The political career of James A. Farley

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Authors Swindeman, Earlene, 1941-

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Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10150/317993 THE POLITICAL CAREER OF

JAMES A. FARLEY

by

.Eaplene Swind^man

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

. In The Graduate College

THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA STATEMENT BY AUTHOR

This thesis has been submitted in partial fulfill­ ment of requirements for an advanced degree at the University of Arizona and is deposited in the University Library to be made available to borrowers under rules of the Library.

Brief quotations from this thesis are allowable without special permission, provided that accurate acknow­ ledgment of source is made. Requests for permission for extended quotation from or reproduction of this manuscript in whole or in part may be granted by the head of the major department or the Dean of the Graduate College when in his judgment the proposed use of the material is in the inter­ ests of scholarship. In all other instances, however, per­ mission must be obtained from the author.

SIGNED

APPROVAL BY THESIS DIRECTOR

This thesis has been approved on the date shown below:

y Herman Bateman V Dkte Professor of History ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author expresses foremost appreciation to her advisors Dr. Herman Bateman3 for his prompt and considerate guidance in directing this thesis. Additional acknowledg­ ments and thanks are extended to Mr. James A. Parley for his valuable correspondence, and to Miss Madelem Fare whose thesis was of significant value. Special appreciation is given to the author's husband for his critical yet patient assistance concerning many facets of the preparation of the manuscript,

iii TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.. O O OO0 0 0 00 00060 oodo o ooo

Chapter

I. THE YOUNG JAMES PARLEY. 000000000600000000

II. TAKING IT ON THE CHIN. OOOOOOOOOQOOOOO O

III. DRIFTING APART... 0000000000000000000 0000

IV. PARTING OF WAYS...... 000000000 0 0 0000

F. THE 1942 NEW YORK CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION

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LIST OF REFERENCES.'000000000 o ooooooooooooo ABSTRACT

This thesis represents an effort to describe and analyze James A. Farley’s public life from his first politi­ cal post in 1909 to the 1942 New York Congressional election straggle. Since Parley was Chairman of the Democratic

National Committee and Postmaster General from 1932 to 1940, the author has discussed the elections in which Parley was involved, his relationship and conflicts with Roosevelt and also his role in the Democratic Party during this period.

Due to his effective techniques. Parley, as

Roosevelt’s campaign manager, was credited by many for having put Roosevelt in the White House in 1932. Parley was appointed Postmaster General and was selected as Democratic

National Chairman as a reward for his effort. All went reasonably well between Roosevelt and Parley for the first three years of Roosevelt’s administration, despite the fact that Parley sometimes felt that the President was using him as a scapegoat over certain political issues. Differences in political ideals began to become increasingly more apparent between the two men. Parley was an old line party politician.

To him, party unity and loyalty were foremost. Roosevelt., on the contrary, was interested essentially in his New Deal principles, and how to transform them into substantive pro­ grams. These differing political views were irreconcilable.

v and. after the .194.0. Demo or at ie Convention s Parley and

Roosevelt went separate ways. CHAPTER I

THE YOTOG JAMES PARLEY

James A. Farley was a man of great power and prestige

In early 1932. He was Chairman of the Democratic National

Committee, Roosevelt’s campaign manager, and soon to become

Postmaster Gdrieral of the United States, In addition to these positions^ he was a successful businessman "as well.

How did this small town boy achieve so much? Perhaps this question can be partially answered by an investigation of his background.

Farley believes that his birthplace. Grassy Point,

New York, had a profound influence on his entire life, and throughout his two autobiographies, he.frequently referred to i t . In this small town background, with close family ties,

Farley grew up to be a sensitive, active extrovert. The members of his family were staunch Catholics, and he in turn has been a firm believer in this faith. The fact that he was a Catholic affected Farley’s political future, as shall be discussed in the following pages.

He was born May 30, 1888, to James and Ellen Farley, a family of modest means, yet one which managed to live

James A. Farley, Behind the Ballots (New York: Har- court. Brace and Comp., 1938), p. 192.™

1 cemfertably ©n the seni©r Farley’s salary. B®th James and

Ellen Farley were b©rn In the state ©f New York and were the

children of Irish Immigrants. In early 1898, the elder

Farley was the victim of a fatal accident, leaving a widow with five sons to provide for. Young James, aged nine, and his four brothers were soon to feel the pressures of family 2 responsibility.

Farley’s formal education began at the age of five when he attended Grassy Point Grammar School. When he

reached the eighth grade, he was transferred to Stony Point

Grammar School. Upon graduation from high school, he entered

the Packard Commercial School in New York City where he com- 3 pleted a one year business course.

Much later in life, Farley commented that even though he had several honorary degrees, he very much regretted not having gone on to college to earn his degrees in the conven-

tional manner.

After finishing the business course, Farley worked

for the Merlin Keiholtz Paper Company for two ye airs, and then

secured a position with the United States Gypsum Company where he remained for fifteen years. Following these valu­

able years with U.S. Gypsum, Farley in partnership with his

2 James A. Farley, Jim Farley’s Story (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Comp., Inc., 1948), p. 2. 3 Ibid. 4*--- Ibid., p. 43. 3 brother-in-law, Harry Finnegan, organized a building materi­ als firm known as James A. Farley and Company, Inc. This business venture proved to be very successful, and soon the owners merged with several other companies to form a pros­ perous corporation called the General Builders Supply Cor- 5 poration, then one of the largest of its kind.

Farley's political career also prospered. His father was a Democrat and influenced his sons in that, direc- 6 tion. Farley won his first political position in 1909, as

Democratic town chairman of Stony Point. Two years later he was elected town clerk and was re-elected to that post three times. Being a player on the Grassy Point baseball team gave

Farley a great deal of popularity in his home town, and he exploited this esteem to further his political career.

"Stretch" Farley was then twenty-one years old and the teamis celebrated first baseman. The office of Town Super­ visor was his next step up the ladder. These positions which

Farley held were no small victories for the Democratic Party, since Rockland County was traditionally a Republican strong­ hold. Farley won these offices by methods tried and trusted in political circles. Few voters in his district ever met him on the street without being greeted by their first names.

The young, pali-t-iean attended most local christenings,

— r - Ibid., p. 2. 6 - Raymond Holey, 27 Masters of Politics (New York: Funk and Wagnalls Comp., 1949), p. 107. 14 weddings9 funeralss and public functions. Later, as Post­ master General of the United States, he did not alter his 7 technique. The year 1918 proved to be extremely successful for

Parley, He gained a foothold in state politics when he was elected Democratic county chairman of Rockland County. In the hopes of making his county better recognized in New York

State politics. Parley contacted Alfred E. Smith, then Presi­

dent of the New York Board of Aldermen, and urged him to be- 8 come a candidate for governor. Smith did campaign for this position, won, and appointed Parley as a Port Warden of New

York in reward for his loyal support, This position paid

$5,000 a year, but Parley was not content with the job since 9 it involved very little work or initiative on his part.

Parley had served at this post for about a year, when the number of Port Wardens was reduced by the new Republican

governor. Parley, being a member of the opposite party, was 10 one of the first to be eliminated.

In 1920, Parley married Elizabeth A. Finnegan, a girl whom he had known since childhood. In the succeeding years,

7 Drew Pearson and Robert S. Allen, "The President’s Trigger Man," Harper’s Magazine, CLXX (March, 1935)3 385-394. 8 Parley, Jim Parley’s Story, p. 3. 9 Parley, Behind the Ballots, p. 26. 10 Ibid.

e Elizabeth Parley gave birth to three children, two girls and 11 one boy.

Parley met Franklin Roosevelt for the first time in

1920, Their meeting was casual and politically insignificant.

The occasion was at the Democratic party state headquarters in New York City where party faithfuls were invited to meet the Democratic Presidential and Tice-Presidential candidates,

James M. Cox and Franklin Roosevelt respectively. At this time Roosevelt was a relatively obscure politician. He had first come to the public’s attention when he became a New

York Senator in 1910, then, in 1913 9 he was appointed

Assistant Secretary of the Navy by President Wilson as a re­ ward for his active support in the 1912 preeonvention battle.

His bid, in 1914, to become a United States Senator from New

York failed. Upon his defeat in the Senate race, he re­ turned to the Navy Department where he remained until 1920.

This position gave him valuable experience in government

, . 12 which he was to have great need of in the future. The Cox-

Roosevelt ticket, of course, was buried in the Harding-

Coolidge landslide

11 Ibid., p. 27. 12 Pearson, Harper*s Magazine, CLXX, 389. Frank Preidel, Franklin Delano Roosevelt: The Triumph (Boston: Little, Brown and Comp., 1957), III, 173 ■> Farley , Behind the Ballots, p . 1. Parley ’s first experience in beliind-the-seenes national polities occurred when he was selected to manage

A1 Smith’s headquarters at the Democratic State Convention 13 in Syracuse. Smith was campaigning for re-election to the governorship in 1922.. Due to his effective techniques and increasing popularitys this position led to Parley’s election to the New York State Assembly. After serving for one term he failed to be re-elected, primarily because he voted for a state wet law which was not a very popular thing to do in Rockland County at the time, since national prohibition was still in effect, and the people of this 1% county were staunch observers of this law.

In 1923s Smith, who was once again governor of New

York, appointed Parley to the New York State Athletic Com­ mission, a position which carried no salary but involved a great deal of publicity. Parley was the third member on the

Commission, the other two being.William Muldoon, an athletic promoter, and George P. Brower, the chairman. Within a few months Parley became chairman of this Commission. One Fri­ day, Farley and Muldoon met and the chairmanship was changed.

Since regular meetings were always held on Tuesday, some felt that Parley had taken unfair advantage of Brower's absence

13 Alfred E. Smith was governor of New York from 1918 to 1920, and from 1922 to 1928. 14 Pearson, Harper's Magazine, CLXX, 389. Charles Michelson, The Ghost Talks (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1944), p. 133, ; 7 by calling a special meeting. When Brower was reached over

the telephone by members of the press, he said:

It appears that they took advantage of my ab­ sence in proceeding as they have done. The action is not legal, however, because the regular meeting day is Tuesday. Sessions on Friday are only infor­ mal meetings, at which only minor routine matters are disposed of, unless I call a special meeting of the Commission, when important matters are awaiting the attention of the board. Under the circumstances, Tuesday being the only regular meeting day for the Commission, Tuesday is the only day on which reor­ ganization plans could be adopted or put into oper­ ation. 15

Farley retorted that he had spoken to Brower about reorgani­ zation of the Commission over the telephone. Brower had assured Farley that he would attend the meeting, since he was up for re-election. Farley stated that he wanted the chair­ manship as well. Brower did not arrive at the meeting so the other two men went on with the proceedings. Farley said fur­ ther that the chairmanship would be rotated; Muldoon agreed, since Brower and he had already held the chairmanship. The next day Brower, in making a statement to the press said that he accepted the decision of his two colleagues.

In 1926, Farley was re-elected chairman of the Ath­

letic Commission. It was announced that the board had been willing to continue the custom of rotating the chairmanship,., and had offered the post to Commissioner Muldoon, but he de­

clined in favor of Farley. Farley was re-elected each year

15 - ' New York Times, February 10, 1926, p. 17. Ibid., March 7, 1925, p. 9. 16 until his resignation from the Commission in 1923..

Farley came to know Roosevelt on a personal basis for the first time in 1924. He admired the future president for his perserverenee and courage in his fight to overcome the physical disability incurred from infantile paralysis. In the summer of 1928. a conflict arose among the Democratic leaders over who should be the nominee for the governorship of New York. Farley favored Roosevelt because he felt that the Roosevelt name would be a good vote-getter. At first.

At Smith, who was aspiring to the office of presidency, favored Herbert H. Lehman, New York banker, or Judge

Townsend H. Scudder of the state supreme court, but he was finally convinced to support Roosevelt. Later, Smith per­ suaded Roosevelt to run.. Farley, as newly appointed Secre­ tary of the Democratic State Committee, was placed in charge of the Roosevelt headquarters at the Hotel Biltmore in New

York City. To the surprise and dismay of the Democratic

Party, Smith lost the election and even failed to carry his own state of New York. Roosevelt, on the other hand, was 17 victorious. Farley’s job was just beginning.

From this time on, Farley devoted his time to strengthening the Democratic party in New York, A survey of the upstate New York Democratic organization confirmed

16 Ibid., March 7, 1925s p. 9. Ibid., February 10, 1926, p. 17. Pearson, Harper’s Magazine, CLXX, 385. 17 Farley, Behind the Ballots, p. 152. . 9 Roosevelt’s worst suspicions. The few aggressive, organiza­

tions to be found were interested only in local elections.

They even traded votes with their rivals by supporting Re­ publicans for state and national offices in exchange for lo­

cal offices. Parley found only disinterest and apathy

toward the state organization. William Bray, the state

chairman, was an elderly man who lacked energy and imagina­ tion. Together, Roosevelt and Parley worked out a plan to by-pass Bray and the- Committee in strengthening the Demo­

cratic party upstate. Finally in 1930, Roosevelt eased Bray 18 out of the chairmanship and Parley took his place.

Parley interpreted Roosevelt’s election as a smashing party victory with much of its success attributable to him­

self. Hiw views were not shared by all« Some people felt that this successful campaign was primarily a personal vic­

tory of Roosevelt’s rather than a party victory, since all the other statewide Democratic candidates won by fewer, votes 19 than Roosevelt. Whatever the reason for the victory.

Parley anticipated more success in the future for his friend,

Franklin Roosevelt.

A1 Smith, after his defeat in the presidential con­ test, declared that he would never again run for public

18 William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the New Deal (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), p. 118. 19 James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt the Lion and the Fox (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Comp., 1956), p. 122. 10

office. Farley,. newly appointed State Chairman of the Demo­

cratic Party, took this statement as Smith’s final decision.

Upon Roosevelt’s re-election to the governorship In November,

1930, Farley, with Louis Howe’s assistance, prepared a vic­

tory statement. Included was ^the following paragraph:

I fully expect that the call will come to Gover­ nor Roosevelt when the first presidential primary is held, which will be late next year. The Democrats in the nation naturally want as their candidate for President the man who has shown himself capable of carrying the most important state in the country by a record-breaking majority. I do not see how Mr. Roosevelt can escape becoming the next presidential nominee of his party, even if no one should raise a finger to bring it about. 20

This declaration was released to the press by Farley, and

Roosevelt was informed of its contents soon after. Roosevelt worked diligently for Roosevelt’s nomination. It was

Roosevelt’s policy to leave the actual management of the cam­

paign to Farley, Howe, and his friends throughout the country 21 while making the key decisions himself.

Howe and Farley worked together remarkably well, even

though they had different personalities. Farley described

Howe as the "first Roosevelt-for-President man, preceding FDR 22 himself by years."

20 Farley, Jim Farley’s Story, p. 6. 21 Burns, p. 126. 22 Farley, Jim Farley’s Story, p. 7.

( 11 Howe was a smalls weazened man of about sixty years of age. He was often unkindly referred to as a "gnome" in political circles. He was untidy in appearance and, unfor­ tunately, often a very ill man. Abrupt in manner, he made little effort to be friendly or even polite to most men. 23 Howe served as the Governor’s adviser, spur, and confidant.

He was stubbornly jealous of anyone who became too close to his "Franklin", and suspicious of anyone who was not one hundred per cent for Roosevelt’s cause. Tirelessly striving for his friend’s advancement, Howe worked off his frustra- - 24 tions in tirades against Roosevelt’s rivals and enemies.

Farley on the other hand was a huge man of six feet three inches, and weighed well over two hundred pounds, He was well known for his friendliness and honesty. His pledge, once promised, was always kept. His motto was, "favor for favor, deed for deed." He could get along well with most people, even with Howe; this was part of his effectiveness.

He served as a buffer when the situation called for some dip­ lomacy. Burns describes him as "a joiner, a mixer, a glad- 25 hander who could remember names - anybody’s name."

23 Freidel, pp. 170-171. Grace Tully, Franklin Delano Roosevelt: My Boss (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1949), p. 136. 24 Freidel, p. 170-171. Michelson, p. 37. Samuel I. Rosenman, Working with Roosevelt (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952)s p. 25. 25 Burns, p. 126. 12

Farley possessed a priceless political skill which he well

used to his advantage. This ability was to catalogue men­

tally names and faces, to retain associations among people,

and to know who was related to whom by blood, business, or politics. He astonished and flattered countless people by remembering their names, homes, and their particular prob- 26 lems. Farley and Howe worked well together, shared a loy­ alty to Roosevelt and both were inexperienced in national 27 politics.

In November, 1930, Farley received a letter from

Roosevelt in which, he later on bitterly remarked, he was given the only formal expression of appreciation he ever re­ ceived for managing two gubernatorial and two presidential campaigns. It said: .

This is the first chance I have had to sit down for a few minutes and write you connectedly about the campaign. You have done a wonderful piece of work and I don’t need to tell you how very apprecia­ tive and grateful I am. 28

Later on in the letter, Roosevelt stated, ,!I have an idea that you and I make a combination which has not existed since

Cleveland and Lamont." Farley took this to mean that he would have a position in Roosevelt’s Cabinet if he became

26 Moley, 27 Masters of Politics, p. 107. Raymond Holey, After Seven Years (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1939), p. 58. "Big Jim as Saviour," New Republic, May 31, 1939, p. 100. 27 Farley, Jim Farley’s Story, p. 7- 28 : : “ Ibid. 13 president, since in the parallel that Roosevelt had drawn,

Daniel Scott Lament had been Cleveland's political advisor 29 and later a member of his Cabinet.

Two methods of campaigning were possible for

Roosevelt's supporters to pursue. They could sit back and conduct a passive campaign. This would mean limiting them­ selves to making personal contacts and issuing press state­ ments extolling Roosevelt's merits. Or they could employ a more direct, active program by openly disclosing their objec­ tives, and setting about the job of rounding up enough dele­ gates to make nomination a certainty. The Roosevelt group decided to use the aggressive approach to securing delegates.

The campaign involved a tremendous amount of work, and Parley himself remarked that "never in the history of politics, up to that time, was there anything like the Committee’s letter 30 writing and long distance telephone activities." Parley wrote to every county chairman asking for a progress report of the Roosevelt campaign in his district. Men and women in key positions throughout the country received friendly, per­ sonal calls from Roosevelt. Autographed photographs were dis­ tributed widely. Births, marriages, wedding anniversaries, and deaths brought appropriate letters. By the spring of

1931s Roosevelt's supporters were well organized and ready

29 Ibid., p . 8. Freidel, p . 17%- 30 Parley, Jim Parley's Story, p. 9. 31 for intensive campaigning.

In the summer of 1931s Parley combined a trip to

Seattles Washington, where he was to attend the annual Elks

Convention, with an active political campaigning whirl.

With a list of the Democratic state chairmen and national committeemen in his pocket. Parley started out on June 29,

1931• He described himself as a "combination political 32 drummer and listening post." He covered eighteen states in nineteen days, and he returned to Hyde Park bursting with optimism. Actually, Parley's estimates were generally too enthusiastic. A newcomer to national politics, he did not realize the extent of factionalism in some states. His whirlwind trip did not give him a chance to explore many of the centers of power. Party leaders who promised to deliver their delegations simply were not able to do so. The dele­ gates were involved with conflicting loyalties to a variety 33 of candidates for state and local offices.

On January 23, 1932, Governor Roosevelt formally an­ nounced his candidacy in a letter to Fred. W. McLean, Secre- 34 tary of the Democratic State Committee of North Dakota.

31 Ibid., p. 11. 32 Ibid., p. 12. 33 Burns, p. 127.. 34 New York Times, January 24, 1932, p. 1. 15 The state law required that he present his candidacy in his own handwriting in order to place a slate of delegates in the preferential primary. That same day the Democratic Terri­ torial Convention of Alaska instructed its six delegates 35 pledged to his candidacy.

Other party hopefuls were A1 Smith,the former standard-bearer; John Nance Garner, the Speaker of the House of Representatives; Governor Albert C , Richie of Maryland;

Governor George White of Ohio; former Senator James A. Reed of Missouri; Senator James Hamilton Lewis of Illinois; Gover­ nor William H . Murray of Oklahoma; Newton D. Baker, former

Secretary of War from 1916 to 1921, and Owen D. Young, a noted New York industrialist who was regarded as a likely dark horse. A1 Smith made it quite plain that he intended to 36 stop Roosevelt from winning the nomination.

It was obvious that Roosevelt and Smith were no lon­ ger as friendly as they were in 1928 when Roosevelt nominated

Smith to run on the Democratic ticket for the presidency.

Perhaps one of the reasons for this coolness could have been the fact that Roosevelt, as Governor of New York, had dis- , missed several party faithfuls whom Smith had installed when he was governor, furthermore, each wished to become president.

» Parley, Jim Parley’s Story, p. 127. 36 Ibid. Thomas L. Stokes, Chip Off My Shoulder (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1940), pp. 316-317. 16 Howevers Smith failed to make it known that he intended to run until the .spring of 1932« By this time the Roosevelt 37 campaign machinery was in high gear.

Many feared that an open break between these two men might create a split in the party and thereby destroy any 38 hope for a victory in 1932• In an effort to get them to­ gether personally, and it was hoped politically, numerous meetings were arranged by their mutual friends. Outwardly they appeared to be friendly, however, this was not true be­ hind the scenes. Their hostility to each other appears to have been caused at least partially from confidential re­ marks that each had made about the other to close friends.

These comments usually reached the other individual not long 39 after they were uttered.

The event which eventually brought about the es­ trangement of Roosevelt and Smith arose out of the prohibi­ tion issue. Smith and his followers were in favor of taking a firm stand against prohibition and to make repeal the leading issue of 1932. Although Roosevelt was- not for pro­ hibition, he was opposed to Smith’s plan of making it the

37 Parley, Behind the Ballots, p. 78. Rosenman, Working With Roosevelt, p. 55. - 3 3 Roy V. Peel and Thomas'C. Donnelly, The 1932 Cam- paign An Analysis (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 39 Ibid., p. 62. 17 dominant issue of the campaign. Roosevelt wanted prohibition 40 pushed to the background while stressing economic questions.

In Marchg 1931, John J. Raskob, whom Smith had made chairman of the Democratic National Committee3 attempted, upon Smith's request, to persuade.the committee to make a declaration against prohibition, Roosevelt checkmated him by directing New York state Democratic chairman Parley to call a meeting of his committee, which adopted a resolution opposing a statement in advance of the national convention. This move was widely accepted, and Raskob failed in his endeavor to persuade the National Committee to make the declaration he 41 desired.

Roosevelt was considered the most likely winner for the nomination at the time Smith made his rather tardy an­ nouncement of candidacy. Smith's entry into the race caused embarrassment to several of his friends who had committed themselves to Roosevelt believing that party harmony would be best served by backing the candidate whom they considered 42 most available.

Smith had to prevent Roosevelt from entering the con­ vention with two-thirds of the delegates pledged to his

40 Ibid,, p. 63. : ; 41 . Ibid. ■■ 42 .. ■ New York Times, March 10, 1932, p. 2. Edward J.' Flynn, You're the Boss (New York: The Viking Press, 1947), p.. 94. / ' ■; . 43 nomination o His only hope was to. deadlock; the convention on the first few ballots and then possibly win the nomination himself, or, at least, to have a part in naming the compro­ mise candidate. On February 9 3 just three days after Smith entered the race, Jouett Shouse, chairman of the executive committee and a Smith man, made a suggestion, the significant part of which said that it would be better not to instruct delegates to the Democratic convention in favor of any can­ didate, except where such instructions are necessary under 44 . the law. Roosevelt replied, saying Shouse's plan would make the nomination for the presidency a process of ”trade 45 and barter" by a few leaders. It would, he claimed, shut out entirely the popular choice of the rank and file of the party. Shouse had now gained the objective he sought. By revealing the intention of the Smith group to oppose

Roosevelt's nomination he encouraged several favorite sons, 46 who had been holding back, to enter the race. This devel­ opment was fortunate, for Smith,, since several of the favo­ rite sons. Garner, for example, were able to win the delegates that otherwise would have been undoubtedly in­ structed to vote for Roosevelt. The New York governor, in

43 New York Times, February 10, 1932, p. 3• 44 ■ Peel, p. 66. 45 New York Times, February 14, 1932, p. 28. 46 : Ibid., February 12, 1932, p. 16. 19 February9 1932, through Cummings of Connecticut sought the withdrawal of several of the "sons" by urging that their can­ didacies might lead to Smith's nomination. The plea failed because the hope of deadlock by Roosevelt's opponents was too 4? strong.

The major political machines in the country were op­ posed to Roosevelt, presumably because he was too much of a 48 reformer to be "reliable.” The belief that Smith’s control of the party machinery might produce the stalemate necessary to prevent the nomination of Roosevelt made Smith the center 49 of the anti-Roosevelt forces.

The Democratic pre-convention period that began so 50 favorably for Roosevelt ended in doubt. The Governor, although assured of a majority of delegates, largely due to

Farley's cultivation of political workers at the grass roots 51 level, had far less than the needed two-thirds. Smith, on the other hand, had failed to win the minimum one-third. For either to win, accessions from the unpledged ranks or alli­ ances with delegations from states instructed for favorite

47 Ibid., February 16, 1932, p. 4. 48 Flynn, p. 99. 49 Edgar Eugene Robinson, The Roosevelt Leadership , 1933-1945 (New York: J.B. Lippincott Comp., 1955)s p . 63. 50 . - Farley, Behind the Ballots, p. 100. 51 Robinson, p. 63. 20 sons were necessary, Such support had to be bargained for at 52 . ' the Convention. -

Farley and Edward J. Flynn arrived in Chicago a week before the convention began, to establish the Roosevelt head­ quarters. They admitted that they were rather new and inex­ perienced in national politics, but both went to work like 53 old veterans. Fafeley took over the main reception center, where he greeted Roosevelt delegates, briefed the more im­ portant ones on their tasks at the convention, and sought to. impress and win over delegates pledged to other candidates.

One of Farley’s most useful tools was a huge map of the

United States, commonly referred to by the opposition as

"Field Marshal Farley’s Map," upon whiph he had shaded in 54 Roosevelt-controlled states in red. It was impressive, for it showed that in terms of area the nation’s Democrats were behind Roosevelt. Smith commented, when he arrived that

Roosevelt had lots of area, but not what was more important, lots of delegates. Smith scoffed at Farley’s first-ballot 55 predictions as "ballyhoo," or "Farley's Fairy Tales."

52 Peel, p. 80. 53 Flynn, p. 89. 54 Farley, Behind.the Ballots, p. 110. Flynn, p. 89. "Selling Roosevelt to the Party," American Magazine, CXXVI (August, 1938), 10. 55 Farley, Behind the Ballots, p. 114. New York Times, June 23, 19325 p. 1. 21 Hie Democratic Convention, which met in Chicago

shortly after the Republicans disbanded, provided much con­

trast for the observer„ Where the Republican Sonvention was

rather uninteresting since Hoover’s renomination was inev­ itable, the uncertainty among the Democrats lent color and ; 56 interest to their convention. The Democrats felt confident that they would win and that they had finally dispelled the 57 old ’’Republican Prosperity Myth”.

