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UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES
POSTAL ADDRESS ADRESSE POSTAUE- UNITED NATIONS. N.Y. IOO17
CABLE ADDRESS ADREBSE TELEGRAPHIOUE: UNATIONS NEWVORK
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY.GENERAL
CABINET OU SECRETAIRE GENERAL
Rm. S-3840-Tei: (212)963-5495-Fax: (212) 963-1185
5 June 2001
Dear Ms. Berger,
On behalf of the Secretary-General, I write to thank you for your recent letter conveying "official reports of the Swedish-Russian Working Group on the Fate of Raoul Wallenberg" on behalf of Ms. Susan Mesinai and Dr. Marvin Makinen. These reports have been conveyed to the Secretary-General and Mrs. Annan.
Yours sincerely
Gillian Martin Sorensen Assistant Secretary-General for External Relati
Ms. Susanne Berger Arlington V
Susanne Berger 4793 Williamsburg Blvd Hi'. Arlington, VA 22207 -.1 am 1 703 237 0946 Tel/Fax FX-i":'JT!VE OFfiC*: sberger@prodigy. net
The Secretary-General Kofi A. Annan The United Nations New York, NY 10017
Arlington, 05.28.2001
Your Excellency,
Mr. and Mrs. Guy von Dardel of Geneva, Switzerland have asked me to please forward to you the official reports to the Swedish-Russian Working on the Fate of Raoul Wallenberg by the Group's two other independent consultants, Susan E. Mesinai and Dr. Marvin Makinen. These reports were formally presented to the public in Stockholm on January 12, 2001.
Please note that Ms Mesinai's report is currently available only in a printout taken from an electronic transmission. As a result, the copy appears unformatted and it includes several printing errors. Ms Mesinai will furnish you an original copy of her report at the earliest convenience.
Sincerely, TO' bhC-GhJN DATE: ThU May 31 ZOU1 1 re»pect | EUROPE AMOTBHCWrt DDPENHAOEN LDNOON OSLO OTOCWKXM KOPtMAKGATAN 15j 113 31 STOCKHOLM _ TELEPHONE « 46 8. •> 54 06 00 1 TELEFAX *468-45406 10 WES WWW.RESPECTEUROPE.COM _ TELEFAX To: Kofi Annan, UN Secretary General From: RespectEurope, Nina Johansson Date: May 31,2001 Number of pages: 2 megaFAX Facsimile Services REF tt 0161748A001 PAGE 1 OF 2 Cell Occupancy Analysis of Korpus 2 of the Vladimir Prison An Examination of the Consistency of Eyewitness Sightings of Raoul Wallenberg with Prisoner Registration Cards from the Prison Kartoteka Report Submitted to the Swedish-Russian Working Group on the Fate of Raoul Wallenberg Prepared by Marvin W. Makinen and Ari D. Kaplan Chicago, Illinois USA December 15, 2000 Correspondence addresses: Marvin W. Makinen Ari D. Kaplan Department of Biochemistry & Molecular Biology 10 West Elm Street The University of Chicago Chicago, Illinois 60610 USA 920 East 58th Street Chicago, Illinois 60637 USA Tel: 001-773-702-1080 Tel: 001-312-787-7779 FAX: 001-773-702-0439 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Makipen/Kaplanj Final Report to Swedish-Russian Working Group Page 2 December 15, 2000 TABLE OF CONTENTS Forward A. Introduction and Background 4 1. The First Investigation Ever of the Kartoteka of the Vladimir Prison No. 2 of the MVD 4 2. Research Conducted for the Swedish-Russian Working Group on the Fate of Raoul Wallenberg 6 a. Historical Background for a Computer Based Analysis of the Vladimir kartoteka 1 b. Proposal for Computer Based Analysis of Prisoner Registration Cards 10 B. Construction of the Database for Analysis of Cell Occupancy in Korpus II 16 1. Stipulations of the Russian Government 16 2. Work Conditions and Procedures for Construction of the Database 17 C. Limitations in the Analysis of the Occupancy of Cells in Korpus 2 of the Vladimir Prison 19 1. Prisoner Population Statistics of Korpus 2 19 2. Constraints in the Assignment of Occupied Cells and Cell Numbers 19 3. Cells with the Longest Unoccupied Periods 22 D. Analysis of the Occupancy of Cells in Korpus 2 25 1. Identifying the Earliest Sources of Information about Raoul Wallenberg 25 2. Testing the Consistency of Sightings of Raoul Wallenberg in the Vladimir Prison 31 3. Examining Periods of Solitary Confinement of Other Important Prisoners 45 4. Examining a Reported Sighting of Vilmos Langfelder 51 E. Summary and Conclusions 53 F. Acknowledgments 55 Appendix I 56 Appendix II 59 Makipen/Kaplani Final Report to Swedish-Russian Working Group Page 3 December 15, 2000 Forward In the following report prepared on the basis of our analysis of prisoner registration cards in the kartoteka of the Vladimir Prison No. 2, we have generally used the full name and year of birth at the first mention of any prisoner for full identification according to general Russian custom to facilitate follow-up investigations by others who may wish to carry this analysis further. Subsequent mention of the prisoner in the text is thereafter restricted generally to use only of the family name. Because of the Russian and general European custom of naming dates in the form dd/mm/yy, we have kept that format essentially throughout the text to reduce possible errors in preparing the report from computer print-outs of tables and lists. When dates are occasionally indicated in the American style of mm/dd/yy because of the use of the (American) English version of WINDOWS, particularly in figures and diagrams, notice of the change is brought to the reader's attention in the figure legend. The preparation of this final report, the construction of the database, and completion of the analysis of data requiring lengthy trips to Moscow and occasionally Vladimir were possible only because of the support that we have received at home from our families. Marvin W. Makinen and Ari D. Kaplan Makinen/Kaplan, Final Report to Swedish-Russian Working Group Page 4 December 15, 2000 A. Introduction and Background 1. The First Investigation Ever of the Kartoteka of the Vladimir Prison No. 2 of the MVD As is well described in numerous books and newspaper articles throughout the world, there are a large number of eyewitness reports of sightings of Raoul Wallenberg in Soviet prisons and labor camps despite the Gromyko Memorandum issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union in 1957 to the Royal Embassy of Sweden, alleging that Raoul Wallenberg died of a myocardial infarct in the Lubyanka Prison on July 17, 1947. A significant part of these reports came from former inmates of the prison located in the city of Vladimir, Russia, known as Vladimir Prison No. 2 under the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), at that time in the Russian Federated Soviet Socialist Republic of the Soviet Union. In efforts to obtain documentary evidence of the incarceration of Raoul Wallenberg in this prison or of Vilmos Langfelder, Raoul Wallenberg's assistant and chauffeur, who was arrested with him at the same time in Hungary, an investigation of documentary and archival records of the prison was carried out in late August and early September of 1990. This work was carried out by the Soviet-International Commission on the Fate and Whereabouts of Raoul Wallenberg, a team of 10 individuals without direct government association organized by Professor Guy von Dardel, the maternal half-brother of Raoul Wallenberg. Table 1 lists the members of the Commission. This work, as the first investigation of its kind in the Soviet Union involving non-Soviet participants as well as Soviet citizens, having no association with security organs of the Soviet government and including former political prisoners, was a pioneering event. In addition to investigation of the kartoteka of the Vladimir Prison or registry file of prisoners incarcerated in Vladimir, the Commission was also given access to selected personal dossiers or personal files (lichniye deld) of former prisoners who had had direct association with Wallenberg or Langfelder in Moscow prisons. These files were preserved in the Main Government Archive under the Council of Ministers in Moscow, under the direction of Mr. Stefan Anatol'yevich Prokopenko. The Commission was granted access to archival materials through approval of the Soviet government, in particular, by Mr. Vadim Bakatin, head of the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs. Minister Bakatin stated in his meeting with Professors von Dardel and Makinen, who together directed and coordinated the work, "To hinder the investigation of the case of Raoul Wallenberg is to stand on the wrong side of History." The entire kartoteka of the Vladimir Prison or collection of prisoner registration cards was examined in efforts to identify registration cards of Raoul Wallenberg or of Vilmos Langfelder. Although no card was found that explicitly contained the name of either individual, the group photographed the registration cards of approximately 1200 prisoners for later analysis. There were thirteen criteria according to which cards were selected for photographic duplication. The criteria are listed in Table 2 below for purposes of historical perspective. It was evident from that early experience that lack of paper documentation could not be accepted as conclusive proof of a prisoner's absence from Vladimir: (/) Registration cards and other documentary files could have been systematically removed or destroyed earlier by Soviet authorities; (if) Prisoners may have been registered under a pseudonym; (Hi) Registration cards of up to 32 numbered prisoners, listed in Table 3, were found in the kartoteka. While some were identifiable because the prisoner's name had been written onto the card after the numb- Table 1: Members of the Soviet-International Commission on the Fate and Whereabouts of Raoul Wallenberg Who Investigated the Kartoteka of the Vladimir Prison in August, 1990. Professor Guy von Dardel Swedish, organizer and maternal brother of Raoul Wallenberg. Dr. Vadim Birstein Russian, member of Memorial Society. Dr. Rolf Bjornerstedt Swedish, former Assistant Secretary General of the United Nations. Dr. Mikhail Chlenov Russian, director of VAAD, an organization of Soviet Jews. Professor Irving Cotler Canadian, Professor of International Law at McGill University. Alexei Kartsev Russian, journalist and reporter for Komsomol'skaya Pravda; author of first newspaper article about Raoul Wallenberg in the Soviet press in 1988. Dr. Kronid Lyubarski Russian, former Political Prisoner in Soviet labor camps and in Vladimir, and editor living in Munich, Germany. Professor Marvin W. Makinen American, former prisoner in Vladimir and Soviet labor camps, November, 1961, - October, 1963; Professor and Chairman of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology at The University of Chicago. Alexander Rodnyansky Film director and producer; directed first Soviet documentary film about Raoul Wallenberg, released in late 1990. Arsenii Roginski Russian, Senior Researcher, Memorial Society, and former political prisoner in Soviet labor camps. Makinen/Kaplan Final Report to Swedish-Russian Working Group Page 5 December 15, 2000 Table 2: Criteria for Photographic Duplication of Prisoner Registration Cards from the Vladimir kartoteka in 1990. 1. Cards with names of Raoul Wallenberg or Vilmos Langfelder 2. Cards with first name of Raoul or Vilmos 3. Cards with year of birth listed as 1912 4. Cards of prisoners arrested in Budapest or elsewhere in Hungary 5. Cards of all identifiable foreigners 6. Cards of prisoners whose names contained the syllables berg, val, lang,feld, or van den I. Cards of all prisoners who came from territories seized by the Soviet Union during World War II 8. Cards with no prisoner name 9. Cards of prisoners identified only by a number or letter of the alphabet 10. Cards of prisoners who were brought to the Vladimir Prison for the first time in the 1960s I1. Cards of any individual who was considered to have had some association with Raoul Wallenberg or Vilmos Langfelder either prior to arrest or in prison according to reports made to the Swedish Foreign Ministry 12. Cards of all individuals from Baltic states 13. Cards of prisoners with no cell occupancy data ering system ceased to be applied for that prisoner, several were not. Also, registration cards for several numbered prisoners were missing. Furthermore, there was no reason to assume that the numbering of prisoners higher than 32 did not occur. (Through the copy in the Sakharov Museum in Moscow of the order directed to the warden of the Ivanovo Prison, we now know that the system of incarcerating a prisoner under a number rather than by his or her name was the result of a highly secret order of the Ministry of State Security (MGB) in 1947. The true identity of these prisoners was not to be revealed to local authorities and prison personnel.) Table 3: List of Numbered Prisoners with Registration Cards in the Vladimir Kartoteka Found by the Soviet- International Commission in August, 1990. Number Name Gender Year of Nationality Date of Length of Birth Arrest Sentence 1 _ M 1909 Hungarian 05/12/40 25 years 3 — M 1896 Georgian 10/12/44 10 (+5) 4 Merkis, H. A. M 1922 Lithuanian 26/06/41 25 5 Urbshis, I. K. M 1896 Lithuanian — 25 6 Urbshis, M. F. F 1895 Lithuanian — 25 7 Munters, V. N. M 1898 Latvian 28/03/41 25 8 Munters, N. A. F 1897 Latvian 28/06/41 25 9 Balodis, I. P. M 1881 Latvian 14/07/41 25 10 Balodis, E. Yu. F 1902 Latvian 04/07/41 25 11 Laidoner, lo. M 1884 Estonian 26/06/41 25 12 Laidoner, M. F 1888 Estonian 26/06/41 25 15 Aladjani, P. S. M 1894 Armenian 24/09/45 25 21 Molochnikov, N.V. M 1899 Jewish 10/12/47 25 22 Allilyuyeva, Ye. F 1898 Russian 10/10/47 10 23 Allilyuyeva, A. F 1896 Russian 04/02/48 5 (+5) 24 Klement, T. M 1920 Hungarian 25 25 Pap, L. E. M 1919 Hungarian 29/03/49 15 26 Schandel, K. M 1912 Hungarian 14/01/45 25 27 Meyners, W. lo. M 1908 German 25 28 Vadillo, M. E. M 1903 Mexican 30/09/50 20 29 Menshagin, B. G. M 1902 Russian 28/05/45 25 30 Stul'ginskis, S. A. M 1885 Latvian 25 31 Schilingas, S. A. M 1885 Lithuanian 10/06/41 25 32 Tonkunas, lo. N. M 1894 Latvian 25 Makinen/Kaplan Final Report to Swedish-Russian Working Group Page 6 December 15,2000 One of the expectations of the Commission was that Wallenberg and Langfelder were likely to have been numbered prisoners. We have never obtained direct confirmation of this status for them, but it must be considered likely in view of the prominence of individuals who were numbered prisoners in Vladimir. As will be pointed out later with respect to the case of Heinrich Hermann Grossheim-Krisko and Gustav Richter, it is probable that the Soviet authorities at the time considered Raoul Wallenberg as an "extremely important prisoner." Figure 1 shows a graph of assigned ordinal number and date of entry for these individuals. The graph shows that the ordinal assignment of these prisoners appears to have been temporally coordinated and implies that these prisoners were processed through the same mechanism. We have not received information which sections of the Ministry of State Security or of the Ministry of Internal Affairs were responsible for the processing and numbering of prisoners. We shall discuss later evidence suggesting that Raoul Wallenberg was brought to the Vladimir Prison for the first time on July 25, 1947. If Raoul Wallenberg entered as a numbered prisoner into the Vladimir Prison, his number would have fallen into the range of 13-19 according to the graph in Figure 1 for entry on that date, and this is confirmed through the analysis and research of Susan Mesinai. It is, therefore, noteworthy that all of the registration cards in this range have been removed from the Vladimir kartoteka except for No. 15 which was Aladjani, Pietro Stefano (born 1894), an Armenian Roman Catholic priest with Italian citizenship. 2. Research Conducted for the Swedish-Russian Working Group on the Fate of Raoul Wallenberg Subsequent to the work carried out by the Soviet-International Commission on the Fate and Whereabouts of Raoul Wallenberg, which as stated above had no official affiliation to either government, the Swedish-Soviet, and, thereafter, the Swedish-Russian Working Group on the Fate of Raoul Wallenberg were formed with representatives from the Swedish and Russian Ministries of Foreign Affairs, the Swedish and Russian Security Police (SAPO and FSB, respectively), the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Russian Ministry of Defense. After 1997 jurisdiction of prisons was transferred from the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation to the Ministry of Justice. Consequently, a representative of the Ministry of Justice was appointed to the Swedish- Numbered Prisoners v& Date of Entry (dates not to scale) 35 30 25 20 15 10 f> T- O 04 •* 5 3 3 3 5 ? 8 Sj Figure 1. Graph of prisoner Number versus date of entry for numbered prisoners whose registration cards were found in the Vladimir kartoteka in 1990 by the Soviet-International Commission. The abscissa axis indicates the date of entry for each numbered prisoner. Note that the date is given as mm.dd.yyyy according to American convention. In all other parts of this report, dates are given in the form dd.mm.yyyy or dd.mm.yy according to European convention unless otherwise noted. Makinen/KapJan Final Report to Swedish-Russian Working Group Page 7 December 15, 2000 Russian Working Group. Through a special request of Professor Guy von Dardel, the founding member of the Swedish-Russian Working Group, Professor Makinen was appointed in 1992 as a permanent consultant with approval of both the Swedish and Russian governments. In view of Makinen's history as a former prisoner in the Soviet Union, this was an unusual request, and the special cooperation of the Russian government in this appointment is, therefore, to be acknowledged. Within the Swedish-Russian Working Group, in addition to the assistance and efforts of Mr. Hans Magnusson, co-chair of the Swedish-Russian Working Group, who ensured the completion of this work, in particular the computer scanning and analysis of the prisoner registration cards presented in this report, we wish to specifically acknowledge the efforts of Mr. Sergei Konstantinovich Nikishkin of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in helping to carry out and organize the computer based scanning of the prisoner registration cards in the kartoteka of the Vladimir Prison and of Mr. Kamil Shekyurovich Bakhtiyarov of the Ministry of Justice for ensuring continued preservation of the original scanned images of the cards, construction of the data base from the scanned cards, maintenance of the computers and associated equipment, and facilities for carrying out analysis of the database. Without this assistance and cooperation, this work would have not been possible. a. Historical Background for a Computer Based Analysis of the Vladimir kartoteka Over the 1993-1997 period, Professors von Dardel and Makinen undertook several trips to the Vladimir Prison No. 2 in the city of Vladimir to interview Dr. Elena Nikolaevna Butova, retired chief physician of the prison, and other prison personnel; and to re-examine documents in the Spetzchast'and medical records in the hospital that were still intact in the prison storage rooms. In December, 1993, Professors von Dardel and Makinen were accompanied by Mr. Nikolai Vasileyevich Petrov as an independent consultant and senior staff member of Memorial Society, Ms. Maria Vladimirovna Ruzayeva as translator for Professor von Dardel, and Mr. Sergei Michailovich Tarakanov, chief of the section on prisons in the Russian Federation within the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). On that visit Lieutenant Yurii Miroshin, assistant director of the Vladimir Prison, volunteered the names of two long-term prison employees as being possibly of assistance in the search for evidence of the incarceration of Raoul Wallenberg in Vladimir. These individuals were : (1) Varvara Ivanovna Larina, an elderly, pensioned woman, who continued to work as an assistant in the clinic of the hospital building of the prison known as Korpus 2. (Larina worked in Korpus 2 since 1946 from the age of approximately 16); and (2) Alexandr Timofeyevich Kukin, a retired man who had served earlier as a guard and later head guard in the prison in the 1950s and 1960s. (Subsequently Susan Mesinai, who also worked as an independent consultant for the Swedish-Russian Working Group, established through her own research of prisoner files that Kukin was the head guard for Korpus 2.) On that trip Varvara Larina was interviewed by Makinen and Petrov in the office of the chief physician of the prison, Dr. Lyudmila Ivanovna Polinina. The interview was conducted in Russian. Initially it was evident in the interview that Larina was unaccustomed to speaking about the prison with others unknown to her. Because Dr. Polinina periodically reassured her that she should provide answers to questions if she knew any information since Makinen and Petrov were members of an official international commission and were there through approval of the authorities, she gradually overcame her shyness and became more relaxed and less hesitant to answer questions. In this initial interview she was informed only that we were trying to trace the whereabouts of various foreign individuals thought to have been incarcerated in Vladimir at some time since the late 1940s. At no time was the name of Raoul Wallenberg ever mentioned in the interview. Also, she was not informed that Professor Makinen, who was conducting the interview, had been a prisoner in Korpus 2. In her answers Larina showed no knowledge of international