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THE GENDER GAP IN AFRICAN PARTY SYSTEMS

Leslie Ann Fadiga-Stewart, B.A., M.A.

A DISSERTATION

POLITICAL SCIENCE

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Texas Tech University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Approved

Dennis Patterson Chairperson of the Committee

John Barkdull

Glen Biglasier

Ambassador Tibor Nagy, Jr.

Accepted

John Borrelli Dean of the Graduate School

August, 2007

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It was a joy working with my advisor, Dr. Dennis Patterson. He provided valuable guidance and assistance and made this whole process easier because he was so supportive, understanding, and generous with his time. He saw my research project as an opportunity to learn something new and his positive attitude, infinite patience, and constant support are gifts I will share with my own students. I would also like to thank the members of my dissertation committee for their patience, feedback, and encouragement. I had the opportunity to work with Dr. Barkdull during my first year as his teaching assistant and valued the fact that he was fair, open-minded, and pushed students to think critically. I only had a chance to know Dr. Glen Biglasier for a short time, but appreciated his enthusiasm, kindness, and his suggestions along the way. It was also wonderful to have Ambassador Nagy on my committee and he provided invaluable insights from his experience from living and working in Africa.

I want to offer many thanks to Dr. Susan Banducci for her support while she was at Texas Tech and Dr. Ed Steinhart for generously sharing his time and his love of Africa over several cups of coffee. I cannot say enough kind words about the faculty and staff associated with the Teaching, Learning, and Technology Center (TLTC) that I worked with when I was a fellow in the TEACH program. Dr. Debra Laverie, Suzanne Tapp, Dr.

Marjean Purinton, Dr. Andrea McCourt, Dr. Alan Reifman, and my co-mentors, Dr.

Charlotte Dunham and Dr. Ginny Felstehausen always had a warm smile and words of encouragement. I also want to acknowledge how much I appreciated the financial

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 support I received such as the summer dissertation research award from the Graduate

School as well as my assistantship from the Political Science department. It is also great that the Afrobarometer Network has made the Afrobarometer survey series available and many will learn more about Africa and African people thanks to their efforts.

Lastly, I would like to thank the support of friends and family both near and far. I will miss the conversations I shared with Gamal Gasim, a common interest in gender and politics with Nathan Mitchell, and an easy smile from Jangsup Choi and I wish all of them the best in the future. I would like to thank my family and friends in Colorado, in particular, Selaam Bueyne, Rebekah, Anne, and Sarah Wells, who are like rays of sunshine and made my world brighter. Although they were miles away, I have missed

Yaay, Papa, Babacar, the rest of the Fadiga and Diaw families, Saiba Fainke, and

Abdoulaye Niang and I really appreciated their encouragement and support while I was in Senegal. Nothing has meant more to me than the love and encouragement I received from my husband, Mohamadou. I am proud of everything he has done for me and feel truly blessed because he has been so supportive from the very beginning. A very special thank you to our son, Mamadou, and our daughter, Binta, for making sure I had a good dose of laughter and plenty of hugs each day. I am so excited about everything that is ahead for both of them. May our children follow our lead and may all of our hard work together as a family continue to bring many blessings in the future.

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Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ii

ABSTRACT vi

LIST OF TABLES viii

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS x

CHAPTER

I. INTRODUCTION 1

The Gender Gap in Party Identification 3

The Gender Gap in Partisan Support 7

II. THE GENDER GAP IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 16

Party Politics in Africa 16

The Gender Gap 22

Conclusion 49

III. DATA AND METHODS 54

Variables and Operationalization 55

Outline of the Dissertation 60

IV. WHEN MEN AND WOMEN SUPPORT DIFFERENT PARTIES: THE INCONSISTENT CONTRASTIVE PATTERN 63

Introduction 63

Botswana 64

Mali 72

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

V. WHEN WOMEN PROVIDE LESS SUPPORT ACROSS ALL PARTIES: THE INCONSISTENT SINGULAR PATTERN 94

Introduction 94

Nigeria 95

Tanzania 106

VI. THE GENDER GAP PATTERNS IN COUNTRIES OF LOST DOMINANCE 126

Introduction 126

Kenya 127

Senegal 142

VII. THE GENDER GAP IN AFRICAN PARTY SYSTEMS 168

Introduction 168

Summary and Discussion 168

Implications 177

Future Research 179

REFERENCES 181

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

ABSTRACT

Over the last couple of decades, an extensive body of literature has emerged on

the political gender gap, which explores attitudinal and behavioral differences between

men and women. While this literature has concentrated primarily on advanced

industrialized countries in Western Europe and the United States, it is unclear how

emerging democracies such as African countries are different in terms of the gender gap

and which factors explain differences between men and women in Sub-Saharan Africa.

This study extends the current literature by exploring the gender gap in the

African context. Specifically, it is interested in two aspects of the political gender gap in

Africa. First, it seeks to uncover if men and women are different in terms of party

identification and second, to determine if there are gender differences in partisan support,

that is, whether men and women have preferences for different political parties. Using

survey data from the Afrobarometer series, this study maps the gender gap in party

identification across sixteen different African countries. A multivariate analysis was also

conducted to test competing explanations related to partisan support in six different

African countries: Botswana, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tanzania.

The results show there was a gender gap in party identification but the size of the

gender gap varied depending on whether countries had a high, average, or low level of party identification. In addition, the results established that a gender gap in partisan

support was evident in six African countries defined by the difference in political support

for ruling parties and opposition parties. These countries manifested two different gender

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 gap patterns: an inconsistent contrastive gender gap and an inconsistent singular gender gap. Examining the gender gap in an often-neglected comparative context will add to our understanding of this political phenomenon in new democracies and highlights the future research opportunities in other geographical regions on the gender gap and other related topics.

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LIST OF TABLES

1.1 Gender Gap in Party Identification 11

1.2 Partisan Gender Gap among High Party Identifiers 12

1.3 Partisan Gender Gap among Average Party Identifiers 13

1.4 Partisan Gender Gap among Low Party Identifiers 15

3.1 Gender Gap Pattern I 61

3.2 Gender Gap Pattern II 62

4.1 Support Characteristics of Botswana’s Political Parties 85

4.2 Inconsistent Contrastive Gender Gap Pattern in Botswana 86

4.3 The Gender Gap and Party Support in Botswana 87

4.4 Explaining Partisanship in Botswana 88

4.5 Support Characteristics of Mali’s Political Parties 89

4.6 Inconsistent Contrastive Gender Gap Pattern in Mali 90

4.7 The Gender Gap and Party Support in Mali 91

4.8 Explaining Partisanship for Malian Men 92

4.9 Explaining Partisanship for Malian Women 93

5.1 Support Characteristics of Nigeria’s Political Parties 117

5.2 Inconsistent Singular Gender Gap Pattern in Nigeria 118

5.3 The Gender Gap and Party Support in Nigeria 119

5.4 Explaining Partisanship for Nigerian Men 120

5.5 Support Characteristics of Tanzania’s Political Parties 121

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5.6 Inconsistent Singular Gender Gap Pattern in Tanzania 122

5.7 The Gender Gap and Party Support in Tanzania 123

5.8 Explaining Partisanship for Tanzanian Men 124

5.9 Explaining Partisanship for Tanzanian Women 125

6.1 Support Characteristics of Kenya’s Political Parties 158

6.2 Weak Inconsistent Singular Gender Gap Pattern in Kenya 159

6.3 The Gender Gap and Party Support in Kenya 160

6.4 Explaining Partisanship for Kenyan Men 161

6.5 Explaining Partisanship for Kenyan Women 162

6.6 Support Characteristics of Senegal’s Political Parties 163

6.7 Weak Inconsistent Contrastive Gender Gap Pattern in Senegal 164

6.8 The Gender Gap and Party Support in Senegal 165

6.9 Explaining Partisanship for Senegalese Men 166

6.10 Explaining Partisanship for Senegalese Women 167

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AD Alliance for Democracy (Nigeria)

ADEMA Alliance pour la D émocratie au Mali

ADN Action for Développement National (Senegal)

ADP Alliance pour la Démocratie et Progrès (Mali)

AFORD Alliance for Democracy (Malawi)

AFP Alliance des Forces de Progrès (Senegal)

AJ/PADS And Jëf /Parti Africain pour la Démocratie et le Socialisme (Senegal)

ANC African National Congress (South Africa)

ANPP All Nigeria People’s Party

APP All People’s Party (Nigeria)

ASP Afro-Shirazi Party (Tanzania/Zanzibar)

BAM Botswana Alliance Movement

BCP Basutoland Congress Party/Basotho Congress Party (Lesotho)

BCP Botswana Congress Party

BDP Botswana Democratic Party/Bechuanaland Democratic Party

BDS Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais

BNF Botswana National Front

BNP Basutoland National Party/Basotho Nation Party (Lesotho)

BPP Botswana People’s Party/Bechuanaland People’s Party

CCM Chama Cha Mapinduzi (Tanzania)

CDP-Garab Gi Convention des Démocrates et des Patriotes-Garab Gi (Senegal)

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

CHADEMA Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (Tanzania)

CLN Comité Militaire de Libération Nationale (Mali)

CNID Congrés National pour l’Initiative Démocratique (Mali)

COD Congress of Democrats (Namibia)

CUF Civic United Front (Tanzania)

DA Democratic Alliance (South Africa)

DP Democratic Party (Kenya)

DP Democratic Party (Uganda)

DTA Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (Namibia)

FORD-A Forum for the Restoration of Democracy-Asili (Kenya)

FORD-K Forum for the Restoration of Democracy-Kenya

FRELIMO Frente de Libertação de Moçambique

JLS Jappo Liggeeyal Sénégal (Senegal)

KADU Kenya African Democratic Union

KANU Kenya African National Union

KAU Kenya African Union

KPU Kenya People’s Union

LCD Lesotho Congress for Democracy

LD/MPT Ligue Démocratique/Mouvement pour le Parti du Travail (Senegal)

LDP Liberal Democratic Party (Kenya)

LPK Labour Party of Kenya

MC/ATT Mouvement Citoyen/ Amadou Toumani Toure (Mali)

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

MCP Malawi Congress Party

MDC Movement for Democratic Change (Zimbabwe)

MFDC Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (Senegal)

MMD Movement for Multiparty Democracy (Zambia)

MPD Movimento para a Democracia (Cape Verde)

MSU Mouvement pour le Socialisme et l’Unité (Senegal)

NAPK National Alliance Party of Kenya

NARC National Rainbow Coalition (Kenya)

NCCR-Maguezi National Convention for Construction and Reform-Maguezi (Tanzania)

NDC National Democratic Congress (Ghana)

NPK National Party of Kenya (Kenya)

NPN National Party of Nigeria

NPP Northern People’s Party (Ghana)

NRC National Republican Convention (Nigeria)

ODM-K Orange Democratic Movement-Kenya

PAI Parti Africain de l'Indépendance (Senegal)

PAICV Partido Africano da Independência de Cabo Verde

PARENA Parti pour la Renaissance Nationale (Mali)

PDP People’s Democratic Party (Nigeria)

PDS Parti Démocratique Sénégalais

PIDS Parti de l’Indépendance, Démocratie et de la Solidarité (Mali)

PIT Parti de l’Indépendance et du Travail (Senegal)

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PRC Provisional Ruling Council (Nigeria)

PS Parti Socialiste du Sénégal (Senegal)

PSP Parti Soudanais Progressiste (Mali)

PUDP Parti pour l’Unité, la Démocratie et le Progrès (Mali)

RDP Rassemblement pour la Démocratie et le Progrès (Mali)

RENAMO Resistência Nacional Moçambicana

RND Rassemblement National Démocratique (Senegal)

RPM Rassemblement pour le Mali

SAPs Structural adjustment programs

SDP Social Democratic Party (Nigeria)

SWAPO South West African People’s Organization (Namibia)

TANU Tanganyika African National Union (Tanzania)

TLP Tanzania Labour Party

UDD Union pour la Démocratie et le Développement (Mali)

UDF United Democratic Front (Malawi)

UDF-Mboloomi Union pour la Démocratie et le Fédéralisme/Mboolomi (Senegal)

UDP United Democratic Party (Tanzania)

UDPM Union Démocratique du Peuple Malien

UNIP United National Independent Party (Zambia)

UPC Uganda People’s Congress

UPS Union Progressiste Sénégalaise

US-RDA Union Soudanais-Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (Mali)

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UTP United Tanganyika Party (Tanzania)

ZANU-FP Zimbabwe African National Union-Federal Party

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Over the past two decades, an extensive literature exploring the political phenomenon known as the gender gap has emerged. Several studies have explored the gender gap in such countries as the United States, Great Britain, Australia, Canada,

France, Germany, The Netherlands, Sweden, and Postwar Japan (Dalton 2002; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Mueller 1988; Norris & Lovenduski 1993; Patterson and Nishikawa

2002). There have been subsequent studies in other countries, but most of what we know about the gender gap comes from studies conducted in the world’s advanced democracies. This means that current research on the gender gap is geographically focused on a small number of American and Western European countries. As a result, this research provides insufficient insight into the political differences between men and women in emerging democracies. This is important because a gender gap is evident in several African countries, many of which were part of the “third wave” transitions to democracy that began in the 1990s. Unfortunately, few studies have explored the gender gap in the African context. This dissertation fills this gap by testing competing theories of the gender gap using survey data from several African countries.

In the most basic terms, the gender gap refers to attitudinal and behavioral differences between men and women. Previous research in political science has shown that there are significant differences between men and women in their party identification, partisan support, political knowledge, political interest, policy preferences,

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 and political behavior. This study is interested in two aspects of the gender gap in Africa.

First, it is interested in how men and women are different in terms of party identification and second, how they are different in terms of partisan support, that is, whether men and women have preferences for different political parties. 1 This study will map these two aspects of the gender gap in sixteen countries in Africa and it will explain why these countries manifest different gender gap patterns. 2 In this way, it will determine the sources and implications of these differences between men and women for African politics.

With these goals in mind, this study will investigate a number of specific research questions. How are the countries of Africa different in terms of the gender gap? Why has a gender gap in party identification emerged in some African countries but not in others? Why are there gender differences in support for political parties in Africa? Why do these gender gaps vary across different countries and which factors can help explain these gender gaps? What are the implications of these gender gaps for African politics in general? How does explaining the gender gap in Africa inform our understanding of this phenomenon more broadly?

1 Please note the question used for this party identification is not exactly the same as it has been for studies based on Western countries. In the Afrobarometer surveys, the question most often asked is “Do you feel close to any party?” The meaning of partisan support is consistent with other studies such as Kaufmann (2002).

2 To date, the Afrobarometer series includes three rounds of surveys, covering eighteen countries. Round 3 includes Benin and Madagascar; however, the results of the surveys from this round were not available at the time of this study and were not included. 2

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

The Gender Gap in Party Identification

The recent availability of public opinion polls has provided a unique opportunity to examine the gender gap in party identification and specific partisan support in Africa.

By drawing on data in the Afrobarometer series, this dissertation can begin to address these issues in ways that were not done previously. For example, consider the

Afrobarometer data in Tables 1.1 and 1.2, which reveal the existence of a gender gap party identification, and partisan support in several African countries.

Table 1.1 maps the gender gap in party identification in fourteen different African countries. These countries were included in the Afrobarometer data for surveys conducted between 1999 and 2002 (Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi 2005). As Table

1.1 shows, each country has been placed into one of three different categories defined by extent to which respondents identify with a political party. Countries are classified according to whether they have a high, average, or a low level of party identification.

Countries with a high level of party identification are those countries where 70% or more of the respondents stated they identify with a political party. Countries where between

50-70% of respondents identify with a political party are classified as average. Finally, those countries with fewer than 50% of the respondents stating they identify with a political party are classified as low.

The gender gap in party identification is measured by subtracting the percentage of males from the percentage of females who indicated that they identify with a political party. A positive number indicates the percentage of women exceeded the percentage of men who identify with any political party. Conversely, a negative number indicates the

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 percentage of men who identify with a political party is greater than the percentage of women.

Table 1.1 points out that there are some interesting patterns not only among all of the countries in general, but also within each level of political identification. The data reveal there is a wide variation in party identification among the countries surveyed between 1999 and 2002. Seven countries, Botswana, Ghana, Mali, Namibia, Nigeria,

South Africa, and Uganda have more than one survey, which allows us to observe the gender gap at more than one point in time. In Uganda and South Africa, the gender gap increased while it narrowed in Nigeria between the two periods. The gender gap narrowed in Ghana from over 6% to less than 1% between 1999 and 2002 and decreased almost 4% in Mali over one year. In Namibia, there was little change from 2000 to 2001 but the gender gap decreased 4% in 2003. Interestingly, in Botswana, the gender gap, which was initially positive in 1999, became negative in 2003.

As the data in Table 1.1 indicate, the gender gap also varies depending on the level of party identification. With the exception of Tanzania in 2003, the gender gap is smallest among those countries with the highest level of party identification, and conversely, the largest gender gaps are among those with the lowest levels of party identification. This gap nearly doubles from 4.46% among countries with a high level of party identification to 7.66% for those with an average level identification. Finally, the largest average gender gap expands to 11.91% as one moves from the average category to countries with the lowest levels of party identification.

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

Regardless of the level of party identification, it is evident there is a gender gap, and this gender gap is defined by women’s level of party identification being generally lower than men’s across all sixteen countries. The only exceptions to this general pattern can be found in Botswana (1999) where women’s level of party identification is higher.

The widest gender gap exists in Nigeria, a country with one of the lowest levels of party identification. Here, there is a two-digit gap between men and women: it was 21.58% in

2000 and it continued to remain high at 21.35% in 2001. In contrast, the smallest gaps were in Tanzania (2001) and Ghana in 2002 where there is a near parity between men and women (there is less than a 1% difference).

Among those countries classified as high party identifiers, the average level of party identification is over 77.7% and the average gender gap is 4.46%. The average percentage of respondents who identified with a political party ranged from a high of over 81% in Malawi and Botswana (1999) to a low of slightly over 75% in Namibia

(2001). Out of the four countries listed in the Table 1.1 with a high level of party identification there is a positive gender gap in Botswana indicating women have a higher level of party identification. In Tanzania (2001), the percentage of women who identified with a political party was roughly equal to the percentage of men. However, the gender gap increased dramatically by 2003 with women 12% less likely to identify with a political party. In Namibia, although the percentage of party identifiers increased from

69.13% to 75.21% between 2000 and 2001, the gender gap barely shifted during both years and the gender gap closes to only 2.64% by 2003. Finally, in Malawi, women had a lower (2%) level of identification with a political party compared to men.

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

Table 1.1 presents some interesting patterns for countries with an average level of party identification as well. The average party identification was close to 61.73% and ranged from a high of over 69% in Namibia (2000 only) to a low of over 49.83% in Cape

Verde. The average gender gap in this group of countries was 7.66%. However, two countries deviated dramatically from this average. On one hand, Mali had the largest gender gap at over 15% followed by Kenya at 14.5%. On the other hand, the percentage of men versus women identifying with any party was roughly equal in Ghana for 2002.

This meant the gender gap in Ghana narrowed considerably (over 6%) from 1999 despite the fact that the overall percentage of party identification remained nearly identical at

67.28% in 1999 and 65.50% in 2002.

Nigeria, South Africa (2000), Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe are all classified as countries with a low level of party identification with the average percentage of party identification being 39.26%. The gender gap in this group of countries was very close to a 12% average. This was three times larger than the countries with a high level of party identification and almost twice as high as those with an average level of party identification. The largest gender gap was in Nigeria where it was in the double digits in both 2000 and 2001. Although party identification increased in Nigeria by 7%, the gender gap remained large and decreased slightly. Zambia followed close behind Nigeria showing a gender gap higher than the average at over 14%. Interestingly, although party identification increased from 2000 to 2002 in Uganda, the gender gap increased by nearly

4%. Finally, the lowest gender gaps were just slightly over 4.53% in Zimbabwe and

5.28% South Africa in 2000.

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

The Gender Gap in Partisan Support

While interesting, these data capture only part of the gender gap story in Africa.

The data also reveal that support patterns for specific political parties are characterized by a gender gap. The Afrobarometer surveys used to illustrate this aspect of the gender gap are presented in Tables 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4. These data show clearly that, in addition to the gender gap in party identification, there is also a partisan gender gap in several African countries defined by the difference in support for specific political parties.

Tables 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4 examine partisan support across all sixteen African countries for each of the three levels of overall partisan support identified above. The data reveal there are significant differences in both the direction and magnitude of this partisan gender gap. As stated above, the preponderance of negative signs indicate women support political parties to a lesser extent than men while positive signs indicate the opposite. Compared to the previous table on party identification, the following tables illustrate that dramatic partisan gender gaps exist in some but not all countries.

Table 1.2 contains data on partisan support for those African countries where party identification levels are high, and the data indicate that focusing only on party

identification will underestimate the extent to which a gender gap exists in some African

countries. For example, in Botswana, women were over 15% more likely to support the

governing party, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), whereas, men were more likely

to support opposition parties such as the Botswana National Front (BNF) and Botswana

Congress Party (BCP). A similar but less dramatic pattern emerges in Tanzania. Similar

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 to Botswana, women were more likely to support the governing party, the Chama Cha

Mapinduzi (CCM). In contrast, women in Malawi gave more support to the Malawi

Congress Party (MCP), and women in Namibia showed less support for all political parties including the South West African People’s Organization (SWAPO), the country’s

ruling party in 2001.

Table 1.3 provides data on specific parties for countries with average levels of party identification. In Cape Verde, Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, and Namibia (2000) women consistently showed less support for all parties including the ruling parties.

However, Table 1.3 shows there is also little or a negligible difference between men and women with respect to support for the main opposition or smaller parties. Senegal and

Lesotho followed a pattern similar to Botswana but in the opposite direction. In both countries, either there was little difference between men and women or women were more likely to support the two main opposition parties. In Lesotho, women were more supportive of the Basotho National Party (BNP), the Basotho Congress Party (BCP), while men were more likely to support the ruling party, the Lesotho Congress for

Democracy (LCD) by over 9%. A similar pattern emerges in Senegal where women were slightly more supportive of the opposition party, the Parti Socialiste (PS), while

men were 9% more likely to support the governing party, Parti Démocratique Sénégalais

(PDS).

Lastly, Ghana revealed some interesting changes over time. In 1999, Ghana showed a pattern similar to those countries that had a high level of party identification with very little difference between men and women in their support for the ruling party.

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

However, in 2002 the gender gap in support for the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and the

New Democratic Congress (NDC) had increased. There is a similar pattern in Namibia in 2000, which retained a small gender gap in support for SWAPO, the ruling party. As

Table 1.2 shows, the gender gap in support for SWAPO increased from 2000 to 2001.

However, the gender gap for the Congress of Democrats (COD) decreased over time with more men (over 3%) identifying with this party to near gender parity in 2001 (see Table

1.2). There was also little difference in the gender gap for the African National Congress

(ANC) and more men supported opposition parties in South Africa during 2002.

Finally, as noted in Table 1.4, there are interesting gender gap patterns within the last category of countries with a low level of party identification. The most dramatic gender gap is in Nigeria for both years. Women were significantly less likely to support the ruling party, the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), by almost 13% in 2000 and close to 15% less than men in 2001. Zambia also revealed a two-digit gap of over 13% between men and women’s preference for the Movement for Multiparty Democracy

(MMD), and in South Africa, women were more than 5% less likely to support the

African National Congress (ANC) in 2000. These results contrast greatly to the data in

Table 1.3 where there was near parity, indicating the ANC was able to close the gender gap between 2000 and 2002. Table 1.4 also notes that, in Zimbabwe, the percentage of men and women supporting the ruling party, Zimbabwe African National Union-Federal

Party (ZANU-FP), was very low (less than 2%).

Lastly, Uganda shows some interesting shifts in partisan support between 2000 and 2002. Although there was a perceptible partisan gender gap in party identification in

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 both years, it did not translate into a gender gap with respect to partisan support. In 2000, women were slightly less supportive of the Movement Party and there was very little difference (less than 2%) in party identification between men and women. In 2002, although the gender gap in party identification doubled, surprisingly, the partisan gender gap reversed, so that women were slightly more likely to support the Movement Party— but again the gap is small (less than 2%).

In conclusion, a preliminary analysis of the empirical data provides substantial evidence that there is a gender gap in party identification across a number of African countries. In addition, this gender gap may mask important gender gaps in partisan preferences for political parties regardless whether a country has high, average, or low levels of party identification. In light of these results, the task then of this dissertation is to offer an explanation for these patterns in countries where data is available. This effort begins with a discussion of the scholarly work on this important phenomenon and how

existing work informs the analyses performed in this dissertation.

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

Table 1.1: Gender Gap in Party Identification (in percentage)

Party Gender Country Year N Identification (%) Gap (%) High Level of Party Identification Botswana 1999 1200 81.47 3.41 Malawi 2000 1208 81.34 -2.04 Namibia 2001 1200 75.21 -6.51 Namibia 2003 1138 78.56 -2.64 Tanzania 2001 2198 79.20 0.11 Tanzania 2003 1223 70.81 -12.08

Average Level of Party Identification Botswana 2003 1200 61.87 -2.19 Cape Verde 2002 1268 49.83 -7.95 Ghana 1999 2239 67.28 -6.08 Ghana 2002 1200 65.50 0.03 Kenya 2003 2398 67.99 -14.50 Lesotho 2000 1177 54.91 -6.79 Mali 2001 2089 57.03 -15.27 Mali 2002 1286 60.94 -10.92 Mozambique 2002 1400 63.92 -5.69 Namibia 2000 1183 69.13 -6.55 Senegal 2002 1147 54.84 -10.17 South Africa 2002 2400 67.51 -5.85

Low Level of Party Identification Nigeria 2000 3603 36.80 -21.58 Nigeria 2001 2210 43.98 -21.35 South Africa 2000 2200 42.57 -5.28 Uganda 2000 2271 25.55 -6.19 Uganda 2002 2400 48.34 -10.05 Zambia 1999 1198 36.55 -14.39 Zimbabwe 1999 1200 41.04 -4.53

Source: Compiled by the author from Afrobarometer data.

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

Table 1.2: Partisan Gender Gap among High Party Identifiers

Botswana 1999 BDP BNF BCP Small parties Percentage support 49.27% 24.59% 5.05% 2.57% Partisan gender gap 15.54% -8.53% -3.25% -0.66%

Malawi 1999 UDF MCP AFORD Percentage support 48.35% 25.43% 7.55% Partisan gender gap -4.96% 5.19% -2.28%

Namibia 2001 SWAPO DTA COD Small parties Percentage support 54.42% 10.94% 7.57% 2.28% Partisan gender gap -2.57% -2.66% -0.48% -0.78%

Tanzania 2001 CCM TLP CUF Small parties Percentage support 62.31% 5.19% 8.06% 3.64% Partisan gender gap 9.32% -3.64% -2.83% -2.74%

Source: Compiled by the author from Afrobarometer data. Note: All party acronyms are listed on the Abbreviations page.

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

Table 1.3: Partisan Gender Gap among Average Party Identifiers

Cape Verde 2002 PAICV MPD Small parties Percentage support 24.09% 23.51% 2.24% Partisan gender gap -3.97% -2.81% -0.67%

Ghana 1999 NDC NPP Small parties Percentage support 38.26% 25.27% 3.75% Partisan gender gap -0.23% -2.85% -3.00%

Ghana 2002 NPP NDC Small parties Percentage support 46.09% 15.72% 3.69% Partisan gender gap -3.45% 2.92% 0.57%

Kenya 2003 NARC KANU Small parties Percentage support 52.38% 4.56% 11.05% Partisan gender gap -4.83% -1.82% -7.85%

Lesotho 2000 LCD BNP BCP Small parties Percentage support 36.82% 12.00% 4.91% 1.18% Partisan gender gap -9.14% 2.60% 0.25% -0.49%

Mali 2001 ADEMA CNID PARENA UDD Small parties Percentage support 41.27% 1.80% 3.75% 2.43% 7.79% Partisan gender gap -8.14% -0.95% -1.02% -1.40% -3.76%

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

Table 1.3: Continued.

Mozambique 2002 FRELIMO RENAMO Percentage support 59.15% 4.23% Partisan gender gap -4.61% -0.63%

Namibia 2000 SWAPO DTA COD Small parties Percentage support 55.45% 6.75% 3.87% 3.06% Partisan gender gap -1.73% -0.85% -3.11% -0.87%

Senegal 2002 PDS PS Small parties Percentage support 36.88% 8.71% 9.24% Partisan gender gap -8.96% 0.28% -1.49%

South Africa 2002 ANC DA Small parties Percentage support 49.73% 4.75% 13.03% Partisan gender gap 0.52% -1.79% -4.58%

Source: Compiled by the author from Afrobarometer data. Note: All party acronyms are listed on the Abbreviations page.