It was clear before the Democratic Convention opened on June 27, 1932, that Roosevelt could not win the first- ballot victory which Parley had predicted, unless a stampede could be touched off at the end of the first roll call. As a last resort, the Roosevelt forces decided to try a rather risky maneuver. This was an attempt to repeal the two- thirds rule. The reason was quite obvious. Each previous national convention adopted its own rules by straight major­ ity vote; sure of commanding such a majority the Roosevelt men needed only to change the rules and then nominate their 58 candidate by a straight majority. The idea might have worked, except that it was ill-timed. The issue came up for

consideration rather unexpectedly at an organization meeting of Roosevelt delegates, called by Parley before the convention

56 Peel, p. 25. 57 Ibid., p. 214. 58 Burns, p. 135» ■ . ■ . ■ 22 59 opened. Suddenly3 Senator Huey Long of Louisiana took the floor to offer a resolution, stating that Eooseve.lt es friends would fight for a straight majority rule. Farley tried to persuade the gathering not to act. He asserted that it would be unfair to do so without consulting Roosevelt.

But he made the mistake, of allowing discussions to continue.

This pause gave Long his opportunity. He received permission . to second his own motion, which he defended with a speech so effective that the resolution went through causing the op- 60 position to rise in indignation. Senator Carter Glass of

Virginia said that a nomination won under these circumstances 61 would be "damaged goods obtained by a gambler's trick."

Roosevelt's opponents now had a moral issue about which to unite and the Southern delegates showed signs of desertion, since the two-thirds rule had become a venerable policy for 6,2 protecting the power of the South in the party. Farley was forced to give up the struggle, and Roosevelt withdrew 63 his approval as gracefully as possible. Roosevelt said that he was withdrawing from the abrogation fight so that

59 Farley, Behind the Ballots, p. 116. 60 New York Times, June 2.4, 1932, p. 1. Ibid. , June 25, 1932, p, 1. "Flynn, p. 90. 61 New York Times, June 25, 1932, p. 1. 62 Ibid., May 2, 1932, p. 1. Harold F. Gosnell, Cham­ pion Campaigner: Franklin D. Roosevelt (New York: Macmillan Comp., 1952), p. il8. 63 - Burns, p. 135. • 23 there would be no taint on his honor. "It is true that the issue was not raised until after the delegates to the conven­ tion had been selected," he admitted, "and I decline to per­ mit myself or my friends to be open to the accusations of poor sportsmanship or to the use of methods which could be 64 called, even falsely, those of a steam roller."

This defeat caused Roosevelt’s opponents to feel en- 65 heartened and to believe that he could be stopped.

Another preliminary move the Roosevelt people were checkmated on was their attempt to postpone the consideration of the platform until after the nominations. The anti-

Roosevelt. forces refused,this proposal presented by Parley,

However, they did consent to reoommen# the abrogation of the two-thirds rule in the future. Parley feared a battle on the platform issue might develop animosities and split his 66 pledged delegations. There were four important battles facing the convention when it formally opened. These were the contests over the seating of disputed delegations, the battle over the permanent chairmanship, the fight over the platform and the struggle over the nominations. The first three questions were ultimately, settled in Roosevelt’s

\ 64 Parley, Behind the Ballots, p. 119. New. York Times, June 28, 1932, p. 13. — - 65 : /. ; ■ •- ■ : . Peel, p. 93» New York Times, June 28, 1932, p. 13. 66 Peel, p. 93. • 67 favor- It was a very tense time for Farley, He remembers:

The nervous strain during this period, of sus­ pense was very close to the limit of physical en­ durance, At a time when clear thinking and cool judgment were needed as they never were before, I was working eighteen or nineteen hours a day9 con­ versing with hundreds of people, constantly consul­ ting with other leaders, receiving reports from' ^ every delegation, and meeting at least twice daily with several hundred newspapermen. I ate my meals, usually consisting of sandwiches and milk, off a tray, and slept a few hours just before dawn if the opportunity offered,.,. Hundreds of other men were . caught in the same, dizzy whirl and were trying to keep up the same maddening pace. 68

As the first drawn-out roll call got under way,

Farley, was still confident that the bandwagon spirit would prevail and Roosevelt would win on the first ballot. It 69 dragged on for more than an hour and a half. When it was over, Roosevelt had 666 votes; Smith, 202; Garner, ninety;

Richie, twenty-one; Reed, twenty-four; Traylor, forty-three;

Byrd, twenty-five; Murray, twenty-three; and White, fifty- 70 two. Roosevelt still lacked more than 100 votes for the necessary two-thirds. On the second roll call, Roosevelt gained eleven and one-half votes. Roosevelt's forces were 71 holding firm, but so were his opponents. Farley desper­ ately wound between the seats, and up and down the aisles.

67 Ibid., p . 100.

68" Farley, Behind the Ballots, p. 129 = 69 Ibid., p. 142.. 70' . New York Times, July 1, 1932,. p. 1. 71 Burns, p. 136. 25 trying to persuade delegates to shift their votes to the New

York governor. On the third ballot, Roosevelt gained only

five votes, and it was rumored that his bandwagon had been

stopped. After the third ballot, it was 9:15 in the morning,

and the convention was adjourned until that evening. The

delegates and reporters staggered back to their hotel-rooms, 72 disheveled, unwashed and unshaved.

Parley had mustered all possible support and was

still eighty-seven votes short. Unless Roosevelt could pick up new, decisive strength on the fourth ballot, his cause

seemed lost. The rumors were that Baker would be the com­

promise candidate. Parley had to now bring to fruition the negotiations which had been going on so incessantly since be­

fore the convention started. The desperate campaign manager

immediately joined Howe at the Congress hotel for a confer­

ence. Howe was lying on the floor, his head on a pillow,

uncler the breeze of two electric fans. Parley lay down be­

side Howe and whispered in his ear that he wanted to stake 73 everything on winning over Texas. Howe agreed.

Within a few minutes, Parley went to. the hotel apart­

ment of Senator Harrison and George E. Allen, to meet with

Garner’s manager. Representative Sam Rayburn of Texas.

Although the nomination seemed to hang upon the outcome, the

72 . Parley , Behind the Ballots, p. 143. 73 Ibid., p. 144. ' ■■ . 26 exhausted Parley snored away on Allen’s bed until Rayburn arrived„ The meeting lasted only a short time. At the con- 74 elusion, Rayburn said, "We ’11 see what can be done .” He made no definite promise,, but Parley felt elated, certain that with Texas’ and California’s support Roosevelt’s nomi- 75 nation was assured.

Parley contacted the very powerful publisher, William

Randolph Hearst who had had much to do with Garner’s victory in California. Parley told him that if the deadlock was not broken, Newton Baker or A1 Smith might win. Hearst had no love for Roosevelt, feeling Tike many others that the New

York Governor was fundamentally weak. But he hated Smith personally and disagreed with Baker’s internationalist views.

The Hearst press, the most important group of' Democratic newspapers in the country, supported Garner for President, chiefly because Garner was strongly opposed to the United

States joining the League of Nations. Roosevelt had come to believe that the League had evolved from Wilson’s original plan into an organization which was no longer to the interest of the United States to join. He made these feelings clear to the public, probably to make his candidacy more palatable

74 - ' . Ibid., p . 145. George Allen was a personal friend of Senator Harrison and was then a commissioner for the District of Columbia. 75 Ibid. to Hearst. Not. even Hearst, however, could swing Califor­ nia to Roosevelt. Under the interpretation of California law the delegation was pledged to Garner, and Garner alone could 77 release it. ■

If Parley and his co-workers had known Garner’s in­ tentions they would have been spared many anxious hours. The new speaker of the House had nothing to do with his being a

Democratic candidate for the presidency. ■His friends had taken the initiative in gathering support for him. Garner decided to watch the proceedings at the convention to see who was the apparent favorite, and then to release his delegates to this individual, thus breaking the deadlock which he feared. Smith tried to reach Garner in Washington several times so that he could persuade him to hold out until

Roosevelt started to lose his support. Garner refused to talk to Smith, not wishing to get involved in this bitter struggle. Garner analyzed the three ballots and called

Rayburn in Chicago.

Sam, I think it is time to break this thing up, Roosevelt is the choice of the convention. He has had a majority on three ballots. We don’t want to be responsible for wrecking the party's chances. 78 The nomination ought to be made on the next roll call.

76 Burns, p. 137. Basil Rauch, The History of the New Deal, 1933-1938 (New York: Creative" Age Press, Inc. , ISHPT), p. 32. Bascom N. Timmons, Garner of Texas a Personal History (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), p . 153- 77 Farley, Behind the Ballots, p. 131. Parley, Jim Parley’s Story, p . 24. 78 Timmons, pp. 159-166. Rayburn said tie would Investigate the situation and call

back. When tie returned the call, tie reported to Garner that

Smith’s group was standing firm. Roosevelt could not get the

support of additional delegations, and Mississippi and some

other states pledged.to him showed signs of desertion.

Rayburn said further that California would go to Roosevelt if

Garner released the delegates. Texas would not change their pledge unless Garner was made Roosevelt’s running mate. If

Texas and California did not go to Roosevelt in the fourth

ballot, Rayburn thought that the convention was in for a

deadlock and that the Democrats may subsequently lose the

election. Garner did not like the idea of being nominated

for the vice-presidency, but remembered the long ballot fight between A1 Smith and William McAdoo in 1924, which resulted

in a Republican victory, and he also thought of the 1928

Democratic defeat. Consequently, he told Rayburn to go ahead

and release, his delegates and, "...see what you can do.

Hell, I ’ll do anything to see the Democrats win one more 79 national election."

Texas and California voted for Roosevelt, and other

delegates fell into line and voted for the New York governor, 80 making his nomination nearly unanimous. Indiana, Illinois,

79 Ibid.

80” New York Times, July 2, 1932, p. 5. Timmons, pp. 166-167. 29 Missouri, Maryland, and Oklahoma joined Roosevelt, but 190 81 delegates refused to switch.

The result of the fourth ballot gave Roosevelt 9^5 82 votes and the nomination. The delegates felt confident when they left the convention that they had just nominated the next president of the United States. Garner was chosen to be Roosevelt’s running mate, as a reward for his part in breaking the deadlock and because of his popularity in the 83 South and West. His nomination was not really part of the

"deal", since he would be leaving a powerful office for one of relatively little Importance. Farley had repeatedly offered the vice—presidency to the Garner group, but they had never made it part of the bargain. Farley felt the Texan was entitled to the nomination if he wanted it; Roosevelt ap­ proved. Farley organized the Roosevelt forces to select

Garner. He parried those urging other Roosevelt supporters, such as Senators Clarence C. Dill of Washington, Burton K.

Wheeler of Montana, and Governor George H. Bern of Utah.

Farley refused to even call a conference to discuss the vice- presidential choice. The nomination of Garner was unani- 84 . mous. After the vice-presidential nomination had been

81 Arthur F. Mullen, Western Democrat (New York: Wilfred Funk, Inc., 1940), p. 22.9. Timmons, p. 167. 82 . New York Times, July 2, 1932,. p. 1. 83 Farley, Jim Farley1 s Story, p. 25.. 84 . Mullen, p. 276. Farley, Behind the Ballots, p. 153. Timmons, p. 167. 30 made, the convention marked time for several hours awaiting- the arrival of Roosevelt who was flying to the convention.

His flight created two precedents; it marked the first utili­ zation of the airplane in national politics by a candidate, and his acceptance speech was the first ever delivered before a national convention by its nominee. This flight also helped to dispel any belief that the governor was physically 85 weak or that he was not a man of action.

The Democrats’ last item of business before leaving for home was to select a new chairman of the Democratic 86 National Committee. James A. Parley was chosen.

When Farley took over the chairmanship of the Demo­ cratic National Committee there was already a great deal of organization available to undertake the coming task. There was the Roosevelt preconvention network that he himself had largely built up. And, then, there was the Raskob organi- 87 zation in Washington.

Prior to 1928, it was customary for the party which lost the election to disband its national organization and close up shop until the next presidential election. Shortly after the election of 1928, Smith recommended that the Demo­ cratic party develop the educational function of the minority

85 Peel, p. 10 3. 86 Farley, Jim Farley’s Story, p. 27. 87 Peel, p.. Ill 31 party and adopt a constructive program rather, than sit and

adopt a policy of Inaction with the hope of profiting by the

mistakes and failures of the opposition. Several months

later, Raskob, acting on Smith’s suggestion, announced the

creation of a permanent executive committee and the appoint- 88 ment of Jouett Shouse as its chairman. On June 15, 1929,

Charles Michelson, former Washington correspondent of the now

defunct New York World, was appointed as director of pub­

licity for the committee. Roosevelt arranged for Michelson

to be retained in his service even before he obtained the nomination. Michelson spent half of his time at party head­ quarters in Washington and half at the Roosevelt headquarters 89 : in New York.

Michelson proved to be a very good selection. Thus,

for the ^Irst time, the minority party, served as a continuous and effective critic of the majority party in the interim be­ tween presidential elections. The success of this organiza­ tion was, of course, due partly to the vulnerability of

Hoover’ s administration; but credit must also be. given to

Michelson. . No president ever had his every mistake so thoroughly advertised as Hoover. No minority party in Ameri­

can history ever so fully capitalized on the mistakes of the

88 Ibid, p. 112. 8 9 " Michelson, p. l4l. 32 president as did the Democratic party3 thanks, to their pub- 90 . licity bureau.

The central headquarters of the Democratic campaign

organization were located in New York City. The idea of

having branch headquarters was considered but abandoned. As

a results the campaign was directed entirely from New York,

thus eliminating duplication of effort and expense. This *

plan also avoided the possibility of jealousies by not having

to select men to supervise branch headquarters, and it also brought state organizations into closer touch with the 91 national chairman and the candidate. Regional leaders op­ posed the idea. They claimed that Farley, and Howe did not have the national political■experience to justify centrali­

zation of complete control in their hands. The final de- 92 cision on organization was made, by Roosevelt himself.

Roosevelt and Parley tried to make their personal in­

fluence reach down to the precinct-worker level. Parley

collected as complete a list as possible of county and pre­

cinct workers in every state so that he could send them cam­ paign pamphlets and letters signed in his usual way, with

green ink. He felt that much of the printed matter distrib­

uted to regional, state, and the local committees never

90 Peel, p . 112. 91 Ulid. 92 . Ibid, p. 113. 33 reached the workers. So he sent it directly, along with .let­

ters which the workers were thrilled to receive. Altogether,

sixty-eight different dupligraph letters and two hundred and

twenty-three multigraph letters went out. Nearly a total of

one million seven hundred thousand copies were actually sent.

There were also four hundred seventy-five news releases

totaling 300,000 copies, approximately forty-two million 93 pieces of printed matter, and ten million buttons and pins.

Equally effective were the supposedly personal

letters that Howe’s hard-working organization poured into the

mails in answer to the thousands deluging Roosevelt. Most of

these had the. personal touch, utilizing the "mirror” tech­

nique of selecting and repeating various phrases or comments

from the incoming letter. Some of these answering letters

were bold and even blunt, but the majority were very general

and innocuous, so that the opposition could not collect a

number of them and compare them, and charge the Democrats 94 with contradictions.

The incoming letters served as an excellent source of

. intelligence on conditions throughout the country. Skilled

readers condensed all important reports and clippings into : '• ■ 95 daily bulletins for Roosevelt and his campaign staff.

93 Farley, Behind the Ballots, pp. 159-160. 94 Moley, After Seven Years, p. 40. 95 Peel, p. 115. - From the .beginning of the campaign, the problem of money-raising was one of the most: liff icult'. This was es­ pecially true in this depression year of 1932.. Funds poured in compared with the pre-convention period, but the needs were much larger. Altogether, the Democrats, who were still in debt from their 1928 campaign, made reported expenditures of about two and one half million dollars, compared with ap­ proximately two million, nine hundred thousand for the sol­ vent Republicans. Although they sponsored campaign books, medallions, tire covers, and other devices to stimulate small contributions, they had as always, to depend upon a few large 96 donors.

As in 1928, both party organizations made extensive use of the radio. All the addresses of the presidential can­ didates were carried over national networks. The convention programs of the two parties were put on the air free of charge by the radio industry, but thereafter the parties had 97 to pay for their own time. This use of the radio turned - out to be the largest single expenditure of each party. In

1932,. the Republicans bought even more network time than the

Democrats, seventy hours compared with fifty hours. But

96 Louise Overacker, "Campaign Funds in a Depression Year," American Political Science Review, XXVII (October, 1933), 769-783. - 97 Ibid. Peel, p. 116. 35 the Republicans had no one. to put on the air whose radio ap— 98 peal could remotely approach Roosevelt.

There were several campaign committees and:subcom-'

mit.fc.eea. The women’s division was especially large and ef­

fective under, the vigorous leadership of Mary W„ Dews on. For

the first time it was a major campaign unit. Farley realized that a women’s organization could increase the Democratic

vote by ten to twenty per cent, and gave it his enthusiastic backing. In 1928, the Democrats had brought out. the vote of

the urban women from the lower class for the first time; in

1932, Democratic women worked effectively, speaking and dis­

tributing materials. In July, Eleanor Roosevelt planned an

organization with Miss Dewson. They established divisions

for field work, clubs, labor, publicity, speakers, files 99 and mail.

Early in the campaign it was clear to seasoned obser­

vers that Roosevelt was going to win. John H . McCooey, the

boss of Brooklyn, said immediately after the convention that

Roosevelt would be the next President without campaigning.

Popular confidence was with the Democrats for the first time 100 in many years. The Literary Digest, which had an obvious

98 Peel, p. 146. Overacker, American Political Sci- en.ce Review, XXVIII, 771. 99 . Frances Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew (New York: The Viking Press, 1946), pp. 120-121. Farley, Behind the Ballots, p. 160.

100 . Peel, p. 107. bias in favor of Republican candidates,, conducted a poll, and 101 the results, indicated Roosevelt to be the expected winner.

Farley predicted that Roosevelt would carry forty-four

states; he miscalculated by only two states. Hoover carried 102 only Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, and Connecticut.

Roosevelt won fifty-nine per cent of the popular vote, and the Democratic party gained control of both houses of 103 Congress'.

Election night came with a gala atmosphere prevailing in the Democratic headquarters. The first returns showed most Democratic candidates in the lead, a position which they never lost. Upon Hoover’s telegram conceding defeat, the new

President-elect opened his door and received the hundreds of well-wishers waiting to congratulate him. When. Mrs. Farley reached his side, Roosevelt whispered in her ear, "Get ready to move to Washington." She replied that she was not plan­ ning to go to Washington. "Well, get ready anyway," he

laughed, "because Jim is coming down there after the fourth 104 of March."

101 Ibid., pp. 154-155. 102 Farley, Jim Farley’s Story, p.. 32.. 103 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Vote Cast in Preslden- tial and Congressional Elections, 1928-1944 (Washington, D.C., 194b),. pp. 11 and 22.. 104 Farley, Jim Farley’s Story, p. 31V CHAPTER II

"TAKING IT ON THE CHIN”

One of the first tasks of the President-elect was to appoint his Cabinet and fill other important political posi­ tions. Choices were made for a variety of reasons. These selections were based on the prospective appointee’s experi­ ence 5 political alliances and what area of the country he 1 represented. Farley was involved in most political appoint­ ments made during the seven and a half years while he was 2 Postmaster General.

When the new administration came into office, there were approximately 750,000 federal government jobs available.

About 600,000 of these positions were to be filled by the

Civil Service. The Democratic Party had the responsibility and privilege, of appointing the other 150,000. The vastness of such a job made it impossible for the President to super- 3 vise the process personally. Thus, the burden of interview­ ing and elimination of prospective employees was left to

Postmaster General Parley. The final decision on appoint-

1 Farley, Jim Farley’s Story, p. 3%. 2 Ibid., p. 35, • 3 James A. Parley, "Passing Out the Patronage," American Magazine, CXVT (August,. 1933) $ 20.

37 ments was left to the President. Farley.a In turn, had to rely on the advice of the political leaders of the various states, since he could not possibly know all the applicants 4 and their qualifications.

Most of the office seekers who came to Farley direc­ tly, without obtaining the endorsement of their local leaders were turned away, and at the same time those local officials who endorsed incompetent applicants impaired their future in­ fluence. Farley’s task was to investigate and evaluate each office-seeker and then make recommendations to President .5 Roosevelt.

Farley was much criticized for his adherence to the spoils system, but he always maintained that, "It is just as easy to find a good Democrat as a good Republican or vice 6 versa and.that the party in power should reward its own."

In the Mew York Times, the following paragraph was written:

Leaders complain, in confidence, that the dis­ tributing is being done by amateurs, that several de­ partment heads and even Mr. Farley and his aides, do not recognize many times the difference between a Democrat and a Republican. 7

Any Republican already employed had a chance of

4 Ibid., p. 20.

5 Ibid., p. 21. Gosnell, p. 136.r 6 Parley, Jim Farley’s Story, p. 35. 7 Mew York Times, October 8, 19335 p. 1. "The Making of a Politician," American Magazine, CXXVT (December,1938), 34. 39 reappointment3 if he knew more about his job than anyone else. But if there was a Democrat^just as well qualified, that individual would get the job. The F.K.B.C. Democrats, or the "For Roosevelt Before Chicago men," were preferred over other late-comers in the Democrat ranks when it came . 9 to selecting new employees.

This policy of rewarding supporters was not new.

Loyalty to the new administration has always influenced federal patronage. In 1795 George Washington wrote:

I shall not, whilst I have the honor of adminis­ tering the government, bring men into office of con­ sequence knowingly whose political tenets are ad­ verse to the measures the general government is pur­ suing; for this, in my opinion would be sort of political suicide. 10

Abraham Lincoln, when he entered the presidency, made a wider sweep of the federal offices than any president had ever made before. He replaced eighty-nine per cent of the officeholders, thus unifying his factionalized support. 11 Lincoln was a politician as well as a statesman.

There are two kinds of politicians, s M d Farley, near-sighted and far-sighted. The near-sighted ones lavish

8 Farley, American' Magazine, CXVI (August, 1933) 3 20. 9 Ibid. Flyn, p. 137. 10 Farley, American Magazine, CXVI (August, 1933)3 77. 11 Ibid., p. 71. 40. rewards casually and quickly, thinking only of the next elec­ tion. Far-sighted politicians build for the more remote future and realize that every bad appointment is a millstone around the neck of the party as soon as the people realize 12 that an incompetent has been placed in office.

Farley considered politics to be the "mechanism through which the program of a political party is translated 13 into legislation."

Harold Iekes found Farley to be very considerate about patronage matters. "He has never shown any disposition to press for the appointment of anyone not fit," Iekes said.

"He always says that he doesn't want anyone employed who 14 isn't qualified." :

The Postmaster General's job was not an easy one, es­ pecially since the Republicans had been in office for twelve years and had held a firm hold on patronage. The depression made the employment situation even more urgent. Office- seekers haunted Farley's office from the moment that it was opened until it was closed. When the Postmaster General ar­ rived, he would, pass through the crowd saying to one, "I'm working on your case and you'll hear from me," to another,.

12 Ibid., p. 77. : 13 Basil Rauch, Roosevelt: From Munich to Pearl Harbor (New York: Creative Age Press, 1950), p. 19. 14 Harold L. Ickes, The First Thousand Days (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1953)s I, 39. "See. me later," to. others, "I’m. sorry , hut X can’t .do "any- 15 thing for you." Parley rarely seemed Irritated, or pre­ occupied. His bald head shone and his face showed genuine delight as he thfeust: out his big hand and infallibly pro­ duced not just the right name, but the right nick name,

This large man, with his spontaneous affability and his dis­ arming candor, created a majestic impression of calm solici­ tude and good humor. All of these traits were, greatly needed 16 in his work.

Patronage privileges can be both an asset and a lia­ bility to a political party, since nine out of every ten applicants had to be rejected. A million or more discon­ tented individuals within the ranks of a party would be a 17 danger to any organization.

W l M ' e Parley was deeply involved with the patronage problems of the Post Office Department, he had very little to 18 do with the so-called "New Deal". The New Deal was created with Roosevelt’s initiation of a succession of relief and re­ covery measures to pull the United States out of the great

15 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Crisis of the Old Order, 1919-1933 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Comp., 1959), I ,.4.17. 15 Ibid. 17 Parley, American Magazine, CXVI (August, 1933), 22. 18 The "New Deal" was a name coined in Roosevelt’s ad­ ministration to describe his policies in trying to improve the economic and social condition of the United States. 42 depression. About his own role in the New. Deal, Farley said:

I was not in on its formation, although I was ac­ quainted with measures as they developed; and my con­ tribution was largely in helping to guide the program through Congress. 19

Moley remarked that he never meddled in matters re­ lating to political organizations which was Farley's affair.

And Farley never interfered with Moley, in policy matters.

During the early months of the administration, Farley spent most of his time on the road, particularly in the

South, urging repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment. This was 21 to be one of the first steps in the New Deal. Farley had never been in favor of prohibition even though he personally never drank alcoholic beverages. He was thoroughly convinced that prohibition hsid caused a general breakdown in law and order by making it profitable for criminals to produce and 22 supply illegal liquor.

To the dismay of all those involved, especially

Farley, the central figure, a scandal soon arose concerning

Roosevelt's administration. The roots of the trouble began

19 Farley, Jim Farley's Story, p. 38. 20 Moley, After Seven Years, p. 37. Flynn, p. 134. 21 The Beer Act of March 22, .1933 legalized the man-^ ufacture and sale of beer and light wines of an alcoholic content of no more than four per cent by volume. The twenty- first amendment officially abolished prohibition. 22 Farley, Jim Farley's Story, p. 40. 43 prior to. Roosevelt ’ s nomination in 1932 with a new-comer to the Senate during Hoover’s .administration. This individual 23 was Huey P. Long, the political boss of Louisiana.

When Long arrived in Washington to claim his Senate seat in January, 1932, he proclaimed: "We are for Pat

Harrison, Joe Robinson, or John Garner, and, after them, A1

Smith, for the nomination. We are not going to be for

Roosevelt. He ran too poorly with Cox in 1920 and he would 24 be certain to be beat."

Within a few weeks. Long had eliminated Robinson and

Harrison, for they failed to recognize him as the new Demo­ cratic leader in the Senate. The Louisiana Senator began campaigning for Roosevelt. Senator George Norris, of

Nebraska, Long explained, had done much to change his mind.

Norris convinced him that Roosevelt was the "only hope for the country," and so Long took it upon hSmself to make 25 certain that Roosevelt got the nomination.

