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ISSUE BRIEF 10.29.19 The US Response to Attacks on Persian Oil Infrastructure and Strategic Implications for Petro-States

Jim Krane, Ph.D., Wallace S. Wilson Fellow for Energy Studies Mark Finley, Fellow in Energy and Global Oil

On Sept. 14, 2019, ’s enormous and its crew for two months. In oil processing plant at Abqaiq was hit in a October, ’s national tanker company surprise cruise missile and drone attack. reported an attack on an Iranian oil tanker Further strikes damaged facilities at the in the Red .3 Khurais oil field 150 miles away. The attacks None of these disruptions had more on some of ’s most vital pieces of than a short-lived effect on global oil prices. energy infrastructure initially knocked out Iran appears to have played a direct or 5.7 million barrels per day (Mb/d) of Saudi indirect role in the May/June tanker and oil production and 0.7 Mb/d of Saudi attacks. But the Trump administration liquids production, the largest ever outage has not, as yet, followed the guidelines in in volume terms in the modern history of oil. the 1980 , which states that Oil prices immediately jumped from $60 to Washington would use military force—if $69 per barrel. necessary—to protect its interests in the Gulf. Just over two weeks later, the sense of The US president suggested at one point urgency was gone. Saudi Aramco had fully that ultimate responsibility in dealing with restored the lost production, even as repairs the attacks rested with . “That to damaged infrastructure were just getting was an attack on Saudi Arabia, and that underway.1 Oil prices responded by falling wasn’t an attack on us,” Trump said on Sept. below pre-attack levels.2 16. “But we would certainly help them.”4 The drone and missile attacks The outlines of that help became clear What does the lack of were just the latest in an escalating within a week. Rather than ordering the US a forceful US military series of sabotage and disruptions of oil military to launch a direct attack on Iran, infrastructure in and around the Persian Trump opted for a strategy of deterrence. response say about the Gulf. In May, four empty tankers were He approved a deployment of an additional strategic value of the sabotaged at , just outside the 3,000 US troops to the Gulf, along with a ’s oil producers? mouth of the , apparently by modest beefing up of Saudi air defenses.5 undersea mines. Nearly simultaneously, Saudi Aramco CEO Amin Nasser armed drones damaged two pumping gave voice to Saudi frustrations over the stations on Saudi Arabia’s East-West intensity of the response. "An absence of oil export pipeline. In June, two tankers international resolve to take concrete action (carrying methanol and naphtha, may embolden the attackers and indeed put respectively) were similarly hit. In July, the the world’s energy security at greater risk," Iranian military seized and held a British Nasser said on Oct. 9 in .6 UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 10.29.19

This issue brief leverages these events the US as the world’s largest overall energy to shed light on the current state of US-Gulf consumer in 2009. Most forecasters expect strategic relations and potential directions of future oil and energy demand growth to its evolution in coming years. What does the be concentrated in emerging economies. lack of a forceful US military response say Already, nearly three-quarters of Mideast oil about the strategic value of the region’s oil exports are destined for .7 producers? What are the broader reasons for Second, the has leaped The dwindling of the tranquility in the oil market in the wake up the ranks of oil and gas producers to US oil imports has of significant attempts at disruption? Are become No. 1 in both.8 Increased shale strengthened the geoeconomic and societal trends affecting production has allowed the US to become perception among the strategic importance of ? a growing net exporter of natural gas, the US electorate and and to approach self-sufficiency, on a net basis, in oil. political leadership that BIG PICTURE GLOBAL ENERGY TRENDS Third, intensifying change in the ’s Americans no longer climate is perturbing energy markets. The low-key US military and global financial is starting to incentivize need to expend blood market responses to the Gulf disruptions individuals, companies, and governments and treasure to protect should be viewed within the context of three to reduce use of fossil fuels or substitute broad trends shaping global energy. oil. them with alternate forms of energy. First, global demand for oil—and Climate change is putting increasing energy in general—is shifting to the rapidly pressure on the business models of fossil growing emerging market countries, mainly fuel firms and on the political models of in Asia. While the US remains the world’s states dependent on export rents.9 largest consumer of oil, surpassed

DIFFERENT FUELS, DIFFERING RISK EXPOSURE

The implications of climate action differ markedly for each of the three main fossil fuels:

• Coal, the dirtiest and most carbon-intensive fuel, is the commodity under greatest near-term pressure, since coal has many substitutes, all of which are cleaner. • Natural gas may benefit in the short and medium term as a cleaner substitute for coal and as a backup for intermittent renewables. But gas also has cleaner substitutes in electricity generation that are already viable. • Oil is the fossil fuel most insulated from climate pressure in the short run due to the lack of substitutes. The array of replacement fuels and —most notably electric vehicles but also including biofuels and hydrogen fuel cells—are not nearly as advanced as those challenging coal and gas.