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

Table 1.4: Partisan Gender Gap among Low Party Identifiers

Nigeria 2000 PDP APP AD Percentage support 23.66% 7.33% 5.80% Partisan gender gap -12.98% -4.66% -3.94%

Nigeria 2001 PDP APP AD Percentage support 32.00% 7.66% 4.32% Partisan gender gap -14.53% -3.33% -3.49%

South Africa 2000 ANC Small parties Percentage support 32.24% 10.33% Partisan gender gap -5.85% 0.57%

Uganda 2000 Movement Party DP Small parties Percentage support 20.93% 2.12% 2.50% Partisan gender gap -1.82% -1.62% -2.75%

Uganda 2002 Movement Party DP UPC Small parties Percentage support 35.29% 4.36% 5.08% 3.61% Partisan gender gap 1.94% -4.03% -5.15% -2.83%

Zambia 1999 MMD UNIP Small parties Percentage support 31.13% 3.13% 2.28% Partisan gender gap -13.70% -0.71% -0.03%

Zimbabwe 1999 ZANU-FP MDC Small parties Percentage support 30.71% 5.56% 4.77% Partisan gender gap -1.41% -3.23% 0.11%

Source: Compiled by the author from Afrobarometer data. Note: All party acronyms are listed on the Abbreviations page.

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

CHAPTER II

THE GENDER GAP IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

The data presented in the previous section illustrated there are interesting gender

differences in both party identification and partisan support across several African

countries. However, this information by itself cannot provide an explanation for why

these gender gaps occur. What explains the political gender gaps in party identification

and partisan support in several African countries? In order to answer this question, this

section will provide a critical overview of some of the current research addressing factors

that are related to the gender gap. While previous studies have concentrated primarily on

advanced industrialized democracies, this literature may be able to provide an

explanation for the gender gap in party support in African countries. Thus, the aim of

this review is to synthesize and analyze some of the major findings within this vast

literature and to provide a framework for understanding the source of the political gender

gap in Africa. This discussion is divided into two parts. The first provides a background

discussion on party politics in Africa. The second part focuses directly on the gender gap

and how the scholarly literature has defined this phenomenon and attempted to explain

why it manifests itself in the many ways it does.

Party Politics in Africa

The beginning of the twenty-first century marked an important milestone as the

African continent progressed into its second decade of multiparty politics. Since the

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 beginning of the democratic transitions in the early 1990s, some countries have held two or even three multiparty elections that have been considered free and fair by international standards. On the surface, this appears to be a cause for celebration. Although these

African countries have rejoined the growing community of democratic countries during the last two decades, a word of caution is in order. A closer inspection reveals this trend towards multiparty democracy has actually resulted in less rather than greater electoral competition in several countries. Despite the return to multiparty elections during this period, in some countries there has been an absence of political competition (e.g.,

Bogaards 2000, 2004; Cowen and Laakso 1997, 2002; Creevey, Ngomo, and Vengroff

2005; Diamond and Plattner 1999; Doorenspleet 2003; Kuenzi and Lambright 2005;

Laakso 1997; Mozaffar and Scarritt 2005; Patterson and Fadiga-Stewart 2005; Rakner

and Svansand 2004).

After independence, single-party systems emerged in most African countries. The

only exceptions to this rule have been a small minority of multiparty democracies that

survived during this period in Botswana, Mauritius, and in The Gambia 3 (Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Nohlen, Krennerich, and Thibaut 1999; Mozaffar and Scarritt 2005).

Yet, these one-party regimes are not the same as the dominant party systems that would emerge during the democratic transitions in the 1990s. Whether de jure or de facto , single party regimes in several countries sought to monopolize the electoral arena and either banned political competition outright or found subtle ways to stymie its development. Like the one-party states that dominated the African political landscape

3 The Gambia was considered a multiparty democracy before the military coup in 1994. 17

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 during the postcolonial period, the dominant parties, which emerged in the founding elections during the 1990s, have monopolized political power. In addition, opposition parties did not successfully challenge political incumbents at the executive level on their own or failed to garner significant control of the legislature in previous elections. A notable exception is Senegal where, in the 2000 presidential election, the opposition

Coalition Sopi led by the Honorable Abdoulaye Wade of the Parti Démocratique

Sénégalais (PDS) managed to defeat one of the longest ruling dominant parties, the Parti

Socialiste (PS), which controlled Senegalese politics for over forty years.

As a result, in several countries the dominant political parties ushered in during the 1990s managed to hold on to political power by successfully winning the majority of votes and seats in election after election. The outcome has been the emergence of not only dominant parties, but also a distinctive trend towards a dominant party system in several African countries (Bogaards 2000, 2004; Cowen and Laakso 1997, 2002; Creevey et al. 2005; Doorenspleet 2003; Kuenzi and Lambright 2005; Laakso 1997; Molomo

2003; Mozaffar and Scarritt 2005; Patterson and Fadiga-Stewart 2005; Rakner and

Svansand 2004). There has been some debate over the role of these dominant parties and their impact on the future of democratic politics in African countries. Some scholars have highlighted the evolution of dominant parties in different African countries

(Creevey et al. 2005; Doorenspleet 2003; Rakner and Svansand 2004; van Cranenburgh

2003). Others have debated whether dominant parties represent a serious threat to electoral competition, undermine democratic consolidation in emerging democracies, and possibly lead to the return to neopatrimonial politics (Bratton and van de Walle 1997;

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

Bogaards 2000, 2004; Cowen and Laakso 2002; Creevey et al. 2005; Kuenzi and

Lambright 2005; Laakso1997).

Why this pattern has been so prevalent in Africa is a topic of ongoing scholarly debate. One reason for this is the lack of a clear and agreed upon conceptual definition that would allow scholars to identify, classify, and analyze dominant parties in different countries and regions (Bogaards 2004; Giliomee and Simkins 1999; Pempel 1990;

Rimanelli 1999; Satori 1976). Another reason is simply that more research needs to be conducted on this problem.

In his book Uncommon Democracies, Pempel (1990) focused exclusively on one- party dominant regimes in industrialized countries. Pempel pointed out four characteristics to help identify dominant parties. 4 First, they are “dominant in number”

in other words, a dominant party has gained electoral dominance because it has managed

to win a larger number of parliamentary seats compared to opposition parties. Second,

dominant parties have an ideal “dominant bargaining position” because they are able

maintain themselves if necessary by forming coalition governments with other smaller parties. Third, these parties are “dominant chronologically” and have governed for

extensive periods from thirty to fifty years. Lastly, these parties are “dominant

governmentally” because they have the ability to manipulate public policy to suit their purpose (3-4).

While focused on advanced democratic countries, Pempel’s (1990) work is useful because these characteristics describe many of Africa’s dominant parties. Perhaps even

4 Other scholars have used electoral, parliamentary, and executive dominance to identify dominant parties (see Boucek 1998). 19

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 more useful is the work of Giliomee and Simkins (1999) which compared dominant party regimes in South Africa, Mexico, Taiwan, and Malaysia. Giliomee and Simkins (1999) noted that these dominant parties emerged during democratic transitions. In contrast to industrialized democracies, they asserted that dominant parties could emerge in a variety of electoral systems in newer democracies (see Patterson and Fadiga-Stewart 2005). In addition, these parties maintained their dominance because they became intimately identified with the struggle for liberation or revolutionary movement in their country.

Finally, the authors suggested these dominant parties would evolve over time into either liberal democracies, semi-democracies, or eroding liberal democracies.

Concentrating more specifically on party systems in Africa, Doorenspleet (2003) followed Sartori’s definition of a dominant party which “wins more than 50 per cent of the seats during two consecutive elections” and in contrast to Pempel (1990) and

Rimanelli (1999) argued that this “type of party system does not exist in established democracies” (175). He argued that it is the most common type of party system in

Africa. Based on his definition, only seven dominant party stems exist: Botswana, Mali,

Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Senegal, and South Africa. He compared and contrasted the development of the longest established dominant party systems in Africa:

Senegal and Botswana. He noted that Senegal, particularly in 2000, presidential elections showed alternance was possible in this type of system. However, no such alternance has occurred in Botswana and the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) has been the dominant party since 1965 (Mozaffar and Scarritt 2005).

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

Building on the experiences primarily from Senegal and Botswana and a few other minor cases, Doorenspleet pointed out that dominant parties emerge under four conditions. Like Pempel (1990), he highlighted the role of a political crisis in this case decolonization in the formation of these new parties. As a result, dominant parties emerged during the movement to liberate or nationalize countries from colonialism.

Later on, they are able to capitalize on identification as the nationalist party to not only justify their electoral dominance but maintain it as they used the national liberation as a symbol to draw mass appeal to their party. Once established, Africa’s dominant parties banned opposition parties. Doorenspleet also highlighted that once in power, dominant parties enjoyed an incumbency advantage particularly in funding and were able to use this to their advantage over political opponents. Finally, dominant parties faced a factionalized opposition of smaller, weaker, and underfunded parties who were unable to organize collectively to pose an electoral challenge.

Bogaards (2004) argued that the lack of a conceptual definition has prevented scholars from clearly identifying dominant parties in Africa. He reviewed the previous literature on party systems and argued that previous measures such as the effective number of parties (ENP) were unable to accurately capture party dominance (see

Patterson and Fadiga-Stewart 2005). He found that Sartori’s (1976) rules for counting parties and his party typology were more effective because they are “counting rules not based on relative size but on the number of actors in electoral competition and formation… [and] Sartori’s counting rules, definition of dominant party systems, and

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 typology provide a unified and coherent framework of analysis that is sensitive to context and time” (174).

According to Bogaards, Sartori’s framework was better suited to the party systems in the African context. This is because it concentrated on electoral competition rather than relative size and was concerned with the issue of dominance and the nature of its dominance in the African context. To test the effectiveness of Sartori’s framework,

Bogaards used election data for eighteen countries from 59 elections. He then classified dominant parties and party systems in Africa based on the various definitions provided by various scholars such as Blondel, Ware, Van de Walle, and Butler against Sartori’s years of work. Based on this analysis, he concluded that there is an “urgent need for systematic research into the nature, sources, conditions, and consequences of dominant party systems in Africa” (192). 5

The Gender Gap

If dominant party systems in Africa are in need of further scholarly attention, this is even more true of research on the gender gap. Some of the most recent research published during the past year on recent elections and party support in Africa has not explored the gender differences in party identification and party support (see Garcia-

Rivero 2006; Kuenzi and Lambright 2005; Lindberg and Morrison 2005; Patterson and

Fadiga-Stewart 2005). Yet studies such as Goetz and Hassim (2003) have intimated

5 This was a common theme through a recent special issue on “Political Parties, Party Systems and Democracy in Africa” in Party Politics published in July 2005. See the articles by Mozaffar and Scarritt 2005; Kuenzi and Lambright 2005; Piombo 2005; Creevey, Ngomo and Vengroff 2005. 22

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 ways that Africa’s party systems might matter for the gender gap. This is why this study asserts not only that more research on dominant party systems is needed, but also that more research is needed on understanding what explains the existing gender gaps in

Africa’s party systems.

Although political differences between men and women have existed throughout the twentieth century, it was not until the 1970s that an extensive literature investigating the political gender gap started to emerge. Early research on political behavior did not view the gender gap as an issue worth investigating. Compared to other social divisions such as race, religion, or class, gender was not viewed as a salient social cleavage for investigation, and this initial research treated sex as another demographic variable if at all

(see Anderson 1999; Lovenduski and Norris 1993; Manza and Brooks 1998, 1999; Mattei

and Mattei 1998; Mueller 1988; Norris 1988; Seltzer, Newman, and Leighton 1997;

Tolleson-Rinehart 1992). There has been considerable debate since this period about

whether gender has emerged as a salient social cleavage. Some researchers believe that

gender has become an increasingly important factor in explaining voter alignments and

electoral outcomes, while other scholars disagree (Brooks, Nieuwbeerta, and Manza

2006; Dalton 2006; Dalton and Wattenberg 2000; Frankovic 1982, 1999; Manza and

Brooks 1999; Mattei and Mattei 1998; Mueller 1988; Seltzer et al. 1997; Tolleson-

Rinehart 1992). What follows is a discussion of those debates, the various approaches used in these debates, and how this research informs the study at hand.

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

Structural and Situational Explanations

One set of explanations for the gender gap has focused on the role of structural differences that exist between men and women. This research has examined the impact of demographic and socioeconomic characteristics such as education, age, religion, race, class and more recently region, language, and ethnicity (Dalton 2006, chapter 8; Norris

2002, 2004, chapter 5; Verba and Nie 1972; Welch 1977; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978).

For example, early studies on vote choice noted women were slightly more conservative than men were. Scholars argued this was the result of differences in age or education.

Others pointed to women’s greater religiosity as a factor in their support for conservative parties (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960; De Vaus and McAllister 1989;

Duverger 1956; Lipset 1960; Studlar, McAllister, and Hayes 1998; Togeby 1994).

Education also plays an important role especially since women traditionally have had less education than men (Bendyna and Lake 1994:248; Burns 2002; Burns, Schlozman and

Verba 2001; Welch 1977). Other scholars have investigated whether the gender gap varies by race or by class (Bendyna and Lake 1994; Burns et al. 2001; Cohen 2003;

Lewis 2004; Lien 1998; Manza and Brooks 1999; Seltzer et al. 1997; Welch & Sigelman

1989). Related research analyzed disparities in other factors such as resources like time, political knowledge, interest, income, and efficacy as important sources of the gender gap

(Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995; Burns 2002; Burns et al. 2001; Rosenstone and

Hansen 2003; Tolleson-Rinehart 1992; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, 1997).

Others studies have drawn attention to the impact of situational differences between men and women inside the household and the workplace (Burns 2002; Burns et

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 al. 2001; Gurin 1985; Studlar et al. 1998; Togeby 1994; Tolleson-Rinehart 1992).

Several researchers have suggested that women’s adult family roles as wives, mothers, and housewives may be politically significant (Carroll 1988; Deitch 1988; Erie and Rein

1988; Gidengil, Hennigar, Blais, and Nevitte 2005; Manza and Brooks 1998, 1999;

Seltzer et al. 1997). This theory suggested that married women especially those with children would have little time for political activities because of the division of labor inside the home (Welch 1977). Welch found whether or not one worked outside of the home mattered, but that structural explanations overall, especially education and employment, were better predictors than situational variables for political participation.

In a study on Danish women, Togeby (1994) found ideology was related to the number of children a woman had and marital status.

Some studies have used structural explanations to account for women’s behavior

in specific elections. For example, Carroll (1988) evaluated different explanations for the

gender gap in the 1980 and 1982 elections. She noted that some studies tried to link the

lack of support and approval for Ronald Reagan in these elections to economic

developments such as the “feminization of poverty” and women’s growing dependence

on the welfare state. In contrast to this, Carroll (1988) offered a “women’s autonomy”

thesis as an alternative explanation for the electoral gender gap. Carroll pointed out that

important trends such as women’s increased participation in the labor force, occupational

segregation, women’s higher levels of education, the rise in female headed households,

the feminization of poverty, and the rise of the welfare state all led to women’s increased

economic and psychological independence from men. Her analysis of 1980 and 1982

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

National Election Studies (NES) data confirmed that economically autonomous women were less likely to vote for Reagan. Carroll argued that psychological autonomy was also important because such women were more aware of gender disparities and wanted more equitable gender roles and policies. She found these two types of autonomy were related and that women who were both economic and psychologically autonomous were the least likely to vote for Reagan.

Anderson (1999) took Carroll’s women’s autonomy thesis further and explored women’s experience with the welfare state as an alternative explanation for the gender gap in the United States. She maintained that the gender gap not only endured throughout the 1980s but also grew in the 1990s because women were more likely to be personally affected by changes in welfare state policies compared to men. To investigate this “welfare experience thesis,” Andersen created two variables from 1992 NES data that looked at whether women were involved in jobs close to government and the government payments they received. Her results found that women were four times more likely than men to work in jobs close to the government, and nearly half of the women in her study received some form of payment from the government. She argued women’s experience had an important political impact as well because she found that women who received both government payments and were involved in jobs close to the government were more likely to vote for Clinton in the1992 election.

Women’s autonomy also has political consequences outside the United States.

Using post-election data in 1996 from Haryana in northern India, Chhibber (2003) explored the factors that determined women’s political activity and their awareness of

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 recent political reforms passed in India. He observed a decline in voting turnout by both sexes and that women were poorly represented in the Indian lower house and state assemblies. Despite this fact, a constitutional amendment designed to create a gender quota (30%) at the local level had been in place since the early 1990s. Chhibber suspected this low rate of participation was related to individuals’ political knowledge of the constitutional reform.

He outlined several theories that have tried to explain differences in political participation such as autonomy, gender discrimination, caste, differences in the amount of

leisure or disposable time between men and women. Using a multivariate analysis,

Chhibber first tested whether demographic differences, political attitudes, the amount of

leisure time, and gender relations were related to awareness of the 1992 reform. The

results of his survey revealed the majority of women were not aware of the constitutional

amendment. In addition, the level of a woman’s education and household income were

related to political awareness, but social caste was not. Chhibber then used a logistic

regression to analyze political interest and political participation. His analysis from the

World Values Survey (WVS) revealed that both political interest and participation were positively associated with higher levels of education, social class, urban residence, and

associational membership. Echoing Carroll’s (1988) ideas about the role of women’s

autonomy and concluded that women who were able to create their own autonomy

outside the household were more likely to participate in politics.

In their cross-national study, De Vaus and McAllister (1989) compared gender

differences in political alignment across eleven advanced industrialized democracies to

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 determine if they different or similar. Even though early research found female conservatism was the norm in many countries, De Vaus and McAllister noted that some countries did not follow this pattern. Other studies concluded that gender differences were minimal or, in some cases, realignment had occurred. The authors pointed out three different explanations for the gender gap: situational, structural and socialization theories.

De Vaus and McAllister tested the situational and structural theories to see if they could explain political alignment in these different countries.

Their multivariate analysis used data from the European, United States, and

Australian Values Surveys. The results of their OLS regression revealed women were more conservative than their male counterparts. Only Australia diverged from this pattern. The largest gender gaps were evident in three countries that shared a similar religious culture and were predominantly Catholic: Italy, France, and Spain. The authors attempted to see if structural and situational theories could account for the national patterns. Across all of the countries, De Vaus and McAllister found that women’s conservatism was due to their higher religiosity and lower workforce participation. They also argued that in the coming years, women would become more leftwing in several countries. This means in countries where women were more conservative the gender gap would decrease as female labor force participation and secularization increased over time.

Studies by Erie & Rein (1988) highlighted a number of developments that have made women economically vulnerable over time. For instance, they pointed out changes such as women’s increased participation in the labor force, occupational segregation, changes in marital status, and female-headed households, and the feminization of

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 poverty. These developments have important political consequences because over time, women have become the largest beneficiaries of the social welfare economy in the United

States. As a result, they insisted that the gender gap emerged in the 1980s when the

Reagan administration advocated cutbacks in several welfare programs which women depended on. According to these authors, these women supported the Democratic Party because they had a stake in the perpetuation the welfare state in the US.

While there is some debate on this issue, Deitch (1988) agreed with Erie and Rein that Reagan’s welfare retrenchment policies were related to the emergence of the gender gap since the 1980s (Miller 1988). She analyzed NORC and General Social Survey

(GSS) data from 1973 through 1984 to explore if the gender gap in attitudes on spending on government programs were related to differences in socioeconomic status or gender- based differences as advocated by feminist theorists. The results of her analysis revealed that compared to other government spending such as education or aid to minorities, attitudes on welfare spending between men and women diverged during the 1970s and

1980s. Deitch did not find evidence that gender based attitudes explained this gender gap; rather, she found that socioeconomic variables such as income were important factors in explaining support for government spending.

While Erie and Rein (1988) and Deitch (2003) focused on the political significance of women’s vulnerable economic status, other researchers have argued that women’s increased participation in the labor force was an important factor related to the gender gap. Togeby (1994) for example investigated the political implications of women’s increased participation in the labor force on political behavior in Denmark.

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

Although this country has one of the highest percentages of women employed in the labor force, she noted that Danish women still have not attained equality with men in the political arena. Similar to earlier studies in the United States and Western Europe, her

analysis revealed that Danish women initially supported more conservative parties in the

early 1970s (Norris 1988). However, by the 1980s, a major change in political attitudes

and party support occurred as women shifted their support to parties that were more

liberal.

To understand why women’s party support changed over time, Togeby

investigated several factors using election studies from 1971 to 1991 as well as a youth

survey from 1988. She tested both the structural and situational theories to see if they

were able to account for these gender differences and changes in political behavior over

time. Instead, she found that policy attitudes were the most important factor explaining

why this gender realignment occurred. However, she did not find support for the male

dominance thesis, which argues husbands play a major role in determining women’s political behavior decline over time particularly because women’s participation in the

labor force produced a “political equilibrium” in the family. While Togeby (1994) found

that occupational training had a strong influence on political behavior, she did not find

any support for the socialization theory or that socioeconomic variables reduced

differences in the party choice between men and women.

On the other hand, situational factors such as those related to the amount of free

time available (i.e., marital status or family roles in the household) were shown to have

little impact on women’s political activity. Togeby also discovered there was little

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 difference between those who were single and those who were married or cohabiting.

However, she ascertained that divorcees were more likely to vote for more liberal parties, whereas, women with more children were less likely to vote for liberal parties. Togeby concluded that women’s high labor force participation was the main source of the gender gap in Denmark. This case study would have greatly benefited from comparison to other

Nordic countries where there are similar percentages of women in the labor participation to see if this trend remained a significant factor in explaining women’s political behavior.

Steuernagel, et al. (1999) also highlighted the significance of changes such as the

dramatic increase in women’s participation in the labor force in the 20 th century. Most important, these authors showed that this development led to a rise in occupational segregation with women concentrated in low-paying, low-status jobs such as teaching and nursing that in many ways reinforced women’s traditional roles. Using data from the

1992 National Election Studies (NES) and statistics from the Department of Labor, the authors found that occupational segregation mattered for not only differences in political behavior but also pointed out it was related to gender differences across a number of policy issues where women were more liberal than men were.

In a set of related studies, Manza and Brooks (1998, 1999) also looked at the role of women’s labor force participation. In their article on presidential elections in the

United States, these authors analyzed gender differences in vote choices in US presidential elections with survey data from 1952 to 1992 (Manza and Brooks 1998).

They were particularly interested in understanding when the gender gap emerged, how it varied over time, and what were the sources of the gender gap. They identified several

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 different gender gaps such as gender differences in voting turnout, in the number and type of political offices held, in domestic and foreign policy attitudes, as well as in vote choices for congressional and presidential elections. They argued the gender gap in the

United States emerged as early as the 1950s as women became more Democratic over time compared to men.

It would have been useful if Manza and Brooks (1998) had data to compare

nonworking women with those currently working to measure the relationship between

feminist consciousness and labor force participation. In addition, like most of the

literature on the gender gap, these studies concentrated on presidential elections which

means it is unclear whether women’s labor force participation is related to the gender gap

in other elections such as congressional, senatorial, gubernatorial, or those at other local

levels. Lastly, it would have been useful if this had been a cross-national study in order

to see if the relationship between labor force participation and the gender gap is unique to

the United States or if there a similar relationships in other countries.

Empirical studies on the gender gap in geographical areas outside the United

States and Western Europe have been few but are growing. Lewis (2004) looked at the

gender gap in national elections Chile. He was particularly interested in the impact of

class on vote choice. Lewis used presidential election data from 1952 through 1970 as

well as the elections for the Chamber of Deputies from 1989 to 2001. He found women

in Chile were far more likely to vote for conservative parties before the military coup in

1973. For example, in the 1970 election, the socialist presidential candidate, Allende

received an overwhelming amount of support from men. Although similar findings in

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

Western Europe and the United States before the 1980s argued women’s religiosity was a factor, however, he was skeptical of this argument and pointed out that women were autonomous voters. He also pointed out that women continued to vote more conservatively and men were more likely to support left of center parties during the post- coup Pinochet period in the 1988 referendum and throughout the elections from 1989 to

1999.

In one of the first attempts to study the gender gap in Africa, scholars with the

Afrobarometer Network (2005) explored different explanations for political gender gap in

Uganda, and they noted its development over a five-year period from 2000 to 2005. The authors found there were several large gender gaps in political attitudes such as support for democracy versus a multiparty or one-party state, party affiliation, and political knowledge about executive term limits. For instance, they found that women were less likely to identify with a political party and were more likely to support a one-party state.

However, the most significant gender gap was in political knowledge.

The authors suggested these substantial differences between men and women were related to education instead of sex differences and concluded, “under these circumstances, an apparent gender gap may in fact be better understood as an education gap” (3). However, in their regression analysis, they found both factors were significant and better predictors of political behavior than exposure to radio news, place of residence, and party affiliation with the Movement Party. They also suggested that the large gulf in public opinion between men and women might be related to women’s lack of knowledge regarding the issues.

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

Like Lewis (2004), this study on the gender gap appears to be an initial attempt to explore this issue in an African context. However, this study only concentrated on one country and made no comparisons to other African countries to see if education played an equally important role. It also would have been useful if the authors had explored similar structural variables, the role of situational differences and political attitudes such as equal roles for women particularly since Uganda has one of the strongest and most active women’s movement in East Africa (Goetz and Hassim 2003; Tamale 1999; Tripp 2000).

Feminist Explanations

While many of the scholars noted above have claimed that certain structural and situational factors are related to the gender gap, others remain skeptical. Several scholars have argued there is little evidence that the gender gap is related to structural or situational differences between men and women (Anderson 1999; Cook and Wilcox

1991; Gidengil et al. 2005; Givens 2004). Rather many of these scholars have focused on what is known in the literature as feminist explanations. Scholars in this tradition explain gender differences by focusing on the following questions: are women socialized to develop a certain “maternal thinking” and so are more compassionate and nurturing than men? Are women morally superior to men? Do women’s unique experience as mothers or with patriarchal oppression matter? Do women speak in a “different voice”? Are there inherent female qualities or experiences that make women more supportive of certain policies?

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

Feminist explanations focus on gender role socialization and group consciousness, and such scholars argue that there are distinctive differences between men and women in their experiences, values, and attitudes (Burns et al. 2001; Chodorow 1978; Gilligan 1982;

Gurin 1985; Molyneux 1986; Sapiro 1986). Some scholars have argued that men and women learn gender roles, have different cultural expectations about appropriate political behavior, and these gender differences could have an impact on political participation

(Jennings 1983). As a result, feminist scholars exploring these “different voices” theories argue women have distinct values and different political attitudes that may motivate their voting choices (Abzug and Kelber 1984; Klein 1984; Tolleson-Rinehart 1992).

In her groundbreaking study, Gurin (1985) explored whether women had a sense of group consciousness and introduced the concept of “gender consciousness.” She was interested in understanding the various sources of gender consciousness and how it changed over time. According to Gurin, gender consciousness is comprised of four components: identification with members from the same group, discontent, collective orientations, and legitimacy. In all but the last component, women’s gender consciousness was weak compared to other groups, which is why she argued women often fail to develop a group consciousness. To determine if a sense of gender consciousness did emerge among women, Gurin analyzed National Election Studies from

1972, 1976, and 1983 consumer data. Using these survey data, she tested theories of collective action to see if women would mobilize together in an effort to improve their economic, political, or social status. In addition, she tried to determine if women could identify the source of their inequality and whether or not they felt a sense of gender

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 identification. Gurin concluded that compared to other social groups such as Blacks, women had a weaker sense of group consciousness. This work leads to the question of whether or not gender differences in political attitudes are the source of the gender gap.

Related questions include whether or not women’s values and priorities are fundamentally different from men’s and the implications of such differences. Building on Gurin’s study of gender consciousness, these were some of the questions Conover

(1988) explored in her own investigation into the origins of the gender gap in the 1980s.

Conover (1988) identified four different types of gender gaps. While gender

differences in mass political participation have declined, voting choices between men and

women have diverged with more women identifying with and voting for the Democratic

Party over time. However, she was critical of these earlier studies because she noted

early research only described gender gaps, and as a result, she argued that these works

failed to provide explanations for these gender differences. To uncover the origins of

these gender differences, Conover concentrated primarily on explanations for the gender

gap in political attitudes and their political consequence. This dealt with differences in

issue preferences and in the salience of different policy issues. She noted that feminist

theory from the nineteenth century advanced the idea that the women’s values and perspectives were different due to the nature of their lives and their unique female experiences such as motherhood. In the 1980s, feminist theorists such as Gilligan (1982) built on these ideas and maintained that women speak in a “different voice” because they have a greater sense of morality, caring, and justice (Plutzer 2005).

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

Conover (1988) suggested the political attitudes gender gap could be the result of those women who identified themselves as feminists as well as the women’s movement, which advocated feminist ideas. Using data from the 1985 National Election Study

(NES) pilot study, which provided measures of feminist identity and value orientations, she attempted to determine if a feminist identification or consciousness mattered. The results of her analysis found that the evidence was mixed about whether a distinctive

“woman’s perspective” existed. However, she attributed the origin of the gender gap to feminist women who have a distinctive set of political values and issue preferences from both men and nonfeminist women.