Long thought that he was the only one who could save the day. In the middle of the first ballot, during the 1932

Democratic convention, he telephoned Roosevelt and. said: "I think you should issue a statement immediately saying you are in favor of a soldiers’ bonus to be paid as soon as you be­ come president." "Well I’m afraid I can’t do it because I’m

23 Farley, Behind the Ballots, p. 238. 24 ™ Stan Opotowsky, The Longs of Louisiana (New York: E.P. Dutton and Comp., Inc., I960), pp~ 76-77. 25 Ibid. <44 not in favor of a soldiers’ bonus/’ replied Roosevelt„ 26. "Well, you’re a gone goose," Long snapped and hung up.

After "gone goose" Roosevelt won the nomination. Long im­ mediately proceeded to plot the campaign. He demanded a special train to tour the forty-eight states in Roosevelt’s behalf. Parley,refused to provide this facility. "I hate to tell you, Jim," Long stormed, "but you’re gonna get licked.

Yessir, you’re gonna get licked. Hoover is going back to the

White House and that's all there is to it. I tried to save you, but if you don’t want to be saved it's all right with 27. m o

Parley decided to let Long campaign where he thought the "Kingfish" would do the most good and the least harm. He was., sent to the Dakotas and Nebraska. The Democratic

National Committee received glowing reports about his effec­ tiveness, and Parley said, "We never underestimated him again." Roosevelt carried these states which had not gone

. 28 Democratic since 1916.

Long tried to swing Roosevelt over to his.policies, but failed, and within a month after the new president’s in­ auguration, Long was as opposed to the New Deal as the most

26 Ibid., p. 78. 27 Ibid., James A. Parley, "Patronage and the New Deal," American Magazine, CXXVT (September, 1938), 62 .. ~ 2 8 " : : “ Ibid. staunch Vermont Republican. There were several reasons for the break. Long said it was because Roosevelt refused to back his Share-the-Wealth Plan. Others said it was a case of general disagreement on how the New Deal plans should be con­ ducted. Still others said the Roosevelt administration de­ liberately cut itself loose from Long because it did not want to be allied with such a demagogue. Finally, Long had grand ambitions of his own. He made no secret of his plan to seek 29 the presidency in 1936, if possible, surely by 1940, Long formally announced the break as being caused by differences 30 on Tarm, banking, and reforestation --policies.

The struggle became both vicious and. bitter... Long, stripped of his patronage by Farley, rose on the floor of the 31 Senate to say, "They can take my patronage and go." Then an Internal Revenue Department investigation of Long’s in­ come tax returns, begun halfheartedly during the Hoover ad­ ministration, was intensified. In late 1933, a number of

Long’s top aides .were indicted for income tax evasion. By

1934 the federal patronage in Louisiana was going pointedly 32 to Long’s political enemies. Harold Ickes put a stop order

29 Allen P. Sindler, Huey Long's Louisiana (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1956), pi 86. Thomas Martin, Dynasty The Longs of Louisiana (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons), p. 134, 30 Opotowsky, pp. 78-79 » 31 Ibid., p. 79, 32 Ibid. Harnett. T. Kane,. Louisiana Hay ride (New York William Morrows and Comp., 1941), p. 101. ‘ • 46 on $10,000,000 in PWA projects in Louisiana, saying, "no pub­ lic works money is going to build up any Share-the-Wealth 33 political machine," Harry Hopkins announced that federal employees would take over state administration of NRA funds in Louisiana, and these federal employees turned out to be

Long's enemies suddenly transplanted to the federal payroll.

Long denounced the "blue buzzard administration," and said, 34 "It's not Roosevelt or ruin - it's Roosevelt's ruin."

Long violated the old precedent that Senate new­ comers should be seen and not heard, by carrying on a series of verbal attacks against the new administration. He left his colleagues aghast and amused, and amazed the American 35 public. . Long ridiculed Roosevelt's Cabinet with newly coined names. Secretary of Agriculture Wallace became "Lord

Corn Wallacethe "Ignoramus of Iowa," Postmaster General

Parley became the "Prime Minister" the "Nabob of New York."

Harold Iekes was called the "Cinch Bug of Chicago." 36 Roosevelt became "Prince Franklin, Knight of the Nourmahal."

33 Opotowsky, p.- 79. Farley, Behind the Ballots, p. 240. PWA stands for Public Works Administration. 34 Farley, Behind the Ballots, p. 240. NRA stands for National Recovery Administration. 35 ' Farley, Behind the Ballots, p. 238. 36 Martin, p. 136. Kane, pp. 101 and 118. 47

Long had little respect for Roosevelt's mentality or his political program. "He ain't smart," he once told

Raymond Moley. The Louisiana Senator did admit, however, 37 that Roosevelt had an effective way of disarming a critic.

Early in the winter of 1935, Long decided it was time to intensify his political assault on the Roosevelt admini­ stration. The President's chief political organizer, Farley, would be the first individual to bear the brunt of the attack. Following the aftermath of Long's charges, Farley was to learn that the Louisiana Senator made the comment,

"0h, Jim was the biggest Rooster in the yard, and I thought 38 that if I could break his legs, the rest would be easy."

Parley was the best prospect for a target because at the time , the press, which was hostile to the administration, had been criticizing him for acting in the dual capacity of Post- .39 master General and Democratic National Chairman. '

Early in January of 1935 , after gathering everything he saw in print on the subject, Long formally presented charges against Parley and demanded an investigation. He said he wanted to "pass these here investigations around” and 40 thought it time Farley had one. The charges were placed

37 Holey,' 27 Masters of Politics, p. 228. 38 ; — — Parley, Behind the Ballots, p. 249. 39 . . Ibid., p. 244 . 40 ' New York Times, February 12, 1935, p. 2. 48 before a preliminary investigation committee of the Senate ■ 41 to determine whether a full investigation was warranted.

Senator Long’s resolution was based upon rumors and allegations from unnamed sources. Farley had been involved, he exclaimed, in selling materials to the government, that specifications had been changed to favor a Farley building firm, that he had used the government printing office for personal purposes, that he had been implicated in a wire ser­ vice, furnishing horse racing information to gambling houses, that he had interfered with a loan to a railroad in West

Virginia in behalf of a candidate for the Senate and that he had been connected generally with misconduct irregularities 42 and dishonesty. He said, "Jim can take, the corns off your 43- feet without removing your shoes, h e ’s that slick.” All during the month of February, Long took the Senate floor threatening to "blow the roof off the Capital” by his expose 44 of the corruptness of the present administration. He read excerpts from newspaper articles and charged that what he read was nothing compared to what he was going to prove when 45 the investigation got under way. Long charged that

41 Farley, Behind the Ballots, p. 244. 42 New York Times, February 12, 1935, p. 2. Opotowsky, p. 79. Martin, p. 137. 43 Kane, p. 118. 44 Farley, Behind the Ballots, p. 244. 45 Ibid., p . 245. Opotowsky, p. 79. Secretary Ickes had instituted an investigation of Farley in connection with alleged building material deals in New York

City, but added that apparently the inquiry had been hushed up and all publicity stopped. He read from a New York news­ paper his "proof" of the charge. Long said it was time that the Senate was investigating someone else besides him. As the Senator talked the people in the galleries burst into laughter, until the presiding officer. Senator Joseph

Robinson, the Democratic leader, protested. Robinson had been listening intently to Long. He said:

I don't know what the Senator is talking about, but he seems to be resentful because some one is making an investigation of him. Whatever that in­ vestigation might be, I am sure.the Senate has no knowledge of it.46

"Oh, I thought the Senator knew all about it," Long retorted. Robinson, ignoring Long, continued:

Now, apparently, in answer to these alleged in­ vestigations of him, the Senator from Louisiana has gathered together rumors he has heard and all the newspaper articles he has read and all the innuendo he is capable of, and has put them in this resolu­ tion. He is in the habit of doing this. I think the Senator should confine his charges to his own infor­ mation. 47

Long interrupted to say, "I never have failed to 48 prove any statement I made on this floor." Robinson went

46 New York Times, February 12, 1935, p. 2. 47 Ibid. 4 8 " Ibid. on to say that he did not object to any investigation that would enable the Senate to more, thoroughly carry out its leg­ islative duties, but when asked by Long if he would vote for this inquiry, Robinson said: "I do not propose to tell the

Senator what I shall or shall not do on this particular reso- 49 lution." Long called on Ickes to send to the Senate any materials gathered by the PWA investigator, Louis Glavis, that were concerned with building contracts affecting the

James Stewart Company and General Builders Supply Company, and especially reports pertaining to ether firms in which 50 Farley was interested.

The Senate accepted Long’s resolution and called on

Ickes.for any information gathered by Glavis. The resolution 51 was passed immediately by an oral vote.

Farley ignored the accusations and went to Florida for a long needed rest. But the charges could not be avoided for long. When asked what he planned to do about these charges, Farley remarked, "I am being whereased in Washington 52 today by Huey Long, but I do not take it seriously."

49 Ibid. 50 Hew York Times, February 15, 1935, p. 2. U.S. Con­ gressional Record, 74th Congress, 1st Sess., 1935, LXXIX, Part 2, 2001. 51 U.S. Congressional Record, 74th Congress, 1st Sess. 1935, LXXIX, Part 2, 2001. New York Times, February 16, 1935 p. 1. U.S. Congressional Re cord, 74 th Congress, 1st Sess., 1935, LXXIX, Part 2, 1929. 52 . New York Times, February 16, 1935, p. 2. Farley, Behind the Ballots, p. 245. " 51 The New York Times reported: ~

The investigation is expected to go beyond the purport of the resolution and give opportunity for some disaffected Senators to vent their disappoint­ ment over patronage matters and the political ac­ tivities of Mr. Parley in the 1934 campaign. Democratic Senators say that Mr, Parley has accumu­ lated a host of enemies not only in his own party tout also among Republiean Senators due to disputes over the distribution of patronage and his aggressive opposition in the last election to some Senators who had been more or less friendly with the administra­ tion, 53

Elliott Thurston of the Washington Post wrote t

Parleyism is raising issue of good faith; party independents grow increasingly uneasy over new deal political methods. 54

Thomas L, Stokes of the Washington Daily News reported:

The feud between Huey Long and Jim Parley has the Capital by the ears, awaiting the next move. It has all sorts of political potentialities» in­ volving even the 1936 Presidential election. Resenting the Louisiana Senator’s vicious attacks on the Postmaster Generals administration leaders have been jockeyed into a delicate position by the King- fish ’s demand for an investigation of Parley activi­ ties 9 including the letting of contracts for the New York City post office annex. They are fully aware of the Senator’s intention to carry on his war against the administration by striking at its chief politician, and thus to pro­ mote Long1s own campaign for the Presidency. 55

Senators became incensed over Long* s tirades,

■ 53 New York Times, February 17s 1935, P » 19. 54 Washington Post as quoted in the U.S. Congressional Record, 74th Congress, 1st Sess., 1935, LXXIX, Part 2, 20.01. • • 55 ' Washington Daily News as quoted in the U.S. Con­ gressional Record, 74th Congress, 1st Sess., 1935, LXXIX, Part 2, 2001. 52

Senator Glass remarked that "If he [Long] were a member of 56 the press he would be discharged immediately." "There is

nothing the Senate can do to show its displeasure in the way

of disciplining the fighting member 3" another Senator said.

"It is too bad that he cannot be reached by Senate rules.

The Senators can only treat such a member as he would be 57 treated in a club when he hits below the belt."

Roosevelt realized that Long was attempting to smear

the administration3 so he suggested that Farley voluntarily

request an investigation and appear personally to refute the

charges. Parley disagreed, saying he had done nothing wrong

and refused to be a scapegoat. He proposed doing absolutely

nothing, because it was his opinion that if a man appears be­

fore a committee to answer charges and submits himself to

cross-examination regardless of his innocence, his character 58 will always be suspect in the public mind. The President pointed out that the public may interpret silence as an ad­

mission of guilt, Roosevelt and Parley finally decided that

there should be no public statement, but that the Postmaster

General should send the Senate Committee a detailed and

specific answer to every charge made by Long. Denying all

charges, Parley sent a lengthy letter to Senator Kenneth

56 New York Times, February 22, 1935> p . 1. 57 Ibid. 58 Parley, Behind the Ballots, p. 246. ■ ’ ' . • ■ 53 MeKeliar. One section of which said:

Let me repeat that in the most complete and ex­ plicit manner3 I deny the base insinuation of the Senator from Louisiana that I have at any time used the power and prestige of my office for personal fi­ nancial gain or private interest. 59

Farley also submitted copies of his income tax re­ turns to several Senators who were his personal friends. He showed them his checkbook and all papers pertaining to his personal financial situation, With this data these Senators 60 could now effectively discredit Long’s accusations.

Ickes supported Farley s saying neither the Postmaster

General nor any of his associates had sought to influence the award of public works allotments. ”There has never been a single instancej,! Ickes said, "when Mr. Farley asked for con­ sideration or has shown any interest in any project. He has 61 leaned backward in this respect.”

Long’s demand for an investigation of Farley was re­ jected by the Senate Postoffices and Post Roads Committee with the unanimous conclusion of the membership that he had 62 not produced facts or evidence to substantiate his charges.

They resolved that:

It is the sense of the committee that the senior

Opotowsky3 p. 80. New York Times, March 83 1935, p. 17. 60 Farley, Behind the Ballots, p. 246. 61 Kane, p. 118. Ickes, pp. 299-300. 62 Opotowsky, p. 80. Martin, p. 137- • 54

Senator from Louisiana has not produced facts or evi­ dence constituting a proper case for investigation by the Senate under his resolution number 74.. ... The Senate had before it the official findings of a regular standing committee to the effect that Sena­ tor Long's accusations against Mr. Farley were with­ out foundation. ... From the record, presented by Mr. Ickes, it is ap­ parent that Mr. Farley has been guilty of no improper conduct of any.kind in connection with the contract awarded by the. Treasury Department to James A. Stewart and Company with respect to any contract. 63

Farley was well, defended in the Senate; however, he felt that Roosevelt’s silence on the whole matter was unfor- giveable. Mrs. Farley considered this episode a test of the

President's character and never liked him or his family after his failure to stand by her husband when he needed help. Her outspoken comments on this matter and her apparent dislike of the first family were reported back to the White House and brought a great deal of subtle criticism and pressure upon . 64 Farley.

During this period in 1934 and 1935, when Senator

Long was waging his private war on the Roosevelt administra­ tion, the President's men never had any illusion as to the real purpose of his actions, and they rarely underestimated

Long's ability to damage them politically. The Louisiana

Senator's untimely death put an end to any threat from a third party in the 1936 election, but the Democratic National

Committee's statistician, Emil Hurja, conducted a secret poll

63 New York Times, March 9, 1935, p. 1. 64 : Moley, 27 Masters, p. 112. 55 prior to Long’s, death which disclosed that Long’s "Share the

Wealth" program would have given him between 3900,0,000 to 65 4,000,00.0 votes for the presidency.

At the same time that Parley was being attacked by

Long in the Senate 5. he also faced another dilemma which was

concerned with the Postpffiee Department. The problem arose upon the issuance of several special stamp series by the

Postoffice Department to commemorate noteworthy occasions.

Other administrations had made this practice a precedent3 yet no previous Postmaster General had issued as many sets of 66 stamps as Parley.

There were a number of high ranking Democrats inter­ ested in stamp collecting at this time, including Roosevelt,

Louis Howe and Harold Ickes. Noticing an increasing public interest toward stamp collecting, the administration extended the facilities of the philatelic sales agency. This encour­ agement of stamp collecting proved to be a boon to government 67 finances. Most of the income from the sales of stamps was profit for the government because the philatelic agency was operated at a low cost, and the expense of producing the stamps was negligible in comparison to the revenue received.

Before special issues were first put on sale for the public.

65 Burns, p. 213. Kane, p. 126. 66 Parley, Behind the Ballots, p. 257. 67 Ibid., p. 258. 56 Parley was Informed that it was the custom of the Postmaster

General to present proof sheets and specimens of postage

stamps for souvenir purposes to highranking officials of the

\ . 68 ' government and to other persons. Parley purchased a number

of these specimen sheets for this purpose„ One sheet of

Mother’s Day stamps was presented to a personal friend who had been a .collector for many years. This friend asked

Parley if he could get another sheet for an acquaintance of his who was interested in these stamps as well. Upon the re­ ceipt of six dollars. Parley sent this individual a sheet. A

short time later, the recipient of the stamps went to a bank

and tried to negotiate a loan, offering the sheet of stamps as security upon the assumption that it was worth several thousand dollars. The loan was refused, but news of the in­ cident reached the papers giving the impression that the

Postoffice Department had been giving away stamps■of unusual 69 value.

Representative Charles Millard of New York called the

attention of the House to newspaper reports that stamps worth

"half a million dollars" or more to collectors had been dis­

tributed. He sought to have the House approve a resolution which, in effect, would summon Parley before the House Post-

68 Ibid. 69 Ibid., p. 259- 70 office Committee to explain. Millard asserted that for months stamp collectors had envied Farley’s friends. He charged that when a new stamp issue was produced the Post­ master General would get a full sheet before it had been per­ forated for tearing, pay the face, falue, autograph it, and give it to somebody like the President. Millard claimed that as he understood it. Parley had intended these stamps to be gifts and not to be put on the public market, and nobody was 71 to make any money out of it. Twenty-seven philatelists societies, Mr. Millard said, had protested the Postmaster

General's action. To show the result of being a "friend" of

Parley, the Representative went on, a full set of a series of ten special National Park stamps, not perforated, were given to Ickes. These, Millard said he was informed, had a poten- 72 tial value of at least $60,000 to $100,000.

Ickes conceded at a press conference that he had some of the stamps. When Parley was asked about this, he replied: 73 "If Ickes says he's got'em, he has." Millard asserted that

Roosevelt had a full collection of seventeen new stamp's issued since he had taken office on March 4, 1933• Apparen­ tly, the Postmaster General just unwittingly made a mistake,

Millard said. "The thing furthest from my mind is to accuse

70 ' Dan Porrest Taylor, "Mr. Parley’s Stamp Act," New Republic, February 20, 19353 p. 39» 71 New York Times, January 26, 1935, p . 19. 72 Ibid. - 73 Ibid. 58 him of. deliberate grafting. But if he did make a mistake we 74 ought to know now, as well as how big a mistake it was."

The general congressional reaction, and the Democrats had unquestioned control of the house, was "What of it?"

Chairman James M. Mead, of the House Postoffice Committee, said he had searched the statute books without finding any­ thing that made Farley's actions unlawful in view of the fact that the Postmaster General paid for the stamps. House Demo­ cratic leaders were inclined to find no particular fault with the stamp situation, so the resolution for investigation was 75 pigeon-holed.

An announcement from the Postoffice Department, which followed the House action, stated that orders had been issued that "hereafter no sheets of any stamp will be allowed out­ side the Bureau of Engraving and Printing except in the form in which the stamp is available to the public over the 76 ■ counter." Farley had acted quickly to rectify his mistake.

The Department was directed to run off a supply of Mother's

Day specimen sheets, similar.to the one which was in ques­ tion. At the same time samples of nineteen other special issues, including the National Parks Series., were produced and made available to any collector who wanted one. The

74 Ibid. 75 New York Times, January 29., 1935 s p- 19. 76 Taylor, New Republic, February 20, 1935, 39. 59 wide-spread publicity given to Farley’s error resulted in a net profit of $1,400,000 to the United States Treasury due to 77 the increased-interest in the special issues.

To add to the problems of the new Postmaster General, the revenues of the Postoffiee Department had been showing a decline for the third successive year, beginning in 1930 when the depression began to show its effects on the whole United

States economy. In order to alleviate this deficit, Farley made sharp reductions in Postoffiee expenditures and in- . 78 creased certain postal rates. After careful study, Farley reported that his department had 15,000 unneeded employees.

He had a choice of two courses of action to take; he could either, dismiss some employees or spread employment through means of payless furlough days. These payless days would be discontinued when there was an upward trend in mail volume and when excess personnel had been largely reduced through deaths, resignations and retirements. He chose the latter of the two choices. There were screams of protest, but his actions seemed to help. In 1935 and 1936, there were in­ creases in postal revenues over the 1934 low of a little over twelve million dollars. In 1937, reflecting the upward trend

— ~ New York Times, February 6, 1935, p. 21. Ibid., March 16, 1935, p . 1. Farley, Behind the Ballots, pp. 258-59. 78 Annual Report of the Postmaster-General, 1933, p. vii. - 60 in the nation's economy, postal revenues exceeded the 1930 total, and by 1940 the Postoffice, showed an all-time high of 79 well over eight billion dollars in revenue.

Another problem plagued Parley. Through the years.

Congress had given the Postoffice Department the responsibil­ ity of distributing subsidies to certain necessary private concerns, thus enabling them to stay in business. Such pay­ ments were distributed to steamship and air passenger lines for carrying the mail. As usual, when large sums of money are available in the form of government grants, fierce com­ petition arose between rival organizations attempting to get a share of the available funds. .Often it is very difficult to draw a line between the unscrupulous interests and those 80 . who have legitimate motives. Such a problem arose over the air-mail contracts.

The mail was first flown in May, 1918, by the War De­ partment in cooperation with the Postoffice Department. By

July of 1924, regular transcontinental air-mail routes had 81 been established and were in operation.

79 Annual Report of the Postmaster-General, 1932, p. vii. 1933, p. vii. 1934, p. ix. 1935, p . xi. 1936, p. xi. 1937, p. xi. 1940, p.. xi. New York Times, June 19, 1933, p .L Ibid., September 29, 1933, p . 7. Ibid. , September 30,. 1933, p. 14. Ibid., March 8, 1934, p. 11. Ibid., March 11, 1934,

Parley, Behind the Ballots, p. 26.4. 81 ■ “ : " Henry Ladd Smith, The History of Commercial Aviation in the United States (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1942), pp . 1-180., " • 61 It had long been the policy of the Postal .Service to

let private carriers transport the mails. Thus in 1925 it was decided that the air-mail service should be delegated to 82 . the commercial airlines.

In a 1925' Act of Congress, the government awarded its

first air-mail. contracts to commercial companies. Three amendments followed in the next five years. The last and most controversial one passed by Congress in 1930 was called 83 the McNary-Watres Amendment. Differences in interpretation of this last provision arose and were the basis for the air­ mail controversy in 1934.

When the Democrats came to power, they were ready to give their approval to any investigation that might both pro­ mote public interest and embarrass the Republican administra­ tion. There had been an investigation of the air-mail contract awards in the Hoover administration. Irregularities in the subsidy system were discovered, but the Republican

82 Ibid. 83 It provided for changing subsidy compensation from poundage rates to fixed rates per mile,for weight spaces. One cubic foot of space was considered the equivalent of nine pounds of air-mail. The Postmaster-General could now extend or consolidate existing routes, whenever he thought it neces­ sary or beneficial. U.S. Statutes At Large, 71st Congress, 2nd Sess., 1930, IVL, Part 2, 259« 64 Charlotte Williams , Hugo L . Black : A Study in the Judicial Process (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press’^ 1950), p. 52... 62 dominated legislators refused to act, since Postmaster Gener­ al Walter Brown was a very Important man and exposure would have harmed the Republican reputation. The "New Dealers", prodded by the Independent air transport operators, lost no 85 time in reviving inquiries into this subject.

A Senate Investigating Committee was organized by a 86 special resolution introduced by Senator Hugo Black.

Black, chairman of the committee, set out to investigate the

Merchant Marine mail subsidies. Senator William King, Demo­ crat of Utah, had learned of air-mail subsidy inequalities from a personal friend, who was an air line operator. King, shocked by this report, suggested that air-mail subsidies also be included in the inquiry. Preliminary investigation 87 soon convinepd Black that this was by far the richer field.

85 Smith, p. 214. Walter Brown was Chairman of a Con­ gressional Joint Committee on Reorganization of the Executive Department from 1921-1924, Assistant U.S. Secretary of Com­ merce from 1927-I929, and U.S. Postmaster-General from 1929- 1932. 86 Senate Resolution 349, introduced during the 72nd Congress,, which met from December 5, 1932 to March 4, 1933. Hugo Black, U.S. Senator, Democrat of Alabama from 1927-37. In 1937 he resigned to become an Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. The Committee was called The Special Committee, on Investigation of Air-Mail and Oeean-Mail Con­ tracts. It was composed of three Democrats: Senator Black, Senator William King of Utah, and Senator Patrick McCarran of Nevada, and two Republicans: Senator Wallace White of Maine and Senator Warren Austin of Vermont. 87 Smith, p. 22.6. 63 Black received much data on the misuse of the air­ mail contracts through an individual named Fulton Lewis, Jr., who was at that time assistant bureau manager of Hearsfs Uni­ versal Mews Service in Washington, B.C., and also wrote a 88 column called "The Washington Sideshows". Lewis had gathered some very revealing material on the air-mail con­ tracts, but his newspaper was withholding it from publication, perhaps because the editor of the paper, Arthur Brisbane, was a friend of Brown’s. In 1930, during Hoover’s administra­ tion, Lewis, had learned that Brown had awarded a contract to a large air line. Eastern Air Transport, for the transporta- ‘ . 89 tion of air-mail between Mew York and Washington. This accepted bid was three times as high as the rejected bid pro­ posed by a much smaller, company. The Ludington Lines. After months of investigation, Lewis concluded that Brown was methodically using government subsidies as a means of favor­ ing the big companies and freezing out the smaller indepen- 90 dent operators in the air transport business.

Well stocked with information from Lewis, from the small independent companies, and from data seized from the larger companies’ files. Black began to summon airline ex­ ecutives to the stand to testify about their business

88 Current Biography. (Mew York; H.W. Wilson Comp., November, 1942).. ' 89 Smith, p .215 90 Ibid. 91 activities. As the Senator probed and reconstructed their

testimony a grim picture emerged. Black presented this prob­

lem to Congress as the age-old story of private enterprise 92 using the government to exploit the public. Walter F.

Brown appeared to be the primary villain.

In January, 1934, a former Postoffice Department sten­

ographer, James Maher, testified that he had, under orders

from Brown, destroyed official correspondence concerning the

air-mail contracts just before the end of Brown's term of

office. . Brown denied that anything official had been de­

stroyed and declared that all of the Postoffice Department's papers were in order. A few days later he rushed to Washing­ ton with a packet of papers which were pertinent to the air­ mail contracts. He claimed to have discovered them unexpec­ tedly among his personal belongings. He gave these documents ted correspondence to Farley, who in turn gave them to the 93 Senate Investigating Committee.

91 Raymond Clapper, "Hugo Black: Nemesis of Subsidy Spoilsmen,” Review of ReMews, LXXXIX (April, 1934), 18-20. 92 U.S. Congressional Record, 73rd Congress, 2nd Sess., 1934, LXXX, Part 3, 2716. 93 Brown insisted that he had strong evidence which indicated that someone had placed these papers there to in­ criminate him. He said that he thought the whole investi­ gation was a "conspiracy of character assassination.” Williams, p. 53. ' 65 It was soon discovered that two air line officials had arranged to have data relating to the air-mail contracts 9H . removed from their attorney’s files. These men were

Colonel L. H. Britten,, vice-president of North Western Air-' ways, S M Harris Hanshue, president of Western Air Express.