news from radio, television, or newspapers. In the beginning the discussion was directed to rather general topics: her work responsibilities (cleaning of cells and the clinic or surgery rooms, dispensing meals to prisoners, sterilizing surgical instruments, etc.) and any prisoners whom she might remember. (While she volunteered the names of Pavel Anatol'yevich Sudoplatov and Francis Gary Powers, she could not recall the name of Powers' cellmate, Zigurds-Dzidris Krumin'sh.) She stressed that she was not supposed to learn the names of prisoners, she had no contact with prisoners in the absence of a guard, and she had no knowledge about their backgrounds. She had worked throughout all of these years only in Korpus 2 and had not worked in other parts of the prison. When asked if she could recall any unusual prisoners or prisoners who seemed to be there under special circumstances, she did recall a foreign prisoner who had been kept for a lengthy period of time in solitary confinement on the 3rd floor of Korpus 2. She described this prisoner as being thin, with narrow arms and hands, Maki.nen/KapJan Final Report to Swedish-Russian Working Group Page 8 December 15,2000 without eyeglasses, having a balding head with dark hair, and about 1.7 meters in height. Interestingly, she stated definitely that he was not German but a Westerner. She could not recall clearly the exact period of time that this prisoner had been in Vladimir, but she first suggested possibly late-1940s or early 1950s. (She later added that it could have been late-1950s.) In a later interview she stated that she recalled that a prisoner by the name of Osmak (she was hesitant about the name, stating that she was not certain that this was the correct name) had died in a nearby cell while this foreigner was on the third floor in solitary confinement, as she recalled, in cell No. 49. She stated that she knew no further details about this prisoner, that she did not know whether he received mail or packages, and that she did not know his name or country of origin. When asked why was she able to remember this one prisoner so clearly after seeing hundreds of prisoners over several decades, she answered unambiguously that he complained constantly about everything. For instance, she stated that if the soup was cold when it was delivered to him, he would complain to the head guard. This apparently happened on several occasions so that finally the head guard ordered Larina to serve the soup and meals to this prisoner first. Since the soup was dispensed bowl by bowl and cell by cell from a large kettle, starting on the first floor, then on the second floor, and finally on the third floor when the kettle was lightest of all (the soup having cooled off by this time), to serve this prisoner on the third floor first meant a significant change in her daily activities which apparently lasted for some time. This consequently provides a credible reason why she was able to remember this prisoner so vividly after so many years. In addition, it shows that this prisoner had to have been under special treatment, for a more ordinary prisoner or even a foreigner, complaining about cold soup, would have received a verbal bashing by the head guard in rather colorful language. A number of photographs of men of various ages and sizes, with eyeglasses and without, were presented to Larina, including a composite of photographs of about 15 individuals obtained from the Swedish Foreign Ministry that had been used earlier in interviewing repatriated prisoners-of-war. When asked whether any of the individuals in the photographs resembled or were this prisoner, she selected a photograph with a side profile of Raoul Wallenberg that had been taken in Budapest but had never been used in the international press and was rarely seen by others. This is shown in Figure 2. Although the composite from the Swedish Foreign Ministry had the well known photograph of Raoul Wallenberg as a student at the University of Michigan, as shown in Figure 3, she totally ignored that photograph. Professor Makinen has found that only individuals very familiar with the physical appearance of Raoul Wallenberg associate the side profile in Figure 2 with him. Figure 2. Side profile photograph of Raoul Wallen- Figure 3. Photograph of Raoul Wallenberg as a berg in Budapest identified by Varvara Larina as student at the University of Michigan commonly the foreign prisoner in solitary confinement on the used in the international press but ignored by 3rd floor of Korpus 2 at the time of the death of the Varvara Larina as not recognizable. prisoner Osmak. Mak^nen/KapJan Final Report to Swedish-Russian Working Group Page 9 December 15, 2000 Larina was interviewed by Professor Makinen on two additional occasions, approximately 12 and 24 months later, to verify whether she recalled the same details and whether she was able to recall additional information. These interviews were conducted in the office of the director of the prison with several individuals present in uniform and with Professor Makinen present. On these occasions the name of Raoul Walllenberg was also not mentioned. Larina on each occasion repeated essentially the same details and continued to select the same side- profile photograph, ignoring the photographs of others. On one occasion she was shown a series of photographs which were forensic, age progression likenesses of Raoul Wallenberg's facial features, that had been made by Horace Heafher, a forensic artist at the National Institute for Missing Children in Arlington, Virginia (These age progression drawings were based on a series of photographs of Raoul Wallenberg from early childhood to Budapest and a photograph of his mother according to standard forensic techniques.) Interestingly, Larina pointed to the photograph from this series that corresponded to Raoul Wallenberg at the approximate age of 40-50. The photograph that Larina selected is shown as Figure 4. Figure 4. Forensic aged drawing of Raoul Wallenberg by Dr. Horace Heafher selected by Varvara Larina as corresponding to the foreign prisoner in solitary confinement on the 3rd floor of Korpus 2 at the time of Osmak's death. The aged progres- sions are shown as insets on the right. This information was reported to the Working Group by Professor Makinen after each interview. Members of both the Swedish and Russian governments in the Working Group showed only disbelief that the information provided by Larina was credible and showed no inclination to want to determine whether it was verifiable. For instance, a representative of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Working Group, claimed to have consulted a professor of psychology at Moscow State University who assured him that it was impossible for anyone to recall an individual under such circumstances after 40 years. He also stated that among all of the millions of registered prisoners in the Soviet Union he was unable to find any with a name of Osmak or something similar and that there was none in the Vladimir kartoteka. Because of the reluctance of the Working Group to pursue these leads further, Professor Makinen finally informed Victoria Pope, the former Moscow correspondent for U. S. News & World Report, about Larina. Pope herself visited Larina with Susan Mesinai, and interviewed her. Pope included the Figure 5. Photograph of Varvara information in an article that appeared in the May 13, 1996, issue Ivanovna Larina in her home (repro- of the news magazine. Only from the interview with Pope did duced from U. S. News & World Larina learn of the name of Raoul Wallenberg for the first time. A Report, May 13,1996). copy of the photograph of Larina is provided as Figure 5 that ap- Makipen/Kaplan _ Final Report to Swedish-Russian Working Group Page 10 December 15,2000 peared in that article. After the meeting with Victoria Pope, Larina was not interviewed again by Makinen. (It is Makinen's understanding from Susan Mesinai, who interviewed Larina again, that the authorities tried to get Larina to recant her statements, but she refused and, therefore, had to leave her job at the prison.) Professor Makinen did once visit her in her apartment with Svetlana Zavrazhnova, an interpreter working with the group to photograph cards of the Vladimir Prison kartoteka in late February - early March, 1997 (described below). From that visit it was evident that Larina had neither a television through which she might have heard about Raoul Wallenberg nor newspapers and magazines with international or national news that would have been likely to have contained articles about him. During the December, 1993, trip to Vladimir, Alexandr Timofeyevich Kukin was also interviewed through the assistance of Vitalii Eduardovich Gurinovitch, at that time a history teacher in Vladimir involved in organizing a museum about the history of the Vladimir Prison. Kukin was a patient at the time in a Vladimir hospital convalescing from severe bronchitis and pneumonia. Kukin confirmed that there had been a foreign individual in solitary confinement in Korpus 2 for a lengthy period of time but claimed not to be able to recall details about the individual's background. When shown photographs seen by Larina, he stated that the photographs selected by her were not unlike the foreign prisoner. b. Proposal for Computer Based Analysis of Prisoner Registration Cards Familiarity with the structure of the prisoner registration cards and the information that was written onto the card in the course of the prisoner's incarceration gained through the work of the Soviet-International Commission provided a basis for proposing how the statements of Larina could be tested. To illustrate this, Figures 6 and 7 show the front and back images of the prisoner registration cards of Boris Grigoriyevich Menshagin, an unwitting witness of the Katyn Forest Massacre, first as Prisoner No. 29, and later under his true identity after the practise of referring to him as a numbered prisoner ceased. At that time his card was rewritten. For Menshagin, as Prisoner No. 29 there is a chronological listing of each cell into which he was placed accompanied by the date on which the cell change occurred, as shown in Figure 6. When the card was rewritten later, full information was included, as shown in Figure 7. Also, on the backside of the card are listed the date of his first arrival and final departure from the Vladimir Prison. In the event that a prisoner was transferred to other locations, for instance, Moscow for additional interrogation, etc., the dates of departure from and return to Vladimir were noted on the back side. If the prisoner died while in prison, the date of death was recorded onto the card. Thus, the complete chronological record of each cell occupied by the prisoner was contained on the registration card in the kartoteka even though the prisoner had been identified only by a number or perhaps even a pseudonym. From such cell occupancy data, the chronological history of each cell in the prison in principle could be reconstructed according to its occupants. By accounting for the occupancy of cells on the basis of prisoner registration cards available in the kartoteka, it would then be possible to identify cells that would appear as unoccupied or "empty." These cells were, thus, either truly empty or only apparently empty in the event that authorities had removed the documentary materials from the prison. Therefore, when correlated with independently gathered information from eyewitness reports, the cell occupancy data could be used to test the validity of the witness' statements. If the cell in question proved to have the usual complement of prisoners after analysis of the cell occupancy data, one would have to consider the statement as flawed. On the other hand, if the cell proved to be "empty," the analysis would be supportive of the witness' statements and would indicate that the conditions pertaining to the cell in question had been accurately described. In addition, there was other information such as year of birth, nationality, date of arrest and statute under which sentencing was carried out, and address or last known domicile at the time of arrest, through which prisoners in neighboring cells could be possibly traced as potential witnesses. Proceeding on the basis of this experience, Professor Makinen outlined a plan to the Working Group by which the statements of Larina could be tested and by which it would be possible to verify whether a cell on the third floor of Korpus 2 may have held a prisoner in lengthy solitary confinement: (0 Select for photographic duplication registration cards of only those prisoners who were placed into cells in Korpus 2 during incarceration in the Vladimir Prison between the years of 1947 and 1972. These years correspond, respectively, to the alleged death of Raoul Wallenberg in the Lubyanka Prison according to the Gromyko Memorandum and the last eyewitness account of Raoul Wallenberg in the Vladimir Prison, in this case given by losif Mikhailovich Terelya which will be discussed later; Makinen/Kaplan( Final Report to Swedish-Russian Working Group Page 11 December 15, 2000 ;:? P^s^^f- • ''"••*•»• ii^ &M Figure 6. Front (top) Cn. ? 6. and back (lower) sides of the registration card ;. 8; Meero paOorw, AOJDKH: . of Boris Menshagin as Apz. Prisoner No. 29 in the '9. Hapr...... 10. Hau...mKgj?il. Vladimir kartoteka. On the original card it is t! 12..ApccTOBaH «. ».. 19 r. 13. XapaKtcp npecryn- <, ' possible to see that the name of the prisoner J M. CT.CT. yK.i?4.y.".3.3.; „.. 15. * was written at a later time because of different colored ink. The cell occupancy information .'.I is seen on the right side of the front of the card under the Case No. (No. No. ACJI). On the back side of the card only the Ken length of sentence (25 years) and the begin- CPOK ning of the sentence H«uo cpou JL^. (04/02/50) are written. (This was later changed to start as of the date of initial detention, May 28, 1945.) The cards of Menshagin were origi- nally photographed in August, 1990, by the Soviet - International Commission. (H) Reconstruct by computer search algorithms the chronological history of the occupants of each cell in Korpus 2 from the cell occupancy data contained in the cards; (Hi) Identify prisoners who died in Korpus 2, particularly in the vicinity of cell 2-49; (iv) Determine whether any cells on the third floor showed no occupants at the time of death of a prisoner according to the cell occupancy data from prisoner registration cards; (v) Identify the prisoner whose family name was Osmak or some variation thereof; (vz) Determine when the prisoner Osmak died on the third floor of Korpus 2; and Makinen/Kaplan Final Report to Swedish-Russian Working Group Page 12 December 15,2000 (v/7) Identify prisoners who were held in nearby cells at the time of death of Osmak and who as potential witnesses could provide further information from their knowledge about special or foreign prisoners held at that time in Korpus 2 or in the Vladimir Prison, in general. In late February, 1997, Professor Makinen traveled to the Vladimir Prison with a team of assistants to select and photograph registration cards of prisoners according to the plan outlined above for analysis. The Swedish Embassy had received previously information from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the request of the Swedish government to allow Professor Makinen to carry out this analysis for the Working Group had been approved in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which at that time still had jurisdiction over all prisons in the Russian Federation. The members of the group accompanying Professor Makinen were Professor von Dardel; Susan Mesinai, director of the ARK Project and at that time ad hoc consultant to the Working Group; Mssrs. Nikolai Kostenko, Gennadii Kuzovkin, and Alexandr Popoyan, all members of Memorial Society; and Svetlana Zavrazhnova, translator. The group was accompanied by Mr. Martin Hallqvist, Ambassador-at-Large for the Swedish Foreign Ministry and former member of the Working Group. Professor Makinen had estimated that selection and photography of the cards would require approximately one full week, and the group arrived equipped with photographic equipment, computer scanning equipment, and sufficient photographic film for the work. ^^JjL£a.£iiL&.i.--M-t*~&!SjfeH6ui6rM#- -.,-^W^^^!&^^^:••••;:'••-•-[.,/, *-. .MM "p^v/atr- \1 & ^.tfeafi AM '--'I ^JM^;Mn Figure 7. Front (top) and "' ^^«.is*«A(fefe.. 6«^^^- J, i back (lower) sides of the registration card of Boris Menshagin in which full information is entered including the statute under which he was sen- tenced by Special Tribu- nal. The cell occupancy ^^«f*S^«£^ information is seen on the right hand part of the ^^./^*^fc»4^?'?;;^^ '••!•::•.!. •:' ,,T ,_• ' -W.,"^';'J .»3 JM • wwmiim front side of the card. The Case No. 333 (No. No. /Jeji) is unchanged KlPtwrfHriT.'^^^!^^;*^ from that in Figure 6. The date of arrest, May 28, 1945, is given on the front side in the lower left-hand quadrant. On the back side the length of the sentence has not been changed from 25 years as written in Figure 6, but the beginning of the sentence has been ...... ______-----...... ~-- changed to 28/05/45. Menshagin was released on May 28, 1970, and «^:..M^^ ^ was exiled to the city of y^f^^Ttsr+ifi*: ' e&ir&rHttr . ^^ *t£.. Murmansk where he subsequently died, never to have regained contact with his wife and daugh- ter again. Makinen/Kaplan Final Report to Swedish-Russian Working Group Page 13 December 15, 2000 Despite assurances made by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Moscow, Professor Makinen and his assistants were informed upon arrival in the office of the director of the Vladimir Prison that the Vladimir administration (Upravleniye) had received no instructions to allow photography of prisoner registration cards and would not allow this work to be carried out until specific instructions had been received. Despite the presence of Ambassador Hallqvist and numerous discussions between the Swedish Embassy with the Russian Foreign Ministry and Ministry of Internal Affairs in Moscow, no further progress on this issue was made. While the details of the unpleasant discussions between Professor Makinen and the prison administration officials will not be repeated here, the prison administration did settle in the end on allowing the cards to be selected, stating that they were to be identified by being rotated in the drawers of the kartoteka and that they would be preserved in that state until permission for photography would be obtained. Professor Makinen was also requested to produce a list of the names and year of birth of the prisoners whose cards had been selected. With the assistants from Memorial Society; three prison guards who were hired on an ad hoc basis through the prison director's office to assist in the preparation of the handwritten list of names; Al'bina Dvoretzkaya, in charge of the Spetzchast' of the prison where the kartoteka was kept; and occasional assistance by Vitalii Gurinovitch, the cards of all prisoners who had been in Korpus 2 at some point in their incarceration in the Vladimir Prison between the years of 1947 and 1972 were identified, and a handwritten list of their names and year of birth was prepared. The list consisted of names of slightly over 6,000 individuals. Xeroxed copies of the list of names were made and provided to the Vladimir prison administration, the Swedish Embassy, and later to Mr. Tarakanov in the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Moscow. Also Professor Makinen kept one copy of the list for future reference. The work required approximately 12-14 hours of effort daily for the entire week. This was surely one of the most trying periods in working with the Russian government on this project. While much of the week for Professor Makinen was spent either in discussions with prison administration officials or in assisting with the selection of prisoner registration cards, there were two notable results that were obtained while working with the cards in the kartoteka. These two results provided important support for the idea that analysis of the cell occupancy data for Korpus 2 should be carried out. The first was that the registration card for Osmak, Kirill Vladimirovich, a Ukrainian nationalist, born 1912, was found in the kartoteka. The card stated that he died on May 16, 1960, while he occupied cell No. 49 in Korpus 2. The front and back sides of Osmak's card that document his date of death are provided in Figure 8. (This card was scanned by a laptop controlled scanner in late Figure 8. Front (upper) and back (lower) sides of one of the four registration cards of Kirill Ivanovich Osmak (born 1890) in the Vladimir kartoteka. This card corresponds to the latter part of Osmak's imprisonment in Vladimir from 18/02/55 until his death. As in Figure 7 for Men- shagin, the front side has personal infor- mation and cell occupancy data. On the back side it is seen that Osmak was sen- tenced to 25 years by Special Tribunal. In the central part of the back side, the words in Russian are written: 16. o] May, I960, died. Osmak died the evening before he was to be transferred to KGB headquarters in Lvov. The cause of death is stated on the card as cerebral hemorrhage. An autopsy was carried out for which the report was included