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COOPERATION AND CONFRONTATION IN PAKISTAN-UNITED STATES RELATIONS DURING PERVEZ MUSHARRAF ERA
A THESIS SUBMITTED TO FACULTY OF ARTS AND HUMANITIES UNIVERSITY OF THE PUNJAB IN CANDIDACY FOR THE FULFILLMENT OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
By
SALMA IQBAL
PAKISTAN STUDY CENTRE
UNIVERSITY OF THE PUNJAB LAHORE
2016
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DECLARATION
I, Salma Iqbal, hereby declare that this thesis submitted in fulfillment of requirements for the awards of Doctor of Philosophy in Pakistan Studies, University of the Punjab, is wholly my personal research work unless otherwise referenced or acknowledged. The thesis has not been submitted concurrently to any other university for any other degree.
______
Salma Iqbal
Roll No. 01
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CERTIFICATE BY RESEARCH SUPERVISOR
This is to certify that the research work described in this thesis is the original work of the author and has been carried out under my direct supervision. I have personally gone through all the data reported in the manuscript and certify their correctness/authenticity. I further certify that the material included in this thesis has not been used in part or full in a manuscript already submitted or in the process of submission in partial/complete fulfillment of the award of any other degree from any other institution. I also certify that the thesis has been prepared according to the prescribed format and I endorse its evaluation for the award of Ph. D. degree through the official procedures of the University.
______
Prof. Dr. Massarrat Abid
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Certificate of Approval
This is to certify that the research work presented in this thesis, entitled “Cooperation and Confrontation in Pakistan United States Relations During Pervez Musharraf Era.” was conducted by Mrs. Salma Iqbal under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Massarrat Abid.
No part of this thesis has been submitted anywhere else for any other degree. This thesis is submitted to the Pakistan Study Centre, University of the Punjab, Lahore. in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Field of Pakistan- Studies Department of: Pakistan Study Centre, University of the Punjab, Lahore.
Student Name: Salma Iqbal Signature: ______
Examination Committee:
a) External Examiner 1: Name Signature:______(Designation & Office Address)
Dr. Humaira Dar Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Government College for Women University, Sialkot-Pakistan
Supervisor Name: Prof. Dr. Massarrat Abid Signature: ______
Name of Dean/HOD: Prof. Dr. Massarrat Abid Signature: ______Director Pakistan Study Centre, University of the Punjab, Lahore.
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DEDICATION
I dedicate this work
to my Teachers and Family in particular to my Father who helped me
for completion of this research work.
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Abstract
The study analyzes Pakistan-United States relations, which are a combination of confrontation and cooperation. Since independence, the relations between the two
States have seen many ups and downs. The purpose of this research is not only to provide an exhaustive historical account of the relations; it also aims at interpreting cooperation and confrontation between the two countries in the broader sense during
Musharraf era. The research has focused on how the two countries reached various formal agreements, how the official dialogues were conducted on major issues of bilateral interest, and what impacts it had on the relationship between the two nations.
It has also been enquired how the United States policy towards Pakistan changed from confrontation to cooperation after 9/11 attacks. It has also encompassed the economic dependence of Pakistan on the US aid, its social sector’s developments and the need for the US military aid for the balance of power in the region and Pakistan’s national security. The consequences and backlash on Pakistan economy, socio-religious life, and overview of the country’s law and order situation, suggestions to reduce the atmosphere of mistrust and way forward to improve the Pakistan-US relationship between the two independent-sovereign states has also been part of the analysis of the relations.
This study includes details regarding the cooperation between the two countries, eradicating terrorism, improving socio-political situation in Afghanistan, removing major irritants between the two countries. Moreover, it considers Pakistan’s response to the situation in Afghanistan, steps taken by Pakistan and the US to resolve the crisis and the consequences, for Pakistan, for becoming an ally of the United States in the war on terrorism. Furthermore, it has also discussed why Pakistan’s decision to vii provide logistic and intelligence assistance to the US in the war on terrorism was a precautionary measure against being labelled as a terrorist state and an ally of the
Taliban by the US. The research has endeavored to carry out an in depth study of
Pakistan-US relations and their impact on the policies of both countries. It has also studied the issues relating to some irritants and confrontation between the two countries.
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COOPERATION AND CONFRONTATION IN PAKISTAN-UNITED STATES RELATIONS DURING PERVEZ MUSHARRAF ERA
CONTENTS
Title Page No.
Declaration ii
Certificate by the Research Supervisor iii
Certificate of Approval iv
Dedication v
Abstract vi
Contents viii
Acknowledgements x
Abbreviations xii
List of Tables xvii
INTRODUCTION 1-22
1. PAKISTAN UNITED STATES RELATIONS: A HISTORIC SURVEY (1947-99) 23-63 1.1. United States Policies towards Pakistan 1947-99 23 1.2. Cooperation and Confrontation in Pakistan and United States Relations in the field of Military and Defense 1947-1999 32 1.3. Socio-Economic Cooperation within Pakistan United States Relations 46 1.4. Pakistan United States Relations and Regional Perspective 1947-99 51 1.5. Specific United States Legislations against Pakistan 60 2. PERVEZ MUSHARRAF’S PAKISTAN AND UNITED STATES POLICIES TOWARDS PAKISTAN: AN OVERVIEW OF RELATIONS 64-100 2.1. The US Policies towards Pakistan 2001-2008 66 ix
2.2. The United Nations and World Community’s Response towards 9/11 73 2.3. Pakistan’s Cooperation and US Response 76 2.4. US Policy towards Pakistan on the Issue of Kashmir 84 2.5. Impact of the US Policies in different fields 88 2.6. Change in Pakistan’s Policies 95 2.7. Osama bin Laden views and Policies towards the US 98 3. PAKISTAN UNITED STATES RELATIONS: THE DEFENCE AND MILITARY TIES (1999-2008) 101-134 3.1. Military Assistance Programs 108 3.2. Military Support to US from Pakistan 116 3.3. Divergence/Confrontation between Pakistan and US 119 3.4. Actions Taken by Pakistan (Post 9/11) 122 3.5. Pakistan–US Strategic Cooperation: An Overview 124 4. SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOMENT OF PAKISTAN AND THE UNITED STATES SUPPORT 135-170 4.1. Bilateral Economic Assistance 136 4.2. Socio Economic Relations of Pakistan and United States after 9/11 144 4.3. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), War on Terrorism and Pakistan 160 4.4. The United States courted Pervez Musharraf with economic rewards 162 4.5. Sanctioned waived and Economic aid 2001-2007:an Overview 167 5. PAKISTAN UNITED STATES AND THE REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES 171-205 5.1. Pakistan United States and Afghanistan in the Regional Perspective 173 5.2. Pakistan United States and China in the Regional Perspective 185 5.3. Pakistan United States and India in the Regional Perspective 195 5.4. Causes to Cooperate United States regarding Regional Relations 209
CONCUSION 206-219
APPENDICES 220-264
BIBLIOGRAPHY 265-307
x
Acknowledgement
I first of all, thank Allah Who, in unbounded grace and mercy, helped and gave me strength to complete this dissertation successfully. I am fortunate to receive cooperation from my teachers, friends and family, without their support and good wishes; I would not have been able to complete my work.
I wish to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Prof Dr. Massarrat Abid, Director
Pakistan Study Centre, and former Dean of Arts and Humanities, University of the
Punjab, Lahore, whose wisdom and scholarly rigor inspired and sustained me throughout this research. I am greatly indebted to Prof Dr. S. Qalb-i-Abid Dean of Arts and Humanities, Concordia colleges, Lahore for providing me an atmosphere for research. I am equally indebted to my respected teachers Prof Dr. Hassan Askari Rizvi,
Prof Dr. Farhat Mehmud, Prof Dr. Farooq Hasnat. I profited greatly from their suggestions, their encouraging response was most valuable for me.
I take this opportunity to extend my heartiest gratitude to respectable renowned scholars Prof. Dr. Pippa Virdee from De Montfort University, United Kingdom, Prof.
Dr. Agnieszka Kuszewska, University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Poland and
Prof. Dr. Bettina Robotka of Institute of Asian and African Studies, Humboldt
University of Berlin, Germany, their guidance, support and mentorship facilitated me in completing of research.
I would also like to extend my thanks to Prof. Dr. Nazir Ahmad, Head of the
Department International Relations, Quaid-e-Azam University Islamabad, Prof. Dr.
Moonis Ahmar, Head of the Department of International Relations & Dean Faculty of
Social Sciences, University of Karachi, Mr. Ahmad Awais Former President Lahore
Bar Association, Ambassador Masood Khan who provided guidance during my xi research. I am grateful to Dr. Amjad Abbas Khan and Dr. Ahmad Ejaz Assistant
Professors, Pakistan Study Centre, and Dr. Fraz Anjum, Department of History,
University of the Punjab, Lahore for their suggestions.
I would like to extend my thanks to Higher Education Commission who awarded me scholarship which facilitated me in completion of my research. It would be unjust on my part if I do not thank the Staff of National Documentation Centre Islamabad,
National Archives Islamabad, United States Embassy Islamabad, Punjab Archives
Lahore, Punjab Public Library Lahore, Jinnah Library Lahore, and Library of Pakistan
Study Centre and the main Library of the University of the Punjab, Lahore. The staffs of these libraries were always willing to locate the required material for me.
I am also thankful to my Grandfather, Naim-ud-Din Shah, my father, Muhammad
Iqbal Hussain Shah, my mother, Zahida Parveen, uncle, Muhammad Irshad Hussain
Shah and Muhammad Iftikhar Hussain Shah and other members of my family. Their prayers have been most helpful in completing this task.
Salma Iqbal
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Abbreviations
AIP Afghan Islamic Press
AFCP Ambassadors’ Fund for Cultural Preservation
AIPS American Institute of Pakistan Studies
AMRAAM Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile
ANF Anti-Narcotics Force
BIT Bilateral Investment Treaty
CAS Country Assistance Strategy
CBS Columbia Broadcasting System
CENTO Central Treaty Organization
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CND Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
CNN Cable News Network
CSF Coalition Support Funds
CSH Child Survival and Health
CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
CTC Counter Terrorism Committee
CTED Counter Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate
DART Disaster Assistance Response Team
DCG Defence Consultative Group
DOD Department of Defence
ECO Economic Cooperation Organization
EDA Excess Defence Articles xiii
EPPA Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act.
ESF Economic Support Funds
FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FDDP Friends of Democratic Pakistan
FMCT Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty
FMF Foreign Military Financing
FY Fiscal Year
GAO Government Accountability Office
GDP Gross Development Product
GHCS Global Health and Child Survival
GHQ General Head Quarter
GSP General System of Preferences
GWOT Global War on Terrorism
HEC Higher Education Commission
HIVAIDS Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
HRDF Human Rights and Democracy Funds
IDA International Disaster Assistance
ILO International Labour Organization
IMF International Monetary Fund
ISI Inter Service Intelligence Agency
JDAM Joint Direct Attack Munition
JEM Jaish-e-Muhammad xiv
KLB Kerry Lugar Bill
KPK Khyber Pakhtun Khawa
KRL Khan Research Laboratories
LAT Lashkar-e-Taiba
LOC Line of Control
MAP Military Assistance Programme
MRA Migration and Refuge Assistance
MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime
NAM Non Aligned Movement
NAS Narcotics Affairs Section
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDAA National Defence Authorization Act
NGOs Non-Governmental Organizations
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NORAD Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
NPT Non-proliferation Treaty
NWFP North West Frontier Province
ODA Official Development Assistance
ODRP Office of the Defence Representative to Pakistan
OEF Operation Enduring Freedom
OFDA Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
OIC Organization of Islamic Cooperation
PAF Pakistan Air Force xv
PBS Public Broadcasting Service
PCCF Pakistan’s counter insurgency capability funds
PCF Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund
PL Public Law
PLA People’s Liberation Army
PM Prime Minister
POWs Prisoners of War
PPP Pakistan People Party
PRSP Pakistan’s Redaction Strategy Paper
SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SEATO South East Asia Treaty Organization
SSP Sipah e Sahaba Pakistan
TIFA Trade and investment framework agreement
TMB Textiles Monitoring Body
TNFJ Tehrek-e-Nafaz-e-fiqh-e-Jafaria
TNSM Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi
TOW Tube-launched Optically-tracked Wire-guided
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
UNICEF United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UNSC United Nations Security Council
US United States xvi
USAID United States Agency for International Development
WB World Bank
WMD Weapon of Mass Destruction
WTC World Trade Centre
xvii
List of Tables
Table No. Page No.
Table. 1. US Foreign Assistance--Obligations and Loan Authorizations-- to India and Pakistan (Economic aid in millions of dollars) 49
Table. 2. US Economic Assistance to Pakistan including Grants and soft Loans, 1953-1990, (US million dollars) 51
Table. 3. Total Economic Aid to Pakistan from US 2002-2010 143
Table. 4. Total Economic and Military Assistance 2002-2010 144
1
INTRODUCTION
Pakistan-United States relations are a combination of confrontation1 and cooperation2.
Since 1947, the relations between the two States have seen many ups and downs. The purpose of this research is not only to provide an exhaustive historical account of the relations; it also aims at interpreting cooperation and confrontation between the two countries in the broader sense during Pervez Musharraf era. “The research has focused on how the two countries reached various formal agreements, how the official dialogues were conducted on major issues of bilateral interest, and what impacts it made on the relationship between the two nations. It has also been inquired how the
US policy towards Pakistan changed from confrontation to cooperation after 9/11 attacks. It has also encompassed the economic dependence of Pakistan on the US aid, its social sector’s developments and the need for the US military aid for the balance of
1 Confrontation means a situation in which people, groups, etc fight, oppose, challenge each other in an angry way. To see what a confrontation strategy is we need to see how it is implemented at various levels. We begin by discussing its implementation at grand strategy, military, strategic, operational and tactical levels of command. The general’s confrontation strategy needs to be analyzed and broken down into strategies that can be carried out by units reporting to him at the tactical level. This is the objective and essential principle of a confrontational strategy. In relation to what is done at the tactical level, the point is that while we are conducting a confrontation, we are not essentially doing anything except communicating. Here “essentially” means that we may be doing other things, but all such other things will have communication as at least one of their functions, and it is function that our confrontation strategy is concerned with. Nigel Howard, “Confrontation Analysis: How to win Operations other than war”, CCRP Publication Series (August 1999) 193.
2 Cooperation means the action or process of working together. Cooperation among nations has become the focus of a wide range of studies in the past decade, a subject of interest to political scientists, economists and diplomats. During the past decade, much of the international relations literature about cooperation has adopted a distinct approach, which has tended to focus on the systemic level of analysis, that is, on the sources of and constraints on cooperation behavior among states as a function of the international system. The recent literature on international cooperation has made two general contributions. First, there is now a consensus on a definition of cooperation, which can help distinguish what behavior counts as cooperation. Knowing what we mean by cooperation is certainly an important first step. Second, the literature has developed propositions about the conditions under which cooperation is likely to emerge, by using game theory to model relations at the systemic level. Following Robert Keohane, a number of scholars have defined cooperation as occurring “when actors adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination”. Helen Milner, “International Theories of cooperation among Nations: Strength and Weaknesses”, World Politics, 44, no. 3 (April 1992): 466-467.
2 power in the region and Pakistan’s national security.” The consequences and backlash on Pakistan economy, socio-religious life, an overview of the country’s law and order situation, suggestions to reduce the atmosphere of mistrust, and the way forward to improve the Pak-US relationship between two independent-sovereign states have also been part of the analysis of the relations.
When Musharraf took control of Pakistan on October 12, 1999, the relations between the two states were deteriorating due to a number of reasons including terrorism, narcotics, and nuclear issues. “US had always been against the nuclear program of
Pakistan that was initiated by the Z. A. Bhutto. The US and its allies had imposed severe economic sanctions on Pakistan. The World Bank had stopped release of funds for Ghazi Barotha Hydropower Project. India had always labelled Pakistan as an enemy. A nuclear Pakistan with its modern missile technology was considered by them more dangerous not only for India but for the entire region. Pakistan’s growing relations with China were a great cause of concern both for India and the US, which wanted India to counter the communist threat. Despite that situation, the US did not wish to put pressure on Pakistan and wanted their relations to remain undisturbed mainly due to Pakistan’s strategic location.” The new military regime in Pakistan also tried to play its cards with utter care, knowing the importance of their country for the
US and its allies.
Due to its nuclear technology pursuit, “Pakistan had been facing severe economic sanctions imposed not only by the US and its allies but from some world institutions as well. The opinion against Pakistan in the US had hardened due to the nuclear issue.
After the military takeover in Pakistan, the situation went from bad to worse. On May
28, 1998, Pakistan conducted a nuclear test despite constant opposition from the US.
Following which Bill Clinton, the US President, imposed non-humanitarian sanctions
3 on Pakistan under section 102 of the Arms Export Control Act. An additional layer of sanctions under section 508 of the Foreign Appropriations Act that included restrictions on foreign military financing and economic assistance was also imposed.3
Since the beginning of 2001, Pakistan has faced a variety of sanctions imposed by the
US. Pakistan was criticized in September 2001, for receiving Chinese components for missile development and was accused of violating the Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR). This became the main cause of sanctions from the US in 2001. In the mid 2001, the relationship between the two countries was revolving around the signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), associated with the Taliban and the military rule in Pakistan.” Tensed relations between the two countries had also been due to the unresolved issue of F-16.4 Pakistan had to face hardship due to the sanctions imposed by the US In this scenario, the US Assistant Secretary of State,
Christina B. Roca, visited Pakistan in 2001. During a meeting with her, Pakistan’s
Foreign Minister, Abdul Sattar, insisted that the US should lift economic sanctions.5
In Pakistan, Musharraf had been criticized for adopting a US dictated policy depicting it as the cause of all the ills Pakistan was facing. “While the media in the West accused
Pakistan of providing safe havens for terrorists, training camps, and sponsoring religious extremism in the region. It had also severely censured Pakistan for Abdul
Qadeer Khan’s efforts for the nuclear proliferation.6 The US media painted Pakistan as a foe before 9/11 and despite its U-turn in its foreign policy the country remained a foe in their eyes after 9/11 as well. However, Pakistan remained important for the United
States due to its geo-strategic location.” Therefore, both in the hot and cold days of
3 Abdul Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2012: A Concise History (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2014), 169. 4 Syed Farooq Hasnat, “Pakistan-US Relations on Slippery Grounds: An Account of Trust and its Deficit,” Pakistan Vision, 12, no. 1 (June 2011): 55. 5 Ibid,, 57 6 Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2012: A Concise History ,166.
4 diplomacy, diplomatic ties were not broken. But, after 9/11, Musharraf administration could not completely comprehend the value of Pakistan for the US. Therefore, the terms of US were accepted by them unconditionally, i.e. agreeing to send Pakistan into hot water and Bush’s (2001-2009) seven demands for cooperation were accepted by
Pakistan.7
An important element of the US policy towards the South Asia has been to attain regional stability by encouraging both India and Pakistan to solve their bilateral issues, especially the Kashmir dispute, through peaceful negotiations. 8 “Musharraf paid a weeklong visit to the US from September 7 to September 14. The purpose of his visit was to attend the special commemoration of 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Centre in
New York. During his visit, many important issues of regional and bilateral concerns also came under discussion with the Bush Administration. Musharraf also raised the
Kashmir dispute with the Secretary of State, Colin Powell. He emphasized that the normalization of relations between India and Pakistan was not possible without solving the Kashmir dispute according to the wishes of the Kashmiris. The two countries confronted several challenges ranging from the war on terrorism to Pakistan’s nuclear program and more importantly its relations with India.” The US agreed to play an active diplomatic role in efforts for reducing tension between Indian and Pakistan over the Kashmir dispute.9
On the other hand, “Pakistan had to pay the price of her cooperation with the US. It had to face several internal security threats, the uprising of sectarian violence, and suicide attacks on its Army and the civilian population. Perhaps, all problems and
7 Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir (London: Simon and Schuster, 2006), 204. 8 Frederic Grare, “Foreign Policy Option”, Economic and Political Weekly (November 2-9, 2002): 4568. 9 Bruce Riedel, “Pakistan and Terror: The Eye of the Storm”, Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science, 618 (July 2008): 38.
5 issues pertaining to the sovereignty and integrity of the State were not fully comprehended. The relations of the two countries at the time of 9/11 could have been improved under very different terms and on conditions which would have suited both
Pakistan and the US, and the fatal consequences could have been avoided. Pakistan faced crisis after crisis, including the challenges to its writ and danger to its integrity.
On the diplomatic front, Pakistan had to confront serious issues, especially in its relations with Iran, China, and newly independent Russian States. Foreign as well as domestic investors lost their confidence in the State due to the turbulent law and order situation.”Though the Gross Domestic Product, (GDP) and foreign remittances were increased, but this rise, unfortunately, had no sustainable and long lasting impact on the economy.
Relations between Pakistan and the US became complicated after 9/11 but overall it brought a soother change in the attitude of the US. Pakistan not only condemned the terrorist attacks, but also affirmed its willingness to join the US in the War against terrorism. Therefore, Pakistan supported the US against the Taliban regime in
Afghanistan. “According to Musharraf, the reasons to join the US led war in
Afghanistan were to protect Pakistan against the threat from India, to preserve its nuclear and missile assets, to revive the economy and to promote the Kashmir cause.
On the other hand, the US decided to ignore the lack of democracy in Pakistan.” The sanctions against Pakistan, imposed in response to the nuclear explosions, were lifted and aid was also restored. At the end of 2001, Pakistan’s economic condition improved due to the unexampled inflow of foreign aid.10
It is no longer a secret that at the time of the takeover by Musharraf, the economy of
Pakistan was in a shamble. Pakistan was already facing US sanctions under Symington
10 Hasnat, “Pakistan-US Relations on Slippery Grounds,” 58.
6
(1978), Pressler Amendment (1990), Glenn Amendment (1998) and other sanctions because of nuclear tests in 1998 and the military coup in 1999.11 “The International
Monetary Fund (IMF) had frozen final instalment of 1.56 billion US dollars’ worth of credit, which had been allocated to Pakistan in 1997. The sanction had also led to dry up foreign investment which lowered to almost zero in 1999-2000. The domestic debt rose from 1877 billion to 3096 billion, which was 97.5% of the GDP. Foreign debt went to 237 billion rupees and as a result, 45% of the budget spending was being allocated in the budget as debt servicing.”
After acceptance of the demands of the US, the major economic developments and other policies towards Pakistan were revisited: i.e. “friendly readjustments of foreign loan, World Bank, IMF, Western Europe, US grant in aid were rescheduled. Musharraf himself admitted that it was because of Pakistan’s economic weakness that it accepted the conditional ties while restoring Pak-US relations after 9/11. Certainly, due to financial and economic constraints, Pakistan could not get better terms and conditions in the war against terror; for, the economic gains could have been magnified and could have long term impact on Pakistan’s economy. Due to shift and acceptance of their proposed terms, as a reward, US. Congress authorized the US President to provide aid and extend complete financial assistance to Pakistan.”
Pakistan got 1.2 billion dollars US assistance in 2002-2003. “US aid worth 600 million dollars were transferred to Pakistan Government directly to pay its internal debt.
Moreover, the US agreed to reschedule 379 million dollars bilateral debts through the
Paris Club and also agreed to support Pakistan’s 12.5 billion dollars bilateral debts with Paris Club Members. Pakistan was also given trade concessions by lowering its
11 Bessma Momani, “The IMF, the U. S. War on Terrorism, and Pakistan,” Asian Affairs, 31, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 44.
7 tariff and restrictions on its textile goods.”The US Senate authorized its President to reduce, suspend, and execute duties on import of textile. On the same analogy, the
IMF executive board approved 135 million dollars for disbursement of Pakistan loan.12
In 2002-2008, “Pakistan received 13696.86 million dollars fund in terms of economic assistance United States Agency for International Development (USAID), military assistance, and Coalition Support Fund. 13 Similarly 12.139 million dollars were provided in different social sector programmes during the same period which included the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) Development Plan, International
Disaster Assistance, and Civilian Assistance Programme. Therefore, during the
Musharraf era, the overall economic condition and GDP growth of Pakistan reached almost to 7-8%. The US Administration seemed concerned and raised questions relating to corruption and transparency issue in the proper utilization of funds. The US and its allies tried to put certain conditions on the use of the aid. Despite all objections and reservations, President Bush was compelled to give remarks “Brave and courageous leader of Pakistan” for Musharraf. Surprisingly, it was the same
Musharraf, whom Bush had denied a handshake two years ago.”
Another important factor was that the military aid provided to Pakistan by the United
States included extraordinary defense supplies worth 5.4 billion dollars for the year
2002-2010. “Pakistan also received 2.1 billion dollars in foreign Military Financing
Grant in addition to military equipment which included P-3/C Orion maritime patrol aircraft (valued at 474 million dollars), 6312 Tube-launched, Optically tracked, Wire- guided (TOW) anti-armor missiles (186 million dollars), 5600 military radio sets (163 million dollars), six surveillance radars (100 million dollars), six C-130E, 20 cobra
12 Ibid, 45. 13 Howard B, Schaffer and Teresita C. Schaffer, How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States, Riding the Rollar Coaster (Lahore: Vanguard books, 2011), 136-37.
8 helicopters (48 million dollars). Similarly, under Coalition Support Funds, from the
Pentagon budget, millions of dollars and equipment were handed over to Pakistan
Army. Almost 2.1 billion dollars were also provided to the Pakistan Army to purchase weapons for counter terrorism.” The Pakistan Army was given special military training and capacity building programme.14
The shift in foreign policy narrated by Musharraf, but the Pakistanis as always, had remained mostly allied but distrustful ally of the US.15 Due to its geo-strategic location
Pakistan needed by the US to play a pivotal role in advancement of their interests in the region. American interests demand their influence in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and
India. Therefore, Pakistan’s demand for parity with India was always dispelled by the
US Consequently, the two states had a history of mistrust, and anti-American sentiments in Pakistan were also noticeable.
The pitfall in the policy of the US relationship with Pakistan remained always in different intensity during Musharraf era. Anti-American sentiments in Pakistan and the trust deficit between the both States on the implementation of even mutually agreed policies had always been an issue of great concern for policy makers. “Moreover, issues like A. Q Khan’s alleged role in the proliferation of nuclear weapons, export of missile technology from China, Pakistan policy on Islamic militancy, and the US areal drone attacks on Pakistani soil added difficulties in the US relations. During the
Musharraf era, although Pakistan had accepted US influence in the region yet every step. Islamabad was analyzed with a lot of skepticism in Washington. US was not satisfied with Pakistan’s efforts and consistently pressurized to do more by deploying
14 Susan B. Epstein, K. Alan Kronstadt, “Pakistan: US Foreign Assistance”, Congressional Research Service CRS Report for Congress. (June 2011): 12-13.www.crs.gov.accessed on January 15, 2014. 15 Robert G. Wirsing, “Precarious Partnership: Pakistan’s Response to U.S. Security Policies,” Asian Affairs, 30, no. 2 (Summer 2003): 77.
9 troops on Pak-Afghan borders at a time when Pakistan was facing the Taliban and other terrorists coming from Afghanistan into Pakistan and has been creating internal security problems. On the issue of drone attacks Pakistan had serious reservations because of the loss of human lives and due to the violations of Pakistan’s sovereignty.
The drone attacks produced tremendous anti-American sentiments in Pakistan, which somehow became a supporter of terrorists by earning sympathies despite their inhuman acts.16 On the nuclear issues, Pakistan had always been at loggerheads with the US.
The so-called safe-haven for terrorists in FATA was another issue on which both states had divergent point of views. The discussion on “good” and “bad Taliban” remained the focal point of discussion during bilateral talks between the two countries. The
Indian role in Afghanistan and its repercussions for Pakistan’s security also remained a hurdle and always created mistrust and skepticism on both sides.”
The endeavors to modify Pakistan’s foreign policy had shown serious repercussions.
The concept was in a successful moderate model state which could remove economic disparity, and provide equal opportunity for progress of every citizen unlike capitalism and socialism.”Due to the deep rooted Islamic ideology, inculcated in the heart and mind of people of Pakistan, the changed policy was not accepted and the public reacted with growing anti-American sentiments. Not only the religious sector of
Pakistan, but also liberal and moderate civil society condemned the US for committing acts of terrorism. The growing influence of India in Afghanistan also created serious issues with specific reference to Balochistan and Karachi where India was accused of providing weapons and financial support to the separatist groups creating serious security threats to Pakistan.”
16 Waqas Sohrab, Ishtiaq Ahmad Choudhry, “Pak-US Relations in 21st Century: Challenges and Opportunities for Pakistan,” Berkely Journal of Social Sciences, 2, no. 3, (March 2012): 12.
10
India and Afghanistan took the advantage of turbulent Pakistan by creating serious sectarian issues through suicide bombing thus depicted the State of Pakistan as
“unsafe” for the minorities. “It also provided an opportunity to hostile countries to raise the issue of human rights violations in Pakistan. The extremists tried to capture
Swat Valley, South and North Waziristan with the support of the Afghan based
Taliban. Furthermore, Jindullah, Hizbullah Tehrik, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan,
Lashkar Jhangvi, Sipah-i-Sahaba and Sipah-i-Muhammad and some other small local militant groups also challenged the writ of Government. Pakistan suffered a loss of almost 67.926 billion dollars from 2001 to 2009. Resultantly socio economic sectors pertaining to human development index fell down. Direct foreign investment, the backbone of the economy of any country, also touched the lowest ebb. The Kashmir dispute and other issues with India were compromised; collateral damage, loss of life was immeasurable.17 Pakistan’s independence and sovereignty were compromised.”
This study has included details regarding the cooperation between the two countries, eradicating terrorism, improving socio-political situation in Afghanistan, removing major irritants between the two countries.“Moreover, it has considered Pakistan’s response to the situation in Afghanistan, steps taken by Pakistan and the US to resolve the crisis and the consequences, for Pakistan, for becoming an ally of the US in the war on terrorism. Furthermore, it has also discussed why Pakistan’s decision to provide logistic and intelligence assistance to the US in the war on terrorism was a precautionary measure against being labelled as a terrorist state and an ally of the
Taliban by the US.”
17 Rashmi Jain, ed., The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2006 A Documentary Study (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 2007), 155.
11
Significance of the Problem
Pakistan-US relations went through several ups and downs. It is necessary to know about the nature of the cooperation between the two countries after the event of
9/11.”The US government promised to eradicate terrorism from the world with the cooperation of Pakistan and by expanding their economic assistance towards it.
Pakistani government also promised the US and their public to eradicate the terrorism.
Pakistan contributed the US by providing help to defeat Afghanistan. In response to a
Pakistan contribution on war against terrorism, US also removed sanctioned that were imposed in 1978, 1990 and 1998 and provided economic aid to Pakistan. The Pakistani
Government decided to help the US so that it could avail economic support and important place in the world stage.”
Although a lot of research has taken place in Pakistan-US relations by eminent foreign and Pakistani scholars but still there are a number of areas in which there is a need to find out more detail as well as facts.”During Musharraf regime, the relationship underwent different stages. The aim of the research is to locate relevant and important material on the cooperation between the two countries after the event of 9/11 and to know the factors that played the key role in increasing the cooperation between the two countries. The study has suggested steps to be taken by the government to improve the relationship. The topic shows that the study has been based on the facts that what steps taken by the government to cooperate with the United States. Fluctuations between the relationships of the two countries has also discussed.”
Objectives of Research
The research has endeavored to carry out an in depth study of Pakistan-US relations and their impact on the policies of both countries. It has also studied the issues relating
12 to some irritants and confrontation between the two countries. The objectives of the study are:
To study the historical relationship between the two countries.
To study the major irritants between the two countries during Musharraf
regime.
To study the changing equation of Pakistan-US relations during Musharraf era
in Pakistan.
One of the most important objectives of the study is to examine the cooperation
with between Pakistan and the US during Musharraf’s era in the fields of socio
economic ties, military and defense ties and regional ties.
Statement of the Problem
Having gone through the history of Pakistan-US relations, as far as Musharraf era is concerned, it was a period when Pakistan had to decide either it was with the US or not in the war against terrorism. During this era Pakistan won the cooperation of the US due to her support in the war against terrorism and accordingly US policies were modified. Pakistan also changed her policies towards her former allies, the Taliban.
The incident of 9/11 changed the world, including the political scenario of South Asia, and Pakistan in particular. Both the countries tried their best to eradicate terrorism, but till date it still exists in the region. The participation of Pakistan in the war against terrorism was essential. And its cooperation towards the US became a reason of the
US aid. Pakistan had to face a lot of internal problems while providing logistical and tactical support to the US. It had to confront problems while giving access to the US to her military bases (Pasni, Jacobabad, Shamsi and Dalbadin). The cooperation was
13 against the Al-Qaeda and Taliban, resulting in tremendous loss of lives leading towards more challenges.
Review of the Literature
Extensive literature has been produced on the subject, but in a scattered form. Many scholars have written on Pakistan’s foreign policy, South Asia and Pakistan-US relations, but till to date no systematic research has been done on the Pakistan-US relations during Musharraf era. Moreover, there is hardly any material available on the issue of cooperation and confrontation between Pakistan-US relations during
Musharraf era. Most studies have with focused on the narration of the events which involved 9/11. This gap needs to be filled. The proposed research has paid special attention on this issue and provides a detailed study on the important subject.
A wide range of literature is available on Pakistan US relations. Scholars from
Pakistan as well as abroad have written on the Pakistan US relations. An endeavor has been made here to discuss the major works on the subject. Sources of these official documents, books, official reports. Both primary and secondary sources have been used for the formulation of the study. Different official documents and literature published by the Governments has been consulted. Interviews with important politicians, ambassadors and academics have also been conducted to gather more information. The newspapers, research journals of national and international importance have also been consulted. In published secondary sources work of foreign and national on the subject have been consulted. A group of scholars comprised
Mohammad Ahsen Chaudhri18, Latif Ahmed Sherwani19, S. M. Burke20, S. A. M
18Muhammad Ahsen Chaudhri, Pakistan and the Regional Pacts, A Study of Pakistan foreign policy 1947-54 (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1988).
14
Pasha21, Shahid M. Amin22, Abdul Sattar23, Pervez Musharraf24, Sudhansu Kumar
Patnaik25, Rohan Gunaratna and Khuram Iqbal26, Iftikhar Malik27, Sita Ram Sharma28 have pointed out in their respective styles have covered Pakistan’s foreign policy.
Mohammad Ahsen Chaudhri 29 has focused on the first seven years of Pakistan’s foreign policy. The book includes useful discussion on regional pacts.
Latif Ahmed Sherwani30 argues that the foreign policy of Pakistan, like that of the any country, is a means to achieve its national interests. Again, as in the case of other countries, the interests of Pakistan have been determined by its history, geopolitics and the aspiration of its people. S. M. Burke31 in his book has provided scholarly and lucid analysis of Pakistan’s foreign policy beginning with the crucial early years after
Pakistan gained independence and leading up to the events preceding the Bhutto-Indra summit in July 1972.
S. A. M Pasha32 seeks to assess Pakistan’s foreign policy till the end of the Zia regime.
Religion has been used by some states to promote their foreign policy objectives.
19 Latif Ahmed Sherwani, Foreign Policy of Pakistan (Delhi: Allied Publishers Private limited 15 Graham Road Ballard Estate, 1964). 20S. M. Burke, Pakistan Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis, 2nd edition (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1990). 21 S. A. M. Pasha, Islam in Pakistan’s Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Global Media Communication, 2007). 22 Shahid M. Amin, Pakistan Foreign Policy (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999). 23 Abdul Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2012: A Concise History (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2014). 24 Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir (London: Simon and Schuster, 2006). 25 Sudhansu Kumar Patnaik, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Kolpaz Publications, 2005). 26 Rohan Gunaratna and Khuram Iqqbal, Pakistan Terrorism Ground Zero, (London, Reaktion Books, 2011). 27 Iftikhar Malik, Pakistan Democracy, Terrorism and the building of a Nation (London: New Holand Publications, 2010). 28Sita Ram Sharma, General Pervez Musharraf wisest dictator and savior of Pakistan (New Delhi: Alfa Publications, 2006). 29Chaudhri, Pakistan and the Regional Pacts, 1. 30Sherwani, Foreign Policy of Pakistan, 1. 31Burke, Pakistan Foreign Policy, 1. 32Pasha, Islam in Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, 1.
15
Islam has acquired a prominence in this regard. Shahid M. Amin33 says that foreign policy of a country influenced by its history and geography.
Abdul Sattar34 had highlighted the foreign policy of Pakistan from partition to post
9/11 years. Pervez Musharraf35 has described in his memoir the incident of 9/11 in detail. He has highlighted the reasons behind the support of the US. He has also analyzed the national interest of Pakistan, the benefits of supporting the US and seven demands made by the US ambassador to Pakistan. Sudhansu Kumar Patnaik36 in his book has argued that the study of Pakistan’s foreign policy has fascinated scholars since its inception in 1947. Rohan Gunaratna and Khuram Iqbal37 have analyzed the myriad insurgent groups working in Pakistan. He has examined the nature, structure and agendas of these groups. Iftikhar Malik 38 has highlighted the complex issues facing Pakistan today, which remaining cautiously optimistic about the future of a pluralistic nation caught between civilian and military imperatives. He has also examined the strategic geopolitical position of the country.
Shahid M. Amin39 has adopted the theory of realism in politics. He has described the
Pakistan’s foreign policy from the beginning till 2005. According to his theory, it is really time to adopt an unemotional attitude about Pakistan’s relations with the rest of the world. Countries pursue policies on the basis of their interest. When there is a mutuality of interest between two countries, they draw closer. When there is a divergence of interests, they move away from each other. This is the prism through
33Amin, Pakistan Foreign Policy, 2. 34Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, 8. 35Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 202-204. 36Patnaik, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, 13. 37Gunaratna and Iqbal, Pakistan Terrorism Ground Zero, 13-14. 38 Iftikhar Malik, Pakistan Democracy, 8-9. 39 Amin, Realism in Politics, 82.
16 which United States-Pakistan relations should be viewed. Dr Sita Ram Sharma40 has analyzed the record of Musharraf and praised his wise handling of domestic and foreign affairs.
Foreign policy making process: A case study of Pakistan edited by Moonis Ahmar41,
Pakistan after 9/11 by Sreedhar42, in a collection of essays edited by him and Political
Violence and terrorism in South Asia by Pervez Iqbal Cheema, Maqsudul Hasan Nuri and Ahmad Rashid Malik43 in a collection of essays edited by them. Mehrunnisa Ali44 has discussed Pakistan’s foreign policy over the last three decades in her edited book.
Pakistan’s relations with the major powers, with its neighbors and the Muslim World have been examined by the Muslim World have been examined by her. A group of other scholars described United States policies towards Pakistan. Every scholar in this group comprising, Nicholas Guyatt 45 , Bob Woodward 46 , Paul Wilkinson 47 have described United States policies towards Pakistan. Nicholas Guyatt 48 has given a succinct, bold and penetrating critique of the triumphalism ideology which insists an
American domination of the century. He has drawn our attention towards the United
State of America’s power. Bob Woodward49 has described the story of Bush and has top national security advisors, after the event of September 11, 2001.
40 Sharma, General Pervez Musharraf wisest dictator and savior of Pakistan, 1. 41 Moonis Ahmar, ed., Foreign Policy Making Process: A Case Study of Pakistan (Islamabad: Department of International Relations University of Karachi, 2009) 42 Sreedhar, ed., Pakistan after 9/11 (New Delhi: Manas Publications, 2003) 43 Pervez Iqbal Cheema, Maqsudul Hasan Nuri and Ahmad Rashid Malik, ed., Political Violence and Terrorism in South Asia (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research institute, 2006) 44 Mehrunissa Ali, ed., Reading in Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1971-98 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001). 45 Nicholas Guyatt, Another American Century? The United States and the World Since 9/11, New updated edition (London: Zed Books, 2003). 46 Bob Woodward, Bush at War, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002). 47 Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism Versus Democracy, The Liberal State Response, 2nd edition (London: Routledge, 2006), 48 Guyatt, Another American Century? The United States and the World Since 9/11, 337. 49 Woodward, Bush at War, 1.
17
Paul Wilkinson50 has compared and evaluated the major policy options available to liberal democracies in their fight against terrorism. He has examined the terrorist networks that operate globally and analysis the long term future of terrorism and terrorist backed insurgencies.
Writers of another group like Ahmed Faruqi51, Howard B. Schaffer and Teresita C.
Schaffer52, Farhat Mahmood53, Syed Farooq Hasnat54, Dennis Kux55, Hafeez Malik56,
Shirin R.Tahir Kheli57, Dr Shahid Hassan Siddique58, Younas Samad59, Latif Ahmed
Sherwani60, while reviewing the Pakistan US relations, have described their point of view about it.
Ahmed Faruqi61 while describing Pakistan-US relations have focused on events in
Pakistan and America, during the Musharraf regime. Howard B. Schaffer and Teresita
C. Schaffer62, have highlighted the Pakistan-US relations and described how both countries negotiated with each other from 1947-2008. They have described the trajectory of Pakistan-U.S relations. The authors have analyzed that the negotiations between the two countries were at the top during dictatorial regime.
50 Wilkinson, Terrorism Versus Democracy, 1. 51 Ahmed Faruqui, Musharraf’s Pakistan, Bush’s America and the Middle East (Lahore: Vanguard Books put ltd, 2008) 52 Howard B, Schaffer and Teresita C. Schaffer, How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States, Riding the Rollar Coaster (Lahore: Vanguard books, 2011) 53 Farhat Mehmud, The History of US-Pakistan Relations (Lahore: Vanguard Books Pvt. Ltd, 1991) 54 Syed Farooq Hasnat, Global Security Watch Pakistan (California: Presage Publications, 2011) 55 Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000 Disenchanted Allies (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002) 56 Hafeez Malik, US Relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan The Imperial Dimension (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002) 57 Shirin R. Tahir Kheli, The United States and Pakistan: The Evolution of an influence Relationship (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982) 58 Dr Shahid Hassan Siddiqui, Pakistan aur America Dahshat Gardi Siassat o Mueshat (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 2011). 59 Yunas Samad, The Pakistan United States Conundrum Jihadists, the Military and the People: the Struggle for Control (London: Hurst and Company, 2011). 60 Latif Ahmed Sherwani, Pakistan, China and America (Karachi: Council for Pakistan Studies, 1980). 61 Faruqui, Musharraf’s Pakistan, Bush’s America and the Middle East, xii-xiv. 62 Schaffer, How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States, 133-134.
18
Farhat Mahmud 63 has analyzed that the United States and China have a lot of importance in Pakistan foreign policy during Ayub Khan Regime. Pakistan’s foreign policy had clearly been determined by a fear of Indians in the early years. Syed Farooq
Hasnat 64 ’s book is also a significant source on Pakistan-US relations. It covers different issues related to Pakistan US relations.
Dennis Kux65 has covered the relations of the US and Pakistan from 1947-2000. He has described the ups and downs of Pakistan-US relations giving extraordinary details.
Hafeez Malik66’s work is an analytical study of asymmetrical relations between the
United States, Afghanistan and Pakistan since the rise and decline of the Taliban and the ascendance of the Clinton and Bush administration. Shirin R. Tahir Kheli67 has also analyses the triangular relationship between the US, India and Pakistan.
Dr Shahid Hassan Siddique68 has focused on the challenges which Pakistan had to face in the war against terrorism. He has analyzed the 9/11 incident and described the economic crisis, which Pakistan had to face due to it. He also has highlighted the security challenges which Pakistan had to face.
Yunas Samad 69 trenchant analysis of contemporary Pakistan illuminates five key players: the country's people, army, Islamists, and politicians, and the American forces struggling to maintain Pakistan's social and political stability. Latif Ahmad Sherwani70 has written a history of triangular relations of Pakistan US and China. According to him, close relations with China and the US and correct relations with the Soviet Union
63 Mahmud, The History of US-Pakistan Relations, 1. 64 Hasnat, Global Security Watch Pakistan, 1. 65 Kux, The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000, 1. 66 Hafeez Malik, US Relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan, ix. 67 Kheli, The United States and Pakistan, xi. 68 Siddiqui, Pakistan aur America, x. 69 Samad, The Pakistan United States Conundrum Jihadists, 1. 70 Sherwani, Pakistan, China and America, xii-xiv
19 should be the target of Pakistan’s foreign policy. A documentary study of Pakistan-US relations by Rashmi Jain 71 in four parts political, economic, military and nuclear relations, edited by him. It is the most comprehensive documentary study of the US
Pakistan relations from 1947-2006.
Forty years of Pakistan-US relations by Rais Ahmed Khan72 is a collection of essays edited by him. According to Craig Baxter 73 , Nawaz Sharif’s government was inefficient, which was replaced by Musharraf, who also continued support to the
Taliban in Afghanistan. But the Pakistani government had to reverse its policy after the September 11, 2001 attacks. And Pakistan has cooperated to a considerable extent in the war against Al-Qaeda. This edited book is the collection of the essays by scholars on different aspects of the internal and external issues of Pakistan.
In primary sources the present researcher intents to include interviews of different authors, academics, Government officials, Foreign Ministers, Ambassadors, etc. The documents available at Foreign Office Islamabad, Ministry of Trade Islamabad,
Ministry of Education, Islamabad, National Documentation Centre, Islamabad, and documents from the US Congress, State Department, White House, Speeches, agreements and will be consulted. Institute of Policy Study Islamabad, American
Institute of Pakistan Studies and Pakistan Fact Sheets has also been used. The official documents, including the statements by different officials, National Assembly debates,
Constitutional documents, speeches and address by government officials, official reports and other agreements have also been utilized.
71 Rashmi Jain, ed., The United States and Pakistan 1947-2006, iv 72 Rais Ahmed Khan, ed,, In Search of Peace and Security, Forty Years of Pakistan-United States Relation, (Karachi: Royal Book Company,1990),1. 73 Craig Baxter, ed., Pakistan on the Brink: Politics, Economic and Society (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2005), 1.
20
The above mentioned works will provide a good framework for the proposed topic. It is important to say that up till now, no particular work on the Pakistan US relations during Musharraf era has been done. The main idea and the purpose of proposed research is not only to fill the gaps that exist on issues of importance, but the research will make an effort to give details of the cooperation and confrontation between
Pakistan and US during Musharraf era.
Research Questions
1. Why Pakistan and the US cooperated and confronted on some issues 1947-
1999?
2. What were the policies adopted by the United States towards Pakistan during
Musharraf era?
3. How and why the two countries developed ties in the field of military and
defense?
4. What impact of US aid and assistance in the socioeconomic development of
Pakistan was recorded?
5. What were the expectations of the US from Pakistan in the regional
perspective, especially in regard to India and China?
6. On what issues the two countries cooperated and on which issues they had
differences during Musharraf time? What patterns emerged in the field of
defense, socioeconomic cooperation?
Methodology
The Methodology applied in the present research is analytical and qualitative research techniques have been applied in the study. Interview method has used for the data collection. Both primary and secondary sources has used for the research. In Primary
21 sources I have conduct interviews from different authors, Pakistani academics,
Government officials, Foreign Ministers, Ambassadors etc. I have also collect data from Foreign Office Islamabad, Ministry of Trade Islamabad, Ministry of Education
Islamabad, Institute of Policy Study Islamabad, National Documentation Centre
Islamabad, Pakistan Fact Sheets and documents from the U.S. Congress, State
Department, White House, Speeches, agreements and American Institute of Pakistan
Studies has also been consulted. In Secondary Sources I have consult different published books, magazines, journals and Newspapers.
Libraries to be consulted
In order to complete the Research Proposal some specialized facilities may be required. So I have consult different libraries of Pakistan, included the library of the
Pakistan Study Centre, History, Political Science and International Relations and the
Main Library of University of the Punjab Lahore, Punjab Public Library Lahore,
National Archives Islamabad, Punjab Archives Lahore, National Documentation
Centre Islamabad, Pakistan Foreign Office Islamabad, Ministry of Trade Islamabad,
Ministry of Education Islamabad, Institute of Policy Studies Islamabad, The Nation’s
Office Lahore, Embassy of the United States Islamabad, National Assembly
Islamabad, Senate of Pakistan Islamabad and other institutions.
