DOCSLIB.ORG

Zimbabwe Zimbabwe at a Glance: 2001-02

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Zimbabwe Zimbabwe at a Glance: 2001-02 COUNTRY REPORT Zimbabwe Zimbabwe at a glance: 2001-02 OVERVIEW Zimbabwe is in a rapidly escalating economic and political crisis that will continue until at least the presidential election, expected to be held in April 2002. If President Robert Mugabe wins he is likely to moderate some of his more controversial policies such as land reform and his opposition to devaluation and economic reform. If he loses, as is possible, then the real question is whether he will accept defeat or whether the country will be dragged into a constitutional crisis, only to be resolved by military intervention. Although the economy is in a steep decline, current economic policy will ensure that a total collapse does not occur prior to the presidential election. While economic reform will be gradually introduced after the election regardless of who wins, the negative impact of the current strategy will serve as a major drag on the economy for years to come. Key changes from last month Political outlook • The Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) candidate, Elliot Manyika, won the Bindura parliamentary by-election. Violence and intimidation towards supporters of both the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), and the ZANU-PF, clearly highlights the strategy of intimidation that Mr Mugabe will continue to use up to the presidential election in 2002. • Another High Court judge has resigned. Three pro-Mugabe judges have been appointed to the Supreme Court as the government steps up its pressure on the judiciary. Economic policy outlook • Private trade in maize has been banned as Zimbabwe faces both a maize and wheat deficit and will need to import supplies in coming months. • Simba Makoni, the finance minister, seems increasingly isolated as he stresses the need for devaluation, as the cabinet has rejected his advice. Economic forecast • Driven by the increase in domestic fuel prices in early June, the year-on- year inflation rate increased sharply in June, to 64.4%. August 2001 The Economist Intelligence Unit 15 Regent St, London SW1Y 4LR United Kingdom The Economist Intelligence Unit The Economist Intelligence Unit is a specialist publisher serving companies establishing and managing operations across national borders. For over 50 years it has been a source of information on business developments, economic and political trends, government regulations and corporate practice worldwide. The EIU delivers its information in four ways: through our digital portfolio, where our latest analysis is updated daily; through printed subscription products ranging from newsletters to annual reference works; through research reports; and by organising seminars and presentations. The firm is a member of The Economist Group. London New York Hong Kong The Economist Intelligence Unit The Economist Intelligence Unit The Economist Intelligence Unit 15 Regent St The Economist Building 60/F, Central Plaza London 111 West 57th Street 18 Harbour Road SW1Y 4LR New York Wanchai United Kingdom NY 10019, US Hong Kong Tel: (44.20) 7830 1007 Tel: (1.212) 554 0600 Tel: (852) 2585 3888 Fax: (44.20) 7830 1023 Fax: (1.212) 586 0248 Fax: (852) 2802 7638 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Website: www.eiu.com Electronic delivery This publication can be viewed by subscribing online at www.store.eiu.com Reports are also available in various other electronic formats, such as CD-ROM, Lotus Notes, online databases and as direct feeds to corporate intranets. For further information, please contact your nearest Economist Intelligence Unit office Copyright © 2001 The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited. All rights reserved. Neither this publication nor any part of it may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited. All information in this report is verified to the best of the author's and the publisher's ability. However, the EIU does not accept responsibility for any loss arising from reliance on it. ISSN 1350-7095 Symbols for tables “n/a” means not available; “–” means not applicable Printed and distributed by Patersons Dartford, Questor Trade Park, 151 Avery Way, Dartford, Kent DA1 1JS, UK. Zimbabwe 1 Outlook for 2001-02 Political outlook Domestic politics State-sponsored political violence will continue to be the central element of President Robert Mugabe’s strategy to try to win the forthcoming presidential election, likely to be held in April 2002. Despite violent intimidation of the opposition, and possible vote rigging by Mr Mugabe and his party, the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), the Economist Intelligence Unit believes that Morgan Tsvangirai, the leader of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), may win the election. If this happens, the question remains whether Mr Mugabe and his supporters will accept defeat. The main feature of the election campaign will be the ZANU-PF’s policy of suppressing all forms of opposition to Mr Mugabe’s rule and of intimidating its own supporters, especially in rural areas. This strategy was clearly evident in the Bindura by-election in July, and will continue to be used in the series of parliamentary by-elections that are due in the coming nine months. The government will also seek to undermine Mr Tsvangirai’s candidacy by continuing with his trial, on terrorism charges, and by using the state media to portray the MDC as a violent party. In addition, the government will attempt to win back urban voters through the militant activities of the Zimbabwe Federation of Trade Unions, created by the ZANU-PF in opposition to the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions, which supports the MDC. The government will seek to suppress the independent news media and the