in his personal dossier (lichnoye delo). Makinen/Kaplan_ Final Report to Swedish-Russian Working Group Page 14 December 15,2000 February, 1997.) Finding the card and verifying that he had died while occupying a cell on the 3rd floor of Korpus 2 was of considerable importance because it gave proof of the general accuracy of the information provided earlier by Varvara Larina and indicated that analysis of the cell occupancy data was imperative. The second result was achieved by Susan Mesinai. Through Lieutenant Yurii Miroshin, assistant director of the prison, she requested access to registry journals for transport of prisoners into and out of the Vladimir Prison for the years 1947, 1952, and 1954. (Susan Mesinai had studied the Vladimir cards photographed in 1990, noting patterns of categories of prisoners according to transfer to psychiatric hospitals, deaths, invalid homes, etc., and the years 1947, 1952, and 1954 corresponded to periods which through her assessment of relevant documents and eyewitness reports from the Swedish Foreign Ministry were most likely to involve transfer of Wallenberg into and out of the Vladimir Prison.) Miroshin stated that the records for 1952 and 1954 had been destroyed but he was unable to confirm whether or not the registry for 1947 was available. Mesinai therefore requested permission to compile a list of date of entry of each prisoner into the prison and Case No. (No. No.flen) written on the registration card for these years. This involved no personal information that could be used to identify prisoners. She had the supposition that the Case No. might be assigned on a chronological or sequential basis although we had not been able to establish its importance through earlier discussions with prison officials or members of Memorial Society. The idea behind this compilation came from the report in Swiss intelligence files by Jakob Hochli, a former member of the German army, upon repatriation. He stated that he had learned from other prisoners in Korpus 3 that the prisoner Vitalii Shulgin, a well known Russian writer and former contemporary of Lenin, was transported from Moscow to Vladimir in July of 1947 in the same transport as Raoul Wallenberg. Susan Mesinai proposed that it might be possible to zero in on the Case No. assigned to Raoul Wallenberg if he indeed was brought to the Vladimir Prison in 1947 with Shulgin. Since we had photographed the card of Vitalii Shulgin in 1990, we knew the precise day of his entering the Vladimir Prison (July 25, 1947) as well as the Case No. recorded on his card (3569). The results of this analysis are presented in Figure 9. Although we estimated at the time that only about 30% of the relevant data had been extracted from the kartoteka, we found a card belonging to a prisoner entering on the last day of December, 1947, setting the outer limit of the graph. An expanded view of the graph around the date of Shulgin's entry into the Vladimir Prison is shown in Figure 10. There are several features of the plots in Figures 9 and 10 that require discussion. Firstly, while scatter in the plotted data is apparent, this arises through the difficulties attendant with reading entries of arrival dates and Case Nos. in the registration cards written by hand with different styles of writing, aged documents with fading ink, and probably occasional, incorrectly entered dates or Case Nos. Secondly, there is a clear discontinuity accounting for approximately 1,000 prisoners in the latter part of May, 1947. This discontinuity may be due to the circumstance that large numbers of prisoners-of-war were brought to the Vladimir Prison but then distributed further into labor camps within the Vladimir Oblast' and no longer detained at the Prison. As stated earlier, we also know that this discontinuity coincides with a secret order from the Ministry of State Security for prisoners of special prominence to be identified by numbers and for maintaining their incarceration as a high priority secret, as verified by a copy of a document observed in the Sakharov Museum in Moscow. Therefore, it is conceivable that some num- case number and date of entry FIGURE 9. Plot of Case No. (No. No. del) on the vertical axis versus the date of entry into the Vladimir Prison on the horizontal axis for the year 1947 for prisoners with registration cards in the kartoteka of the Vladimir Spetzchast'. The date of entry on the horizontal axis is given as mm/dd/yy according to 2000 American custom, in con- trast to the listing of dates as dd/mm/yy in general in other parts of this report 11.'5M6 12/25/48 2/13/47 4)4/47 5(24/47 7.'13/47 ft'1/47 10/21/47 12MOI47 1J29M8 Makinen/Kaplan _ Final Report to Swedish-Russian Working Group Page 15 December 15,2000 7000 i FIGURE 10. Expanded plot of Case No. (No. No. del) versus date of entry from data in Figure 9 for the month of July, 1947. It is seen that there are no entries for several dates surrounding the date of entry of the prisoner Shulgin on July 25, 1947. 6/24/47 7/14/47 8/3/47 8/23/47 9/12/47 bered prisoners may be also included within the discontinuity. Figure 1 implies that the numbered prisoners having entered the Vladimir Prison had reached only about No. 20 at this time. (Details about these aspects are discussed in the report "Strict Isolation and Numbering of Prisoners" by Susan Mesinai.) Thirdly, there is a clear, monotonic increase in Case No.(JVo. No.Del) entered on the registration card and the date of entry of prisoners. (Inspection of Case Nos. for prisoners showed later that in general a prisoner always kept the same Case No. despite multiple entries and departures unless the prisoner returned under a new sentence.) In other words, the Case No. of a prisoner entering for the first time in 1947 can be predicted with some certainty, given the initial date of entry. The Case No. on Shulgin's registration card was 3569. Shulgin's personal dossier, examined by Susan Mesinai in the FSB archives in Moscow, states that he was allowed to walk into the prison from the street from a van and that he was accompanied by Kutepov, Pavel Aleksandrovich (born 1925) and Volkov, Konstantin (born ?). Volkov is not in the database presumably because he was never in Korpus 2. The registration card of Kutepov was written on 26/07/47. The Case No. on Kutepov's card is 3570, falling precisely into the 3400-3700 range, right after Shulgin's, and Kutepov's card was filled out one day after Shulgin's, supporting the correlation. Inspection of the cards of other prisoners entering between the dates of 20/07/47 and 30/07/47 showed, furthermore, the following: Date of entry or filling out of card Prisoner name & year of birth Case No. (No. No. Ren\ 21/07/47 Bogomolova, E. A. (1922) 3486 21/07/47 Tyutin,N.V.(1912) 3498 22/07/47 Kulyarkina,A.K.(1893) 3515 23/07/47 Kuz'min, Yu. A. (1928) 3558 24/07/47 Dryagunova, A. I. (1922) 3565 25/07/47 Badmayev, B. (1901) 3568 25/07/47 Shulgin, V.V.( 1878) 3569 26/07/47 Kutepov, P. A. (1925) 3570 28/07/47 Dmitriyev, A. K.(1900) 3585 28/07/47 Poplanov,B.A.(1918) 3597 28/07/47 Skuyin'sh,A.Yu.(1900) 3614 The individuals listed above from the database are prisoners who spent at least one day in Korpus 2 during their incarceration in the Vladimir Prison over the 1947 - 1972 period, as explained below, while the data in Figures 9 and 10 refer to all prisoners entering for the first time in 1947. This difference accounts for the lack of a continuous Makinen/Kaplani Final Report to Swedish-Russian Working Group Page 16 December 15, 2000 unit by unit incremental change in the Case No. with date of entry in the above table, as, for instance, seen with Badmayev, Shulgin, and Kutepov. Also, we had not had sufficient time to collect all of the Case No. data for 1947. As seen in the graph in Figure 10, there are several absences around the date of entry of Shulgin and Kutepov on July 25, 1947. There are correlations within the database indicating the arrival of other prisoners who had to have been processed at about the same time as Shulgin but are not accounted for through the cards available to us in the kartoteka. For instance, cell 2-2, located in an isolated corner of Korpus 2, becomes 'empty' on 24/07/47, and does not acquire occupants with registration cards in the kartoteka until 01/06/48 for a total of 313 days. Also, cell 2-3 becomes 'empty' on 28/07/47 and remains empty until 02/05/48 for a total of 281 days, and cell 2-10 becomes 'empty' on 21/07/47 until 17/01/48 for a total of 180 days. The observation of three cells becoming ostensibly empty at this time correlated with missing Case Nos. in Figure 10 implies a close connection between the two. These circumstances, thus, speak for isolation of newly arrived prisoners for a lengthy period of time at the time of Shulgin' arrival rather than simple relocation of prisoners within Korpus 2. Examination of the data in Figures 9 and 10 showed, furthermore, that while at least one, and sometimes up to 4 to 6 registration cards were prepared for each day of that week for prisoners entering for the first time, there is no card entered on 27/07/47 or 29/07/47 which correspond to a Sunday and Tuesday, respectively, for that week. Thus, the lack of a Case No. assigned on a given date does not necessarily indicate a holiday. On this basis, the statements of Shulgin's, as reported through Hochli, coupled with the opening of cells 2-2, 2-3, and 2-10 closely coincident with the time of Shulgin's arrival indicate that these cells were occupied by individuals whose registration cards have been removed from the kartoteka of the Vladimir Prison. Examination of other data extracted from prisoner registration cards provides further support for this conclusion. On the basis of Figure 10, it can be deduced that the missing Case Nos. fall within the range of 3400 - 3700. In the event that Raoul Wallenberg was transported to the Vladimir Prison for the first time with Shulgin, as reported, we can conclude that his Case No. would have fallen into this range. We believe that the Case No. probably corresponds to the line in the registry journal of incoming prisoners for the year in which the name of the prisoner was entered. Although we have requested access to such registry journals, none has been given heretofore, and no clear answer has been given whether they have been destroyed or not. B. Construction of the Database for Analysis of Cell Occupancy in Korpus II 1. Stipulations of the Russian Government Through subsequent discussions of the Swedish Embassy with the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, with the participation of Professor Makinen, the conditions under which Professor Makinen would be allowed to conduct an analysis of the Vladimir kartoteka were established. The main conditions for photography or other forms of duplication, examination, and analysis of prisoner registration cards in the Vladimir kartoteka were set forth through the November, 1997, session of the Swedish-Russian Working Group. The conditions were the following: (1) copies of the cards (except for those that had been already previously photographed) were not to be taken out of the Russian Federation and were to remain under the control of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (this had to be amended to the Ministry of Justice which was assigned jurisdiction of prisons and correctional institutions at a later date); (2) the names of prisoners with no direct relationship to the case of Raoul Wallenberg and other means of personal identification were not to be made public; and (3) all precautions were to be undertaken for safeguarding the confidentiality of sources of information and the privacy of prisoners and their immediate families, in particular those prisoners who had no direct association with the case of Raoul Wallenberg. In addition, it was anticipated that after computer-based analysis of data assembled from the prisoner registration cards into a suitable database was completed, a report would be made to the Swedish-Russian Working Group on the results of the analysis. (An interim report of a preliminary nature was submitted to Hans Magnusson, co-chairman of the Swedish-Russian Working Group on July 14, 2000, by special request.) Copies of the original scanned images of the registration cards were to remain under the control of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Makinen/Kaplan _ Final Report to Swedish-Russian Working Group Page 17 December 15,2000 Russian Federation. The archival material was subsequently transferred to the control of the Ministry of Justice when jurisdiction of prisons was later assigned to that part of the government and is being kept for further analysis. 2. Work Conditions and Procedures for Construction of the Database In the latter part of March, 1998, a team headed by Professor Makinen spent 4 days at the Vladimir Prison for selection and computer-controlled scanning of prisoner registration cards. The rest of the group consisted of Dr. Viktor Tumarkin together with a technical assistant from ProSoft, AG, which had been contracted by the Swedish Embassy for making digital images of the registration cards; Mssrs. Kostenko, Kuzovkin, and Popoyan of Memorial Society, who had accompanied him to the Vladimir Prison in February, 1997; Mr. Leonid Ragosin, a translator hired by the Swedish Embassy; and Mr. Ari Kaplan of Chicago, Illinois, who had started to work as a database consultant with Professor Makinen to develop software for analysis of cell occupancy data. The cards selected in February, 1997, had not been maintained in their rotated configuration and all prisoner registration cards in the kartoteka had to be reexamined. Consequently the first requirement was to reselect cards for computerized scanning. The only criteria for selection of cards were: (1) prisoners who had spent one or more days in Korpus 2 during their incarceration in the prison between January 1, 1947, and December 31, 1972 and (2) prisoners who had a notable absence of cell occupancy information between the date of entry into the prison and the first written cell occupied, indicating that they may have been held under special isolation conditions. The cards were scanned under computer control using the specialized equipment supplied by ProSoft. AG, for historically important documents, and images of each registration card were constructed in TIFF format at a resolution of 600 dpi. Images of the front and back sides were made of over 11,000 cards belonging to 8,049 individuals. (From our estimate in August, 1990, that the Vladimir kartoteka contains a total of upwards of 80,000 prisoner registration cards, often with more than one card per prisoner incarceration period; the 11,000 cards selected represent only approximately one-seventh of all of the prisoners who have been incarcerated in the Vladimir Prisoner. Since the estimate of the total number of prisoners includes a sizeable number of prisoners prior to 1947 and after 1972, numbers which are not known to us, we cannot evaluate what fraction of total prisoners is represented by the database over the 1947-1972 time period.) Subsequently under Dr. Tumarkin's direction, the images of the scanned cards were read by a staff of 5 individuals from ProSoft experienced in translation of historical documents into computer file format. This part of the work was carried out under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice in Moscow. An example of the data fields created from the registration card for each prisoner is shown in Figure 11. Figure 11 presents the data fields in two parts: in Russian with Cyrillic lettering (Part A) and in English with Roman lettering (Part B). The data contain the minimum information to identify the prisoner and to reconstruct the chronological course of cell occupancy by the prisoner during imprisonment, including periods of time in which the prisoner may have been transferred to interrogation prisons or other similar institutions and returned to the Vladimir Prison. Mr. Kaplan and Professor Makinen began the analysis of the database in August, 1998, and completed the work in six separate trips to Moscow, each lasting 10-14 days, the last trip having taken place in October, 2000. The initial emphasis of the work was centered on verifying the historical accuracy of all entered data and correcting mistakes in data transfer by comparison of the computer file image such as that in Figure 11 with the TIFF image of the registration card to resolve inconsistencies and discrepancies in the data. In this part of the work, Mr. Nikolai Kostenko provided valuable assistance. It was possible to devote only the last two work sessions in Moscow completely to data analysis, such were the demands of data verification and correction of errors. A list of programs developed by Mr. Kaplan for verifying the accuracy and self-consistency of the entered data is given in Appendix I. A list of programs for analysis of cell occupancy data is given in Appendix II. The data analysis was carried out with the use of two Hewlett-Packard 4510 Notebook laptop computers operating under Microsoft Windows and Office. All programs written by Mr. Kaplan for data verification and analysis employed ACCESS within the Microsoft Office system. The database constructed from these cards contained 8,049 names of prisoners and 98,030 cell records. The chronology of all cell changes was checked for all prisoners, and corrected where necessary by comparison to the scanned image of the card to verify its accuracy. There were no cell records in the database without assignment to an identifiable prisoner, and upon completion of data verification there were no cell records that had not been entered in correct chronological order. The only uncertainty in the data analysis derives from the circumstance, as illustrated in Figure 11, that occasionally cell numbers were entered on a card of a given prisoner without a date. Makinen/Kaplan _ Final Report to Swedish-Russian Working Group Page 18 December 15,2000 Figure 11. Copy of the computer file image of the prisoner registra- tion card of Zigurds KOPnyC- HEPA3EOPHMBO Dzidris Ernestovich KAMEPA AAHHblE ftAHHblE Kruminsh from the Vladimir kartoteka, il- lustrating the data fields extracted from each registration card to construct the data- base for cell occupan- cy analysis. The upper image (Part A) shows the Russian file with Cyrillic lettering while the lower image (Part B) shows the corres- ponding data fields in English translation with Roman lettering. Enter a Prisoner's Last Name, It is also seen that cell then press ENTER:. 2-11 is not associated with a date. This situa- tion was frequently found on registration cards, and the manner in which this situation was treated is des- Prison 'Unclear! cribed in the text. Kru- Cell Date | Date ! 2-17 5/6/56 minsh was the cellmate 2-37 9/22/56 :• of Francis Gary Pow- 1-52 1/28/57 ers and Marvin W. Ma- 2-16 4/17/57 kinen, and was repor- 2-33 7/3/57 ted to have been the 2-52 10/31/57 cellmate of a Swedish 2-29 3/5/58 prisoner by name of "Van den Berg." 2-34 8/15/56 . 