Plan of Chapters
Introduction
Chapter I: Pakistan-United States Relations: A Historic Survey 1947-1999
Chapter II: Pervez Musharraf’s Pakistan and United States Policies towards
22
Pakistan: An Overview of Relations
Chapter III: Pakistan United States Relations: The Defense and Military Ties (1999-
2008)
Chapter IV: Socio-Economic Development of Pakistan and the United States Support
Chapter V: Pakistan-United States and the Regional Perspective
Conclusion
23
CHAPTER 1
PAKISTAN UNITED STATES RELATIONS: A HISTORIC
SURVEY 1947-99
1.1. United States Policies towards Pakistan 1947-99
Pakistan’s orientation towards the US was shaped soon after independence. Although
Washington had favored a united India and was not enthusiastic about the idea of
Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Pakistan’s founder and first Governor-General, felt very close to the US. As early as September 1947, Jinnah had told his cabinet that
“Pakistan as a democracy had to align “with the United Kingdom (UK) and the US rather than with Russia” and that, furthermore communism did not flourish in the soul of Islam. After Jinnah’s untimely death on September 11, 1948, his successor Liaquat
Ali Khan followed the same foreign policy line of alignment with Washington. In a meeting with the US Secretary of State, George Marshall on October 1948, during the
UN General Assembly, Liaquat assured his interlocutor that “communism was against
Islam” and urged Washington to deliver economic aid to the new nation as it was doing across Europe after World War II.74 In 1950, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan backed the American decision to invoke UN collective security action against the
North Korean invasion. Pakistan lobbied the US position with the Middle Eastern and
South Asian countries, but it stopped short of sending troops to Korea, as Liaquat felt his country needed a security guarantee against India. Washington viewed South Asia as a region marginal to the intensifying Cold War, except for the specific areas of conflict such as Afghanistan and Kashmir.”In contrast, from the Pakistani side, the top
74 Heraldo Munoz. Getting Away With Murder: Benazir Bhutto’s Assassination and the Politics of Pakistan (London: W. W. Norton & Company, 2014) 87.
24 priority was not the Cold War or communism but the dispute with India in general and specifically over Kashmir.75 On his return from the US, “Liaquat wrote a letter to
President Truman for their kindness, hospitality and friendship which he had received from the US.76 Following the murder of Liaquat, the succeeding leaders continued to voice Pakistan’s endorsement of the anti-communist cause and willingness to join the so-called free world’s security system. A World Bank Mission consisting of seven members arrived in Karachi by a Pam-American plane on October 15-16, 1950. The mission during their five-week stay in Pakistan discussed with various officers of the
Government of Pakistan, development schemes which had been submitted to the
Bank.”These schemes covered development in the fields of agriculture, industry, hydroelectricity, etc.77 The US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, visited Pakistan from May 22-24, 1953. His visit to Pakistan had been described by the US Embassy as being primarily for the purpose of fact finding and ‘contact making’.78 General Ayub
Khan said in a high state department official during a visit to Washington D C in
September 1953,
“Our army can be your army if you want us”.79
President Dwight Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, were understandably sympathetic to Karachi’s foreign policy postures. Dulles disliked
India’s non-alignment and viewed a well-equipped Pakistani army as a stronghold against the Soviet threat. Vice President, Richard Nixon enthusiastically supported the idea of helping Pakistan as, from his visits to New Delhi and Karachi; he had come up
75 Ibid, 89. 76 Letter from PM Liaquat to President Truman, July 1, 1950. For more detail see Appendix 1. 77 File No. 53(13) Cord/1949-50.Visit of World Bank’s roving Mission to Pakistan, Cabinet Secretariat, Government of Pakistan. For more details see Appendix II. 78 File No. 143/CF/1953.Visit of Mr John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State of USA to Pakistan, Cabinet Secretariat, Government of Pakistan. 79 Heraldo Munoz. Getting Away With Murder, 90.
25 with negative perceptions of India and positive ones of Pakistan. In a briefing to the
National Security Council after a trip to Asia in 1953, Nixon declared that Pakistan was,
“A country I would like to do everything for”.
Not surprisingly,”the US under Eisenhower decided to arm Pakistan as part of a scheme to defend the Middle East and South Asia against the Soviets. On May 19,
1954, Pakistan and the US signed a mutual defense assistance agreement that provided the foundation for the provision of military aid. Pakistan’s alignment with the West was sharply criticized by the Third World nonaligned countries, but Karachi felt it had struck a good deal with Washington. In 1955, Pakistan joined the seven-country South
East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), a largely political organization modeled after
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) but lacking its automatic military mechanism against aggression. Later, Pakistan joined the Baghdad Pact and its successor Central Treaty Organization (CENTO).”The main reasons Pakistan joined these pacts was to strengthen its hand in requesting US military assistance and to claim, as Ayub Khan did, the Pakistan had become Washington’s “most allied ally in
Asia”.
The Soviet endorsement of New Delhi’s posture on Kashmir, accompanied by a sizeable package of economic and military aid to Afghanistan in late 1955, further convinced Pakistan that alignment with the US was vital. Pakistan felt confident of
Washington’s friendship as it leaned towards free enterprise policies, while India opted for a state oriented approach to economic development.80
80 Christophe Jaffrelot, Translated, Cynthia Schoch. The Pakistan Paradox Instability and Resilience (New Delhi: Random House India, 2013) 290.
26
On July 5, 1957, “an agreement between Pakistan and the US was signed for the transit of the US military aircraft to through Pakistan.81 Pakistan’s internal instability led
Washington to occasionally warn the country’s leaders about the need to stick to the democratic political processes. But in a Cold War context, the US valued disciplined and efficient leadership such as that provided by Ayub Khan, who took over in a bloodless coup in late 1958. On March 3, 1959, bilateral agreements of cooperation between Pakistan and the US were signed. 82 A Pakistan-US bilateral security agreement was signed in 1959 as an additional proof of the ongoing cooperation between the two countries. During his second term, in December 1959, Eisenhower became the first American President to visit Pakistan. In 1959 Pakistan agreed to grant the US Air Force a ten-year lease to establish a communications facility at Badaber, near Peshawar, the capital of the NWFP (now KPK), as a cover for a major intercept operation run by the national security agency. At the same time, the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) was granted permission to fly U-2 spy planes from
Peshawar over the Soviet Union.”The downing of a US spy plane over Russia in 1960 and the capture of its pilot, Gary Powers, demonstrated to the Pakistanis the costs of aligning with Washington, as the country became openly entangled in the East-West conflict. Within Ayub’s cabinet, a young minister from Sindh province by the name of
Z. A. Bhutto strongly advocated for a more independent relationship with the US and for improved ties with the Soviet Union and China. Ayub was the pragmatist who sided with Washington so long as the American administration, then presided over by
John Kennedy, would not align with India’s positions and provided it with military assistance. When Bhutto became the foreign minister, the US government considered
81 File No.204/CF/1957. Agreement between the Government of USA and Pakistan for the transit of US military Aircraft, Cabinet Secretariat, Government of Pakistan. 82 File No.112/CF/1959.Bilateral agreements of cooperation between Pakistan and USA, Cabinet Secretariat, Government of Pakistan. For more details see Appendix III.
27 him to be pro-Chinese and anti-American. On March 30, 1963, an agreement was signed between Pakistan and the US for the transit of the US military aircraft.83 The positive relationship between Pakistan and the US was renewed with Richard Nixon in the White House and Yahya Khan, who had fought in World War II, as the ruler of
Islamabad. In the summer of 1969, “President Nixon became the second American
President to visit Pakistan. Nixon expressed his intention to restore a relationship of friendship with Pakistan, based on mutual interest. More importantly, Nixon trusted
Yahya in facilitating a secret dialogue process with China that would evolve into the historic opening of relations between the US and China, inaugurated by Nixon’s visit to Beijing in February 1972. Nixon and Kissinger felt a debt of gratitude towards
Pakistan.”Both leaders also preferred Pakistan over India. “The Indians are no goddamn good”, said Nixon to Kissinger as they discussed the 1971 Pakistan-India war over East Pakistan secession. Kissinger agreed: “Those sons-of-bitches have never lifted a finger for us”.84
After the East Pakistan conflict was over, “Bhutto met with President Nixon at the
White House. Bhutto told Nixon that Pakistan was “completely in the debt of the US”, and expressed that his days of anti-Americanism were over. Nixon promised to do everything possible to help Pakistan. On December 20, 1971, General Yayha Khan, having been militarily humiliated by India and having lost East Pakistan, resigned and designated Bhutto as Pakistan’s new President and Chief Martial law administrator.
Bhutto had won the 1970 elections in West Pakistan, and now he had won the country.
The victor took charge of a shaken and a diminished nation.”President Gerald Ford, who succeeded Nixon after his resignation, singled out the nuclear issue as the key
83 File No.418/CF/1963. Agreement between Pakistan and US from the transit of military aircrafts, Cabinet Secretariat, Government of Pakistan. For more details see Appendix IV. 84 Ayesha Jalal, The Struggle for Pakistan: A Muslim Homeland and Global Politics (London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014) 301.
28 bilateral difference. Bhutto decided that Pakistan had to press ahead with its own nuclear programme after India shook the world on May 8, 1974, by detonating as an underground nuclear bomb. Kissinger, who stayed on as Secretary of State, attempted to convince Bhutto to accept a massive conventional arms package, including A-7 attack bombers, in exchange for giving up the nuclear road. But Bhutto refused to either cancel or postpone the nuclear project, which he put in the hand of A. Q. Khan in late 1975. The election of Jimmy Carter in 1976 changed the entire tone of the bilateral relationship. Abruptly, the cooperative and generally supportive business like relationship was over. Kissinger, with whom Bhutto had forged personal ties, was now out of the picture. And Bhutto’s growing domestic problems had an impact on the new administration in Washington.
The first signal of Washington’s new attitude came in April 1977, when the State
Department announced that it was blocking the export of tear gas to Pakistan on the grounds that such a sale would indicate US support for a “repressive regime”.
Intercepted telephone conversations between American diplomats in which coded reference was made to a source saying that “the party is over” led Bhutto to accuse the
US of plotting to oust him from power. Bhutto launched an official protest, which resulted in a denial of the charges by Washington.
On July 5, 1977, when Zia removed Bhutto and imposed martial law, US relations with Pakistan only worsened. “Z.A. Bhutto was hanged on the morning of April 4,
1979, in Rawalpindi. Soon thereafter, the US suspended aid to Pakistan. In 1977, the
US adopted the Glenn Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, which barred U.S. aid to countries that had not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and that imported nuclear fuel reprocessing technology.”Technically the suspension of aid came from Glenn Amendment violations, but many believed that the timing of the
29 sanctions had to do with Zia’s indifference to President Carter’s and other world leaders repeated clemency appeals for Bhutto’s life.85
The bilateral ties reached a new low with the November 1979 burning of the US embassy in Islamabad after rumors “that the US had been involved in the seizure of the
Grand Mosque in Mecca. But things changed on Christmas Eve 1979, when the Soviet
Union invaded Afghanistan to install an unconditional communist regime in Kabul.
President Carter invited General Zia to the White House in October 1980, demonstrating that Pakistan, thanks to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, had shifted from an international pariah to a key Western ally.”
On December 1982, General Zia traveled to the US on the state visit that reflected the renewed friendship between the two countries.”Pakistan was receiving 600 million dollars annually in military and economic aid. In October 1986, President Reagan certified for the first time, under the so-called Pressler Amendment, that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device. But nuclear program chief A. Q. Khan asserted the opposite in an interview, causing alarm in Washington. In Afghanistan, the Soviets were making plans to leave the country. The mujahedeen had made significant progress in their fighting after they had obtained US made Stringer missiles, thanks largely to the lobbying of Congressman Charlie Wilson and a group of Pakistan and
Afghan resistance supporters, who had convinced Reagan to provide them, despite the objections of the Pentagon, which feared the Stingers could fall into the hands of terrorists.”
After Zia’s death in an August 1988 plane crash, elections were held in November.
Although Benazir’s election as prime minister had a hugely positive political impact
85 Heraldo Munoz. Getting Away With Murder, 100.
30 among both the Republicans and Democrats in the US Congress, she had to respond to serious questions about her country’s nuclear actions when she visited Washington to meet with Bush. In an address to a joint session of congress, she declared, “We do not possess, nor do we intend to make, a nuclear device. This is our policy”. On November
18, 1988, before leaving the White House, President Reagan had signed the latest certification under the Pressler Amendment that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear weapon. He had done so after an intense debate among the various branches of government. Bush began his presidential term in January 1989 when the US had achieved its goals in Afghanistan. The Soviets had withdrawn, and two years later, the
Soviet Union ceased to exist. Nevertheless, Robert Oakley, the American ambassador in Islamabad who had a continuous dialogue with Benazir, warned the Prime Minister that Pakistan was about to commit political suicide, unless it rolled back its nuclear capability. Sure enough, in October 1990, Bush refused to issue a certification under the Pressler Amendment.86
The bilateral relations between two countries improved after voters returned Benazir to the post of prime minister in 1993, with Clinton in the White House. Following a policy initiated during the Bush administration, Clinton gave up on the idea of pushing for a rollback of the Pakistani nuclear program and instead settled for a freeze. Benazir won positive points in Washington when, in early 1995, Pakistan arrested and then extradited Ramzi Yousaf in an operation that incorporated American security officers.
The nuclear issue took the center stage when the Hindu nationalist government of Atal
Bihari Vajpayee in New Delhi detonated several nuclear devices on May 1998, surprising Pakistan, the US, and the world. Clinton imposed sanctions on India, cutting off all aid and voting against India in international financial institutions, while he tried
86 Ibid, 102.
31 arduously to convince Pakistan not to follow suit, promising, instead, a vigorous resumption of economic and military aid. But the political pressures facing Nawaz
Sharif were impossible to resist. On May 28, 1998, Pakistan detonated five underground nuclear devices and, on May 31, an additional one. The US government strongly supported Indian-Pakistani talks in Lahore in early 1999 as a way to reduce tensions and advance a peace agenda. However, another ISI-supported insurgent operation in Kashmir involving the occupation of the highland town of Kargil, beyond the Line of Control (LoC), erupted into another bilateral crisis. In his memoir, Clinton wrote that he told Nawaz Sharif that although it was Independence Day in the US, he was willing to receive the Pakistani Prime Minister; but first, Sharif had to agree to withdraw the forces commanded by Musharraf back across the LoC, and second, the
US President would not intervene in the Kashmir dispute. In Pakistan, Musharraf felt that if Sharif went to Washington under those conditions, it was equivalent to capitulation. Sharif went to Washington anyway. Being a sharp politician, Clinton perceived that Sharif had travelled to Washington “in order to use pressure from the
US to provide himself cover for ordering his military to defuse the conflict”.87
As relations between Sharif and Musharraf deteriorated, “the PM sent his brother
Shabaz Sharif to Washington D C in September too, once again, request US support to counter threats coming from the army due to the Pakistani withdrawal from Kargil. A couple of days later, a US government message to the Pakistani military read, “We hope there will be no return to days of interrupted democracy in Pakistan”. But as
Clinton expected, Sharif did not last long and was overthrown by Musharraf.” The
White House imposed additional sanctions on Pakistan, legally required in case of an overthrow of a democratically elected government. In a nutshell, Pakistan-US relations
87 Bill Clinton, My Life (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004) 88.
32 have seen many ups and downs since independence. Every country has its own interests and it takes decisions according to their interests, sometimes confrontation rose between the countries when their interests diverged and sometimes cooperation emerged when their interests converged. Same is the case with Pakistan-US relations.88
1.2. Cooperation and Confrontation in Pakistan and United States
Relations in the field of Military and Defense 1947-1999
a. Nonaligned Years (1947-53)
In order to proceed with Pak US relations during Musharraf era, there is a need to go into the depth of ups and downs of past sixty seven years in Pak US relations. Pakistan and US cooperated and confronted on some issues during the 1947-99 because of the convergence and divergence of their interests.89 After Pakistan was born in 1947, its security and economic concerns induced Pakistan to the US block. To contain the
Soviet expansionism in the South Asia and to counter the China influence, “the US needed a friend in this region in 1950’s and decided to provide security to the newborn country. Pakistan was hailed during the 1950s as a Frontline bulwark against communist expansionism. Bound to the US in multiple security treaties, it gained a reputation as “America’s most allied ally”. Liaquat Ali Khan making an official visit to Washington in May 1950 left a “positive impression” on the Congress and the
White House, thus laying the foundations of Pakistan’s strategic dependence and pro-
US foreign policy in Pakistan’s national interest, as it promised economic assistance
88 Farooq Hasnat, Interview by the researcher, November 19, 2015.
89 Farhat Mehmud, Interview by the researcher, February 11, 2016.
33 and military support.” On its part, the military led by the commander-in-chief of the
Pakistan army, Ayub Khan, was in persuading to join the US-led alliance.90
Pakistan’s relations with the US slipped in the 1960s and well into the 1970s, the two countries were allies in name, but friends hardly at all but rose swiftly during the
Afghanistan War (1979-1989), only to fall again in the years following the Soviet
Union’s collapse. “The inconstancy of the relationship with the US has greatly bothered Pakistan. In fact, nothing has drawn more rueful public commentary in
Pakistan in the past decade than what Pakistanis almost universally understand to have been Pakistan’s unceremonious dumping by Washington once its usefulness in bringing down the Soviet Union had expired.91 Pakistan reprised its role as a “frontline state” in the US grand strategy of containment, acting as a military conduit between the US and the anti-Soviet mujahedeen in Afghanistan; throughout the 1990s,” and
Pakistani Public Opinion seethed at Washington’s post-Cold War “abandonment” of
Islamabad.92
b. The Alliances with United States and Military aid 1954-1962
Pakistan and the US signed the first defense agreement on May 19, 1954. “The US undertook to provide defense equipment to Pakistan ‘exclusively to maintain its internal security, its legitimate self-defense, or to permit it to participate in defense of the area’. The assistance was to be made available under US legislation- Mutual
Defense Assistance Act of 1949 and Mutual Security Act of 1951 relating to the defense of the free world. On its part, Pakistan undertook to cooperate with the US in
90 Saeed Shafqat, “Pakistan and the United States: A Future unlike the Past?” (New York: Centre for the Study of Pakistan Columbia University, 2005), 8. 91 Robert G. Wirsing, “Precarious partnership: Pakistan’s Response to U.S. Security Policies”, Asian Affairs, 30, no.2 (Summer 2003):70. 92 Craig Baxter, ed., Pakistan on the Brink Politics, Economics, and Society (Lahore: Oxford University Press, 2004) 1.
34 measures to restrict trade with nations ‘which threaten the maintenance of world peace’. PM Muhammad Ali Bogra lauded the Pakistan US agreement. The two countries, he said, ‘have a great deal in common.” They shared conviction regarding freedom and democracy and spiritual strength to fight the totalitarian concept.93
The idea of SEATO came up in 1954. It was conceived by the US in order to create deterrence to communism in general and Vietnam in particular. “The chief reason for
Pakistan’s sudden reservations about SEATO was disappointed with the small amount of assistance the US allocated to Pakistan. Ambassador Amjad Ali told the State
Department that Ayub Khan was ‘dejected and broken-hearted’ even regretting that
Pakistan had joined in a defense agreement with the US. Dulles thought that Pakistani expectations of US aid were ‘self-stimulated’. He said the US capabilities were limited and that while it would provide equipment to enable Pakistan to play an effective role in the Middle East, Pakistan itself would have to bear the cost of maintaining its forces. Similarly, the US was not in a position to provide massive economic aid.
Dulles believed that it was in Pakistan’s interest to join SEATO but he said it should not do so to oblige the US. He also considered it imperative to clarify to Pakistan that the treaty aimed at defense against communist aggression, and excluded involvement in Pakistan-India disputes. The message could only add to Pakistan’s reservation about
SEATO. The government was not satisfied with the first draft of the treaty which would cover only East Pakistan. Unlike NATO, it provided only for consultation, not joint action, in the event of aggression against one of its members. Having insisted on an invitation to participate in the conference, it would have been counterproductive to withhold signature. SEATO members did not consider the 1965 war or the 1971 Indian
93 K. Arif, ed., America-Pakistan Relations: Volume One Documents (Lahore: Vanguard Books Ltd, 1984)107.
35 military intervention in Pakistan to come under the purview of the treaty.” After
Pakistan was severed, Pakistan withdrew from the organization in November 1972.94
Turkey and Iraq laid the foundation of the Baghdad Pact, signing a Pact of Mutual
Cooperation for ‘security and defense’ in February 1955 in the Iraqi capital. On receiving an invitation from Turkey and Iraq to join, Pakistan was not enthusiastic.
After the disappointment with the amount of US aid, “Pakistan was no longer keen to undertake further military commitments in the Middle East. Ayub Khan, then defense minister as well as commander-in-chief of the army, whose opinion was decisive in security matters, was skeptical about the worth of the pact unless the US also joined.
Prime Minister Bogra did not make a commitment when the ambassadors of Iraq and
Turkey met him. On September 23, 1955, Pakistan signed the Pact of Mutual
Cooperation in Baghdad; the other regional members were Iran, Iraq, and Turkey.
Britain also joined it, but the U.S. did not become a full member. It was renamed the
CENTO in 1959.”
Meanwhile, during his visit to the US in July 1957, Prime Minister Suharwardy informed President Eisenhower about Pakistan’s agreement to the establishment of a secret intelligence base in Badaber near Peshawar, and for permission for US aircrafts to use the Peshawar airbase. Ayub Khan was believed to have made the decision in the light of his assessment of Pakistan’s security imperatives and its economic and military needs. Moreover, Pakistan was interested in the early delivery of B-57 bombers. For a decade the base remained an anchor of US military and economic aid
94 Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002)144.
36 to Pakistan. It was also an important factor in restraining Washington from selling modern weapons systems to India.95
The agreement was supplemented by a Formal Note presented by Ambassador James
Langley to Foreign Minister Manzur Qadir on April 15, 1959 which stated, ‘the US would promptly and effectively come to the assistance of Pakistan if it were subjected to armed aggression. A threat to the territorial integrity or political independence of the members of CENTO would be viewed by the US with the utmost gravity’. The commitments made in the 1959 agreement did not guide US policy in the Pakistan-
India wars of 1965 and 1971. It then took the view that its obligation under the 1959 agreement was subject to the clause ‘as may be agreed upon’ and limited to a case of
‘armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism as provided in the Join Resolution’. Pakistan, however, felt the US had let it down by failing to honor its obligation when Pakistan invoked this agreement in 1971.96
Instantly after establishment of Pakistan in 1947, Pakistan’s security and economic concerns compelled it to lean towards the American block. Meanwhile, “the US was looking for a ‘friend’ in the region to thwart the spread of communism in South Asia and to counter the emerging China. A series of treaties (1954: Pakistan-US Mutual
Aid, September 1954: membership of SEATO, September 1955: membership of
CENTO) did two things besides giving an air of security and protection to the new- born country. First, these pacts, along with some domestic governance constraints,
95 Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2012: A Concise History, 55-56. 96 Ibid, 57.
37 introduced military as a durable component in the political system of Pakistan.”
Secondly, Pakistan’s foreign policy got its opening feature.97
Benefits from Alliances
The military assistance agreement between Pakistan and the US was signed in May
1953. "One part of the agreement was the understanding that Pakistan would cooperate in regional defense". That, of course, meant the defense of US interests in the region, primarily its oil interests. Pakistan was not free to utilize any of the military aid for its own purposes. To secure that, “the US set up institutional arrangements so that it could keep an eye on the actual use of the military aid material and to stop any of it being used against India. Under the US Military Assistance Programme (MAP), Pakistan military forces were divided into two distinct formations, namely, the MAP forces and non-MAP forces. US military assistance was earmarked exclusively for units designated as MAP forces to be deployed on Pakistan's western borders, available for intervention in west Asia on US behalf. Military aid supplied under the programme was not to be used by non-MAP forces, which were deployed on the Indian border generally, notably on the Kashmir front and in East Pakistan. This was strictly monitored and supervised by US officials who were stationed right inside the Pakistan army, General Head Quarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi.”
Pakistan's relationship with the US had never been cooler, although Ayub Khan did his best to keep as much US goodwill as he could do. In the period after 1979, under the respective regimes of Zia and Ronald Reagan, US policy once again shifted towards
Pakistan. There were two quite different contexts in which that shift took place. One was that of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. The other was the US animosity
97 Safdar Sial, “Pakistan-United States: A Balance Sheet of Relations” Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, (June 2007): 2-6.
38 towards the Islamic revolution in Iran that overthrew the great ally of the US, the Shah of Iran. The two contexts are intertwined. The US was determined not only to drive the
Soviets out of Afghanistan, but also to eliminate Afghan reformist indigenous communist regimes. That gave an opportunity to Zia to profit from the US aid and support. He even entertained dreams of setting up a client regime in Afghanistan. The
US resumed substantial military aid to Pakistan.98
By 1954, the Cold War played a role in exacerbating the Indo-Pakistan conflict over
Kashmir. Pakistan, which joined the US and Great Britain in the SEATO and CENTO, military alliances designed to contain Soviet expansion, received substantial military support. India, which was much closer to Soviet Union thanks to Nehru’s socialism and an early visit to Moscow, refused to join any of Washington’s Cold War alliances.99 Pakistan’s purpose in joining the alliances was primarily to contain the
Indian threat in which the US had little interest. Benefits were initially meager. The military aid announced by the US in 1954, amounting to only 29.5 million dollars, greatly disappointed even the protagonists of the alliance. Stunned, a ‘broken hearted’
Ayub Khan said,
“It would be better for Pakistan not to be involved in
defense arrangements with the US.”
PM Bogra told Dulles he would be ‘derided.’ It was argued that the aid did not compensate Pakistan for the additional risks it assumed by openly allying itself with the US Pakistan’s concerns were not dismissed in Washington, however. The US increased economic assistance to 106 million dollars in 1954 and boosted military aid
98 Hamza Alavi, “Pakistan-US Military Alliance”, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 33, no. 25 (Jun. 20- 26, 1998), 1554-55. 99 Stanley Wolpert, India and Pakistan Continued Conflict or Cooperation? (London: University of California Press, 2010. 16-17.
39 from 1955 to 50 million dollars. “More significantly, the US soon made a commitment to equip four infantry divisions, one armored division and another armored brigade, to provide modern aircraft for six squadrons for the air force and supply twelve vessels for the navy over the coming years. Despite Indian protests, US economic and military aid for Pakistan increased rapidly. Annual allocations were doubled after 1959.
Altogether, over the 1954-1962 periods, US economic assistance amounted to 3.5 billion dollars. In addition, the U.S. provided 1,372 million dollars for defense support and purchase of equipment. From an antiquated, poorly equipped force in 1954,
Pakistan’s armed forces became a powerful defense machine, with heavy armor and artillery, the latest aircraft and ships, confident of its self-defense capability. Speaking in the national assembly in February 1957, Suharwardy expressed satisfaction over the evidence of the country’s foreign policy. In the U.S., Pakistan had a friend and an ally.
The grievances over the amount of aid were substantially rectified but Pakistan still considered the aid level incommensurate with the liabilities the alliance was perceived to entail.” Its second thoughts continued to grow because of the criticism by friends and penalties by adversaries.100
The US agreed to give military assistance and invite Pakistan to join military pacts because at that time the US believed that there was a real threat of Communist attack and subversion both in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Thus, “the US must have felt that Pakistan, because of its unique geographical position, could become one end of the northern tier opposing the Soviet Union in the Middle East. Many advantages accrued to Pakistan as a result of its alliance with the US, in terms of the badly needed military hardware. The total assistance extended to Pakistan from 1954 to 1965 amounted to between 1.2 and 1.5 billion dollars. But economic assistance in the form
100 Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2012: A Concise History, 65-66.
40 of Public Law (P-L) 480 or other agricultural commodity programs, grants for economic developments, technical assistance development grants, and loans of various kinds were much higher as over the period from 1947 to June 30, 1965, economic assistance of this nature amounted to 3 billion dollars.”
Disadvantages from membership of Alliances
However, Pakistan also had to assume certain disadvantages arising from its membership in the US sponsored alliances, In August, 1953, after a series of bilateral negotiations, a joint communiqué was issued by the Prime Ministers of India and
Pakistan that the Kashmir dispute should be settled through a fair and impartial plebiscite and that the plebiscite administrator for this purpose should be appointed by the end of April, 1954. But when Mr. Nehru came to know that Pakistan was engaged in preliminary negotiations with the US regarding an alliance, he warned Pakistan in
December, 1953, that the agreement set out in the joint communiqué of August, 1953, would not be carried out because the ‘whole context’ of the Kashmir agreement “will change if military aid comes to Pakistan.” Pakistan, later, tried to save the agreement when the Prime Ministers met in May, 1955, but failed.101
Ayub Khan, during his visit to the US as army commander-in-chief in April 1958, also made it clear to US officials and military chiefs that ‘a definite ground swell’ was developing in Pakistan against alliances because Indian attitudes towards “Pakistan had hardened as US aid enabled it to divert its own resources to the purchase of military equipment. Hearing this from one of the architects of the alliances, the US administration was impressed.” Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles explained that strategic compulsions necessitated aid to India but he assured Ayub, the American
101 Sial, “Pakistan-United States: A Balance Sheet of Relations”, 2-3.
41 relationship with India was on an intellectual level whereas with Pakistan it was ‘more from the heart’.102
c. Fluctuations in the Relations (1962-79)
In the 1960s, Pakistan-US relations took a new turn because of the October 1962 border war between India and China. Pakistan sided with China and US supported
India with full military equipment. The relations deteriorated between the two countries in 1962 and in September 1964 senator Humphery declared that US must realize the importance of India in Asian coalition of power in fighting against communism in South East Asia.
During the 1965 war between India and Pakistan the US remained very careful and when Pakistan asked for military assistance, the US Secretary of State, Dean Rust refused bluntly. During the war, “Ayub Khan requested President Johnson for permanent ceasefire between India and Pakistan and cease fire was brought under UN
Security Council Resolution on 25th September 1965. The relations took a positive turn when Pakistan helped US in opening Embassy in Beijing in 1970-71. In the 1971 war, US supported India and Pakistan and used India against China. At last Pakistan cut off the SEATO and CENTO membership in 1972 and 1979 respectively. The relationship was strained between the two countries when US Embassy and several information centers were burnt in bomb blasts. In 1979 Carter administration imposed sanctions on Pakistan because of Pakistan Nuclear Program development.” The Carter administration was against the Bhutto government because of his initiating Nuclear
Program in Pakistan.103
102 Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2012: a Concise History, 69-70. 103 Shahnaz Akhtar, “Dynamics of USA-Pakistan Relations in the Post 9/11 Period: Hurdles and Future Prospects”, International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, 2, no. 11, (June 2012): 206.
42
Pakistan-US relations underwent fluctuations in the Indo-Pak wars of 1965 and 1971.
Pakistan’s relations with US have been motivated primarily by a set of political and economic factors. Politically, Pakistan expected the alliance with US to seek security against India and large scale military aid which it considered to be necessary to ensure power equilibrium in the subcontinent. Pakistan was thus drawn into the vortex of alliances with US till it acquired the questionable distinction of being the most allied ally of the US in Asia.104
On April 12, 1967, “the Department of State, announced that the US had decided not to resume military assistance to Pakistan or to India, which had been suspended in
September 1965, during the war between Pakistan and India. Pakistan felt betrayed and was concerned about its security.” On April 17, 1967, the Foreign Minister of
Pakistan issued a statement which reads, in part, as follows:
“The recent US decision to stop arms supply is fraught
with serious effect on Pakistan’s security and, therefore,
has caused us considerable concern as is apparent from
the reaction all over the country. It is a well-known fact
that most of our military equipment is of US origin”.105
Pakistan had received “almost 1 billion dollars in the US economic assistance from
1972 to 1977, the years that Bhutto governed the country. But military aid during this period stood at a meager 1.87 million dollars, most of it in the form of training for officers and spare parts for US-made equipment.” Bhutto was, however, able to secure
104 Ali, ed., Reading in Pakistan Foreign Policy 1947-1998, 7. 105 Rais Ahmad Khan, ed., In Search of Peace and Security Forty Years of Pakistan-United States Relations (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1990) 58.
43 considerable military assistance from China and was also able to purchase weapons from Europeans countries.106
d. Pakistan as a front line State (1980-1988)
Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, “Pakistan was again viewed as a front line state in the efforts to block Soviet expansionism. In September
1981, the Reagan Administration negotiated 3.2 billion dollars, 5-year economic and military aid package to Islamabad. Pakistan became a key transit country for arms supplies to the Afghan resistance, as well as a camp for some three million Afghan refugees,” many of whom have yet to return home.107
It was alleged that there was also the US role behind military takeover and Bhutto was overthrown in July 1977. After the Soviet invasion in July 1979, “the US turned its attention to Pakistan because of its geostrategic position. Pakistan was the only way for the US to contain Soviet involvement in Afghanistan and that’s why the Zia’s military rule continued in Pakistan for eleven years. Pakistan became a partner of the
US in a proxy war of the US against Afghanistan. In 1981, the Congress authorized 3 billion dollars aid to Pakistan for five years, including 40 F-16 aircrafts and pledged to provide 4 billion dollars further assistance in the next five years, but Pakistan would be a channel for providing aid to Mujahedeen fighting against the Soviet Union.” A new group emerged with the name of Talibans in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union.
106 Hussain Haqqani, Magnificent Delusions: Pakistan, the United States and an epic history of misunderstanding (Public Affairs Press, 2013), 224. 107 K. Alan Kronstadt, “Pak-U.S. Relations”, Congressional Research Service The Library of Congress, December 2002, 1.
44
Pakistan’s ISI and CIA of the US provided military training to Talibans who were the religious extremists and the US also provided military equipment for their training.108
e. Post-Cold War Era and Pakistan United States Relations (1988-
1999)
President Reagan administration pledged to provide further assistance of 4 billion dollars for the next five years (1987-1993) and exempted Pakistan from the Symington and Glenn Amendments for a period of 6 years ending in 1987. In exchange, Pakistan served as a channel for covert US military aid to Afghan rebel forces, the Mujahedeen, fighting the Soviet occupation army.109
In 1989 when the Soviet Union left Afghanistan the US interest in Pakistan was lost.
During these ten years, “Pakistan took full advantage of the situation in the form of aid and military assistance and Pakistan was also exempted from Symington and Glenn amendments for six years. On 1st October 1990 by Pressler amendment economic aid and military assistance was stopped to Pakistan because Pakistan was accused of having nuclear explosive devices. This was the Soviet war in Afghanistan, which brought both the countries together.”
A high-ranking delegation led by the chairman of the Senate, Wasim Sajjad and acting
Foreign Secretary, Akram Zaki, held talks with the US and Defense Department
Officials in Washington on June 11-14, 1990. The visit marked the first step towards improved relations between the two countries since the suspension in October 1990 of the US military aid. It followed a statement by the Prime Minister, Mian Nawaz Sharif on June 6 declaring his intention to remove existing “misunderstandings or
108 Akhtar, “Dynamics of USA-Pakistan Relations in the Post 9/11 Period: Hurdles and Future Prospects”, 207. 109 Sial, “Pakistan-United States: A Balance Sheet of Relations”, 3-4.
45 misgivings” with the US Reports also suggested that the delegation’s visit had been timed to coincide with the period marking the start of the US budgetary procedure allocating foreign assistance for the next financial year. “Pakistan was reportedly scheduled to receive US 113,000,000 dollars in military aid, with provisions for buying up to another US 200,000,000 dollars,” worth of military hardware, in the Bush administration’s 1992 budget.110
By May 1998 nuclear explosives, Glenn and Symington amendments were again imposed on Pakistan and all economic and military assistance was stopped by the US
Glenn Amendment authorized sanctions for non-nuclear states that denote nuclear explosions and Symington amendment prohibited any type of assistance that could deliver or receive nuclear weapons. The American stress was that Pakistan sign the
CTBT. Then the 12 0ctober 1999 military coup in Pakistan invited sanctions on
Pakistan by the United States.111
During an interview, Moonis Ahmar said, Pakistan and United States cooperated and confronted on some issues during 1947-99 because their interests converged and diverged. During the cold war days, it was in the interests of the US to seek Pakistan's support against the Communist threat and it was Pakistan's interests to get American military and economic aid. Likewise, during the Afghan war the US provided enormous economic and military aid to Pakistan as it considered it to be a 'frontline' state against the rising Soviet threat in the region.112
110 Keesing’s Record of World Events, 37, no.6 (June 1991): 38289. 111 Akhtar, “Dynamics of USA-Pakistan Relations in the Post 9/11 Period: Hurdles and Future Prospects”, 207. 112 Moonis Ahmar, Interview by the researcher, August 29, 2015.
46
1.3. Socio-Economic Cooperation within Pakistan United States
Relations
Beginning in the years of independence with Liaquat Ali’s decision to visit America, bypassing Moscow’s invitation at a time when Pakistan had not yet aligned itself with either of the superpowers, the trend became an inherent part of foreign policy in the subsequent years of total and then conditional alignment. Despite various ups and downs in Pakistan-US relations and Islamabad’s membership of the Non Aligned
Movement (NAM), the country’s foreign policy has remained US-tilted.113
Pakistan-US relations have held great importance. “Since the independence of
Pakistan, both countries have been cooperating with each other not only in the economic field but also politically, socially and diplomatically. The US has always assisted Pakistan in all these fields and has been one of the key allies providing funds and support. There have been times of mistrust and suspicions as well, but while analyzing the overall scenario, one can clearly assess that Pakistan’s relationship with the US has been one of the significant features of Pakistan’s foreign policy.” The study assesses the importance of this relationship and the hurdles which obstruct cooperation and progress in the Pakistan US relationship.114
On February 28, 1950, Pakistan joined the IMF and the World Bank.115 The US share to total foreign economic assistance to Pakistan was “68.4 per cent during 1951-60, which dropped to 50.6 percent in the sixties. This steady decline continued in the seventies: 14.9 percent during 1971-77. Despite the decline in the US share, it was useful for Pakistan’s economic development.” Traditionally, the bulk of the assistance
113 Ali, ed., Reading in Pakistan Foreign Policy 1947-1998, 1. 114 Shahnaz Akhtar, “Dynamics of USA-Pakistan Relations in the Post 9/11 Period: Hurdles and Future Prospects”, International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, 2, 11, June 2012.205. 115 File No, 14(8). PMS/1950.IV. Pakistan’s Participation in IMF and World Bank. For more detail see Appendix IV.
47 comprised food aid under the PL-480 program, commodity assistance, and project assistance mainly for agriculture, health, population, education and infrastructure. In the early seventies, it provided loans and grants for overcoming economic dislocation caused by the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war and adopted a sympathetic attitude towards
Pakistan’s request to the international agencies for economic assistance and debt rescheduling. The US also provided humanitarian assistance for flood-stricken areas in
1973, and contributed funds and goods to relief work when an earthquake caused devastation in the northern areas in December 1974.116
It was not until 1975 that the US decided to review its arms supply policy. Several factors contributed to that: first, the detonation of nuclear device by India in 1974 introduced a new element in South Asia’s strategic context. Pakistan, being perturbed by this development, raised the issue at various international forums, demanded guarantees for the non nuclear weapon countries, and put forward a proposal for the designation of South Asia as a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone. India’s nuclear explosion was discussed with the US and the joint communiqué issued at the conclusion of
Kissinger’s visit to Pakistan in October—November 1974 described this as having
‘adverse implications’ for the region.” Pakistan urged the US to review the arms embargo policy in the context of this development in South Asia.117
“The six-year assistance package (1981-87) which amounted to 3250 million dollars
(3.2 billion dollars) was equally divided between economic assistance and military sales. The 1625 million dollars (1.6 billion dollars) economic assistance component focused on programs in the field of agriculture (528.7 million dollars), energy (423 million dollars), health care (I29.8 million dollars), additional development programs
116 Hasan Askari Rizvi, Pakistan and the Geostrategic Environment A Study of Foreign Policy (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1993) 87-88. 117 Ibid, 90.
48 in Balochistan and NWFP (94 million dollars), and other assistance including private sector mobilization, rural roads support and project design, and import of edible oil under PL-480 (449.5 million dollars). Approximately 55 percent of economic assistance was provided as grants while the rest was in the form of loans, repayable in
30 years after a grace period of ten years, at three per cent rate of interest (two per cent during the grace period). The military assistance component of 1,625 million dollars
(1.6 billion dollars) consisted wholly of Foreign Military Sales Credits, repayable in nine years after a grace period of three years at 10-14 percent rate of interest.” Pakistan used these credits to acquire new weapons, military equipment and communications gear for enhancing the mobility, efficiency and strike- capability of the three services.118
United States aid towards Pakistan and India (a brief comparison
1953-60)
Pakistan received more economic aid from the US than India- 396.5 million dollars against India’s 4340.4 million dollars from 1953-1956, in President Eisenhower’s first administration. “The situation changed completely in 1957-1960, during Eisenhower’s second term, when India was allocated 1,795 million dollars compared to Pakistan’s
870.5 million dollars.” The breakdown of US aid to India and Pakistan on a year-by- year basis was as follows:
118 Rizvi, Pakistan and Geostrategic Environment A Study of Foreign Policy, 98.
49
Table.1. US Foreign assistance--obligations and loan authorizations-- to India and
Pakistan (economic aid total) in millions of dollars:119
Year 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 India 45.1 88.9 113.6 92.8 364.8 305.1 366.7 758.4 Pakistan 109.8 23.3 100.9 162.5 170.7 163.3 235.0 301.5
PM Bhutto visited the US in February 1975 to try to persuade the Americans to resume military aid to Pakistan. The Indian nuclear blast of May 18, 1974, and Pakistan’s resulting sense of insecurity, must have persuaded America to reconsider its 1965 arms embargo. On February 23, 1975, immediately after Bhutto’s visit, Under Secretary of
State, Joseph Sisco announced the end of the arms embargo to Pakistan and India. A
State Department spokesman, Robert Anderson, explained the action:
“Indian had received 1,273 billion dollars in arms aid
from the Soviet Union between 1964 and 1973, while
Pakistan received only 24 million dollars from Moscow.
During the same period, the US supplied Pakistan with
160 million dollars in materials, including spare parts
and ammunition for arms the Pakistanis already owned,
and India 88 million dollars. During the 10-year period,
India received 1.697 billion dollars in arms deliveries
while Pakistan obtained 851 million dollars. I should
emphasize that this is a “cash only” policy. We are
119 Farhat Mahmud, A History of US Pakistan Relations (Lahore: Vanguards Book Ltd, 1991), 88-89.
50
planning to provide any equipment on a grant military
assistance basis or on credit”.120
Pakistan also got advantages from its ties with the US. “Pakistan got military assistance of 1.2 to 1.5 billion dollars from the US. While the aid in the form of agriculture commodity, technical assistance, economic development grants from 1947 to 30 June 1965 was nearly 3 billion dollars. 121 During the 1950s, US economic assistance to Pakistan amounted to 960 million dollars or 80 percent of the total foreign aid received by Pakistan, with the result that the US emerged as the largest single donor of aid and financial assistance to Pakistan. The signing of the treaty of friendship and commerce in November 1959 facilitated the entry of US private capital and investment in Pakistan. The level of US economic assistance to Pakistan declined after 1965. In the 1960s and 1970s, US assistance to Pakistan was approximately 2.8 billion dollars and 1.5 billion dollars, representing 55 percent and 20 percent respectively of the total foreign assistance received by Pakistan. Overall, the US economic aid to Pakistan totaled over 5 billion dollars during 1951-1981.122 The long
Pakistan-US relationship has its roots in the Cold War and South Asia regional politics of the 1950s. The US concerns about Soviet expansionism and Pakistan’s desire for security assistance against a perceived threat from India prompted the two countries to negotiate a mutual defense assistance agreement in 1954. By the end of 1955, Pakistan had further aligned itself with the West by joining two regional defense pacts, the
SEATO and the CENTO. As a result of these alliances and a 1959 Pakistan US cooperation agreement, Islamabad received more than 700 million dollars in military
120Khan, ed., In Search of Peace and Security Forty Years of Pakistan-United States Relations, 58. 121Akhtar “Dynamics of USA-Pakistan Relations in the Post 9/11 Period: Hurdles and Future Prospects”, 205-206. 122 Rashmi Jain, ed., The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2006 A Documentary Study,vii.
51 grant aid from 1955 to 1965.” The US economic aid to Pakistan between 1951 and
1982 totaled more than 5 billion dollars.123
Table. 2. US Economic Assistance to Pakistan including both grants and soft loans 1953-90 (US million dollars)
Year 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965
Aid 45 89 114 93 365 305 367 758 668 755 151 140 95
Year 1066 1067 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
Aid 182 223 162 123 28 15 129 110 100 107 108 133 79
Year 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Aid 82 57 57 38 224 275 302 313 312 346 347 351
Source: Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2012: A Concise History, 74.
1.4. Pakistan United States Relations and Regional Perspective
1947-99
a. United States Policies towards Pakistan in the Field of Regional
Ties (India)
A study of the triangular relationship between the US, India and Pakistan examines the
US record of helping to improve the Indo-Pakistan relationship despite their strained relations throughout half a century of cold peace and intermittent war. “The US and the Soviet Union competed for influence in South Asia; in the 1960s and 1970s, the superpowers pursued policies that did little to diminish the antagonism between
Indians and Pakistanis. In 1954, the US signed a defense pact that gave Pakistan membership in the CENTO and the SEATO. This gave Pakistan a measure of protection against Soviet threats and, in the process, annoyed India.” China played an important role in the region as Pakistan’s friend and supporter, as a counterweight to
123 K. Alan Kronstadt, “Pak-U.S. Relations”, 1-2.
52
Soviet influence, and, after the 1962 border conflict between China and India, as a challenge to India.124
The US policy towards South Asia has passed through a number of phases and stages, turns and twists. For much of the time, from 1947 to 1990, “the US essentially followed the Cold War policy towards South Asia. That policy was obviously motivated by its desire to contain the Sino-Soviet influence in South Asia, This meant giving active support to any country or many countries of the region willing to stand up the communist threat, With India becoming non-aligned as early as 1954-55, with all its influence on the rest of the smaller states of the region, namely Ceylon, now Sri
Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, and the Maldives, the only remaining choice for the US was for none other than Pakistan — the country which itself was haunted by an increasingly aggressive India on its north east.”
In the past, the US adopted the same strategy when Ayub Khan, the President of
Pakistan warned President Eisenhower during his visit to the subcontinent in
December 1959 that “it would be fatal to India and Pakistan to continue to be enemies.” He urged the US President to use his good office to resolve the Kashmir dispute. Ayub Khan went to the extent of suggesting that if a plebiscite in Kashmir was not acceptable to India, he was willing to consider any suitable alternative to the people of Kashmir. However, Eisenhower did little to urge Indian Prime Minister
Nehru to get together with Pakistan to work out the problem. The US initiatives in
Kashmir were not based on direct involvement, but with the objective of maintaining the balance of power in the region. The solution of this issue seems impossible without
124 Shirin R. Tahir Kheli, India, Pakistan, and the United States, Breaking with the Past (Lahore: Vanguard Books Pvt Ltd, 1998) xi-xii.
53 an active role of the US as India and Pakistan would never be able to solve the issue by themselves.125
The relationship between the US and Pakistan remained cool in the 1960s with many stresses and strains developed in their relations because of US tilt towards India and divergent interests. It is interesting to note, as has been proved by the declassified papers that President Kennedy was much greatly more interested in India than
Pakistan. An American South Asian expert attributed the Pakistan-US relations like a
“roller coaster ride” marked by so many ups and downs: alliances and partnerships developed during the Eisenhower, Nixon, Reagan and Bush Presidencies while the relationship remained tense and cool during the Kennedy, Johnson, Carter, Bush and
Clinton administrations.126
When the US decided to extend military aid to India in the wake of the Sino-Indian border war in October 1962, Pakistan-US relations took a sharp turn for the worse, and relations between Pakistan and China rose to a higher level of cordiality. But a reappraisal of American policy toward India and Pakistan had been going on ever since President Kennedy came to power in 1961. Even earlier, some of the liberal intellectuals in the Democratic Party had put forward the view that India, being the most influential and powerful democracy in Asia, should be supported by the West in the ideological and the power struggle that was taking place in Asia between the ‘Free
World’ and a communist power like China. Selig Harrison of the New Republic had expressed this view in blunt terms: “India is the great power of South Asia. It is not the business of the US to subsidize Pakistan as a permanent garrison state with a military capability swollen out of all proportions to her size.” Similarly, some of these leaders
125 Dawn, October 18, 2002. 126 The News, Islamabad, June 25, 2003.
54 did not view with sympathy the historical depth and intensity that lay behind the
Pakistan’s Muslim nationalism. Later, in September 1962, Senator Humphrey declared the US must realize that in the long run, the only possible defense against Communism in Southeast Asia was an Asian coalition of powers “with India as its main forces.”127
The Pakistani leaders were also aware of this change in American thinking. “Foreign
Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra, who had been one of the architects of Pakistan’s alliances with the US, declared in the National Assembly in 1962 that the great powers were not attaching much importance to the pacts and regional security arrangements.