judiciary, and will be afforded a powerful voice by its dominance of the daily newspaper market and monopoly on broadcasting. The MDC will continue to discourage its supporters from openly confronting the government, for fear of provoking the suppression of all public opposition. There is also fear that any civil unrest would give Mr Mugabe an excuse to impose a state of emergency and to rule by decree. Given the political climate in which the election will be conducted, it is likely that the MDC will hold few mass rallies and marches during the campaign. Instead, it will conduct something resembling an underground campaign, relying on small meetings, pamphlet distribution and word of mouth to convey its message. This will probably work quite effectively, especially as the climate of repression is likely to harden voters’ attitudes against the government. However, there are several factors that may alter this scenario considerably and lead to a rapid escalation of the current political crisis. The National Constitutional Assembly has stated that it will hold mass demonstrations if the government does not accept its proposed changes to the constitution. With shortfalls in the maize and wheat crops, food riots are also possible unless the government manages to import these staple grains—the minister of finance recently appealed to the international community for food aid. Other potential flashpoints include parliamentary by-elections, and the court cases (or possible EIU Country Report August 2001 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2001 2 Zimbabwe jail sentences) of Morgan Tsvangirai and other MDC leaders, charged with treason and inciting violence. Election watch If Mr Mugabe wins the April 2002 presidential poll he will continue to repress opposition to his government. However, he is also likely to moderate some of his more extreme policies, most notably the violent seizure of land and other examples of the breakdown of the rule of law, in order to win back donor support to help halt Zimbabwe’s economic decline. If Mr Tsvangirai manages to win the presidential race, it is not certain that Mr Mugabe will accept the result; the outcome may then be decided by the military and the police. Optimists claim that the army is professional and will support whoever wins the vote, but to date it has strongly supported the Mugabe regime and may refuse to accept Mr Tsvangirai as president—top ZANU-PF officials have openly stated that they would go “back to the bush” if Mr Mugabe lost the election. If that happens, widespread unrest may ensue. However, if Mr Tsvangirai wins and this result is accepted by Mr Mugabe and the army, considerable changes can be expected, notably a new parliamentary election and a return to even- handed enforcement of the rule of law. Unfortunately, Mr Mugabe’s history suggests that he will retain power through the use of force, although this will be only a temporary solution, delaying a more dramatic, potentially violent change of power in the future. International relations Since the assassination of Laurent Kabila, the president of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), on January 16th 2001, the Zimbabwean government has sought to protect its own interests in the DRC and to establish its influence over Mr Kabila’s son and successor, Joseph Kabila. At present we do not expect Zimbabwe to withdraw the majority of its forces from the DRC until a comprehensive peace agreement, along the lines proposed in the 1999 Lusaka Accord, is implemented. However, the number of Zimbabwean troops in the DRC is likely to be reduced to about 13,000 by the end of 2001. Economic policy outlook Policy trends The government is committed to reviving an updated version of its New Millennium Economic Policy in the second half of 2001, to help tackle the country’s deepening economic crisis. However, this is unlikely to have any real impact, and policy will instead continue to be driven by ad-hoc crisis management, which, despite producing some odd outcomes, should stave off economic collapse prior to the presidential election, due in April 2002.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Mortal Remains: Succession and the Zanu Pf Body Politic
    THE MORTAL REMAINS: SUCCESSION AND THE ZANU PF BODY POLITIC Report produced for the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum by the Research and Advocacy Unit [RAU] 14th July, 2014 1 CONTENTS Page No. Foreword 3 Succession and the Constitution 5 The New Constitution 5 The genealogy of the provisions 6 The presently effective law 7 Problems with the provisions 8 The ZANU PF Party Constitution 10 The Structure of ZANU PF 10 Elected Bodies 10 Administrative and Coordinating Bodies 13 Consultative For a 16 ZANU PF Succession Process in Practice 23 The Fault Lines 23 The Military Factor 24 Early Manoeuvring 25 The Tsholotsho Saga 26 The Dissolution of the DCCs 29 The Power of the Politburo 29 The Powers of the President 30 The Congress of 2009 32 The Provincial Executive Committee Elections of 2013 34 Conclusions 45 Annexures Annexure A: Provincial Co-ordinating Committee 47 Annexure B : History of the ZANU PF Presidium 51 2 Foreword* The somewhat provocative title of this report conceals an extremely serious issue with Zimbabwean politics. The theme of succession, both of the State Presidency and the leadership of ZANU PF, increasingly bedevils all matters relating to the political stability of Zimbabwe and any form of transition to democracy. The constitutional issues related to the death (or infirmity) of the President have been dealt with in several reports by the Research and Advocacy Unit (RAU). If ZANU PF is to select the nominee to replace Robert Mugabe, as the state constitution presently requires, several problems need to be considered. The ZANU PF nominee ought to be selected in terms of the ZANU PF constitution.