Moreover, even scenarios that depict successful climate action project oil and gas retaining a significant share of the world energy system.10 Even so, different economic growth and policy profiles are imposing large shifts in energy balances in some . While the scale of the global energy system makes quick changes unlikely, future policy modifications could hasten the transition toward lower-carbon options. Significant changes are still needed to move the energy system onto a pathway to limit the global temperature rise to 2 degrees or less.

2 THE US RESPONSE TO ATTACKS ON PERSIAN GULF OIL INFRASTRUCTURE AND STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR PETRO-STATES

TRENDS AFFECTING THE MIDDLE EAST THE ‘LOSE-LOSE’ CLIMATE DILEMMA

The global trends outlined above are For the Gulf region, the most important being felt most acutely in the Middle East. unfolding trend is the threat from climate Growing energy demand in Asia, combined change. The warming climate poses an with increasing US self-sufficiency, has overwhelmingly negative development for reoriented Middle East oil exports away from Middle East and other equatorial oil states, the United States and and toward since these countries face potentially Asia. Despite the unprecedented reduction devastating consequences whether or not the in import dependence, the United States world succeeds in arresting carbon emissions. remains the chief security provider for Saudi Fragile Middle East geographies are Arabia and the other Gulf monarchies. directly exposed to physical climate damage, This incongruity has fostered concern particularly from rising heat and humidity. in Gulf capitals about Washington’s long- If decarbonization fails, the possibility term commitment to the Carter Doctrine.11 arises that parts of the Gulf coastline will The modest US response (at the time of be rendered uninhabitable, even within the writing in October 2019) to the attacks on current century.15 Saudi’s oil infrastructure reinforces these But the success of climate action concerns, as have high-profile calls from exposes the region to enormous economic The warming American scholars to scale back the US damage, since it would undermine demand climate poses an deployment in the Gulf.12 for, and prices of, the region’s chief overwhelmingly The evolving geostrategic relationship exports—oil and gas. These exports provide negative development has pushed Gulf monarchies to respond in at the largest source of income for government least three ways. These actions were under budgets, including funds that maintain the for Middle East and way before the attacks but are likely to viability of patronage-based regimes. other equatorial oil gather new momentum. The “lose-lose” prospects of climate states, since these First, Gulf policymakers have sought change have injected new urgency into countries face to diversify security relations beyond the longstanding but ineffective efforts by potentially devastating United States by seeking regional defense Mideast producers to diversify their partnerships with importing powers in East economies. Government plans such as Saudi’s consequences whether and .13 Vision 2030 and National Transformation or not the world Second, there is a gathering push for Plan aim to enlarge the private sector, succeeds in arresting military self-reliance among some of the create jobs for unemployed citizens, attract carbon emissions. larger countries in the region. The ongoing foreign investment, and ultimately raise military buildups increase the likelihood that non-oil businesses’ contributions to GDP and Middle East states beyond will seek government revenues. nuclear weapons. At the same time, producers are Third, the regimes appear to be diversifying the oil business itself, moving seeking non-oil rationales to retain US into non-combustion uses for oil and gas. The strategic interest. One is emerging via the largest of these efforts is in , development of civil nuclear programs such where hydrocarbon feedstocks are converted as that in the . Nuclear to polymers and resins that eventually programs could provide a “strategic hedge” become finished plastic goods. The plastics since they raise the risk of nuclear materials industry is also viewed as a major future falling into hostile hands and thereby create provider of local manufacturing jobs. new impetus for American protection of Plastics and chemicals, however, are regimes that cooperate on these issues.14 also exposed to consumer risk. Feedstocks may not be combusted—and therefore do not emit CO2—but plastic and manufacturing involve large requirements of industrial heat, provided by burning