Ayub Khan was not only aware of these shifts in American policy; he was even prepared to cooperate with India in forging a common front against the inroads of
Communism in Asia. But the most essential condition for this cooperation was the settlement of the Kashmir problem.”
After the Sino-Indian war erupted in 1962 and heavy US aid and military assistance started pouring into India, both Foreign Minister Bhutto and Ayub Khan suggested that
Pakistan expected Chinese support in the event of an Indian attack. A bitter campaign started against the United States in the Pakistani press, and the US was openly accused of interfering in Pakistan’s domestic politics and fomenting conflict between the East and the West Pakistan.
The US, however, remained very careful during the war. “In response to Pakistan’s request for US assistance during the war, US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk declined, saying bluntly that the US was being invited in on the crash landing without having been in on the take-off”. During the course of fighting between Pakistan and India,
Ayub appealed to President Johnson for his intervention and said that the President
127 The New York Times, September 13, 1964.
55 should tell both Pakistan and India, which depended on large US aid programs, that the
US “will not stand for this conflict” and that the two countries should arrange a purposeful and permanent ceasefire. Later, after the ceasefire had been brought about under the Security Council resolution of September 20, 1965, Ayub visited
Washington on December 14 and 15, 1965. According to Ayub, his meeting with
President Johnson cleared the misunderstanding that existed between the two countries regarding Pakistan’s relationship with China, which, according to the Pakistani view, had been dictated by “compulsion of geo-political factors”. Since the December meeting the relations between the two countries started improving. After 1971 war,
Pakistan once again realized that US can support India against China but can’t support
Pakistan against India, thus withdrew from SEATO in 1972 and, later, CENTO in
1979 and joined NAM.128
The Indo Pakistan war of 1965 effectively ended the already badly disheveled Pakistan
U.S. alliance. “It was a messy divorce. Each side accused the other of bad faith. The
Pakistanis claimed that the US had been bound by treaty to their assistance and had reneged on its commitment by not supporting them against Indian aggression. The
Americans were furious at Pakistan for its misuse of US supplied weapons.” More broadly, the conflict solidified the conclusions in Washington that Pakistani and Indian preoccupations with their seemingly insoluble internecine dispute ruled out either one playing a useful role in helping the United States achieve its global Cold War objectives. For many US policymakers, it was a “plague on both their houses.”129
128 Sial, “Pakistan-United States: A Balance Sheet of Relations”, 3-4. 129 Howard B.Schaffer and Teresita C. Schaffer, How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States, 6.
56
b. United States Policies towards Pakistan in the Field of Regional
Ties (China)
Pakistan was the first Muslim and the third non-Communist state to recognize the
People's Republic of China in 1950. That proved to be a prelude to establish formal diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1951. On April 1955, Chinese
Premier Zhou Enlai and Pakistan PM Bogra held their first meeting during the
Bandung Conference. This meeting played an important role in promoting understanding, and developing friendly relations and cooperation between the two countries. “Pakistan voted for a bill concerning the restoration of China's legitimate rights in the UN in 1961. After the 1962 Sino-Indian war and the 1965 Pakistan-India war, an alarming situation was created for not only Pakistan but also for China in terms of regional security. Both countries, then decided to enhance cooperation in every field, especially in the defense and nuclear technology. In 1963, the two states signed an agreement on border sharing and surveillance. To enhance communication links, both states decided to construct the Karakoram Highway, linking China's
Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region with the Northern Areas of Pakistan. At that time, there was a mutual need to counter threats posed by the Soviet Union and India. China supported Pakistan, both diplomatically and economically in the latter's two wars with
India in 1965 and 1971. The creation of the Joint Committee for Economy, Trade and
Technology in 1982 was a significant development in strengthening the strategic partnership between the two states. In the late 1980s, the sale of M-ll missiles and related technology to Pakistan from China was under consideration, but in August
1993, the U.S. imposed sanctions on China for allegedly transferring M-ll missile technology to Pakistan. China responded by calling the sanctions groundless and threatening to scrap its promise to abide by the MTCR guidelines.” Along with nuclear
57 and defense cooperation, Pakistan and China also increased cooperation in the economic field. With many important trade agreements, Pakistan opened up its market for Chinese investment that proved to be vital for their mutual benefit.130
Pakistan’s relationship with China has always been the most important of its relationships with other countries. It is based on trust, respect and mutual benefit.
Since the two countries established their diplomatic relations, this relationship has evolved in a manner to serve the interests of both countries. To understand the evolution of this relationship from a correct perspective, it is important to have a brief overview of the relationship between the two countries. Although Pakistan established diplomatic relations with China in 1951, the actual consolidation of relations started in the early 1960s, when Pakistan changed its previous stance and supported China’s seating in the UN in 1961. In the 1962 Sino-Indian border war, “the U.S. rushed military assistance to India, which Pakistan, being an ally of the West, considered detrimental to its security concerns and moved out of the Western orbit (SEATO and
CENTO). At that point in time, a commonality of interests seemed to be emerging between Pakistan and China. It was the shared sense of an evolving geostrategic environment in which the two countries amicably negotiated and signed an agreement on the demarcation of their common border in March 1963. In the following years,
Pakistan on its part sincerely helped China to end the isolation that both the superpowers wished to impose on China, by signing an air-transport agreement and the trade agreement and helping China maintain contact with a number of countries, especially the Islamic world. Similarly, China played a commendable role in its support of Pakistan in achieving a ceasefire in the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war by issuing stern warnings to India. Following the war, China, in an attempt to compensate for war
130 Haris Raqeeb Azeemi, “55 Years of Pakistan China Relationship”, Pakistan Horizon, Vol.60, no.2, (April 2007). 109-110.
58 losses, supported Pakistan by providing military equipment including tanks and aircraft. In the 1960s, Pakistan-China relations evolved on firm foundations of mutual trust and confidence.” In the early 1970s, Pakistan played an important role in facilitating secret communications between the U.S. and China that resulted in Henry
Kissinger’s secret visit to China followed by President Richard Nixon’s historic visit.131
Pakistan also played a pivotal role in bridging the gap between the US and China when under Nixon, Washington decided to begin the process of normalizing relations with
Beijing. In July 1971, Pakistan facilitated the secret mission to China undertaken by
Henry Kissinger, the US Secretary of State. The first meeting between the two countries actually took place on-board a Pakistan Airline plane flying to Beijing.132
There was a marked improvement in Pakistan’s relations with the United States during
1972-75 against the backdrop of the controversial US tilt towards Pakistan in the course of the Bangladesh crisis, 1971, and Pakistan’s role in the promotion of Sino-US rapprochement. In fact, the normalization of relations between the US and China in
1971-2 removed an irritant in Pakistan-US relations. In the sixties, the US was critical of Pakistan’s efforts to augment its ties with China. However, with the visit of Henry
Kissinger and Nixon to China in July 1971 and February 1972 respectively, the close
Sino-Pakistan ties turned out to be an asset for Pakistan. The two countries were obliged to Pakistan for facilitating their détente.
The US favored an early normalization of relations between Pakistan and India and urged continuation of the ceasefire and withdrawal of ‘all military forces to within
131 Dr. M. V. Raina, The Changing US-Pakistan Relation and its Impact on India (New Delhi: Sumit Enterprises, 2013) 34 132 Shahid Javiad Burki, Historical Dictionary of Pakistan, 2nd edition (London: The Scarecroe press, 1999) 98.
59 their own territories and to their own sides of the Ceasefire Line in Jammu and
Kashmir’. It also welcomed the signing of the Simla Agreement (1972), and the resumption of the repatriation of Prisoners of War (POWs) and civilian internees
(1973). Similarly, it hailed the agreement among Pakistan, India and Bangladesh
(1974) for an amicable settlement of the war trials controversy, and the restoration of diplomatic and other ties between Pakistan and India.133
Thus, a glaring change in the US policy emerged when the “US dropped its long established practice of attempting to maintain ‘even-handedness’ between India and
Pakistan on matters related to their respective security concerns. In fact, there seemed a reversal of the US policy”. During the Cold War there was a tilt in favor of Pakistan and after the War the tilt changed sides in favor of India. A significant demonstration of this policy was made in 1999 when President Clinton paid a five-day visit to India, but restricted his visit to Pakistan to only five hours.134
Major areas of US concern regarding Pakistan include “the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, counterterrorism, settlement of the Kashmir dispute, democratization and human rights, and economic reforms and development. A potential Pakistan-India nuclear arms race continues to be the focus of US non-proliferation efforts in South
Asia and a central issue in US relations with both the countries. This attention intensified following the nuclear tests by both India and Pakistan in May 1998. South
Asia is viewed by some observers as a likely prospect for the use of such weapons, where both countries have deployed nuclear-capable ballistic missiles.” India and
Pakistan have fought three full-scale wars since 1947.135
133 Rizvi, Pakistan and Geostrategic Environment A Study of Foreign Policy, 98. 134 Dr Noor ul Haq, “Unipolarism and Paki-US Relations”, IPRI Journal, vi, no. 1 (Winter 2006): 101-103. 135 Kronstadt, “Pak-U.S. Relations”, 1.
60
1.5. Specific United States Legislations against Pakistan
Symington Amendments 1978, Pressler Amendment 1990, and Glenn
Amendment 1998
It is no longer a secret that at the time of the takeover by Musharraf, the economy of
Pakistan was in shambles. “Pakistan was already facing US sanctions under
Symington (1978), Pressler Amendment (1990), Glenn Amendment (1998) and other sanctions because of nuclear tests in 1998 and the military coup in 1999.136 The IMF had frozen the final installment of 1.56 billion US dollars’ worth of credit, which had been allocated to Pakistan in 1997. The sanctions also led to a dry up of foreign investment which declined to almost zero in 1999-2000. The domestic debt rose from
1877 billion rupees to 3096 billion, which was 97.5% of GDP. The foreign debt rose to
237 billion and as a result, 45% of the budget spending was being allocated in the budget as debt servicing.”
The 1985 Pressler Amendment authorized withholding most of the military and economic assistance to Pakistan if an annual presidential determination that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device was not given. In 1990, Bush was the first President to withhold such a determination. After Pakistan’s May 1998 nuclear tests, Clinton imposed additional sanctions on Pakistan, invoking the 1994 Glenn Amendment, which authorizes sanctions on nonnuclear weapons states that detonate nuclear explosions, and the Symington Amendment, which prohibits military and economic assistance to any country that delivers and/or receives nuclear assistance. The Glenn,
Symington, and Pressler sanctions were waived by Bush under the authority given to him by an earlier piece of legislation known as Brownback II.
136 Bessma Momani, “The IMF, the U. S. War on Terrorism, and Pakistan,” Asian Affairs, 31, no. 1 (spring 2004): 44.
61
During the 1990s, three sets of sanctions were placed on Pakistan. The first came in
1990 under the provision of the Pressler Amendment, the second came in 1998 after
Pakistan conducted a series of nuclear tests; and the third came in 1999 after the military takeover of the country. Enacted in 1985, the Pressler Amendment stipulated that most military and economic assistance to Pakistan could only be authorized after an annual certification by the US President that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device. Certification was not given in 1990, and the resulting punitive measures did the most damage to US Pakistan relations of all the 1990s sanctions.137
The US underwent almost a complete re-evaluation regarding its commitment and relations with countries like Pakistan, which had lost their strategic significance after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the end of the Cold War. “The US downplayed and marginalized Pakistan’s role and significance on the ground that the new global environment did not warrant the old strategic partnership and imposed military and economic sanctions under the Pressler Amendment in October 1990. As a result of Pressler Amendment, US withheld Pakistan military equipment for which
Pakistan had already paid. Pakistan suffered another blow when US imposed further sanctions under Glenn Amendment, triggered by the Indians and Pakistani nuclear tests of May 1998.”
Despite the renewal of US aid and close security ties, many in Congress remained concerned about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. Concern was based in part on the evidence of the US export control violations that suggested a crash Pakistani program to acquire a nuclear capability. In 1985, Section 620E (e) (the “Pressler amendment”) was added to the Foreign Assistance Act. It required the President to
137 Touqir Hussain, “U.S.-Pakistan Engagement The War on Terrorism and Beyond”, Special Report, United States Institute of Peace, (August 2005): 4.
62 certify to Congress that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear explosive device during the fiscal year for which aid was to be provided. “This amendment represented a compromise between those in Congress who thought that aid to Pakistan should be cut off because of the evidence that it was continuing to develop its nuclear option and those who favored continued support for Pakistan’s role in opposing the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. A 4 billion dollars, 6-year aid package for Pakistan was signed in 1986.”
With the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan beginning in May 1988, Pakistan’s nuclear activities again came under closer US scrutiny, and in October 1990, “Bush suspended aid to Pakistan. Under the provisions of the Pressler amendment, most economic and all military aid to Pakistan was stopped and deliveries of major military equipment were suspended. Narcotics assistance of 3-5 million dollars annually was exempted from the aid cutoff. In 1992, Congress partially relaxed the scope of the aid cutoff to allow for P.L. 480 food assistance and continuing support for nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).”
One of the most serious results of the aid cutoff for Pakistan was the complete suspension of delivery of some 71 F-16 fighter aircraft ordered by Pakistan in 1989. In
December 1998, the United States agreed to pay Pakistan 324.6 million dollars from the Judgment Fund of the U.S. Treasury, a fund used to settle legal disputes that involved the U.S. government – as well as provided Pakistan with 140 million dollars in goods, including agricultural commodities.138
Sanctions started in August of 1990 with the Pressler Amendment. This legislation, enacted in 1985, required the US President to certify that Pakistan did not possess
138K. Alan Kronstadt, “Pak-U.S. Relations”, Congressional Research Service the Library of Congress, December 2005, 1-2.
63 nuclear weapons, and without certification, Pakistan would lose most of its military and economic assistance from the US.139 In March 1986, the two countries agreed on a second multi-year economic development and security assistance program. On
October 1, 1990, however, the US suspended all military assistance and new economic aid to Pakistan under the Pressler Amendment, which required that the President certify annually that Pakistan ‘does not possess a nuclear explosive device.’
India’s decision to conduct nuclear tests in May 1998 and Pakistan’s matching response set back US relations in the region, which had seen renewed US interest during the second Clinton Administration. A presidential visit scheduled for the first quarter of 1998 was postponed and, under the Glenn Amendment, sanctions restricted the provision of credits, military sales, economic assistance and loans to the government. An intensive dialogue on nuclear non-proliferation and security issues between Deputy Secretary Talbott and Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmad was initiated, with discussions focusing on CTBT signature and ratification, the Fissile
Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) negotiations, export controls, and a nuclear restraint regime. The October 1999 overthrow of the Nawaz Sharif government triggered an additional layer of sanctions which included restrictions on foreign military financing and economic assistance, with the result that the US Government assistance to
Pakistan was limited mainly to refugee and counter-narcotics assistance.140
139 Raina, The Changing US-Pakistan Relation and its Impact on India, 113. 140 Sial, “Pakistan-United States: A Balance Sheet of Relations”, 5.
64
CHAPTER 2
PERVEZ MUSHARRAF’S PAKISTAN AND UNITED
STATES POLICIES TOWARDS PAKISTAN: AN
OVERVIEW OF RELATIONS
The history of Pakistan-US relations shows many ups and downs between the two countries. Soon after 1950, the first PM of Pakistan visited US. That was the formal initiation of the relationship between the two countries. As a researcher, I have examined the history of these relations, and have noted that the relationship of the US to India was balanced while Pakistan US relations in the region were unbalanced. A security agreement was laid down between US and Pakistan for strategic cooperation in 1959. The US’ think tanks and policy makers considered Pakistan as a failed state, but the incident of 9/11 raised the geo-strategic position of Pakistan.141 As Hashmi describes:
“The growing consensus among US policymakers and
lawmakers was that Pakistan was not only losing its
strategic importance to the US; it was also becoming an
unreliable failed state That perception was partly
transformed after September 11, when Pakistan became
a critical theatre in the US effort to take the fight to the
terrorists”.142
141 Zafar Ali, Ashraf Iqbal, Mirza Jan and Asrar Ahmad, “Coverage of Pak-U.S. Relations on issue of Counter Terrorism by U.S. Leading News Magazines”, Middle East Journal of Scientific Research, vol. 15,no. 10 (2013): 1465. 142 R.S.Hashmi,”War on Terrorism Impact on Pakistan’s Economy”, Retrieved on December 8, 2014.1.
65
Pakistan-US relations in the period of 2001 to the beginning of 2008 have mostly been tenuous. In the cold war era, Pakistan provided full cooperation and assistance to the
US and the Western world. “Pakistan supported the western promoted Jihad against
Russian invasion in Afghanistan. This support of Jihad affected the society of Pakistan badly. It is the reality of these policies of the US that were altered according to its national interest. Its ally of some decades may be its foe in the next year and compensation of their sacrifice will not be entertained. As Kissinger pointed out, “in international politics, there are neither permanent friends nor permanent foes of a state”. The relations with the United States on the war against terrorism resulted in
Pakistan’s instability and internal terrorism.” The historical view of Pakistan-US relations present the diversity in the relations between the two countries. As Hashmi pints out that,
“Osama Bin Laden with his organization Al-Qaeda was
suspected to have their base in Afghanistan and Taliban
government was their supporter. Due to the geographical
proximity of Pakistan with Afghanistan and a day before
9/11 Pakistan was a staunch supporter of Taliban. It was
observed that Pakistan had to face some difficult days
ahead. After the stunning attacks of September 11, 2001,
the US started to contour his new strategy to counter the
situation. Bush declared the “struggle between the good
and the evil”.143
The mutual relations between Pakistan and the US are grounded on convergence of common interests periodically. During the cold war, Pakistan was an important
143 R.S.Hashmi,”War on Terrorism Impact on Pakistan’s Economy”, 3.
66 country for the US and after that it turned off its policies. Soon after 9/11 again,
Pakistan had importance for the US and they supported military dictator for their national interest but not for Pakistan’s prosperity.
2.1. The US Policies towards Pakistan 2001-2008
In a series of suicide attacks on the morning of September, 11th, 2001, the US suffered the most devastating loss of life and property in peacetime since the attack on the Pearl
Harbour naval base in 1941. “Four passenger airliners were hijacked and two of them were deliberately flown by the hijackers into the twin towers of the 110 storey World
Trade Centre in the financial district of New York City, resulting in huge explosions which ultimately led to the complete collapse of the towers in less than two hours. A third hijacked passenger aircraft struck the Pentagon, the headquarters of the
Department of Defense, outside the capital, Washington DC, and a fourth hijacked aircraft, apparently headed for another target in the Washington premises, crashed in
Pennsylvania.”
In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, in which initial estimates suggested 6,500 people were killed in New York alone, the US forces around the world were put on the maximum alert and all US airspace and land borders were closed. However, no credible organization had claimed the responsibility for the attacks. “The sophisticated nature of the attacks led to immediate speculation that they had been perpetrated by individuals associated with Al-Qaeda, a network of fundamentalist Islamic militants financed by bin Laden who was a Saudi-born Islamic militant, based in Afghanistan.
The organization was strongly suspected because of having organized previous terrorist attacks against the US including, most notably, the bombing of two US embassies in east Africa in August 1998.” Although the Al-Qaeda network was
67 considered by intelligence experts to be the most likely culprit, yet the involvement of foreign intelligence services in the planning stages of the attacks was not ruled out.144
In response to the attacks, shocked Bush said in a speech recorded at Barksdale Air
Force Base. Louisiana, during the early afternoon of September, 11th that, “Freedom itself was attacked this morning by a faceless coward, and freedom will be defended”.
He added, “Make no mistake, the US will hunt down and punish those responsible for these cowardly acts”. In a televised speech to the nation on the evening of September
11th, broadcast from the Oval Office of the White House, Bush stated that the US would hunt down and punish not only those who were responsible but also those who harbored or supported the perpetrators. The US, he stated, would make “no distinction between the terrorists and those who harbor them”.
In a speech at the White House on September 12, Bush described the attacks as “more than acts of terror. They were acts of war”. Musharraf’s statement was again on the same day:
“The people of Pakistan are deeply shocked and
outraged at the dreadful terrorist attacks in New York
and Washington, which have resulted in unprecedented
loss of thousands of innocent lives. It is difficult to
describe in words, our sorrow and grief at this moment
of national tragedy for the US people”.145
In a televised conference call on September 13, with the Mayor of New York City,
Rudolph Giuliani, and the governor of New York state, George Pataki, the President
144 Keesing’s Record of World Events, 47, no. 8 (September 2001): 44333. 145Documents, “Statement by the President of Pakistan on September 11, 2001”, IPRI Journal, VI, no.2 (July-December 2001), 144.
68 pledged that “now that war has been declared on us, we will lead the world to victory” in the “first war of the 21st century”. In a radio address on September 13, however,
Bush warned that the war would “not be short, would not be easy”, and asked for a display of “patience” from the US people. He said that, “Victory against terrorism will not take place in a single battle, but in a series of decisive actions against terrorist organization and those who harbor and support them”. On the same day, Musharraf showed the green signal to the US for joining the international coalition against terrorism.
In the wake of the September 11 attacks, “the Bush administration quickly deemed it could not conduct its operations in Afghanistan to dismantle bin Laden’s network and put an end to the Taliban regime without Pakistan, not only because it occupied a key geopolitical position but also due to the information it was likely to possess regarding the Islamist movement.146 On September 13, 2001, the US ambassador to Pakistan,
Wendy Chamberlain, brought a set of seven demands.” These demands had also been communicated to our foreign office by the US State Department through what is called non-paper.
1. Stop Al-Qaeda operatives at your borders, intercept arms shipments through
Pakistan, and end all logistical support for bin Laden.
2. Provide the US with blanket overflight and landing rights to conduct all
necessary military and intelligence operations.
3. Provide territorial access to the US and allied military intelligence as needed
and other personnel to conduct all necessary operations against the perpetrator
of terrorism and those that harbor them, including the use of Pakistan’s naval
146 Christophe Jaffrelot, Translated by Cynthia Schoch, Pakistan Paradox: Instability and Resilience (New Delhi: Random House India, 2015)523.
69
ports, air bases, and strategic locations on borders.
4. Provide the US immediate with intelligence, immigration information and
databases, and internal security information to help prevent and respond to
terrorist acts perpetrated against the US, its friends, or its allies.
5. Continue to publicly condemn the terrorist acts of September 11 and any other
terrorist acts against the US or its friends and allies, and curb all domestic
expressions of support (for terrorism) against the US, its friends, or its allies.
6. Cut off all shipments of fuel to the Taliban and any other items and recruits,
including volunteers en route to Afghanistan, who can be used a military
offensive capacity or to abet a terrorist threat.
7. Should the evidence strongly implicate bin Laden and the Al Qaeda network in
Afghanistan and should Afghanistan and the Taliban continue to harbor him
and his network, Pakistan will break diplomatic relations with the Taliban
government, end support for the Taliban, and assist the US in the
aforementioned ways to destroy Osama bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda
network.147
In his memoir, Musharraf has stated that we just could not accept demands two and three. How could we allow the US “blanket overflight and landing rights” without jeopardizing our strategic assets? We offered only a narrow flight corridor that was far from any sensitive areas. Neither could we give the US “use of Pakistan’s naval ports, air bases, and strategic locations on borders. “We refused to give any naval ports or fighter aircraft bases. We allowed the US only two bases, Shamsi in Baluchistan and
147 Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, 204-05.
70
Jacobabad in Sindh and only for logistics and aircraft recovery. No attack could be launched from there. We gave no “Blanket permission” for anything.148
Moonis Ahmer pointed out during an interview that before 9/11, it was the American policy of stick of sustaining nuclear and democracy sanctions against Pakistan and in the post-9/11, it was the policy of the carrot by lifting such sanctions. Foreign policy is primarily directed to protect and promote the interests of the concerned country. While discussing the demands of the US presented by the US ambassador to Pakistan, he said, that the regime should have waited, consulted with the concerned stakeholders and bargained. 149 On September 14, 2001, Musharraf received a harsh telephonic message from Secretary of State, Colin Powell that “The American people would not understand if Pakistan was not in the fight with the US” President abruptly agreed to support and follow all the seven demands. It was surprising for Powell, who shared his response gladly with members of NSC who were attending a meeting at the White
House. On the same day, the US Congress in a joint resolution authorized the
President to use force against two targets: nations, organizations or persons responsible for the attacks of September 11 and states, organizations or persons ‘who harboured’ the terrorists responsible for the attacks. 150 Woodward writes that the US was expecting that Musharraf would accept two demands and be convinced for one or two later but would never accept one or two demands.151 Musharraf got the approval and backing from the corps commanders and other politicians of different parties. But during these discussions, he suppressed the dissenting voices and insisted that there
148 Ibid, 205. 149 Moonis Ahmar, Interview by researcher, August 29, 2015. 150 Hafeez Malik, US Relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan: The Imperial Dimension (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008)186. 151 Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002)102.
71 was no alternative but to accede to the US demands. This argument was not true as demands could be delayed and meanwhile a better strategy could have been adopted.
On September 19, 2001, after a high official meeting, Musharraf addressed the nation on television and clarified;
“We in Pakistan are facing a very critical situation as
critical as the events in 1971. If we make the wrong
decisions our vital interests will be harmed, our critical
concerns are our sovereignty, second our economy, third
our strategic assets, (nuclear, missiles) and fourth our
Kashmir cause”.152
In a televised speech to a join evening session of Congress on September 20, Bush said, “The war on terror will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated”. The use of the word “global” was significant in that it reflected concerns within the administration, and amongst US allies, that initial
US promises to “eradicate” terrorism had been unrealistic and could lead the US to support governments keen to use the events of September 11th as an excuse for the use of disproportionate force against relatively minor terrorist threats.153
After the terrorist attacks on the US on September 11, 2001, and in recognition of
Pakistan’s cooperation with the U.-led coalition, policymakers in the US searched for new means of providing assistance to Pakistan. Bush’s issuance of a final determination on September 22, 2001, removed remaining sanctions on Pakistan and
India resulting from their 1998 nuclear tests, finding that denying export licenses and assistance was not in the national security interests of the US.
152 Pervez Musharraf address to the Nation, PTV September 19, 2001. 153 Keesing’s Record of World Events, 47, no. 8 (September 2001): 44334.
72
The US after 9/11 incident made some demands on Al-Qaeda members from
Afghanistan. Bush in his address to the nation gave five demands to the Taliban.
1. Hand over all Al-Qaeda leaders and members of the United States
2. The US stresses to close all terrorist camps in Afghanistan.
3. Give access to United States authorities to verify the elimination of training camps.
4. The Taliban should release all foreigners.
5. The Taliban should protect foreign aid workers.154
The Taliban rejected those demands. They refused to give Osama to US authorities.
After that, the US decided to wage a war on Talibans and to punish them. Further, on
October 27, 2001, “President lifted sanctions on foreign assistance imposed on
Pakistan following the 1999 military coup if he determines that such a waiver would facilitate the transition to democratic rule in Pakistan and was important to US efforts to combat international terrorism. The law not only gave the President authority to waive sanctions related to democracy, but to waive sanctions imposed on Pakistan for its debt servicing arrearage to the US under the terms of the Foreign Operations
Appropriations Act.”
On November 6, 2001, Mir was taken from his Islamabad office to meet with bin
Laden in Kabul. On the way, he was blindfolded and bundled up in a carpet in a van, arriving at an Al-Qaeda safe house the morning of November 8, 2001. Hamid Mir, who had previously been skeptical that bin Laden, was behind 9/11, started to change his mind when he saw pictures of Muhammad Atta, the lead hijacker, in the house where the interview took place. Seemingly unaware that the fall of Kabul was only four days away, bin Laden was in great spirits at their meeting, consuming a hearty
154 Hafeez Malik, US relation with Afghanistan and Pakistan, 8.
73 breakfast of the meat and olives. The Saudi terrorist leader privately admitted everything, reaching over to turn off Mir’s tape recorder and saying, “Yes, I did it.
Okay. Now play your tape recorder”. Mir turned the tape recorder back on, and bin
Laden said, “No, I’m not responsible”. When Mir asked him how he could justify the killing of so many civilians, bin Laden replied, “America and its allies are massacring us in Palestine, Chechnya, Kashmir, and Iraq. The Muslims have the right to attack
America in reprisal”. Mir asked bin Laden to comment on reports that he had pride to acquire nuclear and chemical weapons. Al-Qaeda’s leader replied, “I wish to declare that if America used chemical or nuclear weapons against us, then we may respond with chemical and nuclear weapons. We have the weapons as a deterrent”. Mir followed up: “where did you get these weapons from?” Bin Laden responded coyly,
“Go to the next question”.155
On November 10, 2001, Bush met with Musharraf in New York, where both addressed the UN General Assembly. The two leaders discussed the anti-terrorism campaign, regional security issues, economic cooperation, human rights, the October 2002
Pakistani elections, and ways to strengthen the Pakistan United States relationship.
Bush hosted a dinner for Musharraf that evening.156
2.2. The United Nations and World Community’s Response towards
9/11
All the members of the UN were stunned at the sad incident of 9/11 which killed a large number of people. All members of UN condemned these terrorist acts and
155 Peter Bergen, Manhunt: From 9/11 to Abbottabad-the Ten Year Search for Osama bin Laden (London: Vintage Books, 2012)36. 156 http://georgebush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011110-7.html.
74 supported the US action against them. The Security Council passed three resolutions on different days.
i. The resolution 1368 passed on September 11, 2001.
ii. The resolution 1373 was passed by the Security Council on September 28,
2001.
iii. The third resolution came in on September 28, 2001 that was numbered as
1377.
The UN asked for global cooperation on terrorism by all its member states and also stressed on freezing of assets of the terrorist groups involved in the 9/11.157 “The immediate and usually concerted response by the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC) in the 9/11 attacks marked a sea change in the role of the UN in relation to international terrorism and reflected the genuine shock and outrage voiced by the overwhelming majority of governments around the world, including the major powers.” The Council responded to the 9/11 attacks by unanimously passing
Resolution 1368 on the following day, declaring that 9/11 was ‘a threat to international peace and security’ and that it was willing to take ‘all necessary steps to respond to the attacks’. The Resolution also explicitly underlined the inherent right of the US to self- defense and the right of collective self-defense in accordance with the UN Charter.
Moreover, as if to indicate the urgency they attached to the situation, and in contrast to numerous lengthy Council debates on terrorism in the past, the Council passed
Resolution 1373 two weeks later reiterating these declarations. It is true that these resolutions did not specifically propose or endorse military intervention in Afghanistan to topple the Taliban regime that had given a safe haven to Al-Qaeda. The US
157 Waqas Sohrab, Ishtiaq Ahmad Choudhary, “Pak US Relations in 21st Century: Challenges and Opportunities for Pakistan”, Berkely Journal of Social Sciences, Vol.2, Issue. 3, (March 2012): 4.
75 administration was known to have great scepticism about the multilateral cooperation under the UN umbrella and did not seek explicit authorization for its military action in
Afghanistan.158 On September 28, 2001, the Security Council adopted unanimously the resolution 1373 (2001), which decided that all states would take steps necessary ‘to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts’, that they would ‘refrain from supporting the entities or persons engaged in terrorist activities by suppressing recruitment and eliminating the supply of weapons as well as cooperate and share information to facilitate the task of countering terrorism, The resolution also provided for establishing the Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC), consisting of all the members of the Security Council. The CTC was mandated ‘to monitor states’ implementation of the resolution and, where necessary, to facilitate the provision of relevant technical assistance to the Member States. Since then, 13 resolutions have been adopted by the UN which contributed to a universal regime aimed at dealing with different aspects of terrorism. “The Security Council Resolution 1535 (2004), for instance approved the establishing of the Counter Terrorism Committee Executive
Directorate (CTED). In 2005, the Security Council also adopted the resolution 1624
(2005), which deals with the issue of incitement to commit acts of terrorism and expanded the Committee’s mandate to include monitoring its implementation. The
CTC has held three subsequent meetings, hosted by the Organization of American
States (2003), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (2004) and the commonwealth of Independent
States in 2005.” On May 2, 2006, the Secretary General, Kofi Annan, issued a report, entitled “Uniting against terrorism: recommendations for a global counterterrorism strategy”. Together these and other similar steps have contributed to the emergence of
158 Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response (New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2006)169.
76 an international norm that condemns terrorism and also expects members of the international community to acknowledge the need for targeting multifaceted links between international criminal organization and terrorism. 159 In a Joint Session of
Congress, US Bush gave a historical statement, “Every nation, in every region now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists”.160
Musharraf made a momentous decision to join the war on terrorism. But this did not mean an immediate U-turn on all support to militant groups in Pakistan. “As the White
House correctly recognized, even if Musharraf was personally committed to this decision, he faced hard-line skeptics within his own army. The skeptics doubted the
US staying power, lamented the costs of turning against long time jihadi associates, and questioned the wisdom of picking fights with global terrorist outfits. Accordingly,
Musharraf needed to calibrate his actions in order to avoid alienating a powerful and all-important constituency.” And he needed US assistance to bolster his political allies and win over the remaining fence sitters.161
2.3. Pakistan’s Cooperation and US Response
Musharraf reciprocated,
“We have reviewed in depth with President Bush how
to strengthen and expand the Pakistan-US bilateral
relationship and to give it greater depth and meaning.
Both sides have reaffirmed that our ties should be made
more broad-based and multifaceted and placed on a
long-term and predictable basis”.
159Pervez Iqbal Cheema, Maqsudul Hasan Nuri and Ahmad Rashid Malik, ed., Political Violence and Terrorism in South Asia (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research institute, 2006) 8-9. 160Fazal Ur Rehman, “Pakistan and the War on Terrorism”, Strategic Studies, Vol. XXIII, (2013): 63. 161Daniel Markey, “A False Choice in Pakistan”, Foreign Affairs, Vol.86, no.4 (July/August 2007): 85-88.
77
On June 2003, Bush announced a five year US 3 billion dollars package; half of it was for defense and the other half for the economic needs of the people of Pakistan. “As a consequence of the improving relations between the two countries, cooperation was extended to spheres beyond terrorism and ranged from defense, education, science and technology. Pakistan and the US signed a Trade and Investment Framework
Agreement (TIFA) in June 2003 and started negotiations on a Bilateral Investment
Treaty (BIT).” Pakistan was in fact receiving US 700 dollars to 850 million dollars annually, which included two major components: Economic Support Funds and
Foreign Military Financing.162
In August 2003, after Joint Chiefs Chairman, General Richard B. Myers’ visit to
Pakistan, the Defense Department official said that, ‘Pakistan is providing
“phenomenal” support to the US. Ambassador Nancy J. Powell, while discussing US foreign policy goals towards Pakistan, on November 13, 2003 emphasized, working together in the global war on terrorism, helping the states of the area to enhance regional stability, aiding Pakistan to strengthen economic, social, political, and democratic development, and building bridges between our two nations' peoples in order to foster greater mutual understanding between us. With regard to the global war on terrorism, Nancy pointed out that Pakistan has, since that terrible day in September
2001, become one of the US' most important partners in fighting this most challenging of wars. We worked closely and cooperatively with the government of Pakistan to neutralize the remnants of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban that remains in the region. Our two nations she marked, had coordinated among intelligence, law enforcement,
162 Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, Neither a Hawk Nor a Dove: An Insider’s Account of Pakistan’s Foreign Relations Including Details of the Kashmir Framework (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2015)618.
78 finance, and military authorities successfully to apprehend well over 500 suspected Al-
Qaeda and Taliban operatives.163
In May 2004, commander of the US forces in Afghanistan, Lieutenant General David
Barno commanding the support of Pakistan said,
“I can tell you that Pakistan is widely known as a
tremendous partner with the US and coalition forces
during the war on terror. There have been more Al-
Qaeda turned over and arrested by the Pakistani
government and military than any other government we
have worked with around the world”.
More recently, the 9/11 Commission Report, applauding the active assistance of
Pakistan in dislodging the Taliban and capturing and handing over 500 Al-Qaeda operatives to the US has recommended that,
“The United States should support Pakistan’s
government in its struggle against extremists with a
comprehensive effort that extends from military aid to
support for better education, so long as Pakistan’s
leaders remain willing to make difficult choices of their
own”.
In the light of these assessments of the US policy makers (State Department and
Pentagon), Pakistan became a “pivotal state” and potential strategic partner.
Additionally, Pakistan sealed off its western border and made two naval bases, three air force bases, and its airspace available to the US military.164
163 Documents, “U.S. Foreign Policy towards Pakistan”, IPRI Journal, VI, no.2 (June-December 2003) 179. 164 C.Christine Fair, The Counter terror Coalitions Cooperation with Pakistan and India (Arlington: RAND Corporation, 2004)15.
79
On March 4, 2006, in a joint statement, Bush and Musharraf had affirmed the long- term, strategic partnership between their two countries. In 2004, the US acknowledged its aspirations for closer bilateral ties with Pakistan by designating Pakistan as a major non-NATO ally. The Pakistan US strategic partnership is based on the shared interests of the US and Pakistan in building stable and sustainable democracy and in promoting peace and security, stability, prosperity, and democracy in South Asia and across the globe. The two leaders determined to strengthen the foundation for a strong, stable, and enduring relationship. Bush and Musharraf reaffirmed their condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. Following the September 11 attacks, “the
US and Pakistan joined international efforts to fight the scourge of terrorism. Bush was grateful for Musharraf's strong and vital support in the war on terror. The two leaders underscored the need for a comprehensive strategy for addressing the threat of terrorism and extremism. The two leaders recognized the need to promote tolerance, respect and mutual understanding, and interfaith harmony to strengthen appreciation of the values and norms common to the world's religions and cultures. The two leaders supported the peace process and composite dialogue between Pakistan and India for improvement of relations and resolution of disputes and building a better future in
South Asia. Both the leaders also shared concern about the threat to global stability posed by the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and the threat of terrorist groups acquiring such weapons.” Bush and Musharraf committed to play a leading role in international efforts to prevent the proliferation of WMD, their delivery systems, and related technology and expertise.165
165 Document, “Joint Statement United States and Pakistan Strategic Partnership”, IPRI Journal VI, no.2 (Summer 2006), 183-184.
80
Most clearly, Musharraf's own memoir166 underscored that the decision to align with the US after 9/11 stemmed from his concerns that India would steal a march on
Pakistan and that India would both break up Pakistan and destroy its nuclear arsenal if
Pakistan did not move against the Taliban and join the US war on terrorism. Much of the Musharraf period was dominated by Pakistan’s involvement in the US.-led “War on Terror” waged in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on US. This placed
Pakistan at the Frontlines of international attention. It saw the war in Afghanistan spill over into the country’s borderlands to gravely jeopardize its stability.167
By coincidence, the head of ISI, Lt. Gen. Mahmoud Ahmed, was in Washington visiting the CIA on the morning of September 11, 2001. “His mission from Musharraf was to persuade the Americans to ease off on their policy on the Taliban. No one knew more about the extent of Taliban-Pakistan cooperation than Ahmed. He was immediately summoned to the State Department to meet with Deputy Secretary of
State, Richard Armitage. According to Musharraf’s account of that meeting, Armitage told Ahmed that Pakistan had to choose whether to be with the US or against it. Should
Pakistan stand by its relationship with the Taliban, according to Musharraf, Armitage threatened to bomb Pakistan back into the Stone Age. Armitage has denied he threatened to attack Pakistan, but has confirmed that he gave the ISI leader an ultimatum to either help America or be seen as an enemy. Almost immediately
Pakistan's policy towards the Taliban changed.” The Pakistani ambassador in
Washington, Maleeha Lodhi, who had been handpicked for the job by Musharraf, told the press, "We will be urging the Taliban leadership to accede to the demands of the international community and to hand over the person that they are harboring, bin
Laden, so that he is brought to justice". General Ahmed was fired from his post a few
166 Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 143. 167 Maleeha Lodhi, ed., Pakistan Beyond the ‘Crisis State’ (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2011)49.
81 days later, apparently for lack of enthusiasm in the new policy towards his former clients. In 2005, Pakistan was promised, the sale of F 16s again to demonstrate the bad old days were truly over. By 2007, more than 10 billion dollars in aid had flowed to
Pakistan.168
Pakistan and the US have experienced very close relations. These relations bound the interests of both countries. “The US policies towards Pakistan were altered according to the international state of affairs. Historically the US supports and funds the military rulers for its national interests and also appreciates the struggle for democracy. The geo-strategic position of Pakistan has enhanced the importance of Pakistan for US.
Along with countering terrorism and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan it is not possible for the
US to fight with them without the help of Pakistan. The incident of 9/11, provided an opportunity for Bush to eradicate the global terrorism from the world. The US policies had many interests in Pakistan. This covered a wide range of issues, including the nuclear program of Pakistan, war against terrorism and missile proliferation.” The other concerns of the US policies are human rights, democracy, economic reforms and countermoves to narcotics trafficking. In Musharraf regime the US resumed aid to
Pakistan.169
The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre have extremely affected Pakistan’s national solidity and economic conditions. After the attacks of 9/11, once again
Pakistan has become the front-line state in the war against terrorism. “The US was willing to invoke Afghanistan, but Afghanistan is a landlocked country so the US required airspaces and air bases for logistics support from the neighboring countries.
The US had started to talk with Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan for support,
168 Bruce Riedel, “Pakistan and Terror: The Eye of the Storm”, ANNALS, AAPSS, Vol.618 (July 2008): 37- 38. 169 K. Alan Kronstadt, “Pak-U.S. Relations”, Congressional Research Service the Library of Congress, January 28, 2002, 1-3.
82 but its first priority was Pakistan’s support for the invasion, because most of the US supplies of the ship’s route were possible through the Indian Ocean. Pakistan was a viable ally for US for assault. In the war against terrorism, Washington asked Pakistan to decide only in 24 hours, whether “it would be on US side or not”.
Pakistan has cooperated with the US through providing logistic facilities, capturing Al-
Qaeda suspects and sharing of intelligence. Pakistan has closed its western borders. It also granted two naval bases and three air force bases to the US military. “The US has granted Pakistan equalling 1 billion dollars and exempted 1 billion dollars in debt. In
2003, the US also announced a five year aid package of 3 billion dollars for Pakistan.
The US provided 2.63 billion dollars direct aid between 2002 and 2005.” Moreover, both countries signed an agreement on trade and investment.170 According to Qadar
Bakhsh Baloch, an arms sale package was also approved by the US,
“Package that included the purchase of P3C Orion
aircraft, surveillance radars, helicopters and radio
communication system in order to improve Pakistan
capacity to support United States led forces in the War
on Terrorism. Besides, offering F-16 fighter jets to
refurbish its Air Force, Pakistan was declared to be a
major non-NATO ally of the United States”.171
The US assistance to Pakistan has not focused on strengthening Pakistan’s internal stability. Its primary objective was to achieve a specific goal in counter terrorism on the country’s western border and in Afghanistan. It was a politically stipulated assistance and a reward of Musharraf’s cooperation with the US on counter terrorism.
170 Zafar Ali, “Coverage of Pak-U.S. Relations on issue of Counter Terrorism”, 1467. 171 Qadar Bakhsh Baloch, “Engagement and Estrangement in US-Pak Relations”, the Dialogue, Vol 1, no. 4 (2007):41.
83
The 9/11 commissioner figured out that the US assistance had not moved sufficiently beyond its security assistance to include significant funding for education efforts.172
Musharraf, the then Chief of Army Staff, assumed the role of Chief Executive after a bloodless coup in October 1999. Pakistan was faced with intense diplomatic pressure and security challenges due to the military coup, economic difficulties due to Presseler
Amendment, a continuous threat of a hostile and nuclear-capable India in the east, and a destabilized Afghanistan under increasing Taliban control in the west. With the potential emergence of a second security threat from Afghanistan, Pakistan chose to build amiable relations with the Taliban as both countries sought peace. However, despite its recognition of the Taliban, “Pakistan had identified the growing threat of extremism and had taken aggressive actions to curb extremism and combat terrorism” within its borders. Nevertheless, Pakistan’s efforts to combat terrorism were intensified following a 9/11 as the interests of both countries again coincided.173
Musharraf was prompt in extending full support to the US in the war against terrorism following the attacks. He agreed to all the demands listed by Secretary Colin Powell, which, according to some records was more than what the US Administration expected at that time. Musharraf has been frequently criticized within Pakistan for giving in too easily and conceding too much to the US without adequate recompense. The most probable reason for his forthright response was the recognition that the US and
Pakistan could together take on the radical religious and terrorist elements growing within the region. Musharraf was already moving on that path. His wholehearted support of the US, instead of sitting on the fence, has subsequently helped to build a strong relationship between Pakistan and the US. Consequently, Pakistan has assumed
172 Zafar Ali, “Coverage of Pak-U.S. Relations on issue of Counter Terrorism”, 1467. 173 Amit Gupta, Pak-U.S. Relations updated June 4, 2002, Congressional Research Service and the Library of Congress.(2002):4-5.
84 a central and active role in the war on terrorism. Some argued that Pakistan’s support for the War on Terrorism was being sustained by the force of Musharraf’s personality alone and did not reflect the true priorities of the country’s populace and its national interests. Interestingly, the argument is used by Musharraf’s political foes as well as some of his supporters for opposite reasons. His political opponents and the anti-US lobby, while addressing the domestic audience, would forward the argument that supporting the war on terrorism was extremely unpopular in Pakistan. They implied that Musharraf was fighting an unholy war to please the US and thus should be removed from power. Those who were favorably disposed towards him, while talking to the international media, would over emphasize that it was only Musharraf, who could provide unrestricted Pakistani support for the war on terror and thus his continuation as President was crucial to the US interests.174
Pakistan was the US most trusted ally in the global war on terrorism. Like anywhere else in the world, this war could not be won without winning the hearts and minds of the populace and isolating the terrorists from their support bases. In the same context, the cleansing of the border belt with Afghanistan of the terrorist cells had been accompanied by large-scale economic and development projects in the tribal areas aimed at ridding them of such tendencies forever. Construction of roads, schools, and hospitals in the previously inaccessible areas has significantly helped to bring the people of those areas into the mainstream of national life.175
2.4. US Policy towards Pakistan on the Issue of Kashmir
The Kashmir dispute has been yet another area where the interests and the concerns of the global level security complex have been intersecting with those of the
174 Tariq Gillani, “US Pakistan Relations: The Way Forward”, USAWC Strategy Research Project.5. 175 Ibid, 8.
85 subcontinent-cum-level regional complex. “Ironically, contingent upon the new policy,
Pakistan was to use its juggernaut against those outfits which erstwhile received support from a part of the Pakistani establishment. In retrospect, it was Pakistan’s failure in extracting anything from India on Kashmir dispute diplomatically.” Now specifically mentioning Kashmir as one of the raison d’être for justifying Pakistani somersault implied inter alia, that it had to dialogize the issue which was more in the interests of the US and the West in the backdrop of the latter’s locking their horns with what they termed as Islamic fundamentalism.176
The events of 9/11 not only changed the fundamental fabric of Pakistan’s foreign policy, but also complicated Pakistan’s diplomatic stance on the Kashmir dispute. The new situation made it difficult for Pakistan to provide diplomatic and moral support to
Kashmiri indigenous freedom movement as the circumstances provided India with an opportunity to project it as Islamic militancy and to gain the sympathies of the international community.
The government under Musharraf defined the parameters for Kashmir struggle and pledged that no organization would be allowed to indulge in terrorism in the name of
Kashmir and strict action would be taken against any Pakistani individual, group or organization found involved in terrorism within or outside the country. At the same time, Musharraf also asserted Islamabad’s commitment to Kashmir struggle and said,
“Kashmir runs in our blood. We will continue to extend our moral, political and diplomatic support to Kashmiris. We will never budge an inch from our principled stand on Kashmir”.
Thus, Pakistan acted according to the US desire and also maintained its traditional stand that Kashmir problem needed to be resolved through dialogue and peaceful
176 Amer Rizwan, “U.S. Policies towards Terrorism”, IPRI Journal, vol. X, np. 2, (summer2010): 54.
86 means in accordance with the wishes of the Kashmiri people and the UN resolutions.
