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MOHAMAD ROEM'S POLITICAL ACTIVITIES AND ISLAMIC POLITICAL VISION (1908-1983)

by Hamdan Juhannis

A thesis submitted to the Institute ofIslamic Studies Faculty ofGraduate Studies and Research, McGill University in partial fnlfilhnent ofthe requirement for the degree of Master ofArts

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Canad~ ~j. ABSTRACT

Author : Hamdan Juhannis Title of thesis : Mohamad Roem's Political Activities and Islamic Political Vision (1908-1983) Department : Institute ofIslamic Studies, McGill University Degree : Master of Arts (M.A.) ------This thesis deals with the political activities and Islamic political vision of

Mohamad Roem (1908-1983), a prominent Masyumi leader and Indonesian diplomat in

the first halfof the twentieth century. His life and early education as weIl as bis works are

discussed in order ta trace the sources which inspired his vision. In bis political activities,

Roem expressed his IsIamic nationalism by joining and founding Islamic movements

from the late Dutch colonial period through the beginning of the New Order. He had

much political success, especially in the Republican period. However, he was one of

many Muslim leaders who also suffered for bis political involvement ef large magaituele;

in the Soekarno era, he was jailed for about four years, while in the Soeharto era, he was

banned from participating in political activities. He was a moderate Muslim. leader who

aspired to cooperate with "secular" leaders in his time for the sake of a larger cause. His

Islamic political vision had a significant impact and was a major contribution to both the

Indonesian state and the IsIamic community. His moderation is reflected in his political

correspondence with Nurcholish Madjid in which he argued for the need of an Islarnic

political party without demanding the creation of an Islanùc state. Finally, Roem's

political activities and IsIamic political vision point to a model ofactivism in a religiously

pluralistic country and could possibly serve as an inspiration to Muslim politicians,

especially after Soeharto's fall when Islamic political parties found fertile ground for • growth. li ~. RÉSUMÉ

Auteur: Hamdan Juhannis Titre: Les Activités politiques et la vision islamique de Mohamad Roem (1908-1983). Département: 1"1stitut des Études Islamiques, Université McGill. Diplôme: Maîtrise ès Arts (M.A.)

Ce mémoire aborde les activités et la vision politique islamique de Mohamad Roem

(1908-1983), leader important du Masyumi et diplomate indonésien pendant la première

moitié du vingtième siècle. Sa vie privée, son éducation ainsi que son oeuvre seront

analysées afin de remonter aux sources qui ont inspiré sa vision. À travers ses activités

politiques, Roem a pu exprimer son nationalisme islamique en se joignant et en fondant

divers mouvements islamiques depuis la fin de la période coloniale néerlandaise jusqu'au

"'---'-. début du régime de l'Ordre Nouveau. TI obtint beaucoup de succès, particulièrement durant

la période républicaine. Cependant, il fut un parmi tant d'autres leaders musulmans qui ont

eu à souffrir de leur implication politique: pendant la période Soekarno, il fut emprisonné

pendant près de quatre ans et durant le régime Soeharto, il fut exclu de toute activité

politique. Roem fut un leader musulman modéré qui espérait collaborer avec les dirigents

"séculiers" de son époque pour le bénéfice d'une cause plus importante. Sa vision politique

islamique eut un impact significatif et fut une contribution majeure à la fois pour l'état

indonésien et la communauté islamique. Sa modération se reflète dans sa correspondance

politique avec Nurcholish Madjid, par laquelle il plaide pour la nécessité d'un parti politique

islamique sans pour autant exiger la création d'un état islamique. Enfin, les activités et la

vision politique islamique de Roem indique un modèle de militantisme dans un pays de

• iii ~. pluralisme religieux pouvant servir d'inspiration aux politiciens musulmans, tout

particulièrement suite à la chute de Soeharto alors que les partis politiques islamiques ont

trouvé un terrain fertile pour se développer.

-• iv ~. NOTE ONTRANSLATERATION

For Arabie names and Islanlie terms, the system ofArabie transliteration employed

by the institute of Islamic Studies McGili University will be employed. Indonesian

tenns are written according to the Ejaan Bahasa Indonesia yang Disempumakan (EyD)

1972, but the titles of books and articles will remain as quoted. The following is the

transliteration table for Arabie alphabet:

1 = a ..) - z J = q ~ u = b lf - s = k ... Ü = t t.f = sh J = 1 ü = th ~ - ~ r= m ~=j r.P = 4 W = n C=4 1, - t ..J = w t=kh ~=? o = h J = d t = ' l:? = y .i = db t=gh ..) = r J = f

Ta indicate long vowels of i j ts, these are typed by placing a macron above

characters: a, u, r.

The ta:! marbutah (o) is translated as "ah" rather than "a", e.g., da~wah rather

than da ~wa or madrasah rather than madrasa..

-- • v ACKNOWLEDGMENT ~-.

My thanks go to a number of people without whom this thesis would never have

been completed. l would like to express my foremost thanks to Prof. Howard M.

Federspiel, my supervisor, for his continuous guidance, and for the time he spent reading

and correcting my rough drafts until this thesis took shape. Special thanks also to Prof. A.

Üner Turgay, my thesis co-supervisor, academic advisor, and Institute director, for being

available any time l needed bis assistance and for helping me form my critical faculties.

l wish ta thank all the staff of the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University

for their warm welcome; the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) for its

financial support during my two years of study; the Indonesian Ministry of Religious

Affairs for initiating my overseas study; the staff of McGill-Indonesia Project for their .--- untiring service; and the staff of the Islamic Studies Library of McGill University, especially Salwa Ferahian and Wayne St. Thomas for their assistance in locating libarary

materials.

l am grateful to Steve Miller, Reem Meshal and Alan Guenther, for their editorial

assistance; to kakak Dr. Andi Faisal Bakti for his spiritual motivation and scholarly

advice; to pak Haji Fauzan Shaleh, Ph.D. cand., for being a friendly and an academically

helpful roommate, and teman kelas Sukiati Sugiono for our daily academic discussions. l

want to thank many other individuals whose names are impossible to list here. Ail

sustained me intellectually during difficult rimes in Montreal.

No amount of thanks can properly express my special gratitude ta my mother,

Sitti Madinah, who is closest to my heart -- far away in the Southern part of Sulawesi.

• She wove the traditional sarong so that my brother, two sisters and l could go to school,

vi our father having passed away during our childhood. My aIder sister Faridah, aIder ~. brother llham, and younger sister Fatma all deserve my thanks for being madels of

patience.

Finally, completing chis thesis brings to mind my grandmother's last words, "You

will not see me anymore," just prior to my departure to Montreal; she had taken care of ­

me while my mother was working ta provide for the family. She died shartly after my

departure. l dedicate this work to my mother and ta the memory of my father and

grandmother.

• vü ~.• TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract ü

ReSumé üi

Note on Transliteration v

Acknowledgement vi

Table of Contents viü

Introduction 1

Chapter One: A Biographical Sketch ofMohamad Roem 8

A. His Ufe and Early Education 8

B. IIis Works 23

Chapter Two: Mohamad Roem's Political Activities 31

--" A. Roem and the JIB (Jong Islamiten Bond), the SIS (Studenten Islamie- ten Studieclub), and the PSU (partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia .31

B. Roem, Masyumi, and His Diplomatie Activities 52

C. Roem and Parm.usi 77

Chapter Three: Mohamad Roem's Istamic Poütical Vision 89

A. An Overview ofRoem's Political Vision 89

B. Roem's Vision ofan Islamic Political Party 95

C. Roem's Vision ofan Islamic State 101

Conclusion , 115

Bibliography 119

--- • viii INTRODUCTION

• The history ofthe Indonesian fight for independence involved various nationalists

from different backgrounds. ln the historical writings on the period they are usually

divided into two large groupings; those who struggled for strictly national goals are

referred to as secular nationalists,1 while those who based their position on Islam as the

spirit oftheir struggle are called Muslim nationalists. Both groups wanted an independent

lndonesian state free from Dutch control, but they employed different ends to accomplish

their goal. Within each ofthese large groupings there were autonomous sub-groups that

complicated the task. The Muslim nationalists themselves were divided into

traditionalists and modemists. The traditionalists, who for the most part belonged to the

NU (Nahdatul Ulama),2 were considered conservative because they adhered to the

teachings of the four medieval schools of law on religious matters. The term

~~modernists" is applied to those who called upon Muslims to refer directly 10 the Qur'an

and /Jadl/h. The organizations engaged in these modernist activities included

Muhammadiy~3 Persatuan Islam4 and al-Irsyad.5 ft seems that the ideas of the

1 The secular nationalists pioneered the national movement in the early years of the twentieth century. Their movement arose out of an awareness that unity was the key to independence and that religion need not play apart. At this rime. Tjipto Mangkusumo and Wahidin Sudirrohusodo founded Budi Utomo (Noble Endeavor) which was the nationalist organization against the colonialisffi. AIso, Soekarno began to play a role. and later created the PNI (partai Nasional Indonesia). For details, see M. Joenoed Poesponegoro and N. Notosusanto, Sejarah Nasiona/lndonesia, vol. 5 (Jakarta: Balai Pustaka. 1990); Bernhard Dahm, History ofIndonesia in the Twentieh Century (London: Praeger, 1971).

2 There have been excellent studies ofthe NU both by Indonesian scholars and Western ones. See for examples: Mochtar Naim, "The Nahdatul-Ulama Party: An Inquiry into the Origin of its Electoral Success," CM.A thesis, McGill University, 1960); A. Farichin Chumaidy, "The Jamiyyah Nahadatul ~Ulama: Its Rise and Early Development (1926-1945)." (M.A. thesis. McGill University. 1976); Sidney Jones. '~The Contraction and Expansion ofthe 'Umat' and the Role ofthe Nahdatul Ulama," indonesia. 38 • (1984). 1-20. l modernists were inspired by developments of Isiamic thought in Middle East pioneered ". by lamai aI-Dm al Afghani, Muhammad ~ Abduh, and Rashld Ridla. With respect to the nationalist struggle, there were a number of modernists who

contributed significantly toward Indonesian independence. Agus Salim, Mohamamad

Natsir, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, and Mohamad Roem are recognized as playing key

roles in the formation of Indonesia as a sovereign state. Their contribution as weIl as the

development of the movements they Led are known through a wide number of historical

books and articles on the subject, both in Indonesian and English.

The discussion of the modernist political contribution in the post-independence

era often focuses on the modernist factions within Masyumi (Majelis Syuro Muslimin

Indonesia or Counsel of Indonesian Muslim Association).6 Masyumi was at one time the --. only Muslim political party after its establishment in 1945, before the psn (partai Sarekat Islam. Indonesia or Indonesian Isiamic United Party) and the NU left the Masyumi

respectively in 1947 and 1952. However, in discussing the contribution of Muslim

modernists in the post-independence era, it must be remembered that Muslim movements

were not united groups, but rather factions within a general movement. Sorne scholars

3 For further information on Muhammadiyah, see Achmad Jainuri, ''The Muhammadiyah Movement in Twentieth-Century Indonesia: A Socio-Religious Study," (M.A. thesis, McGill University, 1992).

4 For complete information on the Persatuan Islam, see Howard M. Federspiel, The Persatuan Islam: Islamic Reform in Twentieth Century Indonesia. (Ithaca: Comell University Modem Indonesia Projec~ 1970).

S See Deliar Noer, Modernist Muslim Movement in lndonesia 1900-1942 (Singapore, Oxford

University Press, 1973),63-69. #

6 Masyumi was founded in November 1945 in Yogyakarta. It then became the only Islamic party composed of IsIamic organizations such as the NU, Muhammadiyah, psrr. al-Irsyad, etc. This party is thought ta have had a vital raie during the period of Parliamentary Democracy. Masyumi will he deaIt with in depth due to the fact that Mohamad Roem began his important political career with this party. .-.--r • 2 have looked beyond the movement to the importance of the individual modernist ~. Muslims themselves. Kahin, for example, grouped sorne modernist members ofMasyumi

as religious socialists. The principal leaders of this group were Mohamad Natsir,

Sjafruddin Prawiranegar~ Mohamad Roem, Jusuf Wibisono, and Abu Hanifah.7 This

categorization is in line with the description given by Abu Hanifah himself who pointed

out that leaders like Natsir, Sjafruddin and Roem were grouped in the Masyumi faction as

a moderate group and were inclined politically to Sjahrir, the leader of the PSI (partai

Sosialis Indonesia or Indonesian Socialist party).8

Although the contribution of the Muslim nationalists has been discussed in

previous studies and is regarded as being significant, onIy limited attention has been

given to the details of the Muslim nationalists' !slamic vision as compared to the

attention given to their political activities. Their role has been discussed in previous

writings, but writers usually limit themselves ta Iaying out the nationalists' agenda,

restricting their focus to biographical details or a compilation of the Muslim nationalists'

writings and speeches. Their political activities are often emphasized, but a systematic

analysis of the wider historieal backgrounds is generally not given. Therefore, in the

depiction of Muslim nationalists' political activities, their role in influencing events is

often misinterpreted. The reason for this is that their actions are interpreted without

regard to the reality of the dynamics of the political contexte For example, the

7 George McTurnan Kahin. Nationalism and Revolution in lndonesia (Ithaca: ComeIl University Press, 1952), 157.

8 Besides the moderate group, Abu Hanifah aIso mentioned the more Western thinking religious Socialists such as Suldman, Jusuf Wibisono and himself. See Abu Hanifah. Tales ofRevolution (Sydney: • Angus and Robertson. Education, 1972), 161-162. 3 traditionalist NU activists who chose to cooperate with Soekarno's Guided Democracy ~. have been criticized for being opportunistic. The analysis of the involvement of sorne

Masyumi leaders in the PRRI10 (pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia or the

Revolutionary Govemment of the Republic of Indonesia) movement is another example

of common misinterpretation. Due to their involvement, these leaders have been accused

of being revolutionary and confrontative proponents of their ideology. The Islamic

inspiration of the Masyumi leadership as in their call for the founding of an Islamic state

in the Constituent Assembly meeting of 1952 is aIso commonly misinterpreted. This

particular instance has been used to make unwarranted generaIizations regarding their

motivations in other historical episodes. Although the IsIamic state was an important

goal, the Masyumi leadership was pragmatic and usually willing to make the necessary

political concessions to ensure the solidarity ofthe nation.

Because of such categorizations, scholars sometimes ignore the significant

contribution of the Muslim nationalists concemed. Von der Mehden says, for instance,

that the involvement of the Muslim traditionalists in the nationalist movement was more

negative than positive in its influence.Il One Indonesian scholar aIso claimed that the

Islamic political party failed to contribute to Indonesian development in general in

Indonesian history.12

9 This sort ofdemocracy will be touched upon slightly in Chapter Two in connection with the end of Roem's political career.

la See the discussion of chis movement in ChapterTwo. 68-70.

Il Fred R von der Mehden, Religion and Nationalism in Southeasr Asia: Burma lndonesia. the Philipines (Madison: the University ofWisconsin Press, 1968), 138 and 202. • 12 See Chapter Three below, 104. 4 Such judgements need to be reassessed. The purpose of this thesis is, in part, an .~. • effort to do that. It will eoneentrate on Mohamad Roem whose contribution in the founding of Indonesia as a sovereign country should not he ignored, because of bis

erucial diplomatie activities in that effort. Although, he is often seen as one of

Indonesia's most prominent diplomats in the early years of the Republic, this recognition

has often been separated from his position as a Muslim nationalist and an activist in

Islamie movements. In- this study, an assessment of his political activities will he

undertaken and juxtaposed against bis personal vision. This should allow the reader to

come to an appreciation of all aspects of bis life and political activities and provide a

broader perspective than the studies that present only one aspect of rus life.

Mohamad Roem was an Indonesian nationalist who participated in several periods

of bistory-- late Dutch, Japanese, DId Order, and New Order. He was a national hero .. during the revolution and always was a Muslim nationaliste A discussion of the relevance

of ms IsIamic politieal vision in relation to bis national contribution will form the core of

this thesis. The interesting aspect of Roem's legacy is that, despite bis position as an

Islamie leader of the past, rus Islamic politieal ideals have found a foilowing in the

contemporary era among newly emerging Muslim intellectuals.

Although there have been previous works on Roem, they mostly emphasized

Roem's diplomatie contribution to the Indonesian struggle for independence. For sorne

books published about Roem, whether a compilation of Roem's writings or a biography,

the editors chose titles that immediately referred the readers to his diplomatie career. 13 In

a work written by Suratmin, the information given is restricted to bis political biography

13 See Soemarso Soemarsono, et al., eds., Mahamad Raem 70: Pejuang Perunding (Jakarta: Bulan • Bintang, 1978), Mohamad Roem, Diplamasi: Ujung Tambak Perjuangan RI (Jakarta: Gramedia. 1989). 5 and supplemented with other accounts that had been written hefore. 14 Even Muslim • writers have been selective. Deliar Noer's account diseusses Roem but only bis general contrIbution to Indonesian history as an activist of Masyumi. 15 A similar treatment is

given by Saidi when he diseusses the emergence ofthe Islamic youth movement within

whieh Roem was active. 16 Western scholars continue this pattern where Roem usually is

only discussed with respect to Indonesia's diplomatie struggle or when they refer to

points in Indonesia's ·political history when Masyumi cannot he ignored. In one

encyelopedic work on Islam in Indonesia, Roem's name is not found among other

prominent Masyumi leaders. 17 Such a treatment indicates the tendency to separate Roem

frOID bis roots within the Islamic movement.

The objective of this study is, therefore, to analyze Roem as a contributor to

Indonesian nationalism and as an activist of the Islamic movement. Since Roem's

character made him a stronger activist than thinker, bis political activities are the major

concentration of this work. 18 In this study, bis political activities are related to bis

political opinions in order to arrive at a comprehensive understanding of his Islamic

political vision. This thesis is an historical analysis, showing how Roem is different from

other nationalists of bis rime, especially the Muslim nationalists with whom he is often

grouped. A comparison with other leaders ofthe time is used to show the significance of

14 See Suratmïn, Mr. MohamadRoem: Karya dan Pengabdiannya (Jakarta: Depdikbu~ 1986).

lS See Deliar Noer, Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional 1945-1965 (Jakarta: Grafitipers, 1987).

16 See Ridwan Saidi, Cendikiawan Islam di Zaman Belanda: Study Pergerakan Intellektual JlB dan SIS ('25- '-12) (Jakarta: Yayasan Piranti Ilmu, 1990).

17 See Kafrawi Ridwan et al., OOs., Ensiklopedi Islam (Jakarta: PT Ichtiar Barn van Hoeve, 1993). • 18 See the discussion ofhis politica1 charaeter in Chapter Three below, 95-96. 6 Roem's activism and bis Islamic politica1 visio~ and place him in political context. • Through this investigation, the activities of other Muslim nationalists in both pre- and post-independence periods is also reviewed

In the history of the Islamic political discourse, Roem is often regarded as a

moderate Muslim. scholar who was not representative ofany mass Islamic organizatio~

even when he was on the main board ofMasyumi. This is aIso true for the early days of

the New Order, when "he OOd an opportunity to speak and act on behalf of Islam in

general rather than for specifie factions. This study helps to define bis relationship to

specifie organizations, even while he was a committed part of the entire Islamic

movement.

This thesis consists of three chapters in addition to this introduction and a

conclusion. The fust chapter gives a biographical sketch of Roem, containing bis early

life, his career and works. The second chapter offers an account ofbis political activities

by tracing his involvement in nationalist activities from the pre-independence era until

the beginning of the New Order era. The third coopter discusses bis Islamic political

vision, investigating his ideas on an Islamic political party, and his interaction with the

young intellectuals ofthe New Order regarding the concept ofan Islamic state.

The primary sources used for this study are Roem's own writings, speeches, and

reports. Reference is made to other writings that touch on Roem's ideas, especially

writings regarding Islam and politics in contemporary Indonesia, so as to obtain a

comprehensive understanding ofRoem's political vision. • 7 CHAPTERONE • A BIOGRAPIDCAL SKETCHOF MOHAMAD ROEM

A. His Life and Early Education

Mohamad Roem was born in Parakan (Kedu, Central Java) on May 16, 1908. The

year of his birth was the same as that of Mohammad Natsir1 who later became Roem's

colleague in the Indonesian fight for independence, and in the operation ofMasyumi. At

the time Roem was born, Indonesians were beginning to give shape to a modem

nationalist movement, particularly in the field ofsocio-educational reform.. Before 1900,

as Deliar Noer has indicated, the system of Muslim education was comprised of the

pesantren,2 surau,3 langgar4 and mosque, Le., the heart of the traditional system. The

material that was taught dealt exclusively with religious rituaIs, and little thought was

given to an organized movement challenging the colonizers, despite the traditionalists'

claim that the Dutch or the West in general were infidels.5 An attitude of opposition to

the Dutch colonialists had emerged, but it had no organizational structure in the form of

IMuhammad Natsir was born on July 17, 1908 in West Sumatra. This means that he was only two months younger than Roem. In the course of his career, Natsir became the most prominent Indonesian Muslim scholar and politician. When Roem and Natsir both reached the age of 70, a committee was formed to recognize these two prominent figures. For more information, see Badruzzaman Busyairi, Pesan dan Kesan: Pertemuan Silarurrahmi Mohammad NatsirlMohammad Roem 70 Tahun (Jakarta: Fajar Shadiq, 1978); Soemarsono, Mohamad Roem. 70 Tahun: Pejuang dan Perunding.

2 The pesantren is a traditional Islamic boarding school. This kind of school concentrates on religious teachings and bas different methods of instruction, curriculum, and administration from modem schools (madrasahs and general schools). It is usually beaded by a charismatic Islamic teacher and leader under whom the students can Iearn various aspects of IsIamic teachings. See Karel A. Steenbrink, Pesantren, Madrasah, dan Sekolah: Pendidikan Islam dalam Kurun Modem (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1986).

3 The surau is a small prayer house where religious and Qur'wc reading Iessons are given.

4 The langgar is a smaU and simple mosque, but it is only used by a small community group, not a • large congregation, such as the one at Friday prayer. 8 political movements. Nevertheless, Indonesians came to believe that they would not be

free of Dutch control, or what they regarded as Christian incursions, if they remained

attached to traditional ways of interpreting Islam. Consequently, many began working to

introduce reform at all levels of society from socio-educational institutions to socio-

political movements. While the rise and development of the modernist movement is

beyond the scope of the present discussion, it is important to understand that by the time

Roem was born, the idea of reform had already been introduced. And it was this

phenomenon that exposed Roem to reformist ideas that, in tum, influenced his religious

and nationalist activities.

Roem was the fifth and last son to be born in his family. His four older brothers

bore the names ofthe f11"st four caliphs ofIslam.6 His own name was taken from the SÜIah

(chapter) of the Qur·an entitled al-RÜ1n -Roem in the Indonesian spelling of the time.

....~. The fact that this same sUrah contains a revelation to the Prophet Muhammad explaining

the future of the Roman empire carrying a political interpretation, makes Roem a very

appropriate name in view of his political career and his contribution to the formation of

the Indonesian state.7

Judging by the names they chose for their children, Roem's parents must have had

a deep interest in the Islamic tradition. However, we know that their Islamic beliefs were

S Deliar Noer. "The Rise and Development of Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia During the Dutch Colonial Period (1900-1942):' (ph..D. dissertation, Cornell University. 1963),57.

6 His eldest sister was Mut'ah, his eldest brother Abu Bakar, his second oldest Umar. his third oldest Usman, and his fourth oldest Ali. Roem himself was the fifth child. His younger sister was Siti Chadijah. It should be noted that giving a child an Islamic name in Javanese society can be used as one factor by which to judge the interest of a family in Islam. since nominal Muslims tend to name their children using Javanese names. . • 7 Soemarsono. Mohammmad Roem 70 Tahun: Pejuang Perunding. 1. 9 to sorne extent rnixed with anirnistic elements, including seeing life in inanimate objects,. • worsbipping ancestors and spirits.8 This animism \vas a legacy of the pre-Islamic times and had been syncretized with other beliefs such as Hinduism, Buddhism, and local

tradition or adat. In Roem's family, it was mostly bis grandmother who introduced him to

these syncretized beliefs.9 This animistic tradition was common enough among Javanese

Muslim families, and Roem's family was Javanese. But there were so many factors at

work in Roem's case that is difficult to say whether bis relatives were santri (devout

Muslim) or abangan (nominal Muslim).

Muchtarom writes that santri are those who are pious and who embrace Islam

seriously, practicing in full the Islamic precepts as they know them, and keeping their

beliefs free oflocal idolatry. The abangan. on the other band, are people who have very

little concem with the precepts ofIslam and are less strict in fulfilling religious teachings.

They are instead much influenced by the pre-Islamic Javanese tradition.10 Based on this

8 Roem says that one clay when he feU iII, his grandmother ca.lled in a number of du/ams (traditional hea1ers), but it seems ms illness did not showany improvement. His grandmother then gave mm sorne water, perfonned. sorne magic, mixed the water with paper inscribed with Arabic charms. In arder to prevent Roem from faIling ill again, bis grandmother told him to wear Jimat (a written fonnula considered to contain a blessing or magical properties). Suratmîn, Mr. Mohamad Roem: Karya dan Pengabdiannya. 6-7. For a good definition ofjimat. see Howard M. Federspiel. A Dictionary ofIndonesian Islam (Ohio: Ohio State University, Center for International Studies.. L995). L16. Based on this information.. it is clear that sorne ofhis grandmother's practices were influenced by pre-Islamic teachings, - specifically by animism- practices that were not recognized in Istamic teachings.

9Speaking about his childhood, Roem explained how his grandmother dominated the everyday family life. At each Meal, for exa.mple, it was bis grandmother who distributed the food ta Roem and his brothers. In addition, Roem's family was an extended one, so that he lived with his parents, brothers and sisters and with bis grandmother.

10 Muchtarom's ca.tegorization of the religious tendencies in Javanese society inta san/ri and abangan may be a reaction to the early categorization of Javanese society proposed by Clifford Geertz, who differentiated them into priyayi, santri and ahangan. To Geertz, ahangan represented the animistic aspects ofoverall Javanese syncretism., and was broadly related to the peasant elements in the population; santri on the other han

10 categorization by Muchtarom, it cannot be said that Roem came from santri family since • certain members of bis family, most notably ms grandmother, still followed animistic practices.Il Further, ifthe definition of santri includes a fonnal Islamic education such as

in a pesantren, Roem's family again did not qualify, since no family member had yet

benefited from such schooling.

It is difficult, however, to make a clear-cut categorization. Muchtarom regards the

tenn santri as the antithesis ofabangan, not simply as its counterpart; thus in this view if

a person is not santri. he or she must he ahangan. But Roem's family cannot he said to

be abangan either, since they fulfilled the obligatory duties of Muslims such as five-time

daily prayers and fasting. I2 The devotion ofRoem's family to Islam is observable also in

how Roem and bis brothers and sisters had been given Islamic names. It was said that

during childhood, Roem learned fsIamic teachings and the Qur'an through the surau

is not based on consistent criteria. He is confusing two divisions of a different order, mixing up what Muchtarom calls horizontal and vertical divisions. Accorcling to Muchtarom, the terms santri and abangan are used to classify peàple with reference to religious behavior. or the vertical dimension. While the tenn priyayi is much more related to the social strata ofthe Javanese society, or the horizontal dimension, placed with other strata such as ndara (nobel people), sautfagar (merchants)and wong ci/ik (little people). Since santri and abangan are indicated by religious behavior, these can come from any stratum of Javanese society, including priyayi, santri priyayi, or abangan priyayi. Zaïni Muchtarom, "Santri and Abangan in Java," (M.A. thesis. McGilI University. 1975),12-14. The debates overGeertz' ideas ofsantri.priyayi, and ahangan, cao he seen in Robert B. Cruikshank, "Abangan, Santri, and Prijaji: A Critique," Journal of Southeast Asian History. vol. 3, no. 1 (March 1972): 38-43. In addition, Muchtaram's description of Javanese tradition seems to agree with Roem's description of his childhood in Javanese tradition. He classified Javanese social structure as wong Jowo (Javanese peasants) and priyayi. However, Roem added that the priyayi were generally not known to perfonn the five time prayers. Mohamad Roem, "Roem itu Anale Grang Muhammadiyah" in Mohamad Roe~ Diplomasi: Ujung Tombale Perjuangan RI (Jakarta: Gramedia), lO9-l13.