2-15 1 1/29/58 2-36 11/19/59 ; : 2-16 3/23/60 • '; 2-11 2-6 8/19/60 2-31 9IB/60 While we presumed that this indicated that the prisoner was placed temporarily in that cell for perhaps a day prior to being transferred to the next cell associated with a date, in the absence of definitive information, we assumed maximum occupancy of the cell in question to ensure that possible important prisoner pairings in cells were not missed. That is, we assumed in the calculations that the prisoner occupied the cell in question for the entire period between the two dates as well as the previous cell for the entire period between the two dates. This assumption tends to underestimate instances of 'empty' cells with no identifiable occupants. This led to several instances of filling of cells in Korpus 2 with four or more prisoners for short periods of time and occasional, artifacrual pairing of Makinen/Kaplani Final Report to Swedish-Russian Working Group Page 19 December 15,2000 male and female prisoners into the same cell. Each such questionable situation was then examined by resort to the TIFF images of the cards of the concerned prisoners, on which basis the inconsistency was resolved. Of the more than 8,000 prisoners in the database, only 22 had no final departure date entered on the back side of the card. We could discern no systematic basis for this omission except for probable accidental failure to enter the date at the time of departure of the prisoner. In no instance did this affect a cell in Korpus 2 as the final cell occupied by the prisoner. There were 14 prisoners who had been incarcerated only in Korpus 2, and there were 21 prisoners who spent more than two years in a single cell in Korpus 2 in the course of their imprisonment. Also, over the 1947-1972 period there was a total of 157 prisoner deaths, of which 134 occurred in Korpus 2, reflecting the circumstance that Korpus 2 was used not only for isolation of important prisoners but also as a hospital for medical treatment and that many of these prisoners must have been debilitated and in poor physical condition at the time of transfer to Korpus 2 for medical treatment. The age of prisoners at the time of death varied from 19 to 82. C. Limitations in the Analysis of the Occupancy of Cells in Korpus 2 of the Vladimir Prison 1. Prisoner Population Statistics of Korpus 2 In this investigation we have been greatly concerned about conditions such as construction and renovation requiring transfer of prisoners from floor to floor and from korpus to korpus that would result in unoccupied cells. For instance, in the reports provided by several repatriated German prisoners-of-war in the Wallenberg Files in the archives of the Swedish Foreign Ministry, statements indicate that cell changes of prisoners were frequently made with transfer to other korpuses because of construction and repair of cells. These conditions are also reflected in the book published by Sudoplatov, Pavel Anatol'yevich (born 1907) Special Tasks (Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1994), in which he describes his imprisonment in Vladimir. He states that the three main buildings of the prison were enlarged after 1950 to accommodate up to 800 prisoners in all. Since no definitive answer was given to our inquiry to Vladimir prison authorities in 1998 about records of reconstruction and repair of cells, we have analyzed the distribution of identifiable prisoners, i.e., prisoners with registration cards in the kartoteka, over the 1947 - 1972 period to examine the extent of fluctuations in prisoner population in Korpus 2. While increases in total prisoner population would serve only to strengthen arguments based on identification of unoccupied cells when correlated with eyewitness statements, decreases in prisoner population due to renovations, etc., could lead to false conclusions about the distribution of unoccupied cells if the boundary conditions are not established. Our analysis, however, necessarily pertains to those cells in Korpus 2 that have at least one occupant since we have no way of determining whether all cells were uniformly affected. Some exceptions to this situation will be discussed later. Figure 12 illustrates the fluctuations in total prisoner population of Korpus 2 over the 1947 - 1972 period. It is of interest to note further the results in Figure 13 which show fluctuations in the average number of prisoners per occupied cell over the same period. Despite the fluctuations in total prisoner population, it is seen in Figure 13 that the average remained relatively constant at 2.0 ± 0.5 prisoners per occupied cell per week in Korpus 2 over the 1947-1972 period. In addition to fluctuations, the graph in Figure 12 shows a gradual rise in the total prisoner population over the 1947 - 1972 period. With an average occupancy of 2.0 ± 0.5 prisoners per cell, this can have happened only through increasing the total number of cells. It is, therefore, likely that the prominent troughs in total prisoner population over the March, 1949, - May, 1952, and October, 1959, - January, 1962, periods correspond to reconstruction and renovation of cells. It is also probable that the sharp dips in prisoner population over the October, 1956, - June, 1957, period similarly correspond to reconstruction and renovation. We shall later point out that the transfer of two specific prisoners separately but simultaneously from Korpus 2 to Korpus 1 within this time frame provides some support for this assumption. We have not had adequate opportunity to complete programs to evaluate prisoner population statistics according to the number of prisoners entering and departing from the Vladimir Prison on a weekly or monthly basis. Our expectation is that the fluctuations observed in Figure 12 do not reflect parallel changes in total prisoner population for all 4 buildings in which prisoners were held, but rather simply indicate that the sharp fluctuations in the number of prisoners on a given floor were accompanied by transfer of prisoners to other floors and buildings. Furthermore, the gradual, steady rise in total prisoner population of Korpus 2 suggests that the total number of prisoners housed in all 4 korpuses of the Vladimir Prison must have increased in a parallel manner over the 1947 - 1972 period. Makinen/Kapjan Final Report to Swedish-Russian Working Group Page 20 Figure 12. Graphical illustration of variations in the total prisoner population of all cells with identifiable occupants in Korpus 2 (according to the kartoteka) on a monthly basis from 01/01/47 to 31/12/72. 1,5 0,5 Figure 13. Graphical illustration of the average number of prisoners per cell in Korpus 2 over the 01/01/47 to 31/12/72 period. The average number of prisoners per occupied cell is 2.0 ± 0.5. Makipen/Kaplan _ Final Report to Swedish-Russian Working Group Page 21 December 15,2000 I 5 I I ! 6 i f I S I ! 1 B I ! 1 B | M M I I M I i S I I 1 8 | Figure 14. Graphical illustration of total daily prisoner population averaged per month for each floor of Korpus 2 from 01/01/47 to 31/12/72. Makinen/Kaplan _ Final Report to Swedish-Russian Working Group Page 22 December 15, 2000 In Figure 14 fluctuations in total prisoner population are analyzed with respect to the population of each floor. The graphs in Figure 14 show that the total number of prisoners on each floor of Korpus 2 undergoes sharp fluctuations over the January, 1949 - December, 1951 period and over the February, 1957 - July, 1957 period, uniformly affecting each floor. While the fluctuations over the 1949 - 1951 period probably correspond in part to the frequent cell and korpus changes mentioned by repatriated prisoners-of-war, it should be noted that no floor from January, 1949, to July, 1957, exhibits a complete absence of identifiable prisoners. A complete absence of prisoners is observed only in the middle of 1965 for the 3rd floor of Korpus 2 which preceeds a near complete absence on the 2nd floor of 2 days. The precise time limits on the 3rd floor for the complete absence of identifiable prisoners were found to be 28/05/65 to 03/07/65. The only period of complete absence of identifiable prisoners on the 2nd floor was found to be from 05/10/65 to 07/10/65. No period of time was found over which there was ever a complete absence of identifiable prisoners on the 1st floor. We can consequently safely assume that no floor underwent renovations or changes, excepting these relatively brief periods for the 2nd and 3rd floors, which were incompatible with occupancy of some cells by prisoners. This is an important deduction, as will be seen later, since we would not expect that Raoul Wallenberg as a prisoner in Vladimir would have been casually shifted to different floors and korpuses as frequently as other, more ordinary prisoners. 2. Constraints in the Assignment of Occupied Cells and Cell Numbers Because of construction changes, it must be expected that the numbering of cells in Korpus 2 may have changed at least once over the 1947-1972 period. This circumstance brings into question whether the analysis is accurate when cellmates and prisoners in neighboring cells are evaluated since the assignment of cell numbers may be incorrect for the given period in question with respect to the physical location of the cell. Since we have not been able to obtain information from the Vladimir Prison authorities about changes in cell construction and repair which would affect the total number of cells on each floor as well as their numbering, we have chosen as a basic model for cell numbering on each floor of Korpus 2 that experienced by Professor Makinen from late November, 1961, to late July, 1963. This pattern is illustrated below in Figure 15. As seen in Figure 15, a cell is identified as an interrogation room on the 1st floor of Korpus 2, reflecting the experience of Professor Makinen. If the use of this cell was converted for incarceration of prisoners, this change would have the effect of shifting the numbering and, therefore, relative location of cells from n to (« + 1) for cells 2- 5 and higher. This change does not affect the pairing of prisoners in cells and the assessment of cellmates since we must presume that the cell occupancy information written on registration cards for two or more prisoners overlapping in time applies to both. The change in cell numbering would affect the evaluation of neighboring prisoners on each side of a cell in question for cells that are located in the corners of the building. Except for the assessment of whether a prisoner was held in cell 2-5 (in general considered a cell for effective isolation of a prisoner because of its location adjacent to the corridor), there is no other example in the data analysis where evaluation of neighboring cellmates was assessed to be consequential and possibly erroneous. Assignment of the cell number 2-5 localizes the cell to one or the other side of the corridor leading to the walking courts. In both instances communication through wall tappings was essentially impossible and ineffective because no prisoner was ever brought through the corridor to or from the walking courts without being led by a guard who would have prevented wall tapping. The unusual architectural feature on the 3rd floor is that there are two WCs. The one on the left-hand end of the floor lies exactly above the corresponding WCs on the 2nd and 1st floors. These WCs, therefore, were most likely constructed into the building at the same time. The one at the right-hand end of the 3rd floor of Korpus 2 lies above cell 2-29 and has no counterpart on the floors below. (At the time of Professor Makinen's incarceration in cell 2-49 in November-December of 1961, this WC had a toilet of the usual bowl type rather than the ones in the other WCs which were essentially an open drain that was flushed; one cellmate of Makinen's stated that the bowl toilet was for sick prisoner-patients who did not have the physical strength for squatting and that such patients under medical treatment were generally confined to cells on the 3rd floor.) Since there was no comparable WC on the floors below, it is probable that this toilet was installed at a later time, removing one cell for incarceration of prisoners and displacing cell 2-49 from the corner. As seen in Figure 15, the cell numbering in Korpus 2 indicates that the highest numbered cell is 2-56 on the 3rd floor according to the illustrated floor plan. Nonetheless, space has been provided in the cell map to indicate occupancy of cells 2-57 and 2-58 by prisoners. We believe, as explained below, that cell 2-57 ceased to exist after May, 1957, perhaps due to addition of the toilet on the 3rd floor. For reasons explained below, we believe that cell 2-58 was in a different location. Makinen/Kaplan t Final Report to Swedish-Russian Working Group Page 23 December 15,2000 Enter the date: |^|||f|ii|| 11/27/00 itv First Floor, Korpus II Enter the date: 11/27/00 & Second Floor, Korpus II Enter the date: U/27J001 third floor, Figure 15. Cellmaps of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd floors of Korpus 2 in the Vladimir Prison. The maps are drawn to illustrate only the relative position of each cell and the numbering system of cells used in this analysis. The cells are not drawn to scale and the space or corridor between each top and bottom row of cells on each floor was considerably wider than in the drawing. The actual dimensions of cells were approximately 8 ft. x 12 ft. and the corridor space between the upper and lower row of cells illustrated for each floor measured approximately 20 ft in width. The date is given in the window as mm/dd/yy. Makinen/KapJanf Final Report to Swedish-Russian Working Group Page 24 December 15,2000 3. Cells with the Longest Unoccupied Periods The data from the kartoteka provide proof that cells numbering up to 63 were in use in Korpus 2. Since the total number of cells according to the illustrated floor plan can accommodate only 57 cells at most (prior to construction of the second WC on the 3rd floor), this circumstance suggests that cells with numbers higher than 58 were located on the 4th floor of Korpus 2. While we have knowledge through the experience of Professor Makinen as a prisoner that a surgical operating room, medical clinic, dentist's chair and clinic, and medical X-ray, /. e., fluoroscopy, facilities were located on the 4th floor of Korpus 2, the data in Table 4 indicate that prisoner cells may have been located also on the 4th floor. This location would have provided a means for especially effective isolation of prisoners. Detailed comparison of the data for each cell in Table 4 indicates not only the time when the total number of cells was reduced from 57 to 56 but also that higher numbered cells were occasionally occupied by identifiable prisoners. In Table 4 it is seen that cell 2-57 has identifiable occupants from 03/12/51 to 08/05/57 and that the cell is unoccupied thereafter up to the end of 1972, from which point occupancy analysis is not continued further in this report. We, therefore, suggest by comparison to the data for cell 2-58 that the date 08/05/57 for cell 2-57 possibly corresponds to construction of the second WC on the 3rd floor, decreasing the total number of cells from 57 to 56, and that cell 2-58 was not located on the 3rd floor. The reason for assigning cell 2-58 to a different location is because it had identifiable occupants for two different periods, /. e., from 28/06/48 to 06/01/50 and from 11/06/70 to 09/07/70, which do not coincide with the period of uninterrupted zero occupancy of cell 2-57 from 08/05/57 to 31/12/72. The geographical distribution of cells and numbering system would require that these two cells be adjacent to each other if they were located on the 3rd floor. Because of the numbering order of cells, discontinuation of cell 2-57 would have had to be simultaneous with cell 2-58 if the two cells were adjacent. Although we have restricted our analysis in this report only to the 01/01/47 - 31/12/72 period, as explained in the Introduction, the complete database extracted from the registration cards extends beyond these limits in both directions. On this basis cells such as 2-60 and 2-62 are included in the database, although they are indicated as of zero occupancy over the entire 1947-1972 period, because identifiable prisoners were occupants of these cells before 1947. Thus, we can safely assume that cells with these numbers did exist. We see no basis to assume that the extensive periods of zero occupancy indicate that use of the cells was discontinued. We have observed from the database that clusters of cells on the 2nd and 3rd floors simultaneously acquire zero occupancy corresponding to the sharp fluctuations in prisoner population shown in Figures 12 and 14. Therefore, we believe that similar coordinated Table 4: Comparison of longest periods of zero occupancy of cells in Korpus 2. Cell Period of Time Number of days that cell was unoccupied 2-57 06/01/50-03/12/51 696 08/05/57-31/12/72 5716 2-58 31/12/46-28/06/48 545 06/01/50-11/06/70 7461 09/07/70-31/12/72 906 2-59 31/12/46-28/10/47 301 30/10/47-03/05/48 186 26/09/48-28/08/49 336 06/01/50-14/08/67 6429 02/09/67-31/12/72 1947 2-60 31/12/46-31/12/72 9497 2-61 31/12/46-28/08/49 971 06/01/50-31/12/72 8395 2-62 31/12/46-31/12/72 9497 2-63 31/12/46-19/08/49 962 28/12/49-31/12/72 8404 Makinen/Kaplan _ Final Report to Swedish-Russian Working Group Page 25 December 15, 2000 clusters of zero occupancy would be observed for cells 2-58 through 2-63 if use of two or more cells was discontinued through construction or other changes. We note that cell 2-59, presumably adjacent to or near cell 2-58, had occupants before 01/01/47, from 03/05/48 to 26/09/48, from 28/08/49 to 06/01/50, and from 14/8/67 to at least 02/09/67. Furthermore, both cells 2-61 and 2-63 had identifiable occupants for brief periods from 1947 to 1972 while cells 2-60 and 2-62 had none. The configuration of alternate cells with uninterrupted zero occupancy in between cells with occupants, a method well known to have been employed in Soviet prisons for isolation of prisoners, suggests that cells 2-59, 2-61, and 2-63 housed prisoners under strict isolation over extended periods of time. Since we have no information regarding the dimensions and locations of cells 2-58 through 2-63, other than that they were likely not accommodated within the first three floors of Korpus 2, it is possible that these cells were especially constructed for strict isolation of prisoners and may have provided special facilities that were not available to more ordinary prisoners. D. Analysis of the Occupancy of Cells in Korpus 2 I. Identifying the Earliest Sources of Information about Raoul Wallenberg Our analysis of cell occupancy data for Korpus 2 is necessarily guided by reports and evidentiary statements tht have been collected by Susan Mesinai and Susanne Berger in foreign intelligence archives such as that of the CIA and the National Archives in Washington, D. C., in the course of this investigation or have been assembled from the Wallenberg Files of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Stockholm. According to the Wallenberg Files, the earliest traces of discussions among prisoners about the presence of Raoul Wallenberg in the Vladimir Prison are attributable to two prisoners, Shulgin, Vitalii Vital]yevich (born 1878), a well known Russian writer and early revolutionary with Lenin, and Gogiberidze, Semyon Levanovich (born 1900), a Georgian nationalist kidnapped in Paris, France, and forcibly brought to the Soviet Union. We examine the chronological history of cellmates and cell neighbors of each to show the chain of rumors and information that may have passed from prisoner to prisoner beginning with Shulgin and Gogiberidze. In addition, we examine the circumstances surrounding the imprisonment of Henry Tomsen, alias Grossheim-Krisko, Hermann Heinrich (born 1907), in Korpus 2, who under the guise of a Norwegian national worked in the Swedish Legation in Budapest as a contemporary of Raoul Wallenberg, was arrested in Budapest in 1945, and incarcerated in the Vladimir Prison. We also examine, to the extent allowed by the database, whether other Swedish prisoners could have been mistaken for Raoul Wallenberg. a. Vitalii Vital'yevich Shulgin One report about Raoul Wallenberg having been brought to the the Vladimir Prison in the late 1940's centers on the prisoner Shulgin, Vitalii Vitalyevich (born 1878), which we have reviewed in part above. According to the statements of Hb'chli-Wihlman, Jakob-Otto (born 1921), a Swiss citizen, who shared a cell in Korpus 3 with other prisoners, Shulgin had stated that he had been transported to the Vladimir Prison with Raoul Wallenberg in July of 1947 and that both he and Wallenberg were placed into Korpus 2 because of poor health. Reportedly Shulgin had also stated that he had shared a cell in the Lubyanka Prison with Wallenberg and that Wallenberg died in Korpus 2 in 1948. Sanitzer, Johann (born 1904), with Austrian citizenship, trained in intelligence and investigative methods and arrested after the end of World War II, reported that in the early part of his imprisonment he had shared a cell in Korpus 3 with other prisoners during which time through a discussion he learned about Raoul Wallenberg having been brought to the Vladimir Prison. Sanitzer stated that he made efforts through communications with prisoners in other cells and in the walking courts to determine whether Wallenberg was being held specifically in Korpus 3 but could find no evidence for the presence of Wallenberg in Korpus 3. As described in the Introduction, the card of Shulgin shows that he entered the Vladimir Prison on 25/07/47, and he departed on 22/09/56. In contrast to many other prisoners, Shulgin was entirely confined to the Vladimir Prison for this period without having been relocated for short periods of time for further interrogations, etc. in Moscow. Except for an initial period of approximately two months in cell 3-75 in solitary confinement, he was transferred to cell 2-51 from 01/09/47 to 31/12/47 which he shared at different periods with Dil'man, Viktor Viktorovich (born 1907) and Kislitzin, Ivan Yakovlevich (born 1904). Hochli had also stated that Shulgin was in Korpus 2 at the time when he left the Vladimir Prison on 21/10/55. This also coincides with the card of Shulgin showing that he occupied cell 2-51 from 13/10/55 to 22/09/56. Thus, the data in Shulgin's card are in agreement with the report of Hochli. Makinen/Kaplan Final Report to Swedish-Russian Working Group Page 26 December 15, 2000 Examination of the list of cellmates of Shulgin showed that after Korpus 2 he shared cells with the following individuals (among others) for the first time: Cell 3-7 17/11/48-26/02/49 Shulgin 05/05/48 - 28/12/48 Bastamov, V. V (born 1906) 05/05/48 - 21/03/49 Paltzo, R. (born 1904) 05/05/48 - 21/03/49 Rehekampf, G. (born 1903) 17/11/48 - 26/02/49 Schellhorn, F. G. (born 1888) 31/01/49 - 15/07/49 Vogt, G. (born 1914) Cell 3-63 27/03/49-31/10/49 Shulgin 28/03/49 - 31/05/49 Pushkaryov, K. N. (born 1897) 28/03/49 - 31/10/49 Nakamura, K. (born 1890) Cell 3-39 12/09/50 -18/11/50 Shulgin 12/10/50 - 13/01/51 Starke, G. (born 1896) Cell 3-65 18/11/50 - 02/02/52 Shulgin 12/09/50 - 12/12/50 Gogiberidze, S. L. (born 1900) 03/01/51- 26/05/51 Sanitzer, J. (born 1904) 03/01/51 - 26/01/52 Pataridze, L. E. (born 1902) and Cell 3-65 22/03/52-17/06/52 Shulgin 24/11/50 - 17/06/52 Hinckeldey, H. (born 1914) 15/05/52 - 17/06/52 Kumish, W. (born 1915). When considering the earliest possible source of information about Raoul Wallenberg being imprisoned in the Vladimir Prison, it is necessary to examine whether cellmates of Shulgin