Other scholars such as Mansbridge (1985) and Miller (1988) were not convinced by Conover’s work. Cook and Wilcox (1991) pointed out that Conover’s feminist cultural explanations have not fared well in explaining the gender gap. In their article, the authors expressed reservations and pointed out that Conover’s (1988) measure of feminist consciousness did not consider the possibility that men could also be feminist or sympathize with feminism. Consequently, they replicated Conover’s study with data from the 1984 ANES where there they designed a different measure of feminism, comprised of a survey item about women’s equal role combined with a feeling thermometer on the women’s liberation movement. This allowed them to classify both men and women as feminists, potential feminists, or nonfeminists. The results of their analysis did not find support for the idea that a “woman’s perspective” or gender differences in values existed nor did they find large gender gaps in political attitudes.

Instead, they found there was a relationship between feminism with values and policies

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 for both men and women. They concluded, “clearly the values and policy preferences that are associated with feminism are not uniquely feminine…the women’s perspective derives from social and political, not biological sources” (1117).

Building on Gurin’s concept of “feminist consciousness,” Tolleson-Rinehart

(1992) explored gender consciousness and examined its political significance in shaping policy preferences. She defined gender consciousness as “the recognition that one’s relation to the political world is shaped in important ways by the physical fact of one’s sex, and feminism, regardless of the particular form it may take, is, at its root, a powerful manifestation of gender consciousness” (14). To determine the extent of gender consciousness among women, Tolleson-Rinehart analyzed a series of questions dealing with group identification from the ANES from 1972-1988. Comparable to earlier research by Gurin (1985), she found that race consciousness was more evident than gender consciousness. Tolleson-Rinehart (1992) then tested her argument that women who had a sense of gender consciousness were more involved in politics. Her analysis showed that the higher the gender consciousness, the more likely an individual was to engage in a political activity such as voting.

Not everyone agreed with Tolleson-Rinehart’s conclusion. Clark and Clark

(1996) evaluated this and other arguments put forth by feminist scholars that women have similar political attitudes. They questioned whether feminist women might have different political attitudes from other groups of women and investigated the political implications

of convergence or divergence. The authors found little evidence of a unified “women’s bloc” of political interests during the 1980s. Rather, they argued there were diverging

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 political attitudes rooted in socioeconomic differences among women . Using data from the 1992 National Election Survey (NES), they investigated several different policy issues such as social welfare spending and the role of the state, women’s issues, moral and cultural issues, civil rights, militarism, crime, and the environment.

Overall, they found there were gender gaps with respect to the role of the government as well as “compassion” and use of force issues. While women were more liberal on several issues and identified less with conservative (Republican) candidates

Others found no gender gap over the quintessential women’s issue—abortion (Seltzer et al., 1997). Clark and Clark (1996) tested various explanations for diverging attitudes among women such as changing gender roles, the role of gender consciousness, the feminization of poverty, as well as the assumption that women were more compassionate.

They found there were significant gaps on foreign policy issues, but no consensus on moral issues and discovered that the gender gap varies between groups. Finally, the authors explored whether women’s attitudes were converging or diverging on a number of issues. Clark and Clark (1998) countered the claim that the gender gap was not driven by feminism or feminists as other scholars have suggested but instead argued their political attitudes are similar because all of the different groups of women had crosscutting interests.

The literature discussed above highlights that feminists have offered different explanations for the gender gap. Do all women speak with a “different voice”? Are all women more compassionate than men? Some scholars disagree (Cook and Wilcox 1991;

Andersen 1999). A fundamental problem with some of the feminist explanations of the

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 gender gap is their tendency to essentialize women. This work denies the possibility that there may be important divisions and structural or political differences among women, rather than just between sexes. In addition, some studies assume that men cannot embrace feminist ideology or the desire for more a more egalitarian society. Lastly, many feminist explanations have a tendency to be overly focused on women’s behavior at the expense of looking how it compares to men’s behavior (Box-Steffensmeier, de

Boef, and Lin 2004; Gidengil et al. 2005; Kaufmann and Petrocik 1999).

Political Explanations

The previous sections reviewed the literature on structural, situational, and

feminist explanations of the gender gap. This literature has helped explain why the

gender gap exists and takes the patterns that it does, but there is still a gap in our

understanding. Some scholars have attempted to fill this gap by looking at the political preferences of men and women, and others argued the gender gap might be the result of

differences in issue salience between men and women (Bendyna and Lake 1994; Burns

2002; Conover and Sapiro 1993; Everitt 2002; Kaufmann and Petrocik 1999; Patterson

and Nishikawa 2002; Shapiro and Mahajan 1986; Tolleson-Rinehart 1992).

In their book, Sex as a Political Variable , Seltzer, Newman, and Leighton (1997)

analyzed women as candidates and voters in the United States. The authors began by

correcting several incorrect assumptions regarding the gender gap. They argued that the

gender gap was related to certain policy issues that were not necessarily “women’s

issues” such as abortion, an area where previous research found no gender gap. Manza

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 and Brooks (1999) pointed out that social cleavages based on race, class, and religion were important and often had more of an impact on vote choices than gender. Using data from NES and NORC surveys, Seltzer et al. (1997) found that there was an ideological gender gap and that men and women held different views on government spending, the role of government, and the shape of the economy. Similar to other studies, they found little or no gender gaps over issues such as foreign aid and issues traditionally perceived as “women’s issues” such as reproductive rights, equal roles for women, the equal rights amendment (ERA), sexual freedom, and the women’s movement (Chaney, Alvarez, and

Nagler 1998; Clark and Clark 1996; Shapiro and Mahajan 1986).

While Seltzer et al. (1997) concentrated on the gender gap in the United States,

Studlar et al. (1998) used a cross-national analysis to investigate and compare the sources

of the gender gap in voting behavior in Australia, Britain, and the United States. They

noted that although all three countries shared similar political backgrounds and

institutions, each country had a distinctive gender gap. They found Australian women

were more likely to support liberals, British women were more conservative, and

American women had become increasingly liberal since the 1980s. Studlar et al. (1998)

used a “regression decomposition technique” to test competing explanations such as

socioeconomic differences, situational factors, or gender differences in political attitudes

in order to see if these factors were able to account for the gender gap in voting choice in

these countries. Based on their results, they were unable to find one single explanation

that could account for the gender gap across all three countries. However, when each

country was analyzed individually, the authors found that socioeconomic and situational

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 factors were more important in Britain and Australia. However, like Seltzer et al. (1997) they noted that political attitudes mattered more in the United States.

Howell & Day (2000) agreed the gender gap could not be linked to a single cause but argued instead that it might be related to a complex set of factors. They used data from the ANES in 1996 to determine if the gender gap on political attitudes was related to socioeconomic differences, social roles, women’s autonomy, or differences in values between men and women. The results of their regression analysis did not find a common source or pattern across the political attitudes. Instead, Howell and Day argued this indicated the source of the gender gap depended on the type issue.

There has also been a growing body of literature investigating whether men and women place different priorities or salience on public policies. This research has debated whether gender differences in opinions on domestic policy such as abortion, the equal rights amendment (ERA), social welfare policies, trade, as well as foreign policies play a role in determining voters’ support for different parties (Everitt 2002; Frankovic 1999;

Gidengil 1995; Gidengil et al. 2005; Harrison 2003; Mansbridge 1985; Patterson and

Nishikawa 2002; Shapiro and Mahajan 1986; Sigel 1999). Chaney et al. (1998) analyzed

the gender gap in presidential voting in the United States from 1980 through 1992. They

noted that earlier studies offered two primary explanations to account for women’s

greater support of the Democratic Party. Some scholars argued that men and women had

different policy preferences, while others stressed gender differences in policy salience particularly issues dealing with the economy.

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

In order to explain gender differences in presidential voting, Chaney et al. (1998) evaluated different theories on the gender gap such as the “different voices theory,” group consciousness, socioeconomic differences, evaluations of the economy, as well as party identification. Chaney et al. (1998) tested the idea that men and women politicize issues differently with a multivariate analysis of vote choice and found few gender differences across most policy issues. However, like Welch and Hibbing (1992), they found that the exception was differences in how men and women evaluated the economy. In addition, attitudes towards defense spending were more important for women. As a result, they concluded that “multiple differences in the political preferences of men and women are at the root of the gender gap” (333). Chaney et al. (1998) correctly pointed out that much of the literature has focused on a single policy issue when in fact the gender gap might be related to several issues. Most studies have continued to look at the same issues.

Drawing on Blumer’s “group position theory,” Kaufmann (2002) investigated the

impact of the “culture wars” on the gender partisan gap. In particular, she maintained

that public policies such as pressure for female equality and civil rights for homosexuals

might have created a cultural divide between these groups and alienated white males.

She found that the women’s movement, women’s increased participation in the labor

force, and partisan differences especially over social policy were all reasons why cultural

issues became salient in the 1990s. She used an OLS regression to investigate whether

there were changes in the relative importance of different issues between men and

women. She found that men and women politicized certain issues differently. For

example, social welfare issues were more salient for men but cultural issues such as the

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 ones mentioned above were more important for women. Lastly, Kaufmann (2002) investigated the determinants of social welfare attitudes and found gender differences.

Her regression analysis revealed egalitarian beliefs and moral attitudes were more important to men. She concluded that cultural issues played an important role in women’s party identification, whereas, for men, social welfare policies played a greater role.

Patterson and Nishikawa (2002) examined the gender gap and party support in

Japan. They pointed out that Japan’s gender gap in political behavior mirrors differences between men and women in the United States and Western Europe. Previous studies attributed the gender gap in Japan to women’s lack of interest in politics. After noting how Japanese women expressed party preferences that were different from their male counterparts, they highlighted gender differences concerning the saliency of certain political issues. Using election data spanning two decades from the 1970s to the 1990s,

they noted that issues such as the global and home environments and education were

more salient for women. Patterson and Nishikawa (2002) argued these gender

differences had important electoral consequences because “they are at the base of their propensity to extend their political support to some political parties while withholding it

from others. Those political parties that appropriately represent issues of concern to

Japanese females enjoy higher levels of support from them than those that do not” (21).

There have also been notable studies of the gender gap in Europe. Givens (2004) for instance found that there was a gender gap in political support for radical right parties.

She noted that, based on other studies of the gender gap in party support, such differences

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 should be related to factors such as differences in political attitudes between men and women and labor force participation (Brooks et al. 2006; Steuernagel et al. 1999; Togeby

1994, Manza and Brooks 1999 ). Based on election data in 1997 and 1998, Givens investigated whether structural differences, situational, or political factors could explain the gender gap in party support for radical right parties in France, Denmark, and Austria.

Her logistic regression found that the extent to which women were less likely to vote for radical right parties varied from country to country. For example, in Austria, she found that religion, age, and education were negatively related to support for the radical right.

Across all three countries, only attitudes toward immigration were the strongest predictor of party support.

Following Givens (2004), Gidengil et al. (2005) investigated whether gender differences in political support for the radical right parties existed in Canada. They noted there has been a gender gap in support for the Canadian Alliance party since 1993. On the other hand, the authors were critical of past research that concentrated on explanations for women’s party support, which they argued, has neglected investigations of men’s political behavior. Thus, they were not interested in why women did not support conservative parties, but rather why men were attracted to the Canadian Alliance.

Using data from the 2000 Canadian Election Study, Gidengil et al. (2005) estimated two models and used binary logistic regression to examine gender differences in vote choices.

The authors found structural and situational theories could not explain the gender gap in party support. Rather gender differences in political attitudes were the most important factors responsible for the gender gap in support for the Alliance party.

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

Developmental Theory

Initial accounts of gender differences in electoral behavior in both the United

States and Western Europe in the 1950s and 1960s noted that women were less liberal ideologically and more likely to support conservative parties compared to men. Some scholars referred to these early differences between men and women as the “traditional” gender gap (Inglehart and Norris 2000; Inglehart and Norris 2003: 77; Norris 1988).

However, a few studies noticed that the United States deviated from this trend in the

1970s. A process of “gender dealignment” began to occur as gender differences became smaller or nonexistent as (Inglehart 1977; Norris 1988). Similar developments occurred across other countries by the 1980s. This eventually led to a “gender realignment” and the emergence of the “modern gender gap” in the 1990s as women gradually became more supportive of liberal parties and men became more conservative. Cross-national research has shown that these developments were still most evident in the United States

(De Vaus and McAllister 1989; Inglehart and Norris 2000, 2003: 78).

In order to determine if European women were becoming more left-wing like women in the US, Norris (1988) analyzed their vote choices, ideology, and the policy preferences with Eurobarometer data from 1975 and 1983. The results of her analysis revealed that a voting gap did not exist, but she nonetheless found that “there is a potential gender gap, however, as women and men disagree significantly on a range of issues” (226). The survey data from 1983 revealed there were often significant gender

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 gaps over a number of issues such as foreign policy and law and order. She underscored that policy salience could possibly determine voting choices in the future.

Inglehart and Norris (2000, 2003) explored the consequences of this trend for voting and public opinion, informal and formal political participation, and political representation. They insisted that the modern gender gap was now common in other countries and offered a “developmental theory of gender realignment” to explain this general trend (Inglehart and Norris 2000: 444; Inglehart and Norris 2003: 79). As a result, they asserted this modern gender gap in voting behavior would be perceptible among younger generations and among women in postindustrial countries that underwent the same cultural and political transformations. Their multivariate analysis tested their theories of gender realignment using survey data from the World Values Survey (WVS) and the European Values Survey (EVS). They found evidence that women were more liberal ideologically and contrary to scholars such as Manza and Brooks et al. (1998,

1999) and others, their results showed the gender gap in postindustrial countries was

strongly related to cultural change. This also proved to be something that existed to a

lesser extent for the agrarian and industrializing countries in their sample as well. Thus,

their theory has important implications because it suggests that should the global cultural

transformation they outlined continue, it should be expected to move from a traditional to

modern gender gap.

As mentioned above, while most research on the gender gap has been conducted

in advanced countries, some have looked at Africa to study this phenomenon. Logan &

Bratton (2006) explored gender differences across fifteen different African countries

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 using a pooled dataset from a round of Afrobarometer surveys conducted from 2002 to

2003. They specifically concentrated on differences between men and women in their preferences for certain political regimes, economic policies, evaluations of political institutions, and political behavior. Overall, they found that while there was a gender gap in support for democracy. However, they argued any gender gap where men appeared to support democracy more than women might be related to a higher number of “don’t know” responses by women. Their analysis revealed there were also significant variations between countries. For example, fewer women preferred democracy as a form of government in such countries as Senegal and Mali, but the gender gap was smaller in others like Botswana where more women than men preferred democracy. There were also significant gender gaps in approval of one-party governments and political parties across a number of countries. Once again, Logan and Bratton (2006) argued that the evidence really indicates women were “adverse to uncertainty” (6).

These authors looked at citizens’ economic preferences for either the market or state policies. They found no support for Inglehart and Norris’ findings because there were no gender differences. In other words, overall women were not more liberal than men were as expected. However, this was not the case when they examined individual countries. For example, they found women were more pro-state in Uganda and

Botswana. For performance evaluations, they found small gender gaps overall but interesting variations between countries. However, the authors again pointed out this was related to the higher number of “don’t know” responses by women.

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

Lastly, Logan and Bratton (2006) created a political participation index and found

there were large gender gaps in political behavior. In their multivariate analysis,

following Inglehart and Norris (2003) they tested structural, cognitive, cultural, and

agency explanations of the political participation gender gap. They found that gender as

a variable provided very little explanation for differences between men and women in political participation. Similar to the Afrobarometer study (2005) on Uganda, Logan and

Bratton (2006) concluded that “other explanatory factors, reduce, but do not eliminate,

the effects of gender; other things being equal, a significant gender effect remains.

Nonetheless, the gender effects are substantially small. Structural, cognitive, cultural,

agency, and country factors all offer greater explanatory power than gender” (27). Logan

and Bratton’s (2006) study was different from previous studies on the gender gap in the

manner they tested for explanations for the gender gap. Using an index of political participation constructed from ten different types of political behavior, in the first attempt

to explore the political gender gap in another context, the authors primarily investigated

the standard structural and cultural explanations for the gender gap. Logan and Bratton’s

(2006) research underscores there is still not enough known about the political gender

gap in Africa.

Conclusion

This literature review has shown that despite the fact that there has been a great deal of contemporary research focused on a variety of contending explanations for the gender gap, there appears to be no consensus about the source of the gender gap and how

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 certain factors interact to influence the patterns it manifests. Moreover, this review has shown that the literature has concentrated primarily on advanced industrialized democracies, which means more research is needed to understand the sources of the gender gap in party support in African countries.

In light of this, the most important question revealed here is whether or not existing work can provide an explanation for the gender gap in African countries? In order to answer this and other related research questions, this study will test alternative theoretical approaches to determine if they help explain how gender relates to party identification and partisan support for parties in Africa. Although there has been a great deal of empirical research on the gender gap and party support, a goal of this study is to contribute to this vast literature by addressing some important issues not covered or overlooked in the previous literature. One issue is the Western bias of the literature since most of the empirical studies currently available focus on advanced industrialized countries, in particular, the United States and Western European countries. This raises the question about generalizability, since many of these studies are often based on single country case studies or are comparisons of countries with similar political histories.

There are few studies on the gender gap in new democracies, and the issue is whether or not existing explanations for the gender gap will hold in countries with different political, social, and economic development experiences (Hesli, Jung, Reisinger, and Miller 2001;

Lewis 2004).

Consequently, this study will address this issue by exploring the gender gap in party support not in just one country but across a set of six African countries. Compared

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 to the narrow set of advanced industrialized countries in previous studies there is wider economic, political, and cultural diversity among these African countries, which means the results of this study may be generalized to other countries outside the region. The set of African countries examined in this study range from poor countries like Mali to more economically advantaged countries such as Botswana. These African countries are also relatively new democracies. Ghana became an independent country as early as 1956, while Portuguese rule finally ended in Cape Verde in 1975. This means that political participation such as voting in competitive elections is a new mode of citizen participation just as it is in other countries in Africa.

Although there have been previous studies that have looked at gender differences in support for specific parties, they have been limited to advanced industrialized countries where there are established party systems (Gidengil et al. 2005; Givens 2004; Norris and

Lovenduski 1993). However, the party systems in African countries, like some countries in Asia and Latin America, are fluid systems with often a high number of parties fluctuating from election to election. Compared to the United States and Western

Europe, political parties are less institutionalized, often without clear-cut distinctive ideologies, or stable social bases of support. Under such circumstances, it may be difficult for citizens to identify with a particular party over time or for a party to gain and maintain support for an election or for an extended period.

Earlier studies on the gender gap in advanced industrialized democracies have taken competitive elections and the alternation in power for granted so these issues are downplayed or not discussed extensively. Despite the fact that African countries have

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 also adopted a wide variety of electoral systems, dominant parties are a defining feature in African party systems (Bogaards 2000, 2004; Laakso 1997, 2002; Mozaffar and

Scarritt 2005; Patterson and Fadiga-Stewart 2005). In this situation, a single party monopolizes political power in election after election. Dominant parties are not unique to

African countries because they have been common to other countries like India and

Mexico as well as advanced industrialized countries such as Japan and Sweden during certain periods (Giliomee and Simkins 1999). Thus, this study will look at the gender gap in this political context to understand the role a dominant party system plays in shaping the gender gap within these different countries.

Another problem with the previous literature is that the gender gap has become synonymous with women rather than differences between men and women. Some scholars have challenged this assumption and argued that the gender gap is the result of changes in the voting patterns of men, not women, over time (Box-Steffensmeier et al.

2004; Kaufman and Petrocik 1999; Wirls 1986). A related issue is that the literature has a tendency to essentialize the voting behavior of all women by treating women as a monolithic group. Past research has overlooked or downplayed the differences among women based on race, class, and ethnicity and the impact of these societal characteristics on the gender gap. For example, some studies in the United States have shown that the gender gap is larger within African American and Latino communities compared to their

White counterparts (Cohen 2003; Lien 1998).

Lastly, previous research has highlighted the role of public opinion on policy concerns and the role it may play in party support. For example, some scholars have

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 looked at patterns of support between men and women over “women’s issues” or feminism and social welfare issues in “welfare state” countries such as Canada, Great

Britain, or the United States (Burns 2002; Dalton 2002; Everitt 2002; Gidengil 1995).

This study will also investigate the role of public opinion on party support on a wide variety of similar concerns such as the role of government, economic, and social welfare issues in these different African countries.

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

CHAPTER III:

DATA AND METHODS

This study will make use of the large amount of survey data available through the

Afrobarometer data series. Over the past decade, a group of collaborating scholars from

Michigan State University (MSU), the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA),

and the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD) in Ghana have conducted a

series of national surveys throughout Africa. Survey data is also available through the

World Values Survey (WVS). However, the WVS covers a limited number of countries

from Africa. Currently, data is only available for three countries located in Sub-Saharan

Africa: Nigeria, South Africa, and Tanzania (World Values Survey).6 In addition to a larger set of countries, the Afrobarometer surveys include several questions that explore

African men and women’s political attitudes on a wide range of issues. Among the topics of interest for this project are attitudes toward democracy, economic reforms, government performance, and conflict resolution. These surveys also inquire about the political behavior of African men and women in a variety of political activities such as voting, political protest, contacting public officials, and participation in civic associations.

The first round of surveys was carried out between July 1999 and June 2001 in twelve different African countries. 7 These countries included Botswana, Ghana,

Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and

6 The WVS also covers three North African countries: Algeria, Egypt, and Morocco.

7 There were also two previous studies conducted in Zambia in 1993 and 1995.

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

Zimbabwe. The second round included four additional countries: Cape Verde, Kenya,

Mozambique, and Senegal. A third round was scheduled to be completed in 2006 and includes the countries of Benin and Madagascar.8 Together, these eighteen countries represent a cross-section of African nations that include Anglophone, Francophone, and

Lusophone countries from each geographical region. Moreover, the countries in these surveys represent differences of language, political history, culture, and levels of political and economic development.9

Variables and Operationalization

Dependent Variable

The purpose of this study is to isolate those factors that explain the differing patterns of partisan support that characterize African men and women. This will be

accomplished by looking at data from six countries in particular. These include

Botswana, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tanzania. These six countries are

characterized by two different gender gap patterns and they have been paired according

to the pattern they manifest. The first pattern is referred to in this study as a inconsistent

contrastive gender gap. This pattern exists in cases where men and women supported

different political parties. The data in Table 3.1 indicates that two countries demonstrate

8 The data for Round 2.5 (an intermediate round) and Round 3 have not been released yet. 9 Some countries have designated a non-European language as its official languages and in most countries, an African language is the national language most commonly used. For example, Kenya and Tanzania both have Kiswahili and English as their official languages and Arabic is widely spoken in Tanzania. South Africa uses eleven languages including Afrikaans (which is of Dutch origin), Madagascar uses French and Malagasy (a Malayo-Polynesian language), and Malawi uses Chichewa (see the CIA World Factbook for each country). Currently, the Afrobarometer only surveys countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, so North African countries are excluded.

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 this pattern. In Botswana (1999, 2003) and Mali, women supported one political party at a higher rate than their male counterparts and another at much lower rates than men. In these cases, women supported the ruling parties at higher rates than men and the major opposition party at lower rates. This pattern is most evident for Botswana in 1999 where there was a large positive gender gap in support for the Botswana Democratic Party

(BDP), the ruling party. Women were over 15% more likely to support the BDP, while men on the other hand, were over 8% more likely to support the opposition party, the

Botswana National Front (BNF). Between 1999 and 2003, this pattern persisted, but to a somewhat lesser extent. As the ruling party, the BDP continued to maintain a higher level of support among women (4.88%) in 2003, but men continued to show greater support for the BNF than women. Mali is also a country where the gender gap also manifested this contrastive pattern specifically. Women were 3% more likely to support the Mouvement Citoyen/ATT, the governing party, lead by President Amadou Toumani

Toure and were 6.6% less likely than men were to support the former governing party, the Alliance pour la Democratie au Mali (ADEMA).

The second pattern that will be analyzed in the chapters that follow is known as inconsistent singular gender gap pattern. This pattern is apparent among the remaining two countries listed in Table 3.1 and it is defined where the party support patterns of men

and women were different but not across two different parties as with the previous pattern. Specifically, in this gender gap pattern, women were generally less supportive of

the parties overall, albeit not necessarily at the same rate. Nigeria in 2001 is the best

example of this pattern where women were 14.5% less likely to support the current ruling

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 party, the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), and 3% less likely to support the All

People’s Party (APP). Similarly, in Tanzania (2003), women were nearly 8% less likely to support the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), the current ruling party with respect to the main opposition party, Civic United Front (CUF) party and they were less supportive by less than 2 percentage points.

This dissertation will also investigate the role of gender in one other political pattern. Senegal and Kenya are two countries that recently experienced an alternation in political power. In each country, the opposition successfully defeated the ruling parties that had controlled politics since independence. In these alternating elections, the former opposition parties, the Parti Démocratique Senegalais (PDS) and the National Rainbow

Coalition (NARC) party in Kenya, successfully defeated the dominant parties, the Parti

Socialiste du Senegal (PS), and the Kenya African National Union (KANU) party, respectively. Currently, the PDS and KANU are the ruling parties in their respective countries and now compete against the former dominant parties.

The question this dissertation will investigate is the extent to which gender was a factor in these transitions. To understand this role, one must first note that Senegal and

Kenya both manifest the gender gap patterns mentioned above. While Botswana and

Mali revealed a positive gender gap for the ruling party and a negative gender gap for the opposition, Senegal is defined by a weaker contrastive gender gap pattern but in the opposite direction (Table 3.2). In Senegal, women were nearly 9% less likely to support the current ruling party, the Parti Démocratique Senegalais (PDS). There was also a smaller and contrasting gender gap for the main opposition as in Botswana and Mali;

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 however, it was weaker and positive showing that women were slightly (less than 1%) more likely to support to support the Parti Socialiste (PS). The other pattern, inconsistent singular pattern was evident in Kenya. In 2003, women were almost 5% less likely to support the new governing party, the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC). Women also showed less support (less than 2%) for the Kenya African National Union (KANU), which is currently the main opposition party. This demonstrates that the gender gap in

Kenya is an inconsistent singular pattern similar to Nigeria and Tanzania.

Given the political patterns discussed above, the dependent variable is partisan support. The measure for partisan support is based on the response to the question:

“Which party are you close to?” In other words, it looks at the specific party the respondent identified with and the parties are examined separately for African men and women (see Burns et al. 2001: 45-50). This variable will be used for the six countries discussed above and will be defined for male and female subsamples in each chapter.

The purpose of this study is to determine which factors explain gender differences in party support. This is accomplished by conducting a multivariate analysis similar to other studies of the gender gap (see Givens 2004; Gidengil et al. 2005; Patterson and

Nishikawa 2002). The idea is to determine which of the factors identified in the literature review in the previous chapter will have the greatest explanatory power while controlling for those factors existing scholarship says are important. In addition, it has been common in other studies to separate regressions were conducted for men and women. Since dependent variable is categorical, the most appropriate technique here is a maximum likelihood estimation that is adjusted for the structure of the dependent variable.

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

Independent variables

To investigate the factors most related to the gender gap as identified in the

literature above, this study uses the previous research as a guide to explore those factors

most likely to explain the gender gap in Africa. In light of this, the analysis conducted

below will investigate three sets of independent variables. The first set of independent

variables involve structural and situational factors including such things as a

respondent’s gender, age, region, religion, status as the head of household, occupation

type, education level, and household income. 10 Since the variables for race and ethnicity

were not consistently used across all surveys, the group identification variable was also

used. 11

A second set of variables involves political and feminist explanations for the gender gap. These variables include things such as the respondent’s associational membership and their evaluation of the national economy in the past, present, and future.

Psychological engagement such as whether a respondent discussed politics or was interested in government affairs, attitudes on economic reforms implemented such as structural adjustment programs (SAPs), and evaluations of public policies implemented by the ruling party over a variety of issues and attitudes towards women’s equality were also used in this set of independent variables. Other variables in this category that may

10 An additional variable, the state, will be used but is only available for the Nigerian survey. The household income variable was not asked in all the surveys, particularly among those countries included in the first round of the Afrobarometer surveys.

11 The group identification variable offers respondents an opportunity to identify themselves with a particular racial or ethnic group.

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 also have an impact on the gender include such things as gender quotas, which have been implemented in the country under investigation, or other specific political reforms that are directly related to gender relations. 12

The final set of independent variables this study will investigate include the

attitudes of respondents on various policy issues. One of the goals of this study is to

determine the policy basis of party support in Africa while controlling for structural,

situational, feminist, and political factors. This part of the analysis is predicated on the

idea that men and women have different party support patterns and different political parties represent the policy issues of interest to them differently. This idea can be

directly tested by including attitudes on policy issues in addition to the other independent

variables mentioned above.

Outline of the Dissertation

The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows. The next three chapters are analytic and focus on the gender gap and political patterns mentioned above for each pair of countries and analyzes the data on the gender gap and discusses the results of these analyses, and present this data using tables and figures. The final chapter draws conclusions based on these findings and considers the political and policy implications of the results, as well as offers ideas for future research in this area. The last section of the dissertation contains the references used for this study.