11 Roem's grandmother usually indoctrinated her grandchildren by the use of takhayyul. For example, to prevent her grandchildren from leaving the house at night, she said that the night time was crowded with the devils and monsters that can make humans ill. She aIso forbade her grandchildren from eating the heart of a cow, in the belief that it was not good for little children. tQ eat Ït. -See Soemarsono. MohamadRoem 70 Tahun, 8. • 12 Suratmin, MR. MohamadRoem: Karya dan !?engabdiannya. Il.

Il method13 This explains io part the uniqueness of Roem in that even though bis family • was not strictly religious, unlike the families of other prominent Indonesian Muslim modemists, it was not difficult for him to develop ioto a Muslim modernist based on bis

educationaI experiences. The religious background ofRoem's family is reveaIiog because

one asPeCt of Roem's later mission was the purification of Islamic teachings from any

animistic beliefs. One possible reason for !bis was bis tendency since childhood to try

discover logical alternatives to the animistic doctrines taught by bis grandmother. 14

Roem's father was a lurah (village head), and bis mother aIso came from a lurah

family. Koentjaranginrat writes that the social stratification of the old Javanese can he

classified into four levels; i.e. the ndara (nobility), the priyayi (bureaucrat), the wang

dagang or:- sudagar (traders), and the wong cilik (IittIe people). 15 Based on these divisions

of the early Javanese society, Roem' s family with bis father as a lurah, may be

categorized as priyayi (bureaucrat) since members of this class largely served in the

government bureaucracy and were often academically trained intellectuals. During the

Dutch colonial period, the priyayi held important positions since they participated in the

running ofthe Dutch administration. The Dutch preserved the rigid exclusiveness oftbis

13 The surau method does not have any formaI curriculum. Qur'wc recitation was the main subjeet ofstudy. Students brought theie individuaI copies ofthe Que'an to theirteacher who then recited the text while the students followed until they could pronounce the verses correctly.

14 Roem stated how one day, while travelling with bis father to a city, he asked his father about bis grandmother's superstitions. He asked why he needed to wearjimat, for instance. His father said !hat old people believed that it could prevent people from becoming ill and that it was an animistic belief. Roem then asked why he shouldn't eat the heart ofa cow. His father said, laughing, that it was the best part and that children are denied it in order that older persons could have it. Roem then asked why his father kept sHent when his grandmother did something irrationaL His father replied it was ooly to show respect to parents. Soemarsono, MohamadRoem. Pejuang Perunding. 8-9.

IS R.M. Koentjaraningrat, as cited in Muchtarom, "Santri and Abangan in Iava,"12. For more information about old Javanese society, see ibid., 13-15. See also D. H. Burger, StnJ.ctural Changes in • Javanese Society: The Supra-Village Sphere, trans. Leslie H. Palmier (lthaca, Modern Indonesia Project 12 ~. group by restricting admission to training schools to children of administrative officiais.

Hence, ooly applicants who could prave kinship with a member of the administrative

service could enjoy that privilege. 16 By this means, Roem's family had an opportunity to

gain access to the Dutch school system, commonly caIIed Western schools.

Roem succeeded in gaining admission to the HIS (Hollandsche Inlandsche

Schaol), a Dutch language elementary school in Temanggung (Central Java) in 1917, a

prestigious school for young villagers at that time. 17 While still in his third year of

studies, his farnily moved him from that area due to an outbreak of a contagious disease;

he followed bis eldest sister to Pekalongan, where he completed his Inlandsche School

requirements. Having completed ms primary schooIing, Roem then continued on to

STOVIA (School ter Opleiding Voor Indiesche Arts), a preparatory medical school far

indigenaus residents, in 1927.18 After finishing bis rust session at that school the same

year, he moved on to the AMS (Algemene Middelbare Scheol), a general high schoel.

Having graduated from the AMS in 1930, he went on te GRS (Geneskunclige Roge

School), a medical institute in Jakarta.

From bis own account, Reem stayed in this latter school for only two years,

having failed the exams there twice. 19 It seems that Roem's fallure at the medical

CornelL University, 1956), 12; R. Van Niel, The Emergence ofthe Modem lndonesian Elite (The Hague and Bandung: W. Van Hoeve Ltd, 1960), 15-16.

16 Muchtarom, "Santri and Abangan," 13.

17 Soemarsono, Mohamad Roem 70 tahun, 2.

18 Even though STOVIA was a medical school and contralIed by the Dutch, many such as Sukiman Wirjosandjojo who later led the Muslim resistance ta colonialism received their education here. He once led what was formerly the largest Muslim party, Masyumi. Amir Hamzah Wiryosukarto. Wawasan Politik Seorang Muslim patriot Dr. Soekiman Wirjosandjojo (1898- 1974) (Jakarta: YP2LPM, 1984). • 19 Soemarsono, Mohamad Roem 70 Tahun, 5.

13 • Institute was due to bis involvement in the organizations that he joined But from this

stage, he began to shape his career as a nationalist, in wmch capacity he would play a key

. role in Indonesia's diplomatic struggle for freedom. He interrupted bis fonnaL education

for a time, and began to participate in the politicallife ofbis clay, joining the PSII (Partai

Serikat Islam. Indonesia or Indonesian Islamic United Party), which was a very int1uential

Islamic political party in the Dutch colonial era. As of 1929, he had also become active in

the JIB (Jong Islamieten Bond or United IsIamic Youth) which was established in 1925

and became an important Islamic youth movement. When the JIB congress was held in

Jakarta. in 1930, Mohamad Roem was elected as the chairman ofthe committee, bis first

experience in the public limelight. (His involvement in the JIB and the PSSI will be

examined in greater detail ~ Chapter Two.) In 1932, Roem went back to complete bis

formal education, and entered the RHS (Rechts Roge School), a law school. He

completed this course ofstudy in 1937, eaming a MR degree (Meester in de Rechten), a

title he always affixed to bis name (i.e. MR. Mohamad Roem).

Roem's religious education was obtained during bis HIS period at Pekalongan

under the instruction of a Muhammadiyah activist of the Pekalongan branch. His

brother-in-law, Ranuwihardjo,20 who chose to become an activist of Muhammadiyah,

contributed to Roem's understanding ofthe Islamic movement. Muhammadiyah itselfis a

modernist Muslim organization, established by K.H. Ahmad Dahlan in 1912, aimed at

rejuvenating Islam, enabling it to adopt Western science and learning, while trying to

purify it from any doctrinal deviation and within Islam itselfto heighten the awareness of

2~uwihardjo was basically a secretary ofthe Sarekat Islam in Pekalongan. But at that time the relationship between Sarekat Islam and Muhammadiyah was very close, allowing them to work together in • movement. Ranuwiharjo pioneered the founding of Muhammadiyah school using part of his house. He

14 its adherents.21 Ranuwibardjo established an Islamic institution in Pekalongan where ·~-. Roem and other school children leamed modem Islamic ideas. Roem attended the Islamic

recitations where he could study from a modernist like Sutan Mansur.22 This seems ta

have been the fust intensive religious education that Roem received and bis first contact

with modem Islamic ideas. In this stage, Roem describes how difficult it was ta

overcome the obstacles encountered in putting into practice modem Islamic ideas which

society W as not ready ta accept. He notes that at that time, he was told by people around

him not ta follow the pattern ofteaching Islamic lessons introduced by the school.23

It was Haji Agus Salim24 who exercised the greatest influence upon him in

religious as weIl as political matters. As Roem himself once said, bis relationship with

Agus Salim was less a political than a persona! one, extending even to his family. Roem's

fust meeting with Agus Salim toole place in 1925 when he began his activities in the JIB,

during which time Agus Salim was an advisor to the group. Their encounter was at the

married Roem's eIder sister, Mut'ah. See Mohamad Roem, "'Roem itu anak Muhammadiyah," in Roem Diplomasi: Ujung Tombak Perjuangan RI.. 116.

21 On this organization, see Alfiam, Muhammadiyah:The Political Behavior ofa Muslim Modernisr Organization under the Dutch Colonialislm (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1989); Chapter Four and Five ofAlwi Shihab, "The Muh(U!ll!ladiyah movement and its controversy with Christian Mission in Indonesia," (ph.D. Dissertation, TeII:1ple University, Philadelphia, 1995), 138-267; Jainuri, "'The Muhammadiyah Movement in Twentieth-Century Indonesia: A Socio-Religious Study."

22 Sutan Mansur was a leader ofMuhammadiyah Pekalongan.

23 The people of the village refused the new way of studying Islam, believing that the interpretation of Qur'wc verses was de::stroying religion. The use a of local language in the Jum"at congregation speech went against the relig:ion. This unhappy situation made Roem and his family move to another village. However, they continued Co manage the Muhammadiyah Institution they had huile earlier. See Roem, uRoem itu Anale Muhammadiyah," ll7-U8.

24 Haji Agus Salim was a promi:nent Muslim intellectual and nationalist in the early twentieth century. For more information on AgLKS Salim, see Emi Haryanti Kahfi, "Islam and Indonesian Nationalism; The Politicai Thought of Haj i Agus Salim," Sludia Islamica, vol. 4 no. 3 (1997): 6-57. For his biography see Kafrawi Ridwan, et al., etds.• UAgus Salim," Ensiklopedi Islam, vol. 1 (Jakarta: PT Ichtiar • Baru van Hoeve, 1993),67-69. 15 initiative of bis colleagues Kasman and Soepamo, both of whom already knew Agus ~. Salim and wanted ta ask Agus Salim to give Islamic lessons ta the JIB members. Roem

already knew who Salim was, and was familiar with the wide range of bis Islamic and

political ideas. In their initial meeting Roem was amazed at Salïm's personality, and

admired bis simple way oflife, low public profile, and intellectual ability. 25

At that meeting with JIB activists, Agus Salim agreed ta give a course on Islam..

The Islamic lessons were taught intensively during the whole of the frrst year, while the

teaching in subsequent years was less intensive due ta the responsibilities of Agus Salim

as the leader of the PSII, which included having ta travel throughout the countryside on

hehalf of bis organization. Roem attended the class and apparently leamed much. Since

their relationsbip was personal, he leamed from Salim not only in the classroom, but aIso

from their daily conversations with one another and from the way Salim educated bis

children. Roem's relationship with Salim.'s family continued even after Salim's death. In

short, bis close relationsbip with Salim allowed Roem to adopt bis perspectives of the

role of Islam. in education and politics. St. Rais Alamsjah writes that many people in bis

time thought that Roem was the son or the son-in-Iaw of Agus Salim because of their

close relationship.26 Professar Schermerhom, a former Dutch diplomat during the

Indonesian revolution, describes in his diary Roem's closeness ta Agus Salim by

referring to Roem as a "foundling" ·of Agus Salim.27 This term. was intended symbolically

by Schermerhom who observed that Agus Salim appeared to shape Roem's worldview.

2S Mohamad Roem, "Haji Agus Salim," in Panitia Peringatan Buku Haji Agus Salim Seratus Tahun, Seratus Tahun Haji Agus Salim (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1996). 174-177.

26 St. Rais Alamsjah. 10 Orang lndonesia TerbesarSekarang (Djakarta: Bintang Mas, 1952),51. • 27 Soemarsono, Mohamad Roem 70 Tahun, 117. 16 Roem's relationship with Agus Salim. will he further addressed in Chapter Two, in the ~.• context of bis political activities, particularly in the JIB and psrr - in the former Agus

Salim worked as an advisor, while in the latter as an organizationalleader.

One aspect that may not be ignored in the success ofRoem's nationalist activities

was the support of his family, especially bis wife, Markisah Dahliah. Roem and Dahliah

fust met at a JIB event, the congress ofthe JIB's scout movement called Natipij (National

Indonesische Padvinderij) of which both were members, and which Roem Later Led. 28

Many of Roem's acmevements as a nationalist can be related directIy to bis wife's own

career as an activist. Alamsjah, for instance, describes Dahliah's commitment ta Roem's

nationalist activities and how she helped him provide for their family' s daily needs early

in their marriage. Dahliah established a kindergarten which, although drawing little

salary, allowed her ta actualize her nationalist aspirations by educating the next

generation.29 She continued ta support Roem's nationalist activities under the Dutch

colonial regime, the Japanese occupation, the struggle for independence, and in Roem's

political setbacks under bath Soekarno and Soeharto. She remained at ms side until the

day he died.

Significantly, although Roem was formally educated in the Dutch school system

he never became a Dutch official, even though by degree and education he might have

done sa. Inadvertently, Roem thwarted efforts of the Dutch to educate only a few selected

Indonesians and to integrate them into their colonial operation. During the Japanese

occupation from 1942 ta 1945, Roem also successfully avoided cooperating with the

28 Roem's involvement in Natipij will be further discussed in Chapter Two. • 29 St. Rais Alarnsjah, 10 Orang lndonesia TerbesarSekarang, sa. 17 ~.• Japanese by working as a lawyer in private practice. It was ooly after independence was declared that he entered government service on behalfofthe Republic ofIndonesia.

The revolutionary period came immediately after the Japanese surrender to the

Allied forces, of which the Dutch forces were a part. Indonesian leaders used the

occasion of the Japanese surrender ta proclaim independence, known as the U 1945

Independence Proclamation.,,30 In. the year after the proclamation, the government set up

KNIP (Komite National Indonesia Pusat or Central Indonesian National Committee),

which worked as a legislative body.31 Initially, Roem was appointed chairman of the

local KNI, Jakarta. Most KNIs were appointed rather than elected because no real

institutions existed for holding elections. The KNIP had a working committee, which did

much ofthe selecting oflocal KNI leaders. Since this working committee was chaired by

Sjahrir, an anti-Japanese collaborationist, it was assumed that Roem's appointment was

based on his record of non-collaboration with the Japanese. However, Roem was shot in

bis home saon after returning from a meeting of the KNI which led to political inactivity

for half a year and caused him to limp for the rest ofbis life.32

The key raIe that Roem was to play began with the proclamation of independence

in 1945. The Dutch did not acknowledge Indonesian independence and still regarded the

country as part ofthe Netherlands Union. But the retum of the Dutch was met with tierce

resistance by the new Indonesian government, by the infant army it had formed and even

by Indonesian people. The tiercest battle ta maintain Indonesia's independence broke out

30 On the process ofsurrounding the Indonesian proclamation ofindependence and the difficult times faced by Indonesian leaders at the time, see Mohamad Roem. Pentjulikan, Proklamasi dan Penilaian Sejarah (Jakarta: Hudaya. 1970). • 31 On the formation of KNIP, see Kahin. Narionalism and Revolution in Indonesia. 152-154. 18 in Surabaya, East Java on November 10, 1945 - now celebrated as a national holiday and • day of commemoration.33 The United Nations sought to intervene in the conflict between Indonesia and Netherlands favoring a resolution of the conflict through diplomatic

means. From this moment, Roem, a talented diplomat, began to play an important role.

Roem was involved in nearly every diplomatic negotiation that the government

undertook. Fifst, he was a member of the Sjahrir delegation to Linggarjati34 in 1948 that

attempted to end the rriilitary confrontation. In. 1949, Roem served as chairman of the

Indonesian delegation holding talks with the Dutch in Jakarta, which resulted in the

''Roem-Royen Statement" named for him and his Dutch counterpart. This statement not

only elevated Roem's reputation as a diplomat, but aIso paved the way for the eventual

acknowledgement of Indonesian sovereignty. Next came the Round Table Conference, a

follow-up to the Roem-Royen Statement, held in The Hague in 1949. Mohammad Hatta

(Vice-President of Indonesia) chaired the Indonesian delegation to this conference, while

Roem acted as vice-chairman. (Roem's diplomatic activities will however be further

discussed in Chapter Two).

Roem was appointed to severa! ministeria! portfolios in different cabinets under

Parliamentary Democracy.35 In 1946, he was chosen to serve as Minister ofthe Interior in

the Sjahrir cabinet, a post he held aIso in the Amir Syarifuddin cabinet (1948). In the

32 On this accident see, Seomarsono, Mohamad Roem 70 Tahun, 50-52.

33 See M.C. Ricklefs, A History ofModem Indonesia since c. 1300,217.

34 Linggarjati is the name ofa locale in West Jakarta where the negotiators met.

35 The Parliamentary Democracy regime was aIso called Constitutional Demociacy lasting from post-independence until the emergence of Guided Democracy under Soekarno. For a detailed analysis of this form of democracy, see Herbet Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (New • York, Comell University Press, 1962).

19 Hatta cabinet (1949), he was appointed as Minister of state, a post he left following his ~. appointment as High Commissioner ta the Netherlands. Later, he became Minister of

Foreign affairs in the Natsir cabinet (1950). Again in the Wilopo cabinet (1952), he was

nominated as Minister ofHome Affairs, while in the Ali Sastromidjojo cabinet (1956), he

served as Vice-Prime Minister. Roem, together with Mangunsarkoro, was once offered

the chance by president Soekarno to form a government after the demise of the Wilopo

cabinet, but this effort ·was unsuccessful due to internai conflicts among the parties

involved.36

Another important aspect of Roem's politicaI career was his involvement in the

Muslim political party named Masyumi. Although Roem never became the general

chairman of this party, bis influence among its members of this party was certainly

important, probably equivalent to !bat of other prominent leaders such as Natsir,

Sjafruddin, Sukiman, and Prawoto.

From 1953 to1956 Roem was associated briefly with educational activities as a

rector of North Sumatra Islamic University. This was a senior administrative position and

an attempt ta use bis talent appropriately since his raIe as a Masyumi politician was no

longer possible and because academic rectors were in short supply. During the same

period he trave]ed to the United States and other countries to prornote knowledge ofAsia.

His steadfast opposition ta colonialism led him also ta attend the conference against

colonialism held in New Delhi in 1959 when he no longer sat in the formal government.

36 The cabinet formed during the Parliamentary Democracy phase comprised members of different parties, including Masyumi (largest Islamic party), the NU Ca former faction of Masyumi that became an independent political party), the PNI (Indonesian National Party) founded by Soekarno, PSI (Indonesian Socialist Party) and other smaHer parties. For more information about the parties' roles in each cabinet see Deliar Noer. Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional (Jakarta: Temprint, 1987); R. William Liddle, ''The Indonesian Party System 1950-1964." in Ethnicity, Party, and National Integration (New Haven: Yale • University Press, 1970).67-98. 20 With Soekarno's establishment of Demokrasi Terpimpin (Guided Democracy)

following the disbanding of Masyumi in 1960, Roem became inactive politically. As a

Masyumi activist, he was even jailed for a time along with other Masyumi leaders by the

Soekarno regime. Soekarno saw the Masyumi activists as disloyal and an obstacle ta bis

goal of implementing Guided Democracy. Like the others, Roem was not even given a

trial, being held on suspicion of plotting ta assassinate Soekarno during a visit to South

Sulawesi.37

After the fail ofSoekarno and the emergence of the New Orde28 in 1966, Roem

and other political prisoners were released. Roem's attempts to reenter political life,

however, were checked at every tum by Soeharto's government because New Order

leaders saw the Masyumi leadership as untrustworthy and as contributing to the earlier

fallure of parliamentary govemment. For instance, when Parmusi (partai Muslimin

Indonesia or Indonesian Muslim. party), a new IsIamic political party established in the

New Order era, held a congress in Malang, East Java, in 1968, Roem was unanimously

elected as the general chairman, but resigned when the government found him

unacceptable because ofMasyumi connection.

Although Roem never again became formally active in politics, he engaged in

other activities where his abilities and experience were important, such as serving as an

executive member of the Mu'tamar al-'AIam al-Islanii (Islamic World Congress) in

37 Agus Edi Santoso, ed., Tidak Ada Negara Islam: Surat-Surat Politik Nurcholish Madjid and Mohamad Roem (Jakarta: Djambatan, 1997), Ill.

38 The New Order is an era of govemment under Soeharto ranging from 1966 ta 1998, marked by the demise ofSoekarno era, which was then identified as an oid era. The faIl of Soeharto in May 1998 aIso • marked the faIl of the New Order and was associated with the emergence of the reformation era. . 21 ~.• 1975. He participated in other international religious conferences, such as the 1971 International Conference on Bangladesh in New Delhi, and the 1977 Conference of

Religion for Peace in Singapore. Roem used this respite from politics ta write books and

sorne articles in the mass media. Natsir once said "One ofRoem's [greatest] skills which

is just now being realized by society was bis writing. His writing was precise, simple and

condensed. Everybody was eager to read what he wrote in books, newspapers or

magazines."39 Alongside this, Roem continued to be active in the legal profession.

Aisyah Amini, Roem's legal office associate, states that "despite Roem's previous

prominent position in Indonesian politics, such as being a Vice-Prime Minister between

1956-1957, he always put himself equal with bis staff, including myself as a junior

lawyer.,,4Q In terms ofRoem's personality and political achievement, Kahin states:

Never at the top of the pyramid of power, he was heavily relied upon by sorne who were, and during the course of the revolution he emerged as bis country's ablest diplomat. He was one of the leaders of the revolution whom l respected most, and our friendship began with our fust meeting in Yogyakarta in 1948. Intrinsically Roem was modest man, known for his openness, absolute honesty, gentleness ofmanner, and thoughtful regard for others. Many were struck by how genuinely concemed he was to understand the views of those with whom he interacted, whatever their religion-- whether in his home or at the negotiating table. But there was also a formidable inner iron to his character that derived from bis strong and unflagging adherence ta principle.41

Nurchalish Madjid says:

Roem was a person who could detect the modern problems of a nation. He was uninterested in the sloganeering practices that were used to unite the masses, a favorite tactic of Soekarno, who promised utopia in the under-developed society. A man like Roem was not interesting to the people, but he represented an unseen

39 Mohamad Natsir, "Insya Allah Roem Tetap Roem," in Soemarsono, Mohamad Roem 70 Tahun, 213.

40 "Aisyah Amini: Singa Betina yang Doyan Mengaum," Gatra, 28 November. 1998.

41 George MeT. Kahin. "In Memoriam: Mohamad Roem (1908-1983)," lndonesia, no. 37 (April -- • 1984): 135. 22 foundation that supported an entire nation. It was only later on that people reaIized bis inestimable contribution toward the development ofthe country.42

• Sjafruddin Prawiranegara said "the important characteristic that Roem possessed

was bis personal integrity and bis honesty, not ooly in social affairs but aIso in political

matters.,,43 In'amullah Khan, former Secretary General of the !slamic World Congress,

said:

Roem's interest is not confined to Indonesia only. He was equally interested in worid affairs...· From my persona! knowledge 1 can say how conscientious a member he is; he believes in team work and he does his part patiently and weIl; he listens to others and has a ready wit. It is a pleasure and an honor to work with such a duty-conscious, eminent, co-operative and respect worthy colleague... Indeed Dr. Roem is a past-master in the game ofpolitics.44

In general, Roem was a statesmen, a prominent diplomat and a Muslim scholar who

devoted bis life to Indonesian independence, to the formation of a government shortly

after independence and to Islamic political organization.

B. His Works

Roem was a prolific writer, and wrote hundreds of articles which were published

in various magazines and newspapers.45 Roem left more than ten books written in

42 Nurcholish Madjid, foreward to Roem. Diplomacy: Ujung Tombak Perjuangan RI, xii- xiii.

43 Syafruddin Prawiranegara. uRoem, Manusia dan Kawan Ideal," in Soemarsono, Mohamad Roem 70 Tahun, 222- 223.

44 Inamullah Khan, ''Master in the Game ofPolities," in Soemarsono, Mohamad Roem 70 Tahun, 274-275. • 45 For further information on the articles, see Roem, Diplomasi Ujung Tombak Perjuangan RI. 23 • Indonesian.. In spite of bis age and chronic health problems, he kept writing until only

sixteen days before breathing bis last inJakarta in 1983.46

Roem touched on a great Many subjects in bis writings: Islam in general, law, the

history of the Indonesian mdependence struggle, politics, international affairs, and

miscellaneous thernes. Among the writings he produced, Indonesia's struggle before

independence was bis particular specialty, given that he witnessed manyevents directIy.

He aIso wrote about bis own involvement in negotiations with the Dutch and about the

operation ofMasyumi. He was a competent writer on law, because ofbis Iegal practice

spanning several decades. The foUowing is a general survey of bis writings, classified

according to subject.

1. Islam and Politics

Roem wrote extensively on Islam and politics, with the most important topic

being the idea of an Islamic state. Responding to a Panji Masyarakat47 article in 1982 by

Amien Rais,48 Roem agreed that the idea ofan Islamic state is not dealt with in either the

Qur'an or the Traditions ofthe Prophet. In tum his article led to a correspondence with

Nurcholish Madjid, who at that time was a student of philosophy at the University of

Chicago.49 Roem and Madjid exchanged letters four times on this issue, a correspondence

46 His last writings consisted ofhis political correspondence with Nurcholish Madjid, compiled in Agus Edi Santoso, ed., Tidak AdaNegara Islam: Surat-Surat Politik Nurcholish Madjid-Mohamad Roem.

47 PanjiMasyarakat is one ofthe foremost Islamic magazines in Indonesia.

48 Amien Rais is the former general chairman ofthe Muhammadiyah, currently the largest Islamic organization in Indonesia besides the NU. He is now the cbainnan ofthe PAN (partai Amanat Nasional or National Trust Party), a newly established political party in the post-Soehano era.

49 Nurcholish Madjid is an Indonesian Muslim reformist of the contemporary period; for more infonnation on bis life, see Mark Woodward, "Nurcholish Madjid," in John L. Esposito, ed., Oxford • Encyclopedia ofModem Islamic world, voL 3 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 255.

24 .--..... which was later published in book forro under the title Tidak Ada Negara Islam: Surat- • Surat Politik Nurcholish Madjid-Mohamad Roem (There Is No Islamic State: The Political correspondence ofNurcholish Madjid and Mohamad Roem).50

Other important articles relating to Islam. and politics written in the 1970s were

compiled in a small book entitled: Islam Da/am Perjuangan Kemerdekaan dan

Pembangunan Indonesia (Islam in Independence Struggle and Indonesian

Development)51 in which Roem described the contribution of Islam. in early nationalist

political organization through the Sarekat Islam. movement in the fIrSt quarter of the 20th

century. In 1982, Roem wrote further on this theme in an article entitled "Sebuah

Tinjauan Perjuangan Politik: Pasang Surnt Perjangan Ummat Islam Indonesia" CA

Perspective on the Political Struggle: The Fluctuation of the Struggle of the Indonesian

Muslim Community)52 which traced the emergence of the Islamic movements and their

efforts in the late Dutch era, in the Soekarno era, and finally under the New Order. Roem

also wrote two short articles on international Muslim concems: "Prospect Dunia Islam

Abad XV Hijriyah" ( Prospects for the Islamic World in the Fifteenth Century Hijra)53

and "Masalah Islam Yang Dihadapi Dunia" (problems Faced by the Muslim World).54

50 Agus Edi Santoso, ed., Tidak Ada Negara Islam: Surat-Surat Politik Nurcholish Madjid­ Mohamad Roem.

5t Mohamad Roem. Islam Dalam Perdjuangan Kemerdekaan dan Pembangunan Indonesia, (Djakarta: nnn. 1972?).

52 Mohamad Roem, "Sebuah Tinjauan Perjuangan Politik: Pasang Surut Perjangan Umat Islam Indonesia." in Roem. Diplomasi: Ujung Tombak Perjuangan RI. 220-228.