Their attorney, William P. McCracken, was summoned by the

Senate Committee to appear with all of his official records which dealt with the air-mail contracts. He refused to sub­ mit this data because of the confidential relationship be­ tween attorney and client„ Senator Black suggested that

McCracken wire his clients for permission to open his files, and this he agreed to do. While the Committee waited for him to report on the reply of his clients, he allowed Britten and

Gilbert Givvens, assistant to Hanshue to go through his files and remove any correspondence that they did not want the Committee to have. Soon McCracken was again summoned by the Committee; he refused to appear this time and denied the

Committee's right, to compel him to present himself.

McCracken, Hanshue, Britten and Givvens were cited with con­ tempt of the Senate and tried soon after. The papers that were removed were personal, they claimed, and had nothing to do with the air-mail contracts. Givvens and Hanshue were found not guilty, because they stated that they were not aware that

94 William P. McCracken, attorney for Northwestern Airways and Western Air Express, was formerly Assistant Sec­ retary of Commerce in charge of Aeronautics. 66 the Senate had the papers in question under subpoena.

Britten and McCracken were found guilty of contempt of the

Senate and sentenced to ten days in the District of Columbia . 95 Jail.

In his address to the Senate on February 19, 193%,

Senator Black said that Congress had passed several laws in recent years authorizing the Postoffice Department to pay air transport companies for carrying the mails, based upon the theory that the progress of aviation would be accelerated.

The tragic part of this practice, he stated, was that inves­ tigations had revealed that these huge governmental expen­ ditures had, in great part found their way into the pockets of profiteers, stock manipulators, and powerful, political 96 and financial groups.. . Black also maintained that financial and political groups controlled aviation through directorates and holding companies whose main interest had been to make unfair profits. He charged huge trusts and combines, com­ posed of transport, engine-building, airplane, and supply companies, with fixing exhorbitant prices on engines, air- • 97 planes, and supplies. Black revealed that in the spring of 1930, Brown called together representatives of twenty-six

' 95 New York Times, February 10, 1934, p • 1. Williams p. 74.. U.S. Senate Documents, 73rd Congress, 2nd Sess., 1934, Document CXXXI, V.I. 96 U.S. Congressional Record, 73rd Congress, 2nd. Sess. , 1934, LXXX, Part 3, 2716. 97 Ibid. selected companies, to allocate, alr-mail. contracts. Exten­

sions to existing contracts were given',- new contracts were

made, and new certificates were awarded to those companies

participating in the meetings, all of which were transacted without competitive bidding. Black produced photostatic

copies of the minutes, of these conferences, which revealed

the objectives, purposes and agreements arrived at by the participants. He also had the sworn testimony of officers who were present at these meetings to substantiate his 98 accusations.

Such charges called for an immediate reply. On Feb­ ruary 19a 1934, in his statement to the Senate Committee,

Brown declared that the purpose of the May 19 and June 4 meetings was entirely "legal and proper." These conferences were held to aid, under the provisions of the Watres Amend­ ment, those transport companies which carried passengers and who had either little or no mail business. Many of them showed losses which would necessitate the abandonment of 99 their operations with passengers. There was nothing

"clandestine or secret" about them he asserted, and that

98 Ibid. 99 U.S. Congressional Record, 73rd Congress, 2nd. Sess., 1934, LXXX, Part 3, 271EI 68 every requirement of the law was observed in the granting of

100 . contracts. In addition. Brown said that the major purpose of the legislation which authorized the award of mail con­ tracts was not to transport the mails at the lowest possible cost to the government, but to foster the maritime and aero- 101 nautical industries. Brown also claimed that since the

MeNary-Watres Act was passed, senators and representatives had often demanded the extension of existing routes under the 102 / provisions of section six of this act. He sought to bring order and stability to this disorganized industry. Brown claimed that he naturally felt the larger companies to be more stable and capable than small air pioneers. The inde­ pendent operator was colorful, but not likely to be a good businessman or have enough capital to finance the air system

100 Ibid. 101 Ibid., p. 27.17 • He used the Jones-White Merchant Marine Act of May 22, 1928, and the MeNary-Watres Amendment as the basis for his argument. Both acts were primarily con­ cerned with development and promotion within their respective areas. Brown claimed that the ultimate goal of the commer­ cial aviation policy was to create as economically indepen­ dent aeronautical industry by enabling transport companies to regain their losses incurred from carrying passengers, in the form of mail pay. 102 "The Postmaster-General in establishing air-mail routes under this act may, when in his judgment the public interest will be promoted thereby, make any extensions or consolidations of routes which are now or may thereafter be established." U.S. Congressional Record, 73rd Congress, 2nd Sess., 1934, LXXX, Part 3, 2717. which the United States needed. Thus this responsibility fell to the Wall Street financiers. Brown was a very able man and believed it to be his duty as Postmaster General to coordinate and consolidate American air lines as a means of 103 establishing a national air transport system.

Senator Black refuted Brown's explanations in his address to Congress on April §6., 1934. He said that the aviation monopoly with its railroad and bank connections did 104 not provide for healtby expansion of the industry .

After investigation of the air-mail problem it was clear to the Senate Committee that something must be done and that one of three general courses could be followed. First, the subsidy system could be partially dropped and the govern­ ment could operate those lines for which no satisfaetdry ar­ rangement could be made through the subsidy system. James M.

Mead suggested the elimination of the old system of space- mileage entirely and put all air-mail on a mileage-pound 105. basis. Third, was a proposal to retain the subsidy policy, but to rewrite the laws granting subsidies. The features which had been found to facilitate the making of huge profits

' 103 Williams, p. 54. Smith, p. 94. 104 U.S. Congressional Record, 73rd Congress, 2nd. Sess., 1934, LXXXIV, Part 7, 7441. 105 James Mead was House Post Office Commitee Chair­ man. A Democratic [Representative from New York from 1919-38. In 1938 he became a U.S. Senator and served until 1946.. 70 and unfair competition in contracts bidding would be elimi-

106. nated.

Senator Black was in favor of subsidizing the air system which he felt was necessary to the nation, but he also felt that subsidies required the cheek of competitive jgidding.

Late in January of 193^9 Black, who was lunching with the

President, pointed out that the Postmaster-General had the power to cancel any air-mail contracts which had been obtained by fraud or conspiracy, and suggested that the President look into the matter. On February 8, Roosevelt asked Attorney-

General Homer S. Cummings to review the accumulated evidence concerning the contracts. The next day Cummings reported that 107 this evidence showed sufficient justification for cancellation.

The next problem was, when should these questionable contracts be terminated? There were differing opinions on this point. Some members of the Postoffice Department wanted to postpone cancellation until June 1st so that there would be no interruption in air-mail service. They could then use the intervening time to advertise for new bids. James Parley asserted that he was not in favor of immediate cancellation.

"In considering cancellation I wanted to allow the domestic lines to continue to carry mail until new contracts could be

106 The New York Times, February 12, 193^s p. 3. 107 Rosenman, Working With Roosevelt, p . l4l. 108. negotiated.. Cummings was behind me In this." The Presi­ dent decided3 however, that if the contracts were dishonest they must be cancelled immediatelys and that the Army should carry the mail until new legislation could be arranged.

General Benjamin D . Foulois3 Chief of the Army Air Corps, and eager to show off the Corps, assured the President that the 109 Army was capable of such a service, Harold lekes said in his diary that he had advised the President that it would be

"sound public policy for the Post Office to build its own 110 airplanes and carry its own mail." Roosevelt was inclined to agree and "favored giving the service an opportunity to 111 distinguish itself."

Two hours after his conference with Foulois, on Feb­ ruary 9, 193*1 s the President issued an order which annulled the air-mail contracts and directed the Army Air Corps to assume the responsibility of this service until new legis­ lation could be passed. The annullment was made effective at midnight, on February 19, 193*1, Since the Army Air Corps had carried the air-mail up to 1925, it seemed to be Mae' most

108 Farley, Jim Farley's Story, p. 46. 109 Samuel I. Rosenman, The Public Papers and Addres- ses of Franklin D . Roosevelt (New York: Random House, 1938), H I , p. 141. ~ ~ — — 110 Ickes, I, 147. Ill Farley, Jim Farley's Story, p. 46. ' - 112 . likely prospect for this emergency„

Roosevelt ordered that certain Army equipment and personnel be placed at the disposal of the Postmaster Gener­ al . Immediately after the cancellation order, the Army offered to hire the experienced commercial crews, but as Army pay was only about half that paid by the air lines, few of 113 the old mail pilots accepted the offer.

Fourteen of the old mail routes were to be continued.

These were the most important of the twenty-six routes that 114 had been flown by commercial transport companies. Passen­ ger and express business was to be carried on by the civilian 115 companies.

Many Republican newspapers such as the New York

Idrald Tribune, The Philadelphia Inquirer and The Chicago

Tribune criticized the democratic administration and especial­ ly James. Farley, for the cancellation, Later they had even more reason for condemnation when several army pilots were 116 killed in the process of carrying the mail. During the same week that the Army Air Corps assumed the air-mail re-

112 Ibid. 113 Smith, p. 253. 114 ■ The New York Times, February 13, 1934, p. 1.

115 . . Ibid., February 10, 1934, p . 2. 116 "The Air-Mail in Politics,n Literary Digest, March 10, 1934, p. ?. 73 sponsibility3 the country was faced with some of the worst weather in years. The West was plagued by blizzards, and the

Mid-West and.the East suffered from sleet, gales, fog, and intense cold. The Army pilots were not adequately trained for flying in bad weather, and many lacked the experience to even fly at night. Few knew the transcontinental routes that 117 they were now ordered to fly. They were supposed to use the interim week between the date of cancellation and the day that they were to assume the air-mail responsibility to learn and practice-fly these routes. Bad weather and the inex­ perience of the pilots brought disaster after disaster. By the end of the first week of Army transport, five pilots were dead, three of whom were killed in test flights before the

Army had really officially taken over. Six pilots were seri- 118 ously injured, and eight planes were wrecked. Many news­ paper and magazines violently attacked the administration, and it appeared that those people who were dissatisfied with the New Deal policies were going to make their opinions heard by using this administrative act as their target . The aviac­ tion industry was anxious to retaliate against the high- handedness of the administration, and Charles A. Lindbergh

117 "Army Takes Over," Time, February 26., 193^, p . 26 . 118 Ibid. was their spokesman,

Lindbergh was still a young man of thirty-two and

tremendously popular due to Mis daring sol© flight across the

Atlantic Oeean a few years' before. Also the tragi© loss of his infant son bo kidnappers in 1932 endeared him to the hearts of sympathetic AmericansSince his famous flight,

Lindbergh had become closely associated with the aviation in­

dustry, and in 1929 he became a technical advisor for Trans­

continental Air Transport. For this service he received a

gift of 20,00.0. shares of Transcontinental Air Transport

stock, ifehen valued at $250,000. He also received an annual 120 salary of $10,000 for associating himself with that company.

In 1933s as technical consultant for Pan-American, he

accepted stock warrants which were worth $150,000 all of

121, which he re-invested in the company. . Lindbergh seemed to

be the logical man to represent the aviation companies.

Transcontinental and Western Air Transport, airways with

which Lindbergh was connected, attempted to obtain a tempor­

ary injunction to stop the government from cancelling their

contracts. This attempt at legal restraint was denied

119 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. The Coming of the Mew Deal (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Comp., 1959) > II, #52.. 120 The New York Times, January 11, 1934s p. 1. 121 Schlesinger, II, 452« 75 in the United States District Court by Judge John C. Knox for 122 lack of jurisdiction. Lindbergh sentaa message to Presi­ dent Roosevelt which attacked the cancellation of the con­ tracts. He claimed that Roosevelt’s order of cancellation of all air-mail contracts condemned the largest portion of the commercial aviation without just trial and did not dis- 123 criminate between innocence and guilt. . Roosevelt sent this communication to James Parley3 and requested that he send a reply to Lindbergh. Parley responded to Lindbergh’s message with a telegram saying, ’’Your wire of February 11, addressed to the President has been referred to me for reply.

I am certain that if you were in possession of all the facts you would not feel that any injustice had been done or will 124 be done.”

It was on James Parley, the man who had technically cancelled the contracts, that the major criticism fell.

Farley actually had little to do with the final cancellation decision. He bitterly discussed his meager role in the air­ mail controversy in his book, Jim Parley *s Story :

Although the order was mine, the decision was ap­ proved by Attorney-General Cummings and by President Roosevelt. The unhappy series of accidents took all

122. ’’Air-Mall Graft, ” Nation, February 28, 1934 3p.2 35 .. 12 3 U.S. Congressional Record, 73rd Congress, 2nd Sess., 1934, LXXX, Part 3, 2391. 124 The New York Times , February 15, 1934, p. 1.. 76 minds off any consideration of the ethics surround­ ing the negotiation of the private contracts. The wrath of an aroused public descended on my head as the author of the order canceling the contracts. I had learned in the past to take abuse and criticism, but when I was called a murderer, I began to look around frantically for help. I looked to the White House. No help came. I was hurt that the President had not seen fit to divert the wrath. Later I rea­ lized it was part of my Job to take as many blows for him as I could. Nonetheless, a kind word would have been a great help when the lashes were falling. 125

Farley was severely criticized from all sides. Senator

Simeon Fess, Republican from Ohio, said "Mr. Farley’s can­ cellation of the air-mail contracts on the charge of fraud was made with the desire to reward faithful democrats and 126 incidentally smear a former administration."

Farley wrote a letter addressed to Hugo Black on Feb­ ruary 14, 193^3 which was to be read before the Senate. In view of the gathered evidence, he said that he was convinced that before any of the air-mail contracts were awarded during

Brown’s tenure of office, those interested held meetings for the purpose of dividing territory and contracts among them­ selves. He said that certain air transport representatives who had not been invited to attend were refused admission when they attempted to gain entrance. These meetings, he continued, were held during May and June of 1930, and some were actually held in the Postoffice Department. These

125. Farley, pp. 46-47. 126 The New York Times, October 16, 1934, p. 27. 77

meetings were attended by Brown and Second Assistant Post­

master General W. Irving Glover and for all practical pur­ poses competitive bidding was eliminated. Remarking further, he said that certain papers known to exist could not be found in the Post Office files where they should have been. Inves­ tigation based on the records, books, papers, contracts, and documents in the Post Office Department, or evidence intro­ duced before the Senate Committee, or taken from the files of

Mr. McCracken, he stated, '’'-revealed that all of the contracts which had been canceled were obtained in the elosed-door con­ ferences of 1930. Farley considered these meetings "to be 127 contrary to law." He therefore concluded that these con­ tracts were secured by conspiracy and collusion, and that it was his official duty to annul them. He based his authority to cancel contracts on the Mail Act of June 8, 1872, which was passed to revise, consolidate, and amend the statutes re-

128 ■ lating to the Post Office Department.

127 U.S. Congressional Record, 73rd Congress, 2nd Sess., 1934, LXXX, Part 3, 2471. 128 "No contract for carrying the mail shall be made with any person who has entered, or proposed to enter, into any combination to prevent the making of any bid for carry­ ing the mail, or has made any agreement or given or performed, or promised to give or perform, any consideration whatever to induce any other person not to bid for any such contract; and if any person so offending is a contractor for carrying the mail, his contract may be annulled; and for the first offense the person so offending shall be disqualified to contract for carrying the mail for five years, and for the second offense shall be forever disqualified." U.S. Congressional Record, 73rd Congress, 2nd Sess., 1934, LXXX, Part 3, 2471. — 78 Brown$ he said,, had arbitrarily, extended contracts for a period of ten years, under the ."so-called certificate” method which was inaugurated in the Watres Amendment. This meant then, that if one of these companies, had a contract for part of a through route, a transcontinental system could be 129. . built on that line.

Testimony on the "Spoils Conference” was damaging to the major air lines, but almost as harmful was the evidence produced by the Black Committee to show that Postmaster Gen­ eral Brown had acted illegally in extending the original mail contracts. The first five air-mail contracts had been gran­ ted for a period of four years, when the private operators took over the airlines in 1925. These five routes should have been put up for rebidding after November 7, 1929, but as the deadline approached. Brown ordered Glover to extend the contracts for six months. Parley testified that there was no 130 attempt whatever to readvertise the routes or reaward them.

Undoubtedly Brown favored the large companies by granting the contract extensions, but whether this action was illegal, is another matter. Solicitor Crowley, Parley's counsel, maintained that Brown’s action was illegal; however, the Postal Laws and Regulations state that, "In all cases of regular contracts, the contract may, in the discretion of the

129 Ibid. 130 Smith, p. 246. 79 Postmaster General, be continued In force beyond its express terms for a period not exceeding six months, until a new con­ tract with the same, or other contractor shall be made by the 131 Postmaster-General.,T Farley apparently was unaware of any such law, or at least it appeared so from the following:

Senator Warren Austin: Now, Mr. Farley, did your counsel [Crowley] call your attention to this author- ity and tell you that a Postmaster-General had this authority, which I am about to read; namely. Para­ graph 2, Section 1808, of the Postal Laws and Regu­ lations . ..? Farley : Nothing specific of that nature was called to my attention, but I repeat, this letter [enumerating the charges against Brown] was prepared with all the facts... and I was thoroughly advised as to its legality. Austin: Were you advised in connection with the judgment you were about to sign, and did sign, say­ ing these extensions for six months were illegal; that there was a basic law that gave expressly the discretion to do that very thing? Farley : I am not familiar with that section of the law referred to. Senator. , Austin: That is plain enough for any layman to understand, is it not? Farley: Sure it is; but I repeat, every move that I made was made upon advice of Mr. Crowley and the Attorney General. 132

Senator Austin of Vermont was determined to find out if the

Committee was aware of all the facts that led to the cancel­ lation. He insisted on knowing on what basis Farley had acted.

Farley probably reached this decision solely upon

131 Ibid., p. 24.7. 132 U.S. Congress, Hearings', Special Committee to In­ vestigate Air Mail and Ocean Mail Contracts. 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1934, p. 2705. 80 the advice o f his counselors. They perhaps saw the act of cancellation as an opportunity to administer a coup de grace to the beaten Republicans. Farley himself appeared to be confused about the whole situation. Again and again on the witness stand Farley told inquisitors that he had come to a decision "because of the facts," but when asked for these ' 133 facts, he could only refer to the advice of his counsel.

The following testimony is only one of the many examples of how Farley and Senator Austin approached this subject. When asked what his reasons were for cancellation, Farley replied:

Well; I will answer it this way, Senator, that with all the facts before us we felt the law had been violated and that the contracts were not in order, and I got the legal advice that I felt I should have, being a layman, and, upon their advice, I annulled the contracts. Austin: I don’t think you understand my ques­ tion, or you would not answer it that way. You ad­ mitted that you know that there are two methods of procedure under this Watres Act, and all I am asking you is which method you understood they were attemp­ ting to operate under, regardless of whether they did legally or illegally. Farley: I was not concerned with what method they were legally operating under. Austin: I see. You would pass judgment, then, regardless of which feature of the act they were . operating under? ■ Farley: I will answer it by saying% with the facts before me, as I have repeated, on more than one occasion, with the advice given me by counsel, I acted as I did. Austin: You don’t respond to the question. As a matter of fact, I judge from your answers - and if this is not fair, I want you to say so - I judge from your answer, that you did not consider which one of these two methods these gentlemen were attempting to work under.

133 Smith, p. 265. 81

Parley: We considered all the facts. Senator, and were guided accordingly. Austin: All right. Well, you cannot answer the question intelligently. Senator McCarran: Not the way you want it. Austin: No, nor any way. .1 am perfectly willing Mr. Parley, to have you answer the question any way you wish. Parley: I am perfectly willing to let my answer stand. Austin: If you assume these people (members of the "Spoils Conference") met together by invitation of the postmaster general, similar to the invitation that your office issued to them afterward, to con­ sider the equities that pioneers ought to have con­ sidered in judging whether extensions should be made to them or not, then the fact of meeting together would not be regarded by you as an illegal thing, would it? Parley: I don’t think I should answer any ques­ tions as to what happened prior to my going into of­ fice, Senator Austin, in all justice to Postmaster General Brown. - Austin: You have done so. You canceled all these contracts, and, in you letter of February 14, you stated why. Parley: Yes, sir. Austin: And I am examining you to find out, if I can whether it makes any difference to you, or not, whether the law authorized the contractors to get to­ gether and to talk over equities with the postmaster- general. That is what I am after. Do you consider such meetings as collusive? Parley: I would consider any meeting collusive where contracts for mail lines were allotted to this, that, and the other fellow. Austin: Did you have an idea air lines were all allotted in this case? Parley: I will answer your question by giving the answer I have given on more than one occasion here - that I acted upon the facts presented, after due legal advice. 134

It appeared that Parley was ignorant of the air-mail situation, and, according to Brown, was unsympathetic to the whole investigation. When Brown brought back the missing

134 Senate Hearings, p . 2702.-2703» 82 papers, which he had found in his New York apartment, he de­ livered them personally to his successor. According to

Brown, he and Farley had a pleasant chat in the Postmaster

General’s office. During the course of the conversation.

Brown asserted, Farley commented that, "Well, I haven’t any sympathy with these investigations," and Black is "a pub­ licity hound - but don’t tell anybody I said so, because I 135 have to get along with him." Farley may have disliked

Black, but would he have spoken so freely with a political rival? He may have. Farley denied the statement about Black, but that does not refute Brown’s testimony. No politician is branded a liar for denying private statements later made pub­ lic, and the former Postmaster General might very likely have exchanged confidences with Farley. Washington rumors indicated that Farley had little use for Black, although he 136 spoke well of him in his autobiography.

One morning, early in 1934, the Senator called at my office without having made a previous appointment. When he. came in he said: ’'Mr. Farley, I have examined every bit of the testimony before the committee and in addition I have examined the private files of the companies involved, which were brought before the committee as evidence. There are numerous references to visits paid you by company officials and about the conversations that took place. Yet there is not a scrap of evidence to indicate that you or anyone in your department ever compromised the government’s in­ terests or tried in any way to interfere with the Senate hearings. I thought you were entitled to know

135 Ibid., p. 26.83. 136 Smith, p. 26,8. .83 that and I came down simply for that purpose 137

It was probably with reluctance, then, that Farley made the cancellation order. Once committed, he had to bear the brunt of criticism and vilification. The situation be­ came progressively worse as the air accidents continued.

On February 25j 1934, Arthur Krock of the New York Times said:

For the first time since the President was in­ augurated, a year ago, next Sunday, his administra­ tion seems really on the defensive - The signs grown that the administration feels the air-mail is a bear it has by the tail. It is anxious to let go. The problem is how to get out gracefully, to prevent fur­ ther crashes and loss of life, and at the same time to be able to say that the new terms on which pri­ vate companies are flying the mail eliminate 'col­ lusion and connivance’ and have purified the whole system.... Feet of clay have been revealed, if be­ hind a veil, an impression has gone more widely abroad that even Mr. Roosevelt can not always be right. 138

Apparently the President decided that something had to be done about these tragic deaths and perhaps he wanted to try and save face, for on March 7> 1934, he wrote a letter to the Speaker of the House, H.T. Rainey, recommending, "sound, 1.39 stable, and permanent air-mail legislation." He said, "We must avoid the evils of the past, and at the same time en- 140 courage the sound development of the aviation industry."

Three days later, on March 10, 1934, the President wrote

137 Farley, Behind the Ballots, p. 269. 138 The New York Times, February 25, 1934, p. 4. 139 Smith, p. 255. 140 Rosenman, The Public Papers, III, 138. 84 another letter, this time to Secretary of.Wars George H.

Bern, which discontinued the Army air-mail service tempor­ arily until the weather improved. On March 19, the Army

Air Corps resumed carrying the mail and continued to do so 141 until May 8, 1934. Due to President Roosevelt's urging, after March 30th new air-mail contracts were given to com­ mercial air companies for temporary periods. These con­ tracts were made for the most essential routes. The duration of the temporary contracts was only three months, with re­ newal periods of three months. "These temporary contracts were awarded to the lowest responsible bidders, and service 142 by commercial companies began on May 8, 1934." Members of Congress showed general approval of the President's dis- 143 continuance of the Army air-mail service.

Some people* however, thought that the President had not given the Air Corps enough time to prove itself. Several

Air Corps officers felt that perhaps the President was unduly alarmed at the number of accidents that had occurred during the air-mail operations. They claimed that the records showed that the fatality rate for January and February, 1934, was not much greater than it had been for the last five 144 , years. As a result of unprecedentedly severe weather, the

141 Ibid., p. 142.. 142 . Ibid., p. 140. 143 The New York Times, March 11, 1934, p. 1. 144 Ibid. Secretary of War asserted, a number of fatalities occurred, and these, without any real investigation of concomitant cir­ cumstances, were seized upon in some quarters as proof of inefficiency, neglect and obsolescence in the Army Air Corps.

Much of the criticism was unjust, which is proven by the fact that after the weather cleared up, and the pilots had become familiar with their routes, the Air Corps carried the mail 145 satisfactorily and with relative freedom from accidents.

Although the criticism was largely uninformed, he stated, it was, in certain respects justified. The cancellation experi­ ence exposed certain defects which were not the fault of the 146 Air Corps, but due to insufficient appropriations.

Roosevelt was anxious to be rid of this embarrassing problem and asked Congress for new air-mail legislation. On

March 24, 1934, in response to Roosevelt’s plea. Senator

Black and Senator Kenneth McKellar introduced a bill to the

Senate for a new permanent air-mail act. On May 10, the

House passed a similar bill. A compromise act was agreed to by both the House and the Senate on June 5 . This new statute

145 Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1934, p. 4. 146“ ' : “ Ibid. 86 147 was to be. known, as. the Air Mail Act. of 1934. President

Roosevelt signed the new. Air Mail Act on June 12, 1934, and.

147 Its. provisions were as follows: A six^cent air mail postage rate of thirty-three and a third cents per air­ plane mile for loads not in excess of 300 pounds was estab­ lished, For each additional hundred pounds, one-tenth the base rate would be paid with the maximum rate limited to for­ ty cents per airplane mile, regardless of the poundage car­ ried. Interlocking directorates would be prohibited in the new bill and holding companies were forbidden to acquire stock in companies, engaged in carrying air-mail. The bill authorized the Postmaster-General to award contracts to the lowest responsible bidders for periods not to exceed one year, and gave to low bidders the right to appeal to the Com­ ptroller-General. The new act forbade the sale or transfer of contracts without the permission of the Postmaster- General. Extensions of routes were limited to one hundred miles and permitted only one such extension to any one person. Four trans-continental routes would be maintained as "primary routes," and the Postmaster-General was authorized to desig­ nate secondary routes. The bill limited routes to an ag­ gregate of 29,000 miles, with a total annual schedule of 40,000,000 airplane miles. The Interstate Commerce Commis­ sion was empowered to fix reasonable compensation rates, but limited such rates to those provided in the Act. It also directed the Commission to review the rates of compensation paid, at least once every calendar year, and to be assured that no unreasonable profit was resulting or accruing there­ from. Carriers whose contracts were canceled were given per­ mission to sue for damages through,the Court of Claims. Every bidder on air-mail contracts would be required to fur­ nish a list of stockholders, directors and a statement of the financial status of the concern that they represented. The Secretary of Commerce was to prescribe safety requirements for aircraft and to certify qualifications for flying per­ sonnel. The President was authorized to appoint a commission of five men to survey all phases of American aviation and report their findings to Congress not later than February 1, 1935. U.S. Statutes At Large, 73rd Congress, 2nd Sess., 1934, III, Part 1 and 2, 933. 148 87 it went into effect the same day.