may have had contact with Wallenberg or Vilmos Langfelder in Moscow before transfer to the Vladimir Prison. That is, we must also consider the possibility that Shulgin had received information about Raoul Wallenberg from prisoners who had been earlier in the Butirka or Lefortovo Prisons in Moscow. Of the largely foreign cellmates of Shulgin listed above, all were reported to have talked about Raoul Wallenberg to other prisoners in the Vladimir Prison. While Rehekampf had shared cells earlier with prisoners in the Lefortovo Prison who had had direct knocking contact with Raoul Wallenberg, he himself did not. Only Starke, who had been with Pelkonen, Eero Danillyevich (born 1922) earlier in the Butirka Prison in Moscow from January - April, 1946, after the latter had been a cellmate of Vilmos Langfelder; and Hinckeldey, who had had knocking contact with Raoul Wallenberg in the Lefortovo Prison in Moscow; had direct knowledge of the imprisonment of Raoul Wallenberg in the Soviet Union. Thus, one can conclude that there was adequate opportunity for discussions about Raoul Wallenberg through Shulgin before he shared cells with prisoners who earlier had had direct contact with Raoul Wallenberg himself or with Vilmos Langfelder. Later during his incarceration, Shulgin did share cells with several individuals who had had either direct or indirect knowledge about Raoul Wallenberg and Vilmos Langfelder from Moscow. Among these individuals were Josef-Manfred Bohm (born 1911), Fritz Hammerschmidt (born 1893), Erich Hansen (born 1889), Karl Spalke (bom 1891), Ernst Krenner (born 1895), Ernst Keitel (born 1915), and Lucien Gouaze (born 1913). However, these individuals are unlikely to have been the first source of information to Shulgin about Raoul Wallenberg because they shared cells with him much later. In particular, Gouaze who knew of Raoul Wallenberg in Budapest did not have direct contact with Shulgin until May-July of 1955. Moreover, while Sanitzer had had direct contact with Shulgin, Hochli had not. Analysis of the cellmates of Hochli shows the following: Cell 3-71 03/09/54 - 27/09/55 Hochli 31/12/53 - 27/09/55 Pataridze 03/04/54 - 11/05/55 Schellhorn and Cell 3-64 27/09/55-21/10/55 Hochli 27/09/55 - 28/10/55 Pataridze Makinen/Kaplan , Final Report to Swedish-Russian Working Group Page 27 December 15, 2000 Thus, although Hochli spent a relatively short period of time in the Vladimir Prison (03/09/54 - 21/10/55), all in Korpus 3, he had had direct contact with two prisoners who had previously shared cells with Shulgin. The period above during which Pataridze and Shulgin shared cell 3-65 with others is the only period during which they were cellmates. It is important to note from the list of Shulgin's cellmates above, that Semyon Levanovich Gogoberidze shared a cell with Shulgin as noted above. This was their only direct contact as cellmates. Several repatriated prisoners who had shared cells with Gogiberidze in the mid-1950s stated that he had earlier learned from a Russian prisoner that Raoul Wallenberg was being held in Korpus 2. Shulgin is consequently a possible source of this information to Gogiberidze. More will be discussed with respect to Gogiberidze below. It would be important to have further documentation about Shulgin's incarceration in the Lubyanka Prison because of the information that it might provide about Raoul Wallenberg. However, despite requests we have received essentially no information concerning conditions under which prisoners were kept in the Lubyanka Prison. Although Shulgin reportedly stated that Wallenberg had died in 1948, this may simply represent the limit of his knowledge in view of later sightings of Wallenberg that are discussed below. The three cells that became empty in Korpus 2 at the time of his arrival remained empty into 1948, but this is not compatible only with demise of a prisoner. It is also compatible with removal of the prisoner either to another cell or to another prison. b. Semyon Levanovich Gogiberidze Gogiberidze was a well known prisoner in Vladimir, having served two sentences there. There was consistently one description of him from other prisoners, and that was that he was a kind and good person. Invariably repatriated prisoners described him as a trustworthy person. Makinen himself remembers Gogiberidze, having met him once in the bath, and Kruminsh, Zigurds-Dzidris (born 1927), Makinen's second cellmate, spoke about him in kind terms. Since Gogiberidze figures prominently in evidentiary statements of a large number of former repatriated prisoners-of-war, due both to the nature of the man and the fact that he was imprisoned in Vladimir twice, it is important to establish the possible initial source of his knowledge of Raoul Wallenberg and to determine whether it came from Russian sources, or whether it was obtained through sharing cells with any of the foreigners who had acquired knowledge of Raoul Wallenberg in Moscow. The most detailed accounts about Gogiberidze's statements about a Swedish prisoner in Korpus 2 were given by Mulle, Horst Teodor (born 1917). He stated that at the time of Erlander's visit to the Soviet Union in 1956 Gogiberidze brought up the issue of Raoul Wallenberg after reading the article in Pravda about the visit. Not only was a joint Soviet-Swedish communique after Erlander's visit published on April 3, 1956, on the front page of Pravda that was read in full on Soviet radio, but there was also a full paragraph written about Raoul Wallenberg. It would have been hardly possible for prisoners not to know about this communique since copies of Pravda were disseminated to prisoners on a daily basis and passed by the guards from cell to cell (having checked that messages were not written onto the paper. The prison was well equipped outside with public address systems through which Radio Moscow programs were broadcast. Also, in Korpus 2, at least in Makinen's time and presumably in other korpuses, each cell was equipped with a small receiver for Radio Moscow and for political lectures and announcements from the prison administration. At about the time of the communique, the following prisoners shared cell 3-64 with Gogiberidze: Cell 3-64 12/03/56-03/08/56 Gogiberidze 12/03/56-03/08/56 Pataridze 28/03/56 - 03/08/56 Laube, K. (born 1923) 28/03/56 - 02/06/56 Mermelstein, I. (born 1921) 28/03/56 - 03/08/56 Mulle, H. T. 28/04/56 - 03/08/56 Spiess, J. (born 1920) 21/05/56 - 03/08/56 Bikovskii, T. K. (born 1928) 18/06/56 - 14/09/56 Vorobyov, Yu. G. (born 1920) 18/06/56 - 13/11/56 Kuznnetzov, A. S. (born 1936) 18/06/56 - 13/11/56 Plekhanov, V. G. (born 1930) 21/06/56 - 03/08/56 Briigger, E. (born 1903). Makinen/Kaplan ( Final Report to Swedish-Russian Working Group Page 28 December 15, 2000 The cell occupancy data thus fully confirm Mulle's account of sharing a cell with Gogiberidze at the time; he also stated to Swedish officials that they could confirm the account through Mermelstein, a Czech prisoner. We see that Mermelstein was also present. It could be argued that the subject of Raoul Wallenberg may have been raised by others in the cell at the time of the communique and that Mulle may have focused only on Gogiberidze. Certainly, Pataridze had had contact previously with Shulgin, and Briigger was also aware of who Raoul Wallenberg was. Although Briigger was not in cell 3-64 at the time of the communique, discussions may have arisen later in his presence. (More will be discussed with respect to Brugger later.) However, Mulle's report is supported by statements of Rehekampf, Gunther (bom 1903). Rehekampf shared cell 3-65, as noted below, and cell 3-75 for 6 months (31/12/53 - 16/06/55) with Gogiberidze earlier and had stated that Gogiberidze had talked to him in the early 1950s about Raoul Wallenberg being imprisoned in Vladimir. It is, furthermore, of interest to note that there are also reports in the Wallenberg Files in the Swedish Foreign Ministry that Gogiberidze caused such a commotion in the prison at the time of the communique because he knew that the Swedish prisoner Wallenberg was being held in Korpus 2 that he was sent to a punishment cell. In December, 1997, Professor Makinen and Susan Mesinai examined the personal dossier of Gogiberidze in the archives of the FSB in Moscow. Twenty-seven pages are absent from his personal dossier some of which correspond to this period. Both Mulle and Rehekampf reported to the Swedish Foreign Ministry that Gogiberidze had learned from a Russian prisoner about the presence of Raoul Walllenberg in Korpus 2 although they were both somewhat unclear about the time, either late 1940s or early 1950s. Moreover, Gogiberidze had once informed Mulle that a political officer had told him, "Den Wallenberg konnen Sie lange suchen," implying that he was well hidden in the prison. According to these accounts Gogiberidze acquired knowledge of Raoul Wallenberg's presence through some earlier source. While we cannot specify with certainty the precise source of this information, two Russian prisoners, in addition to Shulgin as noted earlier, are possible candidates according to their cell histories. Since Shulgin, as outlined earlier, reportedly stated that he was brought to Vladimir on the same transport with Raoul Wallenberg, it is quite conceivable that Kutepov, who entered the prison with Shulgin from the same transport, was likely to have also known about Raoul Wallenberg. It is thus of interest to note that Kutepov, shortly after his arrival, shared a cell for over a year with Gogiberidze. (Prior to Gogiberidze, Kutepov shared cells with several prisoners, none of which were foreign prisoners who had had wall tapping contact with Raoul Wallenberg or Vilmos Langenfelder in Moscow.) The cell occupancy data show (among others): Cell 3-43 17/12/47 - 22/03/49 Gogiberidze 26/07/47-23/03/49 Kutepov and later Cell 3-65 22/03/49-23/04/50 Gogiberidze 21/03/49 - 31/10/49 Rehekampf 21/03/49-31/10/49 Paltzo 23/03/49 - 31/10/49 Kursonov, B. N. (born 1899) 23/03/49 - 26/05/49 Kutepov 23/03/49-31/10/49 Hinckeldey 10/08/49 - 31/10/49 Hammerschmidt, F. (born 1893). Thus, if Kutepov was the original source of the information about Raoul Wallenberg, Rehekampf was ideally positioned to have learned about this since he shared cell 3-65 with both after Gogiberidze's and Kutepov's transfer from cell 3-43. In addition, it is important to note that Hinckeldey, who had had knocking contact with Raoul Wallenberg earlier in the Lefortovo Prison in Moscow, also occupied that cell with them. Any mention of a Swedish prisoner by Kutepov would have led immediately to a discussion because of Hinckeldey's experience. It is unlikely that Gogiberidze learned of Raoul Wallenberg while in Korpus 2. Gogiberidze's first time in Korpus 2 was in cell 2-44 (11/03/53 - 26/03/53) during which time the neighboring cells on each side were occupied by identifiable prisoners. For this period of two weeks, however, he has no identifiable cellmate. There is no indication from reports of others that Gogiberidze ever spoke about sharing a cell with Raoul Walllenberg. From the above list of prisoners in cell 3-65, there is, however, one additional possible source of information about a Swedish prisoner in Korpus 2, namely Kursonov, Boris Nikolaiyevich. During the first 11 weeks of his imprisonment in the Vladimir Prison (19/03/48 - 08/06/48), Kursonov was in solitary confinement in cell 2-7. The interesting aspect of this period of solitary confinement is that Kursonov was adjacent to cell 2-8, for which occupancy is not defined, that is, there are no listed occupants according to the kartoteka. Cell 2-8 is Makinen/Kaplan i Final Report to Swedish-Russian Working Group Page 29 December 15, 2000 calculated as "unoccupied" from 21/05/48 - 28/06/48, a period of 38 days. Since Raoul Wallenberg was known in the Lefortovo Prison as an "ardent knocker," knocking contact may have been established with Kursonov during this time. However, for a new prisoner initially in solitary confinement, as was Kursanov, it is also possible that he had not learned the system for wall tapping. Subsequently, Kursonov shared cells as follows prior to sharing cell 3-65 with Gogiberidze as listed above: Cell 3-39 29/06/48 - 23/03/49 Kursonov 14/09/48 - 01/02/49 Vorwerk, J. (born 1902) 14/09/48 - 01 /02/49 Hinckeldey 06/07/48 - 31/03/49 Berishvili, S. N. (born 1899) It would be expected that he would have learned more about the "Swedish prisoner" from Hinckeldey and Vorwerk, the latter having been in the Lefortovo Prison where he had learned about Raoul Wallenberg as a cellmate of Willi Rodel in that prison. c. Hermann Heinrich Grossheim-Krisko alias Henry Tomsen Grossheim-Krisko (born 1907), a Russian German from the region of Rostov-on-Don, had worked in the Swedish Legation in Budapest in the 1940s under the alias of Henry Tomsen with a Norwegian passport. He was a contemporary of Raoul Wallenberg, and was arrested in Budapest and brought to Moscow. His sentence was distinguished by the added document signed by Boris Soloyov, a senior interrogator in the 3rd Directorate of the MGB, that he was to be kept under strict isolation because "he had been associated with a very important prisoner." This document was found in his personal dossier by the Soviet-International Commission in 1990. (A similar document was found at that time also in the personal dossier of Richter, Gustav (born 1912), who had been Raoul Wallenberg's first cellmate in the Lubyanka Prison in Moscow, providing the basis to assume that the important prisoner in common between the two was Raoul Wallenberg.) Grossheim arrived at the Vladimir Prison on 16/02/52, spent one day in solitary in cell 3-56, and was then transferred to cell 2-19 which he occupied until 19/06/53 until he was repatriated. His only cellmate was Sokach, Janosh (born 1902), a Hungarian, who arrived directly in cell 2-19 on 21/04/52 and departed on 17/06/53. They had also been cellmates in Moscow. Since Grossheim had worked in the Swedish Legation in Budapest and was known to have communicated with other prisoners through wall tapping, we must explore the possibility that prisoners who had communicated with Grossheim may have later mistaken him for Raoul Wallenberg upon hearing other prisoners speak about Wallenberg as a Swedish prisoner or a prisoner who had worked in the Swedish Legation in Budapest. Since cell 2-18, a corner cell on one side of Grossheim and Sokach, was occupied over the 04/12/51 - 23/06/53 period by Klement, Tiber (born 1920), a Hungarian in solitary confinement as Prisoner No. 24 (c/, Table 3), wall tapping communications with Grossheim-Krisko that could have been transmitted further could have occurred only through cell 2-20 at the time. One such important communication was reported by Turin, Ivan-Karl Yakovlevich (born 1900) who shared cell 2-20 with Uibel, Adam (born 1917). Both had shared cell 3-52 (with others) prior to relocation to cell 2-20. The data in the kartoteka show: Cell 2-19 17/03/52 - 19/06/53 Grossheim 21/04/52-17/06/53 Sokach Cell 2-20 07/03/53 - 20/03/53 Turin 07/03/53-20/03/53 Uibel Cell 2-21 04/12/51 - 27/07/54 Krafft, Ernst (born 1885) 21/04/52 - 06/04/54 Stahel, Reiner (born 1892) Turin's report states that he and Uibel were returned to Korpus 3 when the guard caught them having wall tapping communication with cell 2-19. Turin also reported that through the wall tapping he learned that the prisoner in 2-19 was Henry Tomsen (Grossheim-Krisko revealed to his Soviet interrogators only later that the name Tomsen was an alias) and that he stated that he had worked in the Swedish Legation in Budapest. Since Turin stated clearly that he had learned that the prisoner's name was Tomsen, we must assume that he reported the same information to his cellmates later when they were transferred back to Korpus 3. The kartoteka shows that they shared cell 3-63 upon their return from cell 2-20 with the following: Makinen/Kaplan f Final Report to Swedish-Russian Working Group Page 30 December 15, 2000 Cell 3-63 20/03/53 - 02/04/53 Turin 20/03/53 -14/09/53 Uibel 18/06/52 - 01/12/53 Supprian, Karl (born 1902) 15/09/52 - 02/12/53 Adelman, Rudiger (born 1893) 15/09/52 - 15/05/53 Osmak, Kirill Ivanovich (born 1890) 17/09/52-07/12/53 Sanitzer 19/01/53 - 11/05/53 von Hanstein, Wolfram (born 1899) 15/09/52 - 19/06/53 Hellmundt, Gustav (born 1907) 15/09/52 - 01/12/53 Kernes, J. Ya. (bom 1890) Of these prisoners, Sanitzer had earlier shared a cell in Vladimir with Shulgin and Pataridze, as discussed above, and Supprian had had frequent wall tapping communications earlier with Willi Rodel and Raoul Wallenberg in the Lefortovo Prison in Moscow. We must assume that Turin and Uibel spoke specifically about Tomsen although it is quite probable that Raoul Wallenberg was also discussed in cell 3-63. From the report of Turin we must also assume that Grossheim gave his name as Tomsen clearly to others although he is likely to have added that he worked at the Swedish Legation in Budapest. While not an early witness about Raoul Wallenberg in Vladimir, the report of Schoggl, Otto (born 1917), an Austrian, is nonetheless puzzling since he stated that he had been placed by accident in the cell of a Swede in Korpus 3 who was very ill and that the guard removed him the next day when they realized the mistake. Schoggl stated that he was placed into this cell after surgical treatment. It is difficult to evaluate this report since we have no information about the extent of medical facilities in Korpus 3, and analysis of cell occupancy of Korpus 3 through this database is limited. While there are many contradictions in Schoggl's statements, it is of some interest to point out that he was once placed into the cell adjacent to Grossheim, but that these conditions are not to be confused with his report of a 'Swede'. According to the cell occupancy data on his registration card, this was the only cell in Korpus 2 that he occupied during his incarceration in Vladimir. We point out simply that this situation could not have corresponded to Schoggl's statements. The data show: Cell 2-20 31/01/53-06/03/53 Schoggl 11/02/53 - 27/02/53 Wolfin, I. M. (born 1913) overlapping entirely with Grossheim and Sokach in cell 2-19 and Krafft and Stahel in 2-21. From the kartoteka data Schoggl was without a cellmate 31/01/53 - 11/02/53 and from27/02/5 3 - 06/03/53. Grossheim reported that he was never ill in Vladimir. Wolfin was an instructor of the Swedish language in the GRU, had worked in the Soviet Embassy in Stockholm in 1944-1945, and also spoke fluent German. Although we have no information about the health of Wolfin at this time, the length of time together with Schoggl does not agree with Schoggl's statement about the 'Swede'. Since Schoggl had stated that he had had surgery in Vladimir, medical records in Moscow could be checked to confirm this about him, providing more credence to his accounts. It may have occurred that the surgery that Schoggl had was very minor and did not require post-operative care in Korpus 2. In conclusion we have no reason to believe that the presence of Grossheim in Korpus 2 led to false rumors about Raoul Wallenberg. Firstly, at least according to the report of Turin, Grossheim communicated his name to others as Tomsen, and secondly, as already discussed above, several prisoners such as Hinckeldey had had contact with Raoul Wallenberg or Vilmos Langfelder in Moscow and had been in the Vladimir Prison since the late 1940s, prior to Grossheim's arrival. Thus, the strength of the reports that Gogiberidze had knowledge of Raoul Wallenberg's presence in Korpus 2 through a Russian prisoner from the late 1940s, his early association with Kutepov and Shulgin, and the general confirmation of cell occupants and conditions through the data in the kartoteka argue more directly for Raoul Wallenberg's presence in Korpus 2 at that time. d. Swedish Speaking Prisoners We have only very limited information about other Swedish speaking prisoners known to have been incarcerated in Vladimir because the Swedish Foreign Ministry has never released full information about all Swedish citizens who have been imprisoned in the Soviet Union. Also, we must conclude that information in the kartoteka is absent on some Swedish citizens although through reports we know them to have been in the Vladimir Prison. Makinen/Kapknn t Final Report to Swedish-Russian Working Group Page 31 December 15, 2000 According to the Wallenberg Files in the Swedish Foreign Ministry, Ludwig Hunoldt, who had been imprisoned in Vladimir from December, 1948, to August, 1953, reported that he had met a Swedish prisoner by name of Eriksson in cell 2-57 of Korpus 2 in June, 1950. Eriksson had been arrested in 1944. We did not find cards for Hunoldt or Eriksson during scanning of cards for the present database or during photography of cards in 1990. Viktor de Latry, a Swiss journalist, is reported to have stated according to the Wallenberg Files that he had had knocking contact with Karl-Moritz Leuvenhaupt in the Lefortovo Prison in 1948. While de Latry clearly stated that he did not believe that Leuvenhaupt had been sent to Vladimir, it had been reported to the Swedish Foreign Ministry that there had been three Swiss prisoners and one Swedish prisoner, namely Leuvenhaupt in Korpus 3. de Latry was in the Vladimir Prison from 04/12/52 to 19/08/55 but had not heard of Leuvenhaupt there. There is no information either in the present database or in the cards photographed in 1990 about Leuvenhaupt. Susan Mesinai has requested to examine the personal dossier of Leuvenhaupt but it has not been produced. Nietz, Harald-Kurt (born 1926), who had previously lived in Sweden, was imprisoned in the Vladimir Prison as an 'American spy' from 28/07/52 - 10/10/55. While Nietz spoke Swedish fluently, we believe that it is unlikely that he would have been confused with a Swedish prisoner held in Korpus 2. Nietz occupied cells only in Korpus 3 during his imprisonment in the Vladimir Prison. 