53 Mohamad Roem. "Prospek Dunia Islam Abad XV." in Roem. Diplomasi Ujung Tombak Perjuangan RI. 280-283.

54 Mohamad Roem. "Masaiah Islam Yang Dihadapi Dunia." in Roem, Diplomasi: Ujung Tombak • Perjuangan RI. 288- 292. 25 • These two articles, are based on Roem's perspectives as an executive member of

Mu'tamar al-'AIam aI-Islamf (World Muslim Congress). He discussed the prospects of

the Islamic world in the emergence ofa number ofindependent Muslim countries on one

hand, but aIso some existing problems faced by Muslims~ especially in the countries

where they have become a minority on the other band

2. History ofPre-Independence Indonesia

Roem produced severa! monographs on this topic in which he paid close attention

to the historical events that led to Indonesian independence. In bis short monograph Tiga

Peris/iwa Bersejarah (Three Historical Events),55 he suggested that there were three

historical events of significance which most Indonesians did not appreciate: the fust

National Congress in 1916, the emergence of Pancasila in 1945 and the retum to

Yogyakarta as the Indonesian capital in 1949. The anniversaries of these events are not

recognized as national holidays in Indonesia and yet they were events of great national

consequence. The first National Congress was held by Sarekat Islam and served to unite

Indonesians against colonialism. The adoption of Pancasila was an event that united

Indonesian perceptions on the national ideology after Many months ofdebate. The return

to Yogyakarta resulted in the fonnation of the government in that city by Indonesians

fighting for independence, and served as proof to the Dutch that the new state was a

reality.

Roem's works on a number ofother aspects of Indonesian history, mostly in the

form of speeches and articles, are aIso available. One example is Suka Duka Berunding

• SS Mohamad Roem, Tiga Peris/iwa Bersejarah (Djakarta: Sinar Hudaya., 1972).

26 Dengan Retanda (Sorrow and Happiness in Negotiating with the Dutch),56 Roem writes • from ms perspective as a participant in negotiations with the Dutch, descnbing the difficulties of dealing with an adversary. He states that gaining sovereignty through

diplomacy was not an easy task. The Dutch tried every means possible to prevent

independence from becoming a reaIity, even though Indonesia had begun to receive

international support, especially in the United Nations. In the end, Indonesia was

successful when the Dutch were forced to attend the Round Table Conference that

acknowledged Indonesian sovereignty.

Roem ~ s own participation in the events surrounding the Indonesian struggle for

independence allowed him ta write an important account of the proclamation of

independence. He pointed out, that it actually was preceded by the kidnapping of

Soekarno and Hatta by youths57 who insisted that the announcement be made without

waiting for instructions from the Japanese. These youths were of the opinion that the

Japanese, having surrendered ta the Allied forces, no longer had any authority; hence

they could not confer legitimacy. They held that a simple proclamation would confer as

much legitimacy on the act as any Japanese declaration. Soekarno made the proclamation

two days later, apparently agreeing that this was the most advantageous way ofdoing it.

Roem also put forward the various views of other historians ofthis period regarding the

56 This short book was based on Mohamad Roem's speech presented on May 31, 1975, to a gathering in the Kebangkitan Nasional building in Jakarta. Mohamad Roern. Slika Duka Beronding Dengan Belœu:la (Jakarta: ldayu Press, 1977).

S7 This group ofyoung people, included Sukamï, Wi~ and Singgih went to Soekamo's home on August 15, 1945 and took Soekarno and other senior nationalists to RengasdengkIok Ca village), due to Soekarno's refusaI to make the proclamation ofIndonesian independence at that rime. This event is known in history as the "Peristiwa Rengasdengldok" (Rengasdengklok event). See Mohamad Roem, Pentjulikan, Proklamasi dan Penilaian Sejarah. (Djakarta: Hudaya, 1970); Poesponegoro and Notosusanto, Sejarah • Nasionallndonesia, voL 6, 82- 83. 27 issue ofthe proclamation as weIl as the strategy followed by the Indonesian government • to win freedom in bis work PenjuIikan, Proldamasi dan Peni/aian Sedfarah (Kidnap, Proclamation and Historical Appraisal).S8

Roem produced other historical writings in the form of articles on Indonesian

revolutionary events, including anecdotes of the struggle for independence collected in

Bunga Rampai Dari Sejarah (Selections from History).59 This book is interesting because

it is enriched with Roem's comments on the involvement ofother Indonesian nationalists

in the struggle, such as Sutan Sjahrir, Faqih Usman, and Prawoto.60

3. Law

In the compilation of Roem's articles entitled Diplomasi: UJung Tombak

Perjuangan RI (Diplomacy: Spearhead ofthe Indonesian Struggle, 1989), one finds some

writings ofa legai nature. Here Roem dealt with controversial issues ofbis day, such as

human rights, capital punishment, and marital justice. As might be expected he often used

Islamic values as a source.

According to Roem, the Qur'an had already determined the basic human

freedoms long before the Universal Declaration ofHwnan Rights was ever produced. He

notes that in the Qur'an, the freedom to choose one's religion is guaranteed as an

essential human right that affects other rights in human life. In bis writings he also

describes how the rights of Indonesians had been oppressed since the coming of Dutch

58 Moharnad Roem, Penju/ikan, Proklamasi dan Penilaian Sedjarah (Djakarta: Hudaya, 1970).

59 Mohamad Roem, Bunga Rampai Dari Sejarah (Djakarta: Bulan Bintang. 1972).

60 Sutan Sjahrir was leader ofthe Socialist party and the first Indonesian Prime Minister, while • Faqih Usman and Prawoto were Roem's colleagues in the Masyumi leadership. 28 colonialism and how this had had a negative impact on the development of Indonesian ~. human rights. Fortunately~ he adds~ Indonesians were wise enough to include human

rights provisions in the 1945 Constitution~ which resembled the declaration that had been

produced by the United Nations.61

In bis article Tentang Hukuman Matz-62 (On the Law of Execution)~ Roem argues

against a literal interpretation of sorne elements of Islamic Iaw. He suggested two

alternative punishments for serious crimes: execution or life imprisonment. Roem states

that execution should be applied ooly in the most egregious of crimes, but he does not

specify which crimes. He states, however~ that life imprisonment is preferable.63 In this

article, Roem based bis views on the positive law applied in Indonesia without trying ta

reconcile it with the IsIamic law.

Roem~s other workof a legal nature is 500 exMasjumi/P.S./ Kehilangan Hak

Dipilih? (500 of Fonner MasYUIIliJPSI lost their Elected Right?)~64 which questions the

basis of the government~s ban on the election of the former Masyumi and PSI leaders as

members of the House of People~s Representatives in the 1971 national electioD. Roem

saw the inappropriateness of the policy in the light of democratic and constitutional

principles. Sorne of Roem~s other works contain matters of a legal nature but are

classified as historical and political.

61 Mohamad Roem, "HaIe Azasi," in Roem. Diplomasi: Ujung Tombak Perjuangan RI, 310- 321­

62 Mohamad Roem, UTentang Hukuman Mati," in Roem, Diplomasi: Ujung Tombak Perjuangan RI, 295- 298.

63 Roem's idea was based on a story told by Mohamad Hatta in the course of their discussion on how to implement the constitution. Hatta told of a criminal that was once brought before a judge for trial, only to collapse and die there due to malnutrition. • 64 Mohamad Roem, 500 exMasjumiIPSI Kehilangan Hak Dipilih? (Surabaya: Dokumenta, 1970. 29 4. Reports on International IsIamic Affairs

As an activist in international IsIamic organizations, Roem wrote sorne articles on

issues affecting Muslims throughout the world. As a pro-Islamic activist Roem criticized

the founding of Israel at the expense of the Palestinian people. He expressed concem

about the problems faced by Islamic countries in recent decades: the Islamic govemment

in Pakistan, the independence of Bangladesh, Afghanistan's resistance to the Russsian

invasion, the Iran-Iraq war, and the struggle ofSouth Philippine Muslims far autonomy.65

Roem published many other pieces in variaus newspapers, but these are more

difficult ta classify as they are more general in nature and tend to he anecdataI, referring

ta events during bis participation in the Indonesian struggle for independence. Roem's

writing style consists of brief but pithy descriptions of these events. In bis writings on

Indonesian bistory, he frequently criticized Soekarno, especially after the era of Guided

Democracy, even though in the early years after the Independence he showed respect for

Soekarno as a father of the independence proclamation.66 Another marked feature of his

writings is bis strong dislike for the Indonesian communist movement which paralleIs

that of most other Islamic leaders in Indonesi~ apparently because of its rejection of

religion and the deep mistrust between Communist and Muslims in 20ch century

Indonesian politics.

6S These matters May be found in the articles entitled: "Kekuatan Dunia Sedang Bergeser" (The Change ofWorld Power)~ "Pengaruh Lobi Yahudi" (fhe Impact of the Jewish Lobby), "Intervensi Militer Rusia di Afghanistan" (The Russian Military Intervention in Afghanistan), "Perang Iran-Irak" (The Iran­ Iraq War), and "Mendalami RasH Konferensi Islamabad" (Unders~ding the Results of the Islamabad Conference). AIl of which are included in Roem, Diplomasi: Ujung Tombale perjuangan RI, 176-204.

66 See the discussion of his criticism of Soekarno in Chapter TItree, 94-95; Mohamad Roem, "Sukarno, Otobiografi yang Diceritakan kepada Cindy Adams (Timbangan Buku)," in Roem, Bunga .~~-. Rampai Dari Sejarah. 148-162.

30 CHAPTERTWO • MOHAMAD ROEM'S POLmCAL ACTI\TflES

A. Roem and the JIB (.Jong Islamieten Bond), the SIS (Studenten Islamieten Studie­

club), and the PSU (partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia).

Roem's nationalist activity prior to independence bas significant links with bis

involvement in nationalist movements, principally the JIB (Jang Islamieten Bond), the

SIS (Studenten Islamieten Studieclub), and the PSU (partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia). The

JIB was the fust movement that Roern joined, and it was there that he fust met Agus

Salim who later contnbuted greatly to the development ofIslamic nationalist ideals. The

SIS can be seen as having emerged in reaction ta the declining influence ofthe JIB and as

a continuation ofthe academic anti-colonial movement in that members ofthe JIB were

for the most part pre-college students while those ofthe SIS were college students proper.

The PSU, on the other band, was the focus ofRoem's fust fonnal political activity - one

in which Agus Salim featured prominently.

Roem's fonnal involvement in nationalist aetivities began when he took part in

the JIB. Pioneered by Samsurizal, the JIB was established in 1925 in response to existing

local youth organizations which did not regard the teachings of Islam as important.

Samsurizal, a chairman of one of these youth organizations, called Jang Java, felt that

Islamic doctrines among the younger generation could be utilized to promote a united

national front if they were effectively disseminated. The idea, however, found few

supporters since many were from Java where nominal beliefs on Islam were prevalent • and because the education ofthe period portrayed Islamic values as opposed to modem 31 science and ideas of progress. Roem once commented that this rejection within Jong

~'. Java of Samsurizal's Islamic agenda was a ''blessing in disguise" because the JIB would

never have been founded otherwise. L Accordingly the JIB was at fust simply a vehicle for

Samsurizal's Islamic programs and made efforts to inculcate Indonesian Muslim youth

with Islamic teachings and values. The goal ofthe JIB itself was to spread Islamic beliefs

among young Muslims, as weIl as to foster their interest in Islamic doctrines, while

remaining tolerant of other faiths.2 These goals were especially appropriate for young

Muslims of the period, as they were meant to counter Dutch efforts to downgrade Islam

as a point of identification among the Indonesian elite.3 Due to the political content of its

message, therefore, the JIB cannot be viewed exclusively as an educational organization.

It was a vehicle for the training and grooming of Muslim students, many of whom were

later to dominate Indonesian politicallife and thought in the years following the struggle

for independence. A nucleus ofleaders, trained in the Jang Islamiten Bond later came to

occupy a central position in Islamic political parties.4 Apart from its Islamic goals, in its

later development the JIB is considered to have been one of the fust nationally oriented

youth organizations, its membership open to all young Muslims, without consideration

for ethnic origin.

Roem writes that in the early years following the establishment of the JIB, sorne

people questioned whether the JIB would assume a constructive role in the nationalist

1 See Ridwan Saidi. Cendikiawan Islam di Zaman Belanda: Study Pergerakan Intellectual JIB dan SIS ('25-'42) (Jakarta: Yayasan Piranti llmu. 1990), 12-13.

2 Mohamad Roem, "Sejarah Berdirinya Jang Iskamiten Bond," in Roem, Diplomasi: Ujung Tombak Perjuangan RI, 29.

3 Deliar Noer, "Jang Islamiten Bond," in Soemarsono, Mohamad Roem 70 Tahun, 240. • 4 Harry J. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun (The Hague: W. Van Hoeve, 1958),56. 32 movement emerging among the educated young~ and whether the JIB could provide • adequate guidance to young Muslims~ without destroying their effectiveness as future leaders. Due to its commitment to Islam, it was feared that the JIB would he incapable of

fostering nationalist sentiments and woulcL instea~ erase the ideals of national

independence. These questions were generally raised in good fai~ but sometimes the

criticism was designed to discredit the 00.5 For instance~ within nationalist circles there

was a concem that the JIB~s presence would detract from the importance of the

Indonesian national struggle, since nationalism was not stressed among its objectives.6

The concerns ofthe JIB)s critics seem in retrospect to have been exaggerated, as

during each congress ofthe JIB the problems discussed by the participants did not merely

revolve around the problems unique to Islamic youth but also included the concept of

national identity.7 In bis writing, Roem tries to counter the idea that the JIB lacked

nationalist orientation because JIB representatives did not attend the 1928 National

Congress which produced the "Sumpah Pemuda)' (the Youth Oath). Roem disputes the

S Mohamad Roem, "The Genesis ofthe Islamic Youth Movement: The JIB," Mizan, vol. 2 no. 3 (1986): 27.

6 Roem writes that the aims and purposes ofthe JIB were as follows: 1. The studyand promotion ofthe observation ofIslam. 2. The cultivation and promotion of sympathy for Islam and its followers, while giving positive tolerance with regard to those who think: otherwise. 3. The cultivation and promotion of contacts among intellectua1s and with Lite people through [sIam. 4 The promotion of physical and spritual development of its members through self-training (education) and self-aetivity. Mohamad Roem, "Jong Islamiten Bond yang Saya Alami:~ Panji Masyarakat 348, January 1982, 24.

• 7 See Cahyo Budi Utomo, Dinamika Pergerakan Kebangsaall llldonesia. Dari KebaJlgkitan Hingga Kemerdekaan (Semarang: IKIP Semarang Press, 1995), 125.

33 disputes the charge, saying that Many JIB members did attend, including himselfas a]IB • member ofthe Jakarta Branch.8 At the next stage of its development, the JIB established two organs for

disseminating information among its members. The first of these was the magazine an-

Niïr (the Light).9 The second was the Natipij (National Indonesische Padvinderij), an

organization that offered Kewiraan (national pride) lessons to its members. 1O The

establishment ofthe latter is considered a historie milestone, it is one ofthe first instances

of the use of the name Indonesia. At the time, the Dutch did not allow public

acknowledgement ofthis name in organizational titles, referring instead to the region as

the East Indies.

It was from the educational activism ofthe JIB that Roem acquired bis first basic

understanding ofIslam and nationalism. In the JIB he met the senior Muslim nationalist,

H. Agus Salim, deseribed earlier, who, since the establishment of the organization, had

been active as an advisor and instructor in Islamic teachings to its members. Hariyanti

Kahfi writes that at the time Salim had become a beacon for young Indonesians who

wished to discuss the complex problems confronting Muslim society. From the first

generation of Muslim intellectuals, he more than anyone else contributed to the

emergence of the second generation of Muslim intellectuals. Among bis students were

8 In this case7 Roem tries to counter Abu Hanifah's statement that not only did the lIB not actively take part in the discussions ofthe Second Y outh Congress. but it also took no part in the fonnulation ofthe Youth Declaration which constituted the climax oftha.t congress. For more information, see Roem, "The Genesis ofan Islamic Youth Movement: JIB." 25-26.

9 This magazine was also known by its Dutch tide Hel Licht. It was first published in 1925. See Deliar Noer. "Jong Islamiten Bond." in Soemarsono, MohamadRoem 70 Tahun, 247. • 10 Saidi, Cendikiawan Islam Zaman Be/anda, 19. 34 Mohamad Roem, Mohammad Natsir, JusufWibisono, Kasman Singodimedjo and others ~..• who were for the most part studying at the AMS at that time. Il As mentioned in Chapter

One, Agus Salim taught intensively in the early years of JIB's establishment, while

giving moral support ta its members. Salim also transmitted his Islamic ideas ta a wider

audience through the JIB journal, an_Nür. 12 In view ofSalim's vital role in the education

of the young Muslim generation, Roem later hailed him as "the spiritual father" of young

Muslim inteliectuaIs.[3 An example ofthis guidance came as stated in Roem's writings in

honor of Haji Agus Salim, through Salim's attitude while he was an hoofdredacteur

(editor) of a Dutch-operated newspaper, Hindia Baroe. In addition to arranging daily

news items, Salim.'s task at this newspaper included providing a weekly religious column.

Here Salim not ooly commented often on Indonesian practices in contradiction to Islamic

.-.. teachings, but aIso commented on actions by the Dutch that he found objectionable. The

.~. Dutch eventually demanded that Salim retract his criticism of their authority. Rather than

doing so, Salim resigned the following day from ms position. When Roem asked Agos

Salim why he resigned sa hastily, without fust giving the Dutch notice fust and without

securing another source of incarne, Salim contended that his position as leader of the

newspaper was different from his leadership in the Sarekat Islam. In Hindia Baroe, he

demonstrated his commitment ta the truth as he saw it regardless of what common

11 Erni Hariyanti Kahfi. "Haji Agus Salim: His Role in Nationalist Movement in Indonesia During the Early Twentieth Century," (M.A. thesis. McGill University, 1996), 118.

12 Ibid., 118.

13 See Ridwan Saidi, Pemuda Islam dalam Dinamfka Politfk Bangsa (/925-1984) (Jakarta: -- • Rajawali. 1984), 106. 35 opinion or party doctrine may have been. 14 Thus~ despite bis general political moderation ~.• and bis willingness to work with the Dutch in most situations, there were important

moments of confrontation where he exercized moral courage and opposed then. Roem

was particularly impressed with Salim~s simple and rather austere lifestyle, seen in

moving from one rented house to another and making no display of bis position or

influence. 15 Later in life Roem said of Salim: "What l am now is due ta the teachings and

training ofHaji Agus Salim,,16

While a member of the JIB~ Roem became involved in the Natipij which was a

boy scout organization~ and even was its leader for a time. The Natipij was established in

March 1925, soon after the establishment of the JIB, and was designed to function as a

feeder group, bringing new recruits to the JIB. It was also ta emphasize !slamic teachings

rather than Westem values generally in vogue with other scout groups of the time. 11 The

Natipij implemented various programs such as camping, scouting, courses and other

activities which were adjusted with Islamic attitudes. Roem and other Natipij leaders also

gave Kewiraan (materials for national pride) ta the members. During one of the

congresses of the JIB when activists made speeches ta the congress participants, the

Natipij was once represented by Roem. Saîdî said that the involvement of Roem and

other Muslim youth in the Natipij and their stress on Kewiraan materials were crucial for

14Mohamad Roem, "Haji Agus Salim" in Panitia Buku Peringatan Haji Agus Salim Seratus Tahun, Seratus Tahun Haji Agus Salim (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan. 1984), 178-179.

IS For more information on Salim's economic state see ibid., 177-178.

16 This quotation, without mentioning the resource, was cited by Solichin Salam, Hadji Agus Salim: Hidup dan Perjuangannja (Djakarta: Djajamumi, 1961), 171.

17 Syamsuddin Abdullah, et.aI., Organisasi Kaum Muda Islam di Jawa Pada Masa Akhir Penjajahan Belanda, 1925-1942 (Yogyakarta: Lembaga Research and Survey Institute Agama Islam, • 1986), 71-72. 36 --;. the future of Indonesian Muslim. youth in that it fostered an awareness of astate that deserved their support and loyalty. The suspicion with which the Dutch regarded the

scout organizations gives testimony to their significance. The Dutch government tried to

bring scout organizations udner the NIPV (Nationale Indische Padvinderij), an Indies­

wide organization which, naturally, de-emphasized nationalist sentiment and promoted

notions ofgood citizenship under the Dutch colonial authority. However, this unification

effort was unsuccessful, since only one boy scout troop, JIPO (Jong Indonesische

Padvinders-Organisatie) actually affrliated itself with the Dutch while the other scout

troops remained independent of such direct Dutch control and were able to continue

effort toward forming a united youth nationalist front. l8

As Natipij leader Roem apparently had expressed bis dissatisfaction with the

'-"'-'. continued affiliation of Natipij with the lIB, and at the congress held in Madiun (East

Java) in 1931, Roem proposed a separation. He said that it was important for the scouts to

be independent since the JIB could no longer give priority ta the concems of students in

Natipij. But the JIB rejected Roem's suggestion and then dismissed Roem and his board

from the Natipij's leadership. In reaction, Roem and bis board established another

organization based 00 the Muslim studeot community. This organizatioo was called the

SIS (Studenten IsIamieten Studieclub), a group which will be dealt with a little later.

Roem's association with the JIB was highly influential in the fonnation of rus

IsIamic and nationalist ideals. Regarding this link, Titi Marsoetji'sl9 analysis in the an­

Nüi-magazine on the motivations for membership in the JIB gives sorne insight:

t8 A.K. Pringgodigdo, Sejarah Pergerakan Rakyat lndonesia (Jakarta: Dian Rakyat, 1994), 122- 123. • t9 Titi Marsoeji was a member ofthe JIB, but her background is not clearly known. 37 1. Those who received education in western schools, and got religious education at home, but felt it necessary to enter the JIB to meet their religious aspirations. 2. Those who were really consistent in their religion. 3. Those who felt sorry for other religious followers and wished to introduce Islam to them. 4. Those who believed that Indonesian nationalism would not stand without Islam 5. Those who wished to learn about Islam and politics2o

Many of Marsoeji's classifications describe Roem's involvement in the JIB. His

formal education was western but it was through bis involvement in the JIB that he

became aware of Islamic modemist ideas, especially those of Agus Salim. Even prior ta

acquiring a formal western education, he was already in possession of a religious culture

inherited from bis parents. It was through involvement with the JIB, that Roem began ta

he concemed about the fate ofhis young fellow Muslims, many of whom attended Dutch ---. schools and, consequently, knew nothing oftheir religion. Roem writes: At school pupils were taught Dutch, German, French and English literature. When there was anything related to Islam, either now or in history as Western people saw it, they viewed Islam in a manner that would not promote understanding or appreciation. This may not he really due to any ill on the part of the Western world, but only due to their own ignorance. However, sometimes there also existed the deliberate intent to present an unfavorable image of Islam such as Islam allows men as many as four wives. In Islam, women have a very inferior position. The harem still exists in the Moslem world, as does slavery. Moslems are discouraged to have any initiative, as their destiny has been predetermined. Mohammad was an epileptic, and every time he had an attack he spoke, and people wrote down bis sayings during such attacks; this is what the Moslems regard as divine revelations. Islam ooly repeats the Christian and Jewish teachings. As bis country was poor, Mohammad toid every Moslem to make a pilgrimage ta Mecca, at least once in bis life, 50 bis country may have sorne earnings. This was taught at scheol, from the ms up to the university-- level colleges. And it was not surprising therefore, that educated people were te sorne degree, affected by these allegations.21

~. 20 Deliar Noer, "Jang islamiten Bond," in Soemarsono, Mohamad Roem 70 Tahun, 247. 21 Roem. "The Genesis of an Islamic Youth Movement," 20-21.

38 Roem then describes the contribution ofthe J1B in countering the above problem: ~\. The JIB courses and articles gradually succeeded in eliminating these feelings of inferiority, and we no longer felt ashamed of being Moslems; to the contrary, we felt proud and were convinced that Islam. was giving sound guidance to the modem world. We no longer acted as people who had to defend themselves against attacks, and through directly studying the religion we became indifferent as to whether other people liked ordisliked our religion.22

Roem contended that the JIB members did not love their own country any less

than did any secular youth organization since Islam cOIIlIDanded the struggling against

inequity and upholding justice at any price. To bis mind, fighting for national

independence clearly was the same thing. He justified such a view on a 1)adith which read

(in translation): "Love of one's country and nation is part of the true faith." Accordingly,

Indonesian Muslims could not be less patriotic than those of other religious convictions.23

This nationalist view continued to be emphasized long after bis involvement with the JIB

came to an end. Through bis involvement with Agus Safu:n in the JIB, Roem leamt a

brand ofpolitics imbued with Islamic ethics.

Despite the JIB's nominal position as an educational movement for the young, the

JIB was at its core a political movement, whose aims focused on countering Dutch

secular views. Cabyo Budi Utomo writes that the organization was not formally involved

in politics, but its adult members (those over 18) did participate in political activities.24

Husni's analysis points to the JIB as contributing to the Muslim ideological development

at a period of time when movements in Indonesia were going through a formative

22 Ibid., 28-29.

23 Ibid., 28.

24 Cahyo Budi Utomo. Dinamika Pergerakan Kebangsaan lndonesia. Dari Kebangkitan Hingga • Kemerdekaaan. (Semarang: IKIP Semarang Press. 1995). 124. 39 phase.25 In fact, the JIB was extremely important in training Roem and others for later

leadership roles. Even though Roem never Ied the central JIB, his name became

synonymous with the history of the JIB movement, together with other Muslim leaders

such as Natsir, Kasman, Wibisono, and Wiwoho.

Before embarking on a discussion of Roem's activities in the SIS, it is important

to state that the JIB not only encouraged high school students but aIso youth who had

dropped out of school to take up membership in the IIB. Thus the JIB's membership

extended not only to students, but aIso to the youth as a whole. Even those 30 years of

age or oider were permitted to remain members. This effectively maintained the

organizational coherence of the JIB membership, although it was somewhat contrary to

its original mission of educating youth. The primacy of the religious agenda for the

young was further diminished as a greater number of its members was influenced by the

newly emerging spirit of nationalism, that is being free from the Dutch colonialists, and

thus the JIB no longer paid close attention to its basic mission as an educational

organization. This internaI tension, Roem believed, distracted the organization from its

true calling.26

25 Dardiri Husni who wrote his thesis on the JIB, posits that the establishment of the JIB involved three important factors. First, ideological interest characterized sorne Muslirn students who regarded Islam as the religion of most Indonesians. Second. the political agenda proposed by Samsurizal. the pioneer of the JIB. included teaching IsIamic courses in Jong Java and was opposed by sorne students probably for the reasons that sorne belonged to other religions, others did not want to introduce an element into society that was in itself volatile, while others who belonged to a secular view may have found it offensive. Third, in socio-historical terms, the students of the 1920s were living in an intellectuai climate of emerging new ideologies (Islamic, socialist, nationalist) and new directions in political developments. such as the awakening of their own identity. Dardiri Husni, "Jong Islamieten Bond: A Study of a Muslim Youth Movement in Indonesia during the Dutch Colonial Era, 1924-1942," (M.A. thesis McGiIl University, 1998),47. .-- • 26 Saidi, Cendikiawan Islam di Zaman Belanda, 31- 32. 40 To address this problem of organizational direction, in 1934 Roem and Jusuf • Wibisono~27 decided to found the SIS, which was a campus-based organization.. Both were university studen15 at the time and knew that the JIB would not he taken seriously

by university studen15. Roem stated at the tÏme the SIS was designed "to perpetuate the

JIB in the universities." Wibisono explained that the SIS was to he much more serious

and academic in its orientation. 115 purpose was to act as "a medium to meet the

aspirations for more scientific discussion." 28

The SIS followed the original JIB intention by acting as an instrument for the

transmission of Islamic teachings among students who were not familiar with the tenets

oftheir own faith due to the secular nature ofthe educational system introduced by the

Dutch. Roem and Wibisono both realized that Muslim university students had been

alienated from their religion by the Dutch colonial system of education. This was a

conscious policy as the Dutch were aware of the potential danger of those University

Muslim students to become intellectually consolidated and thereby challenge the Dutch

regime. Therefore, Roem and Wibisono felt that ifthe Islamic faith was not reinforced in

these studen15, a cultural vacuum would emerge and their minds would then be

dominated by the intellectual heritage of a colonialized mentality. Instead, Roem and

Wibisono sought to awaken these students to fully appreciate their Islamic heritage and,

as an important byproduct, support the struggle against colonialism. Islam, the faith ofthe

majority ofthe students, thus became a tool for arousing nationalist sentiment.