3 RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 10.29.19

fossil fuels. Plastics also face problems with Meanwhile, subsidy retractions since improper disposal and sea accumulations. 2014 have taken away sources of free or As a result, policy efforts in many countries cheap energy that were key patronage tools seek to reduce their use. undergirding public support for autocratic regimes. Some Middle East oil-exporting regimes, once largely consultative, have POLITICAL REPRESSION ON THE RISE responded to public protest with increased repression. So-called “political terror” data Economic reforms in Mideast petro-states— show increasing repression in Saudi Arabia, whether climate-driven or not—are the UAE, , and (temporarily), as undermining longstanding state-society well as in and Iran16 (Figures 1 and 2). social contracts. Such reforms include The Gulf monarchies and other Middle economic diversification programs and East states face the possibility of falling into retractions of generous energy subsidies. the so-called “Dictator’s Dilemma” trap. More diversified economies may As once consultative regimes grow more eventually increase employment and repressive and curtail opposition speech, broaden sources of national income. But citizens grow less willing to express their the oil export business brings concentrated opinions publicly. The dearth of public financial rewards that are based on the huge commentary feeds “regime survival” competitive advantages enjoyed by these paranoia in ruling circles, which in turn petro-states. Rents provided by oil will be tends to reinforce repression.17 Thus, the difficult to match. more repressive a regime, the less informed it is about public preferences.

FIGURE 1 — POLITICAL TERROR SCALE DATA FOR GCC STATES IMPLICATIONS OF US OIL SELF- SINCE 2009 SUFFICIENCY

5.0 Outside trends reinforce the narrative of petro-states’ declining strategic importance. 4.5 The United States could achieve oil self- sufficiency as soon as 2020.18 Net imports 4.0 averaged 2.2 Mb/d in 2018, equivalent to

3.5 just over 10% of domestic consumption. In 2019, net imports have averaged just over 1 3.0 Mb/d, the lowest amount since 1958.19 The dwindling of US oil imports has 2.5 strengthened the perception among the PTS average score PTS average US electorate and political leadership that 2.0 Americans no longer need to expend blood

1.5 and treasure to protect Middle East oil. That view appears to disregard the reality 1.0 that the United States remains exposed to market events no matter how much oil it 2011 2009 2010 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 produces. A more convincing development Saudi Arabia UAE Oman Qatar is that shale has provided Washington room for increasingly confrontational foreign policy. The United States has imposed NOTE Political Terror Scale (PTS) data combines scores from , Human Rights simultaneous sanctions on two major oil Watch, and the US State Department. The scores range from 1 to 5, with 1 representing secure rule of exporters, Iran and , without law and 5 representing unlimited government repression. subjecting US motorists to spiking SOURCE Political Terror Scale 2019 prices.20 Those sanctions, which include secondary measures that have essentially 4 THE US RESPONSE TO ATTACKS ON PERSIAN GULF OIL INFRASTRUCTURE AND STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR PETRO-STATES

halted exports from these countries, would have been unthinkable without FIGURE 2 — PTS DATA FOR OTHER HYDROCARBON EXPORTERS, AND the additional ~7 Mb/d of US shale oil AVERAGES FOR THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE GCC production over the past decade. The US path to oil self-sufficiency is 5.0 having further unintended effects in the 4.5 form of a reduced trade deficit, which has strengthened the US dollar—and the 4.0 currencies of countries linked to the dollar, including all six Gulf monarchies. For oil- 3.5 importing countries with currencies that are 3.0 depreciating relative to the dollar, oil prices that look cheap in dollar terms are not so 2.5 cheap in domestic purchasing terms. In this score PTS average way, currency effects are likely contributing 2.0 to downward pressure on oil demand. 1.5