    [Show full text]
  • OTHER ISSUES ANNEX E: MDC CANDIDATES & Mps, JUNE 2000
    Zimbabwe, Country Information Page 1 of 95 ZIMBABWE COUNTRY REPORT OCTOBER 2003 COUNTRY INFORMATION & POLICY UNIT I SCOPE OF DOCUMENT II GEOGRAPHY III ECONOMY IV HISTORY V STATE STRUCTURES VIA HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES VIB HUMAN RIGHTS - SPECIFIC GROUPS VIC HUMAN RIGHTS - OTHER ISSUES ANNEX A: CHRONOLOGY ANNEX B: POLITICAL ORGANISATIONS ANNEX C: PROMINENT PEOPLE PAST & PRESENT ANNEX D: FULL ELECTION RESULTS JUNE 2000 (hard copy only) ANNEX E: MDC CANDIDATES & MPs, JUNE 2000 & MDC LEADERSHIP & SHADOW CABINET ANNEX F: MDC POLICIES, PARTY SYMBOLS AND SLOGANS ANNEX G: CABINET LIST, AUGUST 2002 ANNEX H: REFERENCES TO SOURCE MATERIAL 1. SCOPE OF THE DOCUMENT 1.1 This country report has been produced by the Country Information and Policy Unit, Immigration and Nationality Directorate, Home Office, from information obtained from a wide variety of recognised sources. The document does not contain any Home Office opinion or policy. 1.2 The country report has been prepared for background purposes for those involved in the asylum / human rights determination process. The information it contains is not exhaustive. It concentrates on the issues most commonly raised in asylum / human rights claims made in the United Kingdom. 1.3 The country report is sourced throughout. It is intended to be used by caseworkers as a signpost to the source material, which has been made available to them. The vast majority of the source material is readily available in the public domain. 1.4 It is intended to revise the country report on a six-monthly basis while the country remains within the top 35 asylum-seeker producing countries in the United Kingdom.
    [Show full text]
  • National Youth Service Training
    National youth service training - “ shaping youths in a truly Zimbabwean manner” [COVER PICTURE] An overview of youth militia training and activities in Zimbabwe, October 2000 – August 2003 THE SOLIDARITY PEACE TRUST 5 September, 2003 Produced by: The Solidarity Peace Trust, Zimbabwe and South Africa Endorsed nationally by: Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition Zimbabwe National Pastors Conference Ecumenical Support Services Harare Ecumenical Working Group Christians Together for Justice and Peace Endorsed internationally by: Physicians for Human Rights, Denmark The Solidarity Peace Trust has a Board consisting of church leaders of Southern Africa and is dedicated to promoting the rights of victims of human rights abuses in Zimbabwe. The Trust was founded in 2003. The Chairperson is Catholic Archbishop Pius Ncube of Bulawayo, and the Vice Chairperson is Anglican Bishop Rubin Phillip of Kwazulu Natal. email: selvanc@venturenet,co.za or [email protected] phone: + 27 (0) 83 556 1726 2 “Those who seek unity must not be our enemies. No, we say no to them, they must first repent…. They must first be together with us, speak the same language with us, act like us, walk alike and dream alike.” President Robert Mugabe [Heroes’ Day, 11 August 2003: referring to the MDC and the possibility of dialogue between MDC and ZANU-PF] 1 “…the mistake that the ruling party made was to allow colleges and universities to be turned into anti-Government mentality factories.” Sikhumbuzo Ndiweni [ZANU-PF Information and Publicity Secretary for Bulawayo]2 “[National service is] shaping youths in a truly Zimbabwean manner” Vice President Joseph Msika [July 2002, speech at graduation of 1,063 militia in Mt Darwin]3 1 The Herald, Harare, 12 August 2003.