Pakistan also urged the international community, especially the US to play an active role in resolving the Kashmir dispute for the sake of durable peace and harmony in the region.177 9/11 was an opportunity for Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir issue with the help of US. 178
The terrorist attacks in the US on September 11th, 2001 had such far reaching implications for the international system that one can talk about international politics in terms of before and after these terrorist attacks. “The US, other western countries,
Russia and China decided to adopt effective measures for countering terrorism by non- state and transnational entities on the highest priority basis. Most other states supported this effort. The UN General Assembly condemned the terrorist attacks and called upon its members to join the global efforts in combating terrorism” and not to allow their territories to be used for such activities.179
The US objectives have prevailed over Pakistan’s interests in this process of change and the latter’s foreign policy has mirrored the former’s. In fact, Pakistan is considered as the practical implementer of the US policies on the basis of ground realities.
Following the 9/11 incident, unidentified people attacked the Indian parliament on
December 13, 2001. This created pressure on Islamabad to stop supporting terrorists or face attack. In both the cases, the policy makers chose to avert war and took two major
U-turns on Pakistan’s traditional foreign policy stands on Kashmir and Afghanistan which had failed to deliver the desired results. As a matter of fact, the Musharraf
177A. Z. Hilali, US-Pakistan Relationship Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, (London: Ashgate Publishing Limited), 2005, p. 6 178Ahmed Awais, Former President Lahore Bar Association. Interview by the researcher, February 5,
2016.
179 Hasan Askari Rizvi, Briefing Paper for Pakistani Parliamentarians, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Overview 1947-2004, PiILDAT (April 2004): 24.
87 regime could not internationalize the Kashmir dispute, but on the contrary Indian intransigence and determination succeeded in isolating Pakistan and crushing the
Kashmiri independence movement with the cooperation of the US. However to silence domestic criticism, Pakistan kept up its rhetoric on Kashmir’s right of self- determination, exposed Indian atrocities in the state and, told the world that the
Kashmiris were engaged in a legitimate struggle 180 and their right of self- determination was a principle enshrined in the UN resolutions which constituted “a solemn commitment and promise by international community to the people of
Kashmir”.181 In this regard, Pakistan reiterated that it would not accept any solution regarding the core dispute of Kashmir without keeping in mind the aspirations of the
Kashmiris and “there would be no compromise on the issue and no solution against the will of the Kashmiris would be acceptable. 182 Kashmir has a geographically importance and to resolve this dispute Pakistan has to be strong internally.183 Masood
Khan (Ambassador) was on point when he said that we should make Pakistan a strong nation. If Pakistan is weak it will never be able to play a positive role in resolving the dispute.184
The September 11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon transformed US policy in Southwest Asia. “As the US embarked on a long-term, comprehensive campaign to counter global terrorism, Pakistan once again assumed the position of a front line state, just as neighbouring Afghanistan became the target of a new US hot war in Asia. The US indifference to the turmoil within Afghanistan evolved into a policy of active intervention, and past differences with Pakistan were
180 General Pervez Musharraf interview to CNN News, 2000, June 1 and 2004, August 8. 181 The Nations, June 6, 2007. 182 The Nations, March 17, 2007. 183 Ghulam Mustafa. Interview by the researcher, December 17th, 2015. 184 Masood Khan. “Kashmir Dispute: The way forward”. Keynote Speaker, National Seminar, Pakistan Study Centre, University of the Punjab, Lahore. December 17th, 2015.
88 overlooked in the effort to develop a military partnership in the war on terrorism.
These changes in the US policy in Southwest Asia could bear long-term implications for American security. In formulating US policy towards terrorism in Southwest Asia,
Bush and his administration should have analyzed the challenges they confronted from a historical perspective. In doing so, the US might be able to avoid past mistakes and identify the most effective ways of combating terrorist threats from the region and beyond. With global terrorism becoming the focal point of the US policy, the US had to assess the long-term implications of this policy for Pakistan and Afghanistan in particular and for a complex and conflict prone neighborhood more generally.
Recognizing that terrorists and terrorist networks have a global presence, the Bush administration emphasized that the war against terrorism would not end with the elimination of bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda associates in Afghanistan.”The policies that the Bush administration pursued will, however, determine its effectiveness in eliminating terrorist threats to US security from Southwest Asia.185The role of US to resolve the Kashmir issue has been circumscribed. The US wanted to resolve this issue, but cannot pressurize India in this regards. If the US wanted to resolve the issue, then the US will be a mediator, and important thing for mediation is that both the countries have to accept the decision of a mediator. If one country does not accept then mediation fails. Same is the case with Kashmir dispute.186
2.5. Impact of the US Policies in different fields
The US policy interests in Pakistan encompass a wide range of issues, including counterterrorism, nuclear weapons and missile proliferation, South Asian regional stability, democratization and human rights, economic reform, and efforts to counter
185 Samina Ahmad, “The United States and Terrorism in Southwest Asia September 11 and beyond”, The MIT Press International Security, Vol. 26, no.3 (Winter 2001-2002): 79. 186 Farooq Hasnat, Interview by the researcher, November 19, 2015.
89 narcotics trafficking. “These concerns have been affected by several key developments, including proliferation and democracy related sanctions, Pakistan-India conflict over Kashmir and a continuing bilateral nuclear standoff and the September
2001 terrorist attacks against the United States. In the wake of those attacks, Musharraf under strong US diplomatic pressure offered Bush Pakistan’s “unstinted cooperation in the fight against terrorism”. Pakistan became a vital ally in the US-led anti-terrorism coalition. The US sanctions relating to Pakistan’s 1998 nuclear tests and 1999 military coup were quickly waived. In October 2001, large amounts of US aid began flowing into Pakistan. Direct assistance programs include aid for health, education, food, democracy promotion, child labor elimination, counter narcotics, border security and law enforcement, as well as trade preference benefits.” The US also supported grants, loans, and debt rescheduling programs in Pakistan by major international financial institutions. In June 2004, Bush designated Pakistan as a major non-NATO ally of the
US under Section 517 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, a status that may be more symbolic than practical.187
1. Regional field
With the election of Bush as President of the US, a review of US policy towards South
Asia and of sanctions policy was initiated in 200I, as a result of which efforts were made to revive relations with Pakistan. Numerous high-level exchanges took place during the year, and the decision to waive nuclear sanctions against Pakistan (and
India) was taken even before the tragedy of September 11. 188 As a result of its improving relations with both Pakistan and India, the US, as the preeminent world
187 K. Alan Kronstadt, “Pak-U.S. Relations”, Congressional Research Service the Library of Congress, July 26, 2005, 4. 188 Zamir Akram, “Pakistan U.S. Relations after 9/11:A Pakistani perspective”, George Town Journal of international Affairs, (Summer 2002).117.
90 power, was uniquely positioned to facilitate a resolution of the differences between
Pakistan and India. “While India is uneasy about stronger Pakistani-US relations,
Islamabad accepted Washington's position that its relationship with the two countries
"is not a zero-sum game”. Pakistan's only stipulation is that Indo-US relations should not be advanced at Pakistan's expense. Indeed, Pakistan would welcome a more assertive role in the US in helping to build peace in the region. Such a US role would have far reaching positive consequences for both bilateral relations with Pakistan and for US interests in South Asia.189 The 9/11 incident and as a result the launching of
American-led military operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan have made the US a regional actor in the South Asian affairs. For the success of the War on Terrorism, the
US has been very keen to see cordial, friendly and tension-free relations between the two neighboring states of South Asia. It is interesting to note that the US was a driving force behind the beginning of the Composite Dialogue between India and Pakistan in
January 2004. In order to bring India and Pakistan on the negotiating table and to pave the way for normalizing their relations after the attack on the Indian Parliament in
December 2001, the US Deputy Secretary, Richard Armitage, visited South Asia in
May 2003. Armitage’s major focus was on Pakistan’s efforts in stopping cross-border terrorism in Kashmir in order to satisfy India, which accused Pakistan-based militant groups of their involvement in December 13, 2001.”
The US policies toward India and Pakistan clearly indicated a shift in U.S. policy towards India. Bush, during his visit to Pakistan in March 2006, rejected Pakistan’s request for the provision of nuclear technology for civilian purpose similar to US–Indo nuclear agreement on the pretext that India and Pakistan share different historical records which clearly shows that the equation between these three countries is
189 Ibid, 120.
91 changing. It also reflects that the US, despite referring to Pakistan as the most important ally and Musharraf as a buddy, could not see Pakistan with latest technology and alternate source of energy through civilian nuclear means. The US disenchantment with Pakistan indicated that it’s just a matter of time before the future course of
Pakistan's relations with the US was decided. And it seems that once again we were drifting towards estrangements.190
2. Military field
After the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the US, Pakistan pledged and has provided support for the US-led anti-terrorism coalition. According to the US
Departments of State and Defense, “Pakistan has afforded the US unprecedented levels of cooperation by allowing the US military to use bases within the country, helping to identify and detain extremists, and tightening the border between Pakistan and
Afghanistan. The top US officials regularly praise Pakistan’s anti-terrorism efforts. In the spring of 2002, the US military and law enforcement personnel began engaging in direct, low-profile efforts to assist Pakistan’s security forces in tracking and apprehending fugitive Al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters on Pakistani territory. Pakistani authorities have remanded to US custody approximately 500 such fugitives to date. In
2002, the US began allowing commercial sales that enabled Pakistan to refurbish at least part of its fleet of American-made F-16 fighter aircrafts. “
Since early 2003, the US military commanders overseeing Operation Enduring
Freedom complained that renegade Al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters remained able to attack coalition troops in Afghanistan, and then escaped across the Pakistani frontier.
They expressed dismay at the slow pace of progress in capturing wanted fugitives in
Pakistan and urged Islamabad to do more to secure its rugged western border area. The
190 The Nations, March 28, 2006.
92
US government officials have voiced similar worries, even expressing concern that elements of Pakistan’s intelligence agency might be assisting members of the Taliban.
In June 2004, Bush designated Pakistan as a major non-NATO ally of the US. The close Pakistan-US security ties of the cold war era which came to a near halt after the
1990 aid cutoff have been in the process of restoration as a result of Pakistan’s role in
US-led anti-terrorism campaign. 191 In August 2004, “Musharraf hosted Karzai in
Islamabad and assured the Afghan President that Pakistan would not allow extremists to use its territory to disrupt October’s Afghan elections, which were held without major disturbances. In November, Musharraf visited Kabul, where he vowed full cooperation with Afghanistan and efforts to combat terrorism. The defense cooperation between Pakistan and the US involved military equipment of US 1.3 billion dollars in
2004 and the sale of F-16s in March 2005, as well as supply of radars, surface –to-air missiles, vehicle-mounted stinger missiles, harpoon missiles, torpedoes, and special technical equipment to boost Pakistan Air Force’s capacity for active engagement. The
US Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker had indicated in October 2005 that the US administration was planning to notify the Congress about the supply of F-16 aircraft to
Pakistan.”192
On March 2005, the US announced that it would resume sales of F-16 fighters to
Pakistan after a 16 year hiatus. “Major US military grants and proposed sales to
Pakistan have included six C-130 military transport aircraft (75 million dollars grant), six Aerostat surveillance radars (155 million sale), 12 radars and 40 Bell transport helicopters (300 million dollars sale), military radio systems (78 million dollars sale), a
November 2004 proposed sale of eight P-3C aircraft, six Phalanx guns, and 2,000
TOW (Tube-launched Optically-tracked Wire) missiles (worth up to 1.2 billion
191 Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, Neither a Hawk Nor a Dove, 618. 192 Ibid, 620.
93 dollars); and, in May 2005, the proposed sale of 300 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles and
60 Harpoon anti-ship missiles (worth 226 million dollars). The Pentagon reports,
Foreign Military Sales agreements with Pakistan worth 27 million dollars in FY2002,
167 million dollars in FY2003, and 176 million dollars in FY2004.”The comprehensive “South Asia” policy announced on March 23, 2005 was the first ever such policy promulgated for the region. Briefly, the policy inter alia announced that a yet-to-be specified a number of F 16 aircraft would be sold to Pakistan.193
3. Economic Field
Pakistan also received liberal economic assistance from the World Bank, IMF and
Asian Development Bank for various social development sectors, poverty reduction, and capacity building for different institutions of the state. In December 2001, “the aid to Pakistan Consortium (the Paris Club) recommended to its members the rescheduling of Pakistan's debts amounting to US 12.5 billion dollars, for a period of 38 years, including a grace period of 15 years. The US wrote off and rescheduled its debts.
Pakistan received economic assistance, debt relief and trade concessions from Japan and the EU. These measures eased the debt repayment pressure and gave Pakistan sufficient economic space to pursue policies to put its economic house in order.”
The US economic assistance during 2002-2003 included “US 600 million dollars as fiscal support and over US 455 million dollars for different development programs.
Furthermore, Pakistan also received payment for the use of Pakistani facilities by
American troops. On June 2003, the US announced a 3 billion dollars assistance
193K. Alan Kronstadt, “Pak-U.S. Relations”, Congressional Research Service the Library of Congress, July 2005, 14.
94 package for Pakistan” to start in October and to be distributed in over five years, with roughly equal amounts going to economic aid and security assistance.194
In the first three years, “the US provided I billion dollars in grants, wrote off I billion dollars in debt, provided 1.2 billion dollars in arms sales, reinstated a military training program and provided 3 billion dollars for economic aid and security assistance. On
June 2003, the US announced 3 billion dollars for five year assistance package for
Pakistan, with roughly equal amounts going to economic aid and security assistance.
The US President offered a five-year economic assistance package amounting to US 3 billion dollars starting in 2004-05.” It was equally divided between assistance for economic development and military sales.195
Total non-food aid in FY 2004 was 387 million dollars. On June 2003, “Bush vowed to work with Congress on establishing a five-year, 3 billion dollars aid package for
Pakistan. Annual instalments of 600 million dollars each split evenly between military and economic aid began in FY2005. The Foreign Operations FY2005 Appropriations bill (P.L. 108-447) established a new base program of 300 million dollars for military assistance for Pakistan; half of this FY2005 funding came from a May 2005 emergency supplemental appropriations bill (P.L. 109-13). P.L. 108-447 also allows that up to 200 million dollars in FY2005 Economic Support Funds (ESF) may be used for the modification of direct loans and guarantees for Pakistan (Congress made identical provisions in two previous foreign operations appropriations bills and
Pakistan has used that 400 million dollars in ESF to reduce its concessional debt to the
US by 1.48 billion dollars, leaving a balance of some 1.3 billion dollars). When
194 Ibid, 5. 195 Hassan Askari Rizvi, Briefing Paper for Pakistani Parliamentarians, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Overview 1947-2004, PILDAT (April 2004): 24-25.
95 additional funds for development assistance, law enforcement, and other programs were included, the aid allocation for FY2005 was about 692 million dollars.”
Between 2002 and 2005 the US provided Pakistan with US 2.63 billion dollars in direct aid. Additionally, a framework agreement on trade and investment was signed, and the two countries have begun negotiating a bilateral investment treaty. On the security front, the US approved an arms-sale package that includes the purchase of
P3C Orion aircraft, surveillance radars, helicopters and radio communication system in order to improve Pakistan’s capacity to support US led forces in the War on Terrorism.
Besides, offering F-16 fighter jets to refurbish its Air Force, Pakistan was declared to be a major non-NATO ally of the US. From 2002 through 2009, the US provided
Pakistan with some 11 billion dollars in military assistance, of which 7.7 billion dollars was in largely unaccountable “coalition support fund” intended as reimbursement for Pakistani assistance in the war on terrorism. In the same period,
Washington allocated over 4.5 billion dollars in economic and development assistance including food aid.196
2.6. Change in Pakistan’s Policies
The US identified the Al-Qaeda movement of Osama bin Laden based in Afghanistan as the main culprit and declared its intentions to take punitive military measures against the Al-Qaeda movement and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan which allowed
Al-Qaeda to operate from Afghanistan. This focused attention on the policies of
Pakistan for two reasons. First, Pakistan supported the Taliban regime in the past and its military and intelligence agencies had developed multifaceted interaction with the
Taliban. Second, Pakistan shared a long border with Afghanistan and its support was important for any US military operation in Afghanistan. Given the devastation caused
196 Schaffer, How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States, 140.
96 by the events of September 11 and sensing the mood of the international community, the government of Pakistan turned its back on the Taliban regime and joined the international community in its counterterrorism drive. Pakistan's decision was also influenced by the UN General Assembly resolutions which called upon its members to support the global efforts for combating terrorism. This was a decision against the backdrop of the international context in September 2001 which helped to protect
Pakistan's major strategic interests of territorial security, protection of its nuclear and missile programs, Kashmir, and revival of the economy.
Pakistan opened its airspace to US aircrafts for military operations in Afghanistan, and granted permission to the US to use three small airports in Sindh and Balochistan for logistical, communication and emergency support for US military operations in
Afghanistan. The military and intelligence authorities of the two countries shared intelligence on terrorist groups and their activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The
US security and intelligence personnel conducted joint operations in Pakistan with
Pakistani security and intelligence agencies against the Al- Qaeda and Taliban elements that secretly entered Pakistan after being dislodged from Afghanistan. The
US military authorities, and the Afghan government impressed on the Pakistani authorities to flush out the Taliban and Al-Qaeda elements who took refuge in
Pakistan's tribal areas after engaging in violent activities in Afghanistan. Pakistan dispatched its troops to the tribal areas in June 2003, which periodically launched operations against ex-Afghanistan militants in the tribal areas.197
After the events of September 11, 2001, “the US presented Pakistan with a clear ultimatum. As the US unfolded its war plans for Afghanistan, Pakistan would either be with the US or against it. Pakistan formally broke with the Taliban and provided wide-
197 Hassan Askari, Briefing Paper for Pakistani Parliamentarians, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Overview 1947-2004, PILDAT (April 2004):24.
97 reaching assistance to Operation Enduring Freedom, the US war in Afghanistan that began on October 7, 2001. It is important to acknowledge that Pakistan offered unprecedented access to the United States, including two ports and airfields, ground lines of control, and air space. Without Pakistan’s support, the US ability to launch
Operating Enduring Freedom on 7 October 2001 would have been in question.
Moreover, Pakistan assisted in the capture of numerous high-value Al-Qaeda operatives. Notably, however, Pakistan did not remand high-level Talibans to the US.
Quite the contrary: from at least 2004 onward, Pakistan resumed its support for the
Taliban.” Indeed, this support was an important factor in the Taliban’s resurgence in
2005: the consequences of which the US, as well as its Afghan and other partners, continue to suffer.198
In short, the decision to reverse a decade of Pakistani policy in Afghanistan was a derivative of the underlying Pakistani concern about India. For this reversal, Pakistan was handsomely rewarded. Musharraf was invited for a state visit to Washington in
February 2002 and was promised economic assistance and debt relief. In 2003
Musharraf visited Camp David, and Bush announced a five-year, 3 billion dollars economic and military assistance package. In 2005, Pakistan was promised, the sale of
F 16s again to demonstrate the bad old days were truly over. By 2007, more than 2 billion dollars in aid had flowed to Pakistan.
The US reciprocated by withdrawing three categories of economic sanctions against
Pakistan in October-November 2001 and took steps to revive bilateral relations in various fields of mutual interest, including the economy, trade and investment, socio- economic development, military modernization, supply of weapons and military equipment. The direct US assistance to Pakistan has focused on fiscal support,
198 C Christine fair, “The U.S. Pakistan relations after a decade of the War on terror” Contemporary South Asia, Vol.20, no, 2, (June 2012): 247.
98 technical and commodity assistance, enhanced trade, financial and technical support for several sectors like health, education, food, democracy promotion, child labor elimination, and counter-narcotics. The US is extending economic and technological assistance to strengthen border security (mainly Pakistan-Afghanistan border), capacity building for dealing with law and order situation and especially terrorism, improvement of communication and road building in the tribal areas and greater record keeping and control of the people leaving or entering the country through different entry-exit points.
2.7. Osama bin laden views and Policies towards the US
The setting for bin Laden’s October 2001 interview with Tayseer Allouni, Al Jazeera’s correspondent in Kabul, was a tent in Afghanistan. “Allouni was interviewing the man who had dominated the world’s attention for the past month. Yet, for some reason, Al
Jazeera decided not to broadcast the tape, and it was not released by CNN quoted excerpts and published the transcript on February 5, 2002. Al-Qaeda, he explained, was acting as the “conscience” of the Ummah (Muslim world), and the nineteen hijackers had set out to take revenge on its behalf:”
Once again, Allouni was unconvinced and interrupted bin Laden’s flow by asking him about the civilians killed in New York: “What about the World Trade Centre?”Bin
Laden used the same argument he had just given:
“As for the World Trade Centre, the ones who were
attacked and who died in it, was a financial power. It
wasn’t a children’s school! And it wasn’t a residence.
And the general consensus is that most of the people
who were in there were men that backed the biggest
99
financial force in the world that spreads worldwide
mischief. And those individuals should stand for Allah
the Glorious and Exalted is He and to re-think and re-do
their calculations. We treat others like they treat us.
Those who kill our women and our innocent, we kill
their women and innocent, until they stop from doing
so”.199
In short, the foreign policy of Pakistan is shaped largely by geographical and historical considerations, by its political and social system, by virtue of economic dependence and military vulnerability, by its relative power position with reference to the adversary, by the policies of other countries and by the world contemporary environment. Historically, Pakistan’s foreign policy was primarily focused on India, but the events of 9/11 made Pakistan a front-line State in defending US interests in the region. The country had already suffered due to the Cold War; this new situation placed Pakistan in a position where it had to defend itself against the barrage of allegations and look for closer cooperation of friendly countries to avoid international isolation. Besides, it is also believed that the country’s elites decided to support the US because of their desire to receive economic and military assistance and also to gain political support to legitimize the then undemocratic regime of Musharraf. Given all that, Musharraf laid the foundation of a strategic partnership between the US and
Pakistan, and promised to cooperate on the issues of terrorism and to prevent nuclear proliferation.
The White House Spokesman, Tony Snow told reporters at the daily White House press briefing on February 26, 2007, that the Vice President on his trip to Pakistan had
199 Akbar Ahmed. The Thistle and the Drone .97 -98
100 talked to Pakistani officials “about the best way of working forward in the war on terror” and going after Al-Qaeda. He said that “the Taliban is trying to gear up for a spring offensive, and we intend to be working with the Pakistanis to become increasingly effective at dealing with those threat.200
The new US Ambassador to Pakistan, Anne W. Patterson, presented her credentials to the President of Pakistan at a formal ceremony held at the Presidential Palace in the capital on July 31, 2007. “It’s a great honor to serve in Pakistan.” Ambassador
Patterson remarked afterwards. Then she added, “I look forward to working with
Pakistanis to continue building our strong and important partnership”.201
Points of Confrontation between Pakistan and United States
1. The first main point of divergence between Pakistan and the US is the Kashmir issue, both countries have their own views on Kashmir, Pakistan wanted to resolve the
Kashmir issue in its own favour, while the US could not do this because of Indian pressure.
2. Pakistan wanted a clear cut differentiation between the campaign launched in
Afghanistan by the US and its coalition partners and the freedom struggle in Kashmir by Kashmiri people. The US has its own agenda, concerning that issue.
3. The third main goal of Pakistan remained, i.e. it wanted to establish a friendly government in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban regime, while the US wanted to install a stable government after the early crisis.
200Elizabeth Colton, “President Musharraf Committed to winning War on Terrorism”, khabr-o-Nazar, March 2007, 5
201 Elizabeth Colton, “Ambassador Patterson presents Credentials,” Khabr-o-Nazar, August 2007, 5.
101
CHAPTER 3
PAKISTAN UNITED STATES RELATIONS: THE
DEFENCE AND MILITARY TIES (1999-2008)
In the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the Bush administration quickly deemed that it could not conduct its operations in Afghanistan to dismantle Bin
Laden’s networks and put an end to the Taliban regime without Pakistan, not only because it occupied a key geopolitical position but also due to the information it was likely to possess regarding the Islamist movement. At every stage in Pakistan’s re- entry into the international community, Musharraf reiterated202 the cost of the Afghan crisis for his country, emphasizing the fact that this burden had a major humanitarian component due to the inundation of refugees. In response to Musharraf’s speech, “the wealthiest partners of the anti-terrorist coalition did not withhold their financial support, fifteen debts were renegotiated within the clubs of Paris and London; bilateral aid immediately exceeded a billion dollars. The US took the lead with 673 million dollars. In addition to its 50 million Euros in aid, the EU made trade concessions for textiles exports: customs duties on these products (60 % of Pakistan’s exports to the
EU) were removed and the import quota was raised to 15 %. The IMF granted
Pakistan the advantages of the poverty reduction and growth facility together with a loan of 1.3 billion dollars.” The World Bank loaned 300 million dollars. Altogether, adding up direct aid, economic support and trade facilities, Pakistan picked up 6 billion dollars in three months.203
202 Pervez Musharraf, Interview by Aroon Purie and Raj Chengappa, India Today, November 26, 2009, accessed on March 26, 2013. 203 Christope Jaffrelot, The Pakistan Paradox Instability and Resilience (New Delhi: Random House India, 2015), 525.
102
On 7 October 2001, the US commenced Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and by
12 November of the same year Kabul had fallen. Pakistan’s support was critical to the unequivocal success of the allied invasion. Ambassador Chamberlain said that
Pakistan provided “unstinting support” throughout the war. US Central Command officer said that:
“Pakistan has provided more support captured more
terrorists and committed more troops than any other
nation in the Global Counterterrorism Force”.204
The US also followed through with its commitments. “Shortly after sanctions were lifted, the US started to provide economic and military support to Pakistan. In the first three years, the US extended 1 billion dollars in grants, wrote off 1 billion dollars in debt, provided 1.2 billion dollars in arms-sales, reinstituted a military training program, and provided 3 billion dollars for economic aid and security assistance.”
The Pakistan US relationship has been termed by one observer as:
“An excellent example of opportunistic relationship
between two unequal powers, based on self-interest,
rather than mutually congruent objectives”.205
The 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Centre shook America and the Bush
Administration. The sheer scale of the disaster and the audacity of the attacks on the
US at a time when the US was undoubtedly the pre-eminent global power in the world shocked the superpower. This attack on its own soil, with a loss of the most potent
204 Statement by US Ambassador to Pakistan, Wendy Chamberlin after signing ceremony of 600 million dollars aid package to Islamabad, 15 November 2001 (Extract) Rashmi Jain, ed., The United States and Pakistan, 274.
205A. Z. Hilali, US-Pakistan Relationship Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, (London: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005), 248.
103 symbols of the US prestige and economic power, was extremely embarrassing. Within
24 hours of the attacks, the US had received the UN Security Council Resolution 1368.
It called on all states to work together in bringing to justice the organizers, perpetrators and sponsors of the terrorist attacks and authorized the use of force.206 The Taliban was asked to hand over bin Laden, or face the consequences. Pakistan was also in the eye of the storm. Being the principal backer of the largely un-recognized Taliban
Government, it was asked to use its influences to facilitate bin Laden’s handover. The
ISI Chief, General Mehmood, who incidentally was in the US, during the 9/11 attacks, was briefed by the US administration officials, on the mounting evidence implicating
Al-Qaeda in the attacks. He was also asked to convey US demands to the Pakistani
Government, for assisting in bin Laden’s handover. In addition to this effort, the US simultaneously prepared for a visible, massive military effort against the Taliban and
Al-Qaeda. The aim was to punish Al-Qaeda and its supporters in Afghanistan, while ensuring that the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks would be either killed or captured swiftly. Pakistan was therefore critical to the success of the US plans. This was for three main reasons:207
Firstly, “Pakistan had a history of association with the Taliban. It was generally accepted that they had been supported and logistically supplied through Pakistani territory. Being a largely Pashtun group, they had roots in Pakistan’s tribal areas.
Pakistan maintained official contacts with the Taliban leadership of Mullah Omar.“
Secondly, “rhe landlocked country of Afghanistan could only be approached for military action from the Indian Ocean/ Persian Gulf, from either Iran or Pakistan. The
206 Statement by US Ambassador to Pakistan, Wendy Chamberlain at APSS conference after signing ceremony of 379 million dollars 24 September 2001(Extracts) Rashmi Jain, ed., The United States and Pakistan.270.
207 Farhat Mahmud, Interview by the researcher, February 11, 2016.
104 other route was from the Central Asian Republics, which was less practical, as they were themselves landlocked and needed access through Russia. As the map indicates, the US military and naval presence in the Indian Ocean would need direct access through Pakistan, both for the naval support, logistics for a ground offensive and the fighter/bomber raids expected to be generated from the ships in the Indian Ocean and the US bases in Diego Garcia. Since Iran was not a viable option, owing to US–Iran rift, Pakistan’s acquiescence to the US became even more critical. In this regard hectic diplomatic effort was launched by the US State Department.”
Thirdly the US Government had credible intelligence that many of the terrorists suspected of involvement in the terrorist attacks had links to the different organizations/ non-governmental agencies located in Pakistan. Even the ISI had been under constant US pressure to assist in Bin Laden’s capture. The US strategy during the initial period is described by an author as “coercive” in nature and a combination of “carrot and stick policy”.208
This assertion is also validated by the account given by Pakistan’s military leader,
Musharraf, who describes his first conversation with US Secretary of State, Collin
Powell as rather undiplomatic. As per Musharraf’s account Secretary Powell said “you are either with us or against us.” He further adds that the US Deputy Secretary of
State, Richard Armitage, was even blunter:
“Armitage told the Director General of ISI, (General
Mehmood) that we had to decide whether we were with
US or with the terrorists, but that if we chose the
208 Moonis Ahmar, Interview by the researcher, August 29, 2015.
105
terrorist, we should be prepared to be bombed back to
the Stone Age”.209
Pakistan, in the wake of September 11 attacks, was faced with one of the most difficult security challenges in its history. The incidents brought Pakistan, a traditional US ally, at a crossroads. It could either support the Taliban, and be targeted along with them, or make a radical policy shift to avoid disaster. Musharraf came to know of the 9/11 incident from the CNN, as most of the other world leader. 210 The two countries developed ties in the field of military and defence through mutual defence cooperation and the holding of strategic dialogue from time to time.211
The Pakistan President was quick to express his support for the US people and its government. He went on the national TV on the same day and announced:
“We condemn this vile act, that we are against all forms
of terrorism and stand with the US at this appalling time,
and that we would assist it in any way we could”.
Quite apparently, this announcement was inspired partly by the fact that Pakistan was the only country that recognized the Taliban regime. Thereafter the events unfolded very rapidly. Musharraf received the “famous” telephone call from the US Secretary of
State, asking him to decide which side his country was on. The issue of controversy here is that whether Musharraf only agreed on the broader level cooperation, as some observers have commented, or he caved in to the specific demands right there and then, thus foreclosing any options for a better negotiated deal.212 Though there is
209 Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, 201. 210 Interview of President Musharraf with CNN, 23 October 2001. Rashmi Jain, The United States and Pakistan, 169.
211 Moonis Ahmar, Interview by the researcher, August 29, 2015. 212 Rashmi Jain, ed., The United States and Pakistan, 170.
106 sufficient doubt pointing to the first assertion, yet taking Musharraf’s account of the events as a basis, one can still analyze the imperatives, which according to him, made him to take this decision. An aspect that could have definitely played an important role in his decision was the level of legitimacy enjoyed by his regime. Having ousted a democratically elected Government in a military coup, and having assumed all powers in an almost dictatorial style, he was neither a popularl elected leader nor answerable to an elected parliament. This had two distinct implications. Firstly, he was not answerable to anybody. Therefore, the need to consult a party or parliamentarians, before taking a major policy decision, did not really exist. Secondly, being a dictator, he was also hampered by the lack of objective counsel. As he writes himself:
“It is at times like these that the leader is confronted by
acute loneliness”.213
The fact that he did not even consult his cabinet before making the decision is apparent from the statement:
“Having made my decision, I took it to my cabinet. As
expected, there was some concern from the ministers
that they were not consulted”.214
The assertion that Musharraf accepted the demands of Colin Powell telephone call is validated by the 9/11 commission report215 which says:
“Pakistan made its decision swiftly. That afternoon
Secretary of State, Colin Powell announced at the
213 Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, 201. 214 Ibid, 206. 215 9-11 Commission Report, July 22, 2004, accessed on May 2, 2015, http://www.9-11 commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf.
107
beginning of an NSC meeting that Pakistan President
had agreed to every US request for support in the war on
terror”.
The next day, the US embassy in Islamabad confirmed that Musharraf and his top military commanders had agreed to all seven demands. Quite clearly Musharraf had made the decision and accepted all requests, before the US embassy gave the demands formally to his government. This quick decision, some observers believe, took away the flexibility of negotiating a better deal with the US.216
Notwithstanding the timing of Musharraf’s decision, his logic and argument for supporting the US was in his own words, based on following main considerations:
“Musharraf concluded that confronting the US military
was not an option. The country did not have the military
strength, economic prowess or the support at a
national/grassroots level to sustain such an undertaking.
Military confrontation with the reigning global
superpower would spell disaster for Pakistan”.217
Pakistan gained substantial military assistance from the US in the post 9/11 scenario.
This has been a major area of security cooperation between the two countries. The military hardware has been in the domain of counterterrorism equipment, whereby sophisticated night vision sights and helicopters have been provided to enhance the capability against Taliban and Al-Qaeda fighters in the FATA and adjoining areas.
Pakistan has also been able to purchase significant amount of conventional equipment, more suited for its defense needs against India.
216 Elizabeth Colton, “U.S. Embassy Islamabad confirmed”, Khabr-o-Nazar, October 2007, 5 217 Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, 201.
108
In this emerging threat scenario, “Pakistan has been forced to radically review its defense strategy and organization and equipment imbalances to meet the emerging threat. While the Armed Forces have been busy in reconfiguring their response, the US military assistance, due to the security partnership, has been instrumental in enhancing
Pakistan’s conventional defense capability against Indian military build-up.”
3.1. Military Assistance Programs
The sources of military assistance program included Coalition Support Fund (CSF),
Foreign Military Financing (FMF), Pakistan’s Counter Insurgency Capability Funds
(PCCF) and direct funding.
1. Coalition Support Fund (CSF)
The CSF was created after 9/11 to reimburse key allied countries for providing assistance to the US in the global war on terror. “The CSF reimburses expenditures incurred by 27 coalition partners, including Pakistan, in direct support of US military operations. The CSF aims to reimburse Pakistan and other nations for their operational and logistical support of US-led counterterrorism operations. CSF payments have been used to support many scores of Pakistani army operations and help to keep more than
100,000 Pakistani troops in the field in northwest Pakistan by paying for their food, clothing, and housing.”218
During the latter years of the previous decade, however, concerns grew in Congress and among independent analysts that standard accounting procedures were not being employed in overseeing these large disbursements from the US Treasury. The
Government Accountability Office (GAO) was tasked to address the oversight of coalition support funds that go to Pakistan. Its 2008 report found that, until about one year before, only a small fraction of Pakistani requests were disallowed or deferred. In
218 Www.Sassi.org/wp.content/uploads/2012/05/SASSI-Policy-Brief.Pdf.accessed on June 5, 2015, 2.
109 early 2007, the value of rejected requests spiked considerably, although it still represented one-quarter or less of the total. The apparent increased scrutiny corresponded with the arrival in Islamabad of a new US Defense Representative, Vice
Admiral Michael Lefever, who reportedly has played a greater role in the oversight process. GAO concluded that increased oversight and accountability was needed over
Pakistan’s reimbursement claims for coalition support funds.219
The State Department claims that Pakistan’s requests for CSF reimbursements are carefully vetted by several executive branch agencies, must be approved by the
Secretary of Defense, and ultimately can be withheld through specific congressional action. However, a large proportion of CSF funds may have been lost to waste and mismanagement over the years, given a dearth of adequate controls and oversight. The
Bush Administration may have concluded in late 2008 that Pakistan diverted much of the funds toward a military build-up focused on India. Senior Pentagon officials reportedly have taken steps to overhaul the process through which reimbursements and other military aid are provided to Pakistan. The National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) for FY2008 (P.L. 110-181) for the first time required the Secretary of
Defense to submit to Congress itemized descriptions of coalition support reimbursements to Pakistan.220
2. Pakistan’s Counter Insurgency Capability Funds (PCCF)
PCCF is a dedicated fund established by Pentagon to strengthen Pakistan’s counterinsurgency capabilities. For fiscal year 2010, “the Department of State’s
Pakistan counterinsurgency Capability Fund established under the Supplemental
Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111-32), hereinafter in this section referred to
219 Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, Neither a Hawk Nor a Dove, 670. 220 K. Alan Kronstadt, “Pak-U.S. Relations”, Congressional Research Service the Library of Congress, December 2011, 11.
110 as the “Fund”, consisted of the following: (A) Amounts appropriated to carry out this subsection (which may not include any amounts appropriated to carry out title I of this
Act).”
Amounts in the Fund made available to carry out this subsection for any fiscal year authorized to be used by the Secretary of State, with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense, to build and maintain the counterinsurgency capability of Pakistan under the same terms and conditions (except as otherwise provided in this subsection) that are applicable to amounts made available under the fund.221
Since 2009, a new category of security-related aid, the Pakistan Counterinsurgency
Fund/Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCF/PCCF), has also been developed. The
PCF/PCCF objectives were similar to those of the CSF, though with perhaps more focused on fighting insurgency within Pakistan, such as the Pakistan military’s Swat campaigns in 2009. This clearly was in both countries’ interests, and opinion polls indicated public support in Pakistan for combating violent extremists.
3. Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
The US government has a program for financing through grants or loans, the acquisition of US military hardware by those states which supported and shared US regional stability goals. In the case of Pakistan, these funds were established by US government to enable Pakistan to purchase obsolete US Defense equipment for its conventional modernizing programs. Pakistan was not authorized as yet to purrchase defense equipment through sources other than US.222
221 Www.Sassi.org/wp.content/uploads/2012/05/SASSI-Policy-Brief.Pdf.accessed on June 5, 2015, 2. 222 Ibid, 2-3.
111
4. Defense Supplies Through FMF
Major US arms sales and grants to Pakistan since 2001 had included items useful for counterterrorism operations, along with a number of “big tickets” platforms more suited to conventional warfare. In dollars value terms, “the bulk of the purchases was made with Pakistani national funds, but US grants eclipsed that in later years. The
Pentagon reported the total Foreign Military Sales agreements with Pakistan worth 5.4 billion dollars for FY2002-FY2010 (in process sales of F-16 combat aircraft and related equipment account for more than half of this). The US also had provided
Pakistan with more than 2.1 billion dollars in FMF grants since 2001.” These funds were used to purchase US military equipment for long-term modernization efforts.
Pakistan also had been granted US Defense supplies as Excess Defense Articles
(EDA).223Notable items paid for entirely with Pakistani national funds included:
• 18 new F-16C/D Block 50/52 combat aircraft, with an option for 18 more
(valued at 1.43 billion dollars, 17 delivered to date34);
• F-16 armaments, including 500 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile
(AMRAAM) air-to-air missiles; 1,450 2,000-pound
• Bombs; 500 Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) bomb tail kits for gravity
bombs; and 1,600 Enhanced
• Pave way laser-guided bomb kits, also for gravity bombs (629 million dollars);
• 100 Harpoon anti-ship missiles (298 million dollars);
• 500 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles (95 million dollars); and
• Six Phalanx Close-In Weapons System naval guns (80 million dollars).
223 K. Alan Kronstadt, “Pak-U.S. Relations”, Congressional Research Service the Library of Congress, December 2011, 12.
112
• Other major articles transferred via EDA include: 14 F-16A/B combat aircraft;
• 59 T-37 military trainer jets’ and
• 550 M-113 armored personnel carriers.224
Under CSF (part of the Pentagon budget), “Pakistan received 26 Bell 412 utility helicopters, along with related parts and maintenance, valued at 235 million dollars.
Under Section 1206 (global train and equip), Frontier Corps, and PCF/PCCF authorities, Pakistan received four Mi-17 multi role helicopters (another six were provided temporarily at no cost), two King Air 350 surveillance aircraft, 450 vehicles for the Frontier Corps, 20 Buffalo explosives detection and disposal vehicles, hundreds of M-141. Bunker Defeat Munitions, helicopter spare parts, sophisticated explosives detectors, night vision devices, radios, body armor, helmets, first aid kits, litters, and large amounts of other individual soldier equipment.” Pakistan is eager to receive more counterinsurgency hardware for use in western Pakistan, including armored personnel carriers, laser target designators, laser-guided munitions, and more night-vision goggles and surveillance gear.225
Despite the provision of equipment suited to unconventional warfare, some analysts have continued to criticize the programming of security-related aid to Pakistan.
Foremost among “these are assertions that the Pakistani military maintains an institutional focus on conventional war fighting capabilities oriented toward India and that it has used US security assistance to bolster these capabilities while paying insufficient attention to the kinds of counterinsurgency capacity that US policy makers might prefer to see strengthened. For example, of the some 2.1 billion dollars in FMF provided to Pakistan from FY2002-FY2007, more than half has been used by
224 Chronology of Economic Aid from US. For more details see Appendix xi. 225 Ibid.14.
113
Islamabad to purchase weapons of limited use in the context of counterterrorism.
These included maritime patrol aircraft, anti-armor missiles, surveillance radars, update kits for F-16 combat aircraft, and self-propelled howitzers. Counterarguments contend that such purchases facilitate regional stability and allow Pakistan to feel more secure vis-à-vis India, its more powerful neighbor.”
The Defense Department characterized F-16 fighters, P-3C patrol aircraft, and anti- armor missiles as having significant anti-terrorism applications. The State Department claimed that, since 2005, FMF funds had been “solely for counterterrorism efforts, broadly defined.” Such claims elicit skepticism from some observers, and analysts who emphasize the importance of strengthening the US-India strategic partnership, called
US military aid to Pakistan incompatible with US strategic goals in the region.
Moreover, US officials were concerned that Pakistan had altered some conventional
US-supplied weapons in ways that could violate the Arms Export Control Act. Such alleged modifications included expanding the capability of both Harpoon anti-ship missiles and P-3C naval aircraft for land-attack missions. Islamabad categorically rejected the allegations.226
Pakistani officials continued to complain that US supplied Defense equipment, especially which was most needed for counterinsurgency operations such as attack and utility helicopters, had been too slow in coming. “The Pakistani Ambassador to the
United States quoted as claiming that, in his first two years in Washington, Pakistan received only eight used Mi-17 transport helicopters and that Pakistan’s military operations had been hindered by a lack of equipment. Such claims rile US officials, who document that the US had provided Pakistan with at least 50 helicopters since
2006, 12 of them armed Cobra models and noted that the delivery of more top-line
226 Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, Neither a Hawk Nor a Dove, 672.
114 attack helicopters had been delayed because of Pakistani inaction. Former US Joint
Chiefs Chairman and Secretary of State, Colin Powell urged the Obama
Administration to do a better job of providing the Pakistani military with the mobility and intelligence capabilities needed for counterinsurgency operations.”
The first P-3C Orion reconnaissance aircraft was handed over to the Pakistan Navy on
Jan 18, 2007 at Karachi. Acting US Consul General in Karachi Kay Anske presented the documents of the aircraft to Commander Nadeem Qureshi of Pakistan Navy. Kay
Anske said:
“Pakistan and the US are strong allies in the war against
terrorism and the induction of P-3C aircraft in Pakistan
Naval fleet is a representation of this close relationship”.
She expressed the hope that this new addition would benefit Pakistan in improving and increasing its defense capabilities.227
The US Ambassador to Pakistan, Rayan C. Crocker handed over on February 2, 2007, eight night capable Cobra attack helicopters, AHI-F, to the Pakistan Army at the
Qasim Airbase, near Islamabad. These helicopters were part of a 50 million dollar foreign military sales program that provided the Pakistan Army with 20 refurbished helicopters.228 The US Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker emphasized America’s “strategic and enduring relationship with Pakistan” at all meetings during his farewell visit to
Karachi on March 2, 2007.
227 Elizabeth Colton, “US hands over first P-3C Orion aircraft to Pakistan Navy”, Khabr-o-Nazar, February 2007, 9.
228 Elizabeth Colton, “US Delivers 8 Cobra Helicopters to Pakistan Army”, Khabr-o-Nazar, February 2007, 17.
115
The Ambassador led the US Consulate’s memorial ceremony for the first anniversary of the March 2, 2006, consulate bombing that killed two U.S. Government employees, including American diplomat, David Foy, and Pakistani staff member, Iftikhar Ahmed.
“In our strategic and long-term relationship with
Pakistan, we are all together continuing the fight against
extremism”.
Ambassador Crocker stated,
“The US and Pakistan are fighting a common enemy,
and nowhere is this fight more important than here in
Karachi”.229
The US Ambassador to Pakistan Anne W. Patterson, paid rich tribute to the “courage and professionalism” of Pakistan Army aviation personnel and declared them “an asset to Pakistan Army Aviation and to our combined effort to fight extremism and bring peace and stability to the region.”
Speaking at the formalizing ceremony of the final acceptance and transfer of 25 Bell-
412 helicopters to Pakistan Army at the Qasim Airbase, near Rawalpindi, on October
22, 2007, Ambassador Patterson said that the day marked a new chapter in Pakistan
Army’s aviation history.
“This event demonstrates the continued commitment of
the United States to cooperate with Pakistan,”
229Elizabeth Colton, “U.S Ambassador Stresses Enduring Ties with Pakistan”, Khabr-o-Nazar, March 2007, 12.
116
Ambassador Patterson said,
“Our military assistance programs are for the long term.
They are the foundation for cooperation and
engagement, and a way to strengthen our bonds as
partners and allies”.230
3.2. Military Support to US
Since the US invasion of Afghanistan after September 11, 2001, some of the specific assistance provided by Pakistan for Operation Enduring Freedom has been as follows:
1. Provision of Air Bases/ Airfields
In order to meet the requirement of US Coalition Forces, Pakistan provided five air bases/ airfields. However, in an emergency, planes could land anywhere in Pakistan.
“On average 0.4 million litters of fuel per day had been provided to US forces as well as all other services on the bases were used by them. A total of 57800 sorties had been generated from Pakistan’s air space/soil.”
2. Provision of Air Corridor
In order to facilitate launching of air operations in Afghanistan, Pakistan provided two- thirds of its air space as an air corridor to the US Coalition Forces. By so doing,
Pakistan had to reschedule/ redirect many of the commercial flights.
230Elizabeth Colton, “U.S. Transfers 25 combats Helicopters to Pakistan Army Aviation wing”, Khabr-o- Nazar, November 2007, 11.
117
3. Provision of Naval Facilities
Pakistan Navy provided landing facility to the US Coalition ships at Pasni. “At sea,
Pakistan Navy operations/training was curtailed in order to accommodate and facilitate the operations of US Coalition Naval Forces. According to the US Marine Corps
Gazette of June 2002, the Coalition Naval Operations at Pasni were the largest amphibious operations in size, duration and depth that the Marine Corps had conducted since the Korean War. In all, 8000 Marines, 330 vehicles and over 1350 tons of equipment/logistic were off loaded on the beach and later flown to Kandahar from Pasni. Pakistan’s strategic circles who spoke to Asia Times Online on June 2004, over the past few months the US had been engaged in espionage operation, including the use of spy planes, in South and North Waziristan, Chitral, the Hindu Kush mountain chain, Zhob, and the mountainous belt between Kandahar in Afghanistan and Pakistan Balochistan.” Tracking devices had also been installed in a number of places to monitor movements in the border areas.231
The Defense Secretary, General (Retd) Tariq Waseen Ghazi told the Public Accounts
Committee (PAC) of the National Assembly that Pakistan had provided four airports to US forces for logistic support including Pasni, Dalbadin, Shamsi (Kharan) and
Jacobabad. Three of these airports, except Dalbadin, were on the standby list for use by US forces in emergency situations.232
4. Capturing of Al-Qaeda Terrorists
One of the important tasks assigned to Pakistan under the US war against international terrorism is to eliminate Al-Qaeda network. So far, Pakistan has arrested more than
231 Syed Saleem Shahzad, “Stage set for final showdown”, Asia Times online, 21 July 2004. 232 Airports on standby for U.S Secretary, Daily Times, July 19, 2006.
118
600 Al-Qaeda terrorists and handed them over to the US According to a study conducted by the Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies (PIPS) that Pakistani security agencies arrested over 1000 Al-Qaeda suspects between January 2002 and May 2006.