PUZZLING LACK OF POST-ABQAIQ 1.0

PRICE SPIKE 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

What about the recent oil disruptions in Iraq Iran Algeria Region average GCC average the Gulf? Why did the attacks on Saudi oil facilities, which were so effective in NOTE The scores range from 1 to 5, with 1 representing secure rule of law and 5 representing curtailing oil output, not bring longer-lasting unlimited government repression. pain in the global oil market? SOURCE Political Terror Scale 2019 Most importantly, Saudi Aramco’s strong technical capabilities limited the damage from the attacks and allowed the Arabia or on another oil exporter, at a time company to quickly restore lost production. when Saudi Arabia has reduced spare output This bolstered Saudi Arabia’s credibility, as capacity, could have a larger and longer- Saudi oil officials were quick to confirm that lasting price effect. all supply contracts would be honored and Part of the answer also lies in the slack that production would quickly be restored to in the global oil market. Inventories were levels that predated the attacks. relatively high in large part due to historic US To meet these commitments, Aramco production growth. quickly shifted to a “backup” strategy that allowed it to meet export commitments by drawing on domestic oil storage inventories PRESSURE FOR US-IRAN SETTLEMENT and substituting the lost capacity in lighter oil processed in Abqaiq with heavier grades The attacks, widely blamed on Iran, point up that were available via unused production the importance of finding an accommodation capacity from offshore fields.21 Aramco also between the Trump and Rouhani cut back on domestic refining of crude oil administrations. The Trump administration’s and sought to supply its own consumers pullout from the 2015 nuclear agreement and with imported gasoline, diesel, and fuel oil.22 reimposition of sanctions on Iran is the most However, some Saudi processing likely trigger for the disruptive activity in the capacity remained lost at the time of this region. The sanctions have placed enormous writing. The Saudi outage could eventually strain on the Iranian economy, all but cutting lead to a tighter global supply-demand off its access to hard currency and global balance. A price response based on financial markets. fundamentals, as opposed to fear, remains Iranian officials have long vowed possible. Further, a repeat attack on Saudi that Tehran would not allow itself to be 5 RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 10.29.19

singled out in any hostile effort to curb its The US perception that growing exports, and that neighboring countries American oil self-sufficiency reduces would also suffer.23 The recent series of oil US interests in the Gulf has probably infrastructure attacks—none of which Iran contributed to the reluctance to escalate claims to have committed—appear to be the conflict with Iran, even as US consumers Iran’s response. Tehran seems to be seeking remain vulnerable to oil shocks. And since new talks with Washington that would oil markets remain well-supplied and prices allow it to revive oil exports, using President comfortable, there is a sense that it would The hardline US Trump’s sensitivity to higher US gasoline be counterproductive to further antagonize 24 approach toward prices as leverage. Iran and provoke more disruption. It is worth noting that an enormous Finally, while Middle East producers will Iran may have been amount of readily available spare oil remain cornerstones of the global oil market calibrated too strongly production capacity is now held by Iran. for decades, current trends look likely to to be maintained Iranian crude oil production was just under 4 reduce the strategic importance of these major over the long term, Mb/d when US sanctions were re-imposed. petro-states in the eyes of the US, which Blocked Iranian output would be of enormous will force them to seek alternate sources of even with favorable value in the event of a future supply revenue as well as military protection. oil market conditions crunch. Given the moral hazard incurred in Intensifying climate action only driven by the US shale seeking Iran’s help to restore a market that enhances the pressure on fossil fuel revolution. Tehran’s own actions may be responsible for producers. As oil importers seek alternatives damaging, one expects that Iranian oil would for fossil fuels, export states face a reduction be released only as a last resort. in the all-important rents that bolster the Lacking a comprehensive settlement durability of autocratic regimes, adding to with the US, any Iranian return to markets pressures for economic reforms and perhaps would likely be done quietly and on political changes as well. an ad-hoc basis, perhaps by halting enforcement of secondary sanctions or granting additional waivers. ENDNOTES