27 Wibisono was one of the Muslim nationalists who was later active in the IsIamic party. Masyumi, and thus a colleague ofRoem. • 28 Saidi. Cendildawan Islam di Zaman Belanda. 33. 41 ~.• This vision shared by Roem and Wibisono can be seen in the basic charter of the SIS. It states that its purpose was to impact a general knowledge ofIslam. and its doctrines

to any university student that joined the organization.29 Roem and Wibisono also realized

that the number of devoted Muslims was not plentiful in the universities of the day, and

that they would have to recruit from among the nominal Muslims. The organization's

determination to accommodate nominal Muslim involvement may be inferred from the

fact that its frrst chairman, Soediman Kartohadiprojo, was not categorized as a devoted

Muslim before he held this position.3o Roem and Wibisono served as committee

members initially, but later Roem Ied the organization himself between December 1936

and March 1937.31

The expansion of the organization's membership was the main objective in the

fust years of its existence. Recruitment was quite difficult. One problem was that the

numher of universities was small, less than ten at the end of the 19205, with a total

student population at the university level being ooly about 3000.32 Of this number, only

about 100 initially expressed any interest in learning about Islam.33 Because of the

intense competition for a limited pool of members, SIS success was achieved largely at

the expense ofthe JIB, hastening the decline ofthe latter organization.

19Ibid.,34.

3on,id.• 356.

31 The change in the organization was not initiated by the congress. Unlike the JIB. which extended its branches into other areas, the SIS was based only in Jakarta. Its concentration on Jakarta was due ta the fact that most universities at the time were found in Jakarta.

32 Roem. "Sejarah Berdirinya Jang IsIamiten Bond," in Roem, Diplomasi: Ujung Tombak Perjuangan RI. 124.

33 S.U. Bajasut, Alam Fikiran dan Djedjak Perjuangan Prawoto Mangkusasmito (Surabaya: "-- • Documenta. 1972), 340. 42 -~. Roem, besides being a founder of the SIS, was aIso active in Muslimse Reveille, published by the association as a means ofpropagating its message. It was first published

in 1935, about one year after the establishment of the SIS.34 The contents of Muslimse

Reveille were designed to counter Dutch and elite Indonesian impressions of Islam, and

stressed the orthodox understanding of Islamic teachings such as prayers and fasting, as

weil as the presentation of Islam as a logical religion in touch with modem times. The

magazine used scientific discourse to analyze a variety of contemporary topics. It was

constantly subject to Dutch censorship, but continued to he published until it was shut

down by the Japanese when they banned all Indonesian organizations. including the SIS,

in 1942. The Dutch were not the ooly ones suspicious of the SIS motives. There were

those in the Indonesian national movement who feared that it would divide Indonesian

university students.35 This fear was exacerbated by its occasional success in recruiting

members from the university student population who had been associated with nationalist

groups.

The role of the SIS in the history of the struggle of Indonesian youth movement

against the Dutch was significant. Although it started out with littIe more than 100

students, and its membership was never large, its members showed great determination.

Significantly, three ofits leaders, Roem, Wibisono, and Prawoto later played key roles in

the independence struggle from 1945 t01949.

34 Saidi, Cendkiawan Islam Zaman Belanda. 37.

35 This suspicion was cited by Saidi from the book Sejarah Perjuangan Pemuda lndonesia •• published by the Department ofEducation and Culture. See ibid., 40.

43 Roem began ms involvement in the PSII (partai Serekat Islam Indonesia or the • United Party ofIndonesian Islam.) in 1933 when he was 25 years oId and still belonged to the JIB. The PSII was first established under the name of SDI (Sarekat Dagang Islam or

Islamic Mercantile Association). It was founded by Haji Samanhudi in 1912 as a

reaction against the Chïnese who occupied the key-positions in the Indonesian economy

at what was felt to be the expense of the natives. Its activities were, of course, mainly

directed against the Dutch who gave privilege and priority to the Chïnese in matters of

trade and imports of vital chemicals for the batik-industry.36 Roem, in one of his

accounts of Indonesian history, notes that the awareness of the Islamic merchants

movement towards the pressure of the Chïnese was inspired by Raden Mas

Tirtoadijosurjo, an aristocratic Javanese merchant, who published the magazine Medan

Priyayi in 1909 voicing the concems of the pribumi (indigenous) merchants.37 Not

wishing to limit its membership to merchants, the SDI then dropped the word dagang

(mercantile) frOID its title.

Since its foundation in 1912 the Sarekat Islam had served as the foremost IsIamic

party, and for a few years, the only truly mass party in the colonial period.38 Federspiel

posits that the Sarekat Islam dominated the Indonesian political scene frOID its inception

until1927.39 At the latter time, the PNI (partai Nasional Indonesia or Indonesian National

u 36 Anton Timur Jaylani. ''The Sarekat Islam: 1ts contribution to Indonesian Nationalism. (M.A. thesis. McGill Universtiy 1959), 35.

37 Mohamad Roem, Islam Dalam Perjuangan Kemerdekaan dan Pembangunan Indonesia, 2.

38 John IngeIson, Road to Exile: The Indonesian Nationalist Movement, 1927-1934 (Singapore, Asian Studies Association ofAustralia, 1979),45. For more information, see J. TH. Petrus Blumberger, De Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlandsch-Indië (Haarlem: H.D. Tjeenk Willink & Zoon), 55-104. • 39 Howard M. FederspieI, Persatuan Islam: Istamic Reform in Twentieth Century lndonesia, 88. 44 Party) emerged and challenged the domination of Sarekat Islam. The PNI concentrated

·~.' . on the issue of nationalism rather than Islamism as the Sarekat Islam had done. In

response, the sr (Sarekat Islam) leader, HOS Cokroaminoto shifted the organization's

orientation to national issues. Barly in its work the sr was simply a movement without

much definition espousing politicaI, social, religious, and economic causes. In its later

development, the organization assumed the form of a party, and renamed itself the PSI

(partai Sarekat Islam. or Islamic United Party) in its seventh national congress in 1923.

The reason behind this transformation from union activities to a political party lay in the

fact that the Sarekat Islam had allegedly contained communist ideological elements.4o

Aside from this politicaI factor, there was aIso an organizational need to strengthen the

forces of non-cooperation with the colonialist government. An integrated politicaI party

seemed to be the solution ta bath these problems. A loose movement with a tloating, ill-

defined membership and weak bonds between the central organization and the local ones

was replaced by a centralized party called the PSII (partai Sarekat Islam. Indonesia or

Indonesian Islamic United party.)41 The successful change of the SI into PSI can be

attributed, in part, ta the presence of Agus Salim who began to play a key role in the

organization and to emphasize, as he did in his introductory speech to the congress, the

importance ofthe organization's shift to a party format.

Roem joined the Sarekat Islam after its evolution into a fonnaI party. It is

probable that his decision ta joïn the PSII was strongly influenced by Agus Salim.

Roem's major contributions ta the PSI! were made in bis capacity as a lawyer, defending

40 For information on the Communist uprising within the Sarekat Islam, see Vishal Singh, "The Rise ofIndonesian Political Parties:' Journal Southeast Asian Studies, vol. 2, no. 2 (July 1961): 43-65. • 41 Jaylani. 'The Sarekat Islam," 100-102. 45 people facing trial in Dutch courtrooms. He aIso worked to defend the right of the poor

Muslim vis-a-vis powerfuI Iandlords.42 At the time, Roem was a Iaw student of Rechts

Hoge School, making him a rare co:mmodity in an age ofsearee intellectual resources. He

was influential enough in the organization to eventually beeome a member of the central

board.

In 1936 Roem decided ta Ieave the board of the party, and followed Agus Salim

who established the Barisan Penyadar (Consious-Making Forces), an opposition group

within the party. The reason for th~ establishment of this organization was related to the

adoption within the PSII of a non-cooperation poliey against the Dutch, referred ta

afficially as the hijrah policy. The 1zijrah policy was first employed by the Sarekat Islam

in 1923, due ta the party's conviction that acquiescence to or cooperation with Dutch

rulers would not bring it cIoser to its goalS.43 At first, there was a debate within the PSII

over whether ta refer ta the poliey simply as non-cooperation or to use the religious term

hijrah. It was decided that the te:rm hijrah was preferable because, in addition to

conveying the spirit of non-cooperation with the Dutch, it also conveyed a sense of

solidarity in mind and action within aIl aspects of life, whether social, economic, or

political.44 Salim, who opposed the palicy, doubted whether such a palicy cauld actually

be applied against the Dutch, a conviction based on bis own persona! experience. He had

been a member of the Volksraad between 1918-1923 representing the Sarekat Islam, but

then resigned frOID the Volksraad feeling that bis membership supported ooly the Dutch

42Soemarsono, Mohammad Roem 70 Tahun, 36.

43 Noer, The Rise and the Developm:.ent ofthe Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia, 229.

44 Ibid., 229- 230. ""--/••

46 government, not the Indonesian people. After bis resignation, however, Salim reaIized

bis action ooly isolated bis organization from the political scene and from public society.

The reality that the Dutch were in control had ta be recognized.45 Yet Salim saw a

cooperation poliey merely as a tactic, rather than a tenet of ideology. He believed that in

arder ta ensure the continued existence of the party, a pragmatic strategy needed to be

adopted. Sa, in 1935 as chairman ofthe Dewan Partai (Party Council),46 Salim asked the

Ladjnah Tanfidziyah (Executive Committee) to review the hijrah policy due te the

promulgation of stricter reguJations by the colonial government against the political

activities of the non-eooperative parties. He believed that this regillation would paralyze

the party, and consequently argued for the abandonment of hijrah and the adoption of a

cooperative policy.47 As his close ally Roem apparently supported this position.

Salim, however, was unsuccessful. Due ta a new electoral system, Salim. was

ousted from the leadership at the party congress of 1936 and bis question- on the

abandonment of the non-cooperation poliey was deferred by the congress.48 In view of

this difference over policy, Salim and Roem ventured to create within the PSI! a faction

called the Barisan Penyadar (Conscious-Making Forces). As its name suggests, the

45 Soemarsono, Mohamad Roem 70 Tahun. 37.

46 The central structure of Partai Sarikat Islam's organization at its center is divided into two leadership/councils. Dewan Partai and Ladjnah Tanfidziyah. Salim chaired the Dewan Partai (Party Council) after the death of Cokroaminoto while Abikusno chaired the Ladjnah Tanfidiyah (Executive Committee). For more information on this division, see Noer, "'The Rise and the Development of the Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia," 222-223.

47 Mohamad Roem, "Pergerakan Kesadaran dalam PSU" cited in Noer, Modernist Muslim Movement in lndonesia 1908-1942, 145.

48 The 1936 congress elecred the chairman of the party who was to act as a formatter (one who is in charge of the board strucnrre) for the central committee members, so that he would have a free hand in making his own selection. However. Salim, who was very much appreciated for his activities in the party was excluded by the elected formatter, Abikusno. See Noer, Modemist Muslim Movement in lndonesia, ''-- • 145.

47 movement sought to make the PSII members aware that the policy adopted by the central

board shouId he overturned, i.e., become aware ofthe real effects of the hijrah policy and

retum ta a policy ofcooperation.

Roem's decision to follow Salim to establish the Barisan Penyadar PSI! was due

to bis belief that the Indonesian people, who were dependent in many respects, could not

hope to realize their aspirations except through a temporary accommodation with the

Dutch government. It should not, however, be assumed that Salim, Sangadji and Roem

were, as leaders of the Barisan Penyadar, less nationalistic than those who disagreed with

the cooperative policy. They merely differed with their colleagues over how freedom

from colonialism could be best achieved. The Barisan Penyadar, for example, supported

the petition of Sutarjo, an employee of PPBB (persatuan Pegawai-Pegawai

Binnenlandsch Bestuur) which demanded a dialogue with the Dutch government over the

future independence of the Dutch Indies (Indonesia). 49 Roem argued that this strategy

gave the movement an opportunity ta play a constructive raIe since more radical forms of

action against the Dutch were impossible. In an atmosphere where the word merdeka

(free) was banned and where the movement's meetings were strictly controlled by the

Dutch, Roem championed a strategy that set realistic goals in order ta reach its political

target.

However, the movement could not be active for very long following decision of

the central board ta suspend all assistance to the Barisan Penyadar. This policy extended

to ail branches of PSI!. The suspension of assistance came into effect in January 1937.

The following month, Salim, Sangadji, and Roem and other prominent members of the • 48 the Barisan Penyadar were expelled from the party.5O The Penyadar itself ended its • activities in 1942 with the onset ofJapanese control. Even though the PSII had tried to solve this internal problem, the decision to curtail the activities of Salim, Sangadji and

Roem, who had a large following among the members, was a factor in the party's further

decline. In the same period, the PSU began to face competition from various other

Islamic organizations, aIl of wmch appealed to the Muslim community for support. The

Muhammadiyah (founded in 1916), and the Nahdatul marna (founded in 1926) were the

strongest of these organizations. The PSII dominance within the nationalist debate

steadily declined from mid 19205 onwards, and was finally terminated by the coming of

the Japanese.

The Japanese occupation had a considerable effect on Roem's political attitudes.

By this time, aU organizations or movements from the Dutch period including Istamic

movements like the JIB and SIS were banned by the Japane5e. After defeating the Allied

5 in the Pacifie War, the Japanese occupied Indonesia, bringing inevitable changes. [ The

Japanese were quick to dissociate themselves from the policies of the Dutch, choosing

instead to set their own agenda. Thus aH nationalist parties which had existed in the

Dutch period were disbanded, a move which heralded a new chapter in the history ofthe

49 For information on the contents of the petition, see Poesponegoro and Notosusanto, Sejarah Nasio/la/lndollesia. voL 5, 221-230.

SO Noer, Modenlist Mus/im Movement in Indonesia, 46.

.H The pacific war was initiated by the Japanese who tried to build an empire in Asia. The war began when the Iapanese suddenly attacked Pearl Harbor, the center of US Naval forces in the Pacific in Deeember 1941. In Ianuary 1942, the Japanese invaded Indonesia, overthrowing and replacing the Duteh by Mareh 8, 1942. Dutch govemment ended in lndonesia and was replaced by the Japanese. One reason why the Japanese were able to control lndonesia so quickly was that the people themselves remained passive onlookers to these events as a consequence of their opposition to Dutch colonial poliey. For an explanation ofthe absurdity ofthe Duteh which made Indonesian people passive spectators at the time of the Japanese invasion, see Bob Hering. 00., Siauw Giak 1Jhan Remembers: A Peranakan-Chinese and The • Questfor Indonesian Nation-hood (Queensland: James Cook Unvirsity ofNorth Queensland, 1982), 40. 49 Muslim community in Indonesia. Unlike the Dutch, the Japanese eventuaIly realized the • expediency of treating the Muslims, the largest segment of the Indonesian population, with greateT leeway in the political domain. Knowing that much of the political

opposition to the Dutch had come from the Muslim community under the leadership ofits

"uiama-: the Japanese strove to hamess the Muslim aspirations in favoT of its own

interests.52 Part and parcel ofthat strategy was allowing Muslim oTganizations to grow,

but only on condition that they obtain official Japanese permission to operate.53

In the beginning, people's attitude towards the Japanese seemed to have been

positive, largely due to their resentment of the Dutch. The chauvinist and imperialist

elements of the Japanese authorities had not yet become known to the generai public.54

However, Roem experienced very little interference from the Japanese, and was a1lowed

to function as a lawyer and Was not forced to collaborate with the Japanese. Yet, Roem

appears not to have played an active role in politics during the Japanese occupation..

There are a number of factors which might explain this inactivity. First, Roem might

have realized the danger offascism and the new imperialism represented by the Japanese,

and that opposing them would lead to persona! harm, imprisonment or even death.

Second, his aversion to cooperation with the Japanese, might have deprived him of the

role he wanted to play in the institutions established by them, though Roem's nationalist

52 Noer, Panai Islam di Pentas Nasional, 23.

53 Benda suggests that a apart from the bad effects of the Japanese colonialization, there were sorne political organizational benefits acquired by Muslims during their occupation., i.e., the establishment ofMasyumi (the one which was formed by the Japanese before the independence era), the creation ofthe Ministry ofReligion and the formation of Hizbullah (an army training for Muslim youth). For further information, see Hany J. Benda, the Crescent andthe Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam Under the Japanese Occupation (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1958). • 54 Ibid., 2 50 activities had not come to an end.ss To a large exten~ the sudden change from Dutch to ·~. Japanese mIe meant that the situation was very fluid. AlI these factors contributed to

Roem's near resignation frOID formal political involvement. This was not unusual for the

time since many other nationalists at that time chose to avoid cooperation with the

Japanese. Sjahrir, for example, actively campaigned against collaboration and fascism.56

Ahmad Hasan ofthe Persatuan Islam. and Haji Rasul in Minangkabau did much the same.

Roem reemerged as an active player soon after the proclamation of independence

following the defeat of the Japanese by the Allied forces in the Second World War. The

proclamation of independence itself was announced by Soekarno and Mohammad Hatta

on August 17, 1945, prior to the Japanese departure from Indonesia. In the new

Indonesian government, Roem was made chairman of the KNI (Komite National

Indonesia or Indonesian National Committee) of Jakarta. In this capacity, he helped

orchestrate the fust Iarge-scale meeting between the new government and the general

population. This rally was held in Merdeka square where Soekarno appeared, as the

newly elected president, and was welcomed by thousands of people who enthusiastically

SS During the Japanese occupation sorne nationalists, both secuIar and Muslims nationalists, tended to work with the Japanese. But there were a few other nationalists who chose to avoid cooperation such as Mohamad Roem. The eagemess of the nationalists to cooperate with the Japanese was as a result of Japanese propaganda, for instance, claiming to be the eIder brothers of the Indonesians, or that the victory of the Japanese in the Pacifie War meant the victory of Asia over the West. Nationalists who worked with the Japanese, such as Soekarno and Hatta, even thought they were anti-fascist, and that the Indonesian people were in a crisis and needed the help ofthe Japanese who were at the peak of their power. The reason for the cooperation ofMuslim nationalists with the Japanese was that the 'ulama-Iand other Muslim leaders were allowed to continue their Islamic activities even though they had to be under Japanese surveillance. This situation was considered an improvement over the Dutch mIe.

56 See Sutan Sjahrir, OurStruggle, trans., Benedict R. 0 'G. Anderson (Ithaca: ComeU Modem • Indonesia Project, 1983). 51 ·~ attended the historie assemblage.57 The gathering had initially been banned by the • Japanese, who were in nominal control by eommand of the Allies, but people converged on the square in great numbers long before the scheduled hour. The situation created

the potential for a serious confrontation between the Japanese and the masses. As a

chairman of the KNI of Jakarta, Roem together with Soewirjo, the Mayor ofJakarta, met

with the Japanese officiaIs and urged them to allow the gathering ta proceed unhindered.

The Japanese fmally proposed that the rally should last for no more than 15 minutes.

Soewirjo and Roem then secured Soekamo's cooperation and the rally was held as

planned. Even though it lasted for only 15 minutes, the event was historie in that it

represented the fust official meeting between the government and the people. The

identification ofthe state with its people was a sure confirmation of Indonesia's status as

a nation. Unfortunately, Roem and Soewirjo's contribution to this fust large mass

meeting following the proclamation is almost aIways neglected in accounts of the history

behind the proclamation ofIndonesia's independence.ss

B. Roem, Masyumi, and His Diplomatie Aetivities

The period after Indonesian independence marked a shift in Roem's political

eareer. His political activities in this period are discussed with respect ta bis important

role in the Masyumi and bis role in diplomatie aetivities as a means of fortifying the

Indonesian government against the second Dutch invasion, and how these raIes relate to

the objective of Indonesian sovereignty. Roem's role in Masyumi in the post-

57 Merdeka square was called Gambir square in Dutch times, and in the Japanese it was called lkada.

58 See Soemarsono. Mohamad Roem 70 Tahun. 48.

52 revolutionary period is then addressed with reference to the role of Masyumi in the

running of the govemment and its relationship with the PDRI (pemerintah Darurat

Republik Indonesia or The Emergency Government ofthe Republic ofIndonesia) and the

PRRI (pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia or the Revolutionary Government of

the Republic ofIndonesia).

MasYUIDi (Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia or Counsel of Indonesian Muslims

Association) was founded in November 1945, three months after the proclamation of

Indonesian Independence. The emergence of Masyumi after the proclamation of

independence should be viewed in the context of the political situation prevailing in

Indonesia at that time. The political position of the Muslims was weak. 59 In the KNIP

(Komite National Indonesia Pusat or Central Indonesian National Committee), for

example, only 15 members ofits 136 member body represented political Islam.6o Another

factor which weakened Muslim. activities is that independence itself brought a

tremendous corniort which seemed ta dampen political commitment to the Islamic

movement. There was an assumptian that having won independence, the Muslims

majority would naturally exert its influence within the system without special Muslim

political efforts.61

59 The term "Islam" and "Muslim" here are related ta the ideological struggle, not ta the formaI religion that someone professes. This is important to clarify since the other nationalists like Soekarno and Sjahrir were also Muslims, but advocated a secular nationalism.

60 Roem was one of 15 members, while the others were: Abikusno Tjokrosujoso, Kasman Singodimedjo, Jusuf, Jusuf Wibisono, Dahlan Abdullah, A.R. Bawedan, A. Bajasut, Harsono Tjokroaminoto, Ny, sunarjo Mangunpuspito, Wahid Hasjim, Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, Zainul Arifin, Haji Agus Salim, Haji Ahmad Sanusi, and Anwar Tjokroaminoto. Deliar Noer. Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional 1945-1965 (Jakarta: Temptprint, 1987),46.

61 Deliar Noer, c'Masjumi: Its Organization, Ideology, and Political RoIe in Indonesia," CM. A __ e thesis, Cornell University, 1960), 39.

53 Thought turned to the importance of reactivating and transforming the Islamic

political heritage. Roem, along with other IsIamic leaders like Abdoel Kahar Muzakkir

and Wahid Hasyim, held a meeting in September 1945 to discuss the ways to realize this

goal.62 It should be noted that the idea ofestablishing an Islamic political party preceded

the Vice-Presidential Maklumat, No. X 5 November 1945, regarding the institution of a

multi-party system. Roem asserts that the decision to establish an Islamic political party

was not based on the Maklumat but on the awareness ofMuslims for the need to continue

the movement for the survival of Islam in a free Indonesia.63 The follow-up to the

meeting above was a national Muslim congress in Yogyakarta in November 1945,

gathering most ofthe Muslim elements in Indonesia, and resulting in the establishment of

Masyumi. The choice of the name Masyumi was disputed at the congress as the tide was

shared by an organization founded by the Japanese to channel the Muslim political

aspirations and thus held negative connotations for sorne. Roem sided with Agos Salim

and others, preferring the name Partai Rakjat Islam (Muslim People's Party), but they

were defeated in a vote on the issue.54 Since the party was supported by most Islamic

organizations across Indonesia, it was considered the only !slamic party of Indonesia.

Masyumi's status as the sole Muslim political channel prevailed until one of its mass

supporting organizations, the PSII withdrew its membership in 1947. This would occur

again in 1952 when the NU, the Iargest mass organization, left Masyumi and proclaimed

itself as a separate political party. Still Masyumi endured as a major pelitical acter until

outlawed in 1961 by presidential decree.

62 Noer, Partai Islam di Pentas National, 45. '-'. 63 Soemarsono, Mohamad Roem 70 Tahun, 60. 54 Roem was involved in the leadership of the Masyumi upon its creation.

Membership in the Masyumi was divided into two categories: individuaIs and

organizations.65 Roem was classified within the individuai group. In spite of bis former

membersbip in the PSII in pre-revolutionary times, bis political activities in the post-war

era were no longer related to any mass or political organization, except the Masyumi

itself. In the fust period of his involvement with Masyumi, Roem could not concentrate

on party activities, because ofhis raIe as chairman of KNI (Komite National Indonesia or

66 Indonesian NationaI Committee) Jakarta and bis incapacitation frOID being wounded.

Yet, Roem still maintained active contact with bis Masyumi counterparts.

Meanwhile, a newly independent Indonesia required the formation of a

government capable of running the nation. The independent preparatory committee which

was formed in the Japanese period expanded and elected Soekarno and Hatta respectively

as President and Vice-President of the Republic of Indonesia. Thereafter the national

constitution was also promulgated.67 Soekarno soon formed a cabinet and the

Independent Preparatory Committee was dissolved and replaced by the KNIP. The

formation of a new govemment was completed in a very short time because of the threat

of occupation by Allied troops who saw Indonesia as territory to be returned to Dutch

control. In addition to the extemal threat, the newly-formed government also faced a feud

64 Ibid., 63; Noer, "Masjumi: Its Organization, Ideology. and Political Role in Indonesia." 43.

6S For information on the membership system ofMasyurni. See Noer, "Masjumi: Its Organization, Ideology and Political Role in Indonesia.1I

66 For Information on Roem's wound from the Dutch bullet, see Soemarsono, Mohamad Roem 70 Tahun. 50-52.

67 The national constitution was written in the last month of the Japanese occupation, and ---- •• completed a day after the proclamation oflndependence, August 18 1945.

55 between those who had collaborated with the Dutch and those who had opposed Japanese ~~.• control. In Perjuangan Kita (Our Struggle), Sjahrir maintained that the Indonesian

government was in danger of being infected with the fascist symptoms caused by

identification with the Japanese.68 Moreover, the Allies who were about to land in

Indonesia, would, he reasoned, be more disposed to negotiate with and to recognize an

Indonesian government untainted by collaborators.69 Sjahrir aIso rejected a one-party

system for the same reason and urged his peers to replace the monolithic presidential

system of government with a parliamentary-presidential system where power would be

widely diffused.70 Soekarno, a collaborationist himself, saw sorne truth in the Sjahrir

position and converted the Indonesian political system to one modeled on the

parliamentary system, in which the cabinet was responsible to the Parliament. Sjahrir was

also given the opportunity to become the Prime Minister.

With the adoption of a multi-party system, Masyumi emerged as one of the

strongest parties, along with the PNI (partai Nasional Indonesia or Indonesian National

Party) and the Socialist Party. A strong cabinet, therefore, had to be composed of a

coalition of these three parties. But of the three times Sjahrir formed cabinet, Masyumi

never formally declared its inclusion. Members of Masyumi who were in the cabinet

represented only themselves as individuaIs. The rejection ofMasyumi in the organization

of the cabinet was initially caused by the dominant influence of those Masyumi leaders

68 See Sjahrir, Our Struggle.

69 Kahin. Nationalism and Revolution in lndonesia (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project). 66. • 70 Ibid., 166. 56 such as Sukïman and Abikusno,71 representing a faction in Masyumi leadership who

wished to give no concessions to the Dutch. They refused to support Sjahrir's position on

the need for diplomatie initiatives engaging the former colonial regime. On the other

band, there was another faction in Masyumi which was more moderate, consisting of

mostly young activists of Masyumi, such as Roem, Natsir, Prawiranegara, Prawoto and

others. They were the rising stars of Masyumi and bad already played an important raIe

in the struggle for sovereignty. With the formation of the Sjahrir cabinet, these figures

grew in prominence, even though their own party was not involved in the ruling coalition.