    [Show full text]
  • Zimbabwe: Prospects from a Flawed Election
    ZIMBABWE: PROSPECTS FROM A FLAWED ELECTION Africa Report N°138 – 20 March 2008 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................i I. INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................1 II. THE REGIONAL INITIATIVE: INSUFFICIENT RESULTS .................................2 A. PIECEMEAL REFORMS ...........................................................................................................2 1. Constitutional Amendment Eighteen.........................................................................2 2. Amendments to repressive legislation.......................................................................3 3. The Electoral Act.......................................................................................................3 4. Other agenda items ....................................................................................................4 B. DEAL BREAKERS ..................................................................................................................5 C. SADC AND SOUTH AFRICA’S FAILURE ..............................................................................7 III. THE ELECTORAL ENVIRONMENT ........................................................................8 A. A VIOLENT CLIMATE .............................................................................................................8 B. ABUSE OF STATE RESOURCES .............................................................................................10
    [Show full text]
  • Africa Briefing, Nr. 15: Decision Time in Zimbabwe
    AFRICA Briefing Nairobi/Brussels, 8 July 2003 DECISION TIME IN ZIMBABWE I. OVERVIEW In an article published in The New York Times in advance of the Bush visit, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell said of President Mugabe and his Change is in the air in Zimbabwe. Its citizens no regime, “their time has come and gone”,1and that longer talk about whether it will come, but rather new leadership respectful of human rights and the when. All acknowledge, however, that the road will rule of law was needed. South Africa is working to be dangerous, possibly violent. South Africa is the resolve the Zimbabwe crisis since it is experiencing single country with ability to help its neighbour many of its consequences but Deputy Foreign through the roughest patches if it is willing to engage Minister Aziz Pahad, whose efforts, like those of with sufficient determination to persuade the President Mbeki, have been mostly low key and government of President Robert Mugabe and his behind the scenes, said cooly, “I hope we can reach ruling ZANU-PF party to sit down with their a common approach on Zimbabwe. If there is challenger, the Movement for Democratic Change another route, the Americans must put it on the (MDC), and then facilitate and mediate negotiations table”.2 for a transitional government and new elections. A range of other international players need to play There is indeed another route. Getting ZANU-PF supporting roles, including the EU, the Southern and the MDC to the table for unconditional Africa Development Commission (SADC), the negotiations should be at the top of the agenda African Union (AU), and the Commonwealth, but when the U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • ZANU PF's Despotic Rhetoric
    Their words condemn them: The language of violence, intolerance and despotism in Zimbabwe April 2007 2 Contents Introduction......................................................................................................................... 2 Gukuruhundi ....................................................................................................................... 3 Population size.................................................................................................................... 6 Threats against opposition and protestors and incitement to attack opposition supporters 7 Food riots 1998 ................................................................................................................. 21 Murambatsvina ................................................................................................................. 23 Court orders and the rule of law ....................................................................................... 24 Whites, white farmers, Jews and homosexuals................................................................. 25 Archbishop Pius Ncube .................................................................................................... 29 Threats against teachers.................................................................................................... 30 Media and journalists........................................................................................................ 31 Condoning torture............................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • ZIMBABWE COUNTRY REPORT April 2004