The air-mail problem was not yet over for Parley. On

April 18, 1934, four air transport companies, The National

Air Transport, Inc., The Pacific Air Transport, Inc., The

Varney Airlines, Inc., and the Boeing Air Transport, Inc., whose contracts had been canceled, attempted to sue James

Parley personally on the grounds that he had no power as

Postmaster-General to cancel their contracts without a hear­ ing. On June 4, Farley's act of cancellation was upheld by

Justice Donoghue in the District of Columbia Supreme Court, and the suits were dismissed on the basis df lack of juris­ diction. The case was appealed in the United States' Circuit

Court of Appeals. The suit was dismissed on June 11 in this court also, on the grounds that the government played an in­ tegral part in this case and, was, in a sense, a defendant.

The government cannot be sued without its consent, and the 149 case was thrown out. The Postmaster-General was thus officially exonerated. '

148 The President stipulated in signing the bill that: Any contract which has been satisfactorily performed during the initial and extended period shall be continued for an in­ definite period, in accordance with the changes in rates that may be made by the Interstate Commerce Commission, but any contract so continued may be terminated by the Interstate Commerce Commission upon sixty day's notice after a hearing. It may be terminated by the carrier on the same terms. The New York Times, June 13, 1934, p. 5. T49 Ibid., June 12,. 1934, p. 2. 88 Farley gave many speeches in defense of his policy.

In one given on May 13, 1934, he said:

The facts today speak louder than words. We shall shortly complete the advertising and award of a new set of contracts for carrying the air-mail. When these are finally signed we shall have more miles of air-mail routes in operation than before the cancel­ lation; more people will be served, a great area of country that heretofore has been without air-mail facilities will have the benefit of this modern con­ venience and the government will save over $10,000,000 a year. There is the answer to the critics of this administration’s air-mail policy. 150

Post Office Department statistics show that the holding company system was largely eliminated in the new policy, and subsidization rates were much lower. There was a forty-seven per cent saving in the first year, for the government, after the new contracts were distributed; most of this saving was due to elimination of previous excesses. But on the other hand the opportunity to achieve a really competitive system was lost. The "big four" of the airlines won back most of their original routes. The new concerns to enter the field of air-mail carrying, as the result of the new system, were

Braniff, Delta, Northeastern, and Chicago and Southern. The new domestic system covered 28,924 route miles, 3,676 more miles than existed before the contracts were annulled. It not only covered 3,676 more miles than the old system, but it 151 served four additional states and forty-one cities.

150 Ibid., May 15, 1934, p. 6. 151 John P. Frank, Mr. Justice Black (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1949),p. 73 - Postmaster-General * s Annual Report, 1934, p . vii. The air-mail controversy was short in duration. It flared up in January3 1934, and was largely forgotten by

August of the same year. The mail incident was significant because it made the public aware of some existing problems, and brought about badly needed reforms. It became apparent through the Senate investigation that the Army Air Corps was inadequately trained and equipped, and that the aviation in­ dustry needed alteration.; Business interest groups now posed a formidable block of opposition to the administration since they were greatly antagonized by the President’s arbitrary policies. The controversy finally led to new legislation, the Air Mail Act of 1934 and later on, to the Civil Aero­ nautics Act of 1938. Out of this controversy and the re­ sulting legislation, came the foundation for our great Ameri­ can commercial air network. CHAPTER' III

"DRIFTING APART”

Roosevelt’s first year in office has been called the honeymoon period. 'Congress and the public willingly followed his leadership. Some legislation was passed in a matter of hours. In fact, he was so successful in leading Congress 1 that he was charged by some with being a dictator.

Critics began to point out that there were many in­ consistencies in the original legislative program of the

Roosevelt administration. The Economy bill and the closing of the banks were deflationarywhile the CCC and the Emer­ gency Relief Act were inflationary. The AAA and the NRA were based on the theory of raising prices by restricting pro­ duction, while the TVA was created to raise the standards of

; • '■ 2 living by increasing productivity. Some inconsistencies of the New Deal policies were to be ironed out by the Supreme

1 : . Raymond Clapper, Watching the World (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Comp., Inc., 1944), p. 84. Stokes, p. 367. Gosnell, p. 140. . 2 : ' ■ ■ . ■ The CCC or the Civilian Conservation Corps. AAA or the Agricultural Adjustment Act. NRA or the National Re­ covery Act and the TVA or the Tennessee Valley Authority. Henry Bamford Parkes and Vincent P. Carosso, Recent America (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Comp., 1963)s IIj 3-104. Gosnell, p. 142.

90 . 91 3 Court decision and future sessions of Congress.

Within eighteen months of Roosevelt's inauguration in

March3 1933, his honeymoon with the press and big business was over. Never again was Roosevelt to have such a period of % general good will. The NRA had greatly stimulated the- growth and demands of the trade unions. Employers were loud in their protests of this labor threat and the rash of strikes that it brought. The AAA had raised the price of farm pro­ ducts to the consumer. The huge expenditures for the emer­ gency relief program had increased the public debt, and doubts were being raised about the solvency of the nation.

The Liberty League was founded in the summer of 193^ to com­ bat the New Deal and discredit the President and his poli­ cies. A number of conservative Democrats, including A1 Smith went over to the opposition. The newspaper correspondents who had welcomed the new President with such enthusiasm be­ came once again their hard-bittens cynical selves as they 5 ' criticized his policies.

The Congressional campaign of 1934 indicated the nature of the opposition that the Democrats were to face in

3 Gosnell, p. 143. 4 . Farleya Behind the Ballots, p . 289. Parkes and Carosso, p.§9. 5 Leo C . Rosten, The Washington Correspondents (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Comp., 1937)3 pp. 53-60. 92

1936. A Republican senator denounced the Administration’s recovery measures as "un-American” and against the principles of American liberty. Ogden Mills, former under-secretary of the Treasury and Roosevelt1s Hyde Park neighbor, accused the

New Dealers of "fostering revolution under the guise of re- 6 covery and reform.”

One of the generalizations that can be made regarding

American politics is that a party which controls the presi­ dency will lose some seats in the congressional elections 7 held in nonpresidential years. Accordingly, the Democratic party should have experienced reverses in the congressional elections of 193^* Those reverses did not occur. Instead, the party actually gained seats both in the House and in the

Senate. Of the thirty-five Senate contests, the Democrats won twenty-nine, and in the House, they gained an additional twelve, seats. The composition of the newly elected Seventy- fourth Congress consisted of sixty-nine Democrats, twenty- four Republicans, one Parmer-Laborite, and one Progressive in the Senate, and 318 Democrats, ninety-nine Republicans, four Parmer-Laborites, and seven Progressives in the House.

The Democratic Party victory on the state level was also im­ pressive. Only seven Republican governors survived. Here

6 Gosnell, p. 145. 7 Charles Edward M e r M a m and Harold Foote Gosnell, The American Party System (New York: The Macmillan Comp., 1949)7 p. " w : 93 was the greatest tribute that the voters could, pay to the new

President who had met the crisis of 1933 with such calmness

and willingness to act. As far as the great mass of voters 8 was concerned, Roosevelt had become a champion.

Following the strengthening of the Democratic major­

ity. in Congress, President Roosevelt pushed through a new

series of social reforms. It was hoped that these acts would . ' ■ 9 ward off the demagogues who were making more, extreme demands.

Congress enacted the Social Security Act, a stronger Banking

Act, the National Labor Relations Act, the Public Utility

Holding Company bill, a tax bill, a work relief bill, and

other far-reaching measures.. This program was put through with terrific opposition. The relatively smooth sailing of

the One Hundred days was no longer possible. As economic

conditions improved, the opposition of the business and in- 10 dustrial groups to the Roosevelt policies grew more vocal.

Other developments early in 1935 presented a threat

to Roosevelt’s policies and to his chances for renomination

and reelection in 1936. Senator Huey Long, Father Coughlin

and other isolationist elements vigorously attacked

8 Farley, Behind the Ballots, p. 189. Gosnell, p .145 . Parkes and Carosso, p. 50. 9 Demagogues here refer to Huey Long, Father Charles Coughlin, Upton Sinclair and Francis E . Townsend, Parkes and Carosso, pp. 64-69. 10 Frederick Rudolph, HThe American Liberty League,

1934-1940 , n American Historical Review, LVT (October, 1950), 19. 94 Roosevelt’s policies. Long also posed a third party problem.

It was not until September, 1935, that the threat was removed 11 when the Senator was assassinated. This startling develop­ ment may have enabled Parley and others high in the party command to give a sigh of relief.

Other problems were soon to face the administration.

The year 1935 marked the clear-cut beginning of the Presi­ dent's struggle with the Supreme Court, which was to have many repercussions. The Court fight gave the opposition the kind of issue which it had been searching for ever since the 12 popularity of the President had begun to grow.

The Court consisted of a group of nine old men, a majority of whom advocated the socio-economic ideology of the nineteenth century. The New Deal was contrary to their eco­ nomic theories. Beginning in January with an oil case,

Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, the Court began systematically 13 to invalidate one New Deal measure after another.

Early in 1935 Roosevelt prepared a speech which he proposed to deliver if the Court invalidated the Gold Clause

11 Coughlin was a Roman Catholic priest who became a popular radio speaker and whose political ideas were ex­ tremely radical. Merriam and Gosnell, p. 250. 12 . Gosnell, p . 149. 13 Ibid. 14 , Resolution This he did not deliver when the Court upheld 15 the Act by a five to four decision. The Railroad Retire- 16 ment Aets however, was declared unconstitutional. Later, when the Court rejected the code-making provisions of the

National Recovery Act, the President could remain silent no 17 longer. At his press conference he declared that the Su­ preme Court was trying to revert back to its "horse and 18 buggy" days.

This was the break that the opposition was looking for. The President was criticizing the sacred Court. No president since Lincoln had dared to criticize the Supreme.

Court. Roosevelt, who had been concerned about the opposition from the left, was now troubled about the opposition from the 19. right.

14 Franklin Delano Roosevelt: His Personal Letters, 1928.-45, ed. Elliot Roosevelt (New York : Due 11, Sloan and Pearce, 1947)? pp. 456-460. 15 Norman v. B.&O. Railroad, 249 U.S. 240. 16 Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Railroad, 295 U.S. 330. 17 Seheeter Poultry Corporation v. the United States, 295 U.S. 495. Thomas Connally, My Name is Tom Connally, e d . Alfred Steinberg (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Comp,, 1954*)', p. 184. 18 The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, ed. Samuel I. Rosenman (New York: The Macmillan Comp., 1941), IV, 208-209 and 221. Stokes, p. 479. Connally, p. 185. 19 Cosnell, p. 150. 96

By the beginning of 1936 the issues of the coming election campaign were well formed. Roosevelt would be op­ posed by the conservatives of the American Liberty League and the so-called Jefferson Democrats. He would also be opposed by extremists such as Father Coughlin, Gerald L.K. Smith, the 20 Union Party, and the Communists.

In addition, Roosevelt faced the 1936 convention and campaign without the services of his trusted friend Louis

Howe, who had expired April 19, 1936. This meant that

Roosevelt and his wife had to take care of matters which Howe 21 used to handle. At the request of the President, Mrs.

Roosevelt held a conference with those in command of Demo­ cratic headquarters. In a memorandum of July 16, 1936, she presented questions concerning the coming campaign. She asked about the Publicity Steering Committee, the planning of a radio program, the analysis of news, research on the Niw

Deal and on Landon's record, plans for doubtful states, news­ reels, campaign speeches, contracts with newspapers, the speaker’s bureau, and the strategy for the whole campaign. 22 Farley required twenty pages to answer this inquiry.

20 Parkes and Carosso, pp. 59-70. Gosnell, p. 150. 21 Gosnell, p. 151. 22 F.D.R. Personal Papers, pp. 598-600. Gosnell, p. 151. 97 Edward L. Roddan. International News Service Corres­ pondent , had joined the staff of the Democratic National Com­ mittee in January to assist Charles Michelson. Roosevelt told Roddan he was tired of using defensive tactics with his opponents. Michelson and Roddan went on the offensive against the Liberty League, and in no time they had effec­ tively branded it as a "millionaires' Union," and subsequen­ tly, the Republican Barty frantically tried to denounce and 23 disown i t .

Farley was certain that the situation would improve and that Roosevelt would win by more than 5,000,000. votes.

He remarked,

lot since the days of Washington and Monroe had a candidate received such a popular plurality or such an overwhelming electoral vote, actually or propor­ tionately . This result was due in a large measure to the personal popularity of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and to his keen insight into political advantage. It was also due to magnificent teamwork in the Democratic National Committee and throughout the country, 24;

Roosevelt's nomination, of course, was a certainty, and weeks before the convention Farley and his colleagues had the campaigning process well organized with three objectives in view: first, to renominate Roosevelt unanimously; second, to make sure that the platform to be adopted would reflect the principles of the New Deal; and third, to ensure the

23 . Farley, Behind the Ballots, p. 29.5 * 24 Farley, Jim Farley's Story, p. 58. 25 98 abolition of the two-thirds nomination rule. Roosevelt was certainly capable of winning under the two-thirds rule, there fore, Farley could go ahead in the proceedings to substitute for this rule a simple majority requirement for nomination.

Mo question of motive could be raised, as there had been in the 1932 Convention, because in that year it was doubtful 26 whether Roosevelt could have won under the two-thirds rule.

Alfred M. Landon, governor of Kansas, became the chief contender for the Republican nomination early in 1936.

Farley, in a speech on May 22nd before the Michigan State

Democratic Convention, predicted that the Republican nominee would be "the governor of a typical prairie state," obviously 27 referring to Landon. Representative Dewey Short of

Missouri seized upon this reference to a "prairie state" as a reflection on the -citizens of,Missouri,.Illinois, and Kansas.

Landon, he remarked, was of humble but honest parents, even if he could not boast of an illustrious family or of being 28. born with a silver spoon in his mouth. As a result of this

25 Farley, Behind the Ballots, p. 293» Farley, Jim Farley's Story, p. 63° - New York Times, September 11, 1935$ p. 5. The two- thirds rule was discussed in Chapter One of this paper. 27 Mew York Times, May 21, 1936, p. 17. Stokes, p. 448. Miehelson, p. 5©. Farley, Jim Farley's Story, p. 62

28 ' ' Mew York Times, May 22, 1936, p. 3* 99 incident, Roosevelt sent the following advice on speech- making to the Democratic National chairman:

Memorandum for J.A.F.: .

I thought we had decided any reference to Landon or any other Republican candidate was inadvisable. Now that the water is over the dam, I told Michelson that possibly a somewhat facetious refer­ ence to Frank Knox, between now and June ninth, by you might soften the effect of the Landon reference. Another good rule which should be passed down the line to all who are concerned with speech material is that no section of the country should be spoken of as ’typical', but only with some laudatory adjective. If the sentence had read, 'One of those splendid prairie statesno one would have picked us up on it, but the’word 'typical' coming from any New Yorker is meat for the opposition. 29

Roosevelt chose to stand aloof from the political campaigning but Farley couldn't take such a lofty stand.

Being the party organizer, he was naturally a primary target for Republican complaints. He was charged day after day with using relief jobs and public funds to bribe millions of voters, with operating a huge spoils machine, and with ne­ glecting the Postoffice Department. The Republicans hoped to injure Roosevelt politically through his Postmaster General.

Farley also had trouble with some Democrats who were dis- 30 gruntled over Roosevelt's bipartisanship of 1934.

The Democratic i&tional Convention which convened in

Philadelphia on June 23, 1936, was much different from the

' 29 Rosenman, Working with Roosevelt, p. 129. Farley, Jim Farley's Story, p. 62. 30 Burns, p . 2 7.8 . 100

Chicago convention of 1932. There was no doubt, that the

Roosevelt group was in command of the gathering. Thus, the principle function of the convention was to prepare a plat­

form and give various party leaders a chance to defend the record of the party. The business of the meeting could have been finished in a couple of days, but the proceedings were

strung out for two reasons. First, Roosevelt was a sentimen­ talist and wanted to deliver his acceptance speech on Satur­ day , as he had in 1932. Secondly, the Democrats had con­

siderable use of the radio and they wanted to take full ad- 31 vantage of it for the benefit of the current administration.

Farley officially opened the convention, and Senator

Alban Barkley of Kentucky gave the Keynote address, during the course of which he defended the President's critical at- , 32 titude toward the Supreme Court. Senator Robinson, the

Permanent Chairman, also defended Roosevelt's position on .

constitutional issues-and attacked the Republican platform 33 . . ■ . ' .. ■ . and candidate.

A platform, replete with New Deal phrases, was adop­ ted. It was drawn up by the Resolution Committee, but showed

a great deal of Roosevelt's handiwork. The platform re-

31 Farley, Behind the Ballots, p. 306. 32 . The Official Report of the Proceedings-of the Demo- cratic National Convention 1930,: compiled by Oliver A. Quayle, Jr. (Washington D . C : The Master Reporting Comp., Inc., 1936), p. 29. 33 Ibid., p. 82.. 101. affirmed the government's responsibility for the welfare of its citizens, promised further domestic reforms, and declared that if the Supreme Court continued to prohibit federal regu­

lation of economic conditions, the Democratic party would seek a "clarifying amendmentThis clause of the platform was included to imply that the barrier to federal regulation was not the Constitution but the manner in which the Supreme 34 Court had interpreted it.

Another issue to be discussed was the two-thirds nom­ inating rule. Despite opposition from the South, this par­ liamentary rule of procedure was abandoned after more than a century of existence. Hence, Farley's second and third ob- 35 jectives, as previously mentioned, were achieved.

After a series of nominating and seconding speeches,

Farley's first goal was accomplished. Roosevelt was renomi­ nated by acclamation. The selection of John Nance Garner for

Vice President was also by acclamation. On June 27,

Roosevelt stood in the glare of spotlights to address more than 100,00.0 wildly cheering people at Franklin Field. In his address, Roosevelt asserted that the political indepen­ dence which the generation of 1776 had won at Philadelphia on

July 4 needed to be reinforced by a similar declaration

34 Ibid., pp. 192-198. New. York Times, June 26, 193.8, p. 1. 35 New York Times, June 28, 1938, p. 8 . Ibid., June 22, '.1.938., p. 5. 102. against the ’’economic royalists” who had "created a new des­ potism and wrapped it in the robes of legal sanction." Con­

tinuing he said.

In the place of the palace of privilege we seek to build a temple out of faith and hope and chari­ ty ... . There is a mysterious cycle in human events. To some generations much is given. Of others much is expected. This generation of Americans has a rendezvous with destiny. 36

A few weeks after the Democratic National Convention,

the Democratic headquarters was organized and functioning.

The Republicans on the contrary had to go through the tedious process of rebuilding their organization at the state level 37 where the 1932 defeat had done devastating damage.

The Democratic headquarters was assembled at the

Hotel Biltmore in New York City. This organization had

several subdivisions, including Publicity, Business, Foreign

Language, Veterans, and Labor. There was also a small staff

in Chicago, concerned mainly with the agricultural states,

and a few writers and economists were maintained in Washing- 38 ton, D.C.

36 Bosenman, The Public Papers of F.D.R., V, 23.4. New York Times, June 30, 1938V p. 18. New York Times, June 27, 1938, p. 6. Clapper, Watching the World, p. 86. Rexford 6. Tugwell, The Democratic Roosevelt (New York: Doubleday and Comp., Inc., 1957)3 P ° 420. 37 Burns, p. 27.6 - Farley, Behind the Ballots, p. 308. 38 New York Times, August 1, 1938, p. 11. Early in July9 Parley onee again following his old procedurea sent a personal letter to approximately 2,500 leading Democrats in towns and cities throughout the United

States. These letters asked their opinion on how conditions were at the moment and how they expected their home local- 39 - ities to vote in the November election„ This letter was sent to a restricted list of Democratic leaders whom Parley knew to be in close contact with actual political conditions; the majority Parley knew personally. Each one of them re­ plied . On three, separate dates, this group was again con- 40 tacted for opinions.

The fact that the press was overwhelmingly against

Roosevelt in such important areas as New York, Pennsylvania,

Illinois, Ohio and New England was a serious handicap that had to be coped with. The campaign was separated into two distinct parts, "Roosevelt off the stump and Roosevelt on the 41 stump." During July, August, and September, the President managed to keep himself before the public without being in- 42 . volved in direct political action. Nature, too, aided the

President's guise of nonpartisanship., By the summer of 1936 a strip of land extending from Canada to Texas had been the

39 Parley, Behind the Ballots, p. 308. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid., p. 309.

42 . Burns, p. 273. ' 104. victim of a searing drought,. The President decided to take one of his "look-sees". The trip proved to be a tremendous political success. The President made a score of back- platform speeches in nine states; he saw, and was seen by, tens of thousands of voters. Never did he mention the cam­ paign, except in an offhand, humorous way, and he never men­ tioned the Republican opposition. It was on this trip that a potentially embarrassing situation arose. A meeting was ar­ ranged for the President to confer with the drought state governors in Des Moines, Iowa. Since Landon was governor of. one of the stricken states, he had to be invited as well. 4 3 The meeting was uneventful and cordial.

During the campaign much mud was slung, not only at

Roosevelt but at Parley as well. Parley complained in his book. Behind the Ballots, that the Republican National Chair­ man John Hamilton "traveled extensively about, the country, delivering petty and unfounded attacks" against him "when his time might better have been employed at worthwhile accom­ plishments for his party." Roosevelt was attacked upon his 44 family life, his health and his Jewish and Catholic advisors.

Landon was portrayed as the "great economizer" a

"Kansas Coolidge," a hard-working self-made American, and a

43 New York Times, September 1, 1938, p. 20. Burns, p. 2%7. Parley, Behind the Ballots, p. 309. 44 New York Times, July 3» 1938, p. 5. Burns, p .278. Gosnell, p . 158. Parley, Behind the Ballots, p. 311. man of. his word. The Republicans claimed that the party in

office had failed to solve unemployments and that if they

were victorious in the coming election they would see that

industry would absorb unemployment. Upon their victory9

claimed the Republicans s all attempts to tamper with the

authority of the Supreme Court would stop. They would elimi­ nate monopolies and bring back free enterprise and private

competitions and the budget, would be balanced. The merit

system would be restored, a sound currency would be re- 45 established, and business confidence would exist.

Meanwhile Roosevelt continued to make non-political addresses9 never mentioning his ppponent *s name. He ignored 46. Landon in order to belittle him. The President ran on his past record and promised the country more of the same if he were reelected. He made, few definite commitments, preferring

to answer Republican charges against him by asking the voter

to compare his standard of living in 1936 with what it was in

1933• Roosevelt defended himself against the charge that he enjoyed Communistic support by repudiating it and all other 47 foreign ideologies.

45 New York Times, June 12 , 1938s P » 1. Gosnell, p. 158. 46 Burns, pi. 276 . Gosnell, p. 158. 47 Parkes, p. 98. Burns, p. 27.6 . 106

The entire Democratic campaign was based on the pro­ position that Roosevelt, and he alone, was the issue before the voters. The basis for this idea was the assumption that people think first in terms of personalities in connection with politics and secondly in terms of issues. The opposition unwittingly helped the Democratic campaign by carrying its criticism of the President to great lengths. It was almost ' 48 certain to cause a reaction in favor of Roosevelt.

Roosevelt did not actively participate in the cam­ paigning until the last part of September, opening with an address before the New York State Democratic Convention at

Syracuse. This left him little more than a month to "take the stump'1'; actively in his own behalf. Yet judging from his ultimate victory he was apparently able to largely refute the 49 Claims of his foes and reassure the American public,

"On the stump" or from the back of the train or on the radio, Roosevelt was always poised, friendly, and char­ ming. Landon, on the contrary, was tense, serious, and 50 colorless, and his speeches were usually uninspiring.

On the Saturday before the election, Roosevelt visited headquarters in New York to thank the workers engaged

48 Burns, p. 287• Parley, Behind the Ballots, p.314. Moley, After Seven Years, p. 351. "99 \ • Parley, Behind the Ballots, p. 316. 50 Parkes, p. 98. 107.

In the reelection drive. Included in his speech were the

following words:

I am proud of the fact that our information has been kept at a pretty high.level. One reason for that is the fact that we have at the head of this campaign a man who has always been square. I have known Jim Parley for a great many years and I have never known him yet to do or think a mean thing. 51

The day before the election Parley sent a letter to

Roosevelt by special messenger. The following paragraph was included :

After looking them all over carefully and dis­ counting everything that has been given in these re­ ports , I am still definitely of the opinion that you will carry every state but two - Maine and Vermont. 52 .

The President himself was not that optimistic. He estimated that he would receive some 360 electoral votes and 53 Landon 171.

That same afternoon and night Parley spent hours telephoning Democratic campaign workers, and any new infor­ mation gained was reported to Roosevelt. The next morning

after the election. Parley’s predictions were confirmed and 54 proven one hundred per cent correct.

The Congressional vote was also a Democratic land­

slide. Of the 4-35 House seats contested, 333 went to the

51 Parley, Behind the Ballots, p. 321 52 Ibid., p. 325. 53 " Ibid., p . 326° 54 Parley, Jim Parley’s Story, p. 66. 108 Democrats. In the new Senate3 the .Democratic membership was

Increased to seventy-five. The gubernatorial races indicated a similar rout of the Republicans; the Democrats won twenty- six of the thirty-three governorships that were contested, and the Republicans won only five, losing even. Landon’s home 55 state to the Democrats.

The election results had definite economic and social features. Roosevelt failed to carry the upper income group: white collar workers and professional people. He was popular with the lower income group: the blue collar workers, farmers, and the unemployed. Among the religious groups he was most popular with Catholics, Jews and non-church members. He 56 barely won the Protestant vote.

Although Parley did not realize it, by 1935 Roosevelt was shifting his ideological ground and his long-term politi­ cal plans from the generality of the country toward a more concentrated effort to get the urban and labor vote. The overwhelming victory of 1936, which was a reflection of

Roosevelt's shift in emphasis, was accepted by Parley as a 57 smashing party victory.