Roem was appointed as a Minister of Home Affairs in the third Sjahrir cabinet, an

appointment that may weil bave been based on Sjahrir's belief that Roem was not tainted

by any hint of collaboration with the Japanese.

While the formation of the new Indonesian government was under way, the

Dutcb, tagged along with the Allied forces and landed in Indonesia on September 29,

1945. In addition ta disarming the Japanese, the Allied forces took military control of the

archipelago and then recognized the Dutcb in political control. Needless to say, the

nations of the Allied forces chose not to acknowledge the independence proclaimed by

the Indonesian people, although the Republic of Indonesia was recognized as the de facto

power in the territory it controIled. Ta win sovereignty over the entire region the

Republican army pursued an armed revolution from 1945 ta 1949.72 Indonesia did not

limit itself to the battle field, it also engaged in diplomacy that ultimately brought an end

71 Sukïman was the first president of Masyumi. He was a respected leader in both Dutch and Iapanese times. Abikusno was a former PSI! leader in the Dutch period, known to have championed noo­ cooperation with the Dutch.

72 This era is caIled revolutionary times. See the complete information on the war of Indonesian independence in M.C. Ricklefs "The Revolution 1945-1950)" in A History of Modem lndonesia since • c./300 (london: Macmillan, 1993),212-233. 57 to the confrontation, after a long and intricate bargaining process engaged in by ~. Indonesian nationalists, since the Dutch were determined not to give up their interests in

Indonesia.73 This is the time Roem emerged as a very important figure.

Roem began to play a role in the central government after being appointed

Minister of Home Affairs in Sjahrir's third cabinet formed in 1946. His fust diplomatic

experience came when he attended the Linggarjati meeting, led by Prime Minister

Sjahrir, in 1946. The settlement reached at this meeting established broad principles of

agreement for implementing independence graduaIly. According to this agreement, Java

and Sumatera became the de facto authority of the Republic. The RepubIic together with

the state ofBorneo and the Great Eastern would be set up as a sovereign federal state, the

United States of Indonesia. This union would then he amalgamated into the Netherlands-

Indonesian Union together with the Netherlands, Surinam, and Curacao under the Queen

of the Netherlands.74 This agreement had its advocates and detractors. Some Indonesian

parties rejected the content of the agreement, arguing that it fell short of bringing true

sovereignty. But Sjahrir tried to convince the other politicalleaders that this agreement

was not to be interpreted as a final solution. It was intended only as a stepping stone to

the real end, which would he independence. The agreement recognized that Indonesia

now existed. Indonesia, he reasoned, needed not just juridical status, but also political

power.75 Roem held a similar position. As a member of the negotiating team, he

73 See ragarding the diplomatie activities between Indonesia and Holland in Poeponegoro and Notosusanto, uDiplomacy Sebagai Sarana Penylesaian Pertikaian" in Sejarah Nasionallndonesia, 123-127.

74 For more complete list of the provisions of the Linggarjati Agreement. see Kahin. Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, 196-197. See aIso, Indonesian Independence and the United Nation, 28-33. • 75 Poeponegoro and Notosusanto. Sejarah Nasional Indonesia, vol. 6. p.132. 58 considered the Linggarjati Agreement a success. He once pointed out that the mere

participation of the Netherlands in the negotiations had been a tacit recognition of

Indonesia's existence.76

Significantly, Masyumi, Roem's own party, was among the political parties

opposing the agreement. Masyumi's opposition was based on belief that the agreement

gave too many concessions to the Dutch. In particuIar, Masyumi rejected the articles

which provided for a Netherlands-Indonesia Union under the Dutch Crown and the

restoration to all non-Indonesians of their previous rights and property.77 Masyumi's

objections carne early, namely when the presidential cabinet was changed to a

parliamentary mode1.78 This sparked disagreement between Masyumi and those of its

members who followed Sjahrir. Dissident party members even complained of their

party's decision before seeking a confirmation from any Masyumi ministers.79 Roem

said, even though Masyumi rejected the agreement, those ministers belonging to

Masyumi who supported the agreement did not represent their party. He complained that

Masyumi had taken the decision to reject the agreement even prior to his retum from

76 Mohamad Roem, "Arti Perjanjian van Roijen-Roem bagi Sejarah Diplomasi Republik Indonesia," in Roem. Diplomasi: Ujung Tombak Perjuangan RI, 7.

77 Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, 198.

78Masyumi preferred a presidential cabinet rather than a parliamentary one, since members of the KNIP were an appointed body and it did not represent the existing parties. Therefore, in Masyumi's views, the body did not qualify yet ta work in the system of Parliamentary Democracy. However, Soekarno prefered Sjahrir's idea and the idea was agreed by the KNIP. Masyumi had Iittie choice but to accept the decision. See Anwar Haryono, Perjalanan Politik Bangsa. Menoleh ke Belakang Menatap Masa Depan (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 1997),86-87.

79 There were five ministers of the third Sjahrir cabinet from Masyumi; Mohamad Roem as Minister of Domestic affairs) Harsono Cokroaminoto as Minister of Defense, Mohamad Natsir as Minister of Information, Yusuf Wibisono as Minister of Social welfare, Syafruddin Prawiranegara as Minister of Finance and K.H. Fathurrahman as Minister of Religious Affairs. See Noer, Partai Islam di Pentas • Nasional, 164. 59 Linggarjati with a report on its actual contents,SO Roem had suggested that Masyumi • postpone its meeting until the Linggarjati Agreement was signed, at which time he and the other ministers from Masyumi could attend and expIain the details. Roem, whose

suggestion was disregarded, sent a letter of protest to the Masyumi leadership in

Yogyakarta voicing ms concems about the party's non-democratic character. He argued

that the voice ofits members had been neglected. To mm, the party had deviated from the

democratic principles of its own constitution; accordingly, he reminded the leadership

that priority must be given to consultation among its members.8 l Roem and other

members of Masyumi in the cabinet who accepted the agreement, believed that a party

member who was elected to cabinet or to sorne other governmental post owed ms loyalty

to the country rather than to the party. Complicating the issue was the nature of the

appointments they held; the agreement of Roem, Natsir, and Prawiranegara's with

Sjahrir, a Socialist Prime Minister,82 made these Masyumi leaders appear to he cCreligious

socialists." Roem respected Sjahrir as an Indonesian revolutionary and valued his

contribution in bringing the Dutch to the negotiating table.83 HQwever, Roem asserted

that he and other Masyumi members who supported Sjahrir did 50 ooly in 50 far as the

negotiations were concemed, and not in respect to bis socialist ideology.84 The internal

80 Soemarsono, MohamadRoem 70 Ta}lUll, 68.

81 [nterview with Roem in 1956 as cited in Noer, Partai Islam di Pentas National,. 166

82 See the introduction ofthis thesis on Kahin who argued that the progressive leaders ofMasyumi were influencOO by Sjahrir's pany, pages 2-3.

83 Roem's respect for Sjahrir is evident from bis writings in remembrance ofthe late Sjahrir. Roem saw Syahrir as a little man who did a big thing. He caUs Sjahrir a little man due to his physical stature but accomplishing a big thing for the nation. For a complete account, see Mohamad Roem, "Hung Kecil yang Berbuat Besar" in Rosihan Anwar, ed, Mengenang S]ahrir (Jakarta: Gramedia., 1980), 139-165

84 Mohamad Roem, "nusi Kawan-Kawan PSLn in Santoso., 00., Tïdak Ada Negara Islam: Surat­ • Surat Politik Nurcho/ish Madjid-MohamadRoem, 60-61. 60 ·~. conflict among Masyumi members represented a conflict over the means to an end, and did not imply a permanent rupture in the party. Opposition to Sjahrir's cabinet from

various parties Led to its collapse and returned the mandate to the president.

Despite the internaI opposition, international support was gamered saon after the

agreement to ensure the recognition of Indonesia as a sovereign nation. Unfortunately,

the Linggarjati Agreement itself broke down when bath the Indonesian govemment and

the Netherlands tried ta interpret the contents according ta their respective interests.85

The Dutch finally terminated the agreement, complaining that the Indonesian government

consistently refused the concessions made by them. In July 1947. Dr. Bell. the Dutch

Govemor General in Indonesia, decided to use military force to occupy those areas

excluded from the agreement. While somewhat successfu1, the move created an

international backlash against the Dutch.86 The British, who had been supporters of the

Dutch for over a hundred years were under the leadership of a labor party government

which wanted an end to colonialism. Therefore, British leaders urged the Dutch ta end

hostilities. Other nations, particularly the Arab govemments had similar responses. This

international support was seen as a clear indication of rising political support for

Indonesia in the rest ofthe world.

In response to Dutch "police action," the Security Council of the United Nations

engaged in active diplomacy to end the confrontation. The Security Council formed a

mediating body known as the KTN (Komisi Tiga Negara or Three Nations Commission).

as Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in lndonesia, 209.

86 The first reaction came from ~asan al-Banna' of Ikwanul al-MuslimIn who sent a wire to the United Nations. The Secretary General, on behaIf of the Arabs and Islamic World, insisted the UN take action to end Dutch aggression. At the same time, protest came from Jawaharlal Nehru of India. Australia • aIso hoped the confrontation would end in favol" ofinternational peace. 61 consisting of Australia (chosen by Indonesia), Belgium (chosen by the Netherlands), and

the United States of America (chosen by mutua! consent).81 Subsequent to this effort,

severa! meetings were held leading ta agreements such as the Renville Agreement.88

Indonesian concerns also found an international forum at the New Delhi Asia

Conference.89 At the signing of the Renville Agreement, the cabinet was led by Amir

Syarifuddin. Syarifuddin was personally disliked by Masyumi since he was Muslim barn

but had converted to Christianity when he was 24 years oId.9o For Masyumi such a

conversion in matters offaith threw bis political sincerity into question. They saw him as

little more than an opportunist with no moral convictions. However, heeding the cali for

participation in the diplomatic process, Masyumi participated in Syarlfuddin's second

cabinet. Five of its members became ministers, including Roem who was again

appointed as Minister of Home Affairs. His chance of taking part in the UN sponsored

negotiations was thwarted, however, when Masyumi decided to withdraw from the

cabinet before the agreement was signed. The rejection was justified by Masyumi on the

grounds that the agreement ceded tao much to the Dutch.91 Little can be said for Roem's

decision to acquiesce to his party's wishes. Instead ofopposing the party leadership as he

B7 For further information on the commission, see Alastair M. Taylor, lndonesian lndependence and the United Nations, 54-55; Poeponegoro and Notosuanto, Sejarah Nasioanal lndonesia. 137 and Mohamad Roem. Diplomasi: Ujung tombak Perjuangan RI, 8.

s8RenviIle is the name of the US navy ship on which the meeting was held. For a comprehensive understanding of the Renville agreement, see K.M.L Tobing, Perjuangan Politile Bangsa lndonesia. Renville (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1976).

89 Poeponegoro and Notosusanto, Sejarah Nasionallndonesia, 139.

90 See QCGalelano. uOportunis Politik dan Negarawan," Republika Online, Il August, 1998.

• 91Por the points ofthe agreement that be~efited the Dutch. See Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in lndonesia. 213-229.

62 had done in support of the Linggarjati Agreement, he followed the party's bard line on

this occasion. However, the agreement evoked opposition not only from Roem and bis

Masyumi collogues but also from Sjabrir ofthe Socialists.

The general feeling of mistrust proved well-founded. The provisions of the

Renville Agreement were broken by Dutch military action in January 1948, known as the

agresi Belanda kedua (the second Dutch police action). During this attack, Yogyakarta,

the capital of Indonesia at the time, was occupied by the Dutch and the government

leaders and personalities were captured. Roem was one of the nationalists who was

arrested and exiled to Bangka, an island near Sumatera. He was part of a larger group of

political prisoners which included President Soekarno, Hatta, Haji Agus Salim, and Ali

Sastromidjojo.92 The Dutch were of the view that by taking over the capital and arresting

the national leadership, the Republic of Indonesia would be destroyed. During this time,

when the President and the Prime Minister and most other leaders were under arrest by

the Dutch, the PDRI (pemerintah Darurat Republik Indonesia or Emergency Government

of the Republic of Indonesia) was formed. Based in Sumatera and led by Sjafruddin

Prawiranegara from Masyumi, this temporary government attempted to fill the leadership

vacuum left by the arrests.93 The coordination of PDRI itself was not easy, due to the

clisruption in the channels of communication between Sumatera and Java. In Java, a

military government under the coordination of General Sudirman, also claimed to be the

legitimate continuation of state authority. Those ministers who were not arrested

92Mestika Zed. Somewhere in the Jungle: Pemerintah Darurat Republik lndonesia. Sebuah Mata Rantai Sejarah yang Terlupakan (Jakarta: Pustaka Utama Graffiti, 1997),254.

93For a comprehensive understanding of the PDRI, see Sekitar PDRl (Pemerintah Darurat ~. Republik lndonesia) (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1982); Dwi Purwoko, Perjuangan PDRI (Jakarta: Media Dakwah, 1991).

63 continued to work under the leadership of Sukïman, a Minister from the Masyumi party.

Eventually however, after hard efforts to produce cooperation, all those that were still

free ofthe Dutch were united under the PDRI chaired by Prawiranegara.94

Contrary to Dutch expectations, their upolice action" only heightened

international pressure. The demand that the Dutch end their violent intervention in

Indonesia was impossible to ignore. Moreover, the strong resistance shown by the

Indonesian army during this period frustrated the Dutch who began to see the futility of

trying to impose their will militarily. Roem talked of how the world changed the way it

regarded the situation, moving from a neutral stance to one of support for Indonesia's

position.95

In response ta these developments, the United Nations passed a resolution

demanding a Dutch retreat from Yogyakarta., the Republic's capital. The resolution also

called for a conference to discuss the end of hostilities. Roem, who was still under Dutch

arrest, was appointed by Hatta, the official Prime Minister at this time, -- also onder arrest

- ta become the chairman of the delegation to the UN negotiations. This was considered

a crucial negotiation since the agreement would be a continuation of the Renville talks,

which it was felt, had not gone in Indonesia's favor. As a chairman of the delegation,

Roem was determined to win sovereignty for bis country.96

94 For more information on the situation ofcentral government at the time the PDRI was formed in Java. see Mestika Zed, Somewhere in the Jungle, 189-209.

95 Mohamad Roem. "AIti Perjanjian Roem Royen." in Roem, DiplomasiUjung Tombak Perjuangan RI, Il.

• 96 See Rais Alamsjah. "Mohamad Roemtt in Rais Alamsjah, 10 Orang Indonesia Terbesar Sekarang, 56.

64 ~. After three-weeks ofnegotiations, however, the talks yielded no significant result. The main obstacle was a difference of opinions on the proposed plebiscite that was to

determine popular will as to the existence of an Indonesian state.97 However, in April

1949, negotiations resumed between the two parties in Jakarta under the auspices of the

UN Commission for Indonesia. A week later, the negotiations again reached an impasse

due to the insistence of the chief of the Dutch negotiation team, J.H. van Royen, that bis

govemment would only restore the Republic of Yogyakarta after the Republican

govemment had ordered its Armed Forces to cease guerilIa warfare and to cooperate in

the restoration of peace and the maintenance of law and order. He also demanded that

they agree to attend a proposed Round Table Conference ta take place in The Hague.

Roem, as chief of the Indonesian delegation, argued that such demands were

unreasonable in view of the fact that members of the Indonesian government were

dispersed, out ofcontact with one another, and unable to meet in the capital.

Through the efforts of the UN Commission an agreement was reached in May

1949, and both Roem and Royen read their statements publicly. This agreement became

known as the Roem-Royen Statement. Afterwards Roem said that the treaty represented

not one, but two different agreements.98 In general, they provided for the restoration of

Yogyakata as the Republican capital, which implicitly recognized the authority of

Soekarno's government, and also prepared the way for the Round Table Conference.

97 Indonesia did not refuse the plebiscite but the Dutch, feeling that it would weaken their position. did. The plebiscite was conducted in the areas which were confronted, namaely Java, Madura and Sumatra.

98 Mohamad Roem. "Ani Perjanjian Royen-Roem,"11. For more information ofthe content on the agreement see K.M.L. Tobing, Perjuangan Politik Bangsa lndonesia. Persetujuan Roem-Royen dan KMB --'. (Jakarta: Haji Masagung. 1987), 92-94. 65 ~. With the retum. of the government ta Yogyakarta, arrangements were begun for opening the talks. At the same time, the Dutch continued to maneuver against the formation of a

united and sovereign Indonesian nation. The Dutch engaged in what the Indonesians

referred to as politik memecah belah (policy to create disunity) among the different

Indonesian states that were ta constitute the new federaI system, of which the Republic of

Indonesia would be ooly a part. For its part, the Indonesian government was able to unite

the country by conducting a conference called the Konferensi Antar lndonesia

(Conference Among Indonesians), resulting in the creation of the United States of

Indonesia with Republican officiaIs assuming control ofthe new federai state. An integral

aspect to this new political arrangement was the establishment of a standing army, the

Indonesian forces, at its disposaI.99

On August 23, 1949 Roem accompanied Hatta, who now led the Indonesian

delegation to the Hague for the Round Table Conference, formally resulting in the

acknowledgment of Indonesian sovereignty, as the United States of Indonesia, on

December 27, 1949. [00 This process ended the confrontation between the two nations,

even though the status of West Irian was delayed until a later time. For the Indonesian

perspective, what happened on December 27, 1949 was no more than Dutch

acknowledgment of an Independence gained earlier on August 17, 1945. As Soekarno put

it, this did not amount to the giving of sovereignty but ta the acknowledgement of

sovereignty.lOI

99 For further information on this conference and its results. see Poeponegoro and Notosusanto, Sejarah Nasionallndonesia, vol. 6, 69-l70.

100 One year after attaining sovereignty, Republican and Federal States of the archipelago decided to unite under the United Republic ofIndonesia. • 10lRoem, "Arti· Perjanjian van Royen-Roem," 18. 66 ..~...... The Roem-Royen Statement was not accepted without internaI dissent. For example, Prawiranegara, the leader of PDRI and Roem's colleague in Masyumi. felt he

had been ignored by Roem during meetings. Prawiranegara complained that Roem should

have consulted with the PDRl as the de facto government. Prawiranegara insisted that the

PDRI was, at the time, more informed than either Soekarno-Hatta, who were in jail.

However, Prawiranegara fmally conceded that Roem had merely acted in the best

interests of the country, attributing their problems to the deficient communication

infrastructure.102 Since Prawiranegara accepted that the agreement was concluded in good

faith he vacated bis position as chairman ofthe emergency government in favor ofHatta.

Within Masyumi itself, discontent was aIso expressed with the agreement. It was

even claimed that a debate occurred between Roem and Natsir over the result of this

agreement.103 Natsir dissociated himself from the contents of the agreement, feeling that

it benefited the Dutch only, as the area assigned to the Republic in the agreement was

only within Yogyakarta. This aIso Ied ta Natsir's resignation from an advisory position

to the delegation. In this internal debate within Masyumi, Roem Led the faction in favor

of the agreement while Natsir led the opposition. Roem asked his colleagues not to see

the agreement as a final goal, arguing that the fight had not ended. The agreement merely

nudged the international community towards an acknowledgment of the Republic 1 s

existence. The return of the Republic of Indonesia to Yogyakarta was a strong start to

achieving that objective. Roem asserted that the Dutch were reluctant to negotiate with

102 The difficulty in communication between the leaders in Java who were arrested and the PDRI was proven at the time for the formation of PDRI when Soekarno sent a letter to Prawiranegara to form a cabinet; the letter never arrived. The formation of the PDRI was purely the initiative of Prawiranegara himself who visited Sumatra and was supponed by local leaders. See the interview with Syafruddin Prawiranegara as cited in Noer, Partai Islam di Pentas nasional. 188. --"••

67 .~. the Republic of Indonesia because of their conviction that the Republic had heen destroyed. BY extending the negotiations, the Dutch position had been altered to

recognize the legal existence of the Republic. 104 Despite the dehate within Masyumi

members, the party finally chose to accept the agreement.

More internai dissent over the Roem-Royen Agreement came from S.M.

Kartosuwirjo, another Masyumi leader who used the agreement as a pretext for leaving

the party and establishing the NIl (Negara Islam. Indonesia or Indonesian Islamic State) in

West Java. 105 His movement was popularly known as Daru! Islam. 106 Kartosuwirjo saw

the agreement as poisonous for the Indonesian struggle. He accused Roem of

embarrassing the Islamic leadership.l07 The realization of the Roem-Royen Agreement

was politically very difficult, since it was also initially rejected by the TKR (Tentara

Keamanan Rakyat), former Indonesian Armed Forces, who believed that the Dutch

would renege on their part of the deal, as they had done in the Linggarjati and Renville

cases.

Having analyzed the intricacies of the diplomatie process and outlined the

obstacles facing Roem, whether extemal or internal, it can he seen that the Roem-Royen

Statement played an extremely important role in the process. Through the Statement.

Yogyakarta was recognized as the seat of Republican power by the Dutch, an event

103 Mestika Zed. Somewhere in the Jungle. 268.

104 Interview with Roem as cited in Noer, Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional. 194.

10SFor a comprehensive account ofDarul Islam in Indonesia, see C. Van Dijk. Rebillion under the BannerofIslam: The DarulIslam in lndonesia (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981).

lO6por a comprehensive account ofDarul Islam in Indonesia. see C. Van Dijk, Rebillion under the Banner ofIslam: The DarulIslam in lndonesia (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. 1981). --.• 107 Noer, Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional, 182.

68 which led to the consolidation ofthe Indonesian government. The agreement thus paved • the way for the Indonesian success at the Round Table Conference, and brought to an end the confrontation.. ft is clear that Roem's contrIbution to the foundation of a sovereign

. Indonesia was truly significant. His involvement in the Roem-Royen Statement proved

hlm to be the most prominent diplomat of bis day. His speech at the Roem-Royen

meeting transfonned the lives of Indonesians who left an era where their future was

unclear as to whether they were to be Dutch subjects or not and recognized them as

having association with an Indonesian state. This fits J.H. Ritman's conclusion:

It is clear that Mr. Mohamad Roem was one of the toughest negotiators on the Republic side. After the transfer of sovereignty he tumed out ta be a staunch defender of the restoration of good relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands. 108

Natsir who at tirst expressed pessimism later said "Soekarno and flatta could return to

Yogyakarta from exile because ofthe Roem-Royen Statement. The way was paved to the

Round Table Conference because of the Roem-Royen Statement; Yogyakarta could be

taken over by the Republican army aiso because ofthe agreement.,,109

When the revolutionary period ended, Roem continued to play an important role

during the Soekarno era. While the country still had a parliamentary system, Roem sat in

the cabinet led by Mohammad Hatta, as Minister ofState. But he left this position when

Hatta asked him to serve as High Commissioner to the Netherlands, that is th~ lndonesian

ambassador to tbat country. Commenting on his activity in this position, J.H. Ritman

said:

lOg J.H. Ritman, "'Mohamad Roem S.R."in Soemarsono. Mohamad Roem 70 Tahun. 296.

109 Mohammad Natsir. "Insya Allah: Roem Tetap Roem" in Soemarsono, MohamadRoem 70 • Tahun. 213. 69 ~ ....1 appreciate the logic of bis attitude; being a formidable antagonist he was _..• allowed to be a generous victor. As the fust High Commissioner of the Republic not only as a successful diplomat, he and bis wife approached the Dutch at home with an open mind and c0lDJ'lete understanding. No more stand-oafishness but cooperation and friendsbip. t 1

When Mohamad Natsir was appointed by President Soekarno to form a new

cabinet after the RIS (Republik Indonesia Serikat or United States of Indonesia) became

the United Republic of Indonesia in 1950, Roem was recalled ta act as Foreign Minister.

Here Roem together with the cabinet faced the daunting task of pursuing the issue of

Irian Barat (West Irian) which was still under Dutch control.ltl This cabinet, however,

failed to fulfil this mission and others it sought to undertake and Natsir lost power.1l2 In

the Wilopo cabinet (1952-1953), Roem sat as Interior Minister, and in the second Ali

Sastromidjojo's cabinet (1956-1957), Roem served as Vice-Prime Minister. 113 Thus,

during the years from 1950 to 1957, Roem sat on four of the cabinets that were formed,

showing his importance as a senior statesman. 114 In the negotiations leading ta the

forming of a new coalition cabinet, Roem sometimes represented bis party. For example,

prior to the formation of the Sukiman cabinet (1951-1952), Roem and Prawoto

represented the Masyumi party in negotiations with Sartono, a representative from the

110 Ibid., 296.

III It is now called Irian Jaya, one of the provinces in Indonesia. Indonesia successfully toak ie from the Dutch in 1963, and changed its name.

112 Roem admitted that the problem of West Irian's integration was difficult in view of the difference of vision between Soekarno and Natsrr. Soekarno was of the opinion that West Irian should be taken over without permission of the Dutch. while Natsir felt that West Irian was included in the international agreement which must be obeyed. See Mohammmad Hatta. "Mohamad Natsir and Mohamad Roem 70 tahunn in Soemarsono, Mohamad Roem 70 Tahun, 203.

113 Ali Sastromidjojo was appointed twice by Soekarno to forro a cabinet. The tirst was in 1953- 1955.

114 For further information on the demise and emergence of these cabinets, see Noer, Partai Islam • di Pentas Nasional, 197- 256. 70 -j. PNI appointed by Soekarno to form a new a cabinet. This, however, resuIted in a failure to forro a cabinet, since Roem and Prawoto insisted that the Prime Minister assume the

leadership of their party. 115 His position in Ali Sastromijojo's second cabinet was his last

formaI govemment post. Thereafter ParIiamentary Democracy in Indonesia came to

end. 116

During this period ofParliamentary Democracy, coalition cabinets often collapsed

because the conflict generated by parties interested in gaining more seats in the cabinet.

Moreover, the hard line ideological orientation of each party fueled the conflict. 117 The

situation was exacerbated in 1957 when sorne provinces expressed dissatisfaction with

the central govemment and demanded autonomy. They believed that Java was receiving

far more than its fair share of resources. This situation led to the creation of separatist

I movements in those areas. 18 Soekarno ultimately taok action to quell these separatist

sentiments and used the instability as an excuse to increase a presidential raIe in poIitics

and reduce that ofparliament. 119 Soekarno blamed the multi-party democratic system for

the ferment within Indonesia. The existing political system. he argued, was a poor copy

of a model which might work in Europe, but not in Indonesia. He argued for the creation

ilS Ibid., 215.

115 See Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Demoeracy in Indonesia (Ithaea: Comell University Press, 1962).

117 For specifie information on the failures of Liberal Demoeraey in Indonesia, see I.D. Legge, Indonesia (New Jersey: Prentice-HaII, 1964), 138-144.