Among the arrested people, “70 were Algerian citizens, 86 were from Saudi Arab, 20 from Morocco, 22 from the United Arab Emirates, 11 from Libya, 7 from Kuwait, 20 from Egypt, 28 from Indonesia, 18 from Malaysia, and 36 from West Asian countries.
Among the people who were arrested as suspects, five were from the US, two from
Australia, and eleven from the UK. But the top-brass of Al-Qaeda, including its leader
Osama bin Laden and Ayman Al-Zawahiri has not been arrested. But later in 2011
Osama bin Laden was killed.”233
5. Handling Taliban
In order to fulfil this demand of the Pakistan-US took severe measure to stop cross- border movement of the people in Afghanistan. Pakistan deployed more than 80,000 troops along the Afghan border. But the relationship between Washington and
Islamabad has come under great strain over the increased attacks of the Taliban in
Afghanistan. The Afghan government have also been protesting, from time to time, to control the movement of the Taliban from the tribal areas of Pakistan.
6. Handling of Qadeer Khan Network
Pakistan has also cooperated with the US in handling the issues of A. Q. Khan, the founder of the Pakistani nuclear program, despite immense domestic pressure, where the man is still considered as a hero. “Press reports in 2002-2003 suggested that
Pakistan assisted and transferred nuclear material and missile technology to North
233 Daily Times, May 26, 2006.
119
Korea, Iran and Libya. Although Pakistan denied those allegations, it conceded in
December 2003 that certain senior scientists were under investigations for possible independent proliferation activities. In February 2004, A. Q. Khan publicly confessed that he was involved in a proliferation network. Later, Musharraf issued a pardon, keeping in view A. Q. Khan’s contributions. Similarly, it is believed that the arrest of other three nuclear scientists, suspected of having passed along nuclear secrets Osama bin Laden, appears to have been done at the behest of the US Federal Bureau of
Investigation.”
3.3. Divergence/confrontation between Pakistan and US
During an interview Moonis Ahmar said that the two countries had differences during
Musharraf era on Indo-US nuclear deal of 2006 and American insistence on Pakistan to "do more" on anti-terrorism drive.234 Too frequently, “the US and its Afghan ally asked Pakistan to do more ignoring what had been done. Pakistan was disappointed that Washington echoed President Hamid Karzai’s criticism of Pakistan for failing to prevent Afghan Taliban from using its territory as a base to organize and launch attacks across the border, making no allowance for the fact that there were three million Afghan refugees on Pakistan soil and it was difficult to identify the terrorists.
Even some US officials were reported to suspect Pakistan’s ability- or willingness to restrain the Taliban. The US Ambassador to Kabul, Zalmay Khalilzad, alleged that some areas in Pakistan had become a sanctuary for Al Qaeda and the Taliban.”
Influential American commentators and academics went further to allege that elements
234 Moonis Ahmar Interview by the researcher, August 29, 2015.
120 within the Pakistan government were playing a double game of openly siding with the
US but secretly colluding with the Afghan Taliban.235
The US started to use drone missiles in 2004 to target Al-Qaeda operatives and their allies in their hideouts in FATA, who mounted attacks across the border. Pakistan objected to the violation of its sovereignty and opinion leaders became highly critical of the US as Drone attacks became more frequent and destructive. Initially,
Washington gave no public explanation except that it reserved the right to launch attacks on Al-Qaeda targets if it received actionable intelligence. The Government of
Pakistan continued to urge reversal of the policy, arguing that such attacks were counterproductive in terms of popular support for Pakistan-US cooperation. Bush telephoned president Musharraf in August 2007 to assure him that the United States fully respected Pakistan’s sovereignty, but the words were believed by actions. A statement by US Defense Secretary Robert Gates implied there was an understanding on the issue between the US and Pakistan, which was promptly denied by the Pakistan
Foreign Office.
One of Islamabad’s grievances centralized US insensitivity to Pakistan’s security concerns. Despite initial criticism of Indian nuclear tests in 1998, “Washington had embarked on a policy of expanding strategic collaboration with India in defense, missile and nuclear technology. Islamabad was particularly aggrieved by the US decision to reverse the policy on transferring civilian nuclear technology to India.
Disregarding the long-standing ban imposed by the Nuclear Suppliers Group on such transfers to non-parties to the NPT, Washington concluded an agreement with New
Delhi in 2008 that would in effect enable India to increase its capacity for diversion of
235 Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2012: a Concise History, 288.
121 fissile material to build a bigger nuclear arsenal. Apart from the threat of a nuclear arms race, the nuclear deal aggrieved Pakistan because of invidious US discrimination against Pakistan, for the US refused to extend the same concession to Pakistan, on the invalid ground that Pakistan’s non-proliferation credentials.” Actually, this argument ignored both the stringent measures Pakistan had implemented since 2001 with the assistance of the United States to tighten custodial, security against any leakage of technology, as well as, the skeletons in India’s cupboard, documented in a research paper published by a reputable US think tank in 2006.236
A more malignant problem that blighted trust between Pakistan and the US had been the recurrent record of unilateral cutoffs of cooperation with Pakistan, leading to the widespread belief that the US was not a reliable friend. “The US refusal to come to
Pakistan’s assistance in the 1965 and 1971 wars was considered a betrayal that left indelible scars on the Pakistani memory. Again in 1990, the US suddenly terminated assistance and even sale of arms to Pakistan, leaving a Cold War ally in the lurch with a plethora of problems bequeathed by the war in which it had played a key role in securing the expulsion of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, which contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Earlier the US 9/11 Commission, recalling the flawed record, recommended that the US should make ‘the difficult long-term commitment to the future of Pakistan’.”
Recognizing the validity of Pakistan’s mistrust, the US government made efforts after
9/11 to underscore the durability of its commitment. Frequent statements to this effect were made by high officials of the US administration. “A more concrete demonstration of the new policy was the passage in 2003 of a five-year, 3 billion dollar economic and
236 Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2012: a Concise History, 290.
122 military aid program. In addition the US contributed generously to the 2005 earthquake relief fund and to education, health and poverty reduction programs. Actual transfers during 2001-06, including payments for supplies Pakistan sent for the US forces in Afghanistan were about 9 billion dollars. By 2008, the amount rose to 12 billion dollars.”237
3.4. Actions Taken by Pakistan (Post 9/11)
These actions were taken by Pakistan after 9/11 like sharing of intelligence on terrorist activity in the US and its allies. “Pakistan also bans on Jihadi organizations.
Strengthening of the an anti-terrorist law and the setting up of anti-terrorist courts with military’s participation and condemnation at the highest level of acts of international terrorism performed by a group with societal links and roots in Pakistan. Ban on display and carrying of weapons and freezing of the financial assets of the banned
Jihadi groups, freezing of bank accounts of more than 50 organizations suspected of links with sectarianism or international terrorism. The decision to incorporate the anti- terrorism recommendations of the intergovernmental Financial Action Task force on
Money Laundering in Pakistani banking laws, arrest and trial of those involved in terrorist activity.” In March 2002 Pakistan deployed nearly 100,000 troops around
Tora Bora to block fleeing Al-Qaeda fighters from crossing over into the Pakistan territory. 238 On January 2003, action taken was hunting down and arrest of the remnants of “Al-Qaeda” network in Pakistan According to official Pakistan figures more than 443 Al-Qaeda suspects belonging to 18 different nationalities had been handed over to the US authorities.239
237 Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2012: a Concise History, 290-291. 238 Dawn, August 2, 2002. 239 Dawn, January 6, 2003.
123
Major government-to-government arms sales and grants since 2001 “included 6 C-130 military transport aircraft, 6 AN/TPS-77 surveillance radars, air traffic control systems, nearly 6,000 military radios, 100 Harpoon anti-ship missiles (with the possibility of sales of another 90, 6 Phalanx guns (with upgrades on another 6), and 2,014 TOW anti-armor missiles. In 2004, the US Navy agreed to grant 8 excess P- 3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft to Pakistan, plans for their major refurbishment and service by
US firms worth 1 billion dollars in 2005-06 years. Other sales included 500
Sidewinder air-to-air missiles and 115 self-propelled howitzers. Major Excess Defense
Article grants included 20 refurbished AH-1F Cobra attack helicopters (with 20 more for parts) and 4 F-16A fighters. Further potential arms sales include costly plans to refurbish and modify three excess P-3 aircraft with the E-2C Hawkeye airborne early warning shot. The Department of Defense had characterized F-16 fighters, P-3C patrol aircraft, and anti-armor missiles as had significant anti-terrorism applications, claimed that elicit skepticism from some analysts. The Pentagon reports total Foreign Military
Sales agreements with Pakistan worth 863 million dollars in FY2002-FY2005. In- process sales of F-16s raised the value to 3.5 billion dollars in FY2006 alone. Security- related US assistance programs for Pakistan were aimed especially at bolstering
Islamabad’s counterterrorism and border security efforts, and had included US funded road-building projects in the NWFP (Now KPK) and FATA along with the provision of night-vision equipment, communications gear, protective vests, and transport helicopters and aircraft. The US also had undertaken to train and equip new Pakistan
Army Air Assault units that can move quickly to find and target terrorist elements.”
Modest US funded military education and training programs sought to enhance the professionalism of Pakistan’s military leaders, and develop respect for rule of law, human rights, and democratic values. US security assistance to Pakistan’s civilian
124 sector was aimed at strengthening the country’s law enforcement capabilities through basic police training, provision of advanced identification systems, and establishment of a new Counterterrorism Special Investigation Group.240
3.5. Pakistan–US Strategic Cooperation: An Overview
An arms race considered between India and Pakistan to be among the most likely potential causes of the future use of nuclear weapons by states. In May 1998, India conducted unannounced nuclear tests, breaking a 24-year, and self-imposed moratorium on such testing. Despite US and world efforts to dissuade it, Pakistan quickly followed. “The tests created a global storm of criticism and represented a serious setback to two decades of US nuclear non-proliferation efforts in South Asia.
Pakistan was believed to have enough fissile material, mainly enriched uranium, for
55-90 nuclear weapons; India, with a program focused on plutonium, capable of building a similar number. Both countries had aircraft capable of delivering nuclear bombs (US-supplied F-16 combat aircraft in Pakistan’s air force reportedly had been refitted to carry nuclear bombs). Pakistan’s military had inducted short- and medium- range ballistic missiles (allegedly acquired from China and North Korea), while India possesses short- and intermediate-range missiles. All were assumed to be capable of delivering nuclear warheads over significant distances. In 2000, Pakistan placed its nuclear forces under the control of a National Command Authority led by its
President.” According to the director of the US Defense Intelligence Agency, Pakistan
240 Malik Iftikhar, Pakistan Democracy, Terror and the Building of a Nation. (London: New Holand Publications, 2010), 14.
125 was building its stockpile of fission weapons and was likely to continue working on advanced warhead and delivery systems.241
The revival of cooperation between Pakistan and the US in 2001 was a consequence of the US decision to intervene in Afghanistan after 9/11, to punish Al Qaeda and the
Afghan Taliban regime. Once again Pakistan was thrust to a Frontline role in dealing with a crisis in Afghanistan. Considered assessment led Islamabad to conclude that it was imperative for Pakistan to join the world community, not merely to condemn the terrorist attacks, but also to extend cooperation to the US to facilitate its foreseeable attack on the base of the perpetrators. At the same time Islamabad decided to avoid direct participation in the invasion of Afghanistan. The demands that Washington made and Islamabad accepted on September 13, 2001 required Pakistan to allow over- flights and the transit of US and allied forces to stop Al-Qaeda at its border and prevent recruits from Pakistan going to Afghanistan. These undertaking were consistent with the principles of international law, which require a state to prevent abuse of its territory for hostile operations against another state. Opinion leaders consulted by Musharraf in the following days, excepting a majority from religious parties, endorsed the decision.242
After the US invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001, Pakistan moved a substantial number of troops to the border in order to stop the influx of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban.
The operation yielded good results. Over a thousand terrorists were killed or captured and hundreds of suspects were, transferred to US authorities. The Bush administration publicly praised Pakistan’s cooperation. Domestic criticism of the post-9/11 policy increased because popular opinion saw Pakistan to be fighting America’s war. Also,
241 Malik Hafeez, US Relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan: The Imperial Dimension. (Karachi: Oxford
University Press, 2008), 129.
242 Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2012: a Concise History, 285.
126
Musharraf became unpopular due to his manipulation of domestic politics for personal ends. Still, he persisted in Pakistan’s firm resolve to fight extremism and terrorism.
Appreciative US officials described Pakistan as a ‘pivotal nation’ and praised its leadership as ‘a voice of moderation and reason in the Islamic world’. Cognizant of the
US image in Pakistan as an unreliable friend, they underlined the US commitment to long-term relationship with Pakistan.243
In 2002, the US began allowing commercial sales that enabled Pakistan to refurbish at least part of its fleet of American-made F-16 fighter aircraft and, three years later,
Washington announced that it would resume sales of new F-16 fighters to Pakistan after a 16-year hiatus.244
According to a Department of Defence fact sheet released on May 28, 2002,
“Pakistan has provided bases and over flight permissions
for all US and coalition force, deployed a large number
of troops along the Afghanistan border, has spent a large
portion of its logistical reserves to support the coalition,
a very significant contribution in light of the country’s
current economic difficulties and self-Defense support
requirements, and ISI has helped in various phases of the
operation”.245
Since July 2003, major US military grants and proposed sales to Pakistan had included
“six C-130 military transport aircraft (75 million dollars grant), six Aerostat
Surveillance radars (155 million dollars sale); 12 radars and 40 Bell helicopters meant
243 Ibid, 286. 244 K. Alan Kronstadt, “Pak-U.S. Relations”, Congressional Research Service the Library of Congress, December 2011, 10. 245 Dawn, May 28, 2002.
127 to enhance Pakistan’s ability to support ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ and to secure its borders (300 million dollars sale); military radio systems meant to improve
Pakistani communication capabilities and to increase interoperability between
Pakistani and US-led counter terrorist forces (78 million dollars sale); and in
November 2004, the proposed sale of eight P-3C aircraft, six Phalanx guns, and 2000
TOW missiles worth up to 1.2 billion dollars.” The US also undertook to train and equip new Pakistan Army Air Assault units that could move quickly to find and target terrorist elements.246
In 2004, demonstrating that the White House had faith in Musharraf, Bush conferred the status of “non-NATO ally” on Pakistan and approved a 700 million dollars aid package.247
“In March 2004 US Secretary to State, Colin Powell
visited South Asia during his visit to Islamabad, he met
Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, Mahmud Kasuri and after
that both held a joint press conference, in which Colin
Powell stated that he had brought a message from the
American people and President Bush that the US sought
to have long term relations with Pakistan and also to
further cement the bonds of friendship”.248
This announcement came as a surprise for Pakistan and it seemed a sudden move, as prior to the press conference there had been no mention of such US intentions. It seemed that this decision was taken to praise Pakistan for its efforts towards “War on
246 K. Alan Kronstadt, “Pak-US Relations”, Congressional Research Service the Library of Congress, December 2002, 6-7. 247 Heraldo Munoz, Getting Away With Murder, 113. 248 Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, Neither a Hawk Nor a Dove, 678.
128 terror”, especially the ongoing, Wana operation by the Pakistani forces to curb the hiding terrorists in tribal areas of Pakistan. This operation was in full swing at the time of the visit of Powell.249
Pakistan-United States security cooperation accelerated rapidly in the post 9/11 period, and in June 2004, Bush designated Pakistan as a major non-NATO ally of the US. In a brief statement issued in Tampa, Florida, where he was visiting the US troops, Bush said, “Consistent with the authority vested in me by Section 517 of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, I hereby designate the Islamic Republic of Pakistan as a Major non-NATO ally of the US.” 250 A major non-NATO ally is exempted from the suspension of US military assistance and qualifies for receiving surplus defense material from US stockpiles. Other benefits include entering certain cooperative training agreements with the US and eligible for expedited processing of export licenses of commercial satellites.251
During his visit to Pakistan in March 2006, Bush agreed to develop a ‘strategic partnership with Pakistan and increase cooperation in the fields of defense trade, education and science and technology. Congressional delegations similarly lauded
Pakistan’s contribution and sacrifices in the fight against terrorism and pledged continuity of support for the strategic partnership between the two countries. However, neither the US nor Pakistan succeeded to liquidate the terrorists.252
In May 2006, days after releasing from detention nuclear scientist and suspected
Khan’s Collaborator Muhammad Farooq, the Islamabad government declared the investigation “is closed.” Some in Congress remained sceptical, however, and a House
249“Visit of US Secretary of State Powell”. Keesing’s Record of World Events, 50, no.3 (Mach 2004): 45902. 250 “Status of Non-NATO ally formalized”, Dawn, June 17, 2004. 251 “Non-NATO status for Pakistan approved”, Dawn, June 3, 2004. 252 Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2009: a Concise History, 286.
129 panel subsequently held a hearing at which three nongovernmental experts insisted that the US and international investigators be given direct access to Khan, in particular to learn more about assistance given to Iran’s nuclear program. No alleged Pakistani participants, including Khan himself, faced criminal charges in the case.
In June 2006, “the Pentagon notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to
Pakistan worth up to 5.1 billion dollars. The deal involves 18 newly-built advanced F-
16 combat aircraft (and an option for 18 more), along with related munitions and equipment, which represent the largest-ever weapons sale to Pakistan. Associated munitions for new F-16s and for mid-life upgrades on others included 500 AMRAAM air-to-air missiles and 700 BLU-109 bombs. Congressional concerns about the sale and displeasure at the Bush Administration’s apparently improper notification procedures spurred a July hearing of the House International Relations Committee.
During that session, many Members worried that F-16s were better suited to fighting
India than to combating terrorists; some warned that US military technology would be passed from Pakistan to China.”
Rice subsequently sent a letter to Congress indicating that no F-16 combat aircraft or related equipment would be delivered to Pakistan until Islamabad provided written security assurances that no US technology would be accessible by third parties.
Islamabad has denied that any “extraordinary” security requirements were requested; however, congressional concerns appear to have been satisfactorily addressed. Since then, several major US Defence corporations have won contracts worth hundreds of millions of dollars to supply F-16 parts and munitions to Pakistan.253
The Air Chief further said, “Pakistan would make a down payment advance of 5 to 10 percent, while balance payment would be completed within the next 5 to 15 years”.
253 Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, Neither a Hawk Nor a Dove, 687.
130
Acquisition of the new F-16s along with their accessories would cost around 2 billion dollars while upgrading of old F-16s would cost an additional 1 billion dollars.254
During October 2006, “Islamabad appeared to have launched a public relations effort aimed at overcoming the stigma caused by Khan’s proliferation activities. The effort included dispatching to Washington the chief of the country’s Strategic Plans Division,
Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai, who attempted to make more transparent Pakistan’s nuclear command and control structure, and who acknowledged that Pakistan’s past proliferation record had been “poor and indefensible.” Many analysts believed that meaningful efforts had been made to improve the physical security of Pakistan’s strategic arsenal.”
Pakistan and the US on April 7, 2007 signed a US 1 million dollar Memorandum of understanding (MoU) in Peshawar for the rehabilitation of frontier posts in several
Frontier Regions. The agreement was part of a joint plan to bolster Pakistan’s border security forces’ capabilities and to enhance the Frontier Constabulary by raising an additional 50 platoons to protect the 286-km frontier region border.
Pakistan and the US had a long term relationship, and supporting the Frontier
Constabulary was part of that relationship,” said the visiting Chairwoman of US House
Appropriations Subcommittee on State and Foreign Operations. Congresswoman Nita
Lowey, who was heading a US Congressional delegation visiting Pakistan, attended the signing ceremony. “I am glad to be here to witness the continuation of America’s relationship with Pakistan’s security forces”, she said, adding that the signing of the
254“Pakistan to get 18 new 26 old F-16s from U.S. in 3 billion dollar deal”, Daily Times, July, 18, 2006.
131
MoU followed a US Embassy commitment last year to provide 2.7 million dollars’ worth of security and communications equipment and infrastructure support.255
In May 2007, “the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies released a report on the Khan network, finding that “at least some of Khan’s associates appear to have escaped law enforcement attention and could, after a period of lying low, resume their black-market business.” Shortly after, a House panel held another listening on the
Khan network, at which several Members and nongovernmental experts called for
Pakistan to allow direct access to Khan for US investigators.” In July, Islamabad reportedly eased house arrest restrictions on Khan, despite the Foreign Ministry denied any change in Khan’s status.256
The United States government delivered two F-16 fighter aircraft on July 10, 2007 with the Pakistan Air Force at Mushaf airbase in Sargodha. US Ambassador Anne W.
Patterson, Air Chief Marshall Tanvir, Chief of the Air Staff. Pakistan Air Force, and
Lt. General Gary L. North, Commander of the 9th Air Force and US Central Command
Air Forces were the senior officials participating in the handover ceremonies at PAF
Base Mushaf.257
US Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte’s statement at the Joint Press
Conference:
“I am extremely pleased to be here in Pakistan again: Your country is both a close friend and a long standing reliable ally of the US. Today’s second round of the
Pakistan-US strategic dialogue has been very useful. The continuing discussion
255 Elizabeth Colton, “1 Million MoU Signed”, Khabr-o-Nazar, May 2007, 9.
256 DAWN, May 22, 2007. 257 Elizabeth Colton, “US Delivers two F-16 fighters to Pakistan air force”, Khabr-o-Nazar, August 2007, 11.
132 between our two countries highlights the commitment both are nations have made for a wide-ranging, substantive, and long-term bilateral relationship. Our relationship with
Pakistan and the Pakistani people is very important. Pakistan has long been a strong
US ally, but now more than ever, Pakistan stands as an important and pivotal nation in the world. Pakistan is a large, moderate Muslim nation with the diverse population in a very critical region. It serves as the gateway, the crossroads, to both central and South
Asia. Pakistan’s continued progress and development are vital not only for its own people, but also for the stability of the region, the US, and the rest of the world. We welcome Pakistan’s leadership as a voice of moderation and reason in the Islamic world. Your nation remains a valuable ally in the war on terror. The US recognizes the tremendous sacrifices the people of Pakistan have made in the struggle”.258
In a nutshell “a total of about 15 billion dollars in direct US aid went to Pakistan, including more than 4 billion dollars in military assistance. On June 2003, Bush hosted
Musharraf at Camp David, Maryland, where he vowed to work with Congress on establishing a five-year, and 3 billion dollar aid package for Pakistan. Annual instalments 600 million dollars each split evenly between military and economic aid began in FY2005. When additional funds for development assistance, law enforcement, earthquake relief, and other programs were included, the non-food aid allocation for FY2006 was 759 million dollars.259 An estimated total of 734 million dollars was to be delivered in FY2007, the first year of the Administration’s plan to devote 750 million dollars in US development aid to Pakistan’s tribal areas over a five- year period. Congress also authorized the spending of billions of dollars to reimburse
Pakistan for its support of US-led counterterrorism operations.” As of August 2007, a total of nearly 7 billion dollars had been appropriated for FY2002-FY2007 Defence
258 Elizabeth Colton, “US-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue”, Khabr-o-Nazar, October 2007, 8. 259 Rashmi Jain, ed., The United States and Pakistan, 224.
133
Department spending for coalition support payments to “Pakistan, Jordan, and other key cooperating nations.” Pentagon documents show that disbursement to Islamabad at
5.26 billion dollars or an average of about 82 million dollars per month account for the great majority of these funds. The amount was equal to more than one quarter of
Pakistan’s total military expenditures. “The Defense Department Appropriations Act,
2007 (P.L. 109-289) allows up to 900 million dollars in Pentagon funds be used for
FY2007 reimbursements. The Bush Administration requested another 1 billion dollars in emergency supplemental CSF for FY2007; however, the supplemental bill signed into law in May 2007 (P.L. 110-28) allowed for only 200 million dollars in additional
CSF appropriations, bringing the FY2007 CSF authorization to 1.1 billion dollars.260
The Administration had requested another 1.7 billion dollars in coalition support for
FY2008. Pakistan began as a reluctant entrant into the global war on terrorism; but later become an active participant in the struggle. ‘Pakistan paid dearly for its commitment towards fighting terrorism, both domestically and internationally. In the war against terrorism, Pakistan became not only the front line fighter, but also the front line target of the terrorists’. The apprehensions of Pakistan regarding the war on terror as most Pakistani wanted, needed to be seriously addressed not only by the US but also by the world at large. Being a partner of the US in its war against terrorism, Pakistan had suffered the most. In this process, Pakistan itself had become a victim of terrorism.
It was facing terrorism in all forms, thus that was seriously damaged not only its internal but also external security.” The effects of war on terror were grave in Pakistan, which was already facing other multiple problems of the poor economy, inflation, unemployment, corruption, extremism, bad governance, sectarianism and the ever
260 President Musharraf of Pakistan, November 05, 2007, accessed on February 11, 2016, https://www.congress.gov/crec/2007/11/05/CREC-2007-11-05-pt1-PgH12457-4.pdf
134 growing menace of terrorism leaving the whole nation in a state of fear and terror.261
The pathetic situation of Pakistan called for a sympathetic treatment by the US along with others; Pakistan no doubt paid a heavy price due to its decision to join the US war on terror. Pakistan’s concerns were serious and needed to be taken seriously as a stable and strong Pakistan was in the interest of all. As Pakistan has been a key player in this process, it was needed to be helped out in getting out of the problems. It is needless to say that a democratic and stable Pakistan would be in the interest of the region as well as the world. For a world free of tension, Pakistan no doubt can be an important player thus proper recognition of its effort needs to be acknowledged.262
261 Schaffer, How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States,138 262Ahmed Faruqui, Musharraf’s Pakistan, Bush’s America & the Middle East. (Lahore: Vanguard Books Pvt Ltd, 2008), 10.
135
CHAPTER 4
SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOMENT OF PAKISTAN
AND THE UNITED STATES SUPPORT
Following a decade of alienation in the 1990s, US relations with Pakistan were once again transformed in a dramatic fashion, this time with the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the US and the ensuing enlistment of Pakistan as a pivotal ally in
US led counterterrorism efforts. Post 9/11 US aid to Pakistan rose dramatically and included a 600 million dollars emergency cash transfer in September 2001. The US aid only benefited a small segment of the Pakistani population, whereas it failed to bring any qualitative socioeconomic change as far as the people were concerned.263
From FY (Fiscal Year) 2000 at 36.76 million dollars to FY2007 at 187.7 million dollars, US aid increased five-fold, and in FY2002 the aid increased by another 11-fold to 2,057 million dollars. In 2003, “Bush invited Musharraf at Camp David, where he vowed to work with Congress on establishing a five-year 3 billion dollars aid package for Pakistan. Annual installments of 600 million dollars each split evenly between military and economic aid began in FY2005. About two-thirds of US aid from FY2002 to FY2007, some 13.3 billion dollars (including Coalition Support Fund reimbursements), and supported security needs of Pakistan. Of that, about 9.4 billion dollars had been funded through Defense Department appropriations, with 3.9 billion dollars in security assistance for Pakistan funded through the Department of State appropriations. Economic assistance for Pakistan from FY2002 to FY2007 totaled more than 6.5 billion dollars. About three fourths (or 4.8 billion dollars) of that was
263Moonis Ahmar, Interview by researcher, August 29, 2015. University of the Karachi.
136 within the Economic Support Fund (ESF).264 FY2007 was the first year of the Bush
Administration’s plan to devote 750 million dollars in US development aid to
Pakistan’s tribal areas over a five-year period.”
4.1. Bilateral Economic Assistance
The US provided bilateral economic, development, and humanitarian assistance to
Pakistan through a number of funding accounts: the ESF, Food for Peace, Global
Health and Child Survival (GHCS), as well as International Disaster Assistance (IDA), and Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA). “Global Health and Child Survival
(GHCS) funding levels within the past decade range from 14 million dollars in
FY2002 to 34 million dollars in FY2009 and totaled 221 million dollars from FY2002 to FY2010. The program provided funds to Pakistani nongovernmental organizations, national, and provincial organizations to fight more effectively the spread of
HIV/AIDS and support the national HIV/AIDS strategy.”
The US offered a generous economic aid package to Pakistan to overcome its deficiencies in education, health, employment and numerous other social and economic indicators, extremism and had been the main cause behind the extremist tendencies and terrorism. The US decided to launch combined aggressive security step, a long-term commitment to development and public diplomacy programs to alleviate
US image in Pakistan.265Pakistan’s economy was in a state of near collapse before being rescued by massive aid and debts write-off after 9/11. “The massive influx of counterterrorism aid included about 3.1 billion dollars for economic purposes only.
The US also became Pakistan’s leading export market, accounting for nearly one quarter of the total exports. In June 2003, Bush and Musharraf met at Camp David
264 K. Alan Kronstadt, “Pak-U.S. Relations”, Congressional Research Service the Library of Congress, December 2011, 1-2. 265 Www.Sassi.org/wp.content/uploads/2012/05/SASSI-Policy-Brief.Pdf.accessed on June 5, 2015, 2.
137 where Musharraf was ensured to be provided a five-year, 3 billion dollars aid package for Pakistan. Under this aid package annual installments of 600 million dollars, each split evenly between military and economic aid, began in 2005.” However, critics argued that these funds hardly reach their intended goals and Washington must pay more attention towards specific development projects and education promotion rather than handing out money to the government. Moreover, the US should encourage US companies to invest in Pakistan in order to bolster its economy.
However, the events of 9/11 bailed out Pakistan from political and economic difficulties. In response to Islamabad’s cooperation to the US-led war on terror, “the
Bush administration waived sanctions under the authority of Brownback II and awarded around 18 billion dollars tangible economic and military aid including 11.5 billion dollars as military assistance. The US administration provided legitimacy to
General Musharraf’s military regime and Washington showed willingness to reschedule Pakistan’s outstanding 400 million dollars debt. It also supported loan rescheduling for Pakistan by various financial institutions, including the World Bank,
IMF and ADB, and helped alleviate Pakistan’s 38 billion dollars foreign debts.”
The Bush administration announced 1 billion dollars aid package to the Musharraf government for the purpose of border control, refugee assistance and poverty alleviation. During 2001-2002, IMF and the Paris Club were pleased with Pakistan’s economic progress and rescheduled much of its foreign debt and extended fresh credits. From 2002 to 2008, “the US provided approximately 5.174 billion dollars and also estimated that an additional 80 - 100 million dollars would be given each month in coalition support fund, a total of 4.75 billion dollars till August 2006. According to the
Department of Defense (DOD), the military assistance which had been provided to
Pakistan was approximately 7.345 billion dollars as CSF for its support of the US
138 military operations in Afghanistan.”266 US Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker stated during his visit to the Bahawalpur Chamber of Commerce and industry on March 6, 2007, that the “United States is committed to finding ways to broaden our commercial relationship with Pakistan”.267
On Civilian front the sources of assistance were ESF, MRA, FATA Development plan,
The Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act (EPPA) of 2009 or KLB and Friends of
Democratic Pakistan forum (FODP).
1. The Economic Support Fund (ESF)
ESF is used to fund a wide array of activities. In Pakistan, the program is used to help establish political parties and bolster Pakistan’s ability to conduct elections; help the government provide services to its citizens; promote the delivery of health-related technologies; provide basic education support and improve the quality of universities in Pakistan. “ESF also provided help for the government of Pakistan to pursue economic reforms, such as improving tax collection, strengthening border management, and building infrastructure. ESF aims at promoting agriculture, which is a key component of job growth in rural districts, and supports linkages between farmers, markets, and business service providers to increase access to modern farm equipment. ESF also promotes private-sector competitiveness to strengthen the business community, create jobs, and expand the economy. However, the small percentage of funds dedicated to carrying out all these activities are grossly insufficient and lacks both the additional funds and clarity of purpose, besides the true objectives, of both the donor and the receiver. ESF form the major chunk of the economic aid given to Pakistan. About 80% of the economic aid from FY 2002--FY 2008 comprised
266 A Z Hillali. “Pakistan’s foreign policy objectives in the post-September 11, 2001 era”. 175. 267 Elizabeth Colton, “U.S. Ambassador urges Bilateral Trade”, Khabr-o-Nazar, March 2007, 15.
139
ESF. These funds were used for a variety of purposes; which included support for government institutions, transfer of health technologies, agriculture restructuring and education reforms.268
All the direct overt US Assistance to Pakistan totaled less than 90 million dollars in
2001, with food aid comprising 86 million dollars and 4 million dollars in limited security-related assistance. “There was no assistance for economic development. In
2002, Pakistan received 2.1 billion dollars, including 665 million dollars in economic aid. Clearly Pakistan did not become needier rather Pakistan became important within the political context of the war on terror. The flow of already limited economic assistance to Pakistan fluctuated from 1971 to 2007. This dramatic variation in assistance appears to have little to do with Pakistan‘s needs; rather, Washington’s changing policy priorities towards the country at different points in history and efforts to achieve US objectives drive the variation.”
“A major portion (57%) of the US 10 billion dollar aid (cost of cooperation) had gone into CSF; 18% was consumed in security assistance, and 16% was given to support the budget deficit, leaving only 10% as the ESF and humanitarian development, including funds for 2005 earthquake assistance and education. It came out to be only 64 million dollars per year for over 55 million dollars for school-aged children (1.16 dollars per child per year). The U.S. had provided Pakistan with funds amounting to 6,536 million dollars for the non-military activities including Child Survival and Health (CSH), development Assistance (DA), Food Aid, Human Rights and Democracy Funds
(HRDF), IDA, MRA, and ESF. While the ESF had the major share of non-military funding (4,797 million dollars), the ratio of military and non-military funds clearly demonstrates the priority of the US in favor of the direct military and security related assistance.”
268 Www.Sassi.org/wp.content/uploads/2012/05/SASSI-Policy-Brief.Pdf.accessed on June 5, 2015, 3.
140
2. Food for Peace and Global Health and Child Survival
In different administrative and organizational forms, the Food for Peace program of the US has provided food assistance around the world for more than 50 years.
Approximately 3 billion people in 150 countries have benefited directly from US food assistance. “The Office of Food for Peace within the USAID is the US government’s largest provider of overseas food assistance. The food assistance programming is funded primarily through the Food for Peace Act. Food for Peace aid is given to al- leviate the suffering of the poor affected by food shortages. It differed from each fiscal year and increased in the years when natural calamities hit Pakistan such as in 2005 the earthquake and in 2010 floods.” GHCS funds are provided to governmental organizations and NGOs to spread awareness and to fight against HIV, polio and other dangerous diseases.269
3. International Disaster Assistance (IDA) and Migration and
Refugee Assistance (MRA)
These funds were provided to support the people affected by the natural disasters of
2005 and 2010, and to help those people who were affected by the war on terror in
Pakistan and were displaced from their homes. The funds for these programs were mostly diverted from the ESF.
4. FATA Development Plan
The FATA development program was launched in 2003 to uplift the economic conditions of the most underdeveloped region of Pakistan and the epicenter of the war on terror. “The main aim of this program was to build social infrastructures in this
269 Www.Sassi.org/wp.content/uploads/2012/05/SASSI-Policy-Brief.Pdf.accessed on June 5, 2015, 3.
141 region, including the development of health and educational facilities in the region.270
The US signed 30 million dollars agreement with Pakistan to support law-enforcement with a major focus on FATA. These agreements were an integral part of the cooperative effort between the two countries to improve the overall law and order situation. Pakistan had offered unstinted support in the fight against terrorism as a frontline ally of the US despite growing opposition from the main religious parties in the country The U-turn on the Afghan policy, arrest of over 430 Taliban and Al-Qaeda remnants, logistical support, intelligence sharing, permission to use Pakistani airspace and airports were some of the key aspects of this cooperation that helped the US rout the Taliban regime in Kabul.” In return, Islamabad received some meaningful financial support.271
Pakistan’s western tribal areas are remote, isolated, poor, and traditional in cultural practices. The social and economic privation of the inhabitants is seen to make the region an attractive breeding ground for violent extremists. The US assisted development initiative for the FATA, launched in 2003, aiming to improve the quality of education, develop health care services, and increase opportunities for economic growth and micro-enterprise specifically in Pakistan’s western tribal regions. “A senior
USAID official estimated that, for FY2001-FY2007, about 6% of US economic aid to
Pakistan was allocated for projects in the FATA. In 2008, the Bush Administration urged Congress to continue funding the five-year, 750 million dollars aid plans for the
FATA initiated in FY2007. The plan supported Islamabad’s own 10-year, 2 billion dollars sustainable development effort there. Moreover, as much as half of the allocated funds reportedly had been devoted to administrative costs. Islamabad insisted
270 Ibid, 3. 271“Report on U.S. financing of law-enforcement in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), 12 March 2003”, Rashmi Jain, ed., The United States and Pakistan, 277-278.
142 that implementation of aid programs in the FATA be carried out wholly by Pakistani civil and military authorities and that US aid, while welcomed, must come with no strings attached.” Attacks on aid workers together with corruption and a tangled bureaucracy thwart and US aid efforts in the FATA.272 Senior representatives of the
United States and Pakistan on September 30, 2007, signed a new agreement for the
American people’s assistance to the FATA development amounting to 750 million dollars over the next five years. The US agreed to provide 105 million dollars in 2008 for the FATA program. 273 The US Ambassador to Pakistan, Anne W. Patterson, outlined that “the US has committed 750 million dollars in assistance” to complement the Pakistan government’s development plan that aimed to improve socio-economic conditions in the FATA.274
5. The Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act (EPPA) or Kerry
Lugar Bill (KLB)
The US Senate passed the KLB Bill in 2009. The main provisions of the bill were tripling of the civilian aid being given to Pakistan. According to this bill, 1.5 billion dollars aid was to be given annually to Pakistan from FY 2010- FY 2014. The main aim of this bill was to improve the lives of Pakistani people especially those affected by conflict. Under the bill, military aid was also increased under the condition that
Pakistan would keep fighting the terrorists on its soil, and eliminate them. The other
272 K. Alan Kronstadt, “Pak-US Relations”, Congressional Research Service the Library of Congress, December 2011, 1-2. 273Elizabeth Colton, “US Pakistan signs new 750 million Agreements for FATA development”, Khabr-o-
Nazar, October 2007, 7.
274 Elizabeth Colton, “Ambassador Lauds Tribal Women’s Role in Development Efforts”, Khabr-o-Nazar, March 2008, 14.
143 main condition was strengthening of the democratic institutions in the country; failure to meet these conditions could lead to termination of US aid.275
6. Friends of Democratic Pakistan (FODP)
In 2009, FODP conference was held in Tokyo, the main aim of this conference was to provide aid and assistance to Pakistan and work in partnership to root out terrorism and bring socio-economic stability to the country. As much as 5.28 billion dollars aid was pledged by 24 countries to be provided to Pakistan within next 5 years.
US had provided Pakistan a total of “19.9 billion dollars in assistance to Pakistan military and civilian government. From the total aid, 13.3 billion dollars went to mili- tary side while 6.63 billion dollars went to civilian side.” The breakdown of the above mentioned US aid, according to 2010 compilation by congressional research service, in a tabular form is as follows: According to this estimate the total economic aid provided to Pakistan stands around 19 billion dollars.276
Table. 3. Total Economic Aid to Pakistan from US 2002-2010
Year CSF PCF/PCCF FMF Total Security Total aid Economic aid
2002-04 3121 _ 375 3669 1224
2005 964 _ 299 1313 388
2006 862 _ 297 1260 539
2007 731 _ 297 1127 576
2008 1019 _ 298 1536 507
2009 685 400 300 1674 1365
2010 756 700 288 1983 1595
Total 8138 1100 2154 12562 6038
275 Www.Sassi.org/wp.content/uploads/2012/05/SASSI-Policy-Brief.Pdf.accessed on June 5, 2015, 3. 276 Ibid, 4.
144
Centre for global development is a renowned international think tank that keeps track of foreign economic aid around the world. It has also published the data containing details of aid provided by the US to Pakistan. Its sources are official figures from different US aid agencies and US government departments.277
Table.4. Total Economic and Military Assistance 2002-2010
Year Economic Economic Military Coalition Total Aid Assistance Assistance Support Fund Assistance through US Total Total aid
2002 937.34 744.74 1739.7 1386.06 2677.04
2003 377.93 284.81 1760.23 1450.98 2138.16
2004 406.12 316.56 891.39 794.11 1297.51
2005 490.42 374.04 1397.06 1050.15 1887.48
2006 689.43 488.46 1246.1 916.13 1935.53
2007 688.62 498.91 1079.72 755.74 1768.34
2008 614.48 392.05 1378.32 1014.9 1992.8
2009 1353.65 1076.25 1114.26 685 2467.91
2010 1867.13 1529.53 2524.61 1230.5 4391.74
Total 7425.12 5705.35 13131.39 9273.57 20556.31
4.2. Socio Economic Relations of Pakistan and United States after
9/11
Pakistan-US relations had seen many ups and downs since independence. International relations every country has its own national interests; same is the case with Pakistan-
US relations. It was due to Afghanistan that the US had come close to Pakistan. Both
277 Www.Sassi.org/wp.content/uploads/2012/05/SASSI-Policy-Brief.Pdf.accessed on June 5, 2015, 5.
145
the countries came close to fulfill their needs.278The September 11 incident brought good news for the fragile economy of Pakistan due to her readiness to cooperate with the US in the war on terror. “President Bush used emergency provisions to commit 100 million dollars in economic assistance to Pakistan. Congress subsequently passed legislation to waive in respect of the Pakistan legal restriction on the provision of assistance to a state where a democratic government have been overthrown by a military coup, sanctions imposed for violations of the MTCR, and provisions restricting assistance to state which were in arrears in debt payments. Washington had also rescheduled 379 million dollars of bilateral debt and favor of new IMF loans to
Pakistan.”
In June 2003, “Bush and Musharraf reached an agreement for the US to provide
Pakistan with 3 billion dollars in assistance over the five year period from 2005-2009.
The US also pledged to provide over 510 million dollars in earthquake relief and reconstruction assistance. In May 2005, Pakistan and the US began a Strategic
Economic Partnership Dialogue to strengthen economic and trade relations as well as integration of South Asia Central Asia. Talking to the reporters after her meeting with the Pakistani PM Shaukat Aziz, Josette Shiner, the US Under Secretary of Economics,
Business and Agricultural Affairs, said that the US government had also allocated 40 million dollars for the construction of bridges and roads from Tajikistan to Pakistan through Afghanistan so that investment could be transported efficiently. She further said that most of the issues regarding the bilateral treaty had been settled and the remaining would be resolved by mutual benefit.”
278 Farooq Hasnat, Interview by the researcher, November 19, 2015. F. C College, Lahore.
146
On June 15, 2006 the government of the US and Pakistan signed an agreement that provided “200 million dollars in direct US budget support for Pakistan’s Federal
Public Sector Development Program (PSDP), 2006-2007. In June 2006, the World
Bank approved a new Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) for Pakistan, covering 2006 to 2009, based on a flexible lending program of up to 6.5 billion dollars, with the year
(2006) lending totaling 1.5 billion dollars. The strategy was designed to help Pakistan achieve its development goals, with the immediate priority being the impact of the
October 2005 earthquake. Up to 1 billion dollars used to support reconstruction and recovery with 840 million dollars already approved. In addition, based on the Pakistan government’s priorities for sustaining growth and poverty reduction, the increase in lending will be primarily in infrastructure mainly energy, water and transport and human development.”
On August 1, 2006, the Government of Pakistan and the US signed an agreement to help Pakistan expand its economy. “The agreement was part of the US Government’s fiscal year economic growth assistance package to Pakistan worth more than US 73 million dollars. The bilateral agreement for USAID’s Economic Growth commits 13.7 million dollars in support for 2006. The funding enabled USAID to provide over
130,000 loans to micro and small businesses in all four provinces and FATA, continues support to promising industries throughout Pakistan, and enables assistance to more than 50.000 farmers in drought-affected areas of Balochistan with new seeds, livestock and irrigation systems.”
1. United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
The USAID is the US Government agency which is primarily responsible for administering civilian foreign aid. President John F. Kennedy created USAID from its
147 predecessor agencies in 1961 by Executive Order. USAID's programs are authorized by the Congress in the Foreign Assistance Act, which the Congress supplements through the directions in annual funding appropriation acts and other legislation.
USAID Program announced by Bush following his meeting with President Musharraf,
14 February 2002 (Extracts)279 included the following:
a. Debt relief: The US agreed to provide Pakistan with roughly 1 billion
dollars in debt relief in the financial year 2003.
b. Democracy assistance: Support for the October 2002 legislative
elections in Pakistan. 2 million dollars for technical support, including
the training of election commissioners, domestic observers and political
party monitors and the provision of election commodities was
announced.
c. Strengthening education: Bush announced 34 million dollars for the
ESP in 2002, the beginning of a multi-year, 100 million dollars
program Pakistan to assist in education strengthening and reform. This
initiative was supported by multiple US government agencies, including
USAID and the Departments of State, Labor and Education. First year
of 28 million dollars program focused on curriculum development,
teaching, training and information technology diffusion in Baluchistan
and Sindh provinces..280
279USAID Program announced by President George Bush following his meeting with President Musharraf, 14 February 2002 (Extracts), Rashmi Jain, ed., The United States and Pakistan, 275. 280USAID Program announced by President George Bush following his meeting with President Musharraf, 14 February 2002 (Extracts), Rashmi Jain, ed., The United States and Pakistan. 276.
148
The USAID launched the Balochistan component of its five years, 60 million dollars nationwide program on child spacing called ‘Family Advancement for Life and Health
(FALAH) in Quetta. Kay L. Anske, Consul General, US Consulate Karachi, said,
“The 2007 Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey
Preliminary Report indicate that almost 50 percent of
families who have one child went for two or more years
before having the next child, FALAH will help them
spacing the birth of their children”.281
The US government on February 14, 2007, agree to allocate 16.7 million dollars to
Pakistan for the provision of “safe drinking water in 31 selected districts/agencies of all the four provinces, including the earthquake-affected areas of NWFP (now KPK),
FATA and Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK). The Acting Deputy administrator of
USAID, James R. Kunder, inaugurated the nationwide project at a ceremony held at the government Girls High School, Sector III in Rawalpindi.” 282 Furthering its commitment towards humanitarian assistance in the flood affected regions of Pakistan, the USAID and its Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) provided a grant of
1.6 million dollars to bring emergency relief to communities affected by Cyclone
Yemyin that hit Balochistan and Sindh provinces in late June 2007. The 1.6 million dollars assistance package was in addition to 390.000 dollars provided in early July that provided relief to over 11,000 households in the Balochistan districts of Bolan,
Lasbela, Jhal Magsi, Jafferabad and Naseerabad.283
281 Megan Ellis, “USAID Birth Spacing Program launched in Baluchistan,” Khabr-o-Nazar, July 2008, 12. 282 Elizabeth Colton, “USAID launches 16.7 million dollars safe drinking water project”, Khabr-o-Nazar, April 2007, 10. 283 Elizabeth Colton, “USAID provides additional 1.6 million dollars for flood victims in Balochistan”, Khabr-o-Nazar, September 2007, 9.
149
A USAID funded project working in support of improved maternal and newborn health, donated 19 purposely-built ambulances worth 45 million rupees for maternal health care in Pakistan. An agreement to this effect was signed in Islamabad on
October 30, 2007 which was witnessed by the Federal Secretary for Health,
Khushnood Akhtar Lashari, and USAID’s Director Health, Mary Sakrie. 284 ”The
USAID allocated more than 72,000 dollars’ worth of personal protective equipment, decontamination and laboratory tools, and poultry testing kits to help Pakistan respond to and contain outbreaks of Avian Influenza.” The equipment was part of the 1.5 billion dollars in aid that the US Government agreed to provide to Pakistan over five years to improve economic growth, education, health and governance and to assist with earthquake reconstruction.285 The US, through the USAID and the UN World
Food Program in Pakistan, signed an agreement valued at 8.4 million dollars to help ease Pakistan’s food crisis. US Ambassador to Pakistan Anne W. Patterson speaking at the launching ceremony on September 18, 2008 in Islamabad said that “this program will benefit thousands of Pakistanis” affected by the rising price of basic food items.286
2. HIV AIDS
HIV is an increasing health concern in Pakistan with the number of cases growing.
Moderately high drug use and lack of acceptance that non-marital sex is common in the society have allowed the AIDS epidemic to take hold in Pakistan, mainly among injection drug users, and repatriated migrant workers. AIDS may yet become a major
284 Elizabeth Colton, “On behalf of the people of the United States Pakistan gets 19 Ambulances for Maternal Healthcare”, Khabr-o-Nazar, December 2007, 15.