12 These new variables were not asked in all the surveys and were often questions about specific reforms in a particular country. 60

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

Table 3.1: Gender Gap Pattern I

Inconsistent Contrastive Botswana 1999 Botswana Democratic Botswana National Party (BDP) Front (BNF) Percentage support 49.27% 24.59% Partisan gender gap 15.54% -8.53%

Botswana 2003 Botswana Democratic Botswana National Party (BDP) Front (BNF) Percentage support 44.43% 9.36% Partisan gender gap 4.88% -4.47%

Mali 2002 Mouvement Citoyen/ Alliance pour la Amadou Toumani Toure Democratie au Mali (ATT) (ADEMA) Percentage support 13.61% 21.07% Partisan gender gap 3.02% -6.62%

Inconsistent Singular Nigeria 2001 People’s Democratic All People’s Party (APP) Party (PDP) Percentage support 32.00% 7.66% Partisan gender gap -14.53% -3.33%

Tanzania 2003 Chama Cha Mapinduzi Civic United Front (CCM) (CUF) Percentage support 57.97% 7.89% Partisan gender gap -7.88% -1.35%

Source: Compiled by the author from Afrobarometer data.

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

Table 3.2: Gender Gap Pattern II

Lost Dominance Senegal 2002 Parti Démocratique Parti Socialiste (PS) Sénégalais (PDS) Percentage support 36.88% 8.71% Partisan gender gap -8.96% 0.28%

Kenya 2003 National Rainbow Kenya African National Coalition (NARC) Union (KANU) Percentage support 52.38% 4.56% Partisan gender gap -4.83% -1.82%

Source: Compiled by the author from Afrobarometer data.

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

CHAPTER FOUR:

When Men and Women Support Different Parties: The Inconsistent Contrastive Pattern

Introduction

The previous chapter outlined two gender gap patterns present in six African countries, the inconsistent contrastive and inconsistent singular patterns. Recall from the previous chapter that the former is a gender gap pattern where men and women support different parties and was identified in surveys taken in Botswana (1999) and Mali (2002).

This chapter will look at these two countries to explain why it is that men and women supported different parties in some countries. The analysis begins with a brief background description of each country’s political, sociocultural, and economic context.

It will then describe the origins of the main political parties and prevailing electoral patterns in each country. The analysis will focus on the patterns of partisan support, concentrating on the various types of social groups from which parties derive their political support. Next, it will analyze how certain individual characteristics, attitudes, and political behavior of respondents affect partisan support. Finally, the investigation will turn to explaining the inconsistent contrastive gender gap pattern characteristic of

Botswana and Mali by using a multivariate analysis to identify which sets of independent variables have the most explanatory power.

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

Botswana

Political Background

Formerly known as Bechuanaland, modern day Botswana is located in southern

Africa. In stark contrast to its trio of neighbors, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa,

Botswana did not emerge as a sovereign nation in 1966 as the culmination of a nationalist

movement for independence from European colonialism. However, Great Britain was

pivotal in shaping the future political landscape of this landlocked country. This was

particularly true when it came to party development and political competition as it

prepared the moderate Bechuanaland Democratic Party (BDP) to take over the political

reins in the early 1960s (Baumhogger 1999). Today, over forty years later, the BDP has

become one of the oldest, continuous governing parties in Africa. 13

Although Botswana is rich in a variety of mineral resources such as copper, its

economy remains heavily dependent on the diamond industry that serves as the main

source of wealth. A growing service sector, particularly Botswana’s tourist industry, has become an increasingly important source of revenue. As a result, Botswana has become

one of the richest and most developed economies in Sub-Saharan Africa with a GDP

(PPP) per capita of $11,400.14 Despite its vast amount of wealth, not everyone has benefited. Botswana has been continuously plagued with high levels of unemployment, estimated somewhere between 24% and 40%. Perhaps even more devastating to its

13 Today, the BDP is known as the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP).

14 The GDP is calculated based on the purchasing power parity (PPP) calculated as of July 1 st of the same year (see CIA World Factbook). 64

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 economic success story has been the high percentage (close to 40%) of the population afflicted by HIV/AIDS (CIA World Factbook).

Botswana is a relatively homogenous country with the Tswana making up close to

80% of the population as well as smaller ethnic minority groups such as the Kalanga

(11%) and the Basarwa (3%).15 Most Batswana are Christian (70%) and over 75% of the

population speaks Tswana.16 As a result, ethnic conflict has revolved around cultural

assimilation into the dominant Tswana group and ethnic disputes have emerged over land

and property rights. A good example of this occurred when the government forcibly

displaced the Basarwa from the Central Kalahari Game Reserve (CIA World Factbook;

Molomo 2003).

Political Parties in Botswana

Botswana has one of the oldest uninterrupted multiparty democracies in Sub-Saharan

Africa. Although there are a variety of political parties in this parliamentary republic, there is also a low level of political competition between parties (van Cranenburgh 2003).

This has allowed the current ruling party, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), to maintain its governing position since its independence in 1966. In 1962, Sir Seretse

Khama founded the Bechuanaland Democratic Party (BDP) and with support from Great

Britain as well as traditional chiefs in rural areas, Khama became the first president after independence. Since the election of 1969, the BDP has eclipsed all other political parties

15 The Tswana are also known as the Setswana. Other ethnic minorities include other Black Africans (particularly from Zimbabwe and South Africa), White Africans, and Europeans (7%).

16 The singular noun for a person from Botswana is Motswana and the plural form is Batswana.

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 and has continuously won an overwhelming majority of votes and seats in election after election. 17 However, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) was plagued by intraparty

struggles throughout the 1980s and 1990s. In 1980, after Vice President Sir Ketumile

Masire became president after Khama’s death, internal disagreements emerged and the

BDP plummeted from winning 75% of the vote in 1979 to 53% in the 1994 election.

Four years later in 1998, Festus Mogae was elected as Botswana’s third president and

currently serves as the president of Botswana (African Elections Database; Baumhogger

1999; Molomo 2003).

Opposition parties like the Botswana People’s Party (BPP) in the 1960s and in the

1970s, the Botswana National Front (BNF), helped to facilitate the Botswana Democratic

Party’s electoral dominance. 18 Individually, opposition parties were weakened by their own internal conflicts, and collectively, they have been unable to organize a coalition to successfully defeat the BDP. The last attempt failed in 1999, when several small parties formed the Botswana Alliance Movement (BAM) (African Elections Database; Molomo

2003).

The Botswana National Front (BNF) was founded in 1965 and is the oldest existing opposition party in Botswana. It first participated in the 1969 election and by the mid-1970s, it replaced the Botswana People’s Party (BPP) as the main opposition party.

Led by Batheon II, a former chief of the Bagwaketse from the south, it has been critical of the BDP’s neoliberal economic policies, which hit the Basarwa particularly hard. The

17 An earlier election was actually held before independence in 1965 (African Elections database).

18 The Botswana People’s Party was formerly known as the Bechuanaland People’s Party. 66

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

BNF drew its political support primarily from urban areas, the country’s youth, as well as the working and middle classes. It became a formidable opponent in the 1994 elections when it captured over 37% of the vote, providing the first real threat to BDP’s electoral dominance in almost thirty years (African Elections Database). Based on its stunning performance five years earlier, the Botswana National Front (BNF) was poised to become the next governing party. However, this was not to be. Intraparty conflicts in 1998 led to the creation of a splinter party, the Botswana Congress Party (BCP), just months before the 1999 elections (Baumhogger 1999; Molomo 2003).

Patterns of Party Support

The question we face is why party support patterns for men and women are so different, and this effort begins with a mapping of the social bases of party support in

Botswana. The purpose of this section is to give a basic description of the groups that support Botswana’s political parties. Party support patterns were determined using the

Afrobarometer survey taken in Botswana in 1999, and the results are presented in Table

4.1. In Botswana, ethnicity is not the primary basis of partisan support as it is in more ethnically heterogeneous countries. So while Botswana is a culturally homogenous country overall, the ruling party, and the opposition were equally supported by most ethnic groups in Botswana. However, there were a few notable patterns. Specifically, the BDP received more support among the Mongwato, the country’s largest ethnic group,

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 while the opposition found greater support among two of the smallest ethnic groups, the

Mongwaketse and the Kalanga. 19

The data indicated that these ethnic divisions were moderately important, but they

also showed that age-based differences in partisan support were more noticeable. While

there was little difference in partisan support among those between 18 and 24 years of

age, opposition parties received greater support from younger adults between 25 and 44

years of age, while older adults over age 45 showed greater support for the BDP. The

data also indicated that occupation was an important predictor of party support.

Specifically, small farmers, domestic workers, housewives, and those who were

unemployed were highly supportive of the BDP. As explained in more detail below, and

most important for this study, is the fact that women were more likely to belong to these

occupational groups. Other occupational groups such as skilled and unskilled labor were

more supportive of opposition parties.

Finally, Table 4.1 points out there were also regional differences with respondents

located in rural villages, Kweneng, and in Botswana Central more supportive of the BDP.

In contrast, the opposition found greater support in the Gaborone region, townships, as

well as urban and suburban areas.

Gender and Party Support

The data in Table 4.2 summarize the inconsistent contrastive gender gap pattern

evident in Botswana from the 1999 and 2003 surveys. To reiterate, this pattern exists

19 Mongwato and Mongwaketse are both Tswana ethnic groups. 68

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 when women support one political party at a higher rate and another party at a lower rate than their male counterparts. So while nearly 50% of respondents indicated they supported the Botswana Democratic Party in 1999, women were 15.5% more likely to support the BDP that same year. In 2003, overall support for the BDP dropped slightly from 49% to 44%, but women still showed 4.88% greater support for the ruling party. In contrast, men were 8.5% more likely in 1999 and 4.4% in 2003, to support the opposition

Botswana National Front (BNF).

The question that naturally follows from the data presented thus far is whether or not there is a social basis to Botswana’s inconsistent contrastive gender gap pattern.

Again, the 1999 Botswana Afrobarometer was investigated to make this determination and the results are presented in Table 4.3. The data in this table show that women who expressed satisfaction with the economy, gave positive evaluations of the ruling party’s efforts to manage crime, and were working in certain occupations such as domestic work, smaller occupations, or were unemployed were more likely to express support for the

Botswana Democratic Party. Women who were dissatisfied with the economy, employed as skilled or unskilled manual laborers, or were students were more likely to support opposition parties. Table 4.3 also draws attention to those factors that influenced male support. Similar to their female counterparts, men who supported the BDP were more likely to be satisfied with the economy and state the ruling party was doing “well” when it came to managing crime. Professionals, small farmers, and students were also more likely to support the BDP. In contrast, males who were dissatisfied with the economy, working in smaller occupations or skilled manual labor supported the opposition.

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

Explaining the Gender Gap in Botswana

For each country, the sample is divided on the basis of gender in order to estimate the effect of the independent variables on partisan support. The dependent variable is the stated partisanship of each respondent and since this is a categorical variable with more than two categories, the appropriate estimation method is multinomial logit. Again, respondents stated whether they supported the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), the main opposition party, the Botswana National Front (BNF) or smaller opposition parties.

Separate regressions were conducted for men and women, and the base category in the analysis was those respondents not supporting any political party.

Results are presented in Table 4.4 and the independent variables that were significant from the 1999 survey are contained in the left side of the table. All variables that were at least significant at the 0.10 level were included. Coefficients in the table are the log odds ratios, which can be converted into probabilities by raising the exponential function to the power indicated by the coefficient. Table 4.4 includes the coefficients for men, and reveals that few structural variables were important for partisan support. Only region (rural), discussing politics, and evaluations of the current regime’s management of the economy were significant predictors of partisan support for Batswana males.

Exponentiating the coefficients shows that the variable with the largest influence was discussing politics, which increased the probability of male support for the ruling party, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) by nearly 3 times. The odds that men who discussed politics would also support the main opposition party, the Botswana National

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

Front was about 2.02 times the odds for women. There were several policy evaluations respondents used to judge the ruling party; however, only the BDP’s efforts at managing the economy were significant. Finally, the table shows that when this issue was considered important, it increased the probability for a male respondent to support the

Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) by 1.96 times and the Botswana National Front

(BNF) by 2.09 times.

Table 4.4 also includes the coefficients for women and shows that a greater number of variables were important for partisan support for women in Botswana. These variables included residing in the capital, Gaborone, as well as the Eastern and Southwest regions. Others included educational level, associational membership, discussing politics, and regime policy evaluations over how well the BDP supplied water to households were also significant . Similar to their male counterparts, discussing politics had the greatest influence on partisan support for women. This variable increased the probability of women supporting the BDP by more than 3 and half times and increased the probability of supporting the BNF by nearly 2 times.

Botswana: Conclusion

This section presented data on the patterns of party support for Botswana from the

1999 Afrobarometer survey. The analysis revealed that the ruling party, the Botswana

Democratic Party (BDP), and its opposition derived their political support from different

social groups in the country. It also highlighted that certain attitudes over policy issues

such as the economic policies implemented by the BDP, regime evaluations such as

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

providing water, the state of the economy, democracy, and crime played a role in partisan

support. In addition, political behavior such as discussing politics also shows there were

interesting differences between those who supported the ruling party and the opposition.

It disaggregated this information by looking at men and women separately to see if there

were gender differences. There was a gender gap in party identification and partisan

support in Botswana in 1999 and important gender differences between men and women

in their attitudes over a variety of policy issues and their support for the opposition and

the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP).

Mali

Introduction

The other country with an inconsistent contrastive gender gap pattern was Mali

(2002). This country is unique among the six countries this study investigates because the last presidential election in 2002 ushered in the current incumbent, Amadou Toumani

Toure (known locally as ATT), who ran successfully as a nonpartisan candidate. While

Toure is not affiliated with any political party, he is supported by the Mouvement

Citoyen/ATT (MC/ATT) , and for the purposes of this chapter the Mouvement

Citoyen/ATT, is treated as the governing party. 20 Like the previous section on Botswana,

section begins with a description of the political parties in Mali, partisan support patterns,

20 The US Embassy in Mali recognizes the MC/ATT as a group of associations who supported Toure. The MC/ATT presented several independent candidates in the 2004 municipal election (see US Embassy). 72

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 and the gender gap in party identification is mapped. Moreover, differences between the political behavior of men and women will be analyzed using a multinomial logit analysis.

Political Background

As the largest country in West Africa, Mali is surrounded by seven other African countries: Algeria and Mauritania to the north, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Cote d’Ivoire to the east and south, and Senegal and Guinea to the west.21 Since 65% of the country is desert this semiarid, Sahelian country must cope with environmental issues such as illegal poaching, desertification, and deforestation, which have increased soil erosion. This is problematic because Mali is primarily an agrarian country with 80% of its labor force involved in some form of agriculture or fishing. It is also one of the largest African exporters of cotton, but salt, gold, and phosphates are still important resources. Mali is still is very dependent on foreign aid and it has implemented several structural adjustment programs (SAPs) over the past couple of decades (CIA World Factbook).

Despite its large size, Mali has a relatively low population of only 11.7 million who live in the capital district located in Bamako or the country’s other eight administrative regions: Gao, Kayes, Kidal, Koulikoro, Mopti, Segou, Sikasso, and

Tombouctou. 22 Currently, half of the population is under 15 years of age and the unemployment rate is 14.6%. Income is not equitably distributed in the country and 64%

21 French Soudan was the former name for present day Mali.

22 The population listed is based on a July 2006 estimate. 73

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 of its residents are poor. Even more telling is the fact that the top 10% earn 40% of the nation’s income, which is a GDP per capita of only $1,200 (PPP) (CIA World Factbook).

Most citizens of Mali (50%) belong to one of the Mande ethnic groups, 17% are

Peul, 12% Voltaic, 10% Tuareg and Moor, and 6% are Songhai or belong to another ethnic group (5%).23 Although French is the official language, the primary language used

is Bambara spoken by 80% of the population and less than half (46.4%) of the population

is literate. Other distinctive socioeconomic statistics on Mali stand out. The net

migration is negative (6.6 per 1000) indicating more people are moving out of the

country. Mali also has a high infant mortality rate at 100 deaths per 1000 births. In

contrast, Mali has a very low percentage (1.9%) of persons infected with HIV/AIDS.

This may be related to the dominant religion—over 90% of Malians are Muslim. 24 While

the low HIV/AIDS rate is commendable, diarrhea and malaria continue to be two preventable but fatal diseases, killing more people each year, particularly children under

5 years of age.

Political Parties in Mali

Only two viable political parties existed in the decade prior to Mali’s

independence. The first to emerge was the Parti Soudanais Progressiste (PSP) founded

23 The Mande ethnic groups include the Bambara, Malinke, and Soninke. The Peul ethnic group is known as the Fulani or Hausa in other countries. The term “voltaic” means this ethnic group originated from the areas in and surrounding Burkina Faso, previously known as Upper Volta. Like the Peul/Fulani, the Tuareg are traditionally a nomadic group and found in northern Mali near Algeria. Moors are primarily from Mauritania, Morocco, and Algeria and several were refugees in Mali in 2005 (see CIA World Factbook).

24 Nine percent practice an indigenous religion and only one percent are considered Christian. 74

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 by Fily Diabo Sissoko and was a conservative party supported by the French colonial government. In response, Modibo Keita founded the opposition party, the Union

Soudanais-Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (US-RDA) in 1946. Like several of his African contemporaries of the 1950s in Senegal, Guinea, Ghana, and Tanzania, Keita espoused African socialism and demanded the end of colonial rule. By 1959, the US-

RDA was a political powerhouse in Malian politics and easily won 80% of the vote in

Mali’s first elections (African Elections Database).25 The same year, Keita joined

Senghor of Senegal to form the Federation of Mali. However, disagreements between the two leaders eventually led to the end of their political alliance. When Mali finally gained its independence from France in August 1960, the US-RDA was the main political party and Keita was appointed as Mali’s first president (Mozaffar 1999).

Mali’s experience with multiparty democracy was cut short when Keita quickly transformed the country into a de facto one-party state. Elections in 1964 included only candidates from the ruling party for legislative positions, and Keita was easily reelected as president. For the first eight years, President Keita and the Union Soudanais-

Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (US-RDA) dominated politics. Then in 1968, Lt.

Moussa Traore overthrew Keita in a military coup and ruled first as military leader of the

Comité Militaire de Libération Nationale (CLN) and later as the civilian president of the official state party, Union Démocratique du Peuple Malien (UDPM) until 1974. 26 He

25 Keita’s political rival, Sissoko eventually joined the US-RDA party.

26 The Union Démocratique du Peuple Malien (UDPM) no longer exists.

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 also served as head of the second republic and like Keita established single-party rule that lasted until 1991 (Mozaffar 1999).27

Various members of civil society organized several protests to demonstrate their general dissatisfaction with the ruling party. Specifically, many were upset with the ban on political parties, the lack of freedom of the press, and economic reforms such as the structural adjustment programs (SAPs) implemented under Traore. As a result, General

Amadou Toumani Toure overthrew Traore in Mali’s second military coup in 1991, established a transitional government, and scheduled multiparty elections for 1992. Dr.

Alpha Oumar Konare, leader of a growing pro-democracy opposition movement and the

Alliance pour la Democratie au Mali (ADEMA) party emerged in the midst of dozens of

new political parties and civic organizations (Bingen 2000; Clark 1997, 2000; Mozaffar

1999; Villalon and Idrissa 2005). ADEMA won 76 of the 116 seats in the legislative

elections for National Assembly Legislative elections in February 1992. Two months

later, presidential candidates represented several different parties such as ADEMA, US-

RDA, Congres Nationale pour la Initiative Democratie (CNID), and the Rassemblement pour la Démocratie et le Progrès (RDP). 28 ADEMA had a strong showing with 45% of

the votes, while the other parties did not gain more than 12% of the vote. However, since

27 Mali’s second constitution (the first was in 1960) was adopted after a referendum in 1974 and made several changes such as the direct election of the president, limiting presidential terms to five years, and establishing a unicameral legislature. This constitutional referendum put in place by the military regime also gave the Comité Militaire de Libération Nationale (CLN) the right to control government policy for the next five years (see African Elections Database).

28 Due to a growing number of disagreements within the party, Tiéoulé Konate and Baba Haidara both ran as presidential candidates for the US-RDA in the first round of the 1992 presidential election. In 1998, Daba Diawara formed the splinter party, Parti de l’Indépendance, Démocratie et de la Solidarité (PIDS) (see Mozaffar 1999).

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 no party won a majority of votes, a second round of elections was held two weeks later between the two top parties, ADEMA and US-RDA. Tiéoulé Mamadou Konate, the presidential candidate for the US-RDA had only 31% of the vote and Konare was elected president of the third republic with 69% of the vote.

Legislative elections were held in April 1997, but ADEMA was still unable win a majority of votes and a second round was scheduled two weeks later. In a controversial move, the Constitutional Court annulled the results of the first round of elections and subsequently cancelled the second round. As a result, several opposition parties protested and refused to participate in the May presidential elections (Mozaffar 1999). This forced

President Konare to run virtually unopposed and he won in a landslide with 96% of the vote. 29 In the 2002 presidential elections, the number of political candidates increased to twenty-four candidates representing thirteen different political parties. An additional eleven nonaffiliated candidates ran as independents including Amadou Toumani Toure, the former general who led Mali’s transition to democracy. Toure won 28% of the presidential vote with ADEMA and the Rassemblement pour le Mali (RPM) not far behind with 23% and 21% of the vote, respectively. Since no party won a majority, a second round was held in May between Toure and ADEMA’s presidential candidate,

Soumaila Cisse. 30 Toure won with 64% of the vote and became the third democratically elected president of Mali.

29 Only the Parti pour l’Unité, la Démocratie et le Progrès (PUDP) fielded a candidate for the 1997 presidential elections.

30 The 1992 constitution barred Konare from running for a third five-year term.

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

Patterns of Party Support

Data on partisan support patterns among different social groups in Mali are presented in Table 4.5. The governing party, MC/ATT , found support among those who identified themselves by their language or occupation, whereas, opposition supporters were primarily among those who identified themselves by their religion.31

There were important partisan differences among different age groups. Malian

youth (18-24 years old) gave more support to the MC/ATT, but those between 30-34 and

45-54 years old supported the opposition. Respondents who stated they were the head of

their household were also greater supporters of the opposition. The ruling party was

supported by those with larger families and respondents with no children or had only one

child were greater supporters of the opposition. Partisan support was nearly equal for

other language-speakers, except the opposition had greater support from Bambara-

speakers. The opposition also found more support among the Malinke and the Tamasheq

ethnic groups, but the ruling party had a greater base among the Soninke, Sonrhai,

Mianka, and Dogon ethnic groups.

Respondents with no formal education gave more support to the Mouvement

Citoyen/ATT and those who had completed primary and high school supported the

opposition. Two groups which were more likely to have more women, domestics and

housewives, supported the MC/ATT. Respondents working in smaller occupations,

farmers (small and commercial), and artisans supported opposition parties. Those who

had no income, made less than 10,000fcfa, and between 30-40,000fcfa supported the

31 Note the question for group identification did not provide specific information on specifically which language, occupation, or religious group respondents identified with in the 2002 survey. 78

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 governing party. 32 Those who made between 10-30,000fcfa and more than 40,000fcfa

were more supportive of the opposition. Table 4.5 shows President Toure and the

Mouvement Citoyen/ATT had greater support in rural areas as well as Mopti and Segou,

two eastern regions bordering Burkina Faso. Greater support for the opposition existed in

the regions in Kidal and Gao neighboring the country Niger, Sikasso to the southeast of

Bamako near Cote d’Ivoire, and Kayes to the northwest near Senegal.

Gender and Party Support

Table 4.6 shows the extent to which the inconsistent contrastive gender gap pattern is also evident in Mali. While women were 3% more likely to support the

Mouvement Citoyen/ATT , men were 6.6% more likely to support the former ruling party,

ADEMA. 33 The 2002 survey revealed there were also some gender gaps in support for

political parties in Mali. 34 Table 4.7 explores those variables, which help explain these different party support patterns for men and women. Specifically, the data show that the condition of the present economy matters for women. Female opposition supporters were more likely to say the present economy was “bad”. As noted earlier, civil society played an important role in Mali’s transition to democracy in 1992. Ten years later, regardless

32 Fcfa is the Franc CFA and it stands for the Communauté Financière Africaine Francs, the currency used in francophone West and Central African countries as well as Equatorial Guinea and Guinea Bissau. As of June 2007, $1USD = 485fcfa and 10,000fcfa is approximately $USD21.

33 This survey was conducted in October 2002, shortly after the June 2002 presidential elections. The party identification question in the 2002 survey asked respondents if they supported Mouvement Citoyen/ATT (MC/ATT). However, it is not a political party, per se, but a political organization which supports President Toure and was treated as the current ruling party for this analysis.

34 In a preliminary analysis, these variables were chosen because there were important gender and partisan differences between men and women.

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 of their partisanship, there is still widespread support for democracy among women.

Women who did not engage in political behavior such as discussing politics were more likely to support the governing party. Finally, an evaluation of the government’s performance shows that female supporters of the ruling party did not think President

Toure was effective in fighting corruption.

Lastly, various countries in Africa have introduced gender quotas to increase

women’s representation in legislative assemblies with policies ranging from reserved

seats to party or legislative quotas (Bauer and Britton 2006; Dahlerup 2006). Mali is

among 31 Sub-Saharan countries which have adopted this policy at the party level

(Krook 2006). The 2002 survey asked respondents whether “one-third of candidates

should be women in order to guarantee that men and women are elected in acceptable proportions”.35 Women who supported the Mouvement Citoyen/ATT were more likely to support the implementation of gender quotas.

In contrast, male opposition supporters were the least likely to support gender quotas in Mali. Similar to their female counterparts, male respondents indicated that they were more supportive of democracy. They were also more likely to state that economic conditions in the Mali were “bad”. In addition, opposition parties found political support with males who discussed politics often. Lastly, there was some disagreement over the effectiveness of the ruling party’s policy dealing with corruption. Unlike female

35 This was a new question for the 2002 survey and was not asked in 2001. However, this survey question is vague as to the type of gender quota, that is, whether there should be a gender quota at the party level, a certain quota of women at the legislative level, or a certain amount of seats reserved for women (see Dahlerup 2006 for the differences between these types of gender quotas). 80

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 supporters of the MC/ATT, male supporters felt the government was effective in fighting corruption.

Explaining the Gender Gap in Mali

The variables identified individually help explain the partisan support differences among men and women in Mali. To see how they work at the same time, a multinomial logit was also used. For the purposes of the analysis, a three-fold partisan classification that included the ruling party, the Mouvement Citoyen/ATT (MC/ATT), its main opposition party, Alliance pour la Democratie au Mali (ADEMA), and smaller opposition parties was used with the no party identification category as the reference.

The results of this analysis are presented in Table 4.8 which shows that several variables were important for partisan support for men in Mali. One thing that clearly stands out is that men were drawn to the smallest opposition parties. For example, residing in the region of Gao was not only extremely significant but also increased the probability of Malian males supporting smaller opposition parties by 27 times. Although, less significant, residing in the regions of Kayes, Segou, and the capital, Tombouctou, also greatly increased male support for smaller opposition parties by 7.6, 3, and 9 times, respectively. Having one child in a respondent’s household was also very significant and increased male support for smaller opposition parties over nine times. Two other issues increased male support for these parties: whether a respondent knew someone who died from AIDS (3.4 times) and men’s evaluation of the ruling party’s performance in creating jobs (1.5 times).

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

Although slightly less significant, men were also drawn to the main opposition party, the Alliance pour la Democratie au Mali (ADEMA). Preference for democracy,

increased partisan support for ADEMA by nearly six and half times and male

respondents’ evaluations of the government’s policy to deal with corruption increased

ADEMA’s support among males by nearly two times. Finally, those men who were

employed as artisans or informal sector workers were 11 times more likely to support the

ruling party, the MC/ATT. In addition, belonging to a professional association increased

support for the MC/ATT by 1.6 times among Malian men.

The results in Table 4.9 point out that several variables were also important for explaining partisan support for women in Mali. The type of occupation women held appeared to be the determining factor driving political support for the ruling party,

Mouvement Citoyen/ATT . Women who responded they were commercial farmers increased their probability by 3.18 times that they would support Amadou Toumani

Toure. Being a small farmer or a domestic also increased their support for the current president by 2.4 times and 2.25, respectively. Occupation type was not an important predictor for support for ADEMA. Instead, a woman’s interest in government affairs increased the probability of a Malian woman supporting ADEMA by 1.5 times and support for a gender quota increased their probability to support ADEMA by 1.3 times.

Compared to the ruling party and the main opposition party, ADEMA, there were a greater number of variables which influenced partisan support for smaller opposition parties. If a female respondent had only an informal level of education, then this increased the probability of small party support by over two times. Occupation type also

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 had a stronger impact in determining partisan support for smaller opposition parties.

Those who stated they were commercial farmers, increased the probability that female respondents would support these parties by over 5 times and those who stated they were domestics, it increased the probability by 2.2 times.