55 Parkes, p. 100. 56 The Gallup Political Almanac for 1948, compiled by the American Institute of Public Opinion (Princeton, 1948), pp. 11 and 272. Merriam and Gosnell, p. 166. Gosnell, p.l66. 57 Moley, 27 Masters of Politics, p . 110. 109. Soon after the 1936 election Farley began to notice a

drifting apart on political issues between Roosevelt and him­

self. Gradually he was eased out of the President’s con­

fidence and replaced by what Farley called."a small band of

zealots, who mocked at party loyalty and knew no devotion . . 58 ■ excepttunswerving obedience to their leader.11

The real problems didn’t begin for the Farley-

Roosevelt relationship until after 1938, and nothing so clear­

ly illustrates this point as the comparison of Farley’s book

of that year. Behind the Ballots, with his Jim Farley's Story

written ten years later. The first autobiography written for

profit, was done in the traditional political way; to Re­

veal little, to protect and praise political friends, to in­

crease party solidarity, and to convey a favorable impression

of the President. In the second book, Farley was more open

and critical. He presented politics in its true light and

described Roosevelt as being somewhat cruel to friends and

associates. Farley’s purpose in writing this second auto­

biography was perhaps to reveal his struggle to protect the

party, the obstacles that Roosevelt placed in the path of his

effort, the capriciousness of Roosevelt in dealing with

people who helped him attain the Presidency, and the efforts

of Farley himself to carry the responsibilities that went

with his positions of leadership. Moreover, he revealed his

58 Parley, Jim Farley’s Story, p. 68. 59 own thwarted ambitions. In his first book which is defi­ nitely pro-Roosevelt,. Farley remarked about the President 6° that "feiere isn’at a snobbish bone in his body.” In his second book, Farley candidly attributed some of Roosevelt's coolness to social snobbishness:

Never was I invited to join informal White House gatherings. My appearances there were for official social functions or for informal dinners followed by exploration of political and patronage problems. Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt once said, ‘Franklin finds it hard to relax with people who aren’t his social equals,’ I took this remark to explain my being out of the infield. 6l

Roosevelt was eager to be amused, and his interests were numerous. He hated to concentrate very long on one sub­ ject. Farley's life and interests centered oh politics.

Business and recreation to him were the same. Farley, a non- drinker and not known for his wittiness, could not have been very interesting to Roosevelt on a social basis, thus the

President tried to restrict his contacts with his Post- 62 master General to set political strategy meetings.

During the 1936 presidential campaign, Farley was offended at receiving a hint from the White House Secretary

Marvin H. McIntyre that he should not appear with the Presi­ dent on the train platform "because of the Tamany situation."

59 Mo ley, 27. Masters of Politics, p. 111. 60 Farley, Behind the Ballots, p. 349. 61 HaMey, Jim Farley's Story, p. 68. 62 . Moley, 27 Masters, p. 113. Ill Parley assumed the real reason was that Roosevelt resented 63 all the friendliness shown toward his campaign manager.

Farley, noted that as early as the 1936 campaign

Roosevelt suspected him of having aspirations for the presi­ dency in 1940. The President, according to Parley, rarely

gave praise to any of his supporters and disliked to see any 64 of them become too popular.

Early in 1937 9 a testimonial dinner was given for

Parley by the Democratic National Committee.. Roosevelt, who attended, solemnly remarked to Parley, "You know, Jim, i t ’s a great comfort to me to know that there is no campaign lying in wait for me at the end of this four years. Yes Sir, 65 nothing but a nice, long rest at Hyde Park." Yet in the months to come, Parley wrote, Roosevelt was to find fault with a long list of aspirants to his succession. "They were either too old or too young, too ambitious or too unknown, too conservative or too radical, or in too poor health or too lacking in personality." Farley was told by a friend that he 66 had been classified as one of the ambitious kind.

The exhilaration of the 1936 election victory did not

last for long. The Supreme Court fight, the isolationist

63 Farley, Jim Parley’s Story, p. 69. Holey, 27 Mas- ters, p. 112. 64 Parley, Jim Parl e y ’s Story, p. 70. 65 Ibid., p. 72. ■ 66 Ibid., pp. 72-73. 112 issue, and the deepening crisis in world affairs split the ranks of the Democratic party wide open. Roosevelt now faced 6? a hostile legislature as well.

The Supreme Court issue and the unsuccessful attempt to "purge” recalcitrant congressmen in the Democratic pri­ maries of 1938 proved to be a major political blunder for the

President. These battles, aroused opposition and divided the 68 party.

The Supreme Court struggle began on February 5, 1937, when Roosevelt delivered a message to Congress on the need for changing the size of the Court in order for it to act in accordance with the times. He argued that the Court’s calen­ dar was congested and that his proposal would eliminate un­ necessary delay in passing legislation. He also implied that some of the Supreme Court justices were too old and infirm. 69 both physically and mentally to carry on efficiently.

Roosevelt’s message was recognized at once for what it was, a plan to provide in advance for Supreme Court ap­ proval of whatever legislative reforms he happened to es­ pouse, and for all practical purposes, enable him to control

67 Gosnell, p. 167. 68 Ibid. 69 New York Times, February 6, 1937, p . 1- Rosenman, Pub11c Papers, VI, 51-66. the Court. The President proposed legislation to appoint one new Supreme Court justice up to a total o£ six for each justice then on the Court who was over seventy years old and would not retire. Justices Willis Van Devanter, James C.

McReynolds, Louis D. Brandeis, George Sutherland, Pierce

Butler and Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes were older than seventy. Since all of these men refused to retire, the

Court’s total would be increased by the new legislation from nine to fifteen. Roosevelt was angry about what the Court had done to his program. The American people knew where he stood since he had made his famous "horse and buggy days" 71 tirade against the Court during his first administration.

Donald Richberg had suggested to Roosevelt that in­ stead of increasing the size of the Court he should recommend a bill which would require all justices, upon reaching the age of seventy to resign or retire to a nonactive status. A new justice would then be appointed in either case. Attorney

General Cummings advised Roosevelt that this would be un­ constitutional since it is written in the Constitution that justices are appointed for life. Richberg disagreed, saying that the justices would technically still be members of the

70 Mo ley, After Seven Years, p. 356. Connally, p.l87» 71 Rosenman, Public Papers, VI, 51-66. Connally, p . 186. 114 Court even though they were not active„ His plan, however, 72 . was abandoned.

Roosevelt made a big blunder by falling to ask coun­ sel from the congressional leaders on the assumption that 73 they would not dare to oppose his plan. On the morning of

February 5th, Roosevelt presented Congress with his bill, read a few highlights from his message to them and the Cabi­ net, and rushed out of the meeting into a press conference.

That was all. There was no discussion or request for advice.

At no point did he seem to doubt that the leaders of his 74 party would do his bidding. Majority leader Robinson was dismayed by the way in which this proposal was presented, 75 without warning, to him and other Senate leaders.

The conservative Democrats and the Republicans quickly grasped the seriousness of his mistake and hurried to take advantage of it. The issue touched off hot debates in the Senate and House, and the cry of dictatorship was raised.

' 72 . Donald Richberg was counsel to ERA from 1933-35, chairman in 1935 and executive director of the National Emer­ gency Council from 1934-1935. Donald R. Richberg, My Hero (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1954), pp. 220-221. 73 Richberg, p 1220. Holey, After Seven Years, p. 360. 74 Holey, After Seven Years, p. 360. Burns, p. 29.4. 75 ■Alben W. Barkley, That Reminds Me (New York: Doubleday and Comp., Inc., 1954), p. 153. 76 The Court case was now one of national interest.

The President made a stirring speech outlining the issues at stake. America must choose. Did the farmer want crop controls and the parity system, or did he want to go back to the cutthroat competition and low prices of the

"horse and buggy" days? Did organized labor want the Wagner

Act or the sweat shop and child labor system of the "free” labor market? Did the consumers want low prices for elec- 77 tricity or did they want to pay what the industry dictated?

The odds against Roosevelt looked overwhelming. If

Howe had been alive, perhaps he might have persuaded the

President to be more patient. At the time, however,

Roosevelt did not know that he would have seven more years to 78 change the composition of the Court. James Byrnes believed that Roosevelt had some brash young men around him who en- 79 couraged him to do the impossible.

Farley contacted party members, trying to induce lag­ ging Democratic congressmentto support the President’s bill.

He vaguely threatened punishment to those who deserted the

76 New York Times, February 6, 1937, p. 1. Farley, Jim Farley's Story, p. 77. 77 Rosenman, Public Papers, VI, 122. Gosnell, p.168 78 Gosnell, p. 168. 79 James F. Byrnes, All In One Lifetime (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958), p. 100. Gosnell, p. 168. 116 cause. The attempted persuasion was to no avail; on this

80 . issue the party lacked initiative and vigor.

In the midst of this turmoil, the Supreme Court took a direct hand in the fight. On March 29, the Court reversed itself by agreeing to the constitutionality of state minimum wage laws for women. And on that same day the Court upheld a revised Frazier-Lemke Farm Mortgage Moratorium Act and the

Railroad Labor Act,, which provided for mediation of disputes and collective bargaining in the railroad industry. On

April 12, the Court went on to approve the Wagner Labor-

Relations Act. These reversals were made possible when

Justices Hughes and Roberts voted with their liberal col- 81 leagues. Stone, Brandeis and Cardozo. It was now hoped by

Farley and others that Roosevelt would abandon his "Court 82 . Packing Scheme".

On May 18, 19379 Justice Van Levanter, one of the

"nine old men," sent his resignation to the White House. De­ spite denials, the move was widely interpreted as a conser­ vative maneuver calculated to weaken Roosevelt's wavering

Senate ranks by a voluntary breaking up of the Court bloc

80 Burns, p. 303. 81 Byrnes, p. 97. 82 . New York Times, April 13, 1937, p. 1« Richberg, pp. 22,4-225. Conn ally, pp. 190-191. • 117 83 which had long troubled the President. The Senate

Judiciary Committee was scheduled to vote on the President's bill on the same day that news of Van Devanter’s resignation became known. Here was a chance for the President to make his own appointment to the Supreme Court. With the recent five to four decisions in his favor, he would be assured of the cooperation of six of the nine justices. In considering these factors, the Judiciary Committee rejected the bill by a ten to eight vote. But even then, Roosevelt remained ob­ stinate. He asked Robinson to sponsor a compromise bill to raise the retirement age from seventy to seventy-five, and to provide for a maximum of a single new justice a year for those over seventy-five who did not retire. Connally felt 84 this compromise bill didn't have a chance.

Senate majority leader Robinson had long wished to become a member of the Supreme Court. Most of his colleagues in the Senate knew of this. His name was high on the list of ■■ ' ' ' 85 ■ prospective nominees for the now vacant position. It was

Roosevelt's intention from the beginning to nominate Robinson

83 New York Times, May 18, 1937, p . 22. Dexter Perkins, Charles Evans Hughes and American Democratic Statesmanship, ed. Oscar Handlin (Boston: Little, Brown and Comp., 195b), p. 182. Rosenman, Working with Roosevelt, pll6l. Parley, Jim Parley's Story, p p . 80-90.

Connally, p. 192.

.. 85 New York Times, May 20,. 1937, p . 1. Connally, p. 192. Parley, Behind the Ballots, p. 332. , 118 for the. vacancy. . Yet Robinson was badly needed in the

Senate to lead the administration fight,, and his removal from that body before the Reorganization Bill was disposed of would have been a great handicap. There was no hurry about the appointment since the new Justice would not participate 86 in Court proceedings until the fall term session. The

President's opponents were quick to seize upon his hesitancy in this matter. Already two accounts of this affair were being printed. Some critics said the President was about to show his ingratitude by failing to bestow the Court appoint­ ment upon Robinson who was making such a brave stand for the administration measure. Others said it was being held out as a "bribe" or bait to keep the Senator active in the fight even though he was basically a staunch conservative and dis- 87 approved of the bill. Roosevelt asked Parley to telephone

Robinson, thank him for his loyalty, and assure him that he would get the Justiceship. Robinson was pleased at the news 88 and understood why the matter was being handled in that way.

In the midst of the battle over Court reform. Senator

Robinson died. His death was a great blow to Roosevelt^ for

Robinson had had a strong sense of party loyalty and was

86 Parley, Behind the Ballots, p. 332. 87 Moley, After. Seven Years, p. 361. Richberg, p. 224. Parley, Behind the Ballots, p. 332. 88 Parley, Behind the Ballots, p. 332. badly needed in the Senate. After Robinson's death the

Court bill lost its leadership. The bill probably would have passed in the House and perhaps in the Senate, but only under 89 Robinson's direction.

The Senator's vacant position had to be filled.

Senator Pat Harrison of Mississippi, who had only paid lip service to the Court bill, and Senator Alban Barkley of Ken­ tucky were the chief contenders. Roosevelt let it be known that he would not recommend one over the other. Farley, in a meeting with both men, declared that neither he nor

Roosevelt would influence the selection of the-jnew majority 90 leader since they were all mutual friends. However, on

July 153 the day following Robinson's death, the White House made public a letter that the President had written to

Barkley. In it Roosevelt addressed the Senator "Dear Alban," and told him that the fight for the Court proposal must go on. Since the Chief Executive knew Harrison was not enthus­ iastic about the Bill, he asked Barkley to continue the fight, which made it appear that he was in favor of the Ken- 91 tucky Senator succeeding Robinson.

89 New York Times, July 15, 1937, p . 1. Byrnes, p.9 8 . Richberg, pp. 224-225. 90 . Byrnes, p. 99. Barkley,p. 155. Connally, p.193° New York Times, July 15, 1937, p.l, Farley, Jim Farley's Story, p. 91.

91 , New York Times, July lo, 1937, p . 1. Byrnes, p. 99. Connally, p. 193. Barkley, p. 155. 120 .

One evening Roosevelt contacted Farley by telephone:

Jim, I want you to call Ed Kelly of Chicago right now. It’s necessary to get him to put the pressure on Senator Dieterich to get him to vote for Barkley. 1 can’t do it, I said. I said I wouldn’t turn a hand either way, for Barkley or Harrison. Dieterich’s weakening, all we need is a phone call. I can’t help it, I can’t call Kelly. You mean you won’t, the President said in hurt accents. Boss, I just can’t, I protested. I gave my word- -my word to Harrison, Barkley, Byrnes, and Guffey on the train. You yourself said it was right for me to take no sides. Very well, he said curtly. I ’ll get Harry Hopkins to do it. 92

Several days later Senator Dieterich confided that • - 93 Kelly had called and persuaded him to switch to Barkley.

By the close vote of thirty-eight to thirty-seven, Barkley

94 • won.

This victory was not enough, for Senator Barkley

lacked Robinson’s experience. On June 14, 1937# a majority

of the Judiciary Committee of the Senate issued a scathing ■ • . 95 report concerning the evils of the President's Court proposal.

92 Ed Kelly, Mayor of Chicago, 1933-1947; Senator Dieterich of Illinois; Senator Harrison of Mississippi; Sena­ tor Barkley of Kentucky; Senator Byrnes of South Carolina; Senator Guffey of Pennsylvania. Parley, Jim Parley’s Story, p. 92. 93 New York Times, May 26, 1938, p. 1. Byrnes, p.99. Barkley, p. 158° Farley, Jim Parley's Story, p. 92. 94 New York Times, July 22, 1937, p. 1. Gosnell,p.169 Farley, Jim Farley’s Story, p. 92. 95. ' " Moley, After Seven Years, p. 362.. 121 On July 22, the Senate voted to recommit the bill to the

Judiciary Committee by a vote of seventy to- twenty-one. And

so ended for all practical purposes the Court fight. This was Roosevelt’s first major defeat as President. He never 96 forgot it.

In the face of the new majority the older justices

resigned one by one as the decisions showed that they had merely become dissenters. The resignation of Justice Van

Deventer was followed by the appointment of Senator Black to the vacancy and marked the end of the conservative domina- 97 . tion.

Although the Supreme Court fight was over in actu­ ality, it lived on in the President’s mind. Outwardly he was 98 as gay as ever; inwardly he was seething. He also resented

the opposition and final defeat he experienced in his Wage

and Hours Bill and the Administration Reorganization pro­ posal. The men advising him these days including Thomas

Corcoran, Harry Hopkins, and Harold Ickes all encouraged him to go ahead with. "The Purge". There was no doubt of his ani­ mosity toward those who were willing to run on a liberal

party platform with him and then vote against the very

96 Ibid. Connally, p. 192. 97 New York Times, July 22, 19379 p . 2. Connally, p. 190. Richberg, pp. 224-225. 98 Stokes, p. 486. Parley, Jim Parley’s Story, p. 96. 99 platform pledges on which they had been elected.

After the Court defeat, Roosevelt began summoning

Senators and Congressmen to the White Ho.use to discuss vari­ ous matters. Invariably he would make some suggestion that those who had opposed him had better be on guard. It was not so much what he said as what he left unsaid. What he left unsaid was relayed to Capitol Hill. There his comments 100 were searched for hidden meanings.

The President enjoyed his game thoroughly. During a luncheon with Parley he commented:

I ’ve got them on the run, Jim, he beamed. They go out of here talking to themselves, memorizing my lines to repeat, up on the Hill. I ’d Tike to see the faces sag over my mumbo-jumbo. They have no idea what’s going to happen and are beginning to worry. They’ll be sorry, yet. 101

Parley made it clear to the President that he wanted nothing to do with the purge, and Ed Flynn expressed 102 similar feelings.

Roosevelt did not undertake a large-scale operation.

He was selective in determining who he wanted to be punished.

99 New York Times, May 29, 1938, p. 3. Rosenman, Working With Roosevelt, p. 176. Moley, After Seven Years, p. 359. Rauch, Roosevelt, From Munich to Pearl, p. 72. 100 Parley, Jim ParTey’s Story, p. 96. 101 Ibid. 102 New York Times, May 27, 1938, p. 1. Ibid. June 14, 1938, p. 2. Flynn, p. 164. Rosenman, Working With Roosevelt, p. 176. Parley, Jim Parley’s Story, p. 122. 123 Several men were marked for "purging”; Included were Senators

Millard E . Tydings of Marylands Frederick VanNuys of Indiana,

Guy M, Gillette of Iowa§%George Morris of Nebraska, Ellison

D, Smith of South Carolina and Representative John O ’Connor ■v;' ■■ , 103 of New York.

Inconsistency marked the whole crusade. Nine Sena­ tors who were up for reeleetibn in 1938 had taken a position

against the Court plan and were presumably marked for punish­ ment. Yet Roosevelt did not attempt to damage all of them, at least publicly, although the New Dealers did seek pri­ vately to punish all opposition. They found themselves against too heavy odds in the ease of men such as Senators

Bennett C. Clark of Missouri, Alva B. Adams of Colorado, and

Patrick McCarran of NejFada, all of whom won easily. The ven-, geance crusade not only, lacked consistency, but most of all it lacked political finesse, management and preparation.

Perhaps the crusade’s defeat can be largely traced to 104 Farley’s failure to participate. Garner confided in

Farley:

The Boss has stirred up a hornet’s nest by get­ ting into these primary fights, there are now twenty men - Democrats - in the Senate who will vote

103 New York Times, June 29, 19384 p . 1. Gosnell, p. 170. Farley, Jim Parley’s Story, pp. 120-125. 104 Stokes , pp . 492 and 499 ° New York Times, June 29, 19383 p. 1. Ibid. August 16, 1938, p. 18. Ibid, Septem­ ber 9, 1938, p. 1. Rauch, Roosevelt from Munich to Pearl, p . 72. 124 against anything he wants because they are mad clean through.. The feeling Is becoming intensely bitter. It’s downright unhealthy. Jim, I think you ought to take exception to the President’s attitude. I think you should do so for the good of the party and this country. 105

Farley replied,

John, I just can't do that unless I resign from the Cabinet and the Democratic Committee. I don’t like the purge any more than you do, but the situa­ tion won’t be helped by my breaking with the Boss. I think I can render the best service by carrying on impartially until after the elections are over and then determine what is best for me to do at that time. Until then there is nothing for me to do but go on as I have been doing. I will do my best to hold the party together. 106

The purgers worked industriously but got nowhere . 107 Their score in the primaries was a succession of defeats.

As a matter of fact, Roosevelt won only one victory in his

"purge," that of Representative John J. O ’Connor. As a mem­ ber of the House Rules Committee, O ’Connor had been extremely influential in blocking Presidential recommendations. He had also been quite free in his criticism of Roosevelt.

Corcoran had induced James H. Fay to enter the primary against O ’ Connor. The contest was not going well in Fay’s favor so the President urged Ed Flynn to conduct the campaign.

Ed was opposed to the President’s meddling in local affairs, but was finally persuaded to take over. His help was given

105 Farley, Jim Parley’s Story, p. 137» 106 Ibid. 107 Ibid., p. 107. : ' 125. upon the eond.ition that l!Corcoran or any of his ilk" stay out of 'it, otherwise he threatened to immediately withdraw.

Roosevelt promised no interference from Corcoran or himself. 108 This ultimately proved to be Roosevelt’s only victory.

The President lost the battle of the "purge" due to localism, provincialism, state pride, local party organi­ zation, mass communications and intensive campaigning by the desperate victims of the intended purge. These individuals proved to be stronger than the national party loyalty and the 109 appeals of the President.

Parley supported Roosevelt in his drive for Court re­ form but balked when it came to the party purge. Perhaps the reason for this was that the Court-packing issue was a matter of public principle and policy, while the purge was concerned with party unity and personal loyalty. Farley was a strong 110 party man and during his life had experienced many loyalties.

He knew from the beginning that Roosevelt had violated a sound political doctrine which demanded that he keep out of 111 local affairs. Finally, the purge emphasized the great.

. 108 New York Times, August 19, 1938, p. 1. Ibid, September 10, 1938, p. 2. Flynn, p, 165. 109. New York Times, September 14, 1938, p. 22. Rosenman, Working With Roosevelt, p. 179. Gosnell, p. 171. 110 Moley, 27 Masters, p. 109. Raymond Moley, "Mr. Farley Lives and Learns," Newsweek, June 30, 19473 p. 84. Ill New York Times, June 9, 1938, p. 4. Stokes, p.486 . Farley, Jim Farley’s Story , p . 146. 126. rift that had developed in the Democratic party between the liberal and the conservative factions. Farley represented

112 . the conservative side 3 and Roosevelt the liberal.

The 1938 Congressional election day finally came.

Farley was stationed in his office at the BiItmore waiting for the election results. Lehman managed to win the governor­ ship of New York by 68,000 votes. Senator Wagner of New York came through as well„ Elsewhere3 there was little for the

Democrats to rejoice about, The Republicans won eighty-one

House seats, eight in the Senate, and eleven governorships.

It was a considerable victory, but the Democrats were still 113 in control. Republican gains were made in the rural areas of the Northwest and in the Midwest, Democratic candidates 114 in the urban centers were better able to hold their own.

At a Cabinet meeting, held November 11, 1938,

Roosevelt declared that he thought that the Democrats' de­ feats were due to local problems. "Well, I've been giving a lot of time to the study of the election returns and I find they demonstrate the result around the country was due in . 115 every case to local conditions." He then continued to

112 Rosenman, Working With Roosevelt, p. 18Ov 113 Farley, Jim Farley's Story, p. 148. 114 Merriam and Gosnell, pp. 114-1.15. 115 Burns, p . 366. Farley, Jim Farley's Story, p .149 . 127 name several states and the local cause for each state going 116 Republican.

Parley hoped now that the attempt to. build up a personal machine would be abandoned and once again efforts to re-build the party would begin. However, the "pUrger" group in the White House had their goal fixed on a third term. From this point on, Farley wrote, "The President be­ gan to see less and less of me ^ as if I were to blame for the defeat I had counseled against, and to see more and more 117 of those actually responsible for the November rout."

Although the President was still outwardly very friendly,

Farley’s appointments came further and further apart. He was no longer consulted and found himself without a voice in 118 political policy.

116 Farley, Jim Farley’s Story, p. 149. 117 Ibid., p. 150. Stokes, p. 486. 118 Parley, Jim Farley’s Story , p . 150. CHAPTER IV

PARTING OF WAYS

After the Presidential election in 1936 members, of the Democratic party began to look forsard to the National

Convention of 1940. At that time there was no thought of a third term for Roosevelt. It was politically wise and proper for men to begin to make plans if they wished to bring about 1 their own nominations for the Presidency or Vice-Presidency.

Farley.undoubtedly thought a great deal about what should be done in 1940 at the National Convention. He felt, as every­ one else did, that Roosevelt would retire, and a new ticket would be named. As National Chairman, Farley was aware of who might be prospective nominees for 1940. He knew his own nomination for one of the two highest political offices in 2 the country was a strong possibility.

In 19373 Roosevelt called Farley to the White House and encouraged him to run for the Governorship of New York.,

The President told him that his services as National Chairman and Postmaster General were insufficient preparation for the presidency. He also suggested that if Farley did not want

1 Flynn, p. 166. 2 Ibid. Stanley High, Roosevelt - and Then? (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1937)s p. 285.

128 tlae governorship he might be able to win the nomination for

United States Senator from Mew York. Farley, replied that he had to start thinking pf his personal finances and that the salaries Involved in either of these offices would not be 3 sufficient to pay off his debts and provide a secure future.

Garner remarked later about this meeting, that it appeared that the President was trying to get. Farley out of the way 4 for the 194© election.

Another reason which prompted Parley to refuse con­ sideration of the governorship was the fact that Mrs. Farley did not want to live in Albany and was not interested in the social life that a governor’s wife would be involved in.

She preferred that her husband return to private business and 5 life.

Roosevelt felt that Parley should have taken his ad­ vice. Farley, on the other hand, believed that he had done the right thing. The coolness between these two men be­ came even more apparent than before and led to a definite rift in the party between the regular organization Democrats 6 and the New Dealers.

3 Rauch, Munich to Pearl Harbor, p. 88. Farley, Jim Farley's Story, p. 110..

Farley, Jim Farley’s Story, p. 111. 5 . New York Times, June 19s 1931, P • 18. Ibid., August 11, 1939, p. 2. Ickes, II, 307. Farley, Jim Farley's Story, p. 143. High, p. 283. MicheIson, p. 161. 6 ' Flynn, p. 168. In Jimes 1937s- the third terra question was placed before the nation at a White House press conference when a newspaperman asked:

Mr. Presidents would you care to comment on Gov­ ernor Earle‘s suggestion that you run for a third term? ’The weather Is very hot,' the President replied laughingly = ’Mr. Presidents would you tell us now If you would accept a third term?’ spoke up Robert Post of the New York Times. ’'Bob Post should, put on a dunce cap and stand in the corner,’ was the Presidential reply. 7

These incidents only provoked more third terra speculation.

In the beginning of 1939$ Roosevelt faced some difficult de­ cisions. According to the two-term tradition he had two more years left in the White House, and he was making plans to re­ turn to private life. While the White House had been stimu­ lating and enjoyable, Washington climate was not considered 8 the most healthful nor the most pleasant.