1. US Energy Information Administration, CONCLUSION “Short-Term Energy and Winter Fuels Outlook,” Oct. 8, 2019, https://www.eia. The hardline US approach toward Iran may gov/outlooks/steo/special/winter/2019_ have been calibrated too strongly to be winter_fuels.pdf. See also Rania el-Gamal, maintained over the long term, even with “Saudi Aramco restored oil output to pre- favorable oil market conditions driven by attack level: trading unit chief,” Reuters, the US shale revolution. Escalating incidents Sept 30, 2019; https://www.reuters.com/ of Iran-authored or Iran-enabled sabotage article/us-saudi-security-oil-aramco/ have left Saudi Arabia paying a high price for saudi-aramco-restored-full-oil-capacity- its support of US sanctions. Even as they call to-pre-attack-level-trading-unit-chief- for a more robust international response, idUSKBN1WF1T0. Riyadh and now appear to be 2. The day prior to the attack, Sept. 13, seeking to dilute the Trump administration’s 2019, the Brent one-month futures price “maximum pressure” strategy, while closed at $60.22. On Sept. 14, the attacks opening channels for dialogue with Tehran, pushed the closing price to $69.02. By Oct. so that Iran is not provoked to further press 1, the price closed below the pre-attack its “maximum resistance” strategy. price, reaching $58.89. Regardless, the series of oil disruptions 3. Najmeh Bozorgmehr, Anjli Raval, and acts of sabotage around the Gulf have and David Sheppard, “Iran says oil tanker been accompanied by a curious lack of hit by two missiles off Saudi Arabia coast.” meaningful response from the United States Financial Times, Oct. 11, 2019, https://www. or the two Persian Gulf monarchies that had ft.com/content/2ae8d55a-ebef-11e9- lobbied for US pressure on Iran. a240-3b065ef5fc55. 6 THE US RESPONSE TO ATTACKS ON PERSIAN GULF OIL INFRASTRUCTURE AND STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR PETRO-STATES

4. Steve Holland and Rania El Gamal, the Persian Gulf (Stanford University Press, “Trump says he does not want war after 2018); Frederic Wehrey and Richard Sokolsky, attack on Saudi oil facilities,” Reuters, Sept. “Imagining a New Security Order in the 16, 2019; https://www.reuters.com/article/ Persian Gulf,” Policy paper (Washington, D.C.: us-saudi-aramco/trump-says-he-does- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, not-want-war-after-attack-on-saudi-oil- October 2015), https://carnegieendowment. facilities-idUSKBN1W10X8. org/2015/10/14/imagining-new-security- 5. Barbara Starr and Veronica order-in-persian-gulf-pub-61618. Stracqualursi, “Pentagon announces new 14. Jim Krane, Amy Myers Jaffe, and troop deployments to Saudi Arabia.” CNN. Jareer Elass, “Nuclear Energy in the Middle com, Oct. 11, 2019, https://www.cnn. East: Chimera or Solution?” Bulletin of the com/2019/10/11//us-additional- Atomic Scientists 72, no. 1 (2016): 44–51. troops-middle-east-iran/index.html. 15. Jeremy S. Pal and Elfatih A. B. Eltahir, 6. “Saudi Aramco hits out at lack of “Future Temperature in Southwest Asia resolve over attacks,” Agence France- Projected to Exceed a Threshold for Human Presse, Oct. 9, 2019; https://news.yahoo. Adaptability,” Nature Climate Change 6, no. com/saudi-aramco-hits-lack-resolve- 2 (February 2016): 197–200. over-attacks-164200162.html. 16. Mark Gibney, Linda Cornett, Reed 7. BP, BP Statistical Review of World Wood, Peter Haschke, Daniel Arnon, Attilio Energy 2019 (London: BP, June 2019), “Table: Pisanò, and Gray Barrett, The Political Terror Oil: Inter-area movements 2018,” c. Scale 1976-2018, retrieved 10/8/2019 from 8. In 2018, the United States produced the Political Terror Scale website, http:// 15.3 Mb/d of oil and natural gas liquids, and www.politicalterrorscale.org/. 80.5 bcf/d of natural gas, amounts that 17. Ronald Wintrobe, “How to were higher than that of any other country. Understand, and Deal with Dictatorship: BP, “BP Statistical Review of World Energy An Economist’s View,” Economics of 2019,” statistical report. Governance 18, no. 3 (2001): 35–58. 9. For a detailed compendium of 18. See, for example, DOE/EIA Short- the risks to fossil fuel producers and term Energy Outlook, September 10, 2019, governments, see Jim Krane, “Climate https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/ Change and Fossil Fuel: An Examination of archives/Sep19.pdf Risks for the Energy Industry and Producer 19. U.S. Energy Information States,” MRS Energy & Sustainability 4 Administration, “U.S. Net Imports of (2017), https://doi.org/10.1557/mre.2017.3. Crude Oil and Products,” 10. See, for example, the Sustainable Sept. 30, 2019; https://www.eia. Development Scenario of the International gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler. Energy Agency’s “World Energy Outlook ashx?n=PET&s=MTTNTUS2&f=M. However, 2018” (OECD/IEA, 2018) https://www.iea. an accurate picture of US dependence on org/weo2018/scenarios. the global oil market would also include 11. For a detailed discussion of the Carter much larger gross imports of about 10 Doctrine, see Gabriel Collins and Jim Krane, Mb/d, largely in the form of crude oil, due The Carter Doctrine 3.0: The New Gulf- to the mismatch between the heavy oil Asia-US Oil Security Nexus (Houston: Rice preferences of domestic refineries and the University's Baker Institute for Public Policy, overwhelmingly light oil produced in the July 2017), https://www.bakerinstitute.org/ US shale patch. Regardless of the amount files/12601/. of US imports, the oil market is global. 12. Charles L. Glaser and Rosemary A. While the overall impact of high prices on Kelanic, “Getting Out of the Gulf: Oil and US the US economy is now more balanced, Military Strategy,” Foreign Affairs 96, no. 1 US consumers are still vulnerable to spikes (February 2017): 122–31. in prices “at the pump” if something goes 13. See, for example, Steve A. Yetiv and wrong in the Middle East, or anywhere else Katerina Oskarsson, Challenged Hegemony: in the global market. The United States, China, and Russia in 7 RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 10.29.19