Opinions on women’s issues such as women’s equality and whether there should be a gender quota were also important predictors of female partisanship. Supporting a

gender quota was marginally significant, but increased the probability of a Malian

woman supporting a smaller opposition party by 1.3 times. Opinions on women’s

equality were highly significant and increased the probability of a female respondent

supporting smaller opposition parties in Mali by 1.72 times.

Mali: Conclusion

This section provided an overview of Mali’s political and socioeconomic history,

the main political parties, and investigated the sources of the gender gaps in party

identification and partisan support. Currently, Mali’s current governing party is led by

President Amadou Toumani Toure, an independent. The press inside and outside of the

country consistently attests that President Toure enjoys widespread support across the

country. Nevertheless, as more young men emigrate, will women’s votes become more

critical in deciding who wins legislative and presidential elections in the future?36 We can only know with any certainty in the next election. Like other African countries

36 An important point to keep in mind is that Mali is one of the few countries with seats (13) reserved to represent Malians who live abroad. In countries like Senegal, women are using the money they gain in their women’s associations ( les tontines) to finance their male relatives’ excursions to Western Europe. Unfortunately, these risky ventures have cost these young men their lives. 83

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 included in this study such as Senegal and Nigeria, a new set of presidential elections in

Mali were scheduled for 2007. The next presidential elections were scheduled for May and elections for the National Assembly will be held in July. The question remains whether ADEMA will regain the presidency, particularly since President Toure has not indicated whether he will run for a second term at this time. There has already been some conflict between the President Toure and his second prime minister, Ousmane Issoufi

Maiga appointed in April 2004 after Ahmed Mohamed ag Hamani resigned. Since the last election, several new parties have emerged and made the April 2007 elections one most competitive to date. President Toure easily won this election with over 71% of the vote. Although he ran as an independent, he was supported the ADP ( Alliance pour la

Démocratie et Progrès), a coalition of 43 different political parties (African Elections

Database). Elections for the National Assembly are scheduled for July 2007.

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

Table 4.1: Support Characteristics of Botswana’s Political Parties

Category Political Parties Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) Opposition Ethnicity Mongwato Mongwaketse Kalanga Age Older adults (> 45 years) Young adults (25-45 years) Occupation Small farmers Skilled manual laborers Domestics Unskilled manual laborers Housewives Unemployed Region Botswana Central Gaborone Kweneng Urban areas Rural villages Suburban areas Townships

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

Table 4.2: Inconsistent Contrastive Gender Gap Pattern in Botswana

Inconsistent Contrastive Botswana 1999 Botswana Democratic Botswana National Party (BDP) Front (BNF) Percentage support 49.27% 24.59% Partisan gender gap 15.54% -8.53%

Botswana 2003 Botswana Democratic Botswana National Party (BDP) Front (BNF) Percentage support 44.43% 9.36% Partisan gender gap 4.88% -4.47%

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

Table 4.3: The Gender Gap and Party Support in Botswana

Factors that Influence Female Support Category Botswana Democratic Party Opposition (BDP) Political Attitudes -Satisfied with the economy -Dissatisfied with the economy Regime Evaluation -Government doing “well” -Government doing “well” managing crime managing crime Occupation -Smaller occupation -Skilled manual laborer -Domestic -Unskilled manual laborer -Unemployed -Student

Factors that Influence Male Support Political Attitudes -Satisfied with the economy -Dissatisfied with the economy Regime Evaluation -Government doing “well” -Government doing “well” managing crime managing crime Occupation -Professional -Smaller occupation -Small farmer -Skilled manual laborer -Student (formal sector)

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

Table 4.4 Explaining Partisanship in Botswana

BATSWANA MEN Independent variables Political parties Botswana Botswana Smaller

Democratic National Opposition Party (BDP) Front Parties (BNF) Region -Rural -1.2385*** -0.7211* Political Engagement -Discuss politics 1.0965*** 0.7049*** Regime Policy Evaluations -Managing the economy 0.6739*** 0.7392***

BATSWANA WOMEN Botswana Botswana Smaller Democratic National Opposition Party (BDP) Front Parties (BNF) Region -Gaborone -1.1549*

-Eastern -1.2207* -2.0730*** -2.4310*** -Southwest -1.9685*** -1.9542** Education Level -Primary education -1.8084*** -1.0586* -1.4453** -Post-High school education -1.9998** -1.7312*** -2.7432*** Associational Membership -Religious association member -0.4162** -Community development -0.8829* member Political Engagement -Discuss politics 1.2984*** 0.6759* Regime Policy Evaluations -Supplying water to households -0.5635*

* Significant at the p < .10 level. ** Significant at the p < .05 level. *** Significant at the p < .01 level.

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

Table 4.5: Support Characteristics of Mali’s Political Parties

Category Political Parties Mouvement Citoyen/ATT Opposition Group Identification Language-speaker Religion Occupational group Age Youth (18-24 years) Young adult (30-34 years; 45-54 years old) Head of Household Dependent Head of household Children Large family (5-9 children) Small family (none or one child) Language Group Bambara-speaker Ethnic Group Soninke Malinke Sonrhai Tamasheq Maianka Dogon Education Level No formal education Primary school completed High school completed Occupation Type Domestics Smaller occupations Housewives Small farmer Commercial farmer Artisan Income Level No income 10 - 30,000 fcfa Less than 10,000 fcfa More than 40,000 fcfa 30-40,000 fcfa Region Rural Bamako Mopti Kayes Segou Kidal Sikasso

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

Table 4.6: Inconsistent Contrastive Gender Gap Pattern in Mali

Inconsistent Contrastive Mali 2002 Mouvement Citoyen/ Alliance pour la Amadou Toumani Toure Democratie au Mali (MC/ATT) (ADEMA) Percentage support 13.61% 21.07% Partisan gender gap 3.02% -6.62%

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

Table 4.7: The Gender Gap and Party Support in Mali

Factors that Influence Female Support Category Mouvement Citoyen/ATT Opposition Political Attitudes -Supports democracy -Present economic conditions -Supports gender quotas “bad” -Supports democracy Political Behavior -Do not discuss politics Regime Evaluation -Government not effective in fighting corruption

Factors that Influence Male Support Political Attitudes -Present economic conditions -Present economic conditions “bad” “bad” -Supports democracy -Supports democracy -Do not support gender quotas Political Behavior -Discuss politics often Regime Evaluation -Government effective in fighting corruption

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

Table 4.8 Explaining Partisanship for Malian Men

Independent variables Political parties Mouvement Alliance Smaller Citoyen/ pour la opposition Amadou Democratie parties Toumani au Mali Toure (ADEMA) (MC/ATT) Region -Milieu -1.2295** -Gao 3.314*** -Kayes 2.0356*** -Segou 1.1117* -Tombouctou 1.9478* Children (in household) -One child 2.2204*** Religion -Muslim -1.5423* Occupation Type -Artisan or Informal sector worker 2.3917*** AIDS crisis

-Know someone died from AIDS 1.2303*** Associational Membership -Trade union/ farm association -0.6389*** -Professional association 0.4991* Political Engagement -Discuss politics -0.9983*** -0.4694* -0.5661*** Preference for democracy 1.8647** Regime Policy Evaluations -Managing economy -0.5960*** -Creating jobs 0.4255* -Reducing gap between rich & -0.3804 -0.4840** poor -Providing healthcare -0.5534** -Fighting corruption 0.6802**

* Significant at the p < .10 level. ** Significant at the p < .05 level. *** Significant at the p < .01 level.

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

Table 4.9 Explaining Partisanship for Malian Women

Independent variables Political parties Mouvement Alliance Smaller Citoyen/ pour la opposition Amadou Democratie parties Toumani au Mali Toure (ADEMA) (MC/ATT)

Region -Sikasso -1.0962*** -1.6765*** Group Identity -Language group identification -0.8793*** Education -Informal education 0.7740* Religion -Muslim -1.6602** -2.4041*** Occupation Type -Small farmer 0.8844** -Commercial farmer 1.1581** 1.6414***

-Domestic 0.8132** 0.795* Income Level -Low income -0.5811** Associational membership -Professional association member -0.2974* Political Engagement -Discuss politics -0.5881*** -0.4468**

-Interest in government affairs 0.4162* -Satisfaction with democracy -0.3955*** -0.2931* Economic Evaluations (general) -Past economy -0.3047* Regime Policy Evaluations -Manage AIDS -0.4164* Opinions

-Women’s equality 0.5452*** -Gender quota 0.2772* 0.2668*

* Significant at the p < .10 level. ** Significant at the p < .05 level. *** Significant at the p < .01 level.

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

CHAPTER FIVE:

When Women Provide Less Support across All Parties: The Inconsistent Singular Pattern

Introduction

Chapter Four investigated the inconsistent contrastive gender gap pattern in

Botswana and Mali. This chapter will continue the analysis with the second pattern, the inconsistent singular gender gap pattern, which exists in Nigeria (2001) and Tanzania

(2003). This gender gap pattern is different from the inconsistent contrastive pattern by the fact that women were less likely to support all political parties compared to their male counterparts. This chapter will explore this gender gap pattern in Nigeria and Tanzania and investigate the variables that influence partisan support for men and women in these two countries. Similar to the previous chapter, the analysis begins with a brief introduction to the political context for each individual country. It will then outline the origins of the ruling party and the main opposition parties as well as provide an overview of the patterns of partisan support that exist in both countries. Each country discussion will conclude with a multivariate analysis to sort out the variables that provide the greatest explanatory power for understanding the partisan support patterns for men and women in Nigeria and Tanzania.

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

Nigeria

Introduction

For nearly half a century, Nigeria has served as a microcosm of the political experience in Sub-Saharan Africa. Nigeria has treaded down the path of political chaos and despair, and has struggled multiple times to overcome an authoritarian past where the military has been a dominant actor in Nigerian politics. It has also pursued another path in search of political stability but has stumbled in its transition to democracy. Now in its fourth democratic republic, Nigeria is currently enjoying its longest continuous period of democracy since 1999.

Various authoritarian regimes in Nigeria have either banned political parties, restricted the types, or number of political parties which existed. The result of these disjointed actions has meant that political parties in the twenty-first century in many ways do not resemble the parties that emerged after the end of colonial rule. Over the years, many parties have simply disappeared and their political leaders have been jailed or assassinated. In addition, many existing political parties are in their infancy and not well institutionalized. For example, the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), led by President

Obansanjo, only emerged within the last decade and has controlled both the executive and legislative branch since 1999. In light of this, the section begins by comparing patterns of partisan support for the ruling party and the opposition in Nigeria. It analyzes the various regions, states, and social groups that offer support to the ruling or opposition parties. It then moves on to analyze how political attitudes and behavior may affect partisan support. Most important for this study, it investigates gender differences in

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 partisan support for the PDP against its opposition and analyzes the variables that affect the gender gap in Nigeria.

Political Background

Under British colonial rule, Nigeria was initially divided into northern and southern protectorates. In 1939, it was further separated into four administrative regions when southern Nigeria split into separate eastern and western regions with a protectorate for Lagos. When Nigeria declared its independence from Great Britain in October 1960, these regional divisions mirrored the major ethnic divisions within the country

(Aborisade and Mundt 1998). For example, the Hausa-Fulani ruled the northern region above the River Niger from the capital, Kaduna. The Yoruba controlled the western region and areas to the south, while the Igbos controlled the area east of the River

Niger.37 Intense regional competition between these ethnic groups eventually led to the secession of the eastern part of Nigeria in the Biafra War, which was fought from 1967 to

1970. The political outcome was a federal republic consisting of twelve separate states with Lagos in the southwest as the federal capital. Today, the number of states has increased to 36 and the capital was moved to Abuja located in central Nigeria. 38

Sectarian conflict also divides Africa’s most populous country, with Muslims located predominately in the north, making up 50% of the population and another 40% of

37 Although the three most populous ethnic groups dominate much of Nigeria’s political history, there are over 250 separate ethnic groups in Nigeria. Currently, the Hausa-Fulani make up 29% of the population, followed by the Yoruba (21%) and Igbo (18%) (CIA World Factbook).

38 Please note that the capital’s location was changed in 1991. It is alternatively known as the Abuja Capital Territory or the Federal Capital Territory (FCT).

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

Nigerians are Christians who live in the south (Aborisade and Mundt 19998; Bendel

1999; Edozie 2002).39

Political Parties in Nigeria

Since the 1960s, Nigerian politics has vacillated between civilian republics and military regimes. Northerners have been active in Nigeria’s military regimes and have dominated party politics. For instance, the first democratic republic began in 1960 under

Tafawa Balewa and lasted until 1966. A Hausa-Fulani from the North, Balewa served as prime minister and Nnamdi Azikiwe, an Igbo from the East was appointed as president in

1963. However, Balewa was assassinated in Nigeria’s first military coup in 1966 and

Azikiwe was later removed when Aguiyi Ironsi, an Igbo, became the military head of state. Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowan, a military officer and a Christian from the

North, then subsequently removed Ironsi in a countercoup. Gowan banned political parties and ruled for nearly a decade until he was overthrown by General Murtala

Mohammed in a coup in 1975. A Hausa-Fulani from the North, Mohammed pledged to return to civilian rule. Unfortunately, his promise went unfulfilled when he was assassinated less than a year later. General Olusegun Obansanjo lifted the ban on political parties and led the first military transition back to civilian rule when he served as the military head of state from 1976 until 1979 (Aborisade and Mundt 1998; Bendel

1999).

39 Nigeria’s population was estimated in July 2006 at 131,859,731 (see the CIA World Factbook). 97

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

Nigeria’s second democratic republic began in 1979 with the election of Alhaji

Shehu Shagari, a Hausa-Fulani from the North and candidate for the National Party of

Nigeria (NPN). However, his tenure was cut short when General Muhammadu Buhari, another Hausa-Fulani from the North, removed Shagari from office in 1983. He quickly reinstated the ban on political parties and Nigeria’s civil society accused the Buhari regime of several human rights abuses, as they demanded a return to civilian rule. In

1985, General Ibrahim Babangida, a Gwari, intervened and promised to reestablish civilian rule and elections. 40 Although Nigeria has been well endowed with petroleum resources, much of the wealth from Nigeria’s oil was squandered and mismanaged by earlier military and civilian regimes.41 As a result, Babangida was forced to implement

Nigeria’s first structural adjustment program (SAP) from the International Monetary

Fund (IMF). Several protests and riots broke out in various parts of Nigeria and this

social unrest plagued him throughout his tenure (Aborisade and Mundt 1998; Edozie

2002).

General Babangida later lifted the ban on political parties but fashioned a two-

party system with the Social Democratic Party (SDP) as the leftist party and the National

Republican Convention (NRC) as the conservative party. The SDP candidate, Moshood

Abiola, a Muslim from the Southwest, won the presidential elections in 1993. However,

Babangida annulled the results of the June elections and a grassroots pro-democracy

40 The Gwari is an ethnic minority group located primarily in northern Nigeria.

41 Earnings from Nigeria’s oil alone make up 20% of its GDP & 95% of its foreign earnings, yet the GDP/PPP per capita is abysmally low at only $1,400 (2005) (CIA World Factbook). 98

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 movement erupted in protest.42 Ernest Shonekan, a Yoruba from the South, took power in 1993 as the interim head of state, but General Sani Abacha removed him from office only a few months later. Nigeria’s civil society also accused Abacha of several human rights abuses and demanded a return to democratic rule. As head of the Provisional

Ruling Council (PRC), Abacha promised to hand the government over to civilians, but never did before he died in office in 1998. 43 As a result, Abdulsalam Abubakar, a Gwari from the North, served as the interim head of state (Bendel 1999; Edozie 2002; Olukoshi

2002).

Nigeria’s fourth democratic republic began with the election of Obansanjo in

1999 as the presidential candidate for the People’s Democratic Party (PDP). 44 Other political parties such as the All People’s Party (APP) and the Alliance for Democracy

(AD) also participated in the 1999 elections. 45 In 2003, Obansanjo defeated Buhari from the All Nigeria People’s Party (ANPP) and was reelected to another four-year term.46

The next presidential and National Assembly elections were conducted in April 2007.

42 Babangida arrested Abiola when he continued to insist he won the 1993 elections. Tragically, he remained in prison until his death in 1998 (see Aborisade and Mundt 1998).

43 The death of Ken Saro-Wiwa in 1995 was one of the most notable cases of the human rights abuse committed under the Abacha regime. Saro-Wiwa was president of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) and leader of the African Writer’s Union. He was tried by a secret tribunal of plotting a coup against Abacha and subsequently executed without a fair trial (see Edozie 2002; Olukoshi 2002). Over a decade later, the conflict between the Ogoni people, the government of Nigeria, and the Shell Oil over oil drilling in the Ogoni area continues and there have been recent reports of foreign workers who have been kidnapped in the area.

44 Obansanjo first ruled Nigeria as a military general from 1976 to 1979. Twenty years later, Obansanjo was elected as a civilian in the 1999 elections.

45 However, these parties contested the results of these elections (see African Elections Database).

46 Buhari was the leader of Nigeria’s second military authoritarian regime from 1983 to 1985. The ANPP split from the All People’s Party (APP) after the 1999 election. Buhari was also the presidential candidate for the ANPP for the 2003 election (see African Elections Database). 99

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

According to the latest constitution adopted in 1999, Obansanjo was not eligible to run as president for a third term (African Elections Database).

Patterns of Party Support

Despite this tumultuous political history, a distinct social basis defines political support for the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and the other opposition parties in

Nigeria. Using the data available from the Afrobarometer survey for Nigeria in 2001, party support patterns are shown in Table 5.1. One of the most striking features of these is the distinct regional basis of party support in Nigeria. Although Northerners have traditionally dominated Nigerian politics, President Obansanjo is a Yoruba from the

Southwest. Table 5.1 shows the PDP received greater political support from northern states such as Katsina, Kaduna, and Kano. The only exception is the state of Sokoto, which offered a higher level of support for the opposition. The PDP also found support in states to the south and southeast such as Delta, Bayelsa, and Bauchi. However, the

PDP received far less support from states in the southwest, including Obansanjo’s home state, Oyo. In Zamfara and southwestern states such as Lagos, the former capital, opposition parties received high levels of support. Overall, opposition parties received greater support in Lagos, the Southwest, and Northwest regions, while the PDP found more support in the Northeast, North Central, South, and Southeastern regions.

Despite to regional basis to party support patterns, there was virtually no difference in support between the PDP and opposition parties in urban and rural support or in the Abuja Capital Territory (ACT). This unusual pattern of support for a

100

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 presidential candidate who is neither a Muslim nor a Northerner could be attributed to the fact that Obansanjo is a Yoruba and even more importantly, he was a former general in a country where the military has traditionally been comprised of Northerners.47

The 2001 Afrobarometer survey for Nigeria also asked respondents which group they most identified with such as a religious or an ethnic group. 48 Table 5.1 shows those

who identified themselves by either their gender or occupation supported the PDP, while

those who identified themselves by their religion, class, or language/ethnic group

supported opposition parties. Both the PDP and its opposition received an almost equal

amount of support from all age groups, but respondents between 30 and 34 years of age

were more likely to support the PDP. There was also no difference in partisan support between those who identified themselves as the head of household compared to those

who did not. Among language groups, the opposition found the greatest amount of

support among Hausa and Yoruba-speakers.49 The PDP received greater support among

Igbo-, Ijaw-, and other minority-language speakers.

Table 5.1 also indicates that respondents who did not have any formal or informal

education as well as those who completed their university education were more likely to

support the opposition. Respondents who completed high school or had some other type

of educational qualifications beyond high school were PDP supporters. The People’s

47 It should be noted that Buhari, Obansanjo’s main political rival for the presidency in the 1999 elections, was also a former military officer. Unlike, Buhari, Obansanjo has never been implicated in any of the previous military coups.

48 In the 2001 survey, respondents were not asked whether they identified with a specific occupation, religion, language, or an ethnic group.

49 The Yoruba is the same language/ethnic group as President Obansanjo. 101

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

Democratic Party (PDP) also received most of its support from Catholics and Protestants, who are located primarily in the southern and southwestern parts of Nigeria. In contrast, opposition parties found their base of support was principally among Muslims, who are generally located in northern Nigeria. Finally, the table notes there were differences in partisan support and occupational groups. Farmers and students were PDP supporters, while technical/skilled manual laborers, housewives, and the unemployed were more likely to support opposition parties.

Gender and Party Support

As shown in Table 5.2, information from the 2001 survey for Nigeria indicates that an inconsistent singular gender gap pattern exists in Nigeria. This type of gender gap pattern occurs when women were less supportive of political parties than their male counterparts. The current ruling party, the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) received

14.5% less political support from women compared to men. Similarly, the main opposition party, the All People’s Party (APP) also received less (3.3%) support from women than men.

Table 5.3 highlights those factors which influenced female and male support in

Nigeria. Data from the 2001 survey emphasizes the role of political attitudes, behavior,

and evaluations of the current regime’s performance on certain public policies. The table

shows that the same factors were important to women regardless of their partisan support.

Specifically, supporting equal rights for women, discussing politics often, negatively

evaluating government economic policies, and the stability of prices were equally

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Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 important for women. The same table shows that a similar picture emerges for male support with a few exceptions. Men who were satisfied with democracy and believed that women should have equal rights were more likely to support the People’s

Democratic Party (PDP), whereas, men who believed women should be subject to traditional African law were more likely to support opposition parties.

Explaining the Gender Gap in Nigeria

Similar to Botswana and Mali in Chapter Four, the sample is divided on the basis of gender in order to estimate the effects of the independent variables on partisan support.

The dependent variable is the stated partisanship of each respondent. Since the categorical variable for respondents included more than two categories, the most appropriate estimation method is multinomial logit. Specifically, respondents stated whether they supported the ruling party, the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), the main opposition party, the All People’s Party (APP), or smaller opposition parties in the 2001 survey for Nigeria. For this analysis, those respondents not supporting any political party in Nigeria were used as the reference category and separate estimations were conducted for men and women.

Table 5.4 contains the results of this analysis and shows those independent variables which were significant at the 0.10 level. All coefficients are the log odd ratios which can be converted into probabilities by raising the exponential function to the power indicated by the coefficient. Table 5.4 includes coefficients for both Nigerian men and women. It shows there was a near equal number of variables that were important for

103

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 understanding the partisan support patterns of both sexes. Starting with Nigerian men, the largest influence on partisan support was region. Specifically, living in the North

Central region of Nigeria increased the probability a male respondent would support the ruling party, the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), by over nine times. This region also increased the probability of a male supporting the main opposition party, the All People’s

Party, over seven times and increased the probability of support for smaller opposition parties by over nine times.

While no other variables increased men’s support for the PDP, there were other variables that were important for the support of opposition parties. Specifically, religion increased men’s support for the All People’s Party (APP). The odds that men who were

Protestant would support the APP were 2.74 times the odds for women. Belonging to a trade union or farm association and positively evaluating of the ruling party’s policy to create jobs were important predictors for males supporting smaller opposition parties.

Translating these coefficients into probabilities showed that the probability of male support among those who belonged to a trade union or a farm association increased by

1.6 times and positive evaluations for creating jobs by 1.9 times.

Table 5.4 also tells us which factors were important for women’s partisan support.

Translating these log odds rations into probabilities for women shows that the variable with the largest influence on support for the ruling party, the People’s Democratic Party

(PDP), was group identification. Specifically, identification with a religious group increased the probability of Nigerian women supporting the PDP by 5.46 times. The same variable also increased the probability of female support for the APP by 4.15 times.

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In addition, the odds that women who stated they were Catholic would support the APP were 5.37 times the odds for men. Women who stated they were the head of household increased the probability of female support for smaller opposition parties by 4.70 times.

Finally, women who reported being Muslim had an extremely high probability of supporting smaller opposition parties.

Nigeria: Conclusion

This section provided information on Nigeria’s political history and presented data on patterns of partisan support in 2001. Results from the 2001 survey for Nigeria show that the PDP had over four times greater political support than the APP. Nigerian women have the lowest level of political support for a ruling party compared to other

African countries. However, the smaller gender gap in partisan support for the APP means that women were more likely to support this opposition party. An analysis of the factors that influence partisan support reveal there were some similarities in the types of variables which influenced political support among men and women in Nigeria.

Specifically, the results show there were a greater number of variables which influenced male and female support for opposition parties, particularly structural variables which played a greater role in determining partisan support for both men and women in Nigeria than political attitudes. The foregoing does not mean that political attitudes were unimportant, because some do help to account for Nigeria’s gender gap in partisan support. For example, men who supported opposition parties were more likely to agree that women should be subject to African law.

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The results presented above revealed that while political support for the current ruling party, the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) is evenly distributed throughout the country, its continued support in the future was uncertain as long as opposition parties have strong political support in vital regions and among key social groups within the country. However, the opposition was unable to provide veritable challenge to the PDP primarily because they were unable to overcome the religious, regional, and ethnic divisions that divide Nigeria. As a result, Umaru Yar’Adua, a Fulani from northern

Nigeria, ran as the PDP presidential candidate and he was declared the winner in the

April 2007 election. 50

Tanzania

Political Background

The early 1960s ushered in the end of British colonial rule in Tanganyika and

Zanzibar, two British colonies located in East Africa. Tanganyika gained its

independence in 1961 and Zanzibar in 1962. 51 By 1964, these two countries came

together to form the sovereign nation now known as the United Republic of Tanzania in

50 Obansanjo was constitutionally barred from seeking a third term. Election results have not been posted but the election has been marred by controversy and opposition parties such as the All Nigeria People’s Party (ANPP) accused the PDP of election fraud and international observers declared the elections were not free and fair.

51 Tanzania was formerly known as Tanganyika until it became independent in December 1961 and Zanzibar which includes the two islands, Pemba and Mafia, located off Tanzania’s coast in the East Indian Ocean. The Republic of Tanganyika was administered by the British as a United Nations trusteeship from 1961-1964. In April 1964, the Republic of Tanganyika and the People’s Republic of Zanzibar and Pemba united to create the United Republic of Tanzania.

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East Africa under the leadership of Julius Nyerere. After thirty years under the shadow of a one-party state, Tanzania reemerged as a multiparty democracy in 1992.

While Tanzania is located on the African continent and bordered by eight other countries in East Africa, Zanzibar is an island situated off Tanzania’s coast in the Indian

Ocean. Nearly 35.5 million people reside in 26 different regions including its former and new capitals, Dar es Salaam and Dodoma, located on the coast and center of the country, respectively. 52 The average age is 17 years old and over 43% of the population is less

than 15 years old. Despite its low percentage of HIV/AIDS cases (8.8%), a low infant

mortality rate (96.48 per 1000 births), and a high fertility rate with women giving birth to

nearly 5 children during her lifetime, life expectancy in Tanzania is still quite low at only

45.6 years.

Tanzania is racially homogenous with less than 1% of its mainland population of

Asian, European, or Arab descent. The other 99% are Black Africans of Bantu origin and

religiously they are divided among Christians, who make up 30% of the population and

the remaining 70% who are equally divided among Muslims and those who practice an

indigenous religion. Tanzania is also one of the few countries with two official

languages: English and Kiswahili, the lingua franca widely spoken throughout many

Eastern and Central African countries. Traditionally, Arabic has been very useful since

there has always been a high level of trade in the country, particularly among the

numerous merchants from the Middle East. Literacy in Tanzania is defined as those over

52 While Zanzibar has tried unsuccessfully to assert its sovereignty on the island since 1995, particularly through its own separate elections. However, it should be noted this paper will concentrate on elections in Tanzania. 107

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15 who can read and write any of these three commonly used languages. The average literacy rate is 78% but women are 15% less literate than men (CIA World Factbook).

Tanzania is weighed down in debt which currently consumes 65.8% of its GDP, and the GDP per capita in Tanzania is very low ($700) with more than one-third of the population unemployed. Eighty percent of the labor force is employed in the commercial agriculture sector and Tanzania continues to produce a variety of agricultural products such as coffee, tea, cotton, sugar, tobacco, and bananas grown on large plantations.

Unfortunately, these goods do not command high prices on the international market and are often destined for export to a small set of countries such as China, Canada, India, the

Netherlands, and neighboring Kenya (CIA World Factbook).

Political Parties in Tanzania

When Tanzania emerged as an independent country in 1964, the Tanganyika

African National Union (TANU) and its leader Julius K. Nyerere were at the forefront of the movement for independence in Africa. Since their sentiment was widely shared throughout Tanzania, TANU easily won both the 1958/59 and 1960 parliamentary elections. These first elections were between TANU, the African National Congress

(ANC), and the United Tanganyika Party (UTP) (Fengler 1999). Julius Nyerere won

against Zuberi Mtemvu of the ANC in a landslide presidential election with 99.2% of the

vote in 1962. This would be the last multiparty election for the next thirty years (African

Elections Database). With a near unanimous vote, Nyerere and TANU quickly

transformed Tanzania into a one-party state. Rather than multiparty elections where

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Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 voters had a choice between several competing parties and a variety of candidates, under the one-party state regime electoral choices were severely limited. In other words, elections were no longer between but within the party and, thus, were far less competitive. Elections offered a choice between two different candidates; however, both were affiliated with the TANU party. In 1965, the TANU joined forces with the Afro-

Shirazi Party (ASP) of Zanzibar to form a new party, the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM)

(Fengler 1999).53

The Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) has dominated Tanzanian politics since 1965.