2. Testing the Consistency of Sightings ofRaoul Wallenberg in the Vladimir Prison a. Berger, Leizer Niselyevich (born 1922) reported that he was in cell 1-29 when the prisoner Vorobyov-Vorobei, Vasilii Feodorovich (born 1910-1913) was brought to that cell into the Vladimir Prison from Novgorod for the first time. Vorobyov was subsequently transferred to Korpus 2. Later Berger was in cell 1-76 with Vorobyov, from whom he then learned about the Swedish diplomat-prisoner Wallenberg being held in Korpus 2. In particular, Berger stated that the Swedish prisoner had been in cell 2-53 with a former "Stalin general" Gorgibereshvilii and that he himself was later in that same cell. Examination of the registration card of Vorobyov indicates that his arrival to the Vladimir Prison was indeed from Novgorod (more will be stated about Vorobyov later) and that he was first placed into cell 1-29 in which was Berger. At a later time the cards show that they were brought together into cell 1-76, fully confirming the cell locations stated by Berger. Cell 1-29 15/03/60-15/09/60 Berger Cell 1 -29 15/03/60 - 02/04/60 Vorobyov-Vorobei Cell 1 -76 15/09/60 - 14/12/60 Berger Cell 1-76 23/08/60-14/12/60 Vorobyov-Vorobei Berger himself was never in cell 2-53, but his registration card does show that he was placed into cell 2-51 for the 18/06/64 - 20/07/64 period. This cell is in the immediate vicinity of cell 2-53 in Korpus 2, and the numbers could have been easily misremembered by Berger through the interval of time between Berger's occupancy of cell 2-51 and his report given after his release from prison during immigration to Israel in 1980. It is of interest to point out that, before Vorobyov-Vorobei was reunited with Berger in 1-76, he was in the following cells: Cell 1-74 02/04/60-18/04/60 Vorobyov-Vorobei Cell 1-74 30/07/59 - 02/08/60 Mamulov, Stepan Solomonovich (bom 1905) Cell 2-52 18/04/60 - 30/05/60 Vorobyov-Vorobei Cell 2-52 31/03/60 - 20/05/60 Shkor, Vladimir Mikhailovich (born 1936) Cell 1-74 30/05/60 - 09/06/60 Vorobyov-Vorobei (still overlapping with the presence of Mamulov); Cell 1 -57 09/06/60 - 06/07/60 Vorobyov-Vorobei (with other prisoners) Makinen/Kapl.an , Final Report to Swedish-Russian Working Group Page 32 December 15, 2000 Cell 2-19 06/07/60 - 23/08/60 Vorobyov-Vorobei Cell 2-19 23/03/60 - 13/09/60 Plazinskii, Vasilii Matveyevich (bom 1921) The above listing of cells and partial listing of cellmates of Vorobyov-Vorobei between the two occasions during which he shared cells with Berger shows that he had ample opportunity in Korpus 2 to learn about foreign prisoners in general and about Raoul Wallenberg in particular. Of particular interest is that he shared a cell on two occasions with Mamulov, who is discussed below. Also, he was in the immediate vicinity of cell 2-49 at the time of the death of Osmak on 16/05/60, an event that was related by Larina as corresponding to the time that a foreign, non-German prisoner, answering to the description of Raoul Wallenberg, was held in solitary confinement on the 3rd floor of Korpus 2. More on this will be described later. There is no prisoner registration card with the family name of Gorgibereshvili that we have been able to find. However, there is a prisoner with the name of Bereshvili, Shalva Nestorovich (born 1899), who entered the Vladimir Prison in 1944 and had the marking of'Menshevik' on his card. His departure date from the Vladimir Prison was 23/05/60, and the card showed that he was in cell 2-49 at the time of Osmak's death on May 16, 1960. Bereshvili had a 25-year sentence and was released prior to having served the entire sentence. We have examined the history of the cellmates of Bereshvili and found that he was 'alone' in cells 2-50 (11/08/54 - 27/09/54) and 2-52 (27/09/54 - 30/12/54). While it can be argued that this may simply be a period in which Bereshvili was "in solitary confinement," examination of the rest of his prisoner-cellmate record shows no other period of detention 'in solitary.' At this point during his incarceration, a period of 4-5 months of solitary confinement would constitute unusual punishment, but if this were the case, the circumstances would be readily verified from inspection of his personal file. It is of interest to note that Bereshvili was 'in solitary' in cells 2-50 and 2-52 in the immediate vicinity of cell 2-53 mentioned by Berger. Furthermore, cell 2-52 is of special interest because it is located in Korpus 2 on the third floor adjacent to the stairwell. It is, therefore, particularly well adapted for isolation of a prisoner because lengthy communication by wall tapping is not possible through the side facing the stairwell, leaving only the other wall to be controlled. As noted in Table 3 for numbered prisoners, Prisoner No. 3 was a Georgian. We have no information about his identity or period of incarceration in the Vladimir Prison. This individual in principle may have been the "Georgian general" rumored to have been Raoul Wallenberg's cellmate. We believe through research carried out by Nikita Petrov, a senior staff member of Memorial Society in Moscow, that this Georgian may have been S. A. Goglidze, an associate of Levrantii Beria's. We have at present no further data to examine this situation further but request access to the file and identity of Prisoner No. 3 and the file of Goglidze. As part of the research carried out for the Working Group, Susan Mesinai has requested to study the personal files of over 100 prisoners of relevance to the case of Raoul Wallenberg, and Professor Makinen has studied with her approximately 30 of these files in the archives of the FSB and MVD. We requested on the basis of these findings that the personal dossier of Bereshvili be added to this list for detailed study and examination by Mesinai and Makinen but have received no definite reply. Because of the importance of these individuals to the case of Raoul Wallenberg, we also add to the request the files of Mamulov and Leizer Berger. b. The Swiss prisoner Emil Briigger, who has been mentioned above, made several statements about Raoul Wallenberg after his return from the Soviet Union. On November 3,1958, he was interviewed in Bern, Switzerland, by Leif Leifland. In this interview Briigger stated that in the end of July, 1954, he was brought to Korpus 2 for about 7-10 days during which he was in a cell on the first floor with Field Marshall Ewald von Kleist (born 1881). The prisoner in the neighboring cell began to knock, and after several days Briigger finally answered him. According to Brugger he received the reply: "My name is Wallenberg. I was first secretary in the Swedish Legation in Budapest. When you are released, I ask you to contact the Swedish consulate and tell them that I am here." Later the prisoner knocked to state that he was alone in the cell. Brugger further stated that, when he spoke about his knocking contact with Raoul Wallenberg upon his return to Korpus 3, two other prisoners Uibel and Turin informed him that they had been in Korpus 2 in 1953 and had had knocking contact with Raoul Wallenberg. Makinen/Kaplan ( Final Report to Swedish-Russian Working Group Page 33 December 15, 2000 We first examine the possibility that Briigger shared a cell in Korpus 2 with von Kleist at the end of July, 1954. At that time, von Kleist was indeed in Korpus 2. The data from the kartoteka show: Cell 2-37 18/03/54 - 24/06/54 von Kleist 18/03/54 - 29/03/54 Voss, H. (born 1897) Cell 2-21 24/06/54 -15/10/54 von Kleist 04/12/51 - 27/07/54 Kraffl, E. (born 1885) 16/07/54 - 29/01 /54 Vasiliyev, V. M. (born 1891) Neither of these cells is located on the 1st floor of Korpus 2. While von Kleist is apparently the only occupant of cell 2-37 over the 29/03/54 - 24/06/54 period after the departure of Voss, the data show that the neighboring cell 2- 36 was occupied by Kalinskii, Abram Mendeleyevich. (born 1912). While we have no information whether Kalinskii shared cell 2-36 with a prisoner at that time whose records have been removed from the Spetzchast', there is no entry in Snigger's card indicating transfer to a cell in Korpus 2 at this time. In cell 2-21, Krafft died on 27/07/54, leaving Vasiliyev as von Kleist's cellmate. To believe Brugger, we must assume that the entry for Briigger into one of these two cells with von Kleist is by some unusual mistake absent on the registration card. While such an error in principle could have occurred, we must consider it highly unlikely in view of the detailed entries made for other prisoners upon transfer to new cell locations. We must, therefore, conclude that the data in the kartoteka do not support Brtigger's story. However, we analyze this situation in more detail below because von Kleist died on 15/10/54 and, we wish to ascertain how Brugger might have learned of von Kleist's death. We also try to ascertain through what route Brugger learned of Raoul Wallenberg in the Vladimir Prison. Brugger arrived at the Vladimir Prison via INTA and Verchne Uralsk. According to reports of the Finnish Security Police, Brugger had stated to Bastamov, a Finnish prisoner, that he had learned in Verchne Uralsk that Raoul Wallenberg had been imprisoned there. Upon arrival in Vladimir he was brought to cell 3-20 on 22/05/54. Among the prisoners in that cell were: Cell 3-20 22/05/54-23/12/54 Briigger 20/05/54-23/12/54 Paltzo 20/05/54 - 23/12/54 Rattenhuber, J. (born 1897) 20/05/54-23/12/54 Uibel 20/05/54 - 23/12/54 Hinckeldey 22/06/54 - 23/12/54 Janczi, Heinz (bom 1916). Brugger was then transferred to cell 3-15 with most of these same prisoners, including Uibel and Hinckeldey, which he shared with them 23/12/54 - 30/12/54. At no point during his incarceration in Vladimir did Brugger ever share a cell with Turin. According to his registration card, Brugger occupied a cell in Korpus 2 for the first time in 1956. None of the cells which he occupied in Korpus 2 were on the first floor, and his cellmates in Korpus 2 according to the kartoteka are as listed below. Furthermore, at the time Brugger first entered a cell in Korpus 2, Field Marshall von Kleist had already died (15/10/54). The cell occupancy data show: Cell 2-47 18/05/56-21/06/56 Brugger 27/10/55 - 15/06/56 Sato, Yasumu (born 1908) 09/05/56 - 21/09/56 Vasiliyev, S. G. (born 1895) Cell 2-36 16/10/56-17/10/56 Brugger 16/10/56 - 17/10/56 Gouaze, Lucien (bom 1913) Cell 2-23 17/10/56-04/12/56 Brugger 17/10/56-04/12/56 Gouaze Cell 2-23 18/03/58 - 23/07/58 Brugger 18/03/58 - 23/07/58 Berishvili After cell 2-23 Brugger spent approximately 2 weeks in cell 4-25 with Bereshvili, Osmak, and Lazarchuk, B. N. (born 1921) and was released for repatriation on 05/08/58. While we shall comment on the peculiar circumstances surrounding the transfer of Brugger and Gouze from cell 2-36 to cell 2-23 while discussing the prisoner Kruminsh Makirjen/Kaplan _ Final Report to Swedish-Russian Working Group Page 34 December 15, 2000 later, we must conclude that Brugger fabricated the story about sharing a cell with von Kleist on the first floor of Korpus 2. Brugger shared cells with several individuals who knew about Raoul Wallenberg. We noted above that he shared cell 3-64 with Gogiberidze, Pataridze, and Mulle, and he also shared cells with Bastamov, and Kalinskii, all of whom had knowledge about Raoul Wallenberg and had stated to others that Wallenberg was in Korpus 2. We also note that Paltzo and Hinckeldey had earlier shared a cell with Shulgin prior to sharing cell 3-20 with Brugger. We can only surmise, therefore, that through these encounters with other prisoners Brugger was himself firmly convinced that Wallenberg was in the Vladimir Prison although he himself may not have had direct contact with him. We believe that he, therefore, decided to fabricate an account to add to the stories of Wallenberg's presence in Korpus 2 and to include himself as participating in the drama. It is probable that Brugger had learned in prison of von Kleist's death and invoked him as a cellmate since the story could not then be checked through von Kleist. There are several possible routes through which Brugger could have learned of von Kleist's death. For instance, the following occupants were in cells adjacent to von Kleist at the time of his death: Cell 2-20 17/10/53 - 30/10/58 Goldstein, I. J. (born 1892) 02/10/54 - 16/11/54 Butin, I. F. (born 1930) Cell 2-21 04/12/51-27/07/54 Krafft 24/06/54 - 15/10/54 von Kleist 16/07/54 - 29/01/55 Vasiliyev, V. M. (born 1891) Cell 2-22 07/04/54 - 21/07/55 Bonizhevskaya, V. F. (born 1907) 07/04/54 - 03/05/55 Pavulin'sh, A.-L. Ya. (bom 1915) As stated earlier, admiral Krafft died on 27/07/54, leaving Vasiliyev as von Kleist's cellmate. After von Kleist's death, the occupants were: Cell 2-21 16/07/54-29/01/55 Vasiliyev 18/12/54 - 23/02/55 Chernev, A. V. (born 1887) 07/02/55 - 23/02/55 Tomashevskii, A. M. (born 1921) Vasiliyev was released approximately 6 months before the end of his sentence on 29/01/55 to the Vladimir hospital because of health, leaving Tomashevskii as the cellmate of Chernev. While we find no link through Chernev or Tomashevskii to Brugger, we note that Goldstein had as cellmates Bikovskii, T. K. (born 1928), 10/04/56 - 21/05/56, and Kalinskii, 08/10/57 - 04/03/58, in cell 2-20. After Goldstein, each prisoner shared cells with Brugger. We noted earlier that Bikovskii shared cell 3-64 with Gogiberidze, Mulle, and Brugger. This was just prior to sharing cell 2-20 with Goldstein; he was then placed back into cell 3-64 on 21/05/56 with Gogiberidze, Mulle, Brugger, et al., giving ample opportunity to give the information about von Kleist's death. Other routes of information about von Kleist's death may have also occurred. We later point out that Goldstein was a cellmate also of Wolfin's, who is closely associated with the case of Raoul Wallenberg. Because of the evidence that Susan Mesinai has obtained that he was considered as a special prisoner and held in strict isolation, Goldstein's file and documents should be examined further. c. Marvin W. Makinen reported to the Swedish Foreign Ministry in 1963 and 1964 that he had learned about a Swedish prisoner in the Vladimir Prison from three different sources: The first was from his first cellmate Mukha, Mikhail Aleksandrovich (born 1935), who had simply stated that he had heard about a Swedish prisoner in Vladimir but knew no further details. The second source of information came from Makinen's second cellmate Kruminsh, Zigurds- Dziedris Ernestovich (born 1927), who had been the cellmate of Francis Gary Powers. Kruminsh, when asked by Makinen whether he had heard of a Swedish prisoner in Vladimir, stated that he had earlier met a Swedish prisoner while he worked in Korpus 2 as a prisoner-trustee (in Russian the appropiate term would be bezkonvoinik) performing tasks such as washing windows and floors, cleaning cells, etc. during an earlier period of his imprisonment. (In an interview in December of 1993 with Dr. Butova, Elena Nikolaevna, retired chief physician of the Vladimir Prison, she categorically denied that it would have been possible for Makinen/Kaplan _ Final Report to Swedish-Russian Working Group Page 35 December 15, 2000 Kruminsh, as a political prisoner, to have worked in Korpus 2 as a prisoner-trustee. In the experience of Makinen in Korpus 2 over the 1961-63 period, the prisoner-trustees working in Korpus 2 were not political prisoners.) Kruminsh spoke rather reluctantly about the Swedish prisoner and volunteered the information only because Makinen had presented questions about this prisoner on several occasions, because to him the circumstance of a prisoner from a neutral country seemed highly unusual. When asked what was the Swedish prisoner charged with, Kruminsh replied only that he did not know exactly but that it seemed to have involved intelligence work. Kruminsh, in an uncharacteristic moment with a slightly sneering tone, then added that the person seemed very certain that when he returned home he would be well rewarded and acknowledged for his work. Kruminsh denied having been a cellmate with the Swedish prisoner and stated that he did not know the prisoner's name. The third source of information about a Swedish prisoner in Vladimir came from the same Vorobyov-Vorobei described above with respect to Leizer Berger. This occurred shortly after Makinen's arrival in August of 1963 in labor camp (Pyatii Lagpunkt, village of Leplei, Mordvanian Autonomous Republic). Vorobyov-Vorobei (who had already stated that he had been previously transferred from Vladimir to the labor camp), inquired who had been Makinen's cellmates. Upon hearing the name of Kruminsh, he responded immediately, "That son-of-a-bitch. He sat with all of the foreign prisoners. He sat with Powers, he sat with you Marvin, and he sat with the Swedish prisoner 'Van den Berg.' " It is of interest to note in confirmation of Makinen's statements that Leiser Berger during his travel from the Soviet Union to Israel in 1980 stated in the Swedish Embassy in Athens, Greece, that of the 5 persons known to have met Raoul Wallenberg in the Vladimir Prison, Kruminsh was one. "He sat with all the well known prisoners." Berger considered Kruminsh to be a "provocateur. " The history of Vorobyov-Vorobei in the Vladimir Prison has been already described above, documenting that he had ample opportunity to learn about a Swedish prisoner in Korpus 2. He had also stated to Makinen that Kruminsh had a well known reputation among prisoners in Vladimir for having been a cellmate with several foreign prisoners, adding that these arrangements were made only if the Soviet prisoner is trusted by the authorities and is working for them as an informant. To Makinen, the statement by Mukha always seemed rather curious because Mukha stated that he had been imprisoned only in Korpus 1 prior to having been brought to cell 2-33, which he shared with Makinen for about two months beginning 15/01/62, and he seemed very vague about the source of his information about a Swedish prisoner. Inspection of the complete list of cellmates of Mukha from the database shows that he shared a cell with Mamulov prior to Makinen: Cell 2-18 13/10/60 - 19/10/60 Mukha, Mikhail Aleksandrovich Cell 2-18 05/10/60-14/12/60 Mamulov, Stepan Solomonovich While the emphasis in this section is on Kruminsh, we shall see below that the period during which Mamulov may have shared cells with Wallenberg would have occurred prior to sharing a cell with Mukha. While Mukha had mentioned the 'Beria people1 to Makinen (at that time he stated that two were in the adjacent cell 2-32), he never volunteered that he had himself shared a cell with one of them. The source of information by Mukha about a Swedish prisoner may have been Mamulov. The history of cellmates of Kruminsh extracted from the database requires considerable discussion because of details that are now revealed, showing that he had to have been trusted by the KGB and prison authorities to be placed with important or special prisoners. In support of this assertion, it must be remembered that Kruminsh was pardoned by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet after having served only one-half of his sentence despite his background as an armed partisan and radio operator in Latvia communicating information to British intelligence units in London. (Kruminsh's sentence, 15 years of loss of freedom to be carried out entirely in prison, constitutes a harsh form of punishment in comparison with confinement to labor camp which was viewed as a less severe form of punishment.) In view of this background, a pardon could have been provided only with complete support from the local prison and KGB authorities of the Vladimir Oblast'. Kruminsh was the only cellmate of Francis Gary Powers in cell 2-31 from 09/09/60 to 08/02/62, without doubt the most publicized case in both the Western and Soviet press of an intelligence agent having been incarcerated in the Soviet Union. Colonel Shevchenko, at that time head of the KGB of the Vladimir Oblast, Makinen/Kaplan _ Final Report to Swedish-Russian Working Group Page 36 December 15, 2000 emphasized in a telephone interview with Makinen during one of the several trips taken to the Vladimir Prison over the 1993-1997 period that Powers had always commented positively and had praised the Soviet authorities for how he had been treated during his imprisonment. (Shevchenko, however, claimed that he could not remember the name of Powers' cellmate in the Vladimir Prison, nor would he admit that he remembered Makinen's name.) Moreover, the record of Kruminsh in the Vladimir Prison shows that he was the cellmate of Mairanovsky, Grigorii Moiseyevich (born 1899), who had acquired a notorious reputation for having been director of a laboratory developing and testing toxins and poisonous substances for SMERSH and the MGB to be used in counter- intelligence