    ZIMBABWE COUNTRY REPORT April 2004 COUNTRY INFORMATION & POLICY UNIT IMMIGRATION & NATIONALITY DIRECTORATE HOME OFFICE, UNITED KINGDOM Zimbabwe April 2004 CONTENTS 1 Scope of the Document 1.1 –1.7 2 Geography 2.1 – 2.3 3 Economy 3.1 4 History 4.1 – 4.193 Independence 1980 4.1 - 4.5 Matabeleland Insurgency 1983-87 4.6 - 4.9 Elections 1995 & 1996 4.10 - 4.11 Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) 4.12 - 4.13 Parliamentary Elections, June 2000 4.14 - 4.23 - Background 4.14 - 4.16 - Election Violence & Farm Occupations 4.17 - 4.18 - Election Results 4.19 - 4.23 - Post-election Violence 2000 4.24 - 4.26 - By election results in 2000 4.27 - 4.28 - Marondera West 4.27 - Bikita West 4.28 - Legal challenges to election results in 2000 4.29 Incidents in 2001 4.30 - 4.58 - Bulawayo local elections, September 2001 4.46 - 4.50 - By elections in 2001 4.51 - 4.55 - Bindura 4.51 - Makoni West 4.52 - Chikomba 4.53 - Legal Challenges to election results in 2001 4.54 - 4.56 Incidents in 2002 4.57 - 4.66 - Presidential Election, March 2002 4.67 - 4.79 - Rural elections September 2002 4.80 - 4.86 - By election results in 2002 4.87 - 4.91 Incidents in 2003 4.92 – 4.108 - Mass Action 18-19 March 2003 4.109 – 4.120 - ZCTU strike 23-25 April 4.121 – 4.125 - MDC Mass Action 2-6 June 4.126 – 4.157 - Mayoral and Urban Council elections 30-31 August 4.158 – 4.176 - By elections in 2003 4.177 - 4.183 Incidents in 2004 4.184 – 4.191 By elections in 2004 4.192 – 4.193 5 State Structures 5.1 – 5.98 The Constitution 5.1 - 5.5 Political System: 5.6 - 5.21 - ZANU-PF 5.7 -
    [Show full text]
  • ZIMBABWE Injustice and Political Reconciliation
    ZIMBABWE Injustice and Political Reconciliation Edited by Brian Raftopoulos and Tyrone Savage Published by The financial assistance of the Swiss Agency for Development and Co-operation is gratefully acknowledged Prelims 1 2/14/05, 1:42 PM ii Published by the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation 46 Rouwkoop Road, Rondebosch 7700, Cape Town, South Africa www.ijr.org.za © 2004 Institute for Justice and Reconciliation All rights reserved. ISBN: 0-9584794-4-5 Produced by Compress www.compress.co.za Cover design by Chaz Maviyane-Davies Marketing and sales agent: Oneworldbooks www.oneworldbooks.com Distributed by BlueWeaver Orders to be placed with Blue Weaver PO Box 30370, Tokai 7966, Cape Town, South Africa Fax: +27 21 701 7302 E-mail: [email protected] Prelims 2 2/14/05, 1:42 PM iii CONTENTS Foreword v Acknowledgements vii Introduction Unreconciled differences: The limits of reconciliation politics in Zimbabwe Brian Raftopoulos viii Chapter 1 The promised land: From expropriation to reconciliation and Jambanja Lloyd M. Sachikonye 1 Chapter 2 Memories of underdevelopment: A personal interpretation of Zimbabwe’s economic decline Rob Davies 19 Chapter 3 ‘Gukurahundi’ The need for truth and reparation Shari Eppel 43 Chapter 4 Reintegration of ex-combatants into Zimbabwean society: A lost opportunity Paul Themba Nyathi 63 Chapter 5 Contextualising the military in Zimbabwe between 1999 and 2004 and beyond Martin R. Rupiya 79 Chapter 6 Whither judicial independence in Zimbabwe? Charles Goredema 99 Chapter 7 Liberating or limiting the public
    [Show full text]
  • Political Violence Report: October 2002
    ZIMBABWE HUMAN RIGHTS NGO FORUM POLITICAL VIOLENCE REPORT: OCTOBER 2002 21 November 2002 A report by the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum Political Violence Report: October 2002 OVERVIEW Reports of organised violence have consistently surrounded the period preceding elections in Zimbabwe. The by-election held in Insiza over the weekend of 26 - 27 October 2002 proved to be no exception as it was allegedly marked by violence and engulfed in intimidation. There were reports of victimization of villagers, real and perceived MDC supporters as well as the MDC candidate himself. In one case, it is alleged when Zanu PF candidate, Andrew Langa, is alleged to have fired a shot at an MDC supporter, Darlington Kadengu, during the campaign period. Siyabonga Mlandu Ncube, the MDC candidate was with Kadengu at the time of the shooting. It is unknown whether the shot that hit Kadengu had been intended for him or not. The reported presence of CIO officers and youths from the Border Gezi National Service Training Centre observing and monitoring the polls in a breach of the electoral laws, was purported to have had an intimidatory effect on the opposition party supporters. As the Electoral Act Section 14B states, it is only those nominated by and accredited by the Observers’ Accreditation Committee before the actual commencement of the polls, and those who also have proof of an accreditation certificate, who are empowered to observe polls; neither of these groups had been accredited. There were allegations that the police were selective in application of the law as they reportedly targeted only MDC supporters, turning a blind eye to political violence perpetrated by Zanu PF supporters.