118 See Poeponegoro and Notosusanto. Sejarah Nasional Indonesia, vo1.6. 272-283.

119 Noer, Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional, 351. For more information on the Guided Democraey, see Daniel S. Lev, Transition to Guided Demoeraey: Indonesia PoUties 1957-1959 (Ithaca: Modern ~. Indonesia Project Southeast Asian Prograrn Comell University, 1966),

71 ~. of an incligenous system,120 and proposed a new model called Demokrasi Terpimpin (Guided Democracy).121 Soekarno's idea was ta retain politicai parties, but to change the

way in which they operated. On this notion, Kahin says:

He maintained ms hostility to the idea of an institutionalized opposition and continued to advocate that decisions be made by consensus rather than voting. Moreover he spoke repeatedly of the need for a more dynamic society: evidently he hoped to fashion institutional fOrInS through which to combat mass apathy and politicai indifference and keep the revolutionary spirit alive. Severa! times he advocated establishment of an appointed advisory council of high status which would not be established on a party basis and would reach its decisions on the basis of consensus. Most important, he spoke of the need for a cabinet of alliarge parties, including the PK! (Communist Party). 122

Legge writes that Soekamo's concept of Guided Democracy was merely an

attempt to test the political climate. Beyond bis conviction that parliament and the party

system had failed, he had not yet determined bis precise goals or evolved a precise plan

for attaining them. l23 Accordingly, Soekamo's real design for Guided Democracy was

obscure.124 Its implementation was designed to meet the contemporary situation and

reflected bis obsession to unite religion, nationalism and communism which had been an

idea! of his since 1920. 125 With the Presidentia! Decree of July 5, 1959, the new system

120 Lev, Transition to Guided Democracy. 50.

121 Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy ln Indonesia, pp. 538-541. The Demokrasi Terpimpin was in line with Soekarno's konsepsi which contained two basic proposaIs; the first was the formation of a new cabinet based on the four major parties in which the PK! should be included. The second was the formation of Dewan National (National Counci1) under Soekarno's leadership. For the further descriptions ofthe konsepsi. see Lev, Transition to Guided Democracy, 17.

122 Ibid., 539. The PK! was one of the four largest parties after the generaI election 1955. But the PK! was never involved in the cabinet formation. due to the r~fusal ofother Parties to work with il.

123 J.O. Legge, Sukarno: A Political Biography (London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1972), 279

J24 Noer, Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional, 365. • 12S See Poesponegoro and Notosusanto, Sejarah Nasionallndonesia, 316-317. 72 was inaugurated. 126 Soekarno made himself Prime Minister, and later was to he named • President for life on the vote ofa People's Assembly whose membership was appointed by mm. He raised the Indonesian Communist Party to special prominence, much beyond

what its actual support in the population warranted. L27 Thus Soekarno refashioned the

government in accordance with bis personal vision, and ail individuals, groups and

parties which represented an obstacle were brushed aside. This included Masyumi, which

opposed bis plans to cooperate closely with the PKI and to build a non-parliamentary

governmentaI system.

Finally Soekarno tound a clear reason to dismiss Masyumi in to the involvement

of sorne of its leaders in the PRRI (pemerintah Revolusioner Republic Indonesia or the

Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia) which was an alternative

government declared in Central Sumatra in 1958. 128 The PRRI received support from

areas in Sumatra and Sulawesi which prior to the tormation of the PRRI had already

begun to show their resentment ofthe dichotorny between Java and Outer Islands, as weIl

as their resentment of the increasing influence of the Communist Party who received

privilege from President Soekarno. In general, the Charter of the PRRI opposed the

constitutional changes President Soekarno undertook when he introduced his konsepsi

in 1957. 129 Several Masyumi leaders were involved in the PRRI~ namely Mohammad

126 This decree refers to the retum to the UUD of 1945 (Basic Constitution), made Just after the proclamation. The constitution used after sovereignty was the DUOS of 1950 (temporary Basic constitution).

127 For more information on the growth orthe Communism in Indonesi~ see Arnold C. Brockrna.n, lndonesian Communism (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1963).

128 For details on the PRRL see Kahin. The Decline ofConstitutional Democracy in lndonesia. 586-588; Rosidi. "Pemerintah Revolutioner Republik Indonesia" in Sjafuddin Prawiranegara Lebih Talcut • Kepada Al/ah SWT Sebuah Biografi. 199-223. 73 Natsir, Sjafrudin Prawiranegara and Burhanuddin Harahap.130 The involvement of these • activists was linked to the official support that Masyumi gave the movement, giving Soekarno sufficient reason to dissolve this party in 1960.

Roem was not part of the PRRI effort to force a change in the government. l31

Roem aetually tried to mediate the affair on behalf of bis party and the central

government by meeting Natsir, Prawiranegara, and Harahap in central Sumatra and

asking them to negotiate and bring the matter to an end. But Roem admitted beforehand

that changing his counterparts' position seemed unlikely. After the central government

made an attempt to resolve the situation peacefully, Soekarno lost patience and decided to

bomb cities in Sumatra and Sulawesi which had become centers of the PRRl

resistance. l32 Once the government opted for a military solution, the PRRI power base

quickly dissipated. 133 The central Armed Forces remained loyal to President Soekarno

whom they regarded as essential to the operation and advancement of the Indonesian

129 The charter ofthe PRRI summoned President Soekarno to dismiss the Juanda cabinet which the PRRl considered not credible since it was formed by Soekarno himself and had no representation from existing political parties. The PRRI also called on Soekarno to return to bis position as constitutional head ofstate and give an opportunity ta Hatta and Hamengkubuwono XI ta form a zaken cabine~ composed of credible and anti-Communist members. For the complete content of the charter, see R.Z. Leirissa. PRRJ­ Permesta: Strategi Membangun Indollesian Tanpa Komunis (Jakarta: Grafiti, 1997), 185-189.

130 For further information on other leaders involved in this movement, see Soemarsono, Mohamad Roem 7U Tahun, 86.

IJ 1 The PRRI was centered in Padang., West Sumatera. At the time ofthe establishing ofthe PRRL Roem went to Medan in the capacity ofthe Reetor ofUISU (Universitas Islam Sumatera Utara or Islamic University ofNorth Sumatera). In Medan. he met NatsÎr_ Roem's wife who also went, invited Roem to visit Bukittinggi. West Sumatra where she once studied during her childhood. When he arrived in Padang., Roem was surprised to meet Syafiuddin Prawiranegara and Burhanuddin Harahap both Masyumi leaders, along with other PRRI pioneers such as Soemitro Djojohadikusumo, Colonel Simbolong and Dahlan Djambek. Roem was asked by Natsir ta attend the special meeting in a place called Sungai Dareh., but he said that he would not join because he was undecided. For further information on this issue, See Ajip Rosid~ ::;Jafruddin Prawiranegara Legih TaJcut Kepada Al/ah SWT. 202-203.

132 Noer, Partai Islam di Pentas Nasiona/. 37ï_ • 133 Despite the eradication ofthe PRRI's power in 1958. the affair was really hastened in 1961. 74 state. Since bis presidency had become a symbol ofunity for a divided nation in the anny • and they moved against PRRI out ofa desire to secure stability in the country rather than out ofsupport for any specifie ideology.

The absence of Roem in the PRRl movement may be seen as a reflection of the

diftèring strategies adopted by Masyumi leaders in opposing Soekarno. The character of

each Masyumi member \\t'aS, undoubtedly, influenced by bis individual and socio-cultural

background. For example, Roem and Prawoto, ofJavanese background tended to he calm

in their opposition to Soekarno, while Natsir, Prawiranegara, and Harahap, of

Sumateranese background in spite ofhaving their careers in Java, tended to he reactive in

their opposition. 134

Roem's effort to seek islah (recoociliation) between the Masyumi leaders

involved in the PRRI and the central government proved that Masyumi as a whole was

not behind the movement. Maarif asserts that if the Masyumi leaders involved in the

movement had spoken to Roem and other Masyumi leaders before taking that action,

their involvement might have never occurred and they might oever have left for

Sumatera.135 Such a statement is merely specu1ation~ but it retlects the feelings ofrespect

that tater Muslim writers had for Roem, and his powers ofnegotiations and persuasion.

Immediately after Masyumi was dissolved in 1961, Roem, on the initiative of

Prawoto, the Masyumi chairman when it was dissolved, went to the court to challenge the

134 In an interview condueted by Syafii Maarif, he asked Natsir whether he knew the subculture of Indonesians. For example Soekarno, a Javanese, was not used to being opposed openly. Natsir answered that he did not knowthat. He treated Soekarno just like his other Masyumi counterparts. This indicated that Natsir did not realize his other Masyumi counterparts were of Javanese background. See Ahmad Syafii Maarit: "Neo-Masyumi?" in Ahmad Syafii Maarif, Islam Ke/cuatan Doktrim dan Kegamangan Umat (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 1997), 117 • 135Ahmad Syafii Maarit: "Dialog Oua Generasi" in Santoso, ed.~ Tidalc Ada Negara Islam, xv. 75 ~. dissolution. Masyumi complained of the injustice of the arbitrary dissolution, done without being taken before the chief justice. Roem registered his case but the courts

chose not to hear the case. 136

The central govemment granted a pardon in 1961 to PRRI leaders and gave them

permission to retum to Jakarta. However, tbey did not enjoy complete freedom, but were

gradually taken into custody one by one and were imprisoned for various lengths of time

from 1961 untiI 1967. 137 Roem himself was in jail from 1962 to 1967. He described his

imprisonment as a "wintersleep," referring to a period of forced retirement from political

and social activity because the Soekarno govemment feared him as a potential

competitor. 138 Roem, in spite ofbeing one of the founding fathers of the republic, and in

spite of a flawless record in public service, was accused ofjoining a plot to assassinate

President Soekarno when he visited Makassar (South Sulawesi) in 1962. J39 This

accusation was never proven through an actual trial and the same charge was used against

other MasYUIIli leaders who were not involved in the PRRI, apparently to remove them

from active politics where they were viewed as impediments to Guided Democracy

136 Roem sent the petiùon ta the Jakarta court which decided that the matter was not within its jurisdiction. Then Roem appealed to a higher court but it was forced to keep quiet and no produced result at aU. For the complete story ofRoem's prosecution, see S.U. Bajasut, "Menggugat Rezim Soekarno" in A/am Pikiran dan Jejak Perjuangan Prawoto Mangkusasmito (Surabaya: Dokumenta. 1972), 164-167.

137 The Masyumi leaders who were jailed included Mohamad Natsir, Mohamad Roem, Prawoto Mangkusasmito, Syafruddin Prawiranegara, Burhanuddin Harahap. Yunan Nasution, Kasman Singaodimedjo. Anwar Haryono, Hamka and Isa Ansjary.

138 Mohamad Roem. "Jangan Main-Main dengan Negara I~lam" in Santoso., Tidak Ada Negara Islam. Surat-Surat PoUtik Nurcholish Madjid-Mohamad Roem, 45. • 139 Nurcholish Madjid, "Menyambung Mata Rantai Pemikiran yang Hilang:' in ibid., 31. 76 policies. Roem was later released along with the other imprisoned leaders when the New • Order emerged ending the Soekarno era in 1966. 140 c. Roem and Parmusi (partai Muslimin Indonesia)

After the extermination of the coup attempt of September 30, 1965 called

Gestapu/P.K..I, 141 followed by Soekamo's relinquishment ofthe power ofthe presidency

to Soeharto, the New Order emerged. Roem and other Islamic leaders hoped that the

new regÏme would allow greater freedom in politicallife. They considered the release of

political prisoners as an initial good sign that democratic life in Indonesia would be

restored. The optimism of the Muslim. leaders led them to consider reconstructing their

political party, anticipating that political parties working in a parliamentary setting would

be a likely scenario. The enthusiasm ofthese Muslims was publicly expressed when the

tasyakkur (thanksgiving) celebration was held around the al-Azhar mosque in Jakarta on

th August 14 , 1966, welcoming the Islamic leaders released from imprisonment.

Approximately 50,000 cheering individuals greeted the appearances ofthe leaders ofthe

fonner Masyumi: Natsir, Sjafruddin, Asaat, Prawoto, Kasman Singodimedjo, and

Mohammad Roem. 142 During the tasyakkur festivities, more than one speaker called for

the rehabilitation ofMasyumi. In bis speech, Prawoto, for example, said that the retum of

140 For Information on the fall ofSoekarno, see Legge, Sukarno: A Political Biography, 384-409; Brian May, The Indonesian Tragedy (London: Routlegde & Kegan Paul, 1978),27-159.

th 141GestapU is an Indonesian acronym for the September 30 movement. It is now usually called G. 30. S.IPKI. Through this movement, the PKI kidnapped and killed the elite generals called "Dewan GeneraIs," on the pretextthat the Dewan GeneraIs intended to overthrow the president. This was the PKI's bid for power in Indonesia, but tumed out to be one of the bi~est disasters ofthe nation's history. For details on the destruction of the PKI, see The September 3d Movement. The Attempted Coup by the Indonesian Communist Party: Its Background, Actions, and Eradication. (Jakarta: The State Secretariat of the Republic of Indonesia, 1995); Jerome R. Bass, "The PKI and the Attempted Coup," JOllnza! of Southeast Asian HiS/ory, vol. 1 no. 1 (March 1970): 96-103. • 142 Boland, the Stnlggle ofIslam in Modem Indonesia, 148. 77 Masyumi leaders meant that the cadre of the Islamic party was once more available for • actions. There is littie doubt that there was an expectation tbat Masyumi should be reactivated. 143

The optimism, both of former Masyumi leaders and their supporters, was

followed up by actions ofthe BKAM (Badan Koordinasi Amal Muslimin or Coordinating

Body of Muslim Activities), an umbrella organization comprising various social and

educational organizations established at the end of Soekarno era, working towards the

rehabilitation ofMasyumi. Unfortunately, the optimism was unfounded The cooperation

between the Army and the Muslim groups in the action against the Communists was

short-lived. Secular groups and much ofthe military beLieved that the Islamic parties still

clung tenaciously to a singuJar vision ofan Islamic state. The new regime was suspicious

of any attempt to rekindle such ideological disputation. l44 On December 2t 1966 the

regional military commanders of ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia or

Indonesian Anned Forces) stated that they would take firm steps against anyone, from

any side, who deviated from Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. The statement referred

especially to the Communist RevoIt in Madiun (East Java), Gestapu, Darul Islam, and

~1asyumi-SocialistParty. 145 This statement may be seen as the essence ofthe New Order

Government which presented itself as a correction ofwhat it considered to he deviations

from the 1945 Constitution perpetrated by Soekarno's OId Order. 146

143 Ibid., 148.

144 Alan A.. Samson, "Indonesian Islam since the New Order" in Ahmad Ibrahim, et. aL, eds., Readings on Islam in Southeast Asia, 165.

145 See the quotation adopted by Samson, "Islam in Indonesian Politics" Asian Survey voL8 no.l2 • (December 1968): 1005. 78 Former Masyumi activists resented the association of their cause with that of the

PK! (Indonesian Communist Party). Prawoto9 the chainnan of Masyumi when it was

dismissed9 sent two letters requesting meeting with president Soeharto to discuss what he

regarded as officiai misperceptions about Masyumi. However9 Soeharto did not reply to

Prawoto's request, and the government and the Armed Forces did not reconsider its

judgement of Masyumi. Aside from Masyumi's earlier espousal of an Islamic state and

association of its members with a group in rebellion against the Indonesian government,

there were political reasons for the government decisioD. It was expected that the Armed

Forces would become the dominant political force and removing both rightists and leftists

from the competition made assumption of that role easier. 147

When the rehabilitation of Masyumi was ruled out by the govemment, Muslim

groups tried to found another IsIamic party through the agency of the BKAM. This

~. organization successfully put together a committee called the c'committee of seven/'

consisting of sorne of the former Masyumi activists and sorne individuals from various

existing Islamic mass organizations. [48 The effort roused the suspicions by the

govemment that Masyumi leaders were simply creating Masyumi under a new name.

After sorne modifications, to allay government concems the committee succeeded in

forming a new Islamic party, Parmusi (Partai Muslimin Indonesia or Indonesian Muslim

party). In this new arrangement Masyumi leaders were excluded from leadership roles.

Soon after its establishment, there was discussion among members cODcerning the place

146 Michael R. J. Vatikiotis, lndonesian Politics under Soeharto: Order. Development. Pressure for Change (London: Routledge, 1993),33.

147Alexander Nadesan, The Founding and the Development of Panai Muslimin lndonesia (Minesota: Bemidji State College, n.y), 3. • 148For further information on the committee, see ibid., 30. 79 ...... -.....__ o. of former Masyumi activists in the new party. Some said that the new party should have nothing ta do with Masyumi, while others held that the former Masyumi members could

participate but only later in the upcoming congress of tfle party. For bis part, Roem was

displeased with government actions against re-establishing Masyumi and resented its

interference in the establishment ofParmusi. 149

The issue of the place of the Masyumi members in Parmusi was answered at the

congress held in Malang, East Java, in November 1968 when Roem was unanimously

elected as the general chairman ofthis party. ISO Roem was apparently chasen on the basis

of bis career as a moderate politician who had not been itlvolved in any opposition to the

government under the Oid arder. There were actuaIly sorne other former leading

Masyumi activists, especially Natsir and Prawoto, but Roem won over them since it was

deemed that the government would object ta them. 151 His election was greeted with

enthusiasm by the party members, but saon after the election, a radiogram from the

central government was received by the conference participants refusing to accept

Roem's election. Nadeson likened it ta "thunder striking in clear weather," evoking

disappointment, sadness and anger in the participants of the conference. Their

disappointment stemmed from the realization that the government had violated its own

guarantee ta respect the right of Parmusi ta exist in a democratic Indonesia. Realizing

that the government intended ta assert sorne contraIs aver the new party, the party

149 Soemarsono, MohamadRoem 70 Tahun, 101.

ISO For infonnation on the elected board of this congress, see ibid., 52-53.

151 See the interview with Roem in 1969 cited in the footnot~S by K.E. Ward, The Foundation of -,- Panai Muslimin Indonesia, 52.

80 .~. organizers decided to delay further election of officers until govemment "clearance" was obtained for candidates, living the board in the hands ofthe old management. 152

The govemment apparently interpreted the election of Roem and other Masyumi

members to the leadership of Parmusi to mean that Masyumi had been rebom under a

pseudonyme This attitude invited much protest from Muslim activists who objected ta the

government interference in the affairs of Parmusi. The Soeharto government had stated

that the prohibition of Masyumi members participating in the Partai Muslimin Indonesia

was effective only until the Malang congress, but in reality, it did not keep ta this

deadline. The government interference provoked a stormy response from Muslim

newspapers and magazines. A noted journalist asked whether Parmusi was a wadah

(receptacle)153 that caught the aspirations of Muslim community or one that caught the

aspirations of the govemment.1S4 Sorne non-Masyumi sympathisers described this

attitude of Soeharto and that of the army officers towards Roem as inexplicable, since

this ex-MasYUIlli politician, originating from Java, was not involved in the PRRI

rebellion. An American observer, Benda, stated that Roem would have given good

leadership ta the party and revitalized Muslim political action. 155 In retrospect Dawam

Rahardjo points out that the rejection of Roem caused great disappointment among

Modernist Muslims. He reasons that had the New Order government welcomed the

152 In fact. soon after he was elected as the general leader of Parmusi, Roem declared his acceptance to be conditional on the government's "clearance." See the discussion ofthe term "clearance" in ibid., 99-100.

153 Wadah is a Javanese word which Iiterally means bowl or receptacle. Politically, this terro refers to a formaI political entity which receives and retains the aspirations of similarly oriented people grouped in it. For further elaboration. see Samson. Islam in Indonesia PaUries. 1006-1007.

154 Rosidi in ibid., 1007.

lSS Boland. The Struggle ofIslam. 152-153.

81 election of Roem, it would have gained wide support from the Moderate Muslim • elements and would have promoted an image ofIslam acceptable to Indonesian nation. 156 Government interference in Parmusi's affairs from its establishment until its tirst

congress was described by sorne writers as marking the beginning of Muslim

I downgrading in the political life of Soeharto's New Order. ,57 Roem himself saw this

problem cautiously_ He was personally disappointed about the New Order government's

treatment of himself and other former Masyumi leaders. Yet confrontation with the

government, he reasoned, would only lead to national instability.158 He graciously

suggested that the congress avert such problems by electing younger men to lead the

party.

Angkatan Bersenjata, a newspaper affiliated with the Armed Forces, referred to

the removal ofRoem as Masyumi impatience. UWhy are we not patient until the generai

elections are held? Isn't it necessary for us to absorb the teachings of Abu T{a>lib (the

Prophet Muh}ammad's uncle) who said that patience is of two varieties: patience in

averting what you do not like, and patience in seeking what YOll want',159 This statement

was a reiteration ofSoeharto's position that former Masyumi leaders could be involved in

Parmusi only after the general election of 1971. From the Parmusi view this was

\S6 Dawam Rahardjo, "Islam dan Modernisasi: Catatan Atas Paham Sekularisasi Nurcholish Madjid" in Nurcholish Madjid, Islam. Kemodernall. dan Keindonesian (Bandung: Mizan, 1987), 13-14.

157 See for example Natsir Tamara, Indollesia in the wake ofIslam (1965-1985), 15; Boland, The Stnlgg/e ofIslam, 149; Samson, "Islam in Indonesian Politics," 1009.

m Soemarsono, MohamadRoem 70 Tahun. 99.

IS9 Angkatan Bersenjata, November 15, 1968, as quoted from Ward, The Foundation ofPanai • Mus/imin Indollesia, 60. 82 inconsistent, since Soeharto had initially said that Masyumi leaders could he elected in • the Parmusi congress. The rejection of Roem as a Muslim. party leader was probably a case of "like~'

and "dislike."~ The New Order govemment simply preferred leaders that they considered

"amenable'~ ta their policy. Despite being moderate and uninvolved with the PRRI~

Roem was seen as committed to activist Islam and a competitor with the new regime.

Under his leadership the Parmusï, could, they worri~ dominate the Indonesian political

scene as the dominant influence ofMasyumi had done before~ while the govemment and

the ABRI had already planned to control aIl other potential political parties by activating

Golkar (Golongan Karya or Functional Group). Golkar was designed as an alternative to

political parties, one which reflect ideological groups in society and was a wadah

(receptacle) of the army in the political arena. 16O The army also reasoned that it was

appropriate for Masyumi leaders to he released from imprisonment and restricted to

da 'wah activities rather than being involved in political activities.

As permission for Masyumi activism was not forthcoming, the party~s board was

taken over by other Muslim POliticians who were regarded as being closer ta Soeharto"s

govemment. 161 This may he related ta the frictions in the Parmusi board that began to

appear in the pre-congress period eSPecially when the govemment was directly

interfering in the party. There were two groups that Samson describes as "idealists~~ and

"realists." These factions were divided more on the basis ofstrategy rather than ideology.

The idealist group wanted the direct involvement of Masyumi leaders in Parmusi

160 For a comprehensive information of Golkar, see David Reeve, Golkar of Indonesia: An alternative to the Party System (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985). • 161 Ward., The Foundation ofPartai Mus/imi lndonesia, 55-56. 83 leadership as a means to get strong support frem the !slamic community. On the other

hand2 the realist group considered the principle held by the idealistic group to be

dogmatic and quite rigid. The realists believed they could work to chanmel Muslim.

political aspirations into a party which was independent of the legacy of Masyumi, even

though they recognized and valued the services of the Masyumi and the imI>0rtant role

played by Masyumi leaders. 162 The realist group seems to have been more imfluential as

is evident in that as soon as the government rejected the committee ofseven's IParty board

prier to the congress, an accommodating position was readily adopted to comply with the

government's wishes. Also, when Roem was rejected by the government2 f<»r example,

the reaction of the internal board was subdued, indicating a shift in favor of th~ realists.

As a result of the attitude of the New Order government to Pa.rn:ll.usi, Roem

criticized the government's improper manipulation of the democratic process and

expressed bis pessimism through his writings and speeches. One of Roem's major points

of criticism was the People's Representatives Assembly elected in 1971 wbich Roem

saw as marked by election irregularities. He did this when Hamengkubuwon..o IX, first

Vice-President in the New Order, stated that to achieve stability, it was ÎlIIportant to

create a clean government. In particular, Roem responded by arguing that clean

government was determined by a clean general election, painting to the 1971 general

election where the government introduced inappropriate regulations. 163 Roem was

referring to the Regulation (permen) No.12 from the Minister of Interior which

established the concept of "political quarantine." One of the Re,gulation's article states

u 162 Samson, ''Islam in Indonesian PoIitics. 1010.

-r-. 163 Soemarsono. Mohamad Roem 70 Tahun, 102.

84 ~. "A citizen ofthe Repllblic of Indonesia who is ex-member of the prohibited organization of the Indonesian Communist party (PKI), including its mass organizations or those

which were directIy involved in the contra-revolutionary movement G. 30. SIPKI or any

other prohibited organization is not given the right ta elect and to be elected."I64 The

question emerged as to what would be considered prohibited organizations. When sorne

said that it referred to ex-Masyumi and PSI activists, the Minister of Interior clarified that

Masyumi and the Indonesian Socialist Party were not considered prohibited by the

govemment under the tenns of its Election Act. However, due to the fact that some

members of Masyumi/PSr were mvolved in the PRRI rebellion, the government

rationalized that among the 35 million MasyumilPSr supporters, about 2500 former

members of Masyumi/PSr would not be allowed ta sit in the parliament. 165 Roem said

that the Interior Minister's move was hardly surprising, given the mass meclia's pre-

emptive report on the ex-Masyumi and PSI leaders who lost their right to be elected. The

mass media aIso reported that former Masyumi members, excepting certain figures, could

become involved in politics on the Parmusi platform. Roem categorized the excluded

figures as members of the Masyumi board, influential people who were not necessarily

members ofthe board, and prominent thinkers. 166

In Roem's view, this regulation restricted people's electoral rights and

contradicted the spirit of the Indonesian national ideology, Pancasila, and the 1945 Basic

Constitution. He maintained that the excillsionary politics the New Order had adopted

164 Department ofInformation of the Republic of Indonesia, Act on General Elections and Act on the Composition and Position ofthe MPR (congress), DPR (Parliament and DPRD (Regional Parliament) cited in Nadesan, The Founding and Deve[opment ofPartai Muslimin lndonesia, 35.

!6S Harian Abadi, February 5, 1970 cited in ibid., 35-36.

166 2500 ex MasyumiIPSI Kehilangan Hak Dipilih? (Surabaya: Dokumenta. 1970), Il.

85 was an insult to all international standards of justice. Roem however conceded that

former members of the PK! shouId indeed be barred frOID holding office, since the PKI

had violently threatened Indonesian democracy and would continue to do so since its

ideology contradicted Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. According to Roem,

therefore, members of the PK! had no place in Indonesian political life. 167 But the

conditions surrounding Masyumi were entirely different. In his words, "when sorne of

Masyumi leaders were involved in the PRRI, whose goal was to revoIt against the

dictator Soekarno and the influence of the PK!, why should they then he excluded frOID

politics at this new dawn of democracy? How is it that another PSI activist such as

Soemitro,168 did not lose bis electoral right when he was known to he involved in the

PRRI? Why was Prawoto denied of his electoral rights despite having no connection

with the PRRI?"Z69 Roem also criticized the government's policy of aIlowing people

without party affiliation to sit in the current parliament. He questioned the political responsibility of a representative who was not registered with a party. Roem also challenged the quota system ofelections which often disqualified those who were elected in the parliament.170

In response to Roem's criticism of the national election regulations, general staff spokesman observed in an interview that keeping Soemitro's electoral appointment was understandable because he had something te contribute to the improvement of the

167 Roem, 2500 Ex MasyumVPSI Kehilangan Hak Dipilih?, 9.

168 Soemitro was of the activists of the PSI (Indonesian Socialist Party) who was aIse involved in the PRRI. He was not banned since he was needed by the govemment for his econonûc expertise.

169 Roem, 2500 ex MasyumiIPSI Kehilangan Hak Dipilih?, 13-14.

170 Ibid., 16-17.

86 economy, whereas Roem and other Masyumi leaders intended to organize a mass

movement and hinder the attainment of political stability.l71 This stripping of political

rights from former Masyumi activists was designed to prevent their retum into the

political arena. For its part, the government reasoned that the decision was in the best

interests of a nation which had just Ieft behind Liberal and Guided Democracies which

had created much political instability, and in which Masyumi had played an important

role. Masyumi was often depicted as being obsessed with establishing an Islamic state,

something which wouId be a danger to national stability due to the impossibility

establisbing it within the pluralistic society of Indonesia Roem's criticism during the

initial stages of the New Order period was stated in terms that were intended to portray

him as an advocate for democratic forms.