Who would carry on the program which he had worked so hard to establish? He could sense the competition among his

Cabinet members for the vied for position so soon to be vacant. Hull, Garner, and Farley were contenders, but 9 Zoosevelt considered them top conservative. Harry Hopkins

7 Governor Earle of Pennsylvania. Burns, p. 409. Farley, Jim Farley's Story, p. 152. Baseom N. Timmons, Garner of Texas; a Personal History (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), p. 251. 3 Rosenman, Working With Roosevelt, p. 200. Gosnell, p. 173. 9 Gosnell, p. 173» 131 was the President 's, closest confident at the time5 but

Roosevelt never took Hopkins as a serious Presidential pros- . 10 .■ . : pect. For a short time s Hopkins considered running, but 11 abandoned the idea due to his ill health.

The foreign situation with the imminenc# of war and

United States involvement was always in the back of the

President Vs mind.,.- Harley, and Rosenman. wrote, that they be­ lieved Roosevelt would not have run for the Presidency in

1940 if it had not been for the pressing international prob- 12 lerns,, Grace Tully5 the President's secretary, said:

If the world had remained at peace .1 am sure that Mr. Roosevelt would have retired in January, 1941, to the quiet Hudson River countryside which he loved so much more than the clattering Washington political scene. 13.

Burns asserted that his interpretation of Roosevelt's per­ sonality led him to believe that even if there had been no intensified international crisis, Roosevelt would have run

It is inconceivable to me that a man still in his prime, conscious of Theodore Roosevelt's difficulties after quitting the Presidency, eager to play a role on the international scene, and not very confident of

10 Moley, 27 Masters of Politics, p. 4l. 11 Robert 1. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins (lew York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), pp. 92-99 and 938-39. Timmons, p. 249= Rosenman, p. 203. 12 . Barkley, p. 185. Rosenman, Working With Roosevelt, p. 203. 13 , / , V Tully, p. 236. , 132 the abilities of his possible successorss would give up the nomination to someone else, 14

There was much speculation as to when the President actually decided to run. Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, recorded in his memoirs, that it appeared to him that

Roosevelt decided to run for a third term sometime in late

Jun#, 1940,. 15 Garner felt that Roosevelt had decided to run 16 as early as June, 1939« Flynn asserted in his autobio­ graphy that he believes Roosevelt made his final decision 17 sometime in April or May, 1940. Rosenman assumed Roosevelt was willing to accept the nomination by the beginning of 18 summer, 1940.

What were the President’s thoughts on the matter?

By 1940,. his intentions were a national guessing game.

Most of the speculators assumed that Roosevelt had made his decision to run or not to run. Burns says that, "these 19 people didn’t know their man," Remarking further. Burns’ said:

Roosevelt was not one to make a vital political

14 Burns, p. 533. 15 Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York The Macmillan Comp., 1948), I, 859. *™ 16 Timmons, p. 25.8. 17 Flynn, p. 168. 18 Rosenman, Working With Roosevelt, p. 200. 19 Burns, p. 409. 133 decision years or even months in advance and then stick to that decision through thick and thin. His method through most of his career was to keep open alternative lines of action, to shift from one line to another as conditions demanded, to protect his route to the, rear in case he wanted to make a sudden retreat, and, foxlike, to cross and snarl his trail in order to hide his real intentions. More than any situation Roosevelt ever faced, the third term de- • manded this kind of delicate handling. 20

The President’s decision was to remain silent. By keeping alive the possibility of running he could protect his political power both on the domestic and international 21 scene.

Though Farley complained that Roosevelt found fault with any prospective Democratic nominee for 1940, Burns said ■ "" ■ 2 2 : it was just to the contrary. Roosevelt encouraged several individuals to make a bid for the presidency. This tactic was to strengthen his own position by the method of divide and conquer. With a host of contenders wrestling for dele­ gates, he could win, without trying, because delegates wanted a neutral figure to support until they could see what the ' 23 ■ - future would bring.

The President never closed the door completely on the possibility ofhhis own availability. Yet he told friends

21 Ibid., p. 411. 2 2 v : Parley, Jim Farley’s Story, p. 152. 23 Burns, p. 411, Paul H. Appleby, "Roosevelt’s Third Term Decision,” The American Political Science Review, IVL (September, 1952), 755-65. ~ and visitors time and again that he neither desired nor in­ tended to run. At tiae same time he pressed for Chicago as the Democratic Convention site because Ed Kelly could be . 24 relied on to fill the galleries with Roosevelt supporters.

The. fall of France to Hitler’s armies three weeks before the Democratic National Convention caused much concern

Apparently by this tiige, the President had convinced himself 25 that he was the only man for the Job. He let it be known indirectly to his intimates that a third term would be ac­ ceptable but that he would not actively seek i t . It must appear to be. a definite draft. He did not want to go through the preeonvention primary battles as he had done in 1932s but he did not say that he would not accept a nomination for a third term if it were given to him without any effort on 26 ; his part.

The third term issue came out in the open in October,

19399 when Secretary of Agriculture, Wallace told an audience that the war situation made it clear that the President was needed for another term. Secretary lekes had been urging a third term since the summer of 1938. He too, believed dan­ gers from abroad made continuation of Roosevelt’s leadership necessary. Harry Hopkins, having abandoned his own ambition

2 4 Edward Kelly, Mayor of Chicago. Burn, p. 412. Ickes, III, 122.i,. Leuchtenburg, p. 315. 25 Byrnes, p. 118. Cosnell, p. 175. 26. Gosnell, p. 175. 135 for the offlee 3 publicly advocated a third terra in Junes

1939. Thus the most important leaders of the "left-wing” or

New Deal group around the President were unified in favor of 27: another terra.

Undoubtedly, the actions of the New Dealers sur­ rounding the President were not entirely uhselfish. They had assumed positions of power in the government which they did not want to give up. Their relationship to the President was a personal one and depended, not on the party, but on the support of Roosevelt. Only the President's re-election could 28 keep them there.

Roosevelt's prib.lem, in the event he finally decided to run, was to bring about a unanimous party draft that 29 would offset the anti-third terra sentiment. Unfortunately for the President, he could not openly do anything to bring about this draft. To do so would only strengthen the op- 30 position's fear that he was grasping too much power.

The No-third-termers were led by Parley, Garner, and

Hull. Hull was a cautious man. He was slow to take action but tenacious when committed to someone or something. Hull, sixty-eight years of age, was aware that he had only a few

27 Hull, I, 858. Tugwell, p. 532. 28 Flynn, p. 169. 29 Burns, p. 413. Tugwell, p. 532 .. 30 Burns, p. 413. 31 years left In his political career. He stood for the old 32 South and feared the "radicalism" of the New Deal.

Earner9 seventy-one years old9 yet strong and robust g spoke

for the new Southwest with its prairie skyscrapers9 huge ter­

minals and oil wells. He looked upon the New Deal as anti-

individualistic and anti-capitalistic. Farleys only fifty-

one years old, was tireless and extremely popular throughout .

the country. He was closely allied to urban politicians who were more interested in getting votes than in policies and programs. These three men had little in common ideologically 33 except varying degrees of disenchantment with the New Deal.

Earners while hopeful for the Presidency 3 was intent 34 mainly on stopping Roosevelt from winning a third term.

Hull would accept the Presidential nomination if he did not

have to struggle for it. Parley wished to get the Demo­

cratic nomination but realized if he consented to be the

Vice-Presidential candidate on the same ticket with either

Hull or Earner9 he would have a good opportunity for the 35 Presidency four years later. - During 1939 and early 1940

these men conferred frequently. Each boosted each other's

Hullj 1 9 32 Ibid.9 p 33 Burns 9 p . 413. 34 Timmons 9 pp. 246 and 26.2. 35 ■ ' Farleys Jim Farley’s Story, p. 153» Sherwood3 p. 95. morale and. strengllaened eaela ether’s resentments at Roosevelt slights. They, mnited not against the President but against the ruthless men who, they told one another, were leading ..3.6 their leader, astray.

At the end of 1938, it appeared that the Democratic nominee for President would be Garner, Hull, or Farley. This was the result of polls, and the opinions of political lead- 37 ers and writers.

In July, 1939, Farley, and flee-President Garner met for lunch. Their conversation soon turned to Roosevelt’s re- election. Garner, remarked that he was not interested in be­ coming president himself and that he could not support a third term for Roosevelt. He told Parley that he intended to lead the opposition if it became necessary. Parley disclosed that he too was against another term for the President since this had been an American tradition adhered to since the Con- 38 stitution was written.

In the.days that followed,- the newspapers and maga­ zines were full of stories about the coolness between

Roosevelt and Farley. in July, 1939 the President asked

Farley to Hyde Park for a visit, perhaps to abate the specu-

36 ' : ■ Burns, p . 4l4. 37 Farley, Jim Parley's Story, p. 153. Timmons, p.252 38 Farley, Jim Farley's Story, p. 172. lation eoiaeeraing their relationship. Several matters were discussed, and when; they finally get around to talking about the election, Roosevelt said secretively, "Of course, I will not run for a third term." Upon his departure, Farley knew that the third term issue could not be settled until the 40 President declared himself one way or the other publicly.

On December 8, 1939, Farley and Hull conferred on their mutual dilemma. Hull expressed his dislike of the idea of Roosevelt's being re-elected. Farley replied, "I will do all I can to get delegates for myself. At least that is what

I think would be best. I think you and Garner should do the same. Then the three of us can sit down and determine what %1 is best for the country and the party,” Farley thoroughly believed that if Hull had declared himself a possible candi­ date and allowed his friends to work for him, that he could 42 have easily won the nomination.

On December 1 7 i 19399 Garner announced his willing- 43 ness to be a candidate in the 1940 election. When the

President asked his Postmaster General his opinion about

39 , New York Times, July. 24, 19399 p . 1. Parley, Jim Farley's Story, p. 180.

“ ~ ~ w ~ ~ Farley, Jim Parley's Story, p. 190. 41 Ibid., p. 214. Hull, I, 861. 42 Parley, Jim Farley's Story, p. 215. 43 Timmons, p. 262. 139 Garner’s action,. Farley, said, "I am convinced he made his announcement only because, of his opposition to the third term. I think he Just wants everyone to understand that he is willing to let his name go before the convention, if 44. necessary to stop a third term."

A few weeks later during a conference with Roosevelt,

Parley asked the President if he had any objection to his placing his own name in the 1940 competition. Roosevelt laughed, "Go ahead, Jim, the water’s fine. I haven’t an ob- 45 - Jection in the world." Soon after, a close acquaintance told Parley that Roosevelt had remarked to him that he Just could not say no to his Postmaster General when Parley asked 46 his sanction on entering the 1940 nomination race.

The President dismissed Garner's candidacy as impos­ sible, probably because Roosevelt and Garner had developed a mutual dislike for each other toward the end of Roosevelt’s second term. They had little contact except at Cabinet meetings, where Garner frequently argued fiercely withthe

President. By early 1940 even official relations between the 47 two men had nearly ceased.

Hull, Roosevelt indicated, would be his choice for a

44 Parley, Jim Parley’s Story, p. 217. 45 Ibid., p. 203. 46 Ibid., p. 224. 47 Burns, p. 4l4. 140 .

successor. Howeyers tie President knew Hull would pose

little competition since the Secretary of State thought it

incompatible with his position to campaign for the nomination.

Hull, knowing that Roosevelt's support was all he needed, 48 chose to take no action.

Parley was a problem for the President. Roosevelt

did not want to lose this v#ry valuable organizer. He could

not offer Farley, the viee-rpresidency because the Constitution

bars Presidential electors from any state voting for both a

President and Vice-President who are residents in the same

state with themselves. Thus New fork electors could not vote

for both Roosevelt for President and Parley, for Vice-Presi- 49 dent. All of Parley's hopes for the nomination hinged on

Roosevelt's not being a candidate. The President hoped to

offset his Postmaster General by insisting that he would not ■ -- 50 . ■ ; ' . -Ban again.

Directly following Parley’s entry into the 1940 con­

test, an article written by the President's official bio­

grapher, Ernest K. Lindley, was published. The article was

supposed to have been inspired by a conversation between

RooseveIt and Congressman Bob Doughton of North Carolina.

Parley remarked that the article hurt his feelings very much.

48 Ibid. 49 U.S. Constitution, Amendment XII. 50 Burns, p .• 4l4. 141

Not only its contents, but the fact that it was supposed to have been initiated by the President and that Roosevelt made 51 no attempt to alter that impression. The article said that the President would not run again unless Britain were in­ vade d3 that Hull was his choice for his successor, that the

Vice-Presidency lay between Robert Jackson, Paul V. McNutt, and Burton K . Wheeler, and finally that Parley was not a good proppeet for the Vice-Presidency because of his religious affiliation. He felt that in the event of Parley’s nomination, people might say that the Democrats were using Cordell Hull . 52 "as a stalking horse for the Pope." Roosevelt refused to comment on this story the next day. Several days later, and much too late, he discredited the story by saying it was not 53 true.

Parley’s first reaction to Bindley’s article was to have a conference with the President and tell him exactly what he thought of it, but upon reflection he decided to keep his temper and see what would happen. On March 8, 1940, at a

Cabinet meeting Parley showed his irritation and resentment by refusing to participate actively in the conversation and

51 ■ ' ■ Parley, Jim Parley’s Story, p. 225. 52 Ibid. New York Times, March 6, 1940, p. 1. New York Times, March 8, T940, p. 8. "Parley’s Defiance of Pres­ ident Heightens Democratic Discord," Newsweek, April 1, 1940, p p . 13—14. 53 Rosenman, Public Papers, IX, 108-110. New York Times, March 20., 1940, p. 23. 142 answered the President’s questions in abrupt remarks.

R©osevelt3 sensing his feelings shrugged and went on to the next Cabinet member. From then on. Parley wrote, he was virtually ignored by the President and only saw him when ab­ solutely necessary at Cabinet meetings. Farley stayed away from Washington and any contact with Roosevelt as much as 54 possible.

Upon relating his problems to Cordell Hull, the Sec­ retary of State replied:

God, Jim, you don’t know what troubles are. Roosevelt is going directly to Welles and Berle. I was never even consulted on Welles’ trip to Europe. Then h e ’s bypassing me by going id. Ambassadors. He’s in.communication constantly with British lead­ ers and others. He doesn’t consult with me or con­ fide in me and I have to feel my way in the dark. 55

In November, 1939$ a Gallup poll among voters listed in Who's Who in America revealed that fifty-four per cent of those questioned expected Roosevelt to run and fifty-five per cent felt that he would be defeated. Only twenty-one - 56 per cent said they would vote for him. Another Gallup poll conducted in April, 1940, found forty-seven per cent of the voters favorable to the idea of a third term. Undoubtedly the issue had changed dramatically since the outbreak of war.

54 . Farley, Jim Farley's Story, p. 232. 55 Sumner Welles and Adolf Berle, members of the State Department under Secretary of State Hull. Farley, Jim Farley’s Story, p. 2 33. . 5i New York Times, November, 26, 1939$ p. 1. before whieb surveys.indieated that the country was two to - . 57 one against a Roosevelt third term. A poll of American newspaper editors at the same time found si:fty-three per cent of the opinion that Roosevelt would toe nominated; only eighteen per cent said he should toe nominated.

Numerous demands were presented to the President in one form or another inducing him to. run. The Georgia Demo­ cratic Executive Committee named a special committee to urge 59 Roosevelt to accept the nomination. In Maine the Demo­ cratic State Convention instructed its. delegates to the

National Convention to vote for Roosevelt. The California 60 primary resulted in a similar victory. Iowa’s twenty-two . ; 61 delegates were pledged to vote for the President as well.

A last minute. Gallup poll revealed that sentiment for a third term had risen sharply since the Nazi invasion of the low Countries and France on May 10.. In Augusts 19399 only forty per cent of the voters favored a third term; toy the end 62 of May, 1940, this figure had risen to fifty-seven per cent.

57 Ibid., April 12,. 1940, p. 3. 58 "What’s Your Bpinion?" Current History, LII (April, 19^0)., 46.-48. ■ 59 New York Times, April 26, 1940, p. 2». 60 Ibid., May 8, 1940, p. 1. 61 Ibid., May 9, 1940, p. 12.. 62 Ibid., June 5, 1940, p. 18. 144 In the summer, of 1940 the Republican Convention selected a Utilities Corporation Executives. Wendell Willkle, as their nominee. This was quite a surprise to Parley and others since Willkle was a relative newcomer to the Repub- 63 lican party.

As it became more and more apparent that Roosevelt intended to run for a third term. Parley decided upon a future course of action for himself. He decided to permit his name to go before the convention as evidence of his pro­ test against the third term. He also decided to leave the

Cabinet and resign his party Chairmanship. However, he also 64 declared that he would not work for the defeat of his party.

On July 1, 1940, Parley was contacted by Steve Early, the President's assistant, to arrange a meeting between the

President and Parley at Hyde Park. Upon their meeting,

Roosevelt confided that he could not issue a statement before this time on the third term, because it would have destroyed his effectiveness as leader of the nation in these trying times. He said further, "Jim, I don't want to run and I'm 65 going to tell the Convention so." "If you make it sped-, fic," Parley said bluntly, "the Convention will not nominate

63 Ibid., June 28, 1940, p. 1. Gosnell, p. 175. Clapper, Watching the World, p. 158. 64“ Parley, Jim Parley *s Story, p. 244. 65 New York Times, July 8, 1940, p. 1. Burns, p. 425. Parley, Jim Parley's Story, p. 249. 145 you." He then continued to tell Roosevelt that he was defi- 66 nitely opposed to the third term. Before Farley left,

Roosevelt, dropping all pretenses, said, "Jim, the family is not going to attend the Convention, undoubtedly I will accept the nomination by radio and will arrange to talk to the dele­ gates before they leave the convention hall after the nomi- 67 nation."

When Farley departed the President's home each man had gotten the information he wanted. Roosevelt knew that

Farley's name would be placed in nomination. Parley knew that Roosevelt would run, but wanted to be drafted to the 68 position. When Parley left for the Convention in Chicago, he was grimly determined that Roosevelt would not get that 69 kind of draft.

On July 16, 1940, the Democratic national Convention 7G convened in Chicago. Delegates, alternates, and spectators milled about,wondering what was going to happen. No one, in­ cluding those in the President's inner circle, knew what was expected of them. Mayor Kelly mentioned Roosevelt's name

66 Farley, Jim Parley's Story, p. 257. 67 Ibid.

68 ~ Burns, p. 425. 69 , ■ ^ k ;;ym:. Ibid. 70 New York Times, July 16, 1940, p ._1. Ibid., June 16, 1940, p. 3. 146 In his welcome to the delegates5 but even this did not change ■■ 71 the mood of the listless participants.

The rumor spread that Harry Hopkins was the man to 72 see if one wanted the answers. Howevers Roosevelt had given no final plan or instructions to anyones not even

Hopkins s because he was determined that the party must draft ■■ 73 him on its own. He would not stop Hopkins, Iekes, and others from working for his nomination, but neither would he aid them. Roosevelt’s indirect tactics were paying off.

No other strong candidate was available now, and even those who had little love for Roosevelt wanted,this great vote get- 74 ter to be their nominee.

It was clear to Parley that Harry Hopkins and James

Byrnes, the chief "third termers", were trying to win the nomination for Roosevelt by acclamation, in an effort to con­ vince the country there was a real draft for Roosevelt.

Farley disliked what he called the "hypocrisyH in what they were doing. Many delegates were sincerely in favor of the.

President running, wrote Farley, but he felt that the majority

71 Flynn, p. 170. Gosnell, p. 176. ■■ 72 . . Flynn, pi 171. Gosnell, p . 176 . I ekes, III, 24.0.. 73 Appleby, American Political Science Review, XLV, 757. Ickes, III, 246.’. Leuchtenburg, p. 316. — 74 Burns, p. 426. ' 75 were against Roosevelt’s nomination. Ed Flynn remarked in his autobiography:

I think it is only fair to say that a majority of the delegates in Chicago were not enthusiastically for the renomination of the President, although they felt that if they did not go along the party would be so hopelessly divided that no candidate would have a chance of winning. 76

Several Democratic leaders urged Farley.to step aside and let Roosevelt win for the unity and good of the party.

Only once did the President attempt to influence the pro­ ceedings at the convention. He telephoned Farley and ginger­ ly implied that there might be no need for a ballot. ’’Th a t ’s perfectly silly," replied Farley curtly. Roosevelt let the 77 matter drop.

Farley appeared to be the main obstacle to a unani­ mous nomination, but he was determined to stay in the running for various reasons. First, he felt that if he stepped aside he would lose the respect of his family, friends, and every­ one who knew him, since he had publicly announced months be­ fore that he would be a nominee. He could not go back on his word. Second, this was his only way of expressing his dislike of the third term without coming out flatly against it. If he had done the latter, the Republicans would have

75 Farley, Jim Farley’s Story, p. 26.1. 76 Flynn, p . 171. 77 Burns, p. 426,. Parley, Jim Farley ’s Story, p. 259 • 148 78 used his words to defeat his party.

Moley said j

Only the politically naive supposed that Farley had the remotest idea that he himself stood a chance of being the Democratic nominee5 or that he had^at that late date any desire to be nominated. The sin­ gle question was which of the contending forces with­ in him would win - the party code of loyalty or the inward conviction that the President should not be nominated. 79

Carter Glass, senior Senator of Virginia, was asked

to place Farley’s name in the running. Attempts were made by

the third-termers to prevent Glass from coming to the Con- 80 vention, thus leaving Farley without his chosen nominator.

Roosevelt authorized Senator Barkley, the permanent

chairman, to read his official statement. This message was heard on the radio by millions of Americans. It stated that

the President had no desire to run; thus he was releasing all

of the delegates pledged to him. Only upon prodding from

Frances Perkins, Secretary of Labor, did Roosevelt contact

Farley, the organizer of the Convention, to let him know that

the White House statement would be read that evening. The

strategy of the message, was obvious to Farley. Barkley was

one of the best orators of the day. After a few minutes of

speaking and upon mention of Roosevelt’s name demonstrations

78 Farley, Jim Farley's Story, p. 259. 79 Raymond Moley, "The Faith of Mr. Farley," Newsweek, XVI. (August 5, 1940), 56.

’ 80 Farley, Jim Farley's Story, p. 273° started in several delegations3 and soon after9 banners were 81 being marched down the aisles to. the tune of FDR-Jones..

Gradually the aisles of the Convention were filled up by 82 strangers with concealed cardboard banners.

Perhaps a principal factor in making the Convention

appear as it did was the packing of the galleries by the

McNutt crowd. Appleby recalls being given a cardboard tic­

ket after the close of the final session by one of the McNutt

leaders. It was one of the 3*500. unofficial and illegal

tickets of admission to the Convention galleries that had been

printed by McNutt supporters. One gateman had agreed to honor them. These tickets were issued to the McNutt crowd,

the members of which had come through the one gate early 83 enough to. occupy a large part of the gallery. Also Mayor

Kelly of Chicago was responsible for hundreds of people being

in the galleries with banners bearing the inscriptions, 84 . 11 Roosevelt and Humanity .n

After Barkley read the President's statement, a

silence.fell over the Convention. Suddenly, over the loud 85 speakers a voice thundered, "We want Roosevelt." For

81 Ibid., p. 280. Barkley, p. 187. 82 Farley, Jim Farley * s Story, p. 83 Appleby, American Political Science Review, XLV, 760. Timmons, p. 275. 84 Timmons, p . 27.4 . . 85 ; Farley, , Jim Farley *s Story, p. 28.0. Burns, p.427 forty-five minutes the voice bellowed out, "Chicago wants

Roosevelt", "New York wants Roosevelt", "The world Meeds.

Roosevelt", "America needs Roosevelt", "Everyone wants

Roosevelt". The delegates and spectators poured on to the 86 floor forming parades of wildly cheering, banner-waving people.

Everyone was curious about the identity of the loud­ speaker voice. Reporters located its source in a small base­ ment room where the amplifier circuits were centered. There sat Thomas D . MeCarry, Chicago’s Superintendent of Sewers. 8? He had been stationed there by Mayor Kelly.

The next morning, July 17, 19^0, was destined to be what Parley calls the "political pinnacle" of his life.

After Roosevelt was formally nominated. Senator Glass, who was a very old and ill man started his nomination speech:

Mr. Chairman and members of the National Demo­ cratic Convention: There is no material consideration and few spiritual reasons that can draw me from a sickroom halfway across the continent to speak a brief word to this National Convention of the great Democratic party. 88

He was interrupted by disrespectful boos from the convention floor. Suddenly his voice boomed as the microphone was lower­ ed closer to.his face. He continued by praising Parley and

"By Acclamation," Time, July 29., 1940, pp. 11-13. Burns, p. 428. 87 George Creel, Rebel at Large (New York: G.P. Put- namfe Sons, 1947), P* 312.. Perkins, p. 129. Burns, p. 428:. Parley, Jim Parley’s Story, p . 281.

Parley, Jim Parley’s Story, p. 288. 151 placing bis name in nomination. He also chided those who Had objected to Farley.'s nomination because he was a Catholic.

The applause was short but Farley remarked that at least it was genuine„ Immediately following Farley's nomination,

Millard S. Tydings, Senator from Maryland, Hull, and Garner were nominated. One hour and ten minutes later the first and only ballot was completed, and the results were: Roosevelt,

946;. Farley, seventy-two; Garner, sixty-one;. Tydings, nine; 89 and Hull, five..

Before his nomination Farley asked Barkley if he could be recognized after the roll call. He wanted to move that the nomination of Roosevelt be. made unanimous after the roll call to show everyone that what he had done was a matter of principle and that he was not a bad loser. Upon his address to the convention to declare Roosevelt the new candidate by a unanimous decision, Farley was given a stand­ ing ovation of praise and he was congratulated for several 90 hours following.

The next day, while conversing with the President over the telephone, Roosevelt disclosed to Farley that since

Hull had refused the Vice-Presidency under any circumstances, he had chosen Henry A. Wallace, Secretary of Agriculture, to

89 Ibid. New York Times, July l8!j 1940, pp.5 and 1. Creel, p. 312. Burns, p. 428. Luuehtenburg, p. 316. 90 . . New York Times, July 18, 1940, p. 3« Burns, p.428. Farley, Jim Farley's Story, p. 29.2. be his new running partner. Farley objected saying Wallace was an impractical man and considered a mystic by most people who knew him. Other political leaders were aghast when they learned of the President’s decision. They considered Wallace an inarticulate philosopher9 a political innocent and a 91 “screwball.” Farley, suggested instead, Jesse Jones, but

Roosevelt said he would not be acceptable due to his ill health. Farley remarked that he was not aware of such a problem, and that he pledged his support to Jones as Vice-

President » Later, when asked why Roosevelt had chosen

Wallace, Farley remarked, “Because there was less chance of

Wallace developing into a Presidential candidate than any— 92 one else."