285 Elizabeth Colton, “USAID donates equipment to fight spread of Avian Influenza in Pakistan”, Khabr- o-Nazar, January 2008, 9. 286 ELou Fintor, “Food crisis in Pakistan US Progress 8.4 million grant in food Aid”, Khabr-o-Nazar, October 2008, 10-11.
150 health issue. Pakistan’s response to HIV/AIDS began in 1987 with the establishment of a Federal Committee on AIDS by the Ministry of health.
Pakistan is a low prevalence and high risk country for HIV, AIDS, where the disease has become an epidemic concentrated among intravenous drug users. “The USAID launched a 2.7 million dollars program to support the Government of Pakistan in the fight against HIV/AIDS. The program aimed to educate 27000 individuals at high risk to HIV/AIDS through community outreach activities, provide treatment for 2000 cases of sexually transmitted infections and provide care and support to 600 individuals living with HIV/AIDS and their families. All these activities directly supported the ministry of Health’s National HIV/AIDS Control Program.287 US Ambassador Anne
W. Patterson and NWFP (now KPK) Governor Owais Ahmed Ghani reviewed support managed by the USAID in FATA and across Pakistan “including 20 million dollars’ worth of projects” in the health sector. During the meeting the Ambassador and the
Governor also discussed more than 20 million dollars’ worth of support to the FATA being provided by the US Government to improve mother and child health, renovate health facilities, train skilled health workers, increase access to clean drinking water, and spread of infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS.” Support for better health in
Pakistan was part of 1.5 billion dollars in aid that the US Government had provided to
Pakistan over five years to improve economic growth, education, health, and governance and to assist with earthquake reconstruction.288
3. Anti-Narcotics Force
The past three decades have witnessed the massive proliferation and production of alcohol and other illicit psychotropic substances like heroin and cocaine in Pakistan.
287 Daily Times, July 26, 2006. 288 Elizabeth Colton, “Ambassador Patterson reviews 20 million dollar for health projects with NWFP Governor Ghani”, Khabr-o-Nazar, April 2008, 17.
151
The government has instituted a series of measures to address the situation. However, the formulation of a comprehensive drug abuse control strategy demanded a realistic assessment of the scope of the problem. “The US helped Pakistan counter drug trafficking. While addressing the US Embassy’s Narcotics Affairs Section sponsored by the Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF) at Islamabad Club, Ryan C. Crocker, US
Ambassador to Pakistan, said that the US would provide 8.2 million dollars for the expansion of ANF by the end of the year 2006. This amount was in addition to 12 million dollars, which the US government had already provided to the Interior
Ministry of Pakistan. Other assistance which the US government is providing includes: operational support, equipment and training to the Pakistan forces deployed at the
Afghan border, including the Frontier Corps and the ANF.”
Since 2002, the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs (INL) had been supporting Pakistan’s Borders Security Project by training border forces, providing vehicles and surveillance and communications equipment, transferring helicopters and fixed wing aircraft to the Interior Ministry’s
Air Wing and road building in the western tribal areas. Congress funded such programs with more than 54 million dollars for fiscal year 2006.289
4. Education
The US through USAID, is helping millions of Pakistani children and young adults rise as far as their hard work and initiative will take them. “The United States and
Pakistan place a priority on ensuring Pakistan has an educated population prepared for the 21st century workforce. The United States fully supported the measure taken by the Musharraf government, and pledged aid for those policies.” In March 2002, US
289 Daily Times, July 26, 2006.
152
State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher said “It is our desire to support the changes and reforms that President Musharraf has announced in terms of his moving
Pakistan toward a more modern and moderate course where education plays a very key role. A lot of US aid money that’s going to Pakistan will be used to help with the education system”.
The Bush administration had indicated that United States policy goal in South Asia had been to ‘combat terror and the conditions that breed terror in the Frontline states of
Afghanistan and Pakistan’.” It also contended that “education was absolutely crucial to
Pakistan’s development as a moderate, democratic nation”. The 9/11 Commission
Report recommended a long term US commitment to provide comprehensive support for Pakistan, including in the area of improving education. 34 million dollars for the
Educational Support Program in 2002, the beginning of a multi-year, 100 million dollars program Pakistan to assist in education strengthening and reform. This initiative was supported by multiple US government agencies, including USAID and the Departments of State, Labor and Education. First year of 28 million dollars program focuses on curriculum development, teaching, training and information technology diffusion in Balochistan and Sindh provinces.” The US Department of
Education provided 800,000 dollars in grants to assist school districts in using technology to promote educational exchanges between schools in the Pakistan and US through the Friendship through Education project, whose private- sector members were also to invest their own 650,000 dollars toward Pakistan-US schools connections.290
290 Rashmi Jain, ed., The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2006, .275-276.
153
While addressing a gathering of students, teachers and parents in Pakistan in July
2006, the then US Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker said that to support Pakistanis studying in the US, the two governments had increased funding for the Pakistan US
Students Full Bright Scholarship Program, giving it a budget of over 30 million dollars a year and making it the largest program in the world in terms of funding.291
Speaking at the Kinnaird College for Women in Lahore, on March 5, 2007,
Ambassador Crocker said,
“Women play a vital role in shaping their societies, from
participating in civil society and government to raising
families, to having an active voice in the media, to
running their own business”.292
He further said that the issuance of student visas to Pakistanis had been increased by
20 percent from previous year 2005. While addressing, the 4th Full Bright Alumni
Conference at the Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad, on April 28, 2007, the US
Charged Affairs, Peter W. Bodde, said that over 200 Pakistanis were studying in
America under the Full Bright Scholarship Program. A similar number of Full Bright
Grantees would be proceeding for the scholarship in 2007.
The government’s ESR plan relies heavily on donors. The aftermath of the attacks of
11 September 2001, has seen a heavy influx of international funds to the education sector. Major donors include USAID, the government of Japan, UNICEF, the
Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), the Asian Development
291 Daily Times, July 25, 2006. 292 Elizabeth Colton, “Ambassador Crocker encourages Women to play vital role in society”, Khabr-o-
Nazar, March 2007, 14.
154
Bank, and the World Bank. “The USAID had funded extensive social programs throughout the FATA region. In FATA, USAID had built and furnished 65 primary, middle and high schools. The USAID also supports teacher training. In public health
USAID had worked to improve the treatment of tuberculosis and eradicate polio throughout KPK. A pilot program in the Districts of KPK has improved maternal and newborn health through the preparation of better trained community midwives and upgraded treatment facilities.” On August 1, 2006, the Government of Pakistan and the
United States signed a Memorandum of understanding to allow the Competitiveness
Support Fund to partner with the Higher Education Commission in support of initiates that promote knowledge-based economic development and ensure long term economic growth.293
The US Embassy’s Deputy Chief of Mission, Peter W. Bodde, said that “there is nothing nobler than the pursuit of strengthening bilateral relationship through academic and scholarly exchange”. “He was speaking at the inauguration of the 2007 conference of the American Institute of Pakistan Studies (AIPS) in Islamabad on
January 19, 2007. The American diplomat said that AIPS is increasing the richness of people-to-people exchange between the US and Pakistan and promoting the scholarly pursuit of a region vital to the US. “This is an excellent example of how ties between
Pakistan and the US continue to deepen and widen.” The current Pakistan-US relationship is not exclusively focused on security and the War on Terror,” he remarked.294
The USAID Mission Director for Pakistan Anne Aarnes
had re-affirmed that the US continues its “partnership
293 Nazir Ahmad, Interview by the Researcher, April 17, 2015. 294 Elizabeth Colton, “US for strengthening Bilateral Relationship through academic, scholarly exchange”, Khabr-o-Nazar, January 2007, 20.
155
with the government in supporting the worthwhile task
of raising the quality of education in Pakistan.”
The US Director of Foreign Assistance and Administrator of the USAID, Henrietta H.
Fore, and Federal Minister for Education Ahsan Iqbal launched a 90 million dollars project to strengthen basic education in Pakistan. Since 2002, USAID has provided more than a quarter of a billion dollars to reform and revitalize the Pakistan’s educational system.295
5. Good Governance and Promotion of Democracy
On August 2006, the United States and Pakistan signed a 22.1 million dollars agreement to strengthen parliamentary institutions, improve electoral processes and advance Pakistan’s devolution process. “The U.S. agreed to fund USAID programs which are implemented in cooperation with governmental and non-governmental organizations. The USAID funds were also used to strengthen the Election
Commission of Pakistan’s ability to implement credible election in 2007 by assisting with the creation of computerized voter rolls, providing transparent ballot boxes, and facilitating dialogue between the Election Commission and Political Parties.” The broad-based relationship between the US and Pakistan represents “a series of long- term commitment to progress and peace”,
Ambassador Patterson observed that all nations base their foreign policy on national interests.
“For us, the Pakistan-US long-term relationship means
to reduce terrorist threat and to help in making a strong,
295 Elizabeth Colton, “USAID Launches 90 million dollar project to improve education in Pakistan”,
Khabr-o-Nazar, June 2008, 13.
156
democratic, prosperous Pakistan. I believe this
relationship will also yield substantial benefits for your
country: more two-way trade, more US investment, and
stronger people-to-people contacts”.296
6. Earthquake relief Funding
The 2005 Kashmir earthquake occurred at 08:50:39 Pakistan Standard Time on
October 8, in the Pakistani territory of Azad Kashmir. It was centered near the city of
Muzaffarabad and also affected KPK The severity of the damage caused by the earthquake is attributed to severe up thrust. The destruction and loss of life in Pakistan were massive, the US responded rapidly and robustly. “In response to the request of
Musharraf and the Government of Pakistan, the US provided an initial contribution of up to 50 million dollars for relief and reconstruction following the earthquake that struck on October 8, 2005. The Department of Defense also provided additional assistance and capabilities. Pakistan's initial request included emergency shelter, food, water and medical supplies, transportation assets, and emergency management personnel.”
The material assistance provided by US included the following”
a. Emergency Relief Supplies
A C-17 US military aircraft containing blankets, winterized tents, and other
relief supplies was scheduled to arrive in Islamabad on October 10. A second
296Elizabeth Colton, “U.S. Pakistan relationship represents long term commitments to progress Peace”,
Khabr-o-Nazar, October 2007, 5.
157
C-17 and two C-130s are scheduled to arrive in Pakistan on October 11 and
other military relief missions were followed.
b. Transportation Assets
Initially, eight US military helicopters (five CH-47 Chinooks and three UH-60
Blackhawks) to assist in bringing emergency relief to communities and villages affected by the earthquake arrived. Some of the most severe damage from the earthquake had sustained in remote areas not easily accessible by road. The helicopters facilitated the delivery of relief supplies to these remote areas in Pakistan. Additional capabilities for damage assessment, heavy lift ground equipment, and medical support were being identified and dispatched from within the Central Command region.
c. Emergency Management Assistance
A seven-person Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) began arriving in
Pakistan on October 10. The team's mission was to assess humanitarian needs, assist with targeting and coordination of US assistance, and provide technical assistance as needed. A 23-member Contingency Support Group from MacGuire Air Force Base was en route and involved in planning and logistics support. The United States Central
Command had also supplied capabilities for damage assessment to assist the Pakistani authorities.297
Over 1,000 American personnel were in Pakistan to assist with relief efforts.
American helicopters had flown over 3,300 sorties delivering over 10 million
pounds of relief supplies to the disaster area and transporting over 15,000
297 Statement on U.S. Assistance for Earthquake in Pakistan. http://georgewbush- whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/10/20051009-1.html
158
people, including over 4,000 needing medical attention.
Over 250 US military and civilian cargo airlift flights had delivered more than
7000 tons of medical supplies, food, shelter material, blankets, and rescue
equipment to Pakistan.
A 125-person Naval Mobile Construction Battalion was working to clear debris
and to build support structures at camps for displaced persons.
A US Army Mobile Army Surgical Hospital operating in Muzaffarabad and a
US Combined Medical Relief Team operating in Shinkaria had provided urgent
medical care to over 9,000 injured people.
d. Private Sector Engagement
US private charitable donations to earthquake assistance have totaled 73
million dollars. These contributions continue to be extremely important in
helping Pakistan recover from this devastating disaster.298
At a ceremony organized by the USAID in Islamabad, US Ambassador Ryan C.
Crocker announced that the US, through the USAID, will provide more than 13 million dollars for earthquake transition activities and had committed 6.5 million dollars towards four projects. The ceremony launched the next step in US support for earthquake efforts.299
298U.S. Department of State Fact Sheet on U.S. Response to Pakistan’s Earthquake disaster, 12 December 2005 (Extracts), Rashmi Jain, ed., The United States and Pakistan, 288-289.
299Press release of the US Embassy in Pakistan on provision of 13 million dollars for earthquake activates, 7 April 2006 (Extract). Rashmi Jain, ed., The United States and Pakistan, 292-293.
159
Following the October earthquake on October 8, 2005, USAID funded extensive relief and transition programs in earthquake affected districts of KPK. “USAID launched its reconstruction program by beginning construction of new schools for both boys and girls in Dadar. Pakistan was devastated by one of the most powerful and deadly earthquakes in modern times. More than 140,000 people were killed or injured in the disaster. The earthquake left 3 million people homeless; hundreds of thousands of children were left without schools. More than a million jobs were wiped out. There were many difficult months and years ahead for the Pakistani people and the immediate danger faced was the winter snow which made relief efforts in Kashmir difficult. In some places it was impossible to reach even by helicopter. Armed Forces played a significant role in relief operations in the earthquake zone. Immediately after the disaster struck, the United States offered Pakistan 156 million dollars in aid. US deployed 950 soldiers as well as 24 helicopters. US Army mobile surgical hospital was also under available in Muzzafarabad, providing medical care to thousands of quake victims.” On May 19, 2006, USAID launched earthquake reconstruction program of
200 million dollars for Schools, clinics and livelihoods. USAID sets itself to begin the implementation phase of its four year 300 million dollar Reconstruction Program.300
7. The Socio-economic and Political Landscape of Pakistan after
9/11
The socio-economic and political landscape of Pakistan underwent drastic changes after Pakistan decided, though somewhat willy-nilly, to join US war on terrorism.
After the Bush administration implicated Bin Laden in the 9/11 terrorist attacks, “the
300Pakistan’s recovery from Earthquakes, November 18, 2005, accessed on February 11, 2016, https://www.congress.gov/crec/2005/11/18/CREC-2005-11-18-pt1-PgS13308.pdf
160
US mounted pressure on Islamabad to clamp down on the latter’s support base as there was a general impression that the Taliban, who had given sanctuary to Osama, traced its roots to Pakistan, which had been promoted during Benazir Bhutto’s premiership.
Pakistan found itself deprived of any middle ground as there was a clear message from
Washington to the reluctant allies that either they were with the US or against it.
Mindful of the most devastating scenarios as a result of not complying with the hyper power, Pakistan quickly had to make up its mind on which side of the fence did it really belong.” The then US Secretary of the State, Colin Powell, stated that:
“The US would seek Pakistan’s cooperation in tracking
down the culprits, Musharraf pledged full cooperation to
the Bush administration in combating terrorism. We
strongly condemned this barbaric act of terrorism, which
will live in memory as a most heinous crime against
humanity. I wish to assure Bush and the US Government
our unstinted cooperation in the fight against
terrorism”.301
4.3. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), War on Terrorism and
Pakistan
The relationship between Pakistan and the US has largely been dependent on the geostrategic value of the region; in other words, the Pakistani-US relationship has failed to be steadfast. Pakistani officials are cognizant of this fact and the Pakistanis have not appreciated being US’ "fair-weather friend". Nevertheless, the opportunity for Pakistan to renew closeness with the US was sure to result in significant economic
301Transcript of joint press conference of President Musharraf and Secretary of State Powell at Islamabad, 16 October 2001. Rashmi Jain, ed., The United States and Pakistan, 168.
161 dividends for Pakistan. At the same time, this renewed closeness also entailed significant political challenges and costs for Pakistan.
Pakistan’s involvement in the US war on terrorism created many domestic and regional challenges including low domestic support for American military involvement in the region, the threat of rise in Islamic fundamentalism involvement in the region, and the possibility for political unrest among Pashtuns who shared kinship with the majority of Afghans. “These were potentially unsettling political consequences for a weak Pakistani regime, such as Musharraf's, to bear. Similarly, the regional consequences of supporting the overthrow of the Taliban regime included a strengthened Iran and India. Removing the Taliban and invariably strengthening the political and military position of the Northern Alliance had the potential to strengthen the Alliance's prime supporters of Iran and India. The regional dynamics of strengthening these other regional powers challenged Pakistan's national interests.”
Musharraf claimed that his support for the US was in the interest of Pakistan: preserving Pakistan's nuclear program to balance Indian supremacy.302
The reasons for joining the US-led war in Afghanistan, “Musharraf publicly stated, were to protect against an external threat (namely India), to preserve Pakistan's nuclear and missile assets, to revive Pakistan's economy, and to promote the Kashmir cause.
In large part, a Pakistan's contribution to the war on terror was the help it provided in defeating Afghanistan's Taliban regime. Pakistan contributed tactical and logistical support for America. Pakistan provided access to strategic military bases and to
Pakistani airspace and provided intelligence. Pakistan also agreed to close and to secure the Afghan-Pakistani border to stop the infiltration of extremists into
Afghanistan and to trap Al-Qaeda and Taliban members within Afghanistan. Pakistani
302 Bessma Momani, “The IMF, the U. S. War on Terrorism, and Pakistan,” 43.
162 authorities arrested and handed over hundreds of individuals who were associated with the Taliban regime, Al-Qaeda, and other extremist organizations and whom the United
States wanted to question. Moreover, the Pakistani government banned extremist religious groups that were on the US list of terrorist organizations.”
For the US, the perceived benefit of having the Pakistani on its side was that the cooperation further legitimized their geopolitical involvement in the region. It was important that Pakistan was a fellow Muslim and neighboring states and a former ally of Afghanistan. The Bush administration believed Pakistan’s support of its war on terrorism would signal to the world that the US was not an enemy of Islam and
Muslim states. The US approached the Pakistani regime with offers of numerous rewards if they joined the US campaign to overthrow the Taliban. One reward was legitimizing Musharraf's autocratic and military rule, and even Congress began to praise Musharraf's leadership. The US was also prepared to give Musharraf tangible economic benefits for joining the US-led coalition.303
4.4. The United States Courted Pervez Musharraf with Economic
Rewards
First, the US removed three different economic sanctions that had been imposed on
Pakistan for testing and acquiring its nuclear arsenal: namely “the Symington
Amendment (imposed in 1978), the Pressler Amendment (1990), and the Glenn
Amendment (1998). The Glen Amendment required that the US government reject loan applications of countries, such as Pakistan, that are on the US sanction’s list.
Removal of the Glenn Amendment along with the other sanctions, allowed the Bush administration to reward Pakistan handsomely.”
303 Ibid, 44.
163
This bill, made into law, allowed the President to continue dispensing a number of economic incentives to Pakistan. Second, the US had promised Pakistan approximately
1.2 billion dollars in US foreign assistance from 2002-2003, including development aid administered by the USAID and more than 600 million dollars in cash transfers to be given directly to the Pakistani government to pay international debts. The US also promised military and security aid for Pakistan to update and modernize its air force.
This level of security and economic foreign assistance from the US to Pakistan was the greatest amount of aid given since the end of the cold war.304
Third, “the US agreed to reschedule a 379 million dollars bilateral debt through the
Paris Club and to examine initiatives to reschedule other outstanding bilateral debt.
This initial rescheduling lifted the Brooke Sanctions imposed on Pakistan by the US for failing to make its principal and interest payments on outstanding US loans. The
US also agreed to support rescheduling Pakistan's 12.5 billion dollars bilateral debt with Paris Club members, of which 2.9 billion dollars were owed to the US and 5.3 billion dollars were owed to Japan. Pakistan wanted to reschedule its debt on more generous terms than giving previously under the Houston Terms (Paris Club debt repayment for a 15 year plus term with generous concessional rates and debt swaps).
American support of this move proved essential in negotiations with the informal group of creditors. The US wields significant influence in the Paris Club and its support for lenient rescheduling terms for Pakistan influenced other creditors to follow suit.”
Fourth, the US gave Pakistan several trade concessions. The US agreed to lower its tariffs and quota restrictions on Pakistani textile goods, specifically on imports of
Pakistani cotton-yarn products. Textiles account for the top ten Pakistani commodities
304 U.S. Aid and Terrorists, June 16, 2004, accessed on February 11, 2016, https://www.congress.gov/crec/2004/06/16/CREC-2004-06-16-pt1-PgS6874.pdf
164 exported to the US. The Senate and House authorized the President to "proclaim such reduction or suspension of any existing duty on imports of textiles and textile products that are produced or manufactured in Pakistan as he determines to be appropriate in response to the threat to national security posed by international terrorism".
“Removing trade quota restrictions on Pakistani goods was now deemed to be in the interest of US national security. This move marked a complete reversal of US trade policy: In 1998, the United States charged Pakistan with dumping combed cotton-yam exports to its markets and subsequently took its complaint to the World Trade
Organization's Textiles Monitoring Body (TMB). After failing to convince the TMB, the United States continued to impose quota restrictions on these Pakistani goods.
Other trade benefits given to Pakistan included, allowing a significant number of duty- free Pakistani goods to enter the United States under the General System of
Preferences (GSP) program.” The GSP applied for 13.5 million dollars in trade. In sum, the US offered Pakistan numerous economic benefits to join the war on terrorism.305
In FYs 2002–2010 (and not including commitments such as the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009), the US gave Pakistan almost 19 billion dollars, or more than 2 billion dollars on average each year, with twice as much allocated in 2010 (3.6 billion dollars) than in 2007. Over the period of 2002–2008, only 10 percent of this money “was explicitly for Pakistani development,” and as much as “75 percent of the money was explicitly for military purposes.” In more recent years the share of economic-related aid has risen, but it is still less than half.
Unlike military aid, economic-related US aid to Pakistan had been a much lower share of total aid until 2009. The primary purpose of aid to Pakistan has been
305Bessma Momani, “The IMF, the U. S. War on Terrorism, and Pakistan”, 45.
165 counterterrorism, not economic support, the building of schools and hospitals, or development, broadly defined. Twenty-five percent of total aid between 2001 and
2008 was allocated for economic and development assistance, including food aid.
Some 5.8 billion dollars of US aid were spent in FATA, the focus of most counterterrorism and counterinsurgency activity in Pakistan. Ninety-six percent of those funds were directed toward military operations, and only 1 percent toward development.306
In addition, “losses to Pakistan’s economy associated with 9/11 and the Afghan crisis were estimated at 2.5 to 3 billion dollars. Public debt was 802 billion in 1990 which increased to 2971 billion by mid-1999. Similarly, external debt almost doubled during the period 1990-98. From a stock of 22 billion dollars in 1990, it increased to almost
43 billion dollars (including foreign currency deposits of almost 11 billion dollars) by
1998. Moreover, the country was burdened with additional external debt obligations of
21 billion dollars in 8 years.307 Thus, after the incident of 9/11 the US not only bailed out Pakistan, but also lifted sanctions that were imposed in response to Pakistan’s nuclear test (1998) and military takeover (1999). Pakistan’s support for the coalition opened up new vistas for enhanced economic cooperation with the US, Europe, Japan, and other countries of the region. So, the US has realized the importance of Pakistan and taken the following steps which have long-term implications on the Pakistan U.S. relations:”
Waived and suspended sanctions, 1 billion dollars provided as debt relief; 600 million dollars transferred in cash for balance of payments support; USAID mission reopened;
300 million dollars line of credit provided for investment promotion as well as an
306 S Akbar Zaidi. “Why Musharraf Succeeds”. Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 42, No.4 (Jan 27-Feb 2, 2007).268-289. 307 The News, June 6, 2005.
166 unspecified amount of Export-Import Bank coverage; 73 million dollars program started for border security assistance; Paris Club creditor nations assisted to negotiate a highly concessional debt rescheduling programmer for bilateral debt; 3 billion dollars cash support paid since 2001 and more in process; 3 billion dollars previous loans written off. Interest on these loans would have been 200 million dollar a year; and 750 million dollars assistance package for FATA’s socio-economic development.308.
Pakistani textiles have been given greater access to the US market and the IMF negotiated a new loan package for the country. “International aid was pledged to provide a total of 3 billion dollars, including grants, write-offs of bilateral debt and humanitarian assistance. So, the US economic assistance and financial help pushed
Pakistan’s economy to grow by 6.4 per cent and raised the country’s foreign reserves to 12.7 billion dollars compared to 1 billion dollars in 2001.309 Pakistan received another 1.7 billion dollars from international financial institutions backed by the US and 700 million dollars per annum in bilateral assistance. In 2002, the US led Paris
Club efforts to reschedule Pakistan’s debt on generous terms and in April 2003 US reduced Pakistan’s bilateral official debt by 1 billion dollars. Pakistan requested additional debt reduction and about 500 million dollars more in bilateral debt was reduced in financial year 2004. Bush also provided 3 billion dollars aid package to
Pakistan in the shape of aid over five years—or 600 million dollars per year— beginning in fiscal year 2005. For the first of these five years, Bush requested the US
Congress for an additional 100 million dollars for a total of approximately 700 million dollars in 2005 which included the following development assistance: 150 million dollars for various USAID development programs, Approximately 50 million dollars
308Daily Times, April 29, 2008. 309Dawn, October 7, 2001.
167 to enhance border security, law enforcement development, counter-narcotics and non- proliferation, 300 million dollars in military and security aid; and 2 million dollars for military education and training. The Pakistan-US Economic Dialogue was held under the co-chairmanship of Pakistan’s Minister of Finance, Revenue, Economic Affairs, and Statistics, Syed Naveed Qamar, and US Assistant Secretary of State for Economic,
Energy and Business Affairs Daniel S. Sallivan. The Dialogue sought to deepen the
Pakistan-US economic partnership and further develop a long-term, broad-based economic relationship that mutually benefits the citizens of our two countries.” The two sides discussed a wide-ranging agenda, including macroeconomic policy, labor, intellectual property rights, energy, agricultural cooperation, eliminating terrorism finance networks, Reconstruction Opportunity Zones, a GOP scholarship proposal, foreign assistance and FATA development, regional cooperation and transit trade, private sector cooperation, and a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT).310
4.5. Sanctioned waived and Economic aid 2001-2007:an Overview
Pakistan was under four sets of sanctions at the time of terrorist attacks. As a result of
Pakistan’s support in the war on terrorism, the Bush administration removed all nuclear related economic sanctions on September 22, 2001 and provided military and economic assistance. “The main challenge posed by the ongoing war on terror to
Pakistan relates to its substantial financial and economic cost. Pakistan’s pivotal role in this war has been a costly affair. Besides turning away the foreign investors and slowing down the domestic economic activity due to political uncertainty, the global war on terror has imposed adversely impacting on the flow of direct foreign investment into the country, Islamabad is estimated to have lost about 2 billion dollars
310 Lou Fintor, “Joint Communiqué: United States-Pakistan Economic Dialogue” Khabr-o-Nazar, September 2008, 8.
168 in export earnings due to cancellation of orders. Pakistan’s average annual export earnings are estimated to be 8 billion dollars during the financial year 2001 as against the annual average of 10.2 billion dollars. These financial losses, however, have been more than offset by some positive outcomes of 9/11 for Pakistan.” These gains include the following:
Foreign exchange reserves raised above 12.6 billion dollars by the end of fiscal 2003-
04, up from mere 1 billion dollars in 1999, Exports grew by 20 per cent crossing 11 billion dollars for the first time ever, “as quota restrictions on Pakistani textiles were waived by the US and EU. Home remittances grew 00 per cent since September 11, reaching 4 billion dollars, the highest ever, and equivalent to more than 5 per cent of
GDP, Debt-scheduling agreement between Paris Club donors and Pakistan worth 12.5 billion dollars, which was nearly one third of the total external debt of the country in
2001.311 The provision of 3 billion dollars in US economic assistance to Pakistan coupled with a debt write-off worth 495.3 million dollars.”
In October 2001, substantial US aid began flowing into Pakistan. Direct assistance program included aid for health, education, food, “democracy promotion,” child labor elimination, counter-narcotics, border security and law enforcement, as well as trade preference benefits. The US also supported grant, loan, and debt rescheduling programs for Pakistan by the various major international financial institutions. During his visit to Islamabad on October 16, 2001, Secretary of State, Colin Powell was
311 Pervez Musharraf, Interview by Iftikhar Ahmad, Geo TV Channel, 2006, accessed on March 26, 2013.
169 effusive in acknowledging Musharraf’s “bold and courageous action” against
“international terrorism”.312
In the spring of 2002, “US military and law enforcement personnel began engaging in direct, low-profile efforts to assist Pakistani security forces in tracking and apprehending fugitive Al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters on Pakistani territory. Since then, Pakistan has claimed to have already remanded to US custody more than 700 fugitives. Subsequently, he banned numerous militant groups, including Lashkar-e-
Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad. Both had been blamed for terrorist violence in
Kashmir and India and were designated as terrorist organizations under US law. In the wake of this policy shift, thousands of Muslim extremists were arrested and detained, though many of them were later released.”
In 2003, a five-year US 3 billion dollars aid package was announced for Pakistan to be disbursed in annual installments of 600 million dollars each commencing from FY
2005, which is split evenly between military and economic aid. Besides extending grants to Pakistan totaling 1 billion dollars during the first three years after 9/11, the
US also wrote off 1 billion dollars in debt. “A framework agreement on trade and investment was signed in June 2003, and the two countries also commenced negotiations on a bilateral investment treaty. On security, the US approved a 1.2 billion dollars arms-sale package that included roughly 950 million dollars for the purchase of P3C Orion aircraft. In June 2004, Bush designated Pakistan as a major non-NATO ally of the US, a move that in all respects was more symbolic than practical. In March 2005, Bush authorized the sale of F-16 fighter jets to Pakistan. This arrangement involves the sale of 18 F-16s in the first instance with Pakistan having an
312Transcript of joint press conference of President Musharraf and Secretary of State Powell at Islamabad, 16 October 2001. Rashmi Jain, ed., The United States and Pakistan, 168.
170 option to purchase a further 18, and an offer to upgrade Pakistan’s existing F-16 fleet.
The US also reinstated a military-training program for Pakistani officers in its military institutions.”
The Department of State313 and Defense publicly acknowledged Pakistan’s role and
“unprecedented” levels of cooperation in terms of allowing the US military access to its air space and bases, helping to identify and detain extremists, and tightening the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. “Top US officials regularly praised
Pakistan’s anti-terrorism efforts. One of them, William Wechsler credited Musharraf with “great courage,” and for making after 9/11, “one of the bravest decisions taken in the past ten years by any foreign leader, which involved from the top down to completely reversing Pakistan’s policy towards the Taliban”. The improved relations, they said, came about because of Musharraf’s actions since the September 11, 2001, attacks assisting with the hunt for bin Laden, cooperating with the investigation into the weapons network of Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan and agreeing to elections in
2007.” Moonis Ahmar said Pakistan has got instability, violence and terrorism in the country, rise of anti-Americanism.in the field of socio-economic by cooperating the
US.314
313 September 11, 2001, accessed on May 2, 2015,www.state.gov/document/organization/10288.pdf. 314 Moonis Ahmar, Interview by the researcher, August 29, 2015. University of the Karachi.
171
CHAPTER 5
Pakistan-United States and the Regional Perspective
5.1. Pakistan United States and Afghanistan in the Regional
Perspective
In the spring of 1999, Musharraf, gained international attention for launching an armed assault on the Kargil in the Indian held Kashmir. In October of the same year, he deposed the elected government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and was widely condemned in the Western capitals for his military coup. However, his image was completely transformed in Western eyes when he took a U-turn in Pakistan’s policy of supporting the Taliban in the neighboring Afghanistan, in the aftermath of the tragic events of September 11, 2001. “In fact, in the beginning Musharraf continued the previous government policy of supporting the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.
Although this policy change earned him a considerable disrepute at home, where a large section of the population supported the Taliban and the majority of the people in
Pakistan opposed the US bombing of Afghanistan. Since Pakistan actively joined the
American war against Al-Qaeda, and the Taliban in Afghanistan, Pakistan took a U- turn in her policy towards the Taliban. Therefore, in reward Pakistan got US economic and military aid.”
After the takeover, Musharraf in his television address on October 17, 1999, announced the following seven-point agenda to be achieved by his regime: (1)
Rebuilding national confidence and morale, (2) Strengthening the federation with the removal of interprovincial disharmony and restoration of national cohesion,(3)
Reviving the economy and restoring investors’ confidence, (4) Ensuring law and order
172 and dispensing speedy justice, (5) Depoliticizing state institutions, (6) Devolution of power to the grassroots level, and (7) Most important, ensuring swift and across- the- board accountability.315
Musharraf promised wide-ranging internal reforms after October 12, 1999, but announced that there would be no change in the foreign policy. “This meant that
Pakistan would carry on the old policy with regard to Kashmir and Afghanistan deemed to have been approved by the army. Therefore, the new military regime in
Pakistan continued the support of the Taliban.316 Internationally, the Taliban regime was further isolated when on 7 December 2000, a resolution in the UNSC was moved from Russia and US asking for strengthening sanctions against the Taliban, including an arms embargo and other measures.” The resolution directed the Taliban to close, within thirty days, all the terrorist camps on its territory and to allow, “strict monitoring of such closures by the UN.”317
Pakistan condemned the draft resolution on the ground that it was discriminatory in nature because it did not include Northern Alliance, which, however, welcomed the draft resolution. “On the issue of terrorist camps, there was considerable support for the Taliban within Pakistani society, especially from the religious and sectarian parties. On Afghanistan, Clinton administration pressurized Musharraf to distance his government from the Taliban. Fearing a backlash among Islamist elements in Pakistan, the general politely demurred.” During his Islamabad meeting with Clinton, Musharraf
315Government of Pakistan, Address to the Nation by Chief Executive Islamic Republic of Pakistan General Pervez Musharraf, Islamabad: Directorate General of Films and Publications Ministry of Information & Media Development Government of Pakistan, December 19, 1999.
316Naeem Ahmed, “General Pervez Musharraf’s Taliban Policy 1999-2008”, Dialogue, vol.5, issue.2 (April-June 2010): 97-98. 317 Dawn, December 8, 2000.
173 reportedly said “that he wanted to be helpful, but stressed how difficult it was to deal with ‘people who believe that God is on their side.”318
Musharraf condemned the 9/11 tragedy as the “most brutal and horrible act of terror” and in his message to Bush had said that the world must unite to fight against terrorism in all its forms and root out this modern-day evil.319 Pakistan eventually negotiated with the US that no combat missions would be carried out from its territory and, instead of blanket over-flight rights, an air corridor was assigned to US planes.
Pakistan was ready to break diplomatic relations with the Taliban government immediately, but the move was delayed on the American advice. The US Assistant
Secretary of State, Christina Rocca, told Ambassador Maleeha Lodhi that Pakistan should keep the diplomatic channel open with the Taliban until the US invasion was completed.320
Chronology of the events of September 11, 2001
08:48 Flight 11, a hijacked American Airlines Boeing 767 with 92 passengers and crew en route from
Boston Logan International Airport to Los Angeles, strikes the north tower of the World Trade Centre.
09:03 Flight 175, a hijacked United Airlines Boeing 767 with 65 passengers and crew en route from
Boston Logan International Airport to Los Angles, hits the south tower of the World Trade Centre.
09:40 Flight 77, a hijacked American Airlines Boeing 757 with 64 passengers and crew en route from
Boston Logan International Airport to Los Angeles, crashes into the west side of the Pentagon, killing an estimated 189 military and civilian personnel inside.
09:45 All government buildings in the capital evacuated; all US airports closed by the authorities, international flights cancelled or diverted to Canada and the Caribbean, the New York Stock Exchange
318 Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies, 357. 319 Dawn, September 12, 2001 320 Zahid. Hussain, Frontline Pakistan the Struggle with Militant Islam, (Islamabad: Vanguard Books (Pvt LTD. 2007), p. 37
174
closed, the National Guard deployed in Washington DC and New York city.
09:50 Caller using White House code words threatens that “Air Force one is next”, President Bush prevented from returning to the capital by the Secret Service due to the “credible threat”.
10:10 Flight 93, a hijacked United Airlines Boeing 757 with 45 passengers and crew en route from
Newark International Airport to San Francisco, crashes 130 km southeast of Pittsburgh in western
Pennsylvania, reportedly after a struggle between hijackers and passengers.
10:29 The north tower of the World Trade Centre collapses.
17:20, World Trade Centre building number seven, a 47 story building adjacent to the ruins of the twin towers, collapses.
19:00 Bush returns to Washington DC from Florida via US Air Force bases in Louisiana and Nebraska.
20:30 Bush delivers a televised address to the nation from the White House.321
Source: “Chronology of the events”. Keesing’s Record of World Events, vol. 47, no.9 (September 11,
2001): 44333,
Musharraf, the military ruler of Pakistan, on September 13, 2001 promised “our fullest cooperation in the fight against terrorism”, an important offer because of the proximity of Pakistan to Afghanistan. However, seeking to avoid the destabilizing effects of possible Pakistani participation in US military attacks on a fellow Muslim country, even if limited to the provision of base facilities and over flying rights, the government of Pakistan embarked upon an urgent diplomatic initiative to persuade the Taliban regime to surrender bin Laden and his closest associates to the US authorities for trial.322
321 “Chronology of the events”. Keesing’s Record of World Events, 47, no.9 (September 2001): 44333,
322 Keesing’s Record of World Events, 46, no.9 (September 2001): 44337.
175
The reclusive leader of the Taliban, Mullah Mohammad Omer, stated on September
14, 2001 that Bin Laden did not have the trained pilots needed for the World Trade
Centre attack and said that:
“Blaming bin Laden without any rhyme or reason is a
move by intelligence agencies to escape their own
failure”.
In a fax to the Afghan Islamic Press (AIP) news agency on September 16, 2001 purportedly from the leader of Al-Qaeda himself, bin Laden congratulated those who had carried out the suicide attacks but denied that he had been involved in their planning or execution.323
Following a stark warning by the Vice President, Dick Cheney on September 16, 2001 that the “full wrath of the US would be unleashed against regimes that harbored terrorists, a Pakistani delegation led by Major General, Faiz Gilani was dispatched to
Kandhar, a Taliban stronghold in southern Afghanistan, on September 17, 2001 to demand that the regime hand over bin Laden to the US or face the possibility of an imminent massive military assault. The US authorities denied that they had attached a specific deadline to the ultimatum conveyed by the Pakistanis. In response to the increasing diplomatic cooperation between the governments of Pakistan and the US, the Afghan Foreign Minister, Wakil Ahmad Mutawakkil threatened on September 16,
2001 that the regime would be “forced to retaliate” against any country that offered the
US the use of airspace or land facilities. In a further development, the Taliban regime discussed with religious leaders the possibility that a jihad could be declared in the
323Ibid, 44337.
176 event of an attack on Afghanistan by the US or other Western countries. It was reported on September 17, 2001 that Mutawakkil had said:
“As regards bin Laden, there has been no shift in our
stance. We are responsible for the security of all those
living in our country”.
General Mahmood arrived in Kandhar on September 17, 2001, and met with Mullah
Omar without any aides. A senior Pakistani foreign ministry official who accompanied the ISI chief said he was surprised when the ISI chief asked him to stay outside and insisted on meeting the Taliban supreme leader alone. No one knew what transpired in the meeting.324
On September 18, the Gilani delegation returned to Pakistan “severely discouraged” after eight hours of negotiations with the Taliban in Kandhar had failed to break the impasse concerning the future of bin Laden. According to the Pakistani delegation,
Omar had set conditions for bin Laden’s extradition to the US. These had included
that evidence against him be provided to the Afghan Supreme Court or to a
panel composed of Muslim judges from the third countries
that bin Laden’s surrender, be approved by the 56 member countries of the
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), and
that bin Laden’s surrender, be accompanied by diplomatic recognition of the
Taliban regime and the lifting of UN sanctions imposed on Afghanistan in
November 1999 due to the regime’s previous refused to turn over bin Laden to
US authorities. The US refused to negotiate conditions with the Taliban,
324 Zahid. Hussain, Frontline Pakistan the Struggle with Militant Islam, 37.
177
however, and argued that the release of evidence against bin Laden and the Al-
Qaeda network would compromise its intelligence sources.325
In an apparently conciliatory development, however, “Omer announced that a council of Islamic clerics in Afghanistan had been called for September 18 in order that they could make a ruling on the US demand that bin Laden be surrendered, and consider the particular point that requiring a “guest” to leave in such circumstances would be a betrayal of a tenet of Islam. The meeting, however, was postponed on September 18 because of logistical problems. In a further development, however, the Council ruled on September 19 that the Taliban should “persuade” but not force bin Laden to leave the country voluntarily “in the proper time and of his own free will”, a ruling which was immediately rejected by the US. In a further development which enraged US officials, the Taliban ambassador to Pakistan, Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef said on
September 21 that the Taliban did not know of the whereabouts of bin Laden and thus could not inform him of the decision of the council of Islamic clerics that he should be persuaded to leave. On September 19, 2001 in a televised address, to the country,
Musharraf said that Pakistan faced “very grave consequences” if it did not back the US in its confrontation with bin Laden and the Taliban. In an attempt to reduce domestic pressure on the Musharraf regime, the US administration announced on September 22,
2001 that it would lift the economic sanctions against both Pakistan and India which had been imposed in 1998 in response to their nuclear testing program.” In the case of
Pakistan, the US also agreed to reschedule 379 million dollars of debt in the US, and promised to review separate economic sanctions, which had been imposed in 1999.326
Donning his military uniform, Musharraf looked stressed as he appeared on state television on the evening of 19 September to explain why he had decided to side with
325 Keesing’s Record of World Events, 46, no.9 (September 2001):.44337. 326 Ibid, 44338.
178 the US in the war on terror. His tone was highly defensive as he told his countrymen how hard he had tried to defend the Taliban against all odds. He justified his decision, saying it was done to save the country’s strategic assets, safeguard the cause of
Kashmir and prevent Pakistan from being declared a terrorist state.327
Musharraf’s September 19 speech to his nation left no doubt as to what was at stake in
Pakistan. “If it did not join the US war effort, the country would be marginalized and isolated. Noting that India had already offered its full cooperation to the US,
Musharraf warned that Islamabad’s refusal to toe the line would result in Pakistan’s being branded a terrorism-supporting state and in the loss of any lingering international sympathy for the Pakistani position on Kashmir. He also implied, obliquely, that the very survival of Pakistan’s hard-won nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles was in jeopardy. He proffered five reasons for choosing this course of action:
I). Secure Pakistan’s strategic assets, ii). Safeguard the cause of Kashmir, iii). Prevent
Pakistan from being declared a terrorist state, iv). Prevent an anti-Pakistani government from coming to power in Kabul, v). Have Pakistan re-emerged politically as a responsible and dignified nation.”
It was assumed that the major powers would extend cooperation to the US in punishing the terrorists. None would oppose a likely US decision to mount an attack against the Taliban. “No proof would be asked, or considered necessary, of Taliban complicity with bin Laden. Already, a year earlier, the Security Council had condemned and imposed sanctions on the Taliban precisely because they provided bin
Laden with sanctuary and a base for terrorist activities.328 However, a later report on
September 28 indicated that the edict had been served on bin Laden, although he was reported to have made no response.” On September 30, the Taliban confirmed that
327 Zahid. Hussain, Frontline Pakistan the Struggle with Militant Islam, 37. 328Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2012, 242
179 they knew the location of the fugitive and stated that: “he is at an unknown place for his safety and security”.329
Musharraf stated that India was trying to get Pakistan declared a terrorist state and wanted to expand the scope of the war against global terrorism to include the militant camps in Pakistani Kashmir. The generals in Islamabad were cognizant of the fact that their county’s geographical position, its links with the Pashtuns of Afghanistan and its comprehensive engagement with Taliban military apparatus made Pakistan the most vital state in the entire region for any US success in Afghanistan. Woodward correctly notes that Pakistan was the ‘linchpin for any strategy to isolate and eventually attack
Al-Qaeda and the Taliban.330
Musharraf took the correct decision in the national interest of Pakistan, otherwise
Pakistan had remained isolated in the world community and Pakistan could face the multiple hardships. Musharraf’s decision of a U-turn on Taliban policy is widely appreciated by the Western countries particularly by the US. Rightly supported by A.
Z. Hilali that Pakistan was the creator, backer and supporter of the Taliban in
Afghanistan in 1994 but the tragedy of the twin towers left no option for Pakistan, but to revise its pro-Taliban policy and cooperate with the US against the war on terrorism. It was a necessary and intelligent decision of Musharraf to protect Pakistan’s vital interests and prevent India from taking advantage of the situation.331
In February 2002, Daniel Pearl, the Wall Street Journalist’s correspondent in Mumbai, had been abducted in Karachi while he was investigating links between Richard Reid, the “shoe bomber”, and Al-Qaeda. After a tortuous ordeal, militants, working under
329Keesing’s Record of World Events, 46, no, 9 (September 2001): 44337. 330 Bob Woodward, Bush at War, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 58. 331 A. Z. Hilali, US-Pakistan Relationship Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, (London: Ashgate Publishing Limited), 2005, 248
180 the notorious Ahmad Omar Sheikh beheaded Pearl. On July 2002, Sheikh was sentenced to death by hanging. The sentence has yet to be carried out. After Daniel’s brutal murder, Pakistan’s negative image took a turn for the worse. Slating the administration for propping up a country that had given nuclear technology and possibly uranium to North Korea, a columnist of the Washington Post labeled Pakistan the “most dangerous place on earth” and the “base from which nuclear technology, fundamentalist terrorism and life-destroying heroin are spread around the globe.332
In August, 2004, “Musharraf hosted Karzai in Islamabad and, assured the Afghan president that Pakistan would not allow extremists to use its territory to disrupt coming
October elections in Afghanistan. However, concern about cross-border infiltrations sharpened in the spring of 2005, with the US military officials in Afghanistan indicating that insurgents opposed to the Kabul government continue to cross into
Afghanistan to attack US-led forces before returning to Pakistan. Once again, in summer 2005, Afghan leaders accused Islamabad of actively supporting insurgents and providing their leadership with safe haven. Pakistan adamantly denied the charges as baseless and sought to reassure Kabul by dispatching an additional 9,500 troops to border areas to bolster security.”
In March, 2005, US Defense Intelligence Director, Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby told a
Senate panel that “international and indigenous terrorists pose a high threat to senior
Pakistani government officials, military officers, and US interests.” During the
September 2005 visit to the region, US National Security Advisor, Hadley also urged
Pakistan and Afghanistan to work together more closely on security matters. The spokesman of US States Department, Sean McCormack told in an official briefing in
Washington on December 12, 2006 that the insurgents had safe heavens along the
332 Ayesha Jalal, The Struggle for Pakistan: A Muslim Homeland and Global Politics (London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014), 332-333.
181
Pakistan-Afghanistan border and they were using them for attacking Afghan and US- led coalition forces. But, on February 12, 2007, US Secretary of State for Defense,
Robert Gates eulogized the contribution made by Pakistan as an important US ally in the war on terror. He said, “Negative comments are never productive; it is always easier to comment at a distance when you are not in the battle itself.”
On the other hand “Dick Cheney during his sudden visit to Pakistan on February 26,
2007, expressed US apprehensions to Musharraf about the regrouping of Al-Qaeda in the tribal region of Waziristan and called for concerted efforts in countering the threat.
Cheney also communicated Washington’s serious concerns about the intelligence on an impending Taliban regrouping in Pakistan’s tribal areas and the possible Taliban spring offensive against the allied forces. However, US showed its serious concern regarding the effective role of Pakistan in the war against terrorism, Taliban and Al-
Qaeda by passing a bill in the House of Representatives. The bill requiring Bush to certify Pakistan is making “all possible efforts” to prevent the Taliban from operating in areas under its control as a condition of continued US military aid. When Bush visited Pakistan in March, 2006, the security of Islamabad was handed over to
Americans, some ten thousand troops and police were deployed on security duty and anti-aircraft guns were installed in the surrounding hills. The extraordinary security measures were necessary as the shadow of Al-Qaeda continued to hang heavy over
Pakistan.” While praising Musharraf for his ‘courage,’ Bush called upon his ‘buddy’ to do more to curb Islamic militancy and stop cross-border infiltration of Taliban insurgents into Afghanistan.333
However, Musharraf appeared visibly uncomfortable as he stood by Bush at their joint press conference on March 4, 2006, and heard the US President say that he had come
333Naeem Ahmed, “General Pervez Musharraf’s Taliban Policy 1999-2008”, 116.
