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INDONESIA 1942–1950 Praise For WILLIAM J. RUST THE MASK of NEUTRALITY THE UNITED STATES AND D E COL O NIZ ATIO N IN INDONESIA 1942–1950 Praise for The Mask of Neutrality: The United States and Decolonization in Indonesia, 1942–1950 “William Rust once again reminds us that we can find no better guide to the labyrinthine origins of America’s tragic entanglements in Southeast Asia. Deeply researched in a broad spectrum of archives and uncovering a range of hitherto little known or even unknown intelligence activities, The Mask of Neutrality explores the twists and turns of the US posture toward the decolonization of Indonesia with insight, nuance, and historical sensibility. A sobering account, it will remain the go-to history for years to come.” ¾ Richard Immerman, Temple University “William Rust likes to say he prefers origin stories. The Mask of Neutrality is just that¾for the nation of Indonesia, emerging from its centuries as a Dutch colony. In a history eerily similar to that of Vietnam¾and, where the author shows us, Dean Rusk had a ringside seat and ought to have learned the lessons¾nationalists have gained the heart of the nation, but Dutch colonialists negotiate insincerely, then fight, to change that. Rust delivers a deep tale of World War II anxieties, inter-allied intrigues, American doubts and internal squabbles, CIA machinations. Its predecessor agency, the OSS, even resorts to kidnapping in order to recruit agents. This is a splendid account, a detailed diplomatic history, and an eye-opening peek at a significant piece of history. Everyone interested in America’s role in the world should read The Mask of Neutrality.” ¾ John Prados, author of Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA “William Rust has done it again. The Mask of Neutrality: The United States and Decolonization in Indonesia, 1942-1950, is another tour de force about American intervention in Southeast Asia after World War II. As with his books about Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, Rust looks at the dynamic trends of dying colonialism, the emerging Cold War, and American efforts to influence events in the region through diplomacy, espionage, and military pressure. His look at the efforts of CIA and its predecessor agencies to field an intelligence service with eyes and ears on the ground is especially revealing.” ¾ John Nixon, author of Debriefing the President: The Interrogation of Saddam Hussein THE MASK OF NEUTRALITY The United States and Decolonization in Indonesia, 1942–1950 Copyright © William J. Rust 2019, 2020 Cover Design: Shagas Design Contents Abbreviations Introduction: We Bow to Coercion 1 1. The Old Order Will Not Return (1942–1944) 17 2. We Had to Take Risks (1944–1945) 40 3. Hard Feelings with the British and Dutch (1945) 75 4. Both Sides Are Beginning to Dislike Us Equally (1945–1946) 102 5. A Decided Turn for the Worse (1946–1947) 133 6. Living in Different Worlds (1947–1948) 162 7. A Feeling of Desperation (1948) 192 8. A Squeeze Play (1948) 214 9. Profoundly Shocked and Grievously Disappointed (1948) 241 10. Pious Hopes (1948–1949) 271 11. Highly Slanted Propaganda (1949) 303 12. Strenuous Opposition (1950) 340 13. Neutrality with a Bias (1950) 371 Appendix: Chronology of US-Indonesian Relations, 1951–1953 396 Acknowledgments 413 Bibliography 414 About the Author 433 Photographs follow page 213 Map of Indonesia produced by the Netherlands Information Bureau during World War II. (National Archives and Record Administration) Abbreviations ABDACOM American, British, Dutch, and Australian Command AIB Allied Intelligence Bureau ANETA Algemeen Nieuws en Telegraaf Agentschap (General News and Telegraph Agency) APRA Angkatan Perang Ratu Adil (Armed Forces of the Righteous Ruler) APRI Angkatan Perang Republik Indonesia (Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia) APRIS Angkatan Perang Republik Indonesia Serikat (Armed Forces of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia) CBI China-Burma-India Theater CIA Central Intelligence Agency CIG Central Intelligence Group CMI Central Military Intelligence COI Office of the Coordinator of Information DCI Director of Central Intelligence ECA Economic Cooperation Administration ERP European Recovery Program FE 22 Far East No. 22 FO Foreign Office GOC Good Offices Committee HRC High Representative of the Crown IBT India-Burma Theater IRIS Interim Research Intelligence Service JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff KNIL Koninklijk Nederlands-Indisch Leger (Royal Netherlands East Indies Army) KNIP Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat (Central Indonesian National Committee) KVP Katholieke Volkspartij (Catholic People’s Party) MDAP Mutual Defense Assistance Program MO Morale Operations MSA Mutual Security Act NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NEFIS Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service