work. Kruminsh shared cells with Mairanovsky for close to 10 months: Cell 2-52 31/10/57-05/07/58 Kruminsh Cell 2-52 05/08/57 - 05/07/58 Mairanovsky Cell 2-29 05/07/58 -15/08/58 Kruminsh Cell 2-29 05/07/58 - 06/08/58 Mairanovsky (The location of cell 2-52 adjacent to a stairwell on the third floor of Korpus 2, limiting communications through wall-tapping with other prisoners, has already been described above with respect to Bereshvili. Cell 2-29 was a corner cell on the second floor, similarly ensuring limited access for communication with other prisoners.) While Kruminsh never mentioned the name of Mairanovsky to Makinen nor gave any indication of the nature of the charges against him, Kruminsh did state that he had earlier shared a cell "with a Jewish professor." In these discussions Kruminsh's strong anti-Semitic feelings readily came to the surface. He could not talk about Jewish people without using the word zhid, a course, derogatory term; he stated that this Jewish professor was like all the rest of them, "too lazy to ever do an honest-day's work"; and he stated that he never met a Jew who could be trusted. Since there is no other Jewish prisoner evident in the listing of Kruminsh's cellmates extracted from the database, Kruminsh's comments must have been made with Mairanovsky in mind. Moreover, Mairanovsky did have an academic appointment as director of a pharmacology laboratory. Analysis of the history of cellmates and imprisonment of Kruminsh extracted from the database reveal the following cells and periods during which he was in solitary or 'apparent solitary1 confinement: Cell 2-17 06/05/56 - 22/09/56 (coincides with Kruminsh's arrival to Vladimir) Cell 2-37 22/09/56 - 28/01/57 Cell 1-52 28/01/57-17/04/57 Cell 2-16 17/04/57 - 03/07/57 Since these total to somewhat more than a year in solitary confinement which would have constituted an extremely severe form of punishment, it is unlikely that Kruminsh was in true solitary confinement during this entire period, particularly because of statements made to Makinen while they shared cell 2-31 from 30/03/62 to 28/01/63. Except for the first cell listed above, there are in addition unusual details revealed about the adjacent cells through analysis of the cell occupancy data. Each is described in turn. The first period in cell 2-17 most likely constitutes true solitary confinement. Not only does this period coincide with the first cell that Kruminsh entered after his arrival to Vladimir, Kruminsh did state to Makinen that he had been in solitary for an initial period after his arrival. He did state, however, that after that initial period he had not been subjected to lengthy solitary confinement again. There is a curious development in the relocation of prisoners associated with Kruminsh's occupancy of cell 2-37. Cell 2-37 was located on the second floor between the WC and cell 2-36. The location adjacent to the WC restricts lengthy communication by wall-tapping because prisoners are in the WC for only short periods of time in the morning or evening and are then under more vigilant surveillance by the guard to prevent efforts to conceal packets of tobacco (makhorka) or written notes in the water reservoir of the toilet. (This was an old-fashioned flush toilet system that operated via a chain.) When Kruminsh was relocated to cell 2-37, the adjacent cell 2-36 was occupied by two prisoners Epifantsev, A. E. (born 1918) and Titov, N. A. (born 1926). They continued in cell 2-36 until 16/10/56 when they were replaced by Emil Brugger and Lucien Gouaze, as noted earlier in the discussion of Brugger. On the next day 17/10/56 both Brugger and Gouaze were relocated to cell 2-23 on the opposite side of the second floor. Subsequently Mairanovsky was relocated into cell 2-36 for the period 31/10/56 - 06/12/56. Makinen/Kaplan , Final Report to Swedish-Russian Working Group Page 37 December 15,2000 One of the reasons that this shift of prisoners is curious is that when Briigger and Gouaze were relocated on 16/10/56 from a cell on the third floor of Korpus 2 to cell 2-36, cell 2-23 was already 'empty' according to cell occupancy data for 2 days, and their relocation into cell 2-23 could have been made directly without spending a 24- hour period in cell 2-36. We have described the sources of information that Briigger had about Raoul Wallenberg. Gouaze hi his intelligence work against Nazi forces in Hungary was also aware of the name of Raoul Wallenberg. If Raoul Wallenberg was in cell 2-37 at that time with Kruminsh, the abrupt relocation of Brugger and Gouaze to a cell on the opposite side of the building most probably occurred because prison authorities realized their error in placing two Westerners with knowledge about Wallenberg into an adjacent cell. Placing Mairanovsky into cell 2-36 would have helped to ensure isolation of the occupants of cell 2-37 since it is unlikely that Mairanovsky would have attempted to generate contacts with other prisoners. (At this point there is no evidence for any further connection between Mairanovsky and Kruminsh since they shared cells 2-52 and 2-29 only afterwards beginning in the latter part of 1957.) It appears that the relocation of Kruminsh to Korpus 1 was made probably for purposes of reconstruction in Korpus 2. Although we have not had time to carry out a systematic study of other prisoner cell histories, we observed through the cell history of Menshagin that he also occupied a cell in Korpus 1 precisely over the same period as Kruminsh. (Menshagin, as the former mayor of Smolensk, had become an unwitting witness to the Katyn Forest Massacre and had spent nearly all of the first 7 years of his imprisonment in Vladimir in solitary confinement.) However, the relocation of Kruminsh to cell 1-52 in apparent solitary confinement is curious because of statements Kruminsh made to Makinen. Kruminsh did admit to Makinen, in response to a question about whether he had been in Korpus 1, that he had been there earlier but only for a short period of time. However, his answer was given reluctantly and with the vaguest of details, but nonetheless stating that he had not been in solitary confinement at that time. He offered no details about his cellmates in Korpus 1 despite inquiries by Makinen. According to Mukha, who had spent considerable time in Korpus 1, the cells were larger than those in Korpus 2 and were designed for up to 5-6 cellmates at a time. Kruminsh's statements were given with the impression that there was nothing atypical about his relocation to Korpus 1 and that he had the usual set of cellmates as other prisoners normally had in Korpus 1. We have no information on the location of cells in Korpus 1 to specify which cells were located in corners of the building or adjacent to toilets, stairwells, etc., restricting wall-tapping and other forms of communication. Also, since the prime criterion for selection of registration cards was that the prisoner spent some time in Korpus 2 during incarceration in the Vladimir Prison, the statistical basis for comparisons of prisoner traffic and changes in cell occupancy may not be as extensive as for Korpus 2. Nonetheless, it is still valid to draw conclusions on comparisons of cell changes, etc. within the subset of data that apply to Korpus 1, and this analysis of Kruminsh's relocation to Korpus 1 is made on this basis. Examination of the occupants of cells 1-51 and 1-53, which we assume are located on opposite sides of cell 1-52, shows the following: Cell 1-51 28/01/57-17/04/57 Gensiruk, Pyotr Filimonovich (born 1934) 25/01/57 - 03/07/57 Perikol'ski, Fedor Ivanovich (born 1917) Cell 1-52 28/01/57-17/04/57 Kruminsh Cell 1-53 28/01/57 - 17/04/57 Petrusenko, Varvara Savel'yevna (born 1905) Since cells in Korpus 1 in general contained at least several prisoners and inspection of the prisoner traffic into and out of these cells showed it to be considerably heavier prior to and after Kruminsh's relocation into Korpus 1, the restricted flow of prisoners in what may be adjacent cells to 1-52 is unusual. There is another aspect to the transfer of Kruminsh to Korpus 1 that may be relevant. The period of Kruminsh's relocation into Korpus 1 overlaps with the release of the Gromyko Memorandum on February 6, 1957, with its accompanying Smoltsov Report to the Swedish Embassy in Moscow, alleging that Raoul Wallenberg (at the age of 34) succumbed to a myocardial infarct in the Lubyanka Prison on July 17, 1947. Although it appears that no public statement was published at that time in the Soviet press about the memorandum, we consider it conceivable that the authorities were likely to have decided that it would be best to remove Wallenberg from Korpus 2 for this period in anticipation of public announcement of the memorandum. Since there was much awareness of the case of Raoul Wallenberg amongst prisoners in Korpus 2 and Korpus 3, Wallenberg's relocation to Korpus 1 with Makinen/Kapl^an _ Final Report to Swedish-Russian Working Group Page 38 December 15, 2000 Kruminsh can be, thus, viewed as an effective measure to minimize contact and prevent information leaks to him in case some statement with respect to the memorandum were to be published in Pravda. We have repeatedly requested to examine the file of Kruminsh but have received no satisfactory answer about what information is available regarding Kruminsh. Also, because of the information that might be found about Kruminsh, Professor Makinen has requested permission for other independent consultants to examine his personal file but it has never been produced. We repeat these requests since the case of Kruminsh is of extreme importance in further investigating the fate of Raoul Wallenberg. d. Kalinski, Abram Mendeleyevich (born 1912) reported to the Swedish Foreign Ministry that Mamulov, Stepan Solomonovich (born 1905) had been a cellmate of Raoul Wallenberg in cell 2-23 and that Mamulov as a cellmate was followed by another Beria associated prisoner Shariya, Pyotr Afanas'yevich (born 1905). This information was apparently given to Kalinski by Gogiberidze. This report finds some echo in information provided by Leizer Berger, who was discussed above, in which Berger stated that Raoul Wallenberg was seen with two former Beria associates together in walking courts that were located behind Korpus 2. Kalinski was a well known prisoner in Vladimir having arrived for the first time on 02/08/45. While he did spend some initial time in Korpus 2 in 1947 and 1948, he departed from Vladimir on 26/09/48 and did not return to the Vladimir Prison until 05/09/55 remaining until 29/10/59. During these last four years he was incarcerated twice in Korpus 2, in cell 2-20 from 08/10/57 - 04/03/58 and in cell 2-28 from 19/08/59 - 29/10/59. While these periods do not overlap with those of Bereshvili or Kruminsh in 'apparent solitary confinement,' they provide adequate familiarity with the structure of the building and the location of cells and walking courts. Kalinski claimed to have obtained the information about Mamulov from Gogiberidze, whom he visited in Tbilissi. (Gogiberidze did share cell 2-33 with Mamulov for 5 weeks just prior to being released on 26/08/65.) Examination of the cell history of Mamulov does show that he shared a cell in Korpus 2 with Shariya, in addition to having shared cells later with Shariya in Korpus 1. The data are: Cell 2-26 20/09/5 8-17/12/58 Shariya, Pyotr Afanas'yevich (bom 1902) Cell 2-26 19/09/5 8 - 08/07/59 Mamulov, Stepan Solomonovich (born 1905) Shariya was then transferred to Korpus 1 where he remained until his departure from Vladimir on 27/06/63, having completed his 10-year sentence. Thus, according to the records, Shariya could not have been a cellmate of Wallenberg's after Mamulov and could not have accompanied Mamulov in the walking courts after 17/12/58 when he last shared a cell in Korpus 2 with Mamulov. (They did share several cells later in Korpus 1 and Korpus 3, in each case with other prisoners.) The only period that Shariya spent in Korpus 2 was as indicated above. His association with Raoul Wallenberg, if any in Korpus 2, would have then been restricted to the period spent with Mamulov, requiring three individuals in the cell. Prisoners were kept on average two to a cell, but this number is seen to fluctuate, as illustrated in Figure 13. Mamulov first came to the Vladimir Prison 18/10/54 and his departure date was 28/06/68, just two days prior to the completion of a 15-year sentence. After Shariya in Korpus 2, Mamulov had no other cellmates in cell 2- 26 according to the prisoner registration cards from the kartoteka. There are also two other significant periods of time in Korpus 2 in which Mamulov was placed in apparent solitary confinement: Cell 2-26 18/12/58 - 08/07/59 (corresponding to the period after Shariya) Cell 2-19 11/03/66-09/07/66 Cell 2-27 08/02/68-28/06/68 Each, particularly that in cell 2-26, constitutes an extensive period of time and is unusual since inspection of the list of prisoner-cellmates of Mamulov, e.g., Eitingon, Sudoplatov, Marchenko, among others, showed not only that he was a special prisoner but also that he was placed with other well known prisoners. In efforts to identify other prisoners who were either Beria or Stalin associates with Georgian backgrounds, we have also examined the prisoner-cellmate listing of Pataridze, Leontii Evstafyevich (born 1902). Pataridze arrived at the Vladimir Prison in 1944, had the label of'Menshevik' on his registration card, and departed 06/01/60 Makiijen/Kaplan _ Final Report to Swedish-Russian Working Group Page 39 December 15, 2000 similarly to Bereshvili. There are no periods of apparent solitary confinement for Pataridze in Korpus 2, and there is in general an absence of cells shared with Bereshvili, Shariya, or Mamulov. e. Larina, Varvara Ivanovna, a woman of approximately 70 years of age who had worked in Korpus 2 as a sanitarka since 1946, described a foreign prisoner of non-German origin who was held for a lengthy period of time in solitary confinement on the third floor of Korpus 2. She described this prisoner in the presence of the chief physician of the Vladimir Prison, Dr. Polinina in an interview in December of 1993 conducted by Marvin W. Makinen and Nikita Vasiliyevich Petrov, an independent consultant and senior staff member of Memorial Society in Moscow. Since a detailed description of this interview has been provided in the Introduction as historical background for Makinen suggesting database analysis of cell occupancy in Korpus 2 to test whether Larina's statements were verifiable or not, we shall not repeat those details here. As described earlier, examination of the kartoteka of the Vladimir Prison immediately revealed the registration cards (there were 4 sets of cards) for the prisoner Osmak, Kirill Ivanovich (born 1890) who died from a cerebrovascular accident on May 16, 1960, (established subsequently by autopsy examination), on the eve of an impending return to KGB headquarters in the Lvov Oblast' in the Ukraine (cf., Figure 8). The card indicated that Osmak was at that time in cell 2-49. Subsequent analysis of the database showed that Osmak shared cell 2-49 with Bereshvili, who has been described earlier, and with one other prisoner at the time of his death. The information showed: Cell 2-31 30/08/58 - 23/03/60 Osmak 30/08/58-23/03/60 Bereshvili Cell 2-49 23/03/60-16/05/60 Osmak 23/03/60-23/05/60 Bereshvili 23/09/59 - 23/06/60 Sidorov, Valentin Dmitriyevich (born 1931) Examination of the 134 deaths which we have established from analysis of the database to have occurred in Korpus 2 between the years of 1947 and 1972 showed that approximately 3 weeks after the death of Osmak the prisoner Konakov, Lev Ivanovich (born 1922), died on 11/06/60 in cell 2-56, located at the opposite end of the third floor from cell 2-49 in Korpus 2. The previous death of a prisoner in a cell on the third floor of Korpus 2 was that of Ivanov, Nikolai Petrovich (born 1931) in cell 2-45 on 20/10/59. After the demise of Osmak, the next death of a prisoner on the third floor was that of Kapriyelyan, Arkadii Samvelovich (born 1939) in cell 2-42 on 24/12/61. From 20/10/59 to 24/12/61, thus, there are no other prisoner deaths that could have been confused with the demise of Kirill Osmak and associated with the presence of a foreign prisoner on the third floor of Korpus 2. Figure 16 provides a cell map illustrating the distribution of prisoners in cells on the 3rd floor of Korpus 2 on May 16, 1960, the day of Osmak's demise. There are 8 cells that have no listed occupants around that day according to the available cards in the kartoteka. Analysis of cell occupancy data yielded the following: cell period unoccupied number of days 2-38 10/02/59-05/02/61 717 2-41 30/04/60-05/02/61 281 2-43 04/06/60-05/02/61 246 2-44 29/04/60-28/12/60 243 2-45 18/05/60-05/02/61 263 2-46 07/05/60-05/02/61 274 2-47 16/05/60-07/02/61 267 2-48 18/05/60-24/02/61 282 2-53 11/05/60-05/02/61 270 Any one of the listed cells at first glance could qualify as the one with the foreign prisoner because they were all on the third floor in the proximity of Osmak's cell 2-49. However, since cells 2-43, 2-45, and 2-48 became empty after Osmak's death, we shall exclude them from the discussion. Also, since cell 2-53 is not located on the side opposite to the cell where Osmak died, we exclude this latter cell. Although cell 2-38 as a cell that was particularly well suited for isolation of a prisoner could be invoked, being across the corridor from cell 2-56 where Konakov died, we feel that it is important to associate the location of the foreign prisoner with the cell of Kirill Makinen/Kaplan _ Final Report to Swedish-Russian Working Group Page 40 December 15,2000 Osmak in view of Larina's recollection not only of his death but also his name. In order to decide in which cell the foreign prisoner described by Larina is most likely to have been located, it is necessary to analyze the changes of the occupancy of all cells on the third floor with time because of the sharp decrease in prisoner population for the 2nd and 3rd floors of Korpus 2 (cf., Figure 14) from late June, I960, to early February, 1961. A minimum of three identifiable individuals was reached as the lowest population of the 3rd floor indicated by the sharp fluctuation in the population of prisoners on the 3rd floor in Figure 14. The distribution and histories of these prisoners and the periods during which they did not have cellmates indicates that the foreign prisoner identified by Larina could have been readily kept also on the 3rd floor during this period also despite possible construction activities. In fact, the low prisoner population on the 3rd floor would have been highly conducive to concealing his identity from other prisoners. At the nadir of the prisoner population on the 3rd floor, Sudoplatov occupied cell 2-42 (23/02/60 - 12/01/63), Menshagin occupied cell 2-40 (17/12/58 - 26/07/63), and Prishlyak, Evgenii Stepanovich (born 1913) was in cell 2- 39 (05/08/58 - 16/05/61). In these cells they were each without assigned cellmates according to the database for the periods of 03/03/60 - 06/02/61, 20/06/59 - 06/02/61, and 06/06/60 - 06/02/61, respectively. Sudoplatov, who organized the assassination of Trotsky and Konovalets; Menshagin, who, as the mayor of Smolensk, became an unwitting witness to Katyn; and Prishlyak, who was considered the most important anti-Soviet Ukrainian nationalist, can be viewed as special prisoners with whom contact with other prisoners must have been monitored carefully by prison authorities. Their presence overlapping with and continuing after the death of Osmak shows that occupation of cells on that side of the 3rd floor was not incompatible with construction activities, if that was the reason for the decrease in prisoner population. Another reason for the decreased population, perhaps coupled with construction activities, could have been additional security measures to conceal the foreign prisoner and to prevent communications with other prisoners. Since cell 2-43 is occupied until 04/06/60 and cell 2-44 Enter the date: 16.05.601 2-38 2-39 2-40 2-41 2-42 2-43 2-44 2-45 2-46 2-47 2-48 ; XtypaB/ies, M. n. MeHbiuaniH, 6. Cyflonflaioa, n. KpHBUOB, T. A. BynaeB, B. fl. (-) /lemeea, 3. K. n/iaTQHOB, B. B. 1926., f. 1 902 A. 1 907 1927 1924 iq?7 1926 „ npHU)/lHK,E. C. 1913 OwrwOesoB, 10. E. 1920 KOflOCOB.C. J\. U. 1935 1928 KpKOUOt, T. A. 1927 OMinGecoB, to. M. 1935 Third Floor, Korpus II FIGURE 16. Cell map of the 3rd floor of Korpus 2 showing known occupants of cells on May 16, 1960, the day of Osmak's death. Osmak is shown as occupying cell 2-49. The (-) sign adjacent to a prisoner's name indicates that the person departed from that cell on the date for which the map is calculated, for instance, as seen for the occupants of cell 2-47. (For cell 2-49 the (-) sign does not appear immediately adjacent to Osmak's name because of formatting.) A (+) sign indicates that the prisoner was brought to that cell on that day. The duplication of names in cell 2-43 occurs because of multiple computer cards for each individual with partially overlapping chronological data. It should be also noted that the prisoner Vorobyov-Vorobei is indicated as an occuoant of cell 2-52. as was discussed earlier. Makinen/Kaplan , Final Report to Swedish-Russian Working Group Page 41 December 15, 2000 acquires a prisoner [Fedorenko, V. P. (born 