    [Show full text]
  • Jacob Chikuhwa a Crisis of Go
    A CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE: ZIMBABWE A CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE: ZIMBABWE Jacob Chikuhwa Algora Publishing New York © 2004 by Algora Publishing. All Rights Reserved www.algora.com No portion of this book (beyond what is permitted by Sections 107 or 108 of the United States Copyright Act of 1976) may be reproduced by any process, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form, or by any means, without the express written permission of the publisher. ISBN: 0-87586-284-5 (softcover) ISBN: 0-87586-285-3 (hardcover) ISBN: 0-87586-286-1 (ebook) Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Chikuhwa, Jacob W. (Jacob Wilson), 1940- A crisis of governance : Zimbabwe / Jacob Chikuhwa. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index. ISBN 0-87586-284-5 (trade paper : alk. paper) — ISBN 0-87586-285-3 (hard cover : alk. paper) — ISBN 0-87586-286-1 1. Zimbabwe—Politics and government—1980- I. Title. JQ2925.C47 2004 320.96891—dc22 2004006344 Printed in the United States This book is dedicated to all the people who were tortured and those who died for the liberation and for the democratic process underway in Zimbabwe. I also dedicate the book to those who are campaigning to make Zimbabwe a truly democratic society. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank my wife Raisa, my son Tonderai-Wilson and his wife Assiati and my daughter Eleonora-Ngwarai, and all my friends and acquaintances who have directly or indirectly made the task of writing this book more easy, bearable and even pleasurable. These include pastors Doug and Jodi Fondell, who provided me with material and moral support when I had just returned to Sweden at the end of April 2002.
    [Show full text]
  • The Day After Mugabe Text:Chapter 1
    Will ZANU-PF survive after Mugabe? The combination of a nationalist guerrilla movement with the mechanisms of colonial administration has been a recipe for disaster, writes Ibbo Mandaza. But close ties to the military and security apparatus mean that only a reformed ZANU-PF can manage a peaceful transition to democracy. Zimbabwe’s ruling party, ZANU-PF, has developed over a period of 44 years as part of the mainstream nationalist movement. Its antecedents were the African National Congress of Southern Rhodesia, the National Democratic Party (NDP), which succeeded it in 1959, and the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) whose name was adopted in 1961 when the colonialists banned the NDP. ZANU was formed in 1963 as a breakaway from ZAPU. A decade or so later, ZANU and ZAPU formed a broad-based guerrilla war coalition known as the Patriotic Front (PF), which in 1979 negotiated the terms of Zimbabwe’s independence in constitutional talks at Lancaster House, London. But the two strands remained essentially separate in both leadership and operations. Their headquarters were in different countries, with PF-ZAPU based in Lusaka, Zambia, under the leadership of Joshua Nkomo, and ZANU-PF under Robert Mugabe in Maputo, Mozambique. The Patriotic Front coalition became strained in the months following independence, after ZANU-PF won 57 of 100 parliamentary seats in the first general election of 1980. PF-ZAPU picked up only 18. The two parties were merged in 1987 under a Unity Accord, on terms which were less a reassertion of the former Patriotic Front coalition than a confirmation of the political dominance of Robert Mugabe and his ruling party.
    [Show full text]
  • AFRICA Briefing
    AFRICA Briefing Nairobi/Brussels, 8 July 2003 DECISION TIME IN ZIMBABWE I. OVERVIEW In an article published in The New York Times in advance of the Bush visit, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell said of President Mugabe and his Change is in the air in Zimbabwe. Its citizens no regime, “their time has come and gone”,1and that longer talk about whether it will come, but rather new leadership respectful of human rights and the when. All acknowledge, however, that the road will rule of law was needed. South Africa is working to be dangerous, possibly violent. South Africa is the resolve the Zimbabwe crisis since it is experiencing single country with ability to help its neighbour many of its consequences but Deputy Foreign through the roughest patches if it is willing to engage Minister Aziz Pahad, whose efforts, like those of with sufficient determination to persuade the President Mbeki, have been mostly low key and government of President Robert Mugabe and his behind the scenes, said cooly, “I hope we can reach ruling ZANU-PF party to sit down with their a common approach on Zimbabwe. If there is challenger, the Movement for Democratic Change another route, the Americans must put it on the (MDC), and then facilitate and mediate negotiations table”.2 for a transitional government and new elections. A range of other international players need to play There is indeed another route. Getting ZANU-PF supporting roles, including the EU, the Southern and the MDC to the table for unconditional Africa Development Commission (SADC), the negotiations should be at the top of the agenda African Union (AU), and the Commonwealth, but when the U.S.
    [Show full text]