Several others were Vice-Presidential hopefuls, in­ cluding Iekes, Paul V. McNutt of Indiana, Jesse Jones of

Texas, Byrnes, and Speaker Bankhead of Alabama. When the news spread that Roosevelt had chosen Wallace, most of the other hopefuls eventually dropped out one by one, but not in good humor. The delegates were in a surly mood. They had supported Roosevelt for the presidency, but now they wanted to select the. vice-president without interference. Mrs.

91 , Creel, p. 313. Burns, p. 428.. #lynn, p. 172. Ickes, III, 286. Hull, I, 860. Rosenman, Working With Roosevelt, pp. 215-218. . 92 Rosenman, Working With Roosevelt, p. 213« Farley, Jim Farley’s Story, pp. 293 and 380. Roosevelt spoke to some of the delegates trying to persmade them to vote for Wallace. She succeeded In calming them down 93 briefly. Roosevelt refused to change his mind since he felt that the Secretary of Agriculture 3 a dependable liberal, would appeal to the farm states where isolationist feeling 94 was strong.

McMutt withdrew M s name leaving the vice-presidential contest essentially between Wallace and Speaker Bankhead..

James Byrnes weaved in and out among the delegations saying that Roosevelt would not run unless Wallace would be his run­ ning mate. Bullied by the threat that Roosevelt might not run, the delegates designated Wallace for the position with a 95 vote of 627 out of a possible 1100.

To save, the future Vice-President from embarrassment,

Wallace was persuaded not to deliver his acceptance speech because of the bad temper of the delegates. Party leaders feared a mass demonstration against Wallace. Many of the party faithful left the Convention "bruised in mind and dis- 96 gusted at heart," especially the old-line party men.

93 Burns, p. 429,. Flynn, p. 172. Perkins, p. 138. 94 Burns, p. 428.. Earley, Jim Parley's Story, p. 299» ■ 95 Mew York Times, July 19, 1940, p. 1. Flynn, p .173. Burns, pp. 428-29, Byrnes, p. 124. 96 Barkley, p. 186. Flynn, p. 174. B u m s , p. 432. Farley, Jim Farley * s Story, p. 303. The next morning. Parley, resigned as Democratic

Mational Chairman. That same afternoon some newspapermen and women gave him a reception and presented him with a wooden plaque and a wrist watch. Parley was very pleased at such a 97 display of appreciation.

©n June 26, 1940, following a Cabinet meeting, the

President asked Parley to come into his office to talk.

Roosevelt proposed that he remain as Democratic National

Chairman in title, while a campaign manager would be appointed to do the actual work. This would enable him to go into pri­ vate business and still help the party. Parley refused, say­ ing it would be unwise to have divided authority at campaign headquarters and that he had definitely made up his mind to male, a clean break.

Roosevelt was a superstitious man» He believed that it was lucky to keep his campaigns the same. He wore the same clothing, used the same campaigning techniques, and most important of all, kept the same people around him. For this reason and also because Parley was a valuable colleague and worker, Roosevelt did all he could to keep him as his campaign, manager. He even sent Parley’s good friend Cardinal Mundelein to persuade him to give up his own ambitions and support

97 Farley, Jim Parley’s Story, p. 304. Burns, p. 436. 98 Farley, Jim Farley 1s Story, p. 308. 155 99. Roosevelt instead. Farley respectfully rebuffed the .Car­ dinal ’s plea by pleasantly pointing out that his political

100 . life was none of the church father's business.

Mrs Roosevelt also requested that he lend his name to the campaign. "Undoubtedly3" she said, "you’re the most pop­ ular man in the party, Jim. If you don't associate yoursfeif with the campaign, it will be construed as a break with 101 Franklin." u Farley refused her request with the. same rea­ sons he had given her husband.

On Thursday, August 1,1940,. Farley attended a meeting of the committee which had been named to pick a successor to the position of Chairman of the Democratic National Committee.

Once again Roosevelt attempted to press Farley into retaining the title of Chairman for the good of the party and of the nation. Farley, replied that he was willing to retain the

Chairmanship of the New York State Democratic Committee and that should be .siifficient evidence of his regard and affection

. 102 for the party. Ed Flynn was chosen hissuccessor as Chair­ man of the Democratic Committee.

Conducting the New York State campaign took a great

99 Mo ley, 27. Masters of Politics, p. 115 . 100 . Ibid., pp. 174-179. 101 Farley, Jim Farley's Story, p. 315. 102 Ibid., p. 320. New York Times, August 11, 1940, p . 3» New York Times, August 2, 1940, p. 1. deal of Farley’s time. He spent countless hours writing letters and contacting people.. Probably the most important letter in this period of his life was written August 7S 1940

It was then that he resigned his position in the:#abinet,

Roosevelt replaced him with Frank Walker a choice which 103 Farley approved of.

Farley took no part in the campaign beyond repeating that he would vote a straight ticket. He could not be per­ suaded to make any speeches, although he remained with the

Democratic National Committee for a month to help his suc­ cessor, Ed Flynn, with the committee’s work. Michelson com­ mented that this was a trying month for those working at headquarters. Flynn and Farley were old friends, and each was so afraid of treading on the other’s toes that nothing was accomplished. Farley felt that the planning should be done by the new Chairman, while Flynn did not wish to assert 104 any power while Farley was still functioning.

The campaign of 1940 was a bitter one, and few in

American history have, exceeded it in the amount of mud-sling­ ing that was indulged in. The Republican nominee frequently referred to his opponent as "the third-term candidate.11

WHlkie made a sweeping tour of the country., speaking so fre­ quently that his voice often gave out. Issues were subor-

103 New York Times, August 9 S 1940, p.. 7« Farley, Jim Parley’s Story, p. 325.. ~ — xoTT ~ . Mi ehe Is on , p . 16 0., dinated to personalities and the platforms were nearly iden- 10 5 tioal. The Repmhlicans, instead of criticizing

Roosevelt’s foreign policys preferred to aim their attack at

New Deal domestic policies. Many experts believe that if the

Republicans had taken advantage of the prevailing desire of

Americans to stay out of the war by fighting "interven­ tionism" with "isolationism" and thus giving the country a 106 clear choice, they would have had a chance to win.

At first, Roosevelt appeared reluctant to go on a campaign tour. Later, he abandoned this policy and visited several vital, defense industries and made speeches in eleven states before the election. He bitterly attacked what he termed the falsifications in the Republican charges against 107 his administration.

On November 5, 19^0, Roosevelt was re-elected by the overwhelming, electoral vote of 4#9 to eighty-two,

105 Charles W. Stein, The Third-Term Tradition (Me York: Columbia University Press, 1943), p . 336.

Stein, p . .337.

Ibid., p. 338. Rosenman, Public Papers, IX, 538-39. 108 New York Times, November 6, 19-40, p. 1. Stein, p. 339. SHAPTER V

THE 1942 NEW YORK CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION

Upon Parley's retirement from national polities in

1940 he Lad several lucrative Easiness offers to consider.

He ultimately decided to accept an offer from the Coca Cola ' ■ 1 Expert Corporation, a position which he still holds.

Parley remained active in state polities, howevers since he retained the eharimanship of the New York State Dem­ ocratic Committee. The New York State. Democratic Convention in 1942 proved to be what Parley described as "the most im­ portant political fight I was ever engaged in." Parleys as

State Chairmansupported Attorney General John J. Bennett for nomination for Governor along with the backing of most of the upstate county organization. Opposing this nomination were the President 9 Governor Lehmans Senators Robert Wagner9 and James Head; Ed Flynn, head of the Bronx organization 5 and 2 Michael J. Kennedy, the leader of Tammany Hall.

In August, 1942, Roosevelt made public his support of

Senator Mead for Governor; however, Flynn, Kennedy, and 3 Wagner had known that Mead was his choice early in July.

1 New York Times, August 11, 1940, p. 3. 2 Parley, J1m Parley1s Story, p. 34?. 3 New York Times, July 11, 1942, p . 1. . . 159 At this point9 Farley, had already received pledges of support

from chairmen of party organizations of fifty-one of the H ' sixty-two counties in the state.

Much to the dismay of Roosevelt *s supporters, the

President had witheId comment and support for a nominee too ' ' 5 long, thus giving Farley, plenty of time to gather support.

One Brooklyn leader said the President ”could have nominated

Jim Mead or Joe Doakes if he had spoken soon enough. But he 6 sat on the fence until too many county leaders were sewed up."

Governor Lehman did not wish to be a candidate, and

it was widely accepted that Bennett would be the new candi­ date since he was a strong party man and well liked by Demo­

cratic leaders. Bennett had stepped aside in the elections

of 1936 and 1938 at the request of the party’s leaders even 7 when the rank and file members wanted him for Governor.

Roosevelt told Farley that Bennett would not get. the

support of the American Labor Party and that he was not pop- 8 ular among some elements of the Democratic Party. Farley

4 Ibid. New York limes, July 19, 1942,. p. S. "Prelude to 1944," Time,. August 3, 1942", P« 18. 5 New York Times, July 19, 1942, p.- 7. Will Chasen, "Farley Picks a Loser," Nation, August 29, 194.2, p. 166. 6 . : Will Chasen, "Farley Picks a Loser," Nation, August 29, 1942, p. 166. 7 , Farley, Jim Farley’s Story, p. 347. ' . 8 — - - Ibid., p. 351. Gosnell, p. 192. New York Times, July 11, 1942, pi. 160 . disagreeds remarking that with Roosevelt*s blessing, Bennett 9 would have no trouble winning.

Within am hour after Mead announced his candidacy.

Parley, in talking to newspapermen, cited nine occasions when

Mead said he did not want to. be Governor, Mead is "scared” of the job, charged Parley, and he would make a "terrible” governor, Fariey. remarked further that he regarded the draft- 10 Mead move as a "piece of political fakery,”

Through June and July the Mew Dealers persuaded and argued with Bennett’s delegates to shift allegiance, but their efforts brought little success« Parley and Bennett de­ cided to go through with their nomination plans. Parley can­ vassed the sixty—two counties in New York and was confident that there would be few defections of those delegates who had

. 11 given him their pledge of support.

In up-state New York, the contest was regarded not only as a fight for present control of the state organization, but as a preliminary struggle to name a majority of the New

York State delegates in the Democratic National Convention 12 . ' in 1944,

9 Parley, Jim Parley’s Story, p . 351. 10 "Prelude to 1944,” Time, August 3, 1942, p, 18, ' 11 " ■ ■ ' , ' ' \ New York Times, July 11, 1942, p, 1. 12 Ibid. "Prelude to 1944,” Time,. August 3$ 1942, p. 18. " : . " ' ■" 161

Farley argued that every state organization should

have the freedom to manage Its own state and local affairs 13 without Interference from Washington. Roosevelt’s sup­

porters retorted that the President had a right to be inter- 14 ested in the affairs of his own state,

Prior to the convention, Farley made a Statement

saying that he expected 650 of the 1,014 delegates, to the 15 convention to vote, for Bennett „

On July 29., 1942, Farley called on A1 Smith to enlist his help in the struggle. Smith’s reply was that he did not want to get involved and that if he made any speeches they would probably cause more harm than good in view of his posi­ tion in the 1936 and 1940 election. Smith remarked:

Jimmy, this isn't a fight against Jack #ennett, but Roosevelt’s beginning of a fight for a fourth term for himself. And he ought to be devoting all his energies to the conduct of the war, as people feel; instead he's worrying about control of the lew York delegation in 1944. 16

On August 20, 1942, the lew York State Democratic

Convention was convened. The delegates were tense, sensing the fierce competition and bargaining among the political 17 leaders for votes.

13 lew York Times, July 19, 1942, p. 7. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid. 16 Parley, Jim Parley’s Story, p. 353° 17 lew York Times, August 20, 1942, p. 1. Roosevelt, hoping to bring about a solution to the dilemma, sent a letter to Governor Lehman suggesting that a eompromise candidate be proposed. His suggestions for a suitable prospect included: William 6 ’Dwyer, a former can­ didate for Mayor of New York City and former Brooklyn Dis­ trict Attorney ; Albert Conway, Associate Judge of the Court of Appeals; and Secretary of State Michael F, Walsh. All of 18 these men were residents of Brooklyn.

The Bennett forces refused this compromise offer.

Parley followed his candidate’s rejection of the proposal with, a prediction that Bennett would now win 670 of the 1,014 . 19 possible voters.

Two minutes before Senator Wagner stepped to the ros­ trum to place Mead’s name in nomination, he had a hurried discussion with Farley and pleaded that the chairman support : ■ 20 a compromise candidate. Farley once again refused.

Senator Wagner in placing Mead’s name in nomination said:

With our country in danger, I submit there is only one question before us and it is this: who in Albany can do most to help us dispel that danger and restore us to security? 21

18 Ibid. "Farley Wins," Time, August 31, 1942,pp.20-21. 19 "Farley Wins," Time, August 31, 19*2, pp. 20-21. 20 . Ibid. New York Times, August ,21, 1942, p. 12, 21 "Farley Wins," Time, August 31, 1942, pp. 20-31. This was a sad moment for the Mead crowd5 sinee Wagner’s last remark brought a great shout fr#m the floor"BennettI”s while the cries for Mead were completely drowned. A few delegates carrying Mead banners tried to parade but found themselves

22 . embarrassingly alone..

When it came time for the nomination of Bennett there was a great roar of cheering and applause. The delegates and spectators paraded for ten minutes cheering their choice 23 - for a candidate.

The result of the balloting was a decisive victory

' 24. for Bennett with a vote of 623 to 393» Representative

Michael J, Kennedy made a motion to make Bennett’s selection

■ 25 unanimous. His move was accepted. The Bennett, victory now gave Farley absolute, control of the Democratic State organi- 26 zation. Farley wrote that once again Roosevelt had made the mistake of meddling in local matters and had suffered a 27 humiliating defeat as a result.

Political leaders predicted that the coming 1942 .

gubernatorial election would cause a split in the Democratic

22 ; Ibid. 23 Ibid. . 24 Ibid. New York Timess August 21, 1942, p. 1 „ 25 New York Times, August 21, 1942, p. 1. 26 Ibid. "Farley Wins," Time, August 31s 1942,pp.20-21» 27 Farley, Jim Farley's Story, p . 358. Party. . Many felt that Parley had 11 deliberately scuttled” his party's chances of electing a Democratic governor in or- ' ■ • ' 29. der to get back at the President for his actions in 1940.

As Roosevelt and others had anticipated, leaders of the American Labor Party met and decided to reject Bennett as their candidate. Plans were made to select their own 30 nominee for the governorship. The 1942 .Congressional elec­ tion was a decisive Republican victory throughout the country.

The Democratic majority in the House and Senate was reduced 31 to the lowest since 1933« Thomas E. Dewey was elected 32 the new Republican Governor of Mew York. Probably the loss of New York State to the Republicans in 1942 could be partly attributable to the President's rather tardy support of

Bennett. However, internal dissensions within the Democratic

Party and the Republican's success in capitalizing on their opponents' mistakes explained why the Democratic party lost 34 . many votes in this election.

28. New York Times, August 22, 1942, p. 26. 29 . Will Chasen, "Parley Picks a Loser,"Nation, August 29, 1942, p. 166. 30 New York Times, August 22, 1942, p. 1. 31 Ibid., November 4, 1942,. p. 1. . • 32 ' . Gosnell, p. 193- New York Times, November 5, 1942, p. 1. 33 Parley, Jim Parley's Story, p.. 358. 34 Gosnell, p . 193- 165 On June 8, 19H4.y Parley resigned as New York State

Democratic Chairman, ,a post which he had held for fourteen years. This resignation ended a thirty-five year political

career. He had wanted to: resign before, but friends and 35 colleagues had persuaded him to continue for various reasons.

From the beginning of 19^3 speculations on the 1944 election were rampant. It was almost a certainty that

Roosevelt was considering a fourth term and would win unless a number of Democratic leaders formed a coalition to stop him. Such a confederation would have been difficult to organize and harder to hold together; consequently, it was 36 never begun. ,

Roosevelt’s violation of second term tradition was not as important an issue for the 1944 election as was his health. Several of his friends urged him not to consider 37 another term because of his failing physical condition.

Farley wrote in his second autobiography:

Anyone with a grain of common sense would surely realize from the appearance of-the President that he is not a well man and there is not a chance in the world for him to carry on for four years more and face the problems that a President will have before him; he just can’t survive another presidential term. 38

Farley, Jim Farley’s Story,,p. 364. New York Times, .June 9» 1944, p. 1. 36 Farley, Jim Farley’s Story, p. 359. 37 Gosnell, p. 195. Flynn, pp. 181-182. 38 Farley, Jim Farley’s Story, p. 365. 166

It was not until July 11, 1944, that Roosevelt made a statement that he would run for a fourth term if nominated.

Demoeratio National Shairman Robert Hannegan, New York National

Committeeman Ed Flynn, Postmaster General Walker and other prominent leaders were in charge of the Democratic National

Convention. Roosevelt was too busy with the war crisis to 39 pay much attention to political matters.

On July 15s 1944, Farley left New York for the

Chicago Convention. He was a delegate and had decided to vote against Roosevelt and oppose Wallace as a possible vice- presidential candidate, but refused to let his name go before the convention. Farley was not very active in the conven­ tion for fear that his friends would be put on Roosevelt's blacklist. Everywhere, leaders and delegates were restless 40 but resigned to the inevitability of Roosevelt's nomination.

Because Roosevelt's nomination was practically un­ contested, and because of his failing health, interest in the viee-presidential nomination was accentuated. It was appar­ ent that a determined effort would be made to oust Wallace.

Farley supported Majority Leader Barkley. Barkley, however, was never considered by the President since Barkley and

39 Gosnell, p . 19I . 40 New York Times, July 16, 1944, p. 26. Ibid., July 17. 1944,; p. 9. Ibid., July 18, 1944, p. 10. Ibid., July 21, 1944, p. 1. Parley, Jim Farley *s Story, p. 365. 1.67 • and Roosevelt had had a bitter disagreement over a recent 41 , tax bill. James Byrnes was considered for the Vice-Pres­

idency but was eliminated because Catholics would object to

his candidacy due to the fact that he left, the Catholic Church 42 when he married. Wallace felt that he should be the Presi­

dent's running partner and interpreted some of Roosevelt's 43 remarks to mean that he was the President's choice. Ac­

cording to Rosenman, Roosevelt felt that Wallace had to be 44 eliminated, but he could not bring himself to tell Wallace.

The Vice-President and his supporters were no match

for the professional politicians and city bosses. The urban

leaders, allied at the convention to nominate a more accep­

table candidate. Senator Harry Truman of Missouri. They drew

away Wallace supporters by putting favorite sons in the 45 field. Not wishing to harm the Democrats' chance for vic­

tory and also not to appear a bad loser. Parley issued a

statement as the convention ended which said,

\ I have been opposed on principle to a third or fourth presidential term. For that reason I voted

41 Gosnell, p. 199. 42 Ibid. Rosenman, Working With Roosevelt, pp. 443-45. 43 ■ Gosnell, p. 198. Rosenman, Pub11c Papers, 1944-45, pp. 199-200.. John Gunther, Roosevelt in Retrospect (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), p. 348. 44 Rosenman, Working With Roosevelt, pp. 440-445. 45 ' ' ' Gosnell, p. 20,1. Flynn, pp. 181 and 198. 168 for the nomination of Senator Byrd of Virginia. Having participated in the proceedings of the con­ vention, I accept its decision and will support the party nominees. 46

The only surprise to. Parley in the 1944 election was

a 1 the size of the. victory, Though Roosevelt was opposed by the very popular Thomas Dewey of Mew York, Parley felt that the

President would be re-elected, but also thought there would be a larger number of defections from the Democratic party.

These desertions were more than compensated for by the five to ten per cent Republican shift to the Democratic ranks.

Perhaps these Republicans felt that a change in leadership and in continuity of the war effort would encourage the Axis 47 to prolong the war.

Concern for the President's health during the last campaign was well founded, for he never lived to complete his last term of office. On April 1 2 9 1945, Parley was informed that the President had died. Parley and Hull met soon after the funeral, and in discussing the President, they agreed that Roosevelt had been a very ill man in recent months.

Physical illness taxed his mind and left him in no condition to bargain with the Russians and British. Parley speculated in his notes that had Roosevelt not been physically and

46 Parley, Jim Farley’s Story, p. 368. 4? Ibid., p. 370. Robinson, p. 338, Burns, 470. mentally tired at the Teheran and Yalta conferences, and if

America had a more, vigorous voice in international affairs 3 many of the troubles which arose following the war would not 48 have come about.

48 Farleys Jim Farley's Story, p . 377• CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

To conelude this•discussion, of James Parleys a num­ ber of the major highlights of his-, political career are pre­ sented. This reiteration of events is included to enhance the author’s analysis of Parley’s interactions with his pol­ itical colleagues and his role in the administration of

Franklin Roosevelt.

Parley was an experienced 9 eager and young, political hopeful when A1 Smith first met him and subsequently made him his campaign manager and later a member of the New York

Athletic Commission.■ When Smith lost in his bid for the presidency in 1928; and declared that he was through with politics, Parley switched allegiance to a bright new political star. Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt. Farley's extraor­ dinary. memory and political finesse won him several impor­ tant positions, culminating in the Chairmanship of the Demo­ cratic National Committee. Many have attributed Roosevelt's victory in 1932 to Parley’s effective campaigning technique.

When Roosevelt went to Washington to assume the pres­ idency, he took along his politically astute lieutenant, making him Postmaster General of the United States. This position suited Parley well since it was not only concerned 171 with the Post Office .Department., but. entailed the distribu­ tion of patronage as well.

Roosevelt and Parley were on the most amiable terms until Parley encountered certain problems. The Air Mail

Contracts3 Huey Long’s attack on Roosevelt through Parleys and the philatelist scandal were among the most important of these dilemmas. Parley wrote in his autobiographies that he felt that the President should have defended him publically; however, Roosevelt chose to remain officially non-committed on the issues. '

In the 1936 election. Parley once again worked dili­ gently for his "chief's" victory, and acquired a reputation for being able to accurately predict election outcomes.

As early as 1935, Parley was beginning to lose his central position in the politics of the Hew Deal. He was becoming little more than a bridge of contact between the New

Dealers and the political bosses. Roosevelt’s conception of what the Democratic Party should be was different from what

Parley and other professional politicians of the "Old School" thought. Parley and his followers were accustomed to deal­ ing not with coalitions and issues, but with organization and jobs; their lines of influence moved from national committee to.country courthouses, city halls, wards and precincts, without consideration of such groups as trade unions, nation­ ality clubs or women’s organizations. They were left behind as the political world grew more and more ideological. Some of these old line politicians were flexible enough to adapt with the times. Farley as well as Raymond Moley and Donald

Richberg were apparently unable to make the transition from what some historians sail the first to the second "New Deal".

Evidence of Farley's basic differences with Roosevelt were the Supreme Court conflict and the party "purge". Farley did not favor either one but did go along with his "chief" on the Court issued primarily because it was a matter of execu­ tive policy. He could not reconcile himself to the purge, however, since this went against everything he believed in politically. It meant sacrificing personal loyalties and ultimately party unity. Moreover, he felt that the President had no right interfering in local affairs. Roosevelt never forgave Farley for failing to support him in his effort to punish recalcitrant party members.

The official break, however, did not occur until the

1940 Convention and Roosevelt's decision to run for a third term. First of all, Farley had ambitions for the presidency or the vice-presidency; however, Roosevelt's candidacy elimi­ nated Farley in either case. Secondly, Farley, being an old line politician, believed in following tradition, precedents, and rules; the third term was certainly an idea which he could not approve. He felt that a party is built up and kept in line by expectations. Most politicians have hopes of even­ tually holding a position of importance. This incentive holds a party together between campaigns. As long as there is a new President at least every eight years, more people have a chance to partieipate in the government. Whatever

Roosevelt *s real reasons were for running, he as well as the

American publie apparently felt that the two term tradition could and should be set aside at this time for the good of the nation.

Farley and others were determined to show their dis­ approval of the third term by allowing their names to be placed in nomination, thus preventing a true "draft11 for

Roosevelt. Once the President was officially accepted as the

Democratic nominee, Farley, a loyal party member^ moved that it be made unanimous. His devotion to his party would not allow Farley to work against Roosevelt and ultimately his party, so he quietly resigned as Postmaster General and Demo­ cratic National Chagafcman and removed himself from the national political scene.

In the 1942 New York Congressional election, the

President and Farley locked horns once again. This time it was over who was to be the New York Democratic nominee for governor. Roosevelt made no comment on his choice for a can­ didate until it was too late. In the meantime Farley went ahead organizing support and received promises from county organization leaders to vote for his nominee, State Attorney

General Bennett. When Roosevelt did make his decision^ he chose to support. Senator Mead. By this time, most of the county leaders were already committed to Farley. Farley was 174 warned by. Roosevelt and others that if Bennett was made the

Democratic Candidate, he would never carry the American Labor

Party which rep resented-a-great deal of. votes.

If Farley realized his nominee's limitations in gain­ ing the labor vote, then he probably deliberately sacrificed a Democrat victory in Sew York in 1942 in order to maintain control of the Sew. York political machine. He refused many pleas to. support a compromise candidate which would have been acceptable to a majority, of the members of the Democratic and Labor parties. Perhaps here he saw an opportunity to humiliate, the President with a stinging defeat, such as the one that Farley, had himself experienced in 1940, and also to demonstrate to the President that once again he had made the unpardonable mistake, of meddling in local affairs.

Since the Coca Cola business was booming and Farley, now Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Coca Cola Export

Corporation, was away from Sew York a great deal of time traveling for the company, he decided to resign his state chairmanship, thus ending for all practical purposes his ac­ tive political career.

The 1944 election, and fourth term of office for

Roosevelt was just as much of an anathema to Parley as the

1940. election had been. However, he was no longer active in polities, and no one else seemed really interested or in­ fluential enough to prevent a fourth term. The attention of the world was fixed on the imminent end of World War Two. 175 Roosevelt was not. .destined to live, to see the end of the war.

Many people including Parley a felt, that the President was physically and mentally exhausted during the last months of his life, and was. unable to. cope with the sharp minds of those he was conferring with over very important inter­ national matters.

By 19*14 $ the politically mature Parley had developed into one„of the most powerful and unique, political figures in American history, and had been nominated for the presi­ dency of the United States. Subsequent to attaining this last distinction, he soon resigned his positions of political influence, and returned to what has been a very successful business life. LIST OF REFERENCES

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Perkins, Dexter. Charles Evans Hughes and American Democratic ■Statesmanship. Edited by Oscar Handlin. Boston: Little, Brown and Comp., 1956.

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ARTICLES AND PERIODICALS

"Air-Mail Graft," Nation, February 28., 1934, p. 235.

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Parley, James. A. "Passing Out the PatronageAmerican Maga­ zine, CXVI (August, 1933), 20. " ' ______"Patronage and the New Deal," American Magazine, CXXIIX (September, 1938), 20-211 —

______. "Selling Roosevelt to the Party," American Magazine, CXXVI (August, 1938), #-11.

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