For reasons outlined above, intra-party elections allowed CCM candidates for the national assembly to run without opposition for all elections held between the 1960s and

1990s. In addition, President Nyerere was reelected (without opposition) in 1965, 1970,

1975, and 1980 until he retired in 1985. His successor, Ali Hassan Mwinyi, ran unopposed in the 1985 election and was reelected in 1990 (African Elections Database).

Tanzania’s transition to multiparty democracy began in 1992. As expected, the

CCM won the presidential and legislative elections which were held concurrently in

October and November 1995 (African Elections Database; Pietila, Ojalammi-Wamai, and

Laakso 2002). Benjamin Mkapa of the CCM was elected as Tanzania’s third president with 62% of the vote. New parties such as the National Convention for Construction and

Reform-Maguezi (NCCR-Maguezi ) had strong support in their first election with 28% of the vote followed by the Civic United Front (CUF) and the United Democratic Party

53 Chama Cha Mapinduzi means “revolutionary state party” in Kiswahili.

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(UDP) with 6.4% and 4%, respectively. 54 Five years later in 2000, the CCM repeated

their electoral success when Benjamin Mkapa was reelected with close to two-thirds of

the vote (71.7%). Recently, Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete became president of Tanzania when

he won with 80.2% of the vote against Ibrahim Lipumba’s (CUF) in 2005 (African

Elections Database).

That the CCM has been successful was possible because as the ruling party it

enjoyed several important incumbency advantages such as patronage, resources, and an

established party infrastructure that newer parties lacked. The CCM also deliberately

made it more difficult for rival parties to emerge. For example, parties were required to

the-post (FPTP) system used for both presidential and legislative elections favored the

CCM and gave it a huge advantage as the largest party. 55 The number of seats nominated by the president also increased to ten seats during the last twenty-five years. Lastly, a

gender quota system was also established during CCM’s one-party rule (Krook 2006;

Meena 2003). This system reserved 75 seats for women which are distributed proportionally between parties based on election results. As a result, most of the women

elected through this mechanism have been from the ruling party providing the CCM an

54 Ten other parties such as Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo ( CHADEMA) which placed third, also participated in the 1995 presidential election.

55 Presidential elections use an absolute majority (with a second round, if necessary) and presidents are limited to two 5-year terms. This system is also used to fill the 323-seat National Assembly where MPs also serve five-year terms. Five members of the Zanzibar House of Representatives are also indirectly elected (see African Elections Database).

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Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 additional edge over its opposition. These are just some of the policies which allowed the

CCM to control the presidency for over three decades.

Patterns of Party Support

Table 5.5 provides information on the various groups that supported the Chama

Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) and other political parties in Tanzania from the 2003 Afro-

Barometer survey in Tanzania. Respondents who identified themselves by their language, by national identity, or did not identify with a particular group were more likely to support the CCM. Other CCM supporters included older individuals, respondents living in larger families, farmers, lower-income respondents, 56 and respondents who identified themselves as Catholic, Protestant, or a member of the

African Independent Church (AIC). The CCM also found support in several regions such as Arusha, Iringa, Kigoma, Mara, Mbeya, Morogoro, Mtwara, Mwanza, and Ruvuma.

In contrast, respondents who identified themselves by their religion or occupation

supported opposition parties. Opposition party supporters also included younger

individuals (under 34 years of age), respondents from average-sized families, Muslims,

and middle- to high-income earners (Tsh 30,000-300,000 or more). A wider variety of

occupational groups such as traders, businesspersons, professionals, and the unemployed

supported the opposition. Finally, those from the Kagera, Kaskazini Pemba, Kaskazini

Unguja Kusini Pemba, Kusini Unguja, Mjini Magharibi, and Tanga region were more

supportive of opposition parties.

56 Low income is defined as a monthly income between Tsh1-30,000 and a medium-high income is between Tsh30, 000-300,000, which is approximately USD$24 -$240 as of June 2007. 111

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Gender and Party Support

Similar to Nigeria in 2001 in the previous section, Table 5.6 indicates the inconsistent singular gender gap pattern is also evident in Tanzania for 2003. In other words, women were 7.88% less likely to support the CCM and were also less supportive

(less than 2%) of the Civic United Front (CUF) party. Table 5.7 shows the factors which were important for men and women’s party support in Tanzania. The data from the 2003 survey for Tanzania indicated that support for the CCM came from women who did not discuss politics, supported equal rights for women, believed the government’s economic policies hurt most people, and thought the CCM was doing a good job in keeping prices stable in the country.

Female opposition supporters also maintained there should be equal rights for women and agreed that the ruling party’s economic policies hurt most Tanzanians. These women were more likely to discuss politics and believed the ruling party was not effective in stabilizing prices. Women also felt that economic conditions were worse 12 months ago. Unlike their female counterparts, male supporters of the CCM discussed politics often and felt that economic conditions 12 months ago were better. The political behavior and attitudes of male supporters of opposition parties were identical to female supporters. These men discussed politics, supported equal rights for women, agreed economic conditions were worse 12 months ago, and did not believe the CCM was not doing a good job in keeping prices stable.

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Explaining the Gender Gap in Tanzania

The sample from Tanzania was separated by gender in order to estimate the role of the independent variables on partisan support. The dependent variable is the partisanship indicated of each respondent where they indicated whether they supported

the ruling party, the CCM, Civic United Front (CUF) party, or smaller opposition parties.

The estimation method used was multinomial logit because the dependent variable had

more than two categories. The group of respondents not supporting any political party

was used as the reference category. Estimations were conducted separately for men and

women. Results in Tables 5.8 and 5.9 include all variables which were significant at the

0.10 level.

Table 5.8 includes the variables that were important for partisan support for men.

The coefficients shown are the log odds ratio and can be converted into probabilities by

raising the exponential function to the power indicated by the coefficient. Starting with

the opposition parties, Table 5.8 shows that religion, occupation type, associational

membership, and attitudes on gender quotas were important variables in determining partisan support for smaller opposition parties. Occupation type was very significant and

had the strongest impact on support for smaller opposition parties. If male respondents

indicated they were traders, this increased the probability of male support over 100 times

and being a commercial farmer increased the probability of male support over eight times

for these political parties. Religion also had a significant impact on partisan support for

men in Tanzania. The odds that men who stated they were Muslim or (evangelical)

Protestant would support smaller opposition parties was about 26.4 and 25 times,

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Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 respectively. The odds that men who belonged to a religious association would support smaller opposition parties were 2.82 times the odds for women. Lastly, supporting female quotas increased male support for smaller opposition parties by 3.6 times.

Several variables were also important for male support for the Civic United Front

(CUF). Most important were age, occupation type, associational membership, and satisfaction with democracy. Occupational type was very significant and had the largest impact. It increased the probability of male support for the CUF by over 19 times when men stated they were traders and over 12 times if they were commercial farmers.

Membership in a religious association was very significant and increased the probability of male support for the CUF by 4.5 times. Finally, the age of male respondents (middle- aged) and their satisfaction with democracy increased the probability of male support for the CUF by 3.86 and 1.78, respectively.

Looking at political support for the ruling party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), four variables appeared to have the most impact on partisan support for male respondents.

Religion was marginally significant and had a strong impact on partisan support for the ruling party. Being an evangelical Protestant increased the probability of male support for the CCM by over 14 times. If male respondents were commercial farmers, this increased the probability of male support for the ruling party by 4.8 times. Participating in a religious association increased the probability of male support by 3.21 times for the

CCM. Lastly, when male respondents gave positive evaluations of the ruling party’s efforts in reducing the gap between the rich and the poor, this increased male support for the CCM by 2.39 times.

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Table 5.9 indicates the variables that influenced partisan support for women in

Tanzania were not the same. The table shows that women’s income had the strongest

impact on partisan support for all parties. Converting the coefficients into probabilities

indicated that having a lower income increased the probability of female support for the

CCM over 18 times and by nearly 14 times for the CUF, and 7.4 times for smaller

opposition parties. If the coefficients are taken as the log odds ratios and converted into probabilities then satisfaction with democracy in Tanzania increased female support for

the CCM by 3.39 times, 3.27 times for the CUF, and 2.99 times for smaller opposition parties. The level of a woman’s education also influenced political support for the CCM.

The odds that women with a secondary education would support the CCM were nearly 10

times the odds for men. The odds that women who gave positive evaluations of the past

economy would support the CCM was 2.5 times the odds for men and for the CUF it was

2.15 times the odds for male CUF supporters. Finally, the odds that women lived in rural

areas would support smaller opposition parties was over five times the odds for men.

Tanzania: Conclusion

This section presented data on patterns of party support for Tanzania from the

2003 Afrobarometer survey indicate there were important differences in why males and

females supported different parties in Tanzania. An analysis of the factors that

influenced partisan support reveal there were some differences in the types of variables

which influenced political support among men and women in Tanzania. For example, the

results showed there were a greater number of structural variables which influenced

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Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 women’s support for political parties in Tanzania. However, there were also some similarities as well. For example, political attitudes such as gender quotas, satisfaction with democracy, evaluations of the policies the CCM has implemented, and perceptions of the state of the economy in the past were also important for partisan support for both sexes.

Tanzania’s next concurrent elections will be held in 2010. Without a doubt,

Tanzania’s political system in 2005 was far more competitive than it was forty years earlier. However, if the results of the 2005 election are any indication, it seems highly unlikely the opposition will control the presidency, especially considering that the CCM’s vote share in the last presidential and National Assembly elections has increased significantly. This perhaps offers the possibility that some of CCM’s opposition may try work together to form an alliance in 2010. 57 Regardless, one way the opposition could

make some headway is to garner more support among women. Currently, the gender gap

for opposition parties is smaller than the gender gap for the CCM. In addition, the data presented here indicates that female supporters of the CCM were more divided than their

male counterparts over several issues. Compared to Nigeria, attitudes and policy

evaluations had a greater influence on partisan support for both men and women in

Tanzania. All of these policies, attitudes, and institutional barriers must be used to their political advantage if the opposition ever hopes of controlling the presidency in the next election.

57 This has been a successful strategy in other countries such as Senegal during the 2000 elections. 116

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Table 5.1: Support Characteristics of Nigeria’s Political Parties

Category Political Parties People’s Democratic Party (PDP) Opposition State Delta Lagos Bayelsa Oyo Katsina Sokoto Kaduna Zamfara Kano Bauchi Region Southeast Lagos South Southwest Northeast Northwest North Central Group Occupation Religion Identification Gender Class Language/ethnic group Age 30-34 years Language Smaller languages Hausa Igbo Yoruba Ijaw Education High school completed No formal or informal education Post-H.S. qualifications University completed Religion Catholic Islam Protestant Occupation Type Student Technical Worker Farmers Skilled manual Laborer Housewife Unemployed

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Table 5.2: Inconsistent Singular Gender Gap Pattern in Nigeria

Inconsistent Singular Nigeria 2001 People’s Democratic All People’s Party Party (PDP) (APP) Percentage support 32.00% 7.66% Partisan gender gap -14.53% -3.33%

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Table 5.3: The Gender Gap and Party Support in Nigeria

Factors that Influence Female Support Category People’s Democratic Party Opposition (PDP) Political Attitudes -Equal rights for women -Equal rights for women Political Behavior -Discuss politics often -Discuss politics once or twice Regime Evaluation -Handling prices: not well -Handling prices: not well -Economic policies hurt most -Economic policies hurt most

Factors that Influence Male Support Political Attitudes -Equal rights for women -Traditional African law for women -Satisfaction with democracy Political Behavior -Discuss politics often -Discuss politics often Regime Evaluation -Handling prices: not well -Handling prices: not well -Economic policies hurt most -Economic policies hurt most

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Table 5.4 Explaining Partisanship for Nigerian Men

NIGERIAN MEN Independent variables Political parties People’s All People’s Smaller Democratic Party opposition Party (PDP) (APP) Parties Region -North Central 2.1992** 1.9518* 2.2098** Language -Yoruba-speaker -3.1824*** -4.4884*** -4.7851*** Education Level -Primary school -1.3073* -2.0515** Religion -Protestant 1.0101* Occupation Type -Small jobs -1.2699*** Associational Membership -Trade union/farm member 0.4761* Political Engagement -Discuss politics -0.7743*** Regime Policy Evaluations -Creating jobs 0.6663*** -Delivering household water -0.4298** -0.3489* -0.5816**

NIGERIAN WOMEN People’s All People’s Smaller Democratic Party opposition Party (PDP) (APP) parties Region -Rural -1.0296* -1.1653* Group Identification -Religious group 1.6981** 1.4246* -Occupational group -1.2154* Head of Household 1.5472* Religion -Islam 11.1831*** -Catholic 1.6809* Occupation Type -Skilled -1.5906* Income -Middle-income -1.9029*** Know Someone who Died from AIDS -1.0070* Associational Membership -Trade union/farm member 0.8458* -Professional association member -0.8522** -0.8228*

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Table 5.5: Support Characteristics of Tanzania’s Political Parties

Category Political Parties Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) Opposition Group Language-speaker Small Groups Identification No national Religion identity/differentiate Occupation Age Older individuals (>35 years) Younger individuals (<34 years) Children Large-sized families (10+ Average-sized families (2-4 children) children) Religion Smaller religions Muslim Catholic Protestant (Mainstream & Evangelical) African Independent Church Occupation Small farmer Smaller Type Commercial farmer occupations/Unemployed Trader/vendor Businessperson Professional Income Tsh 1-30,000 Tsh 30,000-300,000+ Region Arusha Kagera Iringa Kaskazini Pemba Kigoma Kaskazini Unguja Mara Kusini Pemba Mbeya Kusini Unguja Morogoro Mjini Magharibi Mtwara Tanga Mwanza Ruvuma

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Table 5.6: Inconsistent Singular Gender Gap Pattern in Tanzania

Inconsistent Singular Tanzania 2003 Chama Cha Mapinduzi Civic United Front (CCM) (CUF) Percentage support 57.97% 7.89% Partisan gender gap -7.88% -1.35%

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Table 5.7: The Gender Gap and Party Support in Tanzania

Factors that Influence Female Support Category Chama Cha Mapinduzi Opposition (CCM) Political Attitudes -Equal rights for women -Equal rights for women Political Behavior -Do not discuss politics -Discuss politics often/several times Regime Evaluation -Economic policies hurt -Economic policies hurt -Stable prices: well -Stable prices: not well -Past economic conditions worse

Factors that Influence Male Support Political Attitudes -Equal rights for women -Equal rights for women Political Behavior -Discuss politics often -Discuss politics often Regime Evaluation -Stable prices: well -Stable prices: not well -Past economic conditions -Past economic conditions worse better -Economic policies hurt -Economic policies hurt

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Table 5.8 Explaining Partisanship for Tanzanian Men

Independent variables Political parties Chama Cha Civic Smaller Mapinduzi United opposition (CCM) Front Parties (CUF) Age -Middle-aged 1.3525* Head of household -2.9063*** -2.3434** -2.7146** Children (in household) -No children -5.9925*** -5.9727*** -6.6826*** -Two-four children -4.1750** -4.6101*** -4.9578*** Language -Swahili-speaker -4.2085*** Religion -Islam 3.2766*** -Evangelical Protestant 2.6426* 3.2174** Occupation Type -Commercial farmer 1.5862* 2.5129*** 2.1297** -Trader 2.9706** 5.0239*** Associational Membership -Religious association member 1.1678** 1.5249*** 1.0401* Political Engagement -Interest in government affairs -2.1338*** -1.4985** -1.9353*** -Satisfaction with democracy 0.5596* Economic Evaluations (general) -Country’s economic condition 1yr ago -0.7720* -Economic policies hurt or help -0.7519** -0.8813** Regime Policy Evaluations -Reducing gap between rich & poor 0.8716** -Gender quota 1.2901***

* Significant at the p < .10 level. ** Significant at the p < .05 level. *** Significant at the p < .01 level.

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Table 5.9 Explaining Partisanship for Tanzanian Women

Independent variables Political parties Chama Cha Civic United Smaller Mapinduzi Front (CUF) opposition (CCM) parties Region -Rural 1.6753* -Lake region -1.5059* Education

-Secondary education 2.2939** Religion -Catholic -1.7278* Occupation Type -Professional -2.9689*** -3.3444*** -4.7857*** Income Level -Low income 2.8975*** 2.6301** 2.0132* -High income -1.4826* Political Engagement -Support for democracy -1.4474** -1.2080* -Satisfaction with democracy 1.2223*** 1.1856*** 1.0965** Regime Policy Evaluations -Past economy 0.9267** 0.7658* -Creating jobs -0.9935** -Managing healthcare -0.8286* -0.9078* -1.2754** * Significant at the p < .10 level. ** Significant at the p < .05 level. *** Significant at the p < .01 level.

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CHAPTER SIX:

The Gender Gap Patterns in Countries of Lost Dominance

Introduction

Chapter Four and Chapter Five explored the inconsistent contrastive gender gap pattern in Botswana and Mali and the inconsistent singular gender gap pattern in Nigeria

and Tanzania. This chapter continues the analysis of these two gender gap patterns in

two additional countries: Kenya and Senegal. These two countries have the same gender

gap patterns; however, Kenya and Senegal are different from the previous cases in one

important aspect. Out of the six countries analyzed for this study, Kenya and Senegal are

the only countries where political parties emerged after independence in the 1960s, then

evolved into dominant parties that endured for several decades. Ultimately, these

dominant parties peacefully handed over political power to the opposition in stunning

electoral defeats. 58 In both countries, the dominant parties were not defeated by a single political party but by formidable political coalitions. In Senegal, the Parti Socialiste (PS)

which had governed for forty years since independence finally lost both the presidential

and legislative elections against a group of political parties which together formed the

Alternance 2000 and Coalition Sopi in 2000 and 2001. 59 Similarly, the Kenya African

58 Two other countries analyzed for this study, Botswana and Tanzania, also have dominant parties, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) and the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), respectively. However, these parties have been in power since independence and a political turnover to the opposition has not occurred yet.

59 In the 2000 presidential elections, Abdoulaye Wade, the leader of the strongest opposition party, Parti Démocratique Sénégalais (PDS), led the Alternance 2000 coalition. This coalition also included the Action for National Development (ADN), And Jëf /Parti Africain pour la Démocratie (AJ-PADS), the 126

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National Union (KANU) controlled the executive and legislative branches from 1961 until it lost against the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) in the 2002 elections. 60

The sections below include a brief background description of the political, socio-

cultural, and economic context for Kenya and Senegal. It concentrates on the origins and

activities of the political parties and coalitions which would play pivotal roles in the political transitions that occurred Kenya and Senegal four decades later. It will then

compare and contrast the patterns of support for these political parties and will conclude

with a multivariate analysis that will highlight the variables that provide the greatest

explanatory power for men’s and women’s political support for these new ruling and

opposition parties in Kenya and Senegal.

Kenya

Political Background

Nestled between Somalia and Tanzania in one of the most fertile agricultural

regions in Africa, Kenya historically has long been considered the regional center for

East Africa. Although nearly 35 million people live in Kenya, it is also a popular

destination for thousands of tourists each year. Attracted by Kenya’s abundant wildlife

and scenic natural beauty, the tourism industry has not only flourished but is critical to

Ligue Démocratique/Mouvement pour le Parti du Travail (LD-MPT), the Mouvement pour le Socialisme et l’Unité (MSU), the Parti de l’Indépendance et du Travail (PIT), and the Union pour la Démocratie et le Fédéralisme/Mboolomi (UDF-Mboloomi). The PDS also led an alliance of 40 political parties under the Sopi “Change” Coalition and contested the National Assembly elections in 2001 (see African Elections Database).

60 Mwai Kibaki of the Democratic Party (DP) led the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), which also included the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy-Kenya (FORD-K), and the National Party of Kenya (NPK) (see African Elections Database). 127

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

Kenya’s economy. Tourism and other similar industries in the service sector currently make up over 65% of the country’s GDP. Yet, agriculture is still vital to Kenya’s economy and two-thirds of its labor force is still involved in some form of agricultural labor such as the cultivation of tea and coffee, which have become well-known and popular products on the international market.

Despite its success in exporting these agricultural products and the influx of foreign capital from tourism, Kenya is still a relatively poor country. Financial aid has been sporadic and structural adjustment programs (SAPs) were suspended when former

President Moi failed to implement economic and political reforms as the economy declined (CIA World Factbook). The unemployment rate is close to 40% and the GDP

(PPP) per capita is only $1,100. Nearly half (43%) of Kenya’s population is less than 15 years old and 50% percent of the population currently lives below the poverty line as well as a great deal of income inequality in the country (the Gini index coefficient is

44.5). The highest percentile of households consumes nearly 40% of the country’s income, while the bottom percentile only has access to two percent of the GDP (CIA

World Factbook).

Kenya also has one of the highest population densities in Africa and residents live in seven different provinces throughout the country: Central, Coast, Eastern, North

Eastern, Nyanza, Rift Valley, the Western Province, or in the administrative capital located in Nairobi. In spite of its high population, there is a low percentage of Kenyans

(6.7%) living with HIV/AIDS. However, like so many other countries outside southern

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Africa, the most common fatal disease is malaria, not AIDS. 61 Most Kenyans belong to

one of the five major ethnic groups in the country. The largest group is the Kikuyu,

which make up 22% of the population followed by the Luhya (14%), Luo (13%),

Kalenjin (12%), the Kamba (11%) and smaller groups such as the Kisii and Meru which

each make up only 6% of the population. Non-Africans such as Asians, Europeans, and

Arabs make up an additional one percent of the residents in the Kenya.

However, Kenya’s smaller indigenous ethnic groups are dwarfed by the growing

number of refugees from neighboring east African countries such as Somalia, Sudan, and

Ethiopia who have relocated in various parts of Kenya and make up 15% of Kenya’s population. As a former British colony, it is not surprising to find that 45% of Kenyans

are Protestant (either evangelical or mainstream). More than a third (33%) are Catholics

and 20% practice an African indigenous religion or are Muslims. Kenya also has one of

the highest literacy rates in Africa and 85% of the population can read and write in one or both of the two official languages, English and Kiswahili (CIA World Factbook).

Political Parties in Kenya

Originally founded as the Kenya African Union (KAU) in 1947, KANU is one of the oldest political parties in Africa. 62 As its political leader, Jomo Kenyatta pushed for

Kenya’s independence from British colonial rule. Eventually, two political parties would

61 Unfortunately, southern Africa has one of the highest HIV/AIDS adult prevalence rates in the world ranging from a low of 17% in Zambia to a high of nearly 40% in Lesotho and Botswana.

62 Kenyatta was initially the prime minister and later nominated as president in 1964 once the constitution was changed after independence (see Hartmann 1999).

129

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 emerge from the KAU in the early 1960s: the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) and the Kenya African National Union (KANU). The Kenya African Democratic Union

(KADU) found much of its support among the smaller ethnic groups; in contrast, the

Kenya African National Union (KANU) was supported by larger ethnic groups, such as the Kikuyu and the Luo. 63 This advantage allowed the KANU to quickly win its first two pre-independence electoral victories with the 1961 legislative council and 1963 House of

Representatives elections (African Elections Database; Hartmann 1999).64

Kenyatta quickly consolidated his political power and transformed the KANU

into a catchall party to represent all Kenyans. During this period, his primary opposition

came from Jaramogi Oginga Odinga and the Kenya People’s Union (KPU). However,

Kenya became a de jure one-party state when Kenyatta officially banned the KPU and

other political parties. Consequently, all elections between 1969 and 1988 were single- party elections (Hartmann 1999). Without opposition and with his political rivals barred

from participating in politics, Kenyatta was easily reelected president in 1969 and 1974.

When Kenyatta died unexpectedly in August 1978, Vice President Daniel arap Moi became president and ruled for the next decade.

KANU’s de jure single-party rule ended in the early 1990s when the new constitution no longer designated it the sole legal political party. This political opening offered an opportunity for several parties to emerge for the first time since the KPU and

63 These smaller ethnic groups are often referred to collectively as KAMATUSA which stands for the Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana, and the Samburu ethnic groups.

64 By the late 1960s, Kenya’s Senate and House of Representatives were merged into a unicameral National Assembly.

130

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 other rival political parties had been suppressed in the late 1960s. Despite modest political support for opposition parties, these political parties were too divided to defeat

Moi and he won the presidential elections with a mere 36% of the vote (African Elections

Database). In 1997, the opposition failed again to win the presidential elections and the only real political threat was from Mwai Kibaki of the Democratic Party (DP), who managed to win 31% of the vote. Unfortunately, no other political party was able to win than 10% of the vote, which was far too little to prevent Moi from successfully winning the presidency for a second time with 40% of the vote (African Elections Database).

However, as the presidential candidate for the coalition in 2002, the National Rainbow

Coalition (NARC), Mwai Kibaki of the Democratic Party accomplished a spectacular feat in 2002 when he successfully won 62% of the vote and captured the presidency away from KANU for the first time.65

In 2005, Kibaki suffered a political defeat when Kenyans voted against a 2005 constitutional referendum. There were violent protests and it caused a rift within NARC particularly after Kibaki dismissed his cabinet after the referendum did not pass.

Opponents to the referendum formed a new political party, the Orange Democratic

Movement-Kenya (ODM-K). Led by Raila Odinga, and with the help of some former members of KANU, ODM-K has emerged as a formidable opposition party. 66 Recently,

65 Moi was constitutionally barred from seeking a third presidential term so Jomo Kenyatta’s son, Uhuru Kenyatta, ran as the KANU presidential candidate but only managed to win 31% of the vote. Originally, the NARC coalition included Kibaki’s Democratic Party (DP), the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy-Kenya (FORD-K), the National Alliance Party of Kenya (NAPK), and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). After the 2005 constitutional referendum, LDP was no longer part of the coalition and the original members formed a new party, NARC-Kenya (see African Elections Database).

66 Raila Odinga is the son of Oginga Odinga, the leader of the Kenya’s People Union (KPU). 131

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

Odinga announced he would compete against Kibaki for the presidency in the December

2007 presidential election. 67

Patterns of Party Support

Table 6.1 highlights the social bases of political support from the Afrobarometer survey for Kenya in 2003. The current ruling coalition, the National Rainbow Coalition

(NARC), the former dominant party, KANU, and smaller opposition parties all received at least one-third of their support from those who identified themselves by their occupation. The Kenya African National Union (KANU) found the most support among respondents who identified themselves by their religion, those who did not identify with any particular group or identified themselves by their nationality as Kenyans.

Respondents who identified themselves primarily by the language they spoke were slightly more likely to support smaller opposition parties. NARC received the greatest amount of support among the youngest respondents between 18 and 24 years of age, however, there was an equal amount of support between NARC, KANU, and smaller opposition parties for those between 25-34 years old.

In contrast, smaller opposition parties found greater support among older adults

(between 35 and 44 years of age) while the KANU found greater support among middle- aged and older respondents over 45 years old. Smaller opposition parties received twice as much support among heads of households (who were more likely to be male

67 The name of the Orange Democratic Movement-Kenya (ODM-Kenya) came from the fact that an orange was used as a symbol representing “no” and a banana represented “yes” for the 2005 referendum (see African Elections Database; CIA Factbook; ODM-K website) 132

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 respondents) than among dependents. There were clearer partisan differences when respondents were asked about the number of children in the household. Respondents with smaller families were more likely to support NARC. Smaller opposition parties received more support from those with average-sized families and KANU found its greatest support with respondents from larger families.

Kenya is a divided multiethnic society and ethnic and linguistic groups are regionally concentrated throughout the country. This is most evident for the Mijikenda- speakers who live predominately (over 99%) in the Coast Province, and for 90% of the

Meru-speakers, as well as over 75% of the Kamba-speakers located in the Eastern

Province. The Rift Valley is home to over 97% of the Kalenjin-speakers and 92% of

Somali-speakers are located in the North Eastern Province neighboring Somalia. Luhya- speakers are located in the smallest province, the Western Province. Eighty-four percent of the Kisii-speakers and 78% of Luo speakers are in the southwestern Nyanza Province.

Finally, the largest ethnic and linguistic group, the Kikuyu, is concentrated primarily in the Central Province (60%) and the Rift-Valley Province (22%). Historically these ethnic/linguistic divisions have created conflicts that have affected Kenyan politics. 68 For example, these regional/ethnic divisions play an important role in the electoral rules concerning presidential elections. Not only do presidential candidates need to win a majority of votes but they must past another threshold and must receive 25% or more of

68 Moi tried to use this to his advantage and instigated several clashes between ethnic/linguistic groups in order to divide the opposition and to maintain his political dominance during his regime.

133

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 votes in five out of seven provinces or they will face a runoff election (African Elections

Database).