Despite his Iack ofparticipation in politics and especially in Parmusi, and despite

bis not being allowed to be elected in the 1971 general election, he supported Parmusi

from behind the scenes working towards the participation of its members in the election.

From this time on, Roem began to shift his attention from practieal politics. Van Royen,

Roem's political rival on the diplomatie stage in an earlier era, pointed out in a letter ta

Roem that although Roem was no longer active in any formai position in the government,

his ideas and energy were still needed by the larger environment, i.e., the Islamic

world. l72 Indeed, Roem was reeognized in the wider Muslim world as one of Indonesia's

foremost Muslim activists. This was shawn in that when Abdoel Kahar Muzakkir,173 the

l1l SinarHarapan. November 14, 1968 as cited in ibid, 60-61.

172 Soemarsono, Mohamad Roem 70 Tahun, 164. -Je 173 Abdoel Kahar Muzalckir was a Muslim modemist and a former leader of Muhammadiyah. He was aIso one of the nine members of BPUPKI (Independence Committee) that produced the Jakarta

87 representative of Indonesian Muslims in the Mu'tamar al-'AIam al-Islaml (World -". Muslim Congress), passed away, the Mu'tamar immediately contacted Roem ta take bis

place. He was eventually asked to sit on this body's executive council in 1975.

Charter. See Endang Saifuddin Anshari. The Jakarta Charter ofJune 1945: A History ofthe Gentlemen's Agreement between the [slamic and the Secular Nationalists in Modem [ndonesia (M.A. Thesis. McGill --•• University. 1976). 88 CHAPTER THREE

MOHAMAD ROEM'S ISLAMIC POLITICAL VISION!

A. An Overview ofRoem's Political Vision

Since Roem was no longer active in practical politics, he used bis time ta set down in writing the historical facts behind the establishment of Indonesia. As someone who had directIy lived during the various phases of the Indonesian struggle, Roem felt himself capable ofcompiling a historical record of this process. In so doing, he expressed bis opinions on many topics. Besides showing bis concem for democracy, as mentioned previously, Roem aIse attacked the record of the PIa and Soekarno. Here, Roem's attitude demonstrates a change from the early days ofindependence, when he showed bis loyalty to Soekarno and the cause of Indonesia's freedom. But saon after Soekarno's introduction of Guided Democracy, and on recognizing the dangers of cooperating with the PK!, Roem began to distrust Soekarno. He even challenged Soekarno's claim to"have been the creator of Pancasila. He explained that before Soekarno had ever talked about

Pancasila, Mohammad Yamin, an Indonesian nationalist, had already introduced the concept in bis speech to a meeting on the formation of national ideology.2 Roem felt

1 Dne ofthe definitions of "visio~" offered in the Random House Unabridged Dictionary is that it is the act or power of anticipating that which will or may come to be. See "Vision'" Random House Unabridged Dictionary, 2nd edition, 1993, 2116. According to William C. Byham, a human resource specialist, vision is the foundation of someone's attitude. Vision is a person's perspective on the ideals intended. Vision is to answer the term ''wherett consisting two aspects: "what" and "how:' ''What'' is an objective, or what to achieve, whiIe 'llow" is a value, or how to achieve it. See William C. Byham as cited in Arvan Pradiansyah, '"MemiIih Pemimpin Nasional: Negarawan atau Politisi?" Republika 6 February, 1999. Doline. Available: http://www.kompas.comlkompas-cetak/9902l15/DPINIIpart45.htm. 14 February, 1999. In relation to this topic, the writer prefers the term "vision" rather than "thought," due to the nature of the discussion which involves not only Roem's thought on political Islam, but aIso his actions in responding Islamic political development.

2 Roem, 2500 Ex MasyumiIPSI Kehilangan Hak dipilih?, 20.

89 Pancasila to he the work of nationalists as a whole, not of any individuaI, as Soekarno • c1aimed. In his historical account, Roem also reminded the Indonesian people tbat some monumental events of their history, such as the first national congress of the Sarekat

Islam had been neglected. Roem said that apart from being an Islamic congress, this

event was attended by delegations from ail over Indonesia The event was considered the

first national action of the Indonesian movement in the colonial era.. and thus very

significant. He aise reminded bis readers thatthe emergence ofPancasila was perhaps the

most important event in the country's bistory, along with the return of the Indonesian

capital to Yogyakarta.3 What Roem did, in essence, was to invite Indonesian people to he

more aware ofthe significance ofthe history ofthis struggle which had been mentioned

in Indonesian historical accounts but had received less recognition compared to other

historical events.

Roem's political criticism began after he was released from jail in 1966 and

continued until sixteen days before bis death in 1983. However, despite the classification

of ms works as given in Chapter One, Roem wrote mainly an bistorical account of the

politics ofIndonesian Islam in particular and the Islamic world in general, rather than any

work.ofsubstantive Islamic political theory.

An elaboration of Roem's Islamic political vision can be evaluated from two

perspectives, that of bis fonnal political activities as discussed in Chapter Two, and that

of the political ideas which were expressed in bis writings after bis exclusion from the

formai POlitics ofthe New Order em. Unlike sorne Masyumi leaders, such as Natsir and

Zainal Abidin Ahma~ Roem did not involve bimself in the discourses on the theory of

• 3 See, Moharnd Roem, Tiga Peristiwa Bersejarah. 90 ~. political Islam, whether through bis writings or speeches during bis Masyumi period. Roem's reluctance to propose a theory ofpolitical Islam couId have been due to a number

offactors. First, Roem was not weIl known as an Islamic thinker. He was a graduate with

a Westem education, and bis religious education was formed during bis struggle in the

Islamic nationalist movement. Federspiel suggests that Roem was more interested in

Islamic practices rather than in theories. He says that Roem was more a Muslim activist

than a thinker, and that he did what he thought beneficial for the Indonesian people, the

majority of whom were Muslims. Federspiel points out that the reason behind Roem's

signature on the Roem-Royen Statement is that Roem considered it ta be beneficial to the

Indonesian people, despite the opposition of other Masyumi figures.4 The character of

Roem as an activist is also indicated by Sastrosatomo who says that Roem went no

further than Sjahrir in political thought and Natsir in Islamic thought, but his practical

contribution to the country made him an equal of those thinkers.s He adds that Roem's

contribution ta the political struggle of the country can be deduced frOID the results of

what he did, rather than from the doctrines and theories he believed or the fanaticism he

espoused. Therefore, as Sastrosatomo says, for the fanatical Islamic groups Roem was

too moderate, while for the radical, revolutionary nationalist groups Roem was too

compromised and-Iegalistic.6

Another notable reason for Roem's lack of involvement in developing a theory of

political Islam was that he was more deeply involved in the' practical aspects of

"Howard M. FederspieI, interview by author, Montreal, February 6, 1999.

5 Subadio Sastrosatomo, "Mohammad Roem yang Saya Kenal" in Soemarsono, Mohammad Roem 70 Tahun, 268. -----' • 6 Ibid.• 267. 91 nationhood. As mentioned in the discussion of bis political activities, he continued to • fulfill bis duties in the cabinet and was busily involved in diplomatie activities during the revolutionary period Additionally, during the Parliamentary Democracy period, he

served in the cabinet severaI times .in different capacities: Minister of Home Affairs,

Minïster of Foreign Affairs, and Vice-Prime Minister. In bis position as Minister of

Home Affairs in Wilopo's cabinet (1952-1953), he suceessfully dealt with the regulation

ofthe first national general election which was conducted in 1955 by Harahap's cabinet.

In bis position as Minister of Foreign Affairs, he concentrated on Indonesia's foreign

poliey, that is a neutralist or independent policy. In. bis conversation with Federspiel,

Roem apparently indicated that he was in part the arehitect ofIndonesia's foreign poliey.

Roem said that when the Korean war broke out in 1950, and Hatta, who was then Prime

Minister, had decided that Indonesia should not beeome involved in the eonflict and

should not side with either ofthe two great power blocks, - the USA and the USSR -

Roem pointed out that the struggle was between the two great powers with neither of

whom Indonesia wished to become entangled. He said that when he served in Natsir's

cabinet as Minister ofForeign Affairs, he had decided to follow the same basie poliey as

Hatta had, except that instead ofmerely being neutral, Roem wanted Indonesia to have a

more active and positive roIe. The Natsir's cabinet then deeided to pursue a poliey

independent ofthe power blocks but active in attempting fust to end the Korean eonflict

and second to end the cold war.7 Roem said that the greatest success ofthis independent

7Mohammad Roem, interview by Ho'ward M. Federspiel, Jakarta, February 8, 1961. For more information on Roem's ideas on Indonesia's foreign policy, see Mohamad Roem, Politik Indonesia (Jakarta: Penyiaran Umu, 1952). See also Mohamad Roem "Politik Luar Negeri Indonesia: Lahir, • Tantangan, dan Pertumbuhannya" in Roem, Dip/omasi: Ujung Tombale Perjuangan RI, 83-89. 92 policy was the Bandung conference of1955, in spite ofthe fact that the PNI Ali's cabinet • was in power at the time, a cabinet in which Masyumi members did not sit. Roem's final post in government was as Vice-Prime Minister in Ali

Sastromijojo's second cabinet (1956-1957), representing Masyumi, which was one ofthe

largest parties in parliament as a result of the election.g His being appointed as Vice-

Prime Minister removed him from being a member of Constituent Assembly from

Masyumi in which the debate over ideological basis of the state was opened This

situation prevented Roem from having the opportunity to state bis ideas on Islam as a

state ideology. It was in the Constituent. Assembly, where members of Masyumi and

other Islamic politicaI parties were proposing Islam as the basis ofthe state.

Roem often approached political problems frOID a legal point ofview, partly due

to bis degree in Iaw. When Soekarno dismissed Masyumi, Roem tried to argue the legal

invalidity ofthe dismissal, despite the fact that it was not merely a legal problem but aIso

a political one.9 He opposed the ban on former MasYUmi leaders from candidacy in the

legislature from a legal standpoint as reflected in bis speech 2500 exMasyumi/PSI

Kehilangan Hak Dipilih? (2500 former MasyumiIPSI Lost their Elected RightS?).1O

However, the decision of the government should not he seen merely as a limitation of

human rights, or as undemocratic and unconstitutiona1 acts as Roem argued; rather, the

decision was based on the government's own politica1 considerations. Despite bis

practicaIity, Roem's actions indicate that he was still intluenced by the idea1istic

8 There are four large parties sitting in parliament resulted ofthe national election: PNI (57 chairs)~ Masyumi (57 chairs), NU (45 chairs)~ and PKI (39 chairs). For more information on the eleetion, see Herbert Feith, The lndonesian Election of 1955 (lthaca: Modem Indonesia Project, Comell University, 1957). 9 See above Chapter Two, 68. • 10 See the discussion ofhis ideas above, pp. 80-81. 93 character of Masyumi leaders in general, and like them preferred to use constitutional • argumentation in expressing bis political views, as Maa.rifposits.Il Based on Roem's writings and sPeeches produced after his resignation from

formaI politics, we can conclude that he included political Islam within bis treatment of

the bistorical context 12 In relation to bis vision of Islam. and politics, it seems important

to him to adopt the ideas ofan Islamic political pa.rt;y, since the fust movement he chose

to joïn was an Islamic movement, and the peak ofbis political career was when he was in

the Masyumi party. His vision of the Islamic state is aIso important to adopt since the

idea commonly perceived., that an Islamic political -party should uphold an Islamic state,

can be confirmed in Roem's idea Though Roem's idea of the Islamic party might be

included in bis discourse on the Islamic state,13 it is preferable to discuss them separately

because ofthe nature ofRoem's vision ofthe two, and incidentally still reflected in the

debates on both the Islamic political party and the Islamic state that continue to take

place in Indonesia. This debate bas received new life eSPeciaIly after the demise of

Soeharto's New Order, now that Pancasila is no longer required as the sole state

ideology, and severai new politica1 parties used Islam as their azas (basic principle).14

Il Syafii Maarif. "DiaIog Oua Generasi" in Santoso, ed., Tidak Ada Negara Islam. XVI. See also Syafii Maarif, "Neo-Masyumi?" in Syafii Maarif, Islam KelGzlaran Doktrim dan Kegamallgan Ummat (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 1997), 117.

12 See his works ofIslam and Politics in Chapter One above, 19-20.

13 See, for examples, Masudul Hasan, Reconstructiol'l of Po/itical Thought in Islam (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1988); Rohani Abdul Rahim., Muslims in lndonesia andthe Notion ofan Islamic State (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Pustaka Islam, 1991).

14 See for examples: Daud Rasyid, "Panai Agama, Wh:y Not?," Repub/ika, 20 June 1998. Online; Kuntowijoyo, "Enam. Alasan Untuk Tidak Mendirikan Partai Islam," Repub/ika 18 July 1999. Online; Agus Muhammad, "Redefinisi Politik Islam," Kompas 14 September 1998. OnIme. Available: htn'://www. Kompas-eetakl9809114/0PINIIrede4.htm. 14 September 1998; Basri, "Partai Islam dan Utopia • Demokrasi," Jawapos, 15 September, 1998. Available: http://....WWW.jawapos.com/15se.p/a15sepl.htm. 14 94 B. Roem's Vision oran Islamic Politica.l Party • Roem was committed to democracy, and criticized what he viewed as improper and undemocratic procedures used bythe govemment in its interference in Parmusi in the

early New Order era. Roem was convinced of the necessity of an IsIamic party in

Indonesia because it would give Muslims proper !,'UÏdance rather than being led astray by

those trying to take advantage ofthem. He says:

Ninety percent ofthe former Indonesian Communist Party was from the Islamic community, as weIl as ofthe Golkar and some other Indonesian political parties. However, the Islamic figbt, in the political sense, is indicated by the presence of the political parties wbich use Islam as their basis, such as: the NU (when it was still a political party), Partai Muslimin, PSSI, and PERTI."IS

In bis correspondence with Madjid,16 Roem said that for him, Islam is a way of

life and the Islamic party is a place to struggle for th~ sake ofIslam. He adds that even for

Soekarno, the party was important. c;c;Soekamo would he no one without bis PNl (partai

National Indonesia, Indonesian National party).',17 It is clear that for Roem, the IsIamic

party plays an important role in channeling the Muslims' aspirations in Indonesia. This

September 1998; Deliar Noer, "Partai Islam," Forum Keadilan, October 17, 1998; Hajriyanto Y Tohari, Daur Ulang Politik Islam," Kompas January 1999. Available: http://www.kompas.comlkompas­ cetak/990I/21/0PINIIdaur45.htm. 20 January 1999; Ruslani, "Politik Islam di Tengah Pluralisme Politik," /compas, 22 January 1999. Available: http/www.kompas.comlkompas-cetak/99012210PINIIpoli04.htm. 21 January 1999. M Alfian Alfian M. "Dari Islam Politik Menuju Islam Integrafif," 12 February 1999. Available: http://www.mediaindo.co.id/publik/1999/021]210POJ lltmL ]] .February ]999; Muh. Hanif Dhakiri, "Partai Islam dan Islam Berpartai," Kompas 15 February 1999. Available: http://www.kompas.com/kompas-cetak/9902I15/0PINIIpart45.htm. 14 January 1999; and Syamsul Aritin, "Mewaspadai Pudarnya Islam Kultural," Repub!ika 19 February 1999. Available: http://www.re.publika.co.id/9902I19n488.htm. 18 February 1999.

15 Roem, Islam Dalam Perjuangan Kemerdekaan dan Pembangunan Indonesia, 13.

16As mentioned in the discussion of Roem's work in Cbapter One, Madjid had some correspondence with Roem disc:ussing various Islamic political issues in general, and Masyumi in p3J1icular. Their correspondence and the writings which preceded the correspondence have been published. See Santoso, TidakAdaNegara Islam: Surat-Surat Politik Nurcholish Madjid-Mohamad Roem.

17 ~ohamad Roem, "Bagi Saya: Islam? Yes Partai Islam Juga Yes." in Santoso. TidakAda Negara • Islam, 88-89. 95 was a common perception held by older Muslim leaders who identified the Islamic • struggle with that ofthe Islamic political parties. Roem would state: "Islam? Yes; Islamic Party? Also Yes." This assertion

counters the influential idea ofMadjid who suggests: ~~Islam? Yes; Islamic Party, No?,"

which was title ofone ofthe papers he presented when he offered bis refonnist ideas.18

Madjid's questions the validity of an Islamic political party in thé Nèw Order

atmosphere, since it no longer fit with the situation. Madjid rejects the refu1ation of bis

argument by other writers responding to "Islam? Yes, Islamic Party? No." His statement

'~Islamic Party, No?" does not Mean that Madjid disclaims the importance of an Islamic

party; rather, he questions the validity of an Islamic party at that time since it does not

seem attractive to people in the New Order em..

Madjid not only points the Muslim community's negative attitude toward the

New Order, he himselfis critical ofIslamic parties. In one ofhis essays, he says:

So ifIslamic parties constitute a receptacle ofideas which are going to he fought for on the basis of Islam, then it is obvious that those ideas are now unattractive. In other words, those ideas and Islamic thinking are now becoming fossilized and obsolete, devoid ofdynamism. Moreover these Islamic parties have failed to build a positive and sympathetic image; in fact they have an image that is j ust the opposite. 19

With regard to Islamic political parties on the part of young intellectuals, it May

be said that they argue that Islam should help Indonesia's growth without direct

involvement in political practices. Their ideas were fonnulated during the Soekarno era

when Islamic parties failed to build stability in the lives ofIndonesian Muslims. Madjid,

18 Muhammad Kamal Has~ Muslim Intellectual Responses to New Order Modernization in Indonesia (Kuala Lumpur. Dewan Bahasa Pustaka Kementrian Pelajaran Malaysia, 1982), 187-188. • 19 Ibid., 188. 96 who represented young Muslim intellectuals, opposed the ideas of the former IsIamic • POliticaI leaders, especially those of Masyumi. Madjid does not daim tbat the Islamic party was no longer important; rather, bis concem is the lack of interest in the "Islamic"

label among the younger generation, especially among university students. Madjid's

concem is rooted in bis experiences during bis leadership of the HM! (Himpunan

Mahasiswa Islam or Islamic Association of University Students). He had received a

complaint from bis HMI coUeagues in Bandungthat it was difficult to find new members

for the organization, since university students \vere ofthe opinion, "Islam, yes, HML no ~"

However, students showed interest in the teaching offered at Saiman mosque20 which

discussed Islamic but not political matters.21 Madjid came ta believe that for Islam to he

inclusive and universaI, politicaI matters should he put aside. He argued that da'wah in

Islam was the means of universaIizing Islam, so that the whole of the ummah was

involed. Thus implementing of da 'wah could he accomplished without Islamic political

parties, which sometimes caused political frictions among Muslims. Madjid's statement

that the idea ofthe IsIamic political party was obsolete and out ofdate was based on bis

beliefthat a cultural movement for implementing Islamic values in Indonesia was more

appropriate than a political one.

Roem reacted POsitively ta Madjid's ideas, since he thought that refonnation

meant positivism and thus should be welcomed. Roem describes himself as fossiiized

after his imprisonment for more than four years.22 However, Roem does not seem ready

2D Safman mosque is weIl known as a center of Islamic preaching for students at the Bandung Institute ofTechnology.

21 Madjid, "Saya Banyak Kesalahan.," in Santoso, Tidak Ada Negara Islam, 105-106. • 22 Roem "Jangan Main-Main Dengan Negara Islam." 45. 97 to admit that an Islamic political party was no longer important It is odd to attribute to • Roem the daim that the Islamic political party, especially the Masyumi during the era of the Parliamentary Democracy, did not contribute to the national development in

Indonesia's history. Roem felt that he was a leader ofMasyumi, which was a part ofthe

Indonesian govemment from the early years of independence until its dissolution, and

Roem was, himsel( one ofthe founders ofIndonesia as a sovereign nation.23 He regarded

all this as important and as proof that Islamic political activity was valuable and

necessary.

Roem disagreed with the notion popuIar during the period of New Order, that

ideological issues were no longer important, and that ooly development issues should he

put forward.24 He said that this seemed. to imply that people who were involved in

politico-ideological activities were against development. Roem that the Islamic political

23 In his writing, Busyairi quoted Munawir Djazali., a former Minister ofReligous Affairs, saying that Islamic poiitical parties in Indonesia's history failed to contribute directIy to Indonesia's development and they tended to avoid cooperation with the governrnent. However, his statement is countered by Busyairi who tries to prove the contribution of Isiamic political parties in Indonesia's history. Busyairi traced their history from the fight against the Dutch in which the Hizbullah and Sabilillah forces of Masyumi joined with the formai Indonesian army which at that time was caIled TKR (Tentara Keamanan Rakyat or People's Securïty Army). Busyairi pointed out the diplomatic struggle ofRoem ofMasyumi that resulted in the transfer of Indonesian sovereignty. As a foreign diplomat, Agus Salim of Masyumi successfully promoted Indonesia as an independent nation among countries ofthe Middle East. Busyairi also pointed out that the emergency government cbaired by Sjafruddin Prawiranegara of Masyumi was created due to the arrest ofthe central government by the Dutch. Natsir's Integral Motion is aIso proof of an Islamic political party's contribution ta the creation ofa united Indonesia out ofthe Indonesian Republic and other Indonesian states. Busyairi questioned Sjadza.li's statement that the Islamic party avoided cooperation with the govemment. Busyari said if Sjadzali was referring to the Islamic party's non­ cooperation in the time ofthe Dutch then it was true. since it was the Sarekat Islam which pioneered the non-cooperation movement against the Dutch govemment. But after independence, the Islamic poiitical parties were actively involved in running the country as part ofthe Indonesian govemment. Badruzzaman Busyairi, "Peranan Partai Islam dalam Pembangunan Bangsa dan Negara" in Endang Saifuddin Anshari and Anlien Rais, OOs., PakNatsir 80 Tahun, (Jakarta: Media Dakwah, 1988), 154.

24In the beginning ofNew Order efa, sorne slogans which indieated the superiority ofpolitics were replaced by other slogans that indicated a change of the country's orientation; for example, "ideology • oriented" was replaced by "program oriented." 98 fight had been for stability and prosperity, since people who adhered to ideology (Islam) • were supposed to support the ideals of development. Roem then asked: "Can development proceed without an ideological basis?" He answers that Pancasila is a

national ideology that is in agreement with Islamic ideology.25 Roem's insistence that an

Islamic political party was necessary was based on the fact that Masyumi gained

tremendous support from the Islamic community, and that the same community

enthusiastically welcomed the Masyumi leaders when they were released from jail and

ardently supported Parmusi when it was first established. However, Roem's argument

for the necessity of an IsIamic political party was inflexible. He once said in a speech

after he was no longer active in the Islamic party, that the Islamic fight can he achieved

not ooly through political parties but also through social means and da'wah. Roem said

that he himself could not he involved any more in practical politics but still had an

opportunity to campaign for Islamic teaehings through social activities. He gave

examples ofwhat he was doing at that time, making speeches ta the Islamic community

and disseminating bis ideas through the mass media.26 Despite bis strong defense ofthe

Islamic political party, Roem shows by this a tendency to give way ta the young

intellectual Muslims' reformation ideas as represented by Madjid Roem indicated that

the task of the former Masyumi leaders was no longer ta manage the party, but to

continue ta fight for their life mission, not in political activities but in da'wah and

educational endeavors in the New Order era.27

lSRoem, Islam dan Pefjuangan Kemerdekaan dan Pembangunan lndonesia, 16.

26 Roem, Islam da/am Perjuangan Kemerdekaan dan pembangunan Indonesia. . • 27 Mohamad Roem, "I1usi Kawan-lcawan PSI." in Santoso, Tidak Ada Negara Islam, 63. 99 Despite the different areas ofsocial activities in which they were engaged in the • New Order era, 28 Roem and other former Masyumi leaders sought to preserve their ~ilat a/- raljlm. (brotherhood). This commitment was based on the unity they had huilt earlier

in Masyumi Period, in facing crises together. For example~ Roem and other members of

the Masyumi board refused to follow the instruction ofPresident Soekarno to dismiss the

Masyumi leaders who had been involved in the PRRI from the leadership. Madjid stated

in bis correspondence to Roem that ifthe Masyumi leaders had dismissed these men from

the leadership of Masyumi~ they would have eroded the unity for which they had

struggled. They would have weakened the ummak in which all ofthem were important

Tslamic leaders~ and would have blamed one another over the dismissal.29 Madjid pointed

out that the dismissal of Soemitro~ who had been involved in the PRRI, by the PSI had

not guaranteed the survival ofthe PSI or prevented President Soekarno from disbanding

il. Therefore, the refusai of Roem and other Masyumi leaders to ohey Soekarno's

instructions to dismiss those involved in the PRRI at that time should he seen as an

important and historical decision on the part ofMasyumi leaders to preserve their unity in

the post-Masyumi era.

Although Roem represented the Masyumi generation and Madjid represented the

HMT generation/o both weTe moderate and progressive in their views. While Roem was a

28 Mohamad Roem, "llusi Kawan-kawan PSI," in Santoso, Tidak Ada Negara Islam, 63. In their non-political acvities, Natsir formed and 100 the DDIT (Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesi~ The Indonesian Council for [slamic Mission), zainal Ahidin became the Director ofthe Institute ofQur'inic Teaching of Jaleart~ Prawiranegara led Husami (Himpunan Usahawan Muslimin Indonesia or Association of the Indonesian Muslim Businessmen), and Roem himself became active in International Islamic conferences.

29 See Nurcholish Madjid, "Saya Tale Rela Peran Pale Natsir Dikucilkan" in Santoso, Tidak Ada Negara Islam, 79-80. • 30 Madjid was a former intluentialleader ofthe largest Indonesian University student association. 100 Muslim politician who focused on the nationalist struggle in the Islamic movement and • party, Madji

generations and had the advantage bigher education. Roem's goal was to gain political

power in order to "Islamize" Indonesian Islam, while Madjid's goal was to "Islamize"

Indonesia through cultural means and thereby to gain power, including politicaI power.

Both saw how Islam could play an important role in Indonesia as the force ofthe majority

and become a blessing for the Indonesian population or ra(unatan lil- 'iïlamIn (blessing

for the universe) in a religjously pluralistic country.

c. Roem's Vision ofan Islamic State

To understand Roem's vision ofan IsIamic state, the discussion should he placed

in the context of ·Masyumi as an Islamic party. Ifwe look at Masyumi's constitution, we

find that the party's objective was to uphold the sovereignty ofthe Indonesian people and

Islam, and implement Islamic ideas in state affairs.31 To implement Islamic ideas in state

affairs, Masyumi conducted an action program, aimed at repeats creating a society based

on justice according to IsIamic teachings. In externat relations, Masyumi would

emphasize the value ofthe Indonesian Islamic ummah to place the Republic ofIndonesia

on an equal footing with other democratic countries. Domestically, Masyumi would

endeavor to enhance the dissemination ofIslamic ideology throughout Indonesian society

32 without obstructing those ofdissimilar views. .

