- ever they are. The idea of structure, by contrast, connotes conscious effort to develop a framework, some aspects of which can be formal and some informal. This framework will help (1) to channel and concretize expectations, (2) to enable different parties to the structure to calculate their own self-interest in relationship to practices set up by the structure, and (3) to enable these parties to see whether taking part will bring them more advantages than not doing so. A further merit of looking at a structure rather than just a system for security is that doing so permits the development of patterns of behavior and expectations that can endure. A security structure, as opposed to simply a security system, implies the existence of rules—or at least approaches—that are writ- ten down; functional arrangements; institutions, whether rudimentary or more devel- oped; consultative mechanisms that all participants respect to a degree sufficient for the mechanisms to work for all; and processes for dealing with threats and challenges to security (and agreed criteria for determining what they are) within the region that the structure encompasses. What follows is an analysis of many, but by no means all, of the factors in the region of the Persian Gulf and environs that arise in regard to developing security in the broadest sense of the term. The analysis is designed to begin a process of develop- ing means for providing security for the region, especially because the events of the last several years, including the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, will, perforce, create a new system of security that is significantly different from that of the past. That bridge has already been crossed. The question is rather what will fill the place that the collapse of the old system of security—as shaky as it was—has created. Of course, in this particular region, development of a comprehensive and effec- tive security structure may not be possible: Differences among states and religious and other groupings may prove to be simply too deep and pervasive. But that has also been true in other parts of the world when efforts first were made. The hope is that rational calculus of the best means of advancing individual interests will lead to acceptance Preface v that at least some forms of structured cooperation related to security will prove more worthwhile to all concerned than a state of anarchy. What follows is, thus, an effort to spell out some of the key factors in getting from here to there. Political will is of course needed to turn vision and analysis into reality.
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