NEI Netherlands East Indies NIA National Intelligence Authority NICA Netherlands Indies Civil Administration NII Negara Islam Indonesia (Islamic State of Indonesia) NSC National Security Council OIR Office of Intelligence Research OSS Office of Strategic Services OWI Office of War Information PETA Pembela Tanah Air (Defenders of the Homeland) PKI Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party) PNI Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Party) POW Prisoner of War PPKI Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence) PRC People’s Republic of China PvdA Partij van de Arbeid (Labor Party) R&A Research and Analysis RAPWI Recovery of Allied Prisoners of War and Internees RI Republik Indonesia (Republic of Indonesia) RIS Republik Indonesia Serikat (Republic of the United States of Indonesia) RMS Republik Maluku Selatan (Republic of the South Moluccas) RTC Roundtable Conference SC Security Council SEAC Southeast Asia Command SI Secret Intelligence SIS Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) SO Special Operations SSU Strategic Services Unit SWPA Southwest Pacific Area TNI Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Army) UNCI United Nations Commission for Indonesia UP United Press USI United States of Indonesia USIS US Information Service VVD Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy) X-2 Counterintelligence Additional Abbreviations Used in Notes BDFA British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part IV, from 1946 through 1950, Series E, Asia CDBP Coert du Bois Papers CDF Central Decimal File DAP Dean Acheson Papers DCER Documents on Canadian External Relations EIE Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment FAOHC Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection FDRL Franklin D. Roosevelt Library FPGP Frank Porter Graham Papers FOIA Freedom of Information Act FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States HD Historical Documents HSTL Harry S. Truman Library HSTOHP Harry S. Truman Oral History Program MRP Map Room Papers NAA National Archives of Australia NARA National Archives and Record Administration NAPF Naval Aide to the President Files ORE Office of Reports and Estimates PSF The President’s Secretary’s File RG Record Group (at NARA) Introduction We Bow to Coercion The US embassy in The Hague, the seat of the Netherlands government, transmitted a disturbing top-secret message to the State Department on May 16, 1949: Foreign Minister Dirk U. Stikker had denounced American diplomacy and diplomats to the foreign editor of the Chicago Sun- Times, Irving P. Pflaum. In his summary of the interview for the embassy, Pflaum boiled down Stikker’s thirty-minute diatribe to a single sentence: “Everything is lost in Indonesia and [the] US [is] to blame.”1 Stikker, according to Pflaum, said that Secretary of State Dean Acheson had threatened to cut off US economic assistance to the Netherlands if the Dutch did not comply with UN Security Council resolutions aimed at ending their nearly four-year conflict with the revolutionary Republic of Indonesia. The Dutch cabinet’s initial response to Acheson’s warning, the foreign minister claimed, was a refusal to sign the pact establishing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the acceptance of a “shut-off” of American economic aid. But after further deliberation, the cabinet “ordered Stikker [to] submit [to the] Secretary of State[’s] terms and sign [the] treaty.”2 The Netherlands ministers, Pflaum reported, had concluded that the loss of US aid “would cause [an] economic collapse at home with strikes and unemployment within six months.” Stikker’s remarks to the journalist included bitter personal attacks against US officials in Indonesia—one was a “fellow traveler,” another was a “drunkard,” and another was “able” but unduly influenced by “Republican hospitality.” These Americans, said Stikker, had “given incorrect information and bad advice” to Acheson and his predecessor, George C. Marshall. 1 Using “false reports from the field,” the State Department had “manipulated US public opinion,” creating “strong popular support” for Indonesian nationalists and “substantial anti-Dutch sentiment.”3 In Washington, State Department officials were alarmed and perplexed by the anti- American comments from Stikker, who had seemed friendly to the United States and relatively moderate when discussing Indonesia. Only a week before, Stikker expressed “deep appreciation” to Acheson for acknowledging his contribution to a Dutch-Republican agreement reached in Batavia, the city known today as Jakarta. After years of fruitless negotiations, the talks assisted by the United Nations Commission for Indonesia (UNCI) appeared to be moving toward a peaceful transfer of sovereignty to the Indonesians by the end
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