While the largest percentage of the Kenyan population belongs to the Kikuyu ethnic group, there is near parity in size among the other five ethnic/linguistic groups in the country. 69 Table 6.1 notes that support for NARC was widely distributed across all language groups, but it received greater support from the Kikuyu-speakers as well as

Kamba-, Luhya-, Mijikenda-, and Meru-speakers. Close to half of KANU’s support was among Kalenjin-speakers. Other language-minorities such as Somali-speakers were also more supportive of KANU. Luo- and Kisii-speakers were more supportive of Kenya’s smaller opposition parties.

Table 6.1 also demonstrates that half of KANU’s support was from respondents with the least amount of education such as those respondents who indicated they had neither an informal nor a formal education. In contrast, smaller opposition parties had more support among respondents with higher levels of education, particularly those who had finished high school, and those who had a university education. Support for NARC was somewhere in between as the party received most of its support from respondents who completed primary and high school.

KANU received its greatest support from respondents without any religious affiliation, those who practiced an indigenous religion, or were (Sunni) Muslims.

Smaller opposition parties and NARC drew near equal support among those affiliated

69 Unlike some other surveys in the Afrobarometer series, respondents were not asked about their ethnic group in the Kenya (2003) survey. Respondents are only asked about their race; nevertheless, there is a strong relationship between ethnicity and linguistic groups in Kenya with many linguistic and ethnic groups sharing not only the same name but often living in the same geographical region. 134

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 with the Catholic Church, African Independent Church (AIC), and Protestants. As Table

6.1 indicates, NARC, KANU, and the smaller opposition parties received nearly equal

amounts of supports from a variety of occupational groups. NARC and KANU received

most of their political support from small and large commercial farmers, indicating these parties received a strong amount of support from rural areas. In addition, KANU and

smaller opposition parties received slightly more support from the unemployed. NARC

received more support from students, while professionals and teachers were more likely

to support smaller opposition parties. Finally, housewives were more likely to support

the former ruling party, KANU rather than smaller opposition parties and NARC.

There were also differences in partisan support among respondents at various

income levels. Each party received support from nearly one-third of respondents who did

not have any income. Those with the least amount of income (less than KSh500 per

month) were slightly more likely to support KANU, but each party received near equal

amounts of support for those making between KSh501 to KSh7500 per month. However,

those making between 5000-7500 were more supportive of the NARC party and those between Ksh1500 and 2500 per month and with more than KSh7500 were more likely to

support smaller opposition parties. 70

Finally, Table 6.1 shows there was a geographical bias towards rural areas in partisan support for the NARC and KANU in particular. Smaller opposition parties also received support in this area but were more likely to find support in the urban areas.

Partisan support was also concentrated in various regions. For example, smaller

70 As of June 2007, Ksh500 is approximately $USD8 and Ksh 7500 is about $USD112. 135

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 opposition parties received most of their support from the far western Nyanza and

Western regions and in the urban areas such as Nairobi. Not surprisingly, KANU received its strongest support among respondents from the Rift Valley, the region of the former President Daniel arap Moi. NARC was more successful in obtaining support across all geographical regions but found its greatest support in the Central, Coastal,

Eastern, and Western regions. 71

Gender and Party Support

Information from the Afrobarometer 2003 survey demonstrates that a weak inconsistent singular gender gap pattern exists in Kenya. As Table 6.2 notes, this is the same type of gender gap pattern present in Nigeria (2001) and Tanzania (2002), where women were less supportive of all political parties. For example, Kenyan women were close to 5% less supportive of the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) and nearly 2% less supportive of the main opposition party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU).

Table 6.3 demonstrates there were also gender differences in partisan support in the 2003 survey. This table looks at men and women’s partisan support regarding five different issues: respondents’ perceptions of economic conditions in the past 12 months, membership in religious associations, interest in government affairs, respondents’ evaluation on the government’s performance in providing employment and their opinion

71 Despite its name, the Eastern Region is actually located in the central part of Kenya and runs from the northern border near Ethiopia and almost reaches Tanzania.

136

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 about whether past crimes (i.e. human rights abuses) should be investigated. 72 Table 6.3

also shows both male and female NARC and small opposition supporters all agreed the

economy in the past was better. In contrast, female KANU supporters were twice as

likely to agree that the economy was the same. Compared to other countries, Kenya has

one of the highest percentages of respondents actively participating in religious

associations. On average, 70% of the respondents stated they participated in this type of

voluntary organization. As a result, this type of political behavior did not reveal

important gender and partisan differences.

Table 6.3 notes there was some variation between partisan support and interest in

government affairs. Most female supporters were less likely to be interested in

government affairs. Women who supported smaller opposition parties were the most

interested in government affairs. In contrast, KANU supporters were four times more

likely to state they were not interested. Regardless of their partisan support, male

supporters were equally likely to state they were very interested in government affairs.

There was very little difference among males since most stated they were somewhat or

very interested in government affairs.

As expected, NARC supporters were more likely to state the government’s policy

to create jobs was effective and KANU supporters were less likely and small opposition

supporters were divided. Lastly, Table 6.3 shows that respondents were asked whether past crimes should be investigated. Male and female KANU supporters were not only

72 In a preliminary analysis, these variables were chosen because there were important gender and partisan differences between men and women.

137

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 less likely to state there should be an investigation but if they agreed there should be one, believed it should concentrate generally on the entire independence period (1963-2002).

In contrast, NARC and small opposition party supporters, regardless of their gender, were more likely to agree there should be an investigation. However, they were more evenly divided over whether crimes committed during the Kenyatta period (1963-1978) or the

Moi regime (1978-2002) should be investigated.

Explaining the Gender Gap in Kenya

Tables 6.4 and 6.5 investigate the effect of various independent variables on partisan support in Kenya for men and women, respectively. As noted in previous

chapters, the dependent variable is the stated partisanship of each respondent and the

sample was divided by gender in order to compare men and women’s partisan support.

The dependent variable includes the new governing party, the National Rainbow

Coalition (NARC), the former ruling party, the Kenya Africa National Union (KANU),

as well as smaller opposition parties; so as a result, the appropriate statistical technique is

multinomial logit. Respondents contained in the no party identification category are used

as the reference group.

Several variables were important for explaining partisan support for Kenyan men

as shown in Table 6.4. Starting with the current governing coalition, there were five

variables which increased the probability of male support for the National Rainbow

Coalition (NARC). The first was location in the Central region which was very

significant and increased the probability of Kenyan males to support NARC by 3.74

138

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 times. The type of language-speaker also mattered for partisan support. Being a Luhya- speaker increased the probability of male support by 4.8 times and probability of support for Kalenjin-speakers doubled to 9.6 times. Two evaluations of the current governing party’s policies also mattered for male support for NARC. Men’s positive evaluations about the future were very significant and increased support for NARC over two times.

Finally, males who agreed the governing party was effective in fighting crime in Kenya were 1.5 times more likely to support NARC.

The type of language speaker and policy evaluations also mattered for partisan support for the former ruling party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU). If men were Kalenjin-speakers, this increased the probability of supporting this party by nearly

7.5 times. The odds that men who discussed politics would support KANU were about

1.4 times the odds for women. Like male NARC supporters, positive evaluations of the economy in the future also mattered and increased the probability for a male respondent to support KANU by 2.2 times. Positive evaluations of the current governing party’s efforts to create more jobs in Kenya also increased the probability of support for KANU by over 1.6 times.

As Table 6.4 highlights, there were several more variables important for male support of smaller opposition parties. The odds that male respondents had larger families, as noted by the number of children in the household, would support these parties was about 4.1 times the odds for their female counterparts. Once again, language was important and those who spoke minority languages were nearly 12 times more likely to support smaller opposition parties. While Luhya-speakers were over 15 times more

139

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 likely to support the same parties, male respondents who were Kalenjin-language speakers were more than one hundred times more likely to support smaller opposition parties. Religion was also moderately significant and increased the probability of male support by 8.3 times. Finally, the odds that men who participated in music associations would support smaller opposition parties were 1.8 times the odds for women.

Table 6.5 presents the results for Kenyan women. Compared to their male counterparts, more variables were important for female supporters of the governing party.

It is evident there were identical variables such as region, language, and policy evaluations which were important. Region was very significant and showed that when women were from the Central and Eastern region, this increased their probability of supporting the NARC by 5.7 and 3.2 times, respectively. Women who were responsible for childcare were also 1.2 times more likely to support NARC. The odds that women who were language-minority speakers or Kalenjin-speakers would support NARC were

3.6 and 3.5 times the odds for men. Being a Luhya-speaker increased the probability of supporting NARC by only 2.2 times. Finally, Table 6.5 shows that women who were evangelical Protestants were 1.7 times more likely to support NARC and it had a greater impact on partisan support for students who were 3.3 times more likely to support the governing party.

Region also had an impact for female KANU supporters, but often to a lesser extent. If women were from the Central and Eastern regions, this increased the probability for a female respondent to support KANU by 2.6 and 5.1 times, respectively.

Language continued to be an important predictor of partisan support for KANU as well.

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Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

The odds that women were language-minority speakers or Luhya-speakers were both 2.6 times the odds for men. When female KANU supports agreed the current governing party was effective in stabilizing prices in Kenya, this increased the probability of support for the main opposition party by 1.3 times.

Not only were there several variables which were important for support for smaller opposition parties, but they also had a larger impact on partisan support. This was particularly true for the type of language-speaker which was often very significant.

The odds that women were Kalenjin-speakers would increase support for these smaller opposition parties over one hundred times the odds for men. Being other types of language speakers was also very significant. For example, if women were language- minority speakers, this increased the probability of their support for smaller opposition parties by 55 times, 15 times for those who were Kamba-speakers, 6.5 times for Luhya- speakers, and 20.7 times for Somali-speakers. Finally, if women gave positive evaluations about the governing party’s efforts in fighting corruption, then the probability these women would support smaller opposition parties increased by 2.2 times.

Kenya: Conclusion

This section provided an overview of Kenya’s political and socioeconomic history, the current ruling coalition, NARC, and its opposition. It also investigated the variables which were the sources of the gender gaps in partisan support in Kenya. The results of the multivariate analysis show that socioeconomic factors, particularly region and language were important for explaining patterns of male and female partisan support and policy mattered especially for men.

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The National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) led by Mwai Kibaki has held on to both the executive and legislative branch for nearly five years. However, with a second place showing in the 2002 elections, Kenyans could just as easily turn back to KANU. While this sounds unlikely, what is evident is that unless the NARC opposition remains politically strong and does not buckle under ethnic pressures it should remain a formidable political thorn in KANU’s side in the next presidential elections in December

2007. It will also be interesting to see whether women will continue to support KANU and its one-party politics or will multipartyism and NARC’s anticorruption and antifraud campaign finally win over the hearts and votes of this important constituency in Kenya.

Senegal

Introduction

In April 2000, Abdoulaye Wade of the Parti Démocratique Sénégalais (PDS) was elected president of Senegal; however, this event belies the significance of this critical election for Senegalese and African politics in general. In fact, the 2000 presidential elections in Senegal marked the end of four decades of rule under the Parti Socialiste du

Senegal (PS) since independence in 1960. 73 Victory did not come easy for Abdoulaye

Wade and for over twenty years, he tenaciously sought the presidency but it eluded his grasp. The 2000 presidential elections would prove to be one of Senegal’s most competitive elections to date. Abdoulaye Wade (PDS), head of the Alternative 2000 coalition earned 31% of the vote and Moustapha Niasse of the Alliance des Forces de

73 Other examples of dominant parties still in power are the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) and the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM). 142

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

Progrès (AFP) received 17% of the vote. The incumbent Abdou Diouf of the Parti

Socialiste du Senegal (PS) with only 41% of the votes did not win a majority in the first elections held in late February. 74 After the second round of elections was held in mid-

March, Abdoulaye Wade (PDS) won 59% of the vote and Abdou Diouf (PS) won 42% of

the vote.

The 2000 elections symbolized a momentous point in Senegal’s political

development. Senegal’s political alternance meant the opposition had gained control of

the presidency for the first time in 40 years. 75 The PDS scored another electoral coup with the Coalition Sopi , an alliance of forty (40) political parties led by Abdoulaye Wade

(PDS), dominated the legislative elections in April 2001. Together, these two critical elections struck a serious blow to the Parti Socialiste du Senegal (PS) and their grip on political power in Senegal.

Political Background

Originally part of French West Africa, Senegal gained its independence from France in April 1960. 76 While several of its neighbors fell into a predictable period of turmoil

and instability, Senegal enjoyed a relatively healthy period of relative political order and

calm under the Parti Socialiste (PS) after independence. Despite periodic outbreaks of

74 The electoral system in Senegal uses a two round system, which calls for a run-off if a candidate does not win a clear majority of the votes in a presidential election (see African Elections Database).

75 In Mexico during the same year, the Partido de Accion Nacional ( PAN ) led by Vicente Fox defeated the PRI ( Partido Revolucionario Institucional ), one of the world’s oldest dominant parties founded in 1929.

76 In April of the previous year, Senegal joined Mali (formerly known as French Soudan) to form the Federation of Mali. However, continuous disagreements between Leopold Sedar Senghor of Senegal and Modibo Keita of Mali grew and eventually led to the end of their alliance by August 1960. 143

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 separatist violence in the Casamance region in the southern part of the country, Senegal has been one of the most stable and longest multiparty democracies in Sub-Saharan

Africa.77

Senegal is the westernmost country on the African continent and is bordered by the

Atlantic Ocean. 78 As a result, fishing has traditionally been an important part of its economy. Over 75% of its labor force is in the agricultural sector and crops such as peanuts, millet, and cattle-raising have also been the foundation for this poor, Sahelian country. The GDP (PPP) is only $1,800 per capita and over 50% of the population lives in poverty. Over the years, a host of environmental problems such as deforestation, desertification, droughts, and overfishing, overgrazing, and soil erosion have plagued

Senegal’s economy. Today, with these environmental problems and less revenue from traditional sectors, the service sector now makes up a larger portion (60%) of Senegal’s

economy (CIA World Factbook).

Eleven administrative regions in Senegal are further subdivided into 34

départements .79 Nearly 12 million people live in Senegal with the majority of the population living in Dakar and periurban areas. There are six major ethnic groups found

in Senegal; however, most are from three largest ethnic groups located primarily in the

77 The Casamance region is located in the southern part of Senegal, south of The Gambia. Smaller ethnic groups inhabit this area, most notably the Jola. Led by the Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC), they have struggled for independence and autonomy from northern Senegal. Fueled by interference from Guinea-Bissau, this conflict continued until a ceasefire was reached in 1997 and a peace deal was reached between the Wade government and the leader of the MFDC (Vengroff and Creevey 1997).

78 Senegal is also nearly split into two almost separate regions because it is divided by The Gambia located in the center of the country.

79 Some regions have additional administrative divisions known as arrondissements. 144

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 upper part of Senegal. The largest is the Wolof ethnic group, which currently makes up over 43% of population.80 The Pulaar are the second largest ethnic group and make up close to 25% of the population while the Serer, make up another 15%. Smaller ethnic groups such as the Jola, Mandinka, and Soninke live in the southern part of Senegal known as the Casamance region (CIA World Factbook).81 Political stability in Senegal is

due in large part to the lack of ethnic or sectarian violence in the country. 82 Another

factor may be the strong influence of the Wolof culture on Senegalese society. The

majority of Senegalese, regardless of their ethnic or religious background, have

assimilated into the dominant Wolof culture. In addition, a ban on political parties based

on social cleavages such as ethnicity has effectively prevented political entrepreneurs

from capitalizing on these societal divisions (Bendel 1999).

Islam and Catholicism are the two major religions in Senegal. Although only 5% of Senegalese are Catholic and 94% are Muslim, these two religious groups coexist peacefully. Some of the most important political actors in Senegal have been the Muslim brotherhoods, particularly the Mourides , and the religious leaders known as marabouts .

Although President Leopold Sedar Senghor was Catholic, he understood the significance

80 Regardless of their background, most Senegalese speak Wolof, the principal language spoken in the country; however, French is the official language. Most Senegalese who live in the urban, periurban areas, and those with more education speak more French than those outside these areas. European expatriates and Lebanese brought to Senegal during the colonial period make up 1% percent of the population and almost primarily speak French.

81 Also known as the Fulani, the Pulaar are traditionally nomads and found in other countries along the Sahara desert. The Jola, Mandinka, and Soninke ethnic groups make up approximately 4%, 3%, and 1% of the country, respectively. The rest of the population in Senegal is comprised mostly of African immigrants and refugees from neighboring countries such as Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, and Mauritania (see CIA World Factbook).

82 An exception is the separatist movement in Casamance which involves a variety of ethnic groups and both Muslims and Catholics in Senegal. 145

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 of these actors and harnessed their power and influence to work to his advantage so that the Parti Socialiste successfully maintained power for forty years.

Political Parties in Senegal

No other single individual has been more responsible in shaping the development of political parties in Senegal than Leopold Sedar Senghor. After he withdrew from the

Mali Federation in 1960, he was elected as Senegal’s first president in September 1960

(African Elections Database). During Senegal’s first republic, Senghor played a critical role as president. 83 He established a de facto one party regime that lasted through the

1970s and the PS would go on to become one of the oldest dominant parties in Sub-

Saharan Africa.

Together, Senghor and Mamadou Dia founded the Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais

(BDS) which eventually became the Union Progressiste Senegalaise (UPS) a decade later in 1958. The party’s ideology drew heavily on Senghor’s concept of negritude and contemporary African socialism and Marxism. When Senegal gained its independence two years later in 1960, Senghor and Dia became Senegal’s first president and prime minister. With few political rivals in the first post-independence presidential elections in

83 Modeled after France’s system, Senegal’s first constitution called for a strong president and a prime minister. However, between 1962 and 1963, a constitutional struggle ensued between Senghor and his first prime minister, Mamadou Dia. In March 1963, a referendum to abolish the prime minister’s post passed with 99% in favor. After this political crisis in 1962 with his prime minister, Mamadou Dia, a new 1963 constitution established a presidential system with a single executive which increased the power of the presidency. Other electoral reforms included using a single constituency and first past the post (FPTP) system with a party list. Senghor appointed Abdou Diouf as his prime minister after a 1970 referendum with over 95% voting in favor to reintroduce the post. Thirteen years later, the post was abolished once again in 1983 (African Elections Database; Bendel 1999; Vengroff and Creevey 1997).

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1963, Senghor ran unopposed and the UPS was only legal party between 1968 and 1973

(African Elections Database; Bendel 1999; Vengroff and Creevey 1997).

During the mid-1970s, Senghor initiated a series of political reforms which further consolidated his party’s power. He transformed Senegal from a one-party state into a restricted multiparty democracy when he legally recognized opposition parties and designed a three-party system. On the left, the Parti Africain de l’Independence (PAI) would represent Marxist-Leninism and the Parti Démocratique Sénégalais (PDS) represented the more conservative liberal-democratic ideology. 84 Senghor astutely placed his own political party, the Parti Socialiste (PS) as the centrist party representing democratic socialism (Bendel 1999; Vengroff and Creevey 1997).85

Two political parties, the Parti Socialiste PS) and the Parti Démocratique

Sénégalais (PDS) have controlled Senegalese politics. In particular, the PS was the dominant political party from independence in 1960 until 2000 and the PDS was the main opposition party. Wade and the Parti Démocratique Sénégalais (PDS) emerged on the political scene in the early 1970s. However, due to restrictions Senghor placed on political parties, Wade and the PDS could not actively participate in politics. With the odds stacked in his favor as the incumbent and as the centrist candidate, Senghor was assured victory against Abdoulaye Wade (PDS) in the 1978 presidential elections and

84 The Rassemblement National Démocratique (RND) was originally offered the opportunity to represent the political left; however, it did not want to participate. As a result, it was not officially recognized until 1981 by President Diouf, Senghor’s successor, when he lifted restrictions on other political parties (see Bendel 1999; Vengroff and Creevey 1997).

85 The UPS changed its name to the Parti Socialiste du Sénégal (PS) in 1976. 147

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 easily won his fifth election with an overwhelming 82% of the vote (African Elections

Database; Vengroff and Creevey 1997).

Several other noteworthy political developments took place beginning in the early

1980s. Most important, Senghor voluntarily stepped down as president and handed over power to his handpicked successor Abdou Diouf in 1981. Diouf advocated for a

multiparty system and the only condition placed on political parties was that they could

not be based on religion, ethnic or regional divisions. Two years later in 1983, as the new

incumbent, Diouf faced four opponents but won the presidential elections and again in

1988 and 1993. By the early 1990s, it became clear it was the beginning of the end for

the Parti Socialiste (PS) as it continued to lose its dominance in both the presidential and

legislative elections. 86

By February 2000, Diouf failed to win the majority of the votes needed in the presidential election. As the presidential candidate for the Parti Démocratique

Sénégalais, Abdoulaye Wade was also leader of the Alternative 2000 , an alliance of

several opposition parties which emerged to contest the presidential election. A second

round of elections was held in March but the outcome of the elections was very different.

Wade received over 58% of the vote compared to Diouf who maintained 41% of the total

votes. Most important, the opposition finally gained control of the presidency for the first

time since independence (African Elections Database). With this political alternance in

the 2000 presidential elections, the fortunes of these two political parties reversed

86 However, the percentage of votes Diouf gained dropped over time and in both elections, political opponents contested the results and neither was considered free and fair elections by international standards.

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Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 dramatically and the former dominant party, the PS became the opposition party while the former opposition party, the PDS, was the leader of the ruling coalition.

Although the PS and the PDS have been the two forerunners in Senegalese politics, there are now over 65 political parties in Senegal. Some of these smaller opposition parties have joined forces in previous elections.87 Yet until the 2000 presidential elections, none of these political coalitions was successful in ousting the PS from government. This was not until two large coalitions emerged to contest the presidential and national assembly elections, led by Wade (PDS) that the Alternative

2000 coalition and Coalition Sopi were finally able to win the presidential and legislative elections. 88

Patterns of Party Support

Table 6.6 shows there were important differences in partisan support for the ruling PDS, the PS, and opposition parties. As expected, the majority of respondents either identified themselves by their language group, so partisan differences were very similar. Respondents who identified themselves by their religion were less likely to support smaller opposition parties and more likely to identify with the PDS or the PS.

Those who identified themselves by their class were twice as likely to support smaller

87 For example, several opposition parties contested the 1993 legislative elections. The PDS formed an alliance with the Rassemblement National Démocratique (RND ), And Jëf/Parti Africain pour la Democratie et le Socialisme (AJ/PADS), and the Convention des Démocrates et des Patriotes/Garab-gi, (CDP-Garab-gi ) to form the coalition Bokk Sopi Senegaal. As Senghor’s successor, Diouf learned to strategically divide the opposition and invited Wade (PDS) to work within the PS administration. When Wade left the coalition, the remaining opposition parties then formed a new coalition named Jappo Liggeeyal Senegal (JLS) (see African Elections Database; Vengroff and Creevey 1997)

88 The Coalition Sopi which contested the National Assembly elections in 2001 included over 40 political parties. 149

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 opposition parties and respondents who identified themselves by their occupational group were less supportive of the PS, the former dominant party.

Senegalese youth (those under 30 years of age) were less likely to support the PS which represented the status quo and dominant party rule. This age group was more likely to support the smaller opposition parties and the current ruling party, PDS, whose campaign slogan was sopi .89 The PS found a greater amount of support among those between the ages of 30-34 years and those over 55 years old. Smaller opposition parties had greater support among respondents between ages 45-54. These parties also had greater support among heads of household and the PDS found more support among dependents, an indication their support is greater among the youth. 90 There was little

difference in partisan support in smaller households (defined as those with no or one

child). Larger households, with five or more children, were more likely to support the PS

and the PDS. Average-sized households with two to four kids were more supportive of

smaller opposition parties.

Among language speakers, all parties received their largest support from the

Wolof-speakers. However, there was little partisan difference among Wolof speakers in partisan support, but they were more likely to support the PDS and smaller opposition parties. This is not surprising since the current president, the Honorable Abdoulaye

89 The word sopi means “change” in Wolof and politically represented a strong anti-incumbency sentiment felt throughout the country after four decades of rule by the PS.

90 For cultural reasons, children and women would be considered dependents and men are considered the head of household in both Catholic and Muslim (monogamous and polygamous) households. 150

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

Wade, is Wolof. 91 Serer-speakers were more likely to support the PS than smaller opposition parties or the governing PDS party. Again, this high level of support may be due to the fact that former President Diouf is part Serer. This pattern was reversed among the Pulaar-speakers, who were equally supportive the PDS and smaller opposition parties. The PS received nearly half of their political support from this language group which is not surprising because President Abdou Diouf is also part Pulaar. The former dominant party, the PS, received the greatest amount of support among the Diola- and

Soninke-speakers. This was unexpected because these language groups are located primarily in the Casamance region, which threatened to secede during Diouf’s tenure as president.

Table 6.6 also looks at patterns of partisan support based on respondents’ level of education. The data indicate that those with a greatest amount of education were more likely to support smaller opposition parties. The ruling party, the PDS and the PS both received a greater amount of support from those without any formal education or those with an informal education. The PDS also received most of its support from Muslims, but this was anticipated since President Wade is also a Muslim. Most Muslims in

Senegal are affiliated with some type of brotherhood such as the Mourides or Tidianes .

President Wade is not only Muslim but also a Mouride and nearly half of his support was from respondents from the Mourides and those who belonged to the Khadre or smaller brotherhoods. Yet, just as many Mourides supported the PS. Although former President

Abdou Diouf is also Muslim, he received the least amount of support among Muslims.

91 Like Kenya, there is a good correspondence between ethnicity and linguistic groups in Senegal. 151

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

Respondents without any brotherhood affiliation were least likely to support the PDS. In addition, Catholics were equally likely to support the former ruling party, the PS and smaller opposition parties and may be related to the fact that President Senghor, the first president of Senegal was Catholic.

Smaller opposition parties and the ruling PDS found their greatest support with

farmers (both small and large/commercial). The PDS also found more support among

traders, students, housewives, craftsmen, and those employed in the informal sector. In

contrast, support from the PS came from small farmers, domestics, housewives, and the

unemployed. Partisan support was also split based on a respondent’s level of income.

Respondents without any income provided more than half of the support for all political parties; however, they provided more to the PDS and PS. While the PDS found more

support among respondents with income between than 10,000 to 50,000fcfa, the PS

found greater support among respondents with higher levels of income (50,000fcfa and

above). 92 The table also looks at partisan support among ethnic groups. 93 Similar to language groups, there was little difference in partisan support among the Wolof and this group provided almost half of the political support for all political parties. However, this is not the case with other ethnic groups. The Serer were twice as likely to support the

PDS and the PS. Smaller opposition parties received more support from the Mandinka and the Pulaar.

92 As of June 2007, $1USD = 485fcfa and 10,000fcfa is approximately $USD21.

93 Respondents were asked to identify their race; however, it was not significant and over 96% of those surveyed identified themselves as a Black African. 152

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

Finally, the Table 6.6 provides data on regional support for parties. The PS and smaller opposition parties received close to two-thirds of their support from rural areas, while the PS received greater support in urban areas. There was no clear pattern between partisan support and départements in Senegal . Although Presidents Abdoulaye Wade and

Abdou Diouf are both from Louga, located in the Kebemer region, the PDS received the

most support in Kebemer. The largest percentage of support for smaller opposition parties was in Kaffrine followed by Podor and Pikine. The greatest amount of support for

the PS was in Pikine, Fatick, Gossas, Tambacounda, and Tiva.

Gender and Party Support

Data from Senegal’s 2002 Afrobarometer survey indicates that while the pattern

is not as strong as in Botswana and Mali, Senegal is characterized by a weak inconsistent

contrastive gender gap pattern in the opposite direction. In Senegal, women were 9% less

likely to support the new ruling party, the Parti Démocratique Sénégalais ( PDS), but

women and men were nearly equal supporters of the former ruling party, the Parti

Socialiste (PS). Table 6.8 includes those factors which were important to male and

female support in Senegal such as discussing politics, interest in government affairs, and beliefs about whether party competition leads to conflict, or whether the current

government has been effective in dealing with food security or corruption. Table 6.8 also

shows that compared to other countries, Senegalese men and women were far more likely

to discuss politics and to be interested in government affairs. Unfortunately, neither

mattered much for support for any of the political parties. In contrast, female supporters

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Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 of the PS were more likely to agree that party competition meant political conflict and that the government was not effective in dealing with food security or corruption. Their male counterparts and male supporters of smaller opposition parties agreed.

Explaining the Gender Gap in Senegal

Tables 6.9 and 6.10 investigate the effect of various independent variables on partisan support in Senegal for men and women. The dependent variable is the stated partisanship of each respondent, and the sample was divided by gender in order to

compare men and women’s partisan support. Since this chapter is also interested in

analyzing partisan support of the new governing party, the Parti Démocratique

Sénégalais ( PDS) compared to the former dominant party, Parti Socialiste (PS), and

smaller opposition parties, it will use multinomial logit. Respondents which were in the

no party identification category are used as the reference category.