20. Shale’s untethering of US foreign policy is not just a Trump phenomenon. It AUTHOR also assisted the Obama administration’s Jim Krane, Ph.D., is the Wallace S. Wilson Asia pivot and provocative policies in the Fellow for Energy Studies at Rice University’s Mideast (e.g., pro- position, Baker Institute. His research addresses the anti-Mubarak stance, withdrawal from the geopolitical aspects of energy, with a focus Gulf carrier battle group, the Iraq drawdown, on the Middle East and the OPEC states and engagement with Iran, etc.) their political and economic strategies. 21. Julian Lee, “Saudi Recovery From Oil Attack Isn’t All It Seems,” Bloomberg, Mark Finley is the Fellow in Energy and Sep. 27, 2019, https://www.bloomberg. Global Oil at Rice University's Baker Institute. com/news/articles/2019-09-27/saudi- He has 35 years of experience working at recovery-from-oil-attack-isn-t-all-it- the intersections of energy, economics and seems-oil-strategy; and Sotaro Yumae, public policy. “Exclusive: Saudi Arabia floats change to oil supply, sparks concern,” Nikkei Asian Review, Sep. 22, 2019, https://asia. nikkei.com/Business/Energy/Exclusive- Saudi-Arabia-floats-change-to-Japan-oil- supply-sparks-concern. 22. David Sheppard, Anjli Raval and Harry Dempsey, “Saudi Arabia’s oil output bounces back after attacks,” Financial Times, Sep. 25, 2019, https://www.ft.com/ See more issue briefs at: www.bakerinstitute.org/issue-briefs content/636cba08-df8e-11e9-b112- 9624ec9edc59. This publication was written by a 23. “Iran Repeats Its Vow To Close researcher (or researchers) who Off the Strait,” The New Times, participated in a Baker Institute project. Nov. 14, 1983, https://www.nytimes. Wherever feasible, this research is com/1983/11/14/world/around-the- reviewed by outside experts before it is released. However, the views expressed world-iran-repeats-its-vow-to-close- herein are those of the individual off-the-strait.html. “Iranian President author(s), and do not necessarily Hassan Rouhani threatens to close Strait represent the views of Rice University’s of Hormuz,” Deutsche Welle, July 22, Baker Institute for Public Policy. 2018, https://www.dw.com/en/iranian-

© 2019 Rice University’s Baker Institute president-hassan-rouhani-threatens-to- for Public Policy close-strait-of-hormuz/a-44777371. 24. President Trump has demonstrated This material may be quoted or his sensitivity to higher gasoline prices reproduced without prior permission, throughout his term, mainly via tweets in provided appropriate credit is given to which he suggests that Saudi Arabia take the author and Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy. action to reduce global oil prices.

Cite as: Krane, Jim, and Mark Finley. 2019. The US Response to Attacks on Persian Gulf Oil Infrastructure and Strategic Implications for Petro-States. Issue brief no. 10.29.19. Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, Houston, . https://doi.org/10.25613/FF9S-SK08

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