182 to Islamabad to determine whether or not the Pakistani leader was as committed as he had been in the past to the war on terror. “The comments reflected the growing frustration and distrust of the American administration over Musharraf’s failure to stop
Taliban insurgents using Pakistani territory as a base for attacks on the coalition forces in Afghanistan. More American soldiers were killed in the fighting in earlier 2006 than in the last four years following the ousting of the Taliban regime in December, 2001.”
In an interview with foreign journalists on December 12, 2006, Karzai accused
Pakistan of being the boss of the Taliban. He said, “The state of Pakistan was supporting the Taliban, so we presume if the Taliban is still active, they are being supported by a state elements. If the world community does not realize the extent of
Pakistan’s interference in Afghanistan, does not find a solution to the current Pakistani military intervention in Afghanistan, the flames of the fire will spread to the region and the world”.334 Musharraf in his press conference in Rawalpindi on February 2, 2007 said that Pakistan has decided to fence over 35 km of its border with Afghanistan in
FATA, South and Northern Waziristan in the first phase. Border would be fenced at seven or eight points at this stage. In the second phase, he said 250 km of Pak-Afghan border in Balochistan would be fenced. The places where border fencing was planned in North Waziristan and South Waziristan had been identified and surveyed.335
5.2. Pakistan-United States and China in the Regional Perspective
Pakistan and China have enjoyed a generally close and mutually beneficial relationship over several decades. “Pakistan served as a link between Beijing and Washington in
1971, as well as a bridge to the Muslim world for China during the 1980s. China’s continuing role as a major arms supplier for Pakistan began in the 1960s and included
334Ibid, 117. 335 Dawn, February 3, 2007.
183 helping to build a number of arms factories in Pakistan, as well as supplying complete weapons systems. After the 1990 imposition of US sanctions on Pakistan, the
Islamabad-Beijing arms relationship was further strengthened. Indian leaders have called the Islamabad-Beijing nuclear and missile “proliferation nexus” a cause of serious concern for New Delhi, and US officials remain seized of this potentially destabilizing dynamic. Many observers, especially in India, see Chinese support for
Pakistan as a key aspect of Beijing’s perceived policy of “encirclement” or constraint of India as a means of preventing or delaying New Delhi’s ability to challenge
Beijing’s region wide influence.”
China supported the UNSC efforts after September 11, 2001 to adopt a globally shared approach to contain transnational terrorism. China declared that it stood “side by side” with the US for fighting terrorism. During the visit of US Ambassador-at-large,
Francis Taylor, to Beijing in the first week of December, China and the US agreed to
“step up cooperation in fighting international terrorism”. China endorsed Pakistan’s decision to join the global effort to fight terrorism. Foreign Minister Tang Jiawuan, who called on Musharraf in New York, appreciated Pakistan’s support to the global fight against terrorism and assured China’s “support and understanding of Pakistan’s role in this cause.” China and Pakistan suggested that a multi-ethnic interim authority should replace the Taliban government in Kabul. Musharraf visited Beijing in the third week of December 2001 and Chinese President Jiang Zemin reiterated support for
Pakistan’s role in the global effort to control terrorism. Both agreed to continue consultation and coordination for facilitating “a fair settlement of the Afghan issue.”
Pakistan and China continued with their regular interaction during Musharraf era, extending the scope of cooperation in economic, civilian and defense industry, thermal
184 and nuclear power generation, textiles and mining, and natural resources development.336
When Musharraf made his now famous U turn in Pakistan’s Taliban policy not only did he bring Pakistan closer to the US, he also restored harmony to Sino-Pakistan ties, which had been stressed by Pakistan’s five year dalliance with the Taliban. China suspected that the mujahedeen had begun to expand their operations in Xinjiang, with the ISI’s tacit collusion.
China has a well-established state-policy to strengthen its ties with Pakistan and this policy will never be changed, Chinese Ambassador in Islamabad Lu Shulin assured.
The Chinese envoy said the relationship between Pakistan and China over the past 50 years “has never experienced any ups or downs. Our relationship has always been on the upper peak.” “We use the terms of time tested and all-weather friendship to describe our relationship.” He listed non-interference in the internal affairs of each other, identity of objectives and interests and similarity in historical experiences by
Pakistani and Chinese nations at the hands of foreign aggressors and colonial powers as the main reasons for establishment of fast friendship between Pakistan and China.
“It is therefore natural that after independence, both nations assisted and supported each other in national development and reconstruction.” He spoke highly of Pakistan for its unflinching support to China on the issues of Tibet, Taiwan and Human Rights.
“We are very grateful to you for this support.”
With the changing regional and international scenario after 9/11, Pakistan-China relations took a new dimension of understanding and cooperation. “The frequency of the bilateral exchange visits increased and high-level visits have been undertaken
336 Pakistan-China Institute, Handbook of Pakistan-China Relations (Lahore: Dost Publications, 2015) 47-49.
185 every year since 2003. Soon after 9/11, Musharraf visited China from 20-24 December
2001. Both countries pledged to work together with complete unanimity for maintaining regional peace and stability and China expressed its readiness to join the
Pakistan government in its new ventures.337 Various important agreements and MoUs were signed during Prime Minister Jamali's official visit to China from 24-26 March
2003. Pakistan and China signed seven agreements in trade, communications and energy sectors and drew up a framework for greater economic cooperation during the visit of Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz to Beijing from 14-18 December 2004.”
In April 2005, the Chinese prime minister visited Islamabad, where Pakistan and
China signed 22 accords meant to boost bilateral cooperation. Pakistan played a key role in the U.S.-led war against terrorism as a front line state, but this did not affect
Pakistan-China understanding on different regional and international issues. Both countries helped each other in expanding their respective spheres of influence, particularly in the regional context. China supported Pakistan in securing observer status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) on 5 July 2005, and Pakistan staunchly supported China's observer status in the SAARC on 14 November 2005.
This was, ultimately, an effort to create a regional balance of power and to counter the increasing influence of India, which is the most influential state among the SAARC members. It is interesting to analyze as to why China opted to be included in SAARC when its effectiveness is highly questionable in the region. It seems to be a precautionary measure to preclude India from becoming a regional hegemon in case of the possible emergence of SAARC as a vital regional organization in future. Besides,
China also wants Pakistan to remain in a position in South Asia where it can safeguard
Chinese interests. Both countries share commonality of interests, which leads their
337 Dawn, December 21, 2001.
186 cooperation towards new heights in the region set-up as Pakistan too, strongly seeks
Chinese support in containing Indian influence. Pakistan's inclusion in the SCO can work as a catalyst to generate a balance of power in the region and provide Pakistan with access to the Central Asian region to count the possible Indian influence. As rightly pointed out by Prime Minister Aziz: 'SCO today has the potential and the resolve to contribute in a significant manner to harmonious and sustained development of a large part of Asia, and Pakistan has a vital stake in security, stability and well- being of the region as it was among the first countries to seek association with
SCO’.338Through SCO, Pakistan has broader prospects for extending its influence in
Central Asia. It would also help Pakistan to build its own capacity in the economic and political spheres at the inter-regional level. From 5-7 April 2005, the Chinese Prime
Minister, Wen Jiabao visited Pakistan. During this visit, the Pakistan- China Treaty of
Friendship and Cooperation was concluded. The treaty states that 'neither party will join any alliance or bloc, which infringes upon the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of either nation while simultaneously positing that both parties 'would not conclude treaties of this nature with any third party.” This treaty and other agreements that were signed marked a new stage and institutionalized the 54-year relationship between Pakistan and China.339
China and Pakistan have been working together to ensure peace in the region. The spokesman for China's ministry of foreign affairs Qin Gang said. "The two countries have conducted joint anti-terror drills and have also concluded an accord for elimination of terrorism, separatism and extremism," Mr. Qin said. In an interview with an English newspaper, he said after 9/11, Pakistan had done a lot to combat
338 Dawn, July 6, 2005. 339 The News, April 06, 2005.
187 terrorism and that both Pakistan and China were now benefiting from each other's skills and abilities to root out the three evils through joint efforts.340
Musharraf’s five-day visit to Beijing in February 2006 saw bilateral discussions on counterterrorism, trade, and technical assistance. Pakistan and China signed an agreement to enforce Early Harvest Programme (EHP) reducing tariff on a number of industrial and agriculture products on January 1, 2006.341
In early 2006, “Pakistan signed thirteen agreements with China further strengthening the bonds of strategic partnership with China. Notable among these agreements were the defense and nuclear energy pacts in addition to a 350 million dollar loan to buy the
Chinese goods. China also committed itself to upgrade the Karakorum Highway, which was badly damaged by the earthquakes in 2005. Other agreements covered expanding economic ties, cooperative endeavors in health, trade meteorological research and help to Pakistan in providing vocational training.” Pakistan also sought
Chinese assistance in constructing a gas pipeline from the newly developing port of
Gwadar in Balochistan province to western China.342
On 20 February 2006, “Pakistan and China vowed to reinforce and deepen their strategic partnership through increased cooperation in political, diplomatic and economic fields and the Chinese president supported the peace dialogue between
Pakistan and India to find a negotiated settlement of the Kashmir dispute. “China welcomes Pakistan and India to improve their relations through (dialogue) and to
340 China praises Pakistan for curbing terrorism, 2005/06/19, accessed on May 7, 2015, http://pk.china- embassy.org/eng/zbgx/t200508.htm.
341China, Pakistan sign agreement on "early harvest" tariff program, 2005/12/09, accessed on May 7, 2015, http://pk.china-embassy.org/eng/zbgx/t225660.htm
342Malik, Soviet American Relations with Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan, 1.
188 negotiate to settle all their outstanding issues including Kashmir,” Chinese Foreign
Office Spokesman Qin Gang quoted the Chinese leader as having said. Musharraf said
Pakistan would like to further enhance cooperation with China in trade and economic fields, particularly in infrastructure and energy sectors.”
The text of joint statement between Pakistan and China issued during Musharraf's visit to China followed: “At the invitation of President Hu Jintao of the China, Musharraf paid a state visit to the China from 19 to 23 February 2006. President Hu Jintao held official talks with Musharraf. Mr. Wu Bangguo, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, Mr, Wen Jiabao, Premier of the State Council, and
Mr. Jia Qinglin, Chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, met Musharraf respectively. In a cordial and friendly atmosphere, leaders of the two countries had in-depth exchange of views and reached broad common ground on strengthening China-Pakistan strategic partnership of cooperation and on international and regional issues of mutual interest. During his visit, Musharraf addressed the leading Chinese scholars at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, met members of the Chinese business community and attended a special commemorative event marking the 55th Anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between
China and Pakistan.343 The Chinese President Hu’s November 2006 visit to Islamabad was the first such visit by a Chinese president in ten years; another 18 new bilateral pacts were inked, including a bilateral Free Trade Agreement and plans for joint development of airborne early warning radars. Islamabad may seek future civil nuclear assistance from Beijing, including potential provision of complete power reactors,
343 Pakistan-China Joint Statement, 2006/02/21, accessed on May 7, 2015, http://pk.china- embassy.org/eng/zbgx/t236947.htm.
189 especially in the light of Washington’s categorical refusal of Pakistan’s request for a civil nuclear cooperation similar to that being planned between the United States and
India.”
The "Friendship-2006" China-Pakistan joint anti-terrorism exercise, initiated on Dec.
11, 2006 concluded in the hilly area of northern Pakistan's Abbottabad. With the participation of hundreds of army officers and soldiers from both sides, the military exercise included weapons and expertise display, and command exercise and exercise of troops, under a rubric of "anti-terror operation in mountainous terrain”. 'Friendship-
2006' which aimed at honing counter-terrorism skills, was conducted in a mountainous area adjoining Abbottabad. Commandos of the Army Aviation wing of the Pakistan
Army and Special Forces of People's Liberation Army (PLA) participated in the exercise.344
In 2006, four days after the killing of three Chinese engineers in the Hub area of
Balochistan, “Musharraf made a scheduled visit to China from 19-23 February. The visit, just before the arrival of Bush in Islamabad, indicated that Pakistan gives greater priority to its strategic partnership with China and no unfortunate incident can deter the long-time relationship between the two countries. Pakistan and China vowed to reinforce and deepen their strategic partnership through increased cooperation in the political, diplomatic and economic fields and the Chinese President supported the peace dialogue between Pakistan and India for a negotiated settlement of the Kashmir dispute. The two sides covered the entire spectrum of their relations and regional and
344Pakistan-China military exercise concludes, 2006/12/19, accessed on May 7, 2015, http://pk.china- embassy.org/eng/zbgx/t284215.htm.
190 international issues of mutual concern.345 During the visit, an agreement was signed between the two states to 'further deepen cooperation in peaceful application of nuclear power'. The second high profile visit between the two countries in the year 2006 took place when the Chinese President Hu Jintao paid an official visit to Pakistan from 23-
26 November 2006.” During this visit, Musharraf and President Jintao pledged to build on the robust and time- tested Pakistan-China friendship and to expand their 'strategic partnership'. Eighteen agreements and MoUs were signed during the visit, the most crucial being the Tree Trade Agreement.346
The visit by Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz from 16-21 April 2007 to China witnessed
27 agreements and MoUs to re-energize the bilateral cooperation in all fields, including defense, space technology and trade and economics. During his visit, Prime
Minister Aziz welcomed the re- emergence of a multi-polar world system with the strengthening of Chinese economic and military power, regarding the same as essential for global peace and security.347
In May 2007, “Prime Minister Aziz visited Beijing, where Pakistan and China signed
27 new agreements and memoranda of understanding to “re-energize” bilateral cooperation in numerous areas, including defense, space technology, and trade. No public mention was made regarding civil nuclear cooperation. The Chinese government has assisted Pakistan in constructing a major new port at Gwadar, near the border with Iran; Islamabad and Beijing aspire to make this port, officially opened in
March 2007. Some analysts are concerned that the port may be used for military purposes and could bolster China’s naval presence in the Indian Ocean region.”
345 Dawn, February 21, 2006. 346 Dawn, November 25, 2006. 347Dawn, April 18, 2007.
191
Pakistan continues to view China as an “all-weather friend” and perhaps its most important strategic ally.348
5.2.1. Key Events in Pakistan-China Relations:
May 2001: Premier Zhu Rongji visited Pakistan.
December 2001: Musharraf paid a state visit to China.
March 2003: Prime Minister Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali paid an official visit to China.
November 2003: President Hu Jintao held talks with Musharraf in Beijing.
December 2004: President Hu Jintao met Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz in Beijing.
April 2005: Prime Minister Wen Jiabao visited Pakistan.
February 2006: Musharraf paid a visit to China.
November 2006: President Hu Jintao paid an official visit to Pakistan. Free Trade Agreement was signed
during the visit.
April 2007: Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz visited China.349 In a nutshell, the Pakistan-China relationship has proved to be a vibrant strategic partnership in every possible field of cooperation from diplomatic relations to economic ties and, more importantly, consolidating trust and cooperation in the military and security fields. Close diplomatic contacts and frequent high-level visits highlight the strength of their relationship and the standards on which Pakistan and
China maintain their contact and cooperation. “The economic cooperation between the two countries, especially after the signing of the landmark Free Trade Agreement, shows the willingness of both the states to enhance their cooperation in boosting each other's economy. The most important and vital area of Pakistan-China cooperation is defense and nuclear assistance. Although Pakistan has not provided China with any notable defense or nuclear assistance, it plays a very important role in the fulfillment
348K. Alan Kronstadt, “Pak-U.S. Relations”, Congressional Research Service the Library of Congress, December 2007, 16-17. 349 Haris Raqeeb Azeemi, “55 Years of Pakistan China Relationship”, Pakistan Horizon, Vol, 60. no, 2. (April 2007): 110.
192 of Chinese interests in attaining a dominant position in the region. Every aspect of their relationship reflects the strategies upon which both the countries have built their relationship. From the Karakoram Highway to Gwadar port and from high-level diplomatic contacts to people-to-people exchanges, the level of engagement reflects the close bond in which Pakistan and China are tied. There is a need for Pakistan and
China to enhance their cooperation at the United Nations forum and other international and regional organizations. Progress has been achieved at the regional level in the for
щ of the inclusion of China in SAARC and Pakistan in SCO, but Pakistan and China must look ahead to enhance their cooperation on regional and global fronts in order to achieve the balance of power serving their interests. On the regional level, the increasing cooperation between China and India is emerging as a major concern for
Pakistan. But at this juncture, it seems that by strengthening its ties with Pakistan vis-
à-vis India, China is enabling Pakistan to use Chinese influence upon India positively in order to resolve the outstanding issues with India. The chances of closer cooperation between Pakistan and China in the future are increasing with the passage of time with the changing regional and global economic, strategic and security paradigms. The emergence of India as a regional power with tangible U.S. support is alarming for
China and it has sought counter measures in projects like Gwadar and access to the
Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean through Pakistan. On the other hand, Pakistan has a greater interest in having an indispensable support of China being a regional power in political, economic and energy sectors and more importantly to protect its security in the region. This interdependency, generated by commonality of interests has made their relationship and cooperation more dynamic and in order to achieve their strategic goals in the region. Development of its economy and the realization of its bid to become the dominant regional power has compelled China to have closer cooperation
193 with Pakistan. On the other hand, Pakistan has always remained in great need for having cordial ties with China facing deteriorated regional security and domestic economic conditions in general and Indian threat in particular.” Thus, this strategic partnership that brings the two countries closer to the fulfillment of common interests is likely to grow further in future serving the national interests of both Pakistan and
China.350
5.3. Pakistan United States and India in the Regional Perspective
Three full-scale wars in 1947-1948, 1965, and 1971 and a constant state of military preparedness on both sides of their mutual border have marked six decades of bitter rivalry between Pakistan and India. “The acrimonious partition of British India into two successor states in 1947 and the unresolved issue of Kashmiri sovereignty have been major sources of tension. Both countries have built large defense establishments at significant cost to economic and social development. The Kashmir problem is rooted in claims by both countries in the former princely state, divided since 1948 by a military LOC into the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir and Pakistan-held Azad
Kashmir. India blames Pakistan for supporting a violent separatist rebellion in the
Muslim-dominated Kashmir Valley that has taken from 41,000 to as many as 66,000 lives since 1989. Pakistan admits only to lend moral and political support to the rebels, and it criticizes India for human rights abuses in “Indian-held Kashmir.” India held
Pakistan responsible for late 2001 terrorist attacks in Kashmir and on the Indian
Parliament complex in New Delhi. The Indian response, a massive military mobilization, was mirrored by Pakistan and within months some one million heavily- armed soldiers were facing-off at the international borders.” During an extremely tense
2002, another full-scale war seemed a real and even likely possibility, and may have
350 Raqeeb Azeemi, “55 Years of Pakistan China Relationship”, 122-124.
194 been averted only through international diplomatic efforts, including multiple visits to the region by top US officials. An April 2003 peace initiative brought major improvement in the bilateral relationship, allowing for an October cease-fire agreement initiated by Pakistan. The process led to a January 2004 summit meeting in
Islamabad and a joint agreement to re-engage a “Composite Dialogue” to bring about
“peaceful settlement of all bilateral issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, to the satisfaction of both sides.”
During 2004, numerous mid-level meetings, normalized diplomatic relations, and increased people-to-people contacts brought modest, but still meaningful progress towards normalized relations. “Regular dialogue continued in 2005 and a third round of Composite Dialogue was held in 2006. Numerous confidence building measures have been put in place, most notably travel and commerce across the Kashmiri LOC for the first time in decades, and bilateral trade has increased. Yet the militarized territorial disputes over Kashmir, the Siachen Glacier, and the Sir Creek remain unresolved, and Pakistani officials regularly express unease that more substantive progress, especially on the “core issue” of Kashmir, is not occurring. Following July
2008 terrorist bombings in Bombay, India, New Delhi postponed planned foreign secretary-level talks, bringing into question the continued viability of the already slow- moving process. However, after meeting on the sidelines of a Non-aligned Movement
Summit in Cuba in September, Musharraf and Indian Prime Minister Singh announced a resumption of formal peace negotiations and also decided to implement a joint anti- terrorism mechanism. The Composite Dialogue resumed in November after a four- month hiatus when Foreign Secretary Riaz Khan paid a visit to New Delhi for talks with his Indian counterpart. No progress was made on outstanding territorial disputes, and India is not known to have presented evidence of Pakistani involvement in the
195
7/11 Bombay terrorist bombings, but the two officials did give shape to a joint anti- terrorism mechanism proposed in September and they agreed to continue the dialogue process in early 2007. A notable step came in December 2006, when bilateral talks on the militarized Sir Creek dispute ended with agreement to conduct a joint survey.”
In January 2007, Pakistani Foreign Minister, Khurshid Kasuri hosted his Indian counterpart, Pranab Mukherjee, in Islamabad for the first such visit in more than a year. “The two men reviewed past progress and planned for a fourth Composite
Dialogue round in March. On February 18, two bombs exploded on an Indian segment of the Samjhauta Express train linking Delhi with Lahore. The resulting fires killed 68 people, most of them Pakistanis. Days later, Kasuri travelled to New Delhi, where he and Mukherjee reaffirmed a bilateral commitment to the peace process despite the apparent effort to subvert it. While India refused a Pakistani request to undertake a joint investigation into that attack, the two countries did sign an agreement to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war. The new joint Pakistan-India anti-terrorism mechanism met for the first time in Islamabad in March and produced a joint statement in which both governments agreed to use the mechanism for exchanging information about investigations of and/or efforts to prevent terrorist acts on either side of the shared border, and to meet quarterly while immediately conveying urgent information.
Hopes that the February train bombing would provide a fitting “test case” apparently were dashed, however, when India declined to share relevant investigative information with Pakistan. Moreover, Indian officials were unhappy with Islamabad’s insistence that the “freedom struggle” underway in Kashmir should not be treated as terrorism under this framework. Still, the continuing engagement even after a major terrorist attack was widely viewed as evidence that the bilateral peace process had gained a round momentum. A new round of dialogue was then launched in mid-March, when
196 the two foreign ministers met again in Islamabad.” No new agreements were reached, but both officials lauded improved bilateral relations and held “the most sustained and intensive dialogue” ever on the Kashmir problem.351
On 9th January 2000, Clinton embarked on a trip to South Asia. He faced a difficult choice with regards to Pakistan. “With a military dictator in charge, the administration did not want to accord recognition and credibility to a military regime. Yet visiting
India and totally ignoring Pakistan would weaken the little influence and interaction that existed between the two countries. Also concerned about the state of Indo-
Pakistan relationship, the U.S. president decided to have a brief stop-over in Pakistan.
The visit to Pakistan by the U.S. President was preceded by a very lively and positive five day tour of India. From the perspective of Pakistan’s key security concerns, i.e. the issue of Kashmir, Clinton gave an unequivocal support to the Indian claims that
Pakistan should stop cross border incursions and clamp down on “terrorist” networks harboring violence in Kashmir.”
Pakistan was also asked once again to respect the sanctity of the LoC. The Clinton visit to Pakistan on 25 March 2000, was a very somber affair. “The twin cities of
Islamabad-Rawalpindi looked deserted, as extensive security arrangements preceded the US President’s visit. The discussion with Musharraf focused on the issues of
Kashmir, need to control the terrorist groups, and in the context of Afghanistan the need to influence Taliban to handover bin Laden. The US president also touched upon the issue of nuclear non-Proliferation. Clinton’s visit, the first since Richard Nixon’s
1969 trip to Pakistan, was marked with an air of growing differences, under the veneer of apparent cordiality. It reflected how much the two countries had diverged from their close relationship of the 1980s. Musharraf’s apparent inability to address US concerns
351K. Alan Kronstadt, “Pak-US Relations”, Congressional Research Service the Library of Congress, December 2007, 14-15.
197 about bin Laden and the Afghan situation reflected the helpless situation Pakistan had put itself into, owing to flawed Afghan and Kashmir policies. As Pakistan president put it himself “After Taliban came to power, we lost much of the leverage we had with them”. It would take a 9/11 to correct this direction, but would involve an extremely painful transition.”
5.3.1. Kashmir Dispute and United States Role
For the coup of October 12, 1999 to the tragedy of 11 September 2001, the period of one year and nine months was filled with a great deal of tensions between the US and
Pakistan, and some degree of relaxation of tensions between Pakistan and India. After
11 September 2001 the political landscape and dimensions changed rapidly. The US
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice assured Musharraf on September 12, 2001 that the US would like to help out India and Pakistan in moving forward towards the resolution of the Kashmir issue.
Condoleezza Rice has called Musharraf “a stalwart ally in the war on terrorism.” In an interview given to Charlie Rose for the nationwide Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) radio, Rice also said that the US had “de-hyphenated the India Pakistan relationship with a fine and growing relationship with India” and “a firm and growing relationship with Pakistan.” She agreed with the interviewer that the relationship with India had not come at the expense of a friendship with Pakistan or vice versa.
The relations between India and Pakistan had reached at the lowest ebb after the incident of terrorists attack on the Indian parliament on December 13, 2001 that killed over a dozen people. Despite swift and strong condemnation of the attacks by Pakistan, tensions escalated in the area when Indian public started demonstration with the demand for an accounting. “The bus, train and air services were terminated between
198 the two countries. The military buildup between both the countries that followed the bombing intensified the situation. India called back its high commissioner in
Islamabad for the first time after the 1971 war. India accused Islamabad of supporting
Kashmiris militants, whom it blamed for carrying out these attacks. Islamabad rejected these allegations of cross-border terrorism.”352 According to Moonis Ahmar, the US encouraged the Musharraf regime to pursue a pro-active approach to resolve the
Kashmir issue and supported Musharraf’s initiative in this regard launched in the autumn of 2004.353
Tensions rose between India and Pakistan over the separatist conflict in the Northern
Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir during the month of October 2001. “At least 38 people died and about 71 were wounded on 0ctober 1, 2001 in an attack on the state assembly building in Srinagar, the summer capital. A militant rammed the gates and caused an explosion with a stolen car packed with explosives. Three other guerrillas rushed into the building after the explosion at the gates, firing guns and throwing grenades, and two were killed by security forces in the subsequent shoot-out. The
Indian government demanded that Pakistan ban the group held responsible for the attack, Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) which was based in Pakistan. The leader of JeM,
Maulana Masood Azhar, had been released from prison in India in December 1999 in order to secure the release of a hijacked airliner. Musharraf telephoned India’s Prime
Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee on October 8, 2001 and condemned the attack in
Srinagar but did not agree to a ban on JeM. Both the US and the UK on October 12,
2001 froze the financial assets of JeM as part of the wider campaign against terrorism following the September 11, 2001 attacks on the US.” The visit to India on October
352Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, 245. 353Moonis Ahmar, Interview by the researcher, August 29, 2015.
199
17, of US Secretary of State General (retd) Colin Powell, following a visit to Pakistan, failed to soothe Indian anger over the US political and economic favors to Pakistan as a reward for Musharraf joining the coalition against terrorism. Preceding Powell’s visit, Indian forces on October 15, 2001 conducted a heavy artillery barrage on
Pakistani army post across two sectors of the LoC, officials in response to the infiltration of guerrillas, and exchanges of fire across the LoC continued until the end of the month. Farooq Abdullah Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir had said on
October 3, 2001 in the wake of the Srinagar attack that it was time to wage war against the militants training camps, and other officials had hinted that the army might cross the LoC in hot pursuit of the separatists. On October 23, 2001, “six people, including four militants were killed in a failed attack on Quil air base. 36 kilometer South of
Srinagar. Claiming responsibility, the Lashkar-i-Taiba group said that the attack was in retaliation for an Indian incursion. However, India’s Home Affairs Minister, L.K.
Advani said on October 23, 2001 that at no point had Indian forces attempted to cross the LoC. According to Indian figures, at least 145 people had died in clashes in
Kashmir during October.” Lt-General. R. K. Nanavatty, head of the Indian army’s northern command, speaking at a seminar in Jammu, the state’s southern capital, on
October 31, 2001 said that Indian and Pakistan were closer to war over Kashmir than they had been since 1965 and that the conquest of Pakistani Kashmir was
“achievable”.354
In early 2002, “India-Pakistan tensions rose to a dangerous level in the wake of bombings in Kashmir and an attack by Pakistani-based militants against the Indian
Parliament. Bush gave an ultimatum to Musharraf to crack down on terror and make
354 “Increased tension with Pakistan over Kashmir”. Keesing’s Record of World Events, 47, no.10 (October 2001):44398.
200 an unequivocal public statement on the subject.” Musharraf delivered a speech on
January 12—in which for the first time he spoke against jihad and announced the banning of five extremist groups, followed by the arrests of hundreds of militants.355
Meanwhile the US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice remarked during an interview:
“We do not believe that the US can play a mediating role
in the crisis or the differences over Kashmir, but
certainly we want to be supportive of those discussions.
We want to be supportive of efforts to bring a better life,
a more -- a life with greater political participation for the
people of Kashmir. And we want to see an end to the
kind of violence that has wrecked Kashmir and both
India and Pakistan”.356
Secretary Rice called on Musharraf. “She praised Musharraf for his courage and vision in promoting peace and stability in the region and for his concept of enlightened moderation. Dr. Rice had earlier met with Prime Minister, Shaukat Aziz. During these meetings and with her meeting with Foreign Minister, Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri,
Secretary Rice reiterated the commitment of the US to an expanded and sustainable long-term partnership with Pakistan. They had wide-ranging discussions covering bilateral relations as well as regional and international issues. They discussed steps to take their partnership to a new and higher level of engagement. They reviewed their
355 Heraldo Munoz, Getting Away with Murder 109. 356 Secretary Condoleezza Rice; Interview with Quatrina Hosain Currim of Pakistan Television, Islamabad, March 17, 2005, accessed on February 06, 2016 http://2001- 2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/43604.htm.
201 bilateral cooperation and agreed to promote greater collaboration in the areas of security and defense as well as in economic and technological fields. They also focused on the importance of increasing market access of Pakistani products. Kasuri expressed satisfaction with the progress made with India on a number of CBMs.” He also emphasized to Rice that Pakistan desires durable peace with India and pointed out that this could only be achieved by resolving all outstanding issues, especially the
Kashmir dispute.357
Prof. Dr. Hassan Askari Rizvi said while discussing the Kashmir issue in a National
Seminar that, “It is easy as well as difficult to speak on Kashmir problem. It is easy because we have learned about Kashmir right from our school days, etc. It is difficult to talk about Kashmir when we want to explore why resolutions have not been implemented? Why, despite the fact that the resolutions are based on just principles?
Why, despite the fact that every year a committee of General Assembly passes a resolution in favor of the right of self-determination of people but still Kashmir resolutions are not implemented? What are the factors Pakistan talks about international support on Kashmir, but the question is that why Pakistan has not been able to mobilize all gain changing support that can enable Pakistan to implement those resolutions. It is the most contentious issue between India and Pakistan. The major source of conflict between the two countries, threatens peace, not only in South Asia but the international system as well. He also described five possible ways to deal with the Kashmir issue:
1. Stick to the resolutions of UN.
357 Secretary Condoleezza Rice, Remarks with Pakistani Foreign Minister Khurshid Mahmood Kasuri; ; Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Islamabad, Pakistan, Mach 17, 2005, accessed on February 06, 2016 http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/43563.htm.
202
2. Support internal autonomy movement in Indian administered Kashmir.
3. Support an internal revolt in Kashmir.
4. Greater interaction across line of control, trade and movement of the people.
5. Bilateral dialogue to evolve an acceptable solution of Kashmir.
Pakistan needs to continue support to Kashmir but it’s going to be a long struggle and
Pakistan should seek its strength from within not from outside.”358
When the US Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage was asked, are you confident the US can persuade both sides to stand down? Then, he said:
“I am confident we’re going to do our absolute best to
try to bring that about. Both sides have real concerns. I
would like to hear again a reiteration form Musharraf of
the fact that nothing is moving across the line of control.
And I would hope that this would be visible both to the
US and India”.359
Musharraf stressed the need for the United States to lend its support to the efforts aimed at resolving the Jammu and Kashmir dispute, which was at the roots of tension in South Asia. “He was talking to a seven-member US congressional delegation, led by
Congressional co-chairs of the Pakistan Caucus, Congressman Dan Burton
(Republican) and Congress woman Sheila Jackson Lee (Democrat), which called on him here. The president underscored the importance of moving towards a settlement of the Kashmir dispute in the interest of durable peace and stability in the region. The US
358Hassan Askari Rizvi, “Key notes on Kashmir Issue”, (lecture, University of the Punjab, Lahore,
December 17, 2015).
359 Kasuri, Neither a Hawk Nor a Dove, 640.
203 delegation expressed support for the peace process between Pakistan and India to resolve all.”
5.4. Causes to Cooperate United States regarding Regional Relations
The question was that if we do not join US, can we confront them and withstand the onslaught? The answer was no, we could not, on three counts.
First was our military weakness as compared with the strength of the US. Our military forces would be destroyed. Second was our economic weakness. We had no oil, and we did not have the capacity to sustain our economy in the face of an attack by the
United States.
Third, and worst of all, was our social weakness. We lack the homogeneity to galvanize the entire nation into an active confrontation. We could not endure a military confrontation with the US from any point of view.
While discussing the expectations of the US from Pakistan in the regional perspective,
Prof Dr Moonis Ahmar said with regard to India that Pakistan had pursued a non- aggressive approach and vis-a-vis China that it will not get too close to
Beijing. 360Musharraf has explained in his book that “I also analyzed our national interest; First, India had already tried to step in by offering its bases in the US. If we did not join the US, it would accept India’s offer. What would happen then? India would gain a golden opportunity with regard to Kashmir. The Indians might be tempted to undertake a limited offensive there; or, more likely, they would work with the US and the UN to turn the present situation into a permanent status quo. The US would certainly have obliged.”
360 Moonis Ahmar, Interview by the researcher, August 29, 2015.
204
Second, “the security of our strategic assets would be jeopardized. We did not want to lose or damage the military parity that we had achieved with India by becoming a nuclear weapons state. It is no secret that the US has never been comfortable with a
Muslim country acquiring nuclear weapons, and the Americans undoubtedly would have taken the opportunity of an invasion to destroy such weapons. And India, needless to say, would have loved to assist the US to the hilt. Third, our economic infrastructure, built over half a century, would have been decimated.”
On the other hand, “the benefits of supporting the US were many. First, we would be able to eliminate extremism from our society and flush out the foreign terrorists in our midst. We could not do this alone; we needed the technical and financial support of the
United States to be able to find and defeat these terrorists. We had been victims of terrorism by the Taliban and Al-Qaeda and their associated groups for years.” Earlier
Pakistani governments had been hesitant about taking on the militant religious groups that were spreading extremism and fanaticism in our country.361 US Senator, Joseph
Lieberman has reiterated that both parties in the US Congress are keen to promote a
“broad-based and long-term relationship” with Pakistan adding that the US and
Pakistan “shared values and common interests.”
“The US relations with Pakistan are very important,” Senator Lieberman said while addressing a crowded press conference in Islamabad near the conclusion of his visit to
Pakistan on January 9, 2008. The US Senator said that he has been assured by
Musharraf and Prime Minister, Soomro that the elections would be held on February
361Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, 203.
205
18 and that they would be free, fair, and transparent, “Fair elections are important for the future of Pakistan.”362
362 Elizabeth Colton, “U.S. Relations with Pakistan are Important: Senator Lieberman”, khabr-o-Nazar, February 2008, 15.
206
CONCLUSION
The relationship between the two countries started on a high note with the triumphant visit to the US of the first Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan in 1950.
President Truman later acknowledged that “Liaquat and his wife had made an excellent impression on him. Pakistan sought and obtained military and economic assistance from the US to redress its defense vulnerabilities and cope with India military, in return for membership in Western alliance systems, SEATO and CENTO in 1954-55, thus making Pakistan into a ‘most allied ally’ of the US. After Liaquat’s visit the next important leader to strengthen relations with the US was President Ayub
Khan. In the intervening period, the governments had been weak and had lasted only a few months. This situation had elicited Nehru’s famous Jibe. When he was asked who
Pakistan’s PM was, he answered, ‘Noon’ (with reference to PM Feroz Khan Noon), but did not know who Pakistan’s PM would be in the afternoon.” The US share of total foreign economic assistance to Pakistan was 68.4 percent during 1951-60, which dropped to 50.6 percent in the sixties.363
The Americans by all accounts were impressed with Ayub Khan’s ‘engaging personality and Sandhurst training’. “They found him to be a particularly useful ally in this part of the world on the periphery of the former Soviet Union. President
Eisenhower also got along well with Ayub and the defense relationship gained momentum. Kennedy, too, in spite of being under the influence of pro-India advisors like John Kenneth Galbraith, a celebrated Harvard Professor and later Ambassador to
India, got along well with Ayub. In fact, the only state dinner ever held for any visiting
Head of State at Mount Vernon, the home of George Washington, US first president, was for Ayub. It seems that the US romance with Ayub continued under both
363 Rizvi, Pakistan and the Geostrategic Environment, 87.
207
Republican and Democratic administrations. During Ayub Khan’s early years, the relationship between Pakistan and the US broadened to consider ably. But this enchantment followed after the Sino-Indian conflict in 1962, when the US rushed weapons to aid India with strong objections from Pakistan.” The Indo-Pakistan War of
1965 further strained Pak–US relations. Pakistan felt a sense of betrayal, since the US, by imposing sanctions on both India and Pakistan, had caused greater suffering to
Pakistan, which was heavily dependent on the US.364 President Nixon’s so-called tilt’ towards Pakistan in 1971 Indo-Pak War is not hidden. “Nixon was grateful to Yahya
Khan for assisting the US in establishing the first direct high-level American- Chinese contact, leading to Kissinger’s meeting with Chairman Mao-Zedong and the Chinese leadership. It subsequently led to the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. The adverse consequence of facilitating the US in this initiative was to earn Soviet hostility towards Pakistan, leading to an active pro-India position of the
Soviets in the 1971 War, with damaging consequences for Pakistan. When PM, Z. A.
Bhutto assumed office in early 1972, following the election in 1971, Pak-US relations did not immediately deteriorate as is commonly believed. In fact, Bhutto’s visit to the
U.S. in 1973, although nothing to match Ayub Khan’s War reception earlier, could still be regarded as successful since it led to a resumption of economic assistance and the lifting of an arms embargo. The US, however, strongly objected to Pakistan’s professed desire to build nuclear Weapons. Indian’s first nuclear test in 1974, which it cynically called the ‘Smiling Buddha’, and Bhutto’s remarks that Pakistan would ‘eat grass, but still build the bomb’, started resonating in public perception. In 1976, US,
Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger visited Pakistan to offer economic and military assistance if Pakistan gave up its nuclear ambition. When Bhutto did not agree, the
364Kasuri, Neither a Hawk Nor a Dove, 556-557.
208
Symington Amendment was brought in to deny Pakistan economic assistance. In addition, the US imposed sanctions on Pakistan and also successfully applied pressure on France to cancel the contract for the supply of a reprocessing plant to Pakistan.
Meanwhile, Bhutto had moved closer to China, and despite US pressure, continued his efforts to further Pakistan’s nuclear program.” The relationship was strained further when President Jimmy Carter revived the policy on nuclear non-proliferation, with a focus on Pakistan. While on a visit to Iran and India in 1977, Carter did not visit
Pakistan. “This was the year that Bhutto was overthrown, which was a clear message that relations between Pakistan and the US were strained. The old love affair of
Pakistan and the U.S. was revived with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Zia who had become and international pariah following Bhutto’s execution provided unconditional support to the US backed Mujahedeen to force the Soviets out of
Afghanistan.” The six year assistance package 1981-87, which amounted to 3250 million dollars (3.2 billion dollars) was equally divided between economic assistance and military sales.365
The years 1988-1999 were a period when civilian Government led by PM Benazir
Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif could not develop a grip over the country’s foreign policy and deal with the troubled legacy of the Afghan Jihad. Due to lack of stability and troubled civil military relations, economic reform could not take root as was the case in many other countries at the end of the cold war. This situation distracted these governments from focusing on crucial foreign policy issues. As a result, the grip of the establishment on issues relating to India, Kashmir, Afghanistan, and the US grew
365 Rizvi, Pakistan and the Geostrategic Environment, 98.
209 stronger. Despite the best efforts of the two Prime Minister to improve relations with
India, headway could not be made.366
The relations between the two countries were the combination of cooperation and confrontation because relations marred with mutual mistrust and suspicion all the way from 1965 war till today.367 Before 9/11, “the UNSC had adopted counter terrorism measure and imposed sanctions against bin Laden, Al-Qaeda, and the Taliban. In order to normalise relations after Pakistan had joined the US in the war on ‘terror’. President
Bush on September 22, 2001, lifted the multiple layers of Sanctions on Pakistan. Thus, the way was once again cleared the US economic and military re-engagement with
Pakistan. The Sanctions that were lifted included: the Pressler Amendment, which prohibited American military assistance and transfers of military equipment or technology to Pakistan unless the US President certified that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear explosive device; the Symington Amendment, which blocked foreign assistance, arms export, international military education and training for any country developing nuclear enrichment equipment without safeguards; and the Glenn
Amendment, which prohibited assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act for any country which transferred nuclear material to another country or received it or which has exploded a nuclear device. Additionally, Section 508 of the Foreign Assistance
Act barred assistance to any Country who’s duly elected head of government had been deposed by a military coup.” To relieve the democracy related sanction under Section
508 affecting the grant of FMF, ESF, International Military Education and Training
(IMET), and other programmes of assistance, a bill moved by Senator Brownback was
366Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, Neither a Hawk Nor a Dove, 558 367 Moonis Ahmar, Interview by the researcher, August 29, 2015.
210 adopted by the Congress on October 16, 2001, known as the Brownback
Amendment.368
In the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the Bush administration quickly deemed it could not conduct its operations in Afghanistan to dismantle Bin Laden’s networks and put an end to the Taliban regime without Pakistan, not only because it occupied a key geopolitical position but also due to the information it was likely to possess regarding the Islamist movement. On September 13, 2001, “Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, meeting with Pakistan Ambassador to the US and the head of the ISI during their visit to Washington, conveyed a list of seven demands. 369
Musharraf confessed that he had to demonstrate great strength of conviction to bring his ministers and the Pakistan army corps Commanders around to his decision to agree to these demands.370 He saw it as an opportunity to bring Pakistan back into the concert of nations, to have sanctions lifted and thereby be eligible once again for foreign aid. He probably also believed at the time that cooperating with the US in its fight against terrorism would not necessarily force him to alter his policy of support for the Taliban and cooperation with jihadist movements in Kashmir. In any event, there were not many alternatives if the US could not make a deal with the Pakistanis, they would turn to the Indians who had already offered their services. Washington took an even harsher stance__ Armitage reportedly threatened to bring Pakistan “back to the Stone Age”371__ at a time when the failure of Pakistan’s economy and the diplomatic isolation it suffered from left it with very little margin for maneure.”
In response to Musharraf speech, the wealthiest partners of the anti-terrorist coalition did not withhold their financial support a good fifteen debts were renegotiated within
368 Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, Neither a Hawk Nor a Dove, 560 369Christophe Jaffrelot, Translated by Cynthia Schoch. The Pakistan Paradox Instability and Resilience (New Delhi: Random House India, 2013) 523. 370Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, 206. 371Ibid, 201.
211 the Clubs of Paris and London, bilateral aid immediately exceeded to a billion dollars.
The US took the lead with an offer of 673 billion dollars. “In addition to its 50 million
Euros in aid, the EU made trade concessions for textile exports: customs duties on these products (60 percent of Pakistan’s exports to the EU) were removed and the import quota was raised to 15 percent. The IMF granted Pakistan the advantages of the poverty reduction and growth facility together with a loan of 1.3 billion dollars. The
World Bank loaned 300 million dollars. Altogether, adding up 6 billion dollars in three months. This assistance was granted with no strings attached, either in terms of structural reforms or democratization. All the sanctions Washington had imposed on
Pakistan were soon lifted. The first to go were those pertaining to nuclear proliferation imposed by the Symington (1970), Glenn (1977), Pressler (1990) and Glenn (1998) amendments.” The sanctions incurred by the military coup were also reconsidered after a military delegation from the Pentagon, visited Islamabad and a hasty debate was conducted in the Senate, after which the US was more or less obliged to issue
Pakistan a certificate of democracy. The lifting of the sanctions soon enabled
Islamabad not only to secure loans from the US, but also to send soldiers there for training, something that had been impossible since 1990.372
In February 2002, Musharraf visited Bush at the White House___ an event characterized by abundant handshakes, smiles, posed photograph, and compliments.
Bush, in line with his personal approach to diplomacy, declared, “When (Musharraf) looks me in the eye and said there won’t be a Taliban and won’t be Al-Qaeda, I believed him, you know” Bush had called the general “my buddy”, and during his
White House visit, and stated that he was proud to call Musharraf a friend. The US president also applauded what he portrayed as Musharraf’s vision of “Pakistan as a
372Christophe Jaffrelot, Translated by Cynthia Schoch. The Pakistan Paradox Instability and Resilience, 525.
212 progressive, modern and democratic Islamic society”. The visit was positive for
Musharraf. Although he did not get the trade concessions he sought, Bush announced a package of increased economic and military aid.373
Musharraf was the target of two assassination attempts in December 2003. “After the first attack, on December 14, he ordered Lieutenant General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, at the time Rawalpindi corps commander, to lead the investigation. An explosive charge activated by a cell phone call had narrowly missed Musharraf’s three-ton Mercedes as it crossed a bridge in Rawalpindi, but it had left valuable forensic leads. Diligent investigators found a small piece of a cell phone keypad that eventually led to the culprits. Bush conferred the status of “non-NATO ally” on Pakistan and approved a
700 million dollars aid package in 2004.” The US government became increasingly important with the lack of Pakistani progress in the fight against the militants and launched episode missile strikes against Al-Qaeda targets in North and South
Waziristan.374 Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice visited Pakistan from March 16 to
March 18, 2005. During her visit, she talked with Musharraf, PM Shaukat Aziz and
Foreign Minister, Khurshid Kasuri. She said,
“This is a broad and deep relationship. It is a relationship
that is broader than the war on terrorism, although we
obviously admire the courage of the Pakistani leadership
and the courage of the Pakistani people and armed forces
in the fight against terrorism. Bush has pledged 3 billion
373Heraldo Munoz. Getting Away With Murder, 110. 374Ibid, 112.
213
dollars over five years in economic and security
assistance to Pakistan”.375
The US policies towards India and Pakistan clearly indicated a shift in US policy towards India. Bush, during his visit to Pakistan in March 2006, rejected Pakistan’s request for the provision of nuclear technology for civilian purposes similar to US–
Indo nuclear agreement on the pretext that India and Pakistan share different historical records clearly showed that the equation between these three countries is changing. It also reflected that the US, despite referring to Pakistan as the most important ally and
Musharraf as a buddy, cannot see Pakistan with the latest technology and alternate sources of energy through civilian nuclear means.
The United States’ disenchantment with Pakistan indicated that it was just a matter of time before the future course of Pakistan's relations with the US is decided. “A controversial accord signed in September 2006 by Islamabad and a group of Pakistani
Taliban leaders in North Waziristan, which sought to stop all attacks on American and
Afghan forces in Afghanistan and on the Pakistani army in return for the Islamabad’s withdrawal of its garrisons and checkpoints and the release of prisoners and captured equipment produced a cessation of attacks on American troops in Afghanistan. The
Bush administration, which welcomed the deal at first, declared it a failure three months after its signing when it became clear that the tribal areas were increasing the points of origin of Al-Qaeda terrorist plots around the world. Washington’s displeasure with Musharraf also included the discovery that A. Q. Khan had been engaged in nuclear proliferation activities with North Korea, Libya and Iran. A. Q. Khan confessed publicly and was placed under house arrest. Bush did not want to push the
375 Greggory D. Crouch, “U.S. Pakistan relationship is broad and deep. Condoleezza Rice”, Khabr-o- Nazar, April 2005, 1-2.
214 case any further so as not to provoke a nationalist reaction that could endanger
Islamabad’s support in the war on terror.”
In 2007, as Pakistan faced growing instability and political strain within and without, the US came to see the presence of Benazir Bhutto as more and more important.