As shown in Table 6.9, there were no variables which increased the probability of

male support for the PDS or smaller opposition parties. Age, associational membership,

and respondents’ evaluation of the present economy were marginally significant in

determining partisan support for the PS. Older respondents were over three times more

likely to support the PS and men who participated in self-help associations, or had a positive evaluation of the present economy were 1.8 and 2 times more likely to support

the Parti Socialiste (PS) .94 Table 6.10 presents the results for Senegalese women.

94 This unexpected result could be due to the short time span between the 2000/2001 elections and the time when the surveys were administered and could be argued it is unclear is whether respondents are judging the former party, the PS, or the new governing party. 154

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007

Compared to their male counterparts, more variables were important for female partisan support, particularly for smaller opposition parties and the former dominant party.

Similar to males, no variables increased support for the governing party, the PDS. Only women’s evaluations of the government’s policy on corruption were marginally significant and only increased women’s support for the PS by 1.76 times. Women who were Serer-language speakers were 17 times more likely to support smaller opposition parties. If they were housewives, this increased to 35 times more likely but only by five times if they were a member of a professional association.

Senegal: Conclusion

This section presented data on the patterns of party support for Senegal from the

2002 Afrobarometer survey. It broke down the analysis by investigating the new

governing party, the Parti Démocratique Sénégalais (PDS), and the opposition, which

now includes the former dominant party, the Parti Socialiste (PS). The data show that

the new and former ruling party at times derived their political support from similar and

different social groups in the country.

The results of the multivariate analysis point out that a combination of

socioeconomic, political, or policy variables mattered for partisan support in Senegal.

This was so for male support for the PS and female support for smaller opposition parties.

Women were much less likely to support the current ruling party, the PDS, which may

indicate that women were more risk adverse to change and preferred the political status

quo. The PS took advantage of this fear of an uncertain political future under PDS rule in

their political campaigns for the 2000 elections and tried to highlight the political stability

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Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 of their 40-year rule. So far, this may have become a self-fulfilling prophecy, as Senegal has undergone some of the most tumultuous years under PDS rule. It was also questionable whether the political coalition (or his own party) which swept Wade into office in a historic win in 2000 would stay together. With years of internal struggles and discord, this coalition consisting of several political parties and had grown considerably smaller. Under Wade’s tenure, Senegal is no longer the beacon of political stability it once used to be and President Abdoulaye Wade had problems with the prime ministers he appointed. 95

Recently, there was also a great deal of political jockeying as several candidates emerged for the presidential and legislative elections scheduled for February 2007. With the possibility of political chaos looming, it was unclear if the PS would regain the presidency and Assemblée Nationale . Despite these external and internal political challenges, Wade as the candidate for the PDS faced several other presidential candidates including his former prime minister, Idrissa Seck, and Louis Jacques Senghor, the son of

President Senghor. Nevertheless, he managed to win the presidential election in February

2007 with a new coalition, Sopi 2007 . Wade won 56% of the vote and avoided a runoff election against Seck who won 15% of the vote (African Elections Database). With

National Assembly elections postponed for June 2007 and the new presidential elections

95 In Senegal, the prime minister is appointed by the president. After Sopi’s win in 2000, Wade originally appointed one of the opposition leaders, Moustapha Niasse (AFP) as his first prime minister. Niasse was prime minister for less than a year before he was appointed as a UN envoy to the Congo. Wade then appointed the country’s first female prime minister, Mame Madiou Boye, but she was only in office from March to November 2002 before stepping down amidst allegations of incompetence. She was replaced by Idrissa Seck, Wade’s third prime minister, who served until April 2004 before Wade jailed him for treason. Finally, Wade appointed Macky Sall, the current prime minister in April 2004. After the 2007 election, Sall is serving as the current prime minister.

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Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 now seven years away, it is too early to tell whether the PDS will become the next dominant party in Senegal.

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TABLE 6.1: Support Characteristics of Kenya’s Political Parties

Category Political Parties National Rainbow Kenya African National Smaller Coalition (NARC) Union (KANU) Opposition Parties Group Occupation Religion Language Identification No differentiate/Nat’l ID Age Youth (18-24 yrs) Middle-aged/Older adults 35-44 years (45+) Head of Dependents Head of Household household Children in Small families (0-1) Large families (5-9) Average (2-4) Household Language Kamba Kalenjin Kisii Kikuyu Somali Luo Luhya Mijikenda Meru Education Primary completed No formal or informal Primary completed Some primary High school Some high school completed Post-HS qualification University + Religion Catholic No religion or smaller Catholic Protestant religious groups Protestant (mainstream) Sunni Muslim (mainstream) Protestant Protestant (evangelical) Protestant (evangelical) (evangelical) African Occupation Small farmers Smaller occupations Professionals Students Housewives Teachers Unemployed Unemployed Income Ksh 5000-7500 No income Ksh 1501-2500 Ksh 2500-5000 Ksh 7501-15,000 Ksh 15,000+ Urban/Rural Rural Rural Urban Region Central North Eastern Nairobi Coast Rift Valley Nyanza Eastern Western Western

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Table 6.2: Weak Inconsistent Singular Gender Gap Pattern in Kenya

Inconsistent Singular Kenya 2003 National Rainbow Kenya African Coalition (NARC) National Union (KANU) Percentage support 52.38% 4.56% Partisan gender gap -4.83% -1.82%

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TABLE 6.3: The Gender Gap and Party Support in Kenya

Factors that Influence Female Support Category National Rainbow Kenya African National Smaller Opposition Coalition (NARC) Union (KANU) Parties Political -“Somewhat” -“Somewhat” interested -“Very interested” in Attitudes interested in in government affairs government affairs government affairs - Investigate past crimes - Investigate past -Investigate past (Independence era) crimes (both eras) crimes (both eras) Regime -Past economic -Past Economic -Past Economic Evaluation conditions “better” conditions “same” conditions “better” -Government create -Government create -Government create jobs: “Well” jobs: “Not well” jobs: “Not well”

Factors that Influence Male Support Political -Investigate past - Investigate past crimes -Investigate past Attitudes crimes (both eras) (Independence era) crimes (both eras) Regime -Past economic -Government create -Government create Evaluation conditions “better” jobs: “Not well” jobs: “Well” -Government create jobs: “Well”

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Table 6.4 Explaining Partisanship for Kenyan Men

Independent variables Political parties National Kenya African Smaller Rainbow National opposition Coalition Union (KANU) parties (NARC) Region -Central region 1.3190*** Children in Household -Five or more children 1.4118** Language -Smaller language-speaker 2.4721** -Kalenjin language-speaker 2.2627** 2.0091** 5.2181*** -Luhya language-speaker 1.5737* 2.7479*

Religion

-Muslim religious member 2.1185*

Associational Membership -0.9208**

-Professional association member -0.4207** -Music association member -0.3887** -0.3886** 0.6051* Political Engagement -Discuss politics -0.3889** 0.3342* -Interest in government affairs -0.8219*** Regime Evaluations -Present economy -0.5603*** -Future economy 0.7079*** 0.7923*** -Economic policies -0.4382*** -Government creates jobs 0.4985*** -Government fights crime 0.4264** -Government provides healthcare -0.3275*

* Significant at the p < .10 level. ** Significant at the p < .05 level. *** Significant at the p < .01 level.

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Table 6.5 Explaining Partisanship for Kenyan Women

Independent variables Political parties National Kenya African Smaller Rainbow National opposition Coalition Union (KANU) parties (NARC) Region -Central region 1.7471*** 0.9896*** 3.2605*** -Eastern region 1.1777** 1.6283***

Childcare 0.1749* Group Identity -Ethnic/linguistic identity -0.7498* -0.8930*** Head of Household -1.0870*** -1.5669** Language -Smaller language-speaker 1.2834*** 0.9554** 4.0013*** -Kalenjin language-speaker 1.2643*** 5.0623*** -Kamba language-speaker 2.6927*** -Luhya language-speaker 0.8019* 1.0843*** 1.8826* -Somali language-speaker 3.0282* Religion -Evangelical Protestant 0.5816* Occupational Type -Commercial farmer -0.7643* -Student 1.1870** Political Engagement -Discuss politics -0.7021*** Regime Evaluations -Present economy -0.6989*** -Future economy -0.8876*** -Government manages economy -0.8054** -Government stabilizes prices 0.2327* -Government fights corruption 0.7868* Women’s Equality -0.4809*

* Significant at the p < .10 level. ** Significant at the p < .05 level. *** Significant at the p < .01 level.

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TABLE 6.6: Support Characteristics of Senegal’s Political Parties

Category Political Parties Parti Démocratique Parti Socialiste (PS) Smaller Opposition Sénégalais (PDS) Group Religious group Language group Language Identification Occupational group Occupation Class Age Youth (18-24 yrs) 30-34 yrs Young Adults (25-29 55-64 yrs yrs) 65 yrs + 45-54 yrs Head of Dependents Head of household Head of household Household Children Large families (5-9) None Small families (1-4) Large families (5-9) Language Pulaar-speakers Serer-speakers Pulaar-speakers Diola/Soninke Mandinka-speakers speakers Education No formal education No formal education Informal education Informal education Some High School High school completed Post-HS & University Religion Muslim Smaller religions Muslim Catholic Catholic Brotherhood Mouride Mouride Tidiane Khadre & smaller No affiliation No affiliation brotherhoods Occupation Trader/Hawkers Smaller occupations Commercial farmers Type Domestics Commercial farmers Domestics Students Housewives Students Housewives Income 10-20,000fcfa No income 1-10,000fcfa 50-100,000fcfa Ethnic group Mandinka Serer Mandinka Diola/Soninke Pulaar Region Rural Urban Rural Département Bambey Fatick Kaffrine Kebemer Gossas Linguere Mbour Pikine Podor Velin Tiva Ziguinchor

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Table 6.7: Weak Inconsistent Contrastive Gender Gap Pattern in Senegal

Inconsistent Contrastive Senegal 2002 Parti Démocratique Parti Socialiste (PS) Sénégalais (PDS) Percentage support 36.88% 8.71% Partisan gender gap -8.96% 0.28%

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TABLE 6.8: The Gender Gap and Party Support in Senegal

Factors that Influence Female Support Category Parti Démocratique Parti Socialiste (PS) Smaller Opposition Sénégalais (PDS) Political -Party competition Attitudes “always” means conflict Political -Discuss often -Discuss often -Discuss often Behavior -Some/very interested -Some/very interested -Some/very interested in government affairs in government affairs in government affairs Regime Government fights -Government provides Evaluation corruption: “Well” food security: “Not well” -Government fights corruption: “Not well”

Factors that Influence Male Support Political -Party competition Attitudes “always” means conflict Political -Discuss often -Discuss often -Discuss often Behavior -Some/very -Some/very interested -Some/very interested interested in in government affairs in government affairs government affairs Regime -Government fights -Government provides -Government provides Evaluation corruption: “Well” food security: “Not food security: “Not well” well” -Government fights -Government fights corruption: “Not well” corruption: “Not well”

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Table 6.9 Explaining Partisanship for Senegalese Men

Independent variables Political parties Parti Parti Smaller Démocratique Socialiste opposition Sénégalais (PS) parties (PDS) Region -Kaolack -2.4948*** -1.9422*** -2.0509** Age -Older 1.1269* Head of Household -1.2955* -1.6304** -1.3731* Children (in household) -One child -1.2256* -2.1036* Education Level -Secondary education -1.1948* -Post-high school education -1.6548* Associational Membership -Self-help association member 0.5837* Political Engagement -Discuss politics -1.3701** -0.8482* Evaluation of Economy -Present economy -1.019** -Conflicts 0.6701**

* Significant at the p < .10 level. ** Significant at the p < .05 level. *** Significant at the p < .01 level.

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Table 6.10 Explaining Partisanship for Senegalese Women

Independent variables Political parties Parti Parti Smaller Démocratique Socialiste opposition Sénégalais (PS) parties (PDS) Milieu Region -Tambacounda -2.4711** -Kaolack -1.9655*** -1.6431** -Ziguinchor -3.1285** -4.1587** Group Identity -Language group identity -1.2408** -2.3983*** -3.8242***

Language Speaker -Serer language-speaker 2.8551** Occupation -Housewife 3.5735*** Associational Membership -Professional association member 1.6333*** Political Engagement

-Discuss politics -1.0736*** Opinion on Political Parties -Party competition leads to conflict -0.5697* Regime Policy Evaluations -Government provides water -0.5609* -0.6540** -Government fights corruption 0.5497*

* Significant at the p < .10 level. ** Significant at the p < .05 level. *** Significant at the p < .01 level.

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CHAPTER SEVEN:

The Gender Gap in African Party Systems

Introduction

In this concluding chapter, it is necessary to return to the research questions raised

in Chapter One: How are the countries of Africa different in terms of the gender gap?

Why has a gender gap in party identification emerged in some African countries but not

in others? Why are there gender differences in support for political parties in Africa?

Why do these gender gaps vary across different countries and which factors can help

explain these gender gaps?

In order to answer these questions, the next section provides a summary of the findings on the gender gap in party identification from Chapter One and on the partisan gender gap, which were the focus of the previous three substantive chapters. They discuss how the results of the multivariate analysis correspond with previous studies on the gender gap in other countries and looks at the implications of these gender gaps for

African politics in general. Moreover, this chapter discusses how this study informs our understanding of this phenomenon cross-nationally. Lastly, this chapter will point out areas of future research on the gender gap in Africa.

Summary and Discussion

This study began by demonstrating that there were two gender gaps present in several African countries. Chapter One presented evidence of a gender gap in party

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Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 identification. Sixteen countries were analyzed and classified as having a high, average, or low level of party identification. The level of party identification identified in the data varied by country and for some countries, it fluctuated over time. Specifically, in Mali,

Tanzania, Nigeria, Uganda, and Ghana, party identification remained stable over time. In other countries, party identification changed dramatically such as in South Africa where party identification increased by 25%, in Namibia where it changed by 10%, and in

Botswana where it changed by nearly 20% between 1999 and 2003.

Although most countries fell within the average level of party identification category, there was not a predictable pattern as to which countries belonged in each level of party identification. 96 One would have expected higher levels of party identification in countries with the longest experience with democracy or with a greater number of elections. Yet, this does not appear to be the case. For example, Botswana, Mali,

Senegal, and Zimbabwe each have had at least four or more elections since the early

1990s (Lindberg 2006). However, Botswana was the only country classified with a high level of party identification in 1999 and this later fell to an average level of party identification by 2003. Of the remaining countries, Mali and Senegal were classified as countries with an average level of identification and Zimbabwe had a low level of party identification.

In addition, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya all have participated in at least three elections and each one has an average level of identification. The level of identification in Namibia increased between 2000 and 2003 as expected; however, Namibia has had at

96 As noted in Chapter One, an average level of party identification indicated that between 50 to 70% of respondents identified with a political party in their country. 169

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 least three elections, which is just as many as Zambia and Nigeria, two countries that have low levels of identification. Finally, five countries had at least two elections

(Lindberg 2006). Among these countries, only Malawi and Tanzania had high levels of party identification while Mozambique, South Africa, and Uganda had lower levels of party identification as expected.

This study found there were several things that were different about the gender

gap in party identification in African countries. The results showed that there was an

inverse relationship between the level of party identification and the gender gap in party

identification in Africa. In other words, the size of the gender gap increased as the level

of party identification decreased. Compared to previous cross-national research on the

gender gap, this study used a larger and more diverse set of countries. This provided a better opportunity to observe just how much the gender gap in party identification varied both within and among different African countries. In addition, the large number of

countries classified as having either an average or low level of party identification

indicates that fewer respondents identified with a political party. This is not surprising,

given the fact that many new political parties emerged during the democratic transition in

the 1990s, including most of the current ruling parties analyzed in this study. However,

this short time period has meant African parties are not well institutionalized and it has

not allowed voters a sufficient period to identify or affiliate with a particular political party. It further suggests that there is a large independent and nonaffiliated electorate in

several African countries compared to other regions. Lastly, with a few exceptions, this

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Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 study found that women were clearly less likely to identify with any political party at every level of party identification.

Chapter One also pointed out that there were differences between men and women in terms of which parties they supported. With few exceptions, overall, the results in Tables 1.2-1.4 showed that women were less likely to support ruling parties than men. 97 In general, this negative partisan gender gap had a tendency to increase as

the level of party identification decreased. For example, the gender gap for the ruling parties was smallest (less than 5%) in countries with high levels of identification like

Malawi, but increased among countries with average levels of party identification such as

in Mali at 8% and 9% in Lesotho. This partisan gender gap was largest among countries

with the lowest level of party identification, so that the partisan gender gap for ruling parties was largest in Nigeria at 14.5% and 13.7% in Zambia.

In addition, women were less likely to support not just ruling parties but

opposition parties as well. This was first observed in Chapter Three in Tables 3.1 and

3.2, which provided evidence that there were two distinctive partisan gender gap patterns

in Africa. Using Botswana, Mali, Nigeria, Tanzania, Kenya, and Senegal as country case

studies, Chapters Four through Six, elaborated on these two partisan gender gap patterns.

The first type of pattern was the inconsistent contrastive gender gap pattern, which

indicated that men and women supported different political parties. As detailed in

Chapter Four, this pattern was most evident in two cases, Botswana (1999) and Mali

(2002), where women were more supportive of the ruling parties and less supportive of

97 Women were more likely to support ruling parties in only three instances: Botswana in 1999, Tanzania in 2001, and Mali in 2002. 171

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 opposition parties. Chapter Five then explored two additional cases, in Nigeria (2001) and Tanzania (2003), which showed an inconsistent singular gender gap pattern which occurred when women provided less support for all political parties.

Finally, Chapter Six presented Kenya and Senegal, two countries that displayed similar but weaker gender gap patterns found in Chapters Four and Five. These two cases were dealt with in a separate chapter because dominant parties transferred power to the opposition for the first time in Kenya and Senegal in recent elections. As the chapter outlines, a weaker inconsistent contrastive pattern was present in the Senegalese case, but in the opposite direction, indicating men were more supportive of the new ruling party and less supportive of the opposition. In contrast, the Kenyan case displayed a weak inconsistent singular pattern where women were less supportive of both the new governing party and the opposition.

Previous studies have pointed out that there is evidence of a global trend across several countries of an evolution in the gender gap. Initially, women were more supportive of conservative parties and over time became more supportive of liberal parties. However, this study shows that the gender gap in partisan support exists regardless of party ideology. For example, there was an inconsistent contrastive gender gap in Botswana and Tanzania, two countries that currently have a dominant party in power. Yet, this gender gap pattern existed in both countries despite the fact that the ideologies of these dominant parties are very different. The Botswana Democratic Party

(BDP) is right-wing dominant party and there was a positive gender gap for the BDP.

Although the inconsistent contrastive gender gap persisted over time between 1999 and

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2003, it declined substantially. Women were 15% more likely to support this conservative ruling party in 1999 and by 2003, less than 5% of women supported the

BDP. There was an equally dramatic decline with the left-wing Chama Cha Mapinduzi

(CCM) party in Tanzania. Initially, there was a positive gender gap for this party in

2001, but it later evolved from an inconsistent contrastive to an inconsistent singular gender gap by 2003 so that women were not only less likely to support the CCM, but its opposition as well.

Based on previous studies highlighting the role of modernization, one would expect positive gender gaps for conservative parties in less developed countries and liberal parties in more developed and industrialized countries. While there appears to be some partial evidence of this trend in these African countries, one would expect to see some variation among African countries based on their level of GDP per capita or level of industrialization. For example, this global trend would predict that women in the least developed countries such as Nigeria and Mali would show the greatest support for conservative parties and in richer countries such as Botswana and South Africa, women would show greater support for liberal parties. Yet, among the countries analyzed in

Chapters Four through Six, the results show that women were more supportive of conservative parties in all six countries.

As noted above, one of the clearest examples of a positive gender gap for ruling parties was for the conservative BDP in Botswana, which has one of the highest GDP per

capita in Sub-Saharan Africa. Yet, a positive gender gap for the ruling party also existed

in countries with very low GDP per capita such as Tanzania for the liberal CCM party

173

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 and in Mali for President Toure with the MC/ATT. Yet, even when one looks at political support for opposition parties, there was still a tendency for African women to support conservative parties regardless of the level of economic development in the country (see

Table 1.2 and Table 1.3). This may indicate that women in Africa were more risk adverse to political change and preferred the status quo, which represented not only political but also economic stability as well. This is understandable because women (and children) in Africa are the most economically vulnerable groups in societies. Women play an important role in contributing to the economic well-being of their families and must manage their households during times of economic uncertainty. For instance, studies have underscored how the implementation of economic policies has a different impact on men and women.

Which factors were related to the gender gap in partisan support in African countries? In general, this study found that region and membership in religious, trade union/farm, professional, or community development associations had the most influence on partisan support in all of the countries. In five of the six countries analyzed, other factors such as education, discussing politics, and policy issues (primarily dealing with the economy) also had a strong influence on partisan support. Finally, other factors such as group identification, the number of children in a household, and religious affiliations such as Islam and Evangelical Protestantism were important in some countries. Issues that tried to tap into feminist explanations of the gender gap such as attitudes towards women’s equality and the implementation of gender quotas were not important factors in determining the gender gap in Africa. Thus, similar to previous studies on the gender gap

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Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 in other countries, this study found the factors related to the gender gap in Africa varied across countries.

Chapter Four focused on Botswana and Mali, two countries that displayed the inconsistent contrastive gender gap pattern. Other than region, one of the first things that stood out was how little structural issues such as ethnicity played in explaining the gender gap in both of these countries (see Tables 4.4, 4.8, and 4.9). Given the low level of ethnic fractionalization in these two countries, this was not unexpected. 98 Instead, the results of

the multivariate analysis highlight the salience of various policy issues and political

factors such as associational membership, discussing politics, interest in government

affairs, occupation type, attitudes on women’s equality and gender quotas, and policy

issues such as the economy and crime were more important in explaining the gender gap

in Botswana and Mali.

Chapter Five focused on Nigeria and Tanzania, which showed an inconsistent

singular gender gap pattern. The results from these two countries suggest that policy

issues did not matter to the same extent as they did in Botswana and Mali. Rather, as

Tables 5.4, 5.8, and 5.9 indicated, structural variables such as region, age, religion or a

religious group identification as well as a couple of political variables such as

associational membership, and satisfaction with democracy were more important factors

in explaining the gender gap in Nigeria and Tanzania. Ethnicity is more politically more

98 According to Posner’s (2004) measure of politically relevant ethnic groups (PREG) this score ranges from 0 to 1 with 0 indicating a low level and 1indicating a high level of ethnic fractionalization. Botswana has the lowest PREG score possible with a zero (0) and Mali has 0.13 also indicating that ethnicity is not salient in either of these two countries. 175

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 salient in Nigeria and Tanzania. 99 Therefore, it was surprising that the results did not

reflect the importance of this issue. This highlights one of the limitations of the

Afrobarometer surveys because respondents were not directly asked to identify which

ethnic group they belonged to and when indirectly asked to identify their ethnic group,

few did so. 100

Kenya and Senegal were the focus of Chapter Six. Besides the fact these countries both had former dominant parties, Kenya and Senegal also manifested weaker versions of the inconsistent contrastive and inconsistent singular gender gap patterns.

Table 6.4 indicated that the factors related to the gender gap in Kenya were similar to those in Nigeria and Tanzania. Structural factors such as region, language, number of children in the household, religion, along with political factors such associational membership, and discussing politics were important. In addition, few policy issues were salient for the gender gap other than jobs, prices, and corruption. As previously noted, although ethnicity is more salient in Kenya, few respondents identified themselves by their ethnic or language group, and this type of group identification was not a significant factor in the multivariate analysis. 101

99 The PREG scores for Nigeria and Tanzania are 0.66 and 0.59, respectively, indicating there are a number of politically relevant ethnic groups within each country.

100 For example, in most surveys respondents were asked about their group identity such as which ethnic group (or race). Although respondents could indicate they identified with an ethnic or linguistic group, specific ethnic groups were not listed for some country surveys. Regardless, in most countries, respondents did not identify themselves by an ethnic or linguistic group. For example, in Nigeria, only 30% of respondents identified themselves by these groups. In contrast, 26% of respondents in Botswana specifically identified themselves as belonging to the Mongwato or 15% with the Mokweme ethnic groups.

101 The PREG score for Kenya is 0.57. Only 14% of respondents in Kenya identified themselves by a language or ethnic group. 176

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Lastly, Senegal showed a weaker version of the inconsistent contrastive gender gap pattern. The results of the analysis as pointed out in Tables 6.9 and 6.10 indicated that the factors related to the gender gap were similar to those in Botswana and Mali.

Other than region, age, and language, few structural variables were important. Given the low level of ethnic conflict, it is not surprising that ethnicity was not important in Senegal and thus, not an important factor for the gender gap. 102 Instead, factors such as

associational membership, and policy issues such as corruption and inter-community

conflicts were more important.

Implications

The large number of cross-national studies on the gender gap is a testament not only to the level of interest it has generated, but also importance of this topic for gender and politics. However, it is necessary to move this research further into the theory building process. Research over the past couple of decades has kept a myopic focus and

has been limited to investigating gender differences in advanced industrialized countries.

The results of previous studies have been mixed about the sources of the gender gap and

suggest the need for greater investigation in other regional contexts, thus in order to avoid

stagnation this research on the gender gap must be more comparative. New research

102 The PREG score for Senegal is 0.14. Although 33% of Senegalese respondents identified themselves by a language group, no respondents identified themselves by an ethnic group. This is because respondents are never directly asked this question, instead interviewers are asked to indicate what they believe is the respondent’s ethnic group. As a result, interviewers indicated that 44% of the respondents in Senegal were Wolof, 29% were Pulaar, and another 14% were Serer.

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Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 should move beyond advanced industrialized countries to investigate the political differences between men and women in emerging and consolidating democracies.

The lack of research on the gender gap in Africa and other emerging democratic regions may have been previously justified during the period of one-party and military rule when there were few political parties and elections. Since the transition to democracy in the early 1990s, there has been an increase not only in the quantity, but also in the quality of elections in a growing number of African countries. With the availability of survey data such as the Afrobarometer series, we can now begin to analyze differences between men and women in terms of their party identification and the political parties they support. In order to further our understanding of the gender gap, this study has tried to move the research on the gender gap forward by analyzing the gender gap in an African context.

Previous cross-national studies found that the role of structural, political or policy factors varied from country to country. This study found this was also the case in African countries and that structural variables were more important in Nigeria, Tanzania, and

Kenya; whereas, political and policy issues were important in Botswana, Mali, and

Senegal. This study has tried to contribute to the literature on the gender gap by highlighting the role of additional factors that could never have been addressed in earlier research on advanced industrialized countries. 103 For example, this study looked at the

role of salient issues common to many emerging democracies to determine their role in

103 It should be noted that some research on the gender gap in the US has looked at the impact of region (North vs. South) on the gender gap or the differences in the gender gap between different racial groups (see Lien 1998; Seltzer et al. 1997; Welch and Hibbing 1992). 178

Texas Tech University, Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, August 2007 explaining the gender gap in African countries such as region, ethnicity, language, political attitudes on women and traditional law, and gender quotas. Moreover, this study also examined a variety of policy issues such as corruption, food security, AIDS, satisfaction with democracy, and the impact of economic polices such as structural adjustment programs (SAPs).

Future Research

Prior to the return to multiparty democracy in the 1990s, earlier research in Africa

focused primarily on women’s political participation in social movements and as actors in

civil society. The growing number of elections in several African countries has opened

up opportunities for scholars to investigate women’s electoral participation as well (see

Bauer and Britton 2006; Dahlerup 2006; Goetz and Hassim 2003; Meena 2003). Thus,

this study has also tried to broaden the research on gender and politics in Africa by

investigating the gender gap in the African context.

One limitation to this study is the number of countries included in the

Afrobarometer series so it is not possible to analyze the gender gap in other African

countries not included in the series. In addition, the number of surveys available for

some countries is still relatively few, so this study was not yet able to analyze the

dynamics of the gender gap over time or across a number of countries. Lastly, the

surveys used for this study did not ask respondents certain questions (i.e. ethnicity or

marital status) or when they did, they were not asked in all surveys.

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Despite these limitations, there is room for additional research on the gender gap in Africa. Additional research could be conducted in order to gather data not included in these surveys, such as marital status, parental status, or simply to get richer understanding of the factors behind the gender differences in party identification and partisan support in an individual country. Similar to previous research, this study concentrated on the individual-level factors related to the gender gap. Future research on the gender gap in

Africa could address the role of macro-structural or systemic factors on the gender gap in different countries such the role of economic and political development, party systems,

SAPs, population size, cultural and colonial legacies, religious traditions, literacy rates, the year of founding elections.

In addition, there is not enough known about gender differences in political knowledge, political interest, activism, attitudes, or whether there are corresponding gender gaps in partisan support at the sub-national level in Africa. Finally, a natural extension of this study is to investigate the gender gap for female candidates in African elections. Between 1990 and 2007, over thirty women were either presidential or vice- presidential candidates in a number of African countries (Guide to Women Leaders).

Future research could investigate whether there were gender differences in voters’ support for female candidates, determine if there were gender differences in policy outcomes, and investigate if political parties advocated specific public policies in order to attract more female or male voters.

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