31 See Munawir Sjadzali, Islam andGovemmental System (Jakarta: INIS, 1991), 129. •• 32 See ibid., 129-130. 101 Based on its constitution, action program and political manifesto, it is clear that • Masyumi espoused an Islamic ideology and defined democracy in line with Islamic teachings. Even though the term "!slamic stateu was not mentioned in Masyumi's

constitution, the application ofIslamic ideology implied that the state was to be based on

Islam. In fact, Masyumi activists always referred to the ideal ofan Islamic state. Among

the important Masyumi leaders who wrote and worked to establish an Islamic state in

Indonesia were Muhammad Natsir and Zainal Abidin Ahma4, who both outlined their

views in their speeches in the meeting ofConstituent Assembly 1957.33

At the tinte of the proclamation of Independence, Indonesia was faced with the

debate over the basis of the state. In the preparatory meeting of the Indonesian

IndePendence committee set up by the Japanese in 1945, Muslim and secular nationalists

debated the philosophical foundation of the state. The result reached in the compromise

was in the form ofthe "Jakarta Charter," which stipulated that the state was to he founded

on beliefin God "with the obligation for adherents ofIslam to practice Islamic Law,,,34 in

addition to four other bases: humanitarianism, the unity of Indonesia; democracy; and

social justice.35 Non-Muslim Indonesians protested, stating that Indonesian independence

was gained not only by"the effort ofMuslims but also by followers ofother religions. For

the sake of Indonesian unity, the Muslim nationalists agreed that the clause "with the

33 For further infonnation on Natsir's theory ofan Islamic state and bis speeches in the Assembly, see Mohamad Natsir, Islam Sebagai Ideologie (Jakarta: Pustaka Aida, 1995); Tentang Dasar Negara Republic Indonesia dalam Konstituante, vol. 1 (Bandung, n.p., 1952), 109-142; and on Ahmad's, see Zainal Abidin Ahmad, Membentuk Negara Islam (Jakarta: Wijaya, 1956); Tentang Dasar Negara Repub/ic lndonesiadalam Konstituante, vol. 1,353-315.

34 B.I Boland, The Stroggle ofIslam in Modem Indonesia. 27.

3S For more information on this charter. see Endang Saifuddin Anshari, "The Jakarta Charter of June 1945: A History of the Gentlemen's Agreement between the Islamic and Secular Nationalists in • Modem lndonesia,n (M.A. thesis, McGill University), 1916. 102 obligation of Islamic adherents to practice IsIamic law" he erased, and changed to • "Oneness of God." Many Muslim leaders were disappointed but united with other factions to free Indonesia from a common enemy, leaving the problem of ideological

debate to a later agenda.

Another opportunity to place Islamic values as the official philosophy occurred in

the Constituent Assembly of 1957. Three concepts were proposed as the basis of the

state: Pancasila, Islam, and Social Economy. Social Economy had a limited number of

followers in the Assembly, so the debate was mainly over Pancasila and Islam.36 After

lengthy presentations and debate, the issue was left unresolved. Before further debate

could occur the Soekarno government dissolved the Constituent Assembly and also

declared Pancasila to the official state philosophy, thereby deciding the issue unilaterally.

The Soeharto government confirmed this stand when it assumed power in 1966.

It was in the light ofthese developments that Mohamad Roem addressed the issue

ofan Islamic state in 1983. In bis article" Tidak Ada Negara Islam" (There is no Islamic

State), Roem shows bis positive response to the ideas ofAmien Rais, a younger scholar

associated with the Muhammadiyah.37 Roem accepts Amien Rais's conclusion that an

Islamic state is not mentioned in the Qur'an and Islamic Tradition and is, therefore, not

obligatory for Muslims.38 Rais says that what is important for a nation is a knowledge of

how [slamic ethics can he implemented, the establishment of social justice, and the

36 Ibid., 124.

37 Amien Rais is one ofIndonesia's (eading intellectuals and the former leaderofMuhammadiyah. He is now the General Leader ofthe PAN (partai Arnanat Nasional, Nasional Trust Party), a new emerging political party in post-Soeharto govemment. • 38 Amien Rais "Tidak Ada Negara Islam" in Santoso, 00., ndak Ada Negara Islam, xxii. 103 creation ofan egalitarian society in which there is no exploitation. Tbis would Mean, he • suggests, a nation with such characteristics is already Islamic.39 Respondingto Rais, Roem traces the workof the Prophet MII~~ammad in building

a society based on Islamic values. Roem emphasizes that the Propmet had completely

fulfilled his task as a messenger ofAllah to spread Islam on the earth. He says further that

during his mission as Allah's messenger, MlÙJ.ammad was a model Jeader. He led bis

troops to war, delegations to negotiation, and became the head o-.f' the community.

However, Roem adds, the Prophet alone never put himself in any position other than as

RasüIull8h (God's messenger). After Makkah and Madinah were uniteed, the Prophet did

not give a new name ta the territory. Roem emphasizes that the task Otf the Prophet was

only to achieve his mission as a messenger ofAllah and implement th--e values of Islam,

thus completing the perfection spoken ofin the last verse ofthe Qur'aa (SÜTah a/-Maidah

or the Table, verse 3).40 Consequently, the Islamic state is achieved in ::substance, though

notm• name..41

Roem emphasized that Muf}.ammad is more a messenger thao a head of state.

Whatever Muqammad did, whether leading society or expanding the Isilamic nation, was

part of bis mission as God's messenger. The notion reminds us of the controversial

figure, the modernist 'Ali 'Abd al-Raziq, who stated that MuJ.tammad w:as only a Prophet

like the Prophets before mm. The Prophet's task was limited to preaching to people and

inviting them to search for safety in this world and the hereafter by acceepting Islam, and

39 Ibid., xxii-xxiii. 40 The following is the translation ofverse three ofsürab a/-Miidd: ...... Today, l have perfected your religion for you, completed My grace on you approved Islam as a religion for ytOu..." Majid Fakhry, trans., The Qur"an: A Modem English Version (Reading, OK : Gurnet Publishing, 1997), 67. • 41 Ibid., 3. 104 that Allah did not give to the Prophet the right offorcing people to convert to Islam. By • accepting the Prophefs invitation and becoming a Muslim, a set oflaws and regulations became incumbent on the person, regulating bis rights and duties in bis relationship to

Allah and bis fellow Muslims: as a member ofa family, ofa community and ofa wider

political grom. To assure the effectiveness of these rules, a ruler is equipped with the

shaii&ah, with authority to enforce the rules on those who reject them.42 This task, which

the Prophet performed, normally belonged to the authority of a head of state. 'Abd al-

Riiziq held that there is a separation between religion and worldly affairs in Islam. His

ideas are based on the Prophetie saying: "You know more about worldly affairs." Roem

himselfsees worldly affairs in the realm ofreligious tradition. For example, he says that

the 1}adIth taqrlrl(traditions ofthe Prophefs silence)43 play a more important role in the

worldly life of society including political matters, since they deal with that which is not

clearly explained in the Qur'an.44 Although Roem did not discuss the governmental

system in Islam as thoroughly as did 'Abd al-Raziq, he demonstrated bis position as a

rnodernist who eschewed secularism. His idea of the relation of Islamic tradition to

society means that Islam should aIso manage temporal life among Muslims who are

creatures for whom morals and ethical issues are important

42 'Ali 'Abd al Riziq, Ill-Islim wa UjulM-QuIan, ed. M~ammad 'Imirah, (Bayriit: al-Muassasah al-'Arabfyah li al-dirisit wa al-nashr, 1972), 154. 43 The Prophet's iJBditb are divided into different types: iJaditb.fi'/iis a tradition coosisting of the Prophet's words~ !JMlJtb qllw6coosisting ofactions by Prophet, and fJaditIJ taqdii The iJ"ditb tlJqririrefers to a certain deed performed by a Prophet's companion in front of or reported to the Prophet, unaccompanied by any direct statement ofapproval or disapproWl by the Prophet but tacitly implyiog ms approval. For more information, see M. Hasbi Ash Shiddieqy, Sejarah dan Pengantar llmu Hadits (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1991)~ 27; Mw,ammad Mu..,!afa A'~ Diris.t fi a/-EfllLÛtb a/-Nabawi WQ­ Tlirikll rlldwinib(al-Mamlakah al-'Arabfyah al-Sa'üdfyah: Jimï'at al-Riyi4, 1976). • 44 Roem "Tidak Ada Negara Islam.," 4. 105 Roem says that the efforts ofmodem countries to establish an Islamic state is only • idealism. Saudi Arabia, which people consider to he an IsIamic state, bas a political system which is contradictory to the governmental system of the Prophet's time. The

Prophet did not implement a monarchical system as Saudi Arabia has. Roem says that

when the Prophet passed away, leadership was not transferred to bis descendants, and a

republican system as practiced in Indonesia is closer to the Prophet's traditions than is the

system ofa monarchy.45 Roem does not elaborate as to why he considers the Republican

system to be more compatIble with Islamic teachings. However, bis idea can he

understood when it is put into the context of the struggle of Masyumi's leaders to

transfonn a republican system into an Islamic state. Isa Anshari of Masyumi, for

example, says "Our goal is a republican state... led by an elected Head of State who

accepts bis nomination as a trust from God and from the people.',46 Zainal Abidin

Ahmad., another Masyumi leader, refers to the first four khalifas as having characteristics

of a republic rather than a monarchy. He says that they were not monarchs but

"Presidents elected" by the people. The khilifah (caliphate), Ahmad argues, existed only

until the death of Ali, after which it was abolished by Mu'awiah's introduction of the

monarchical system.41 These ideas were given expression in the Constituent Assembly

and reflect thinking in the liberal democracy era. Roem's thinking on this subject, on the

other hand, not was expressed untillater in the New Order period when Pancasila had

45 Ibid., 8.

46 M. Isba Ansh~ Falsafah Pedrjuangan Islam (Medan: Seiful, 1951).218. • 47 Zainal Abidin Ahmad, Membentuk Negara Islam, 119. 106 e- become established as the state ideology. Still bis thinking seems quite sunilar to that of bis former colleagues in Masyumi.

Roem's idea ofan !slamic state is simiIar to that ofNurcholish Madjid who stated

that this idea tends to be apologetic.48 In bis correspondence with Roem, Madjid

generally agreed with Roem's response to Rais when he suggested the tenn ~'Islamic

state" is onlya Iinguistic means to convey the substance. The means was not the essential

thing.49 What Madjid was referring to was the Muslim politicians ofthe Old Order who

spent their time struggling to locate sorne IsIamic symbol in "Islamic state" while

ignoring the more intrinsic Islamic values ofjustice, social welfare, people's educatio~

and the like. Madjid aIso supported Roem in bis contention that the last revelation to the

Prophet M1Ù}ammad announced that Islam was perfeet. Madjid said the last revelation

indicated that wihyu (Qur'8nic revelation) reached its complete form in the Qur'an

which functions as a foundation for a system of life, while its development is based on

the human civilization and culture. Madjid emphasized the role of 'aq! (intellect) in

actualizing the mission ofhumankind as kharJfsh on the earth. Madjid posited that within

the system oflife proposed by the Qur'an, Muslims can work with other non-Muslims as

shown by the Prophet in the "Madinah Constitution.,,50 What Madjid meant is that the

48 See Masykuri AbdilJah, Respo"ses of {nJnllesiall Mu'\lim lntelleetuals /n the COllcept of Democracy (1966-1993) (Hamburg: Abera Verlag, 1997),210.

49 Nurcholish Madjid in "Menyambung Mata Rantai yang Hilang" in Santoso, Tidak Ada Negara Islam, 22.

SO For infonnation on the Madinah Constjtutio~ see Muhammad S. al-Awa, On the Po/inca/ System ofthe Islamie State (Indiana: Trust Publications, 1980), 15-20; Zainal Abidin Ahmad., Piagam Nabi • MuhammadS.A. w.:: Konstitusi Negara Tertulis Yang Pertama di Dunia (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1973). 107 system can vary and can include statehood, as long as the ideaIs ofIslam are achieved.51 • That is why Madjid agreed with Roem's emphasis on the importance of developing ytihad 52 as a way to interpret Islamic teachings to he compatible with the needs of

contemporary society.53

With regard to Islamic teaching in relation to the Indonesian context, Roem

writes that since the rise of the Sarekat Dagang Islam (Muslim Merchant Union), i15

leaders bad emphasized the importance of Islamic teachings without necessarily

mentioning the term IsIamic state.They said: "1lIease conduct life based on the Islamic

teaching, without necessarily waiting to he ruled by the state constitution, since

conducting life based on Islam will surely never damage others.,,54 Roem says that in

Masyumi's statutes and constitution the term ....Islamic state" is not to he found This is in

line with Harun Nasution who writes that Masyumi basically made no mention of an

immediate establishment of the Islamic state by force in its program.55 He says that

Masyumi as bas no detailed official theory on the Islamic state. 115 official political

program included only the six items: a republiéan form of state with the teachings of

Islam as its basis, freedom ofreligion, a presidential democracy, a parliament consisting

of a house of representatives and senate, human rights, and the equality of women in

political, social and economic spheres. Nasution also indicates that all existing

SI Madjid, "Menyambung Mata Rantai yang Hilang,n 28-29.

52 /jtibidis an exeretion ofpersonal effort in making a legal decision regarding a matter not explicitly covered by the Qur'in and the 1Jadith.

53 See Roem "Tidak Ada Negara Islam." Il; Madjid, "Menyambung Mata Rantai yang Hilang,'" 29.

54 Ibid., 9.. • SS Harun Nasution ia a contemporary Indonesian refonner~ usually considered to he Mu'tazili. 108 statements, apart from the official short program statements, are the ideas ofprominent • Masyumi leaders.56 Therefore, what Roem means by Islamic ideals in Masyumi's constitution can he understood as the same as What the Sarekat Dagang Islam (SDI)

leaders meant, namely, the practice of Islamic teachings under any circumstances, not

necessarily in an Islamic state.

Basically, Roem was trying to erase the term ~"Islamic state,~' since he claimed

people were tired ofhearing the term.S7 The question that can be posed here, however~ is

whether Roem's Moderation is a result ofhis time and place inthe New Order em and bis

acceptance ofPancasila as a national ideology or whether he was more moderate than bis

colleagues in the time of Masyumï, such as Mohammad Natsir, Zainal Abidin Ahmad,

Kasman Singadimedjo, !sa Anshari, and others who spoke of Islam as the basis ofthe

state in the Constituent Assembly in 1957. To answer this question, we should remember

that Masyumi activists came from different ethnic, cultural, and educational backgrounds.

These different backgrounds contributed to their ditferent visions of how the Masyumi

programs should he applied The politicaI positions they held aIso in:tl.uenced their vision.

Those who taIked about an Islamic state were working mainly on the constitutional level,

sitting in the Assembly, while other Masyumi leaders who were members ofthe cabinet,

Roem for example, concentrated on those national programs that they considered relevant

to their party's platform. The political visions they developed were also influenced by the

56 Harun Nasution., "The !slamic State in Indonesia: The Rise ofthe Ideology. the Movement for its Creation and the Theory ofthe Masjumi," (MA thesis., McGill University 1965): 18. 124.

• 57 Ibid., 2. 109 changing political situation ofthe country. When the members ofthe Masyumi proposed • Islam as the state ideology in the Constituent Assembly~ it was the only way to counter the danger ofthe CotnIDunist party, which was very strong at that time. Therefore~ in bis

recent writings, Madjid divides the history of Masyumi into two periods: during the

1940s Masyumi which was very liberaI, inclusive, and democratic, and during the 1950s

Masywni which was ideologically Islamic- oriented.58 Roem's idea seems to he

connected to the 1950s Masyumi. There is no clear indication that Roem insisted on the

necessity ofan Islamic state. What can be concluded tbat Roem was more moderate than

bis moderate Masyumi colleagues. His activity in the Linggarjati Agreement and bis

bravery in signing the Roem-Royen Statement. (while sorne of the Masyumi leaders

objected) aIso indicates bis moderation. His absence from the PRRI movement, where

some Masyumi leaders were involve~ and bis attempt to Mediate a reconciliation

between bis Masyumi colleagues and the central govemment aIso demonstrates his

moderation.59 Roem's inclusive and moderate vision continued even into the post-

Masywni period. This is indicated by Madjid who says that when Roem celebrated bis

birthday, those who were invited were not the Kyai,60 but leaders of other religious

communities such as Mr. Simatupang~ a Christian leader. Furthetmore, Roem did this

without any psychological reservations.61

S8 Nurcholish. Madjid, Dia/og Keterhukaan: Artiku/asi Nilai Islam daIam Wacana Sosia/ Politik Kontemporer (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1998),210.

S9 Kahin., "In Memoriam: Mohamad Roem (1908-1983)," 137.

60 Kiyaî is a traditional tide given to the ~Ulamt:i·in Indonesia. • 61 Madjid, Dia/ogKeterbukaan, 210. 110 After his release from prison, Roem simply pointed out the compatJbility • ofIslamic ideology with Pancasila ideology and discussed Islamic ideology as the basis of an Islamic political party, not as an ideology of the state. That Roem was

always distancing himselffrom the idea ofan imposed Islamic state is seen in one ofbis

essays where he states that when he observed Pancasila, he could see himself as a real

Muslim.62 His positive acœptance of Pancasila can be seen in bis preface to Anshari's

book, where he traces the process ofchange in the content of'~e Jakarta Charter." Roem

says that the Jakarta Charter is a part ofhistory, and to regret that history is like crying

over spilied mille" 63 Roem adds that the change in the first of the five points of the

Jakarta Charter which became Pancasila is understandable. He says that the words

Ketuhanan Yang Maha Es;a (the Oneness ofGod) can he found in the holy books ofall

the major religions. Therefore, as an ideology, Pancasila is a unifying factor among the

followers of various religions in Indonesia.64 Roem also mentions that despite the

replacement afone point o:fthe Jakarta Charter in the preamble ofthe 1945 Constitution,

its spirit remams. This is shown by the fact that in the PresidentiaL Decree

July 5, 1959 retuming to the 1945 Constitution.65 states that the Jakarta Charter

62 Moharnad Roem., SoyaMenerima Pancasila Karena Saya DrangIslam (Jakarta: DDU. n.d).

63 Endang Saifuddin A.nsh~ Piagam Jakarta 22 Juni 19-15 dan Sejarah Konsensus Nasional antara nasionalis Islami dan Nasionalis "Selcular" Tentang Dasar Negara Republik lndonesia 1945-/959 (Bandung: Pustaka-Perpustakaam Salman ITB, 1981).

64 Ibid., xiv-xv

65 The national const:1tutlon was changed severa! times in Indonesian history. The 1945 Constitution was replaced by the 1949 ternporary Constitution, followed by the 1950 temporary Constitution. Due to the failure «lfthe Constituent Asseœbly to determine a new national constitution, the President issued a decree on July- 5, 1959 to retum to the 1945 Constitution which has remained in use until • today. III of June 22~ 1945 inspired the constitution in its unity.66 • Roem~ s thought cannot he seen as offering a complete picture with regard to the relationship between Islam and the state. He did not develop a comprehensive theory;

rather he spoke in bis capacity as a former Muslim politician, who, when he first entered

politics, struggled within the Islamic movements which took Islam as their ideology. It

cao. be concluded that Roem's ideas on Islam and the state are presented specifically in

reference to the Indonesian context. This is demonstrated by bis interest in quoting C.A.O

van Nieuwenhuijze:

What stands out is, that Indonesia appears in the world as an Islamic nation and that at the same time Islam is not merely a more or less accurate copy of Islam elsewhere: whether ofIslam in India, from where it first came to Indonesia, or of Islam in the heartlands, which have for such a long time been the pole orientation for Indonesia Muslims. There have been those - non-Muslims, no doubt - who thought they saw an ambiguity here. Ifambiguity it be~ it couid in no way be an exclusive feature of the Indonesian situation. In ever different variants ever the same ambiguity shouid be traceable anywhere in the world of Islam, perhaps more manifestly in the outlying parts, but essentially everywhere, even in the original centers ofIslam.67

The most interesting point in relation to Roem's ideas is their political implication

for the New Order. As noted above, Muslim politicians, eSPeCially those who belonged to

Masyumi are often represented as activists who intended to exercise "political Islam"

while the young Muslim intellectuals, on the other band are interested in "cultwal Islam."

The development of Roem's thought casts doubt on that common perception. Roem

apPears to hearken back to the early period ofMasyumi when its basis was Islam, but at

66 Mohammad Roem., foreword to EneJang s. Anshari~ Kembalinya Piagam Jakarta 22 Juni 1945 dan Sejarah Konsensus Nasional Anlara Nasionalis Islami dan Nasiona/is "Selcu/or" tentang Dasar negara Republiklndonesia 1945-1959, (Bandung: Pustaka-Perpustakaan Salman lTB. 1981), ix.

67 Roem., "Tidak Ada Negara Islam." 9-10. For the original wording ofthe quotation, see C.A.O. van Neuwenhujze, "Indonesia," in Joseph Schacht with C.E. Bosworth eds~ Legacy of Islam (Oxford: • Oxford University Press. 1974), 155.

112 the level ofstate ideology, Masyumi accepted Pancasila.. This might have been shown by • Roem had he been given "clearance" by the government to lead Parmusi in the New Order.

In bis correspondence with Roem, Madjid said that Roem~s ideas would have a

tremendously positive effect on the young generation ofMuslims. Madjid argued that the

clarity ofsuch ideas had long been expected from old Indonesian Islamic leaders such as

Roem and that this had become a barrier for young scholars of the New Order who

eagerly anticipated the reformation of Islamic thought.G8 Madjid believed that the ideas

proposed by the Islamic parties of earlier periods were no longer of relevan~ and their

image was not generally ofa positive and sympathetic nature.69 To support bis reformist

ideas, Madjid wrote "The Necessity ofRenewing Islamic Thought and the Problem ofthe

Integration of the ummah,n ''More on Secularization,'" "The Perspective of Renewal of

Thought in Islam,'" and "Reinvigorating Religious Understanding in the Indonesian

Muslim Community.'"70 In these writings, Madjid pioneered the release of Indonesian

Muslims from the sacredness of political Islam championed by the oider generation.

From these writings too, Madjid's slogan "Islam? Yes; Partai Islam, NoT' (Islam? Yes;

Islamic Party, No?) became popular. To sorne extent, this position was criticized by the

6& Madjid, "Menyambung Mata Rantai Pemikiran Yang Hilang.," 18.

69 Abdillah, Responses oflndonesianMus/im lnteliectua/s, 210.

70 His ideas ofreform were promulgated between 1970 and 1972. For the complete account ofthe above titIes, see Hassan, Mlisfim In/effectual Responses, 187-215. For obtaining a better understanding on Madjid's ideas ofIslamic reform at the time, see Nurcholish Madjid, Islam KeraJcyatan dan Keindonesian: Pikiran-Pikiran Nlircholish Muda (Bandung: Mizan, 1993); Nurcholish Madjid, Islam Kemodernan dan • Keindonesiaan (Bandung: Mizan, 1987). 113 older generation that was still in favor of Islamic parties, but the idea slowly began to • take shape in the vision ofyoung Muslim intellectuals.71 In short, Roem's rejection of the necessity ofthe Islamic state shows that the old

leaders that could adjust to the New Order's Pancasila Roem's ideas c~ therefore,

inspire young MusIim schoIars critical of the oId leaders to \vork freely without being

troubled by earlier debates over ideology. This is why Roem's ideas are enthusiastically

welcomed by young Muslims who want to see Muslims concentrating on modernization

and development.

• 71 For more information on Madjid's cultural Islam. see Syamsul Aritin, "Mewaspadai Pudarnya Islam Kultural," Repuhlika. 20 February 1999.

114 CONCLUSION

• In Roem's biography we see different phases in his religious understanding, from

a tradïtional way of leaming \vhen he lived with bis family, to the modem way after bis

move to the city where he entered a Western system of education. In my opinio~ while

he was a product of Western-style educatio~ his involvement in the Islamic nationalist

movement was tremendously influential in shaping bis religious understanding. It was the

modem thrust of the IsIamic movement with which he was associated that placed him

more in the modernist camp than in the traditionalist.

Roem's Islamic views appear to have taken shape through ms involvement in the

Islamic rnovement rather than through a study of Islamic doctrines. This May he an

important reason why he distanced himselffrom doctrinal ideas ofIslam as compared to

ms MasYUmi collegues. Haji Agus Salim also had a prominent role in providing Roem

with a model of Islamic activis~ and had a tremendous influence on Roem's political

vision.

Roem's contribution to Indonesian politics was not limited to the role he played

as leader ofa political party. It was not uncommon for him to oppose bis party colleagues

for the sake of what he thought profitable for the larger cause. Roem's political

contribution can he seen in the way Indonesians represent the founding fathers of

Indonesia. When they think of the war against the Dutch, they automatically remember

General Sudirman, who led bis troops to face the challenge of the Dutch arroy. When

people talk about the proclamation of Indonesian independence, Soekarno and Hatta

appear as figures who signed and announced t.lte proclamation on hehalf of the

• Indonesian people, and are therefore called the fathers of the proclamation. Likewise,

115 when we trace the development of Indonesia's sovereignty through diplomacy, Roem • appears to have been the Most important figure. The Roem-Royen Statement was of crucial importance in the history ofthe founding ofa sovereign Indonesia.

We May conclude that throughout the time ofthe Dutch and ofthe Japanese, and

from the Old Order to the New, Roem made use of Islamic political organizations and

parties for national causes. It is also clear that bis political vision sees the IsIamic political

party as an appropriate means of channeling the Muslim majority's aspiration. In

Indonesia Roem did not consider the Muslims' majority status as necessarily a problem

in Indonesia because Indonesia is an ideologically pluralistic country. Roem's readiness

to work with secular movements and religious nationalists other than bis own party

proves bis flexibility as a Muslim politician. However, bis tierce attaek on the communist

party in Indonesia reflects bis hostility to doctrine ofatheism, a proposition that is shared

by other Muslim. leaders as weU. Roem's moderate attitude shifted to a more rigid and

exclusivist position when obstacles he encountered touched the principle aspects of his

faith. This is in line with Maarif's description of Roem, "moderate leader but

principled."l

Roem's argument against the necessity ofan Islamic state seems to be the result

of his long participation in the struggle of the Islamic movement beginning with his

membersbip in the 00, the SIS, the PSU and then Masyumi and Parmusi. He believed

that the substance of the Islamic political struggle is not to impose an Islamic state,

rather, to capitalize on the Indonesian people's Islamic values in raising support for

nationalism. He was convinced that Pancasila as the national ideology should not be

• 1 Ahmad.Syafii Maarif, "Golput: Mengapa Dipersoalkan?" in Syafüi Maarit: Membumikan Islam (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 1995), 200.

116 criticized by Indonesian Muslims because not one of its points contradicts Islamic • teachings. He quotes Alamsjah Ratu Perwiranegara2 who said that Pancasila is the worthiest gift ofIndonesian Muslims to the Indonesian people in general because without

the readiness ofMuslims to sacrifice, Pancasila would have never appeared.3

Roem's rejection ofthe idea ofan Islamic state is clearly seen when he quotes the

Shakespearean expression "what's in a name?" This shows the moderate view ofa leader

ofthe former Masyumi and shows that Masyumi and its leaders did not all have the goal

ofestablishing an Islamic state. One can argue that Roem was not trapped by the use of

symbolic language. However, one can ask :why then does he favor the idea ofan Islamic

political party, which uses symbolic language? We surmise that Roem's inconsistency is

related to the fact, that during the time of bis nationalist activities in the pre- and post­

independence Periods, he was always involved with Islamic movements and parties,

making it difficult for him disassociate himselffrom such the concept ofan Islamic party.

The strong attachment ofthe old Islamic leaders to an Islamic party became the object of

Madjid's and other young Muslims' concern, who saw the irrelevance of tying political

struggle to an Islamic political party. Roem's association with Islamic politics tends to

be ignored by young intellectuals in their critique ofthe old Islamic leaders, a fact which

not infrequently has resulted in creating offence.

Finally, it is interesting to relate Roem's political views to the post-Soeharto era,

in which severa! newly established political parties use Islam as their basis. The Muslim

politicians involved in these political parties now have a choice, whether to apply what

2 He is a former Minister ofReligious Affairs in the Soeharto era. • 3 Roem, forward to Ansh~ Piagam Jakarta 22 Juni 1945, xi. 117 Roem views as the position ofan Islamic political party within a pluralistic country, or to • replicate the Masyumi of the 1950s, which aims at the imposition of an Islamic state through constitutional struggle.

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