Musharraf’s dismissal of Chief Justice, Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhary had generated public debated, rallies and street demonstrations calling for his reinstatement. “This opposition soon became known as the “Lawyers movement” growing over the course of the year into one of the largest mass movement in Pakistan’s history.376 Over the period 2001-2007, total transfers from the US to Pakistan amounted to 7,135 million dollars, including 2,335 million dollars in military assistance, budgetary support, development assistance, earthquake relief, and 4,800 million dollars in reimbursement of expenditures on logistic support to US forces in Afghanistan.” In addition, the US wrote off 1,600 million dollars in debt.377
Pakistan’s relations with the US had passed through a definite phase. It is true that the two countries had established the alliance after the 9/11 incident from two different positions: “Washington needed Islamabad to launch attacks against Afghanistan, ruled by the Taliban, who were sheltering Al-Qaeda, allegedly involved in terrorist attacks against the US on September 11, 2001; on the other hand, for Pakistan, the purpose of the alliance was to save itself from the wrath of the US, and reap economic and military benefits from it and other western powers. It is because of this that the cooperation in the war on terrorism between the US and Pakistan has remained shaky and hostage to their respective strategic interests in the region. Consequently, the desired goals of the war on terrorism have not been achieved, and the relations
376Heraldo Munoz. Getting Away With Murder, 113. 377Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2012, 275.
215 between the two allies had reached to the lowest ebb ever since the launching of the war on terrorism. It was argued that the deterioration in relations between Pakistan and the US would have serious consequences for the war on terrorism, which aims to eradicate the terrorist infrastructure of Al-Qaida, Taliban and the militant groups operating in Pakistan’s tribal areas. This is a high time for both the Pakistan and the
US to pragmatically analyze their failures and successes in the war on terrorism, identify areas of convergence and work together for securing the world from the menace of terrorism.” Being the lone Super power, the US need to respect the sovereignty and independence of the weaker states, such as Pakistan, which also happen to be the major ally in the war on terrorism. In this regard, “the US needs to be sensitive to Pakistan’s complaints, and sincerely address its fears of isolating it in the region. Abandoning nuclear Pakistan will be a great mistake on the part of the US. The increasing insecurities may compel Pakistan to rely more on its nuclear capabilities, and thus, the South Asian region would face a nuclear arms race between Pakistan and
India. Moreover, if Pakistan comes out of the US orbit, it would freely pursue its strategic interests in the region, particularly in Afghanistan and India, by using militant groups, which are still considered as strategic assets by Islamabad.” To avoid such a situation, where Pakistan may embark upon its traditional policies vis-à-vis India and
Afghanistan in the wake of its insecurities, the US need to play an active and committed role in two major areas: one, to devise a mechanism for resolving bilateral disputes between India and Pakistan, including Kashmir; and two, to help strengthen the nascent democratic institutions in Pakistan, because a strong democracy will be an effective tool to fight the menace of terrorism in the region.378
378Naeem Ahmed, “General Pervez Musharraf’s Taliban Policy 1999-2008”, 228-229.
216
The relations between the two countries improved in Musharraf era because of the resumption of US military and economic aid in the post-9/11 era. 379 “The above conclusion leads to another one that the US preferred military rule to democracy in
Pakistan. Military dictators, murderers of nascent democracies, did Pakistan’s provision of military bases to America in 1960s, arranging Henry Kissinger’s secret trip to Beijing in 1970, and making Pakistan as a staging area for the covert and overt war in Afghanistan against USSR in 1980s. Washington’s backing of Musharraf since
9/11 has reinforced the traditional popular belief that the US prefers military dictators, lacking legitimacy on the home front, easily submit to its demands.”
The relationship has also shared problems typical of the US ties with a small country.
Pakistan has traditionally responded to regional impulses, while the United States tends to consider global dynamics in its relationships. “The US has historically made light of Pakistan's security concerns and underestimated the strength of Pakistan's commitment to its nuclear program, and Pakistan has failed to see that an inflated
Pakistan-US engagement had no staying power. The US looked aside politely while its ally Pakistan was developing nuclear weapons in 1980s, annually endorsing the presence that Pakistan was not doing so. This practice continued till the American national interests in the area were met with and Pakistan was no more required in their game.”
Anti-Americanism in Pakistan has a complex dynamic. It is framed by four concentric circles: general reaction to the US might and power, “America's current international conduct, relations between Islam and the West, and the history of Pakistan-US relations. Indeed, as the most powerful and arrogant nation on earth, the US provokes envy and resentment around the world.” As for America's international conduct, its
379 Farhat Mehmud, Interview by the researcher, February 11, 2016.
217 legitimacy and self-centeredness have been under challenge, especially after
September 11. Regarding Islam and the West, the picture is even more complex.380
The discussion above testified that Pakistan US relations have never been based on the convergence of common interests rather convenience to America’s national interests.
When the US required U2 surveillance flight facilities and an intelligence base against the Soviets, backdoor diplomacy with the Chinese, overt operations against the Red
Army in Afghanistan, change of Taliban Regime in Afghanistan and recently the war against terrorism, it has extended its best hand forward.
Consequently, American support to Pakistan was forthcoming in terms of military and economic aid as well as support for military dictators. “Pakistan during this time has had modest success in getting economic aid from the US and injections from the
World Bank and IMF. However, all of these spells of engagements have been predicated to the realization of American interests. Every short spell of engagement has brought a long period of estrangement full of suffering, and resentment for
Pakistan.”
The role of the US to resolve the Kashmir issue has been circumscribed. “The US wanted to resolve this issue, but cannot pressurize India in this regards. He also said if the US wanted to resolve the issue, then the US would have to be a mediator, and important thing for mediation is that both the countries would have to accept the decision of a mediator.” If one country did not accept then mediation would fail. Same is the case with the Kashmir issue.381
380Touqir Hussain, “U.S.-Pakistan Engagement The War on Terrorism and Beyond”, July 10, 2005. http://www.usip.org/publications/us-pakistan-engagement-the-war-terrorism-and-beyond. 381 Farooq Hasnat, Interview by the researcher, November 19, 2015.
218
Ambassador Crocker said during an interview,
“The relationship between Pakistan and the US has
developed. It is not really a question of credit to one
particular individual. It is much more important than
that. It has been the development of the institutions of
our relationship, and I think we all know some of the key
examples of that. Our military assistance recently
marked the arrival of Cobra helicopters to support
Pakistan’s effort in the War on Terror. We have done a
great deal with the Pakistan Navy. The F-16 sale is now
moving forward. Two F-16s have already arrived in the
country. We have done a tremendous amount on the
economic side. Our assistance of three billion dollars
over five years, split evenly between economic and
security, is a concrete example of the strength and
continuity of this relationship”.382
The bilateral relationship established in 2001 remained firm. “As had happened with both Ayub and Zia, the US leadership looked on Musharraf as the personification of its ties with Pakistan. The relationship was also strong at the reinvigorated military-to- military level, a particularly important link given the key role of the senior leadership of the Pakistan Army even after Musharraf restored constitutional government and
382 Elizabeth Colton, “Pakistanis are welcoming and Hospitable, Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker”, Khabr-o- Nazar, Match 2007, 8.
219 installed a cabinet drawn mostly from the political world.” It remained so until
Musharraf lost power following the February 2008 parliamentary elections.383
383 Schaffer, How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States, 141.
220
APPENDICES
I. Letter from Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan to President Truman,
July 1, 1950.
II. Visit of World Bank’s roving mission to Pakistan, 1950.
III. Bilateral Agreement of cooperation between Pakistan and USA, March
3, 1959.
IV. Agreement between Pakistan and U.S. from the transit of military
aircrafts.
V. Commending President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan for his
leadership and friendship and welcoming him to the United States,
February 12, 2002.
VI. Commending President Musharraf of Pakistan, February 13, 2002.
VII. US Aid and Terrorists, June 16, 2004.
VIII. President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan to visit Congress, September
22, 2004.
IX. Tribute to President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan, September 13,
2005.
X. Pakistan’s recovery from Earthquakes, November 18, 2005.
XI. President Musharraf of Pakistan, November 05, 2007.
XII. Chronology of Economic Aid From US: 1999-2008
XIII. Pakistan Specific U.S. Legislations
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Appendix I
222
223
224
Appendix II
225
226
227
228
229
230
Appendix III
231
232
233
234
Appendix IV
235
236
237
Appendix V
238
239
240
241
Appendix VI
242
243
Appendix VII
244
245
Appendix VIII
246
247
Appendix IX
248
249
Appendix X
250
251
252
Appendix XI
253
254
Appendix XII
Chronology of Economic Aid from US: 1999-2008
October 28, 1999: A White House Spokesman said that Clinton had decided to waive only two economic sanctions on Pakistan, including the ban on US commercial lending and on agricultural credit guarantees September 27, 2000: Musharraf told the Cabinet that during his visit to New York, an initiative had been taken to improve relations between the US and Pakistan. He said that he held a number of meetings with important people and received an encouraging response to expand political and economic ties between the two countries. August 3, 2001: US Resumed Assistance for Education Sector in Pakistan. During a meeting with Education Minister Zubaida Jalal in Islamabad, USAID Director Swallan James stated that initial 12.5 million dollars would be provided in the next three years. September 29, 2001: Bush announced an outright cash grant of 50 million dollars for Pakistan. October 16, 2001: At a Joint Press Conference with Musharraf in Islamabad, Colin Powell held out a firm assurance that America would take concerns steps in the coming months to help Pakistan to strengthen its economy. Colin Powell held two detailed meetings with five federal ministers and assured them that Washington would offer substantial support for Afghan refugees, give market access and extend possible fiscal support to Pakistan. October 21, 2001: The US Under-Secretary for Economic, Business and Agricultural Affairs Alam Larson stated in Islamabad that US concerns over nuclear proliferation, democracy and human rights would continue to be major foreign policy issues despite offering all our economic support to Pakistan. November 15, 2001: Pakistan and the US in Islamabad signed an agreement under which Washington would provide 600 million dollars in direct budget and balance of payments support to Islamabad. January 17, 2002: During his brief stopover at Chaklala air force base, Colin Powell announced that the U.S. decided to reopen the mission of the USAID in Pakistan. February 4, 2002: A five member delegation headed by deputy Secretary Kenneth Dam called on President Musharraf, in Islamabad, and discussed with him Pakistan’s economic policies. He appreciated consistent economic policies being pursued by the Government and hoped that the Government’s strategy would have desired results. February 14, 2002: Talking to newsman in Washington the Bush announced an economic package for Pakistan that included one billion dollars conditional debt relief along with 100 million dollars for education and 142 million dollars increase in market access for Pakistani apparel exports. February 16, 2002: Shauna Aziz talking to a News Conference in Islamabad said that Pakistan would be charged monthly bills of roughly 60 million dollars for whatever logistics support it extended to the US as long as it forces stayed at the basis in Pakistan in connection to its war against terrorism. In an interview, with PTV Pervez
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Musharraf told that his visit to Washington had helped in achieving deeper and broader” understanding between US and Pakistan. He added that there had been a successful understanding mainly in economic revival, Defense cooperation and diplomatic standing. February 18, 2002: According to official sources, Pakistan had received 80 million dollars against a total of 300 million dollars, the US administration was billed for the logistics of US armed forces and the remaining balance of 220 million dollars was due in a few weeks. February 20, 2002: Five US senators met with Musharraf in Islamabad and expressed great appreciation for Pakistan’s support to the International coalition in its fight against terrorism and discussed the issues of economic concerns between the two countries and regional security. March 6, 2002: Federal Education Minister, Zubaida Jalal after a meeting with an administration official on the US aid program for Pakistan’s education sector, told that the Bush administration had undertaken a 100 million dollars program aimed at promoting educational reforms as part of its 600 million dollars economic package for the current financial tear. March 14, 2002: According to the US embassy news, the USAID administrator announced that it was reopening its mission in Pakistan and Afghanistan in the new fiscal year with a focus on basic education, health, agriculture, rural development and good government. April 20, 2002: An MoU was signed in Washington between Pakistan and the US, according to which a joint economic forum would be established. May 13, 2002: During his visit to Washington, Moinuddin Haider was assured by the US official that Pakistan would get a 73 million dollars grant from the US to combat terrorism in the country. August 9, 2002: According to an agreement signed in Islamabad, USAID program would support the education sector in Pakistan during the next five years. August 23, 2002: According to an agreement signed between Shauna Aziz and Nancy Powell in Islamabad, US rescheduled its debt to Pakistan by 3 billion dollars. September 13, 2002: In a meeting with Musharraf in Washington, President Bush finalized the payment of 300 million dollars for Pakistan to meet the expenses incurred during the US-led war on terror. June 5, 2003: Speaking at a gathering in Islamabad in Islamabad, Nancy Powell said that USAID would provide 100 million dollars during the next five years to support the education program in Pakistan. July 5, 2003: Talking to reporters at a press conference in Islamabad, Shauna Aziz informed that the US granted an unconditional package of three billion US dollar assistance to Pakistan. July 31, 2003: Pakistan received another 256 million dollars from the US for the logistics support it had been providing to the US was against terrorism in this region. August 4, 2003: Responding to a query at his weekly press briefing, Masood Khan said that Pakistan was in constant touch with the US administration and Congress to
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turn down the demand of state Congressmen to hold up the promised US aid of three billion dollars to Pakistan. August 12, 2003: Pakistan and the US signed a five year agreement over a 53 million dollars grant to support Pakistan’s Redaction Strategy Paper (PRSP) program. The agreement was signed by US Assistant Secretary of Commerce William H. Lash a Shauna Aziz in Islamabad. August 18, 2003: Pakistan and the US signed an agreement under which US would provide 115.7 million dollars grant in aid to support Pakistan’s health and development sector. The agreement was signed by Nancy Powell and Waqar Masood Khan in Islamabad. September 4, 2003: Talking to Dawn, Faisal Saleh Hayat said that in addition to the three billion dollars U.S. package for Pakistan, the US had assured more financial assistance for setting up forensic laboratories and check cyber and internet related crimes. A Defense Ministry issued a statement denied a report that US had offered a nine billion dollar defense package to Pakistan. October 2, 2003: Addressing a luncheon at the US Chamber of Commerce in Washington, Prime Minister Jamali while highlighting the existing state of Pakistan’s economy, invited American businessmen to invest in Pakistan. October 3, 2003: The US government approved the sale of 60 attacker’s helicopters to Pakistan. November 19, 2003: Talking to reporters in Islamabad Nancy Powell announced assistance of four million dollars for a project to eliminate child labor in Pakistan, by the US Department of Labor. The project was being executed with the assistance of the ILO, USAID and the US Labor Department December 17, 2003: Addressing a meeting at the Sialkot Chamber of Commerce and Industry (SCCI), U.S. Consul Deborah Grout assured the local businessmen that the US would make strenuous efforts to enhance the mutual trade volume in favor of Pakistan. She further observed that Pakistan’s economy was getting stronger due to the effective and positive economic policies of the government. January 12, 2004: The US government launched a 14 million dollars project to strengthen legislative governance, media and civil society in Pakistan over a period of three years. January 26, 2004: The US government approved 395 million dollars economic assistance for Pakistan. February 26, 2004: Colin Powell presented before the US Senate a 31.5 billion dollars budget proposal for foreign operations of the US which included a 700 million dollars aid package for Pakistan. February 27, 2004: Briefing newsmen in Islamabad, Shaukat Aziz informed that USAID and USDA had entered into contracts worth 32 million dollars for understanding poverty alleviation projects in the country. March 24, 2004: In his testimony before the 9/11 panel, Richard Armitage acknowledged that the sanctions imposed on Pakistan in the 1990s prevented successive U.S. administrative from taking any action against the Taliban and al Qaeda
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because sanctions removed the leverage needed to influence Islamabad. March 25, 2004: The US waived sanctions imposed on Pakistan after President Musharraf seized power in a bloodless coup in 1999, which would enable Pakistan to remove huge economic assistance from the US The sanctions were imposed under clauses 5 and 8 of the Foreign Operations Act which covered areas in the economic and defence sectors. Pakistan welcomed the U.S. decision to lift sanctions imposed on the country. March 26, 2004: The 12-member delegation of the Pakistan-American Business Association, during their meeting with Boll members in Islamabad, announced that US investors would set up an oil refinery in Karachi with an investment of 85 million dollars. April 7, 2004: In an interview with Australia’s SBS Dateline television program, President Musharraf said that Pakistan needed aid, not foreign troops to help rid tribal areas of al Qaeda and other foreign militants. May 11, 2004: A US company Amzo corporation and Pakistan’s private power and infrastructure Board (PPIB) in Islamabad, signed a Letter of Interest (LoI) aimed at upgrading the feasibility study for constructing the 1.2 billion dollars Munda Dam in the NWFP. May 18, 2004: Sources in the Defense Ministry told Dawn that the US government had yet to compensate the loss of 25 million dollars caused to Pakistan due to suspension and curtailment of international air traffic operations to end from Pakistan after 9/11. June 18, 2004: Speaking of Dawn, a senior official of the Finance Ministry disclosed that the U.S. had offered to write off 500 million dollars debt owed by Pakistan. October 28, 2004: During a meeting with Nancy Powell in Islamabad, Prime Minister Aziz appreciated her role in the promotion of Pakistan-US relations and expressed the hope that the growing economic cooperation between the two countries would further strengthen their bilateral ties. November 9, 2004: During a meeting with Musharraf in Islamabad, US deputy secretary of State Richard Armitage assured him of continuity and expansion of Pakistan-US bilateral ties in all spheres, particularly economic and security matters. November 23, 2004: The US Congress approved 701 million dollars in development assistance to Pakistan, including 300 million dollars for military assistance. December 4, 2004: In an official report, US Under Secretary of Treasure for international affairs John Taylor welcomed to Pakistan exist from the IMF’s program due to its increased economic strength. December 8, 2004: Speaking at the function in Quetta, Ryan Crocker announced the expansion of USAID-supported micro-finance programs to six new districts of Baluchistan for enhancing the skills of micro-entrepreneurs and extending loans to boost economic prosperity in the region. December 17, 2004: Addressing the Pakistani journalist based in Washington, Jahangir Karamat welcomed the U.S. decision to provide 1.2 billion dollars arms package to Pakistan. He said that Pakistan needed high-performance aircraft and would make “alternative arrangement” if it failed to get F-16 from the US.
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January 13 2005: The USAID provided 1521 million rupees grants to the Pakistan, poverty alleviation fund (PPAF) to alleviate poverty in the country. January 31 2005: in an interview with an American TV channel, U President George walker bush lauded president Musharraf leadership for introducing socio-economic reforms in his country. He declared that President Musharraf was not under US pressure to introduce those reforms. February 4, 2005: In his meeting with a US defense delegation led by Under Secretary for Defense Douglas J. Feith in Islamabad, President Musharraf appreciated US military assistance to Pakistan and termed it as “critical” for maintaining the military balance in the region. February 11, 2005: According to an official document, the US government was providing 27.5 million dollars to Pakistan as development assistance for its education sector. March 11, 2005: The US Agency for International Development (USAID) announced doubling the amount of aid for Pakistan from 7.2 million dollars to 14.4 million dollars in 2005. March 15, 2005: A 14 member US business delegation led by Chairman of the US- Pakistan Business Council Ahmet Bozn, held a meeting with Awais Leghari and appreciated Pakistan impressive economic growth saying that the US businessmen could play a crucial role in strengthening the country’s economy. March 21, 2005: During his news briefing in Islamabad, Jalil Abbas Jilani rejected that the US had promised massive arms procurement to Pakistan in return for military bases and intelligence assistance by Islamabad in case of anticipated U.S. attack on Iran. March 30, 2005: The US government launched the USDA funded poverty alleviation program amounting to 25 million dollars for Pakistan. April 6, 2005: The USAID and the HEC in Islamabad agreed to increase scholarships to Pakistan students studying in the US to 90 million dollars. April 15, 2005: During a meeting with the acting US Trade Representative Peter Allgeiv in Washington, Homerun Akhtar called for signing an FTA with the US to improve Pakistan’s economy. He stated that the agreement would be of greater help than any direct economic assistance provided by the US. May 26, 2005: The USAID agreed to provide 147.6 million dollars to Pakistan for improving the quality of education, health services, electoral and legislative processes and employment in Pakistan. An MoU in this regard was signed by Christina Roca and State Minister for Economic Affairs Division Hina Rabbani Khar in Islamabad. During a meeting with Christina Rocca in Islamabad, Javed Ashraf Qazi urged the US soften its student visa policy as a large number of Pakistani students were being deprived of studying in the US. May 31, 2005: Talking to a three member US congressional delegation in Islamabad, Musharraf asked the U.S. government to provide greater access to Pakistan products in the U.S. market. The delegation observed that US economic assistance to Pakistan was necessary to deal with the threat of religious extremism.
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June 10, 2005: According to an agreement, the US would provide an additional 200 million dollars to Pakistan to support social and economic investments. The agreement was signed by Ryan Crocker, USAID Director Lisa Chiles and Hina Rabbani Khar. October 1, 2005: Under its embassy program,, the “Ambassadors’ Fund for Cultural Preservation (AFCP), the US government granted 32,887 dollars to Pakistan to restore a fifth century monastery. October 10, 2005: The US government pledged 50 million dollars for relief to Pakistan. October 14, 2005: During a visit to Pakistan’s embassy in Washington, Bush extended condolences over the tragic loss of lives in the earthquake and assured the people of Pakistan of his country’s support in relief and rehabilitation work in the affected areas. October 24, 2005: A US Navy vessel, carrying 140 tons of relief goods for the earthquake survivors, arrived at Karachi port. October 25, 2005: An MoU was signed between the Punjab Assembly and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) on formalizing cooperation between the two institutions. November 9, 2005: Briefing the White House, Bush announced the establishment of the “South Asia Earthquake Fund” which aimed to provide funds and supplies of relief goods for the earthquake survivors in Pakistan. November 10, 2005: Talking to newsman in Washington, Pakistan’s ambassador to the US Jahangir Karamat lauded President Bush for establishing the Earthquake. January 15, 2006: During a meeting with US Senator John Kerry in Islamabad, President Musharraf expresses gratitude for the prompt assistance provided by the U.S. in the areas affected by the earthquake. January 20, 2006: According to an agreement signed between Minister of state for Economic Affairs Hina Rabbani Khar and US Under Secretary of State for political affairs Nicholas Burns in Islamabad, the US government provided 200 million dollars in aid to Pakistan for the reconstruction of the earthquake-hit areas. March, 4, 2006: Pakistan and the US signed an agreement on enhancing maritime trade security under a bilateral initiative, the integrated Cargo/Container Control (IC3) Program. The agreement was signed by Central Board of Revenue Chairman Mohammad Abdullah Yusuf and Ryan Crocker in Islamabad. June 11, 2006: The US House of Representatives reduced its aid to Islamabad from 550 million dollars to 300 million dollars for the fiscal year 2007. July 25, 2006: Talking to Dawn, a US official declared that the reported construction of a nuclear reactor at Khushab would not affect the 5.1 billion dollars arms deal offered to Pakistan by the US, despite demands from US lawmakers to cancel the deal. July 30, 2006: According to official sources, the US government slashed its grant for Pakistan’s Narcotics Control Program by 20 percent that is from 43 million rupees last year to 35 million rupees this year. August 4, 2006: According to a MoU signed by Ryan Crocker and Commandant Frontier Constabulary Malik Naveed Khan in Islamabad, the US pledged to provide 3.5 million dollars grant to help Pakistan stem the tide of Talibanization and its spill
260
over into the settled districts of NWFP (now K.P.K).. August 15, 2006: According to an agreement signed by the USAID Country Director for Pakistan Jonathan Addelten and Khalid Saeed in Islamabad, the U.S. government pledged to provide 22.1 million dollars to Pakistan to support and promote local governance, parliamentary institutions and holding of fair elections. September 27, 2006: US charged Affaires Peter Bodde and Additional Secretary, Economic Affairs Division Ahmed Jawad signed three documents in Islamabad, under which the US would provide 41.2 million dollars to Pakistan for improving law enforcement and border security. October 3, 2006: Talking to newsmen in Islamabad, Ryan Crocker assured continued support to Pakistan in the reconstruction of areas affected by the earthquake. He added that 50 schools and 15 health care facilities would be completed in the first year of the four-year project under USAID’s 200 million dollars reconstruction programs.. November 14, 2006: According to an ADB report, the US provided around 1.1 billion dollars to Pakistan last year for the logistical support for counterterrorism operations, including military operations in Waziristan and other tribal areas. November 20, 2006: In a notification to Congress, the Pentagon disclosed that the US was selling 160 million dollars Harris High Frequency Radio System to Pakistan in response to a request made by Pakistan in this regard. November 30, 2006: The first session of the high level dialogue on education between Pakistan and U.S. was held in Washington, where the US earmarked 100 million dollars to assist education reforms in Pakistan for the year 2007. December 30, 2006: Briefing newsmen in Ottawa, Richard Boucher, while extending US support to Pakistan’s strategy to bring economic prosperity and political stability to the tribal areas, urged the world community, particularly developed states to help Pakistan in implementing the new economic development plan for these areas. February 2, 2007: Pakistan received eight night-capable Cobra attack helicopter AHI-F from U.S. March 6, 2007: Speaking at a function in Bahawalpur, Ryan Crocker stated that his country was committed to finding ways to broaden commercial ties with Pakistan and the Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) represented an important first step in growing Pakistan–US economic relationship. June 15, 2007: An agreement was signed between Pakistan and the US in Islamabad under which the U.S. would provide 200 million as grants for Pakistan’s Public Sector Development Program for 2007-08. June 21, 2007: Speaking at a news briefing in Washington, Khurshid Kasuri disclosed that the US had already delivered some F-16 fighter planes, while others were expected. He expressed the hope that the US would not reduce military assistance to Pakistan despite a change of command in the US Congress. September 30, 2007: The USAID and the development of Pakistan signed an agreement for the provision of 750 million dollars assistances for development in FATA over the next five years. November 4, 2007: In an interview with Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) Joseph
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Biden suggested that Washington should take Punitive action against Pakistan, including withdrawing ling F-16 aircraft and other military equipment from Pakistan if President Musharraf did not end the state of emergency in the country. November 8, 2007: In a statement, Joseph Biden urged the US government to unconditionally triple non-security aid to Pakistan to 1.5 billion dollars a year for at least a decade, which would build schools, clinics and roads instead of funding military hardware. December 14, 2007: Pakistan signed a 284 million dollars arms deal with a US company Raytheon Missile System for the purchase of 500 advanced medium range air-to-air missile (AMRAAM) as well as 200 AIM-9M Sidewinder missiles. December 19, 2007: The US Senate approved a 785 million dollars aid package for Pakistan, but withheld 50 million dollars, which would be released only after the State Department submitted a report that Pakistan was making progress in the fight against terrorism and taking steps for the implementation of democracy in the country. February 4, 2008: According to a White House statement, Bush sought financial assistance of 830 million dollars for Pakistan in order to help the country in achieving the goals of stability, development and democracy. February 13, 2008: Condoleezza Rice presented a budget request before Congress for 2009, which included 830 million dollars assistances for Pakistan, with 453.2 million dollars from the economic support fund and 300 million dollars from the foreign military fund. March 26, 2008: President Bush waived democracy related restrictions on Pakistan, allowing the country to receive 300 million dollars US assistance in the current year. April18, 2008: In its latest report, the US Government Accountability Offer noted that the US would provide 956 million dollars to Pakistan between 2008 and 2011 as part of a comprehensive plan to expand its engagement with the country from military to civilian sectors. June 24, 2008: The US House of Representative approved more than 523 million dollars economic assistance to Pakistan. June 27, 2008: The US Senate approved 150 million dollars of economic assistance to Pakistan. June 30, 2008: Musharraf urged the US government to release the development fund of 750 million dollars assistances announced for the five years, to help improve the socio economic conditions in the tribal areas. Prepared by the researcher with the help of different journals from 1999-2008
262
Appendix XIII
PAKISTAN SPECIFIC U.S. LEGISLATIONS
Symington Amendment: Adopted 1976. Sec. 101 of the Arms Export Control Act, formerly Sec. 669 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended.
Prohibits most US assistance to any country found trafficking in nuclear enrichment equipment or technology outside of international safeguards. President Jimmy Carter found Pakistan in violation of the Symington amendment in 1979 because of
Islamabad's construction of a uranium enrichment plant. US aid to Islamabad was possible between 1982 and 1990 only through the use of presidential waivers.
Glenn Amendment: Adopted 1977. Sec. 102(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, formerly Sec. 670 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended.
Prohibits US foreign assistance to any non-nuclear-weapon state (as defined by the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) that, among other things, detonates a nuclear explosive device. Clinton imposed Glenn amendment sanctions against India on May
th 13, 1998, on its nuclear explosion of 11 May. Clinton invoked similar sanctions
th against Pakistan on May 30, 1998, following Islamabad's retaliatory detonation on 28
May.
Pressler Amendment: Enacted in 1985. Sec. 620E[e] of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 as amended.
The Pressler Amendment stipulated that most military and economic assistance to
Pakistan could only be authorized after an annual certification by the US president that
Pakistan did not possess a nuclear explosive device and that the provision of US aid
263
would significantly reduce the risk of Pakistan possessing such a device. Bush did not offer certification in 1990, resulting in a series of punitive measures, including banning most of the economic and military assistance to Pakistan. Pressler amendment prohibitions damaged the most to US-Pakistan relations.
Brownback I: Adopted 1998. The India-Pakistan Relief Act of 1998, incorporated into the fiscal 1999 omnibus appropriations bill (Public Law 105-277).
Provides the president with authority to waive, for a period of one year, Glenn,
Symington and Pressler amendment sanctions on India and Pakistan, except for those pertaining to military assistance, dual-use exports and military sales.
Brownback II: Adopted 1999. Incorporated into the fiscal year 2000 defense appropriations bill (Public Law 106-79).
The president was authorized to waive off provisions of the Glenn, Symington and
Pressler amendments with respect to India and Pakistan. It States that the broad application" of export controls on Indian and Pakistani government agencies and private companies suspected of having links to their country's nuclear or missile programs is "inconsistent" with the national security interests of the US and urges the application of US export controls only against agencies and companies that make
"direct and material contributions to weapons of mass destruction and missile programs and only to those items that can contribute to such programs.47
October 1999-"Democracy Sanctions: After Musharraf's October 12, 1999, coup,
Congress invoked Section 508 of the Foreign Assistance Act, prohibiting all US economic and military aid toward Pakistan.
Post 9/11 Waivers: Bush waived the Glenn, Symington, and Pressler sanctions under
264
the authority given to him by the legislation known as Brownback II. Congress voted to allow Bush to waive the "democracy sanctions" imposed on Pakistan through
September 30, 2003. These democracy sanctions have since been waived annually.
December 2004: Ackerman Amendment: This amendment to the Intelligence
Authorization Act requires the CIA, over a five-year period, to make annual reports to
Congress about Pakistan's nuclear activities, democratic development, and counter terror efforts.
Source: Qadar Bakhsh Baloch, “Engagement and Estrangement in U.S.-Pakistan Relations”, The
Dialogue, Vol. 1, No. 4, (Spring 2008) 51-53.
265
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Colton, Elizabeth O. “Former US Ambassador to Afghanistan Ronald Neumann Visits
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Fintor, Lou. “Joint Communique United States-Pakistan Economic Dialogue”. Khabr-
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NEWS DIGEST
Keesing’s Record of World Events (1999-2008)
“The Prime Minister of India Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Pakistan Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif Talks”. Keesing’s Record of World Events, 45, no. 2 (Feb 1999):
42778.
“Escalation of Conflict in Kashmir”. Keesing’s Record of World Events, 45, no.5 (May
1999):42936.
“Attacks in Kashmir-Prolonged Detention of Hurriyat Leaders”. Keesing’s Record of
World Events, 45, no. 12 (December 1999):43310.
“Reports on Bin Laden”. Keesing’s Record of World Events, 46, no.1 (February
2000):43406.
“Domestic Response to the Attacks (Bush’s Speech)”. Keesing’s Record of World
Events, 47, no.9 (September 2001): 44334.
“Removal of U.S. Sanctions and Rescheduling of Debt-IMF Loan”. Keesing’s Record
of World Events, 47, no.9 (September 2001): 44344.
“Statement by President Bush and Bin Laden”. Keesing’s Record of World Events, 47,
no.10 (October 2001): .44392.
278
“Landmark Broadcast by Musharraf”. Keesing’s Record of World Events, 48, no.1
(January 2002): 44557.
“Kidnapping of U.S. Journalist”. Keesing’s Record of World Events, 48, no.1 (January
2002): 44558,
“Murder of Kidnapped U.S. Journalist, Keesing’s Record of World Events, 48, no.2
(February 2002): 44614.
“Visit by Musharraf to U.S.”. Keesing’s Record of World Events, 48, no.2 (February
2002): 44615.
“India and Pakistan Close War over Kashmir-Massacre at Army Camp”. Keesing’s
Record of World Events, 48, no.5 (May 2002): 44792.
“Suicide Bomb Attack on U.S. Consulate”. Keesing’s Record of World Events, 48.
no.6 (June 2002): 44840.
“Verdict in Pearl Murder Trial”. Keesing’s Record of World Events, 48, no.7 (July
2002): 44894.
“Attacks on U.S. Consulate in Karachi-Attack on Karachi Mosque”. Keesing’s Record
of World Events, 49, no.2 (February 2003): 45242.
“U.S. Sanction over Missiles”. Keesing’s Record of World Events, 49, no.3 (March
2003): 45290.
“Visit of Senior U.S. Officials”. Keesing’s Record of World Events, 49, no.5 (May
2003): 45402.
“Visit of U.S. Secretary of State Powell”. Keesing’s Record of World Events, 50, no.3
(Mach 2004): 45902.
279
“Law on Musharraf’s Dual Role. Law on Honour Killing”. Keesing’s Record of World
Events, 50, no.19 (October 2004): 46252.
“U.S. Approval of F-16 Sale”. Keesing’s Record of World Events, 51, no.3 (March
2005): 46517.
“U.S. Missile Strike on Tribal Area”. Keesing’s Record of World Events, 52, no.1
(January 2006): 47038.
“Visit of Bush- Hostile Demonstrations and Bombing in Karachi”. Keesing’s Record
of World Events, 52, no.3 (March 2006): 47149.
“Claim by U.S. Intelligence Chief of Al-Qaeda Base in Pakistan”. Keesing’s Record of
World Events, 53, no.1 (January 2007): 47694.
PRESS CONFERENCES/BRIEFINGS
“President General Musharraf’s News Conference after Talks with President Bill
Clinton, March 25, 2000”. Rashmi Jain, ed. The United States and Pakistan,
1947-2006 A Documentary Study, New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 2007. 160.
“Text of the Press Conference of Chief Executive of Pakistan, General Pervez
Musharraf”. Pakistan Horizon, 54, no. 1 (January 2001): 100.
“Transcript of Joint Press Conference of President Musharraf and Secretary of State,
Powell at Islamabad, October 16, 2001”. Rashmi Jain, ed. The United States
and Pakistan, 1947-2006 A Documentary Study, New Delhi: Radiant
Publishers, 2007. 168.
“Text of White House Press Briefing on the U.S. President George W. Bush’s Series
of Phone Calls to the Leaders Around the World to Rally an International
280
Coalition to Combat Terrorism, Washington, DC”. Pakistan Horizon, 54, no.4
(October 2001): 89-134.
“Text of the News Briefing given by the U.S. Secretary of State, Colin Powell at the
State Department, Washington DC”. Pakistan Horizon, 54, no.4 (October
2001): 89-134.
“Text of the Joint Press Briefing by President Pervez Musharraf and U.S. President
Bush”. Pakistan Horizon, 56, no. 3 (July 2003): 155-164.
“Text of the Joint Press Briefing by President Pervez Musharraf and President Bush”.
Pakistan Horizon, 59, no.2 (April 2006): 141-189.
“Text of the Joint Press Briefing by Foreign Secretary Riaz Mohammad Khan and U.S.
Deputy Secretary of State, John Negroponte at the Conclusion of Second
Round of Pakistan-U.S. Strategic Dialogue”. Pakistan Horizon, 60, no.4
(October 2007): 135-165.
PUBLISHED INTERVIEWS
“Text of the Interview given by Chief Executive of Pakistan, General Pervez
Musharraf to the Time of Oman”. Pakistan Horizon, 54, no.3 (July 2001): 93.
Ayesha Jalal’s Interview. The Herald, Annual (January 2002): 111-114.
Maleeha Lodhi, Interview by Ray Suarez, PBS Newshour, January 11, 2002. Accessed
January 11, 2015, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia-jan-june02-
pakistan_1-11/.
“Excerpts from the Interview given by President Pervez Musharraf to Washington
Post”. Pakistan Horizon, 55, no. 3 (July 2002): 171-182.
281
“Text of an Interview given by President Pervez Musharraf to BBC World Services
Programme”. Pakistan Horizon, 55, no.3 (July 2002): 119.
“The Edited Text of President Pervez Musharraf’s Interview with BBC World
London”. Pakistan Horizon, 56, no.4 (October 2003): 166-174.
“Condoleezza Rice Interview with Quatrina Hosain Currim of Pakistan Television
Excerpts”. IPRI, v, no. 2 (Summer 2005): 190-192.
Colton, Elizabeth O. “U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Boucher’s Interview
by Hasan khan with Private TV Channel AVT Khyber”. Khabr-o-Nazar,
January 2007, 14-15.
Colton, Elizabeth O. “An Interview with USAID Director Jonathan Addleton”. khabr-
o-Nazar, February 2007, 6-8.
Colton, Elizabeth O. “An Exclusive Interview with Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker”.
Khabr-o-Nazar March 2007, 8-11.
Colton, Elizabeth O. “U.S. Aid Launches 16.7 Million Dollars Safe Drinking Water
Project”. Khabr-o-Nazar, April 2007, 10.
Colton, Elizabeth O. “An Interview with U.S Foreign Policy Expert, Walter Russell
Mead”. Khabr-o-Nazar, October 2007, 12-13.
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accessed on March 24, 2013.
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Lodhi, Maleeha. Interview by Naseem Zahra, Dunya News TV Channel, May 12,
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AUTOBIOGRAPHY
Blair, Tony. A Journey. London: Hutchinson, 2010.
Bush, George W. Decision Points. New York: Crown Publishers, 2010.
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YEAR BOOKS
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Pakistan.
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Pakistan.
Foreign Office, Year Book 2002, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of
Pakistan.
Foreign Office, Year Book 2005, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of
Pakistan.
Handbook of Pakistan China Relations 2008, Pakistan China Institute.
MOUs
Colton, Elizabeth O “U.S. Congressional Delegations Visit Pakistan. U.S
Congressional Witnesses Signing Ceremony, 1 Million dollar MoU signed”.
Khabr-o-Nazar, April 2007.5.
“MoU was signed in Washington between Pakistan and the U.S. according to which a
Joint Economic Forum would be established”. Pakistan Horizon, 55, no.3 (July
2002): 110.
284
“MoU was signed by Christina Roca and State Minister for Economic Affairs Division
Hina Rabbani Khar in Islamabad”. Pakistan Horizon, 58, no.3 (July 2005):
165.
“MoU was signed between the Punjab Assembly and the USAID on Formalizing
Cooperation between the two Institutions”. Pakistan Horizon, 59, no.1 (January
2006): 119.
“According to a MoU signed by Ryan Crocker and Commandant Frontier
Constabulary Malik Naveed Khan in Islamabad, the US Pledged to Provide 3.5
Million Dollars Grant”. Pakistan Horizon, 59, no.4 (October 2006): 190.
STATEMENTS
“Joint Statement United States Pakistan Strategies Partnership, March 4, 2006”. IPRI,
vi, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 183-186.
“The Pakistan United States Joint Statement on US Energy Secretary Samuel
Bodman’s visit to Pakistan March 13, 2006”. IPRI, vi, no. 2 (Summer 2006):
187-188.
“Text of the statement issued by Foreign Minister Abdus Sattar after the summit
between President of Pakistan Pervez Musharraf and Indian Prime Minister
Atal Behari Vajpayee”. Pakistan Horizon, 54, no.4 (October 2001): 89-134.
“Text of the Statement made by the US President Bush to the U.S. nation after the 11
September terrorist attacks, Washington DC; 11 September 2001”. Pakistan
Horizon, 54, no.4 (October 2001): 89-134.
285
“Text of the Joint Statement issued during President Pervez Musharraf’s visit to China,
Beijing”. Pakistan Horizon, 59, no.2 (April 2006): 141-189.
“Text of the Joint Statement issued during US President Bush’s visit to Pakistan”.
Pakistan Horizon, 59, no.2 (April 2006): 141-189.
Colton, Elizabeth O “US Pakistan Strategic Dialogue, Deputy Secretary Negroponte’s
Statement at the Joint Press Conference, His meeting with President Pervez
Musharraf”. Khabr-o-Nazar, October 2007.8
“Joint Statement on US Pakistan Strategic Partnership”. Khabr-o-Nazar, August 2008.
6.
REMARKS
“Remarks by Finance Minister Shaukat Aziz at the Signing Ceremony of the 3 Billion
Dollars debt Rescheduling Agreements 23 August 2002”, Rashmi Jain. ed. The
United States and Pakistan, 1947-2006 A Documentary Study.277.
“Remarks by Interior Minister Moinuddin Haider to Newsmen at Shakaraparian, 27
September 2002 (Extract)”, Rashmi Jain, ed. 277-278.
Colton, Elizabeth O “Excerpt of Remarks to the Press by Assistant Secretary for South
and Central Asian Affairs Richard A. Boucher.” Khabr o Nazar. August 2007.
“Remarks by Thomas R. Pickering, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, 6
December 1999”, Rashmi Jain. ed. 156.
“President Clinton’s Reply to the Remarks by Pakistani Ambassador Maleeha Lodhi
on the occasion of the Presentation of her Credentials, 4 February 2000”.
Rashmi Jain, ed. 157.
286
“Text of the Remarks made by the U.S. President Bush in a Meeting with Muslim
Community Leaders, Washington DC.” Pakistan Horizon, 54, no. 4 (October
2001): 89-134.
REPORTS
Report on U.S. Financing of Law-enforcement in Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA), 12 March 2003 Rashmi Jain, ed. 277-278.
Congressional Report on the Budget Session, 22 November 2004 (Extract) Rashmi
Jain, ed. 285.
Report U.S. Payment of Rs.73.8 Million of Pakistan for Arresting Terrorist, 6 July
2005 (Extracts) Rashmi Jain, ed. 287
Report on U.S. –Pakistan trade, August 2005 (Extracts) Rashmi Jain, ed. 287.
U.S. State Department’s Annual Report on Terrorism, 30 April 2000. Rashmi Jain,
ed.161.
“Report of the Policy Working Group on the United Nations and Terrorism.” Pakistan
Horizon, 56, no. 3, (July 2003):164-196.
ADDRESSES
Government of Pakistan, Address to the Nation by Chief Executive Islamic Republic of
Pakistan General Pervez Musharraf, Islamabad: Directorate General of Films
and Publications Ministry of Information & Media Development Government
of Pakistan, December 19, 1999.
287
Government of Pakistan, Press Conference by Chief Executive General Pervez
Musharraf, Islamabad: Directorate General of Films and Publications Ministry
of Information & Media Development Government of Pakistan, March 25,
2000.
Government of Pakistan, Address to the Nation by Chief Executive General Pervez
Musharraf, Islamabad: Directorate General of Films and Publications Ministry
of Information & Media Development Government of Pakistan, August 14,
2000.
General Pervez Musharraf Speech on Radio Pakistan on 12 October 1999.
“Address of President Bush to National Defence University”, Khabr-o-Nazar, April
2005, 6.
“President’s Address to the Pakistan Community in U.S., September 24, 2006.” IPRI,
VII, no.1 (Winter 2007): 177-179.
“Text of the Address by Chief Executive General Pervez Musharraf to the Nation, 15
December 1999.” Pakistan Horizon, 53, no.1 (January 2000): 69.
Text of the Address made by Chief Executive of Pakistan General Pervez Musharraf
and the Chinese Prime Minister, Zhu Rongji at a Press Conference, 11 May
2001.” Pakistan Horizon, 54, no.3 (July 2001): 91-157
“Text of the Address Delivered by the U.S. President Bush to the U.S. Congress and to
the US People, Washington DC; 20 September 2001.” Pakistan Horizon, 54,
no.4 (October 2001): 89-134.
288
“Text of the State of the Union address delivered by U.S. President Bush, Washington
D C; 31 January 2006.” Pakistan Horizon, 59, no.2 (April 2006): 141-189.
“Text of President Pervez Musharraf’s Address to the Nation, Islamabad; 8 November
2007.” Pakistan Horizon, 61, no. 1-2 (January-April 2008): 240.
“Text of U.S. President Bush’s State of the Union Address, Washington D. C; 28
January 2008.” Pakistan Horizon, 61, no. 1-2 (January-April 2008): 240.
“Text of the Address Delivered by President Pervez Musharraf to the Nation”.
Pakistan Horizon, 60, no.4 (October 2007): 135-165.
PRESS RELEASES
Press Release USAID assistance of 147 Million Dollars, 26 May 2005 (Extracts)
Rashmi Jain, ed. 285-286.
Press Release on U.S. Assistance of 200 Million Dollars, 10 June 2005 (Extracts)
Rashmi Jain. ed. 285-286.
U.S. Embassy Press Release on the Provision of 30 Million Dollars to Pakistan for
Counter Narcotics and Border Security, 20 September 2005 (Extracts) Rashmi
Jain, ed. 287
Press Release of the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan on Provision of 13 Million Dollars for
Earthquake Activates, 7 April 2006 (Extract) Rashmi Jain, ed. 292-293.
FACT SHEETS
U.S. Department of State, Fact Sheet on U.S. Response to Pakistan’s Earthquake
disaster, 12 December 2005 (Extracts) Rashmi Jain, ed. 288-289.
289
Department of State, Fact Sheet on U.S.-Pakistan economic cooperation, 4 March
2006 (Extracts) Rashmi Jain, ed. 290.
Department of State Fact Sheet on U.S.-Pakistan cooperation in education, 4 March
2006 (Extracts) Rashmi Jain, ed. 292-293.
High-Level Visits to and from Pakistan during Pervez Musharraf era
Bill Clinton visit to Pakistan, March 25, 2000.
US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, visits South Asia, October 2001.
President Bush and President Musharraf met at the UN General Assembly in New
York City, November 10, 2001.
Colin Powell Visits South Asia, December 2001.
President Musharraf Arrives in Washington for a three-day Official Visit, February
2002.
President Bush and President Musharraf met at the UN General Assembly in New
York City, September 12, 2002.
US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia met President Musharraf met, October
2002.
US Ambassador in Islamabad, Nancy Powell, January 2003.
Pakistan’s ambassador to the U.S., Ashraf Jehangir Qazi met with U.S. Officials,
February 2003.
US Assistant Secretary of State, Christina Rocca, Arrives in Islamabad, March 2003.
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Visit of Senior US Officials to Pakistan, May 2003.
President Bush and President Musharraf met in Washington, DC and Camp David.
Arrived in Boston June 20, later Visited Los Angeles. June 23–27, 2003.
President Musharraf met with President Bush at the UN General Assembly in New
York City. September 24, 2003.
US Vice President, Dick Cheney, meets President Musharraf in Davos, January 2004.
US Secretary of State, Powell visit to Pakistan, Mach 2004.
US Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage visit to South Asia, July 2004:
President Musharraf met with President Bush at the UN General Assembly in New
York City. September 21–22, 2004.
Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice visit to Pakistan, March 16-18, 2005.
President Pervez Musharraf Visit to China on 19 to 23 February 2006.
President Bush visit to Pakistan, March 3-4, 2006.
President Musharraf Visits United States. September 2006.
Ambassador Shirin Tahir Kheli Visit to Pakistan, March 14, 2007.
US Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker Visit to Pakistan March 2007.
US Congressional Delegations Visit Pakistan, April 3, 2007.
Former US Ambassador to Afghanistan Ronald Neumann Visits Islamabad, 16 May
2007.
Anee W. Patterson as Ambassador to Pakistan, 28 June 2007.
291
Ambassador Patterson Visits Lahore, 2 August 2007.
Ambassador Patterson Visits Lahore, August 2, 2007.
Chinese President Visits Pakistan Medical Mission in China. June 1, 2008.
US Deputy Secretary of State, John D. Negroponte Visit to Pakistan, March 25-27,
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NEWSPAPERS
Business Recorder, Karachi.
Daily Times, Lahore.
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Pakistan and Gulf Economist, Karachi.
Pakistan Today, Lahore.
307
The Nation, Islamabad.
The News, Islamabad.
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