1928)] on 29/12/60, we suggest that the most likely cell that held the foreign prisoner identified by Larina was 2-47 since the adjacent cells 2-46 and 2-48 remained without occupants for virtually the same exact period of time. With adjacent cells empty, communication through wall tapping is eliminated. In addition, this cell also is directly opposite cell 2-49 in which Osmak died on May 16, 1960. Furthermore, attempts to communicate through the fortochka in the window of the cell with individuals in the walking courts three stories below would have been extremely difficult and readily prevented because of the guard who always monitored the walking courts against any illegal activities of prisoners with each other through windows. The guard stood on a platform allowing surveillance of the entire backside of Korpus 2. Because of the witness statement of Larina that a foreign prisoner of non-German origin occupied a cell on the third floor of Korpus 2 opposite to the cell in which Osmak died and because of the unhesitating manner in several interviews in which she consistently selected the photograph of Raoul Wallenberg to identify this prisoner, including one on December 20, 1994, in the presence of Pavlov, Alexei Anatol'yevich, the acting director of the prison; Miroshin, Yuri Ivanovich, head of the section of corrective affairs of the Vladimir UVD; Kuzovkin, Gennadii Valer'yevich, an independent consultant to the Working Group and member of Memorial Society in Moscow; Professor Guy von Dardel; and Professor Makinen, we must conclude that the likelihood of mistaken identity is extremely small. The cell occupancy data and Osmak's registration cards completely confirm Larina's statements. The analysis of the constellation of prisoners in nearby cells to that in which the foreign prisoner is likely to have been held demonstrate that his isolation at this time would have been extremely effective for preventing communications with other prisoners. From this analysis we can only conclude that this prisoner was most likely Raoul Wallenberg and that his registration card and other documentary materials in the Vladimir Prison have been removed by KGB authorities. f. Terelya, losef Mikhailovich (born 1943), an ardent Ukrainian nationalist and devout member of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, entered the Vladimir Prison on 19/10/69. Except for a two-month absence in 1972, his final departure was on 27/11/72. Terelya, because of his fierce religious beliefs and strong resistance to the Soviet government, was forced out of the Soviet Union with his family and resettled in Canada, temporarily in St. Catherines, Ontario, and later near Toronto, Ontario. Professor Makinen interviewed Terelya on three separate occasions in the late 1980's at the request of Professor Guy von Dardel, the maternal brother of Raoul Wallenberg, the last interview having been conducted in the Ukrainian language through an interpreter who was considered trustworthy by Terelya. The first two interviews were conducted in Russian with an apology by Makinen that he was unfamiliar with the Ukrainian language. (Terelya had informed Makinen during the first interview that on Soviet soil he refused to ever speak Russian and insisted that all official communication with him be conducted in the Ukrainian language; Makinen made this apology to engage Terelya' s cooperation because he was aware of the Ukrainian's dislike of being under Soviet rule.) Terelya reported that he shared a cell with another prisoner on the second floor of Korpus 2 in March or April of 1970, when one evening the guard made a mistake and released them out of their cell to go to the WC before a prisoner from another cell had been returned to his cell. (To provide credibility that such a mistake could happen, a similar occurrence happened once also for Makinen in 1962.) Terelya stated that at that time the prisoner was in cell 33 on the opposite side of the second floor from his. He also stated that he had realized that the prisoner in cell 33 had been recently transferred to that cell from cell 25, which was on the same side of the second floor as his cell. He described the prisoner as having a prominent forehead with 'three fingers' of baldness, grey-white hair, and an unusual sharpness in his eyes. Terelya commented that the eyes were unusual because most prisoners had a constant dullness in their eyes due to poor nutrition. While he tried to say something to the person, Terelya first spoke in Ukrainian which was not understandable to the prisoner. Terleya's description of what the prisoner answered was unclear but it was not in Russian. Terelya stated that he was later transferred to another cell on the second floor of Korpus 2 which was then a few cells away from where the foreign prisoner sat in isolation. At that time he stated that his cellmate was Ogurtsov, Igor Vyacheslavovich (born 1937). Since his new cell lacked a tumbuchka or small wooden cupboard/night-stand in which prisoners could store their belongings in the cell, he requested from the guard that they have the usual supply of cell furniture. At some point they realized that the foreign prisoner must have left the second floor because they saw no activity in cell 33 and things were unchanged from day to day as they walked by the cell to go either to the WC or to the walking courts. The guard apparently brought to them a tumbuchka from that cell on the backside of which was written "Sweden Raoul Wallenberg" and the words "Martina Miranda." Terelya stated that only afterwards did he realize that this Makinen/Kapl.an t Final Report to Swedish-Russian Working Group Page 42 December 15, 2000 individual might have been Raoul Wallenberg. Because of the name Miranda, he was puzzled and thought that perhaps the individual was Spanish. A guard had earlier told him, when Terelya inquired who the prisoner was after their first encounter, that the prisoner was a White Russian war criminal. For this reason Terelya stated that he would expect that Wallenberg was not imprisoned under his true identity since the name was too well known. By way of confirmation of the information that Terelya provided, it is important to point out that Makinen interviewed by telephone a few years ago Janis Rozkalns, a Latvian emigre in Germany who had been a prisoner in the Soviet Union and had earlier written a letter to the Swedish Foreign Ministry that he had information about the fate of Raoul Wallenberg. The interview was conducted in German from the Foreign Ministry in Stockholm in the presence of Mr. Lage Olson, a member of the Working Group, and Rozkalns was at that time in Munster, Germany. Rozkalns had very similar information to that provided by Terelya, including the words Raoul Wallenberg and Martina Miranda written on the backside of the tumbuchka. When asked how he had learned of this information since he had not been himself a prisoner in Vladimir, Rozkalns stated that in a labor camp in Perm he met Terelya who had described the situation. (Terelya had been transferred to Perm from Vladimir.) Thus, this information provided by Rozkalns confirms that Terelya had indeed experienced an encounter with the foreign prisoner he described on the second floor of Korpus 2 and had described the situation to a prisoner in the Soviet Union before he had been forced to leave the Soviet Union and live in Canada. Analysis of the prisoner registration card of Terelya from the kartoteka does indeed indicate that he was transferred from cell 2-6 on the first floor of Korpus 2 to cell 2-21 on the second floor on 24/12/69. The data from the kartoteka show the following cell changes: Cell 2-21 24/12/69 - 19/02/70 Terelya 14/11/69 - 25/03/70 Stepanov, I. S. (born 1930) Cell 2-30 19/02/70 - 16/10/70 Terelya 13/05/69 - 28/05/70 Menshagin 12/03/70 - 14/12/70 Ogurtsov 28/07/70-19/09/70 Budulak, Nikolai Aleksandrovich (born 1926) Results of the analysis of the distribution of prisoners in cells on the 2nd floor of Korpus 2 are illustrated in Figure 17. This shows the occupancy of cells for three different dates that are critical to the statements of Terelya. The first cell map (Figure 17A) is calculated for 15/01/70, showing that Terelya is indeed in cell 2-21 which is located on the opposite side of the 2nd floor from cell 2-33. The latter cell has no identifiable occupants. Of considerable interest is that cell 2-25 is occupied by the prisoner Novikov, Vasilii Pavlovich (born 1926). The data from the kartoteka show: Cell 2-25 31/12/69-29/01/70 Novikov 13/12/69 - 08/01/70 Snastin, Evgenii Borisovich (born 1939) Thus, the data indicate that Novikov was alone in cell 2-25 from 09/01/70 - 29/01/70 after which he was transferred to cell 3-38. However, from the database it is calculated that cell 2-25 remained 'empty' over the 29/01/70 - 04/02/70 period. This is illustrated in Figure 17B. Finally Figure 17C shows that Terelya has been transferred to cell 2-30 on the opposite side of the 2nd floor which he shared with the prisoners Ogurtsov and Menshagin. (This was apparently Menshagin's last cell according to his sentence and prior to release and exile to Murmansk.) Cell 2-30 was a few cells away from cell 2-33 with the unknown prisoner, precisely as described. The cell occupancy data fully confirm the cell locations described by Terelya with respect to his encounter with a foreign prisoner. Firstly, cell 2-25 is 'empty' for a brief period compatible with Terelya's statement that the foreign prisoner had been transferred to cell 2-33 from 2-25. Furthermore, Terelya's description of the relationships of the cells that he occupied to that of the foreign prisoner are fully confirmed by the kartoteka. Furthermore, while all of the other cells on the second floor are continually occupied by identifiable prisoners with only relatively brief interludes of zero occupancy (Note that the data in Figure 14 show an average population of 38-40 prisoners for the 2nd floor at his time, indicating essentially a "full house".), inspection of the database shows that the occupancy of Makin.en/Kapl,an. Final Report to Swedish-Russian Working Group Page 43 December 15, 2000 s ±.rthe Il5.01.70 ( bene^wH i5.oi. 70 -.at I ra : aa r«r 2-18 2-19 ! 2-20 2-21 i 2-22 2-23 2-24 ' 2-25 2-26 2-27 : : 2-28 rlOTeMKKH. K>. H. UBCTKOS. C. M. CrenaHOB, M. ToBHaCflH, f. C. A/ICKCaHAPOB, 6epe3HH, A. H. HoBHKOa, B. n. OKyHee, A. D. KaHaTbeB, K). M. CSMCOHOB, 4>. T. 1935 1926 C. 1930 1933 M. A. 1942 1946 1926 1932 14^& 1929 UJep&aKOB. A. A. MepHbifi, L fl. 1941 Tepe/ut, H. M. MypCMH, n. A. ryce^bHHROB, noAGyuKHtf B MaXMyAOB, A. iq^S 1943 1936 D. B. 1938 C.I 93 9 3.1939 Tepe/w. H. M. TBSPJWKOB. n. . " 1943 fl.1917 Second Floor, Korpus II KaH«u6a. M. A. BHIHpOB. X. H. HonoB, A. *. fa6nco3, B. K. EaiBnoa, H. C. j 1930 1935 1932 1942 1939 /lyitHK, M. n. MeHbiuarHH, E. 1921 CyMapyn, tO. KOTy6efiTw. H. r. 1902 MaooTKO, M. C. B. 1 940 1925 1918 MacKJTHO, M. C. VneHiOK, A. M. flaHHsnb, K). 1918 1929 M. 1925 FIGURE 17A. Cell map of the 2nd floor of Korpus 2 shortly after the prisoner I. M. Terelya was brought to cell 2-21. While other cells, namely 2-19, 2-29, and 2-34 appear unoccupied in addition to cell 2-33, they all acquire occupants within a few days after 15/01/70. However, cell 2-33 remains without apparent occupants for a total of 267 days. The names of some prisoners appear twice within the same cell. This is because the cell occupancy data for that prisoner was written into two records with partial overlap of cell chronology data. It is seen that the prisoner Novikov occupied cell 2-25 alone at this time. Enter the itf.K ito ;. "--.';;.;"•;. V; •' Iftmu date: 01.02.70 :.$**•' ; , K). H. |jle6«eB.B.H. I'BecereiB.n. Deceju A ! CrenaHOB, M. C R. fl. , B. i AnnGbea, B. H. {BacHjlbea, H. Jl. CaMcmaB, «. r 11934 11934 1930 1928 J1930 1929 |XaHai . X. i HUii. E. fl. 1333 Tepern, M. M. lilsaq. r. M. OKyHeB, A. H. 1943 1947 1932 Tepenn, M. M. 1943 Second Floor, Korpus II Stair- S«SaBKSta!«Sri«SSSS' ass'KiMid^nssJs:. well;, roBucos, B. K. KonfiywOB. A. C. KynHWB, A. n J1932 ' 1942 1937 1931 RKVHHH, B. 1C 1939UJllpBKOB. B. A. |CynapyK, K). B. KmySeii.H H 1930 1 1940 1925 MeHbiuaraH, B. r. 1902 VneHKX, A. M. 1 1929 M 192S' i 1 i FIGURE 17B. Cell map of the 2nd floor of Korpus 2 on 01/02/70 before the prisoner I. M. Terelya had been brought to cell 2-30. It is seen that Novikov has left cell 2-25 leaving that cell empty while Terelya is still located in cell 2-21. Menshagin is alone in cell 2-30 and cell 2-33 is unoccupied. Makinen/Kapl,an . Final Report to Swedish-Russian Working Group Page 44 December 15, 2000 Enter the ie n i T/I 75.03. 70 -Efaor date: 15.03.70 mBEBBI 2-21 2-22 2-23 2-24 2-26 2-26 2-27 2-28 rioTaneHKO. r. C. BwaitaBHMtoc, A. ^^^^^^^^BoraaHoa, 10. H HenoMHstUHx, Boroflvma, B. B. Amen, A. K. EynuniH, A. n. AHTOHDB. H. K. fHycapee, B. 3axapoB, B. M. CaMCOHOB, *. F. 1915 A. 191S M. 1938 !\. K. 1944 1929 1946 1924 1933 C. 1931 1941 1929 noleMKHH, 10. H. 1935 UJett>epc. K. O. POMatlleHKOR, Maiypj, B. !\. KpOTOB, B. M. Paea, B. B. Sapamoa, A. 3. TlaryHOB, n. T. 1942 B. M. 1939 1943 1931 1949 1924 1931 ClenaHOB, V\. MepHWfi, 1, A. C. 1930 1938 Second Floor, Korpus II 2-33 2-32 2-31 2-30 2-29 rewGyrac, K). iDonoB, A. *. Ta6ncoBF B. K. Orypuoa, H. B. KyiwKOB. A. H. 1925 1932 1942 1937 1931 MacnTKO, M. C. MeHbiuarHH, B. 1918 MeSorapea, H. AaHHsnb, K). T. 1902 MacoTKO, M. C. H. 1939 M. 1925 1918 Tepun.U. M. X3HNOBH4, f\. 3. 1943 19*3 _ Tepera, M. M. 1943 Figure 17C. Cell map of the 2nd floor of Korpus 2 on 15/03/70 after the prisoner I. M. Terelya had been brought to cell 2-30 which he shared with Ogurtsov and Menshagin. Cell 2-25 is occupied by other prisoners and cell 2-33 remains 'unoccupied' according to the registration cards in the Vladimir kartoteka. All other cells on the 2nd floor are occupied. cell 2-33 is unaccounted for from 02/09/69 to 27/05/70 for a total of 267 days. From Terelya's description of the timing of the foreign prisoner's transfer from cell 2-25 to cell 2-33, we must assume that this person was not in cell 2-33 for the entire 267 days. However, from Terelya's description it is reasonable to assume that the prisoner possibly occupied cell 2-25 and 2-33 from 29/01/70, when Novikov was transferred out of cell 2-25, to 27/05/70, the last date for which cell 2-33 remained 'empty'. This period constitutes a total of 117 days. Thus, the data, nonetheless, attest in a striking manner to the unusual nature of the absence of occupancy data for cell 2-33 for which time we can assign the presence of this prisoner to this cell. Makinen can state by personal experience that cell 2-33 is an effective cell for isolation of a prisoner since he himself shared this cell with Mukha approximately 8 years earlier. As seen by comparison of the cell maps in Figure 15, the cell is located adjacent to the stairwell, making wall tapping communications ineffective. Also, the cell is located directly above the guards' office on the first floor, limiting communication by tapping on the floor. It can be argued of course that the cell data do not prove that Raoul Wallenberg was the prisoner in cell 2- 33. However, the data show unambiguously that this prisoner had to have been of unusual importance to the Soviet government and to the KGB for all records and documents to have been removed from the Spetzchast'. To disprove our contention that this prisoner was Raoul Wallenberg, it will be necessary for Russian government officials, presumably from the FSB and MVD, to disclose who this person was and to demonstrate convincingly that the history of this person's incarceration is fully compatible with this database analysis and the physical description of the prisoner by Terelya. Terelya's description of the physical features of the prisoner, the words written on the backside of the tumbuchka repeated to another prisoner in Perm before they were ever communicated to us in the West, and the clear selection of Raoul Wallenberg's photograph and description of his physical features by Larina as the prisoner on the third floor only nine years earlier, coupled with the unambiguous confirmation of the conditions described by these witnesses through analysis of the cell occupancy data in the Vladimir kartoteka, leave virtually no room to argue for mistaken identity. Thus, we conclude that this prisoner was most likely Raoul Wallenberg. This conclusion remains in complete agreement with the statements made earlier by Kruminsh about meeting a Swedish prisoner in Korpus 2 "who expected to be well acknowledged for his work upon return home" and Kruminsh's reputation for having been a cellmate of the Swedish prisoner 'Van den Berg.1 We cannot imagine another set of explanations that Makinen/Kap^an t Final Report to Swedish-Russian Working Group Page 45 December 15,2000 would be logically consistent with all of these facts and observations. The chance that the prison records of cell occupancies, personal documents, transport records, personality traits, and physical features of some other secret, special prisoner incarcerated by Soviet authorities could be shown to be computationally consistent with this database analysis is so small as to be considered impossible. 3. Examining Periods of Solitary Confinement of Other Important Prisoners A variety of reports from individuals having been incarcerated in the Vladimir Prison have implicated other prisoners as cellmates of Raoul Wallenberg, in addition to Mamulov, Shariya, Bereshvili or some other Georgian, and Kruminsh covered in part D. 2. above. For purposes of thoroughness we examine these cases, bringing into light statements made by these witnesses that are either confirmatory with or contradictory to the data in the kartoteka. We also add individuals to this list who have not been considered previously. a. Boris Georgiyevich Menshagin The case of Menshagin as a witness of Katyn has already been described. Of the 25-year sentence given to him by Special Tribunal, a significant part was spent in solitary confinement, including his incarceration in Moscow prior to transfer to the Vladimir Prison in 1951. To be precise, according to examination of the database, the following periods were spent in solitary confinement primarily in Korpus 2 (cells are not be listed because they are too numerous): 30/09/51-04/12/51 (coincides with arrival) 09/04/52-01/12/53 01/01/54-10/06/55 28/01/57 - 17/04/57 (spent in cell 1-45 coinciding with the presence of Kruminsh in cell 1-52 described earlier) 08/05/57 -17/12/58 12/12/65-31/03/69 The last cell occupied by Menshagin was 2-30 with Ogurtsov and Terelya (among others before them) from which he was exiled to Murmansk on 28/05/70, as described earlier. While individuals such as Sudoplatov; Mamulov; Steinberg, Matus Ozaryevich (born 1904); and Moroz, Valentin Yakovlevich (born 1936) figure among his occasional cellmates, Menshagin makes no mention of direct association with Wallenberg in his autobiography Vospominaniya (YMCA Press, Paris, 1988) written while in exile, although he references articles of Abram Kalinskii published in Tel Aviv, 1986, claiming Shariya and Mamulov as cellmates of Wallenberg. b. Nikolai Semyonovich Lyalikov (born 1924) In an article in 1985 in Novoye Russkoye Slovo, a Russian language newspaper published from New York City, Abram Kalinskii states that Lyalikov was a 14-year old woodcutter who became a witness to Katyn while coincidentally working in the forest at that time, and was arrested and kept in the Vladimir Prison. In that article he also states that Raoul Wallenberg died of pneumonia as a cellmate of Lyalikov in the 1970s. Although he did not know the name of the individual, Kruminsh himself told Makinen while the two shared cell 2-31 that it was known among prisoners in Vladimir that somewhere in the Vladimir Prison was a prisoner-woodcutter who had been arrested as a young teenager because he had accidentally witnessed Katyn. Thus, this story about a young woodcutter was obviously known to many. Lyalikov according to his registration card lived in the village Yeernishenski in the Lyoznenskii Raiyon of the Viterbskii Oblast', an area that would have had appropriate proximity to Katyn. He was first brought to the Vladimir Prison as a 20-year old man, spending the initial period 28/06/44 - 12/07/44 in solitary confinement in cell 2-5. After 1947, the only periods of solitary confinement experienced by Lyalikov were the following: Cell 2-44 14/05/47 - 19/03/48 Cell 2-48 05/07/48 - 08/07/48 08/08/48 - 30/08/48 25/09/48 - 26/09/48 (the latter date corresponds to departure from the Vladimir Prison). Makin,en/Kaplan. Final Report to Swedish-Russian Working Group Page 46 December 15,2000 Despite the contradictory statements of Kalinskii about the history of this prisoner, the 14/05/47 - 19/03/48 period of solitary confinement in cell 2-44 is not inconsistent with the possibility of Raoul Wallenberg's first transfer to the Vladimir Prison according to study of documents in Moscow by Susan Mesinai. Nothing is at present further known to us about Lyalikov. It would be important to determine whether he may still be alive to shed further light on the period of solitary confinement described above. c. Semyon Levanovich Gogiberidze The history of this prisoner has been thoroughly discussed above. Analysis of the history of his cellmates and cells occupied by Gogiberidze shows that he spent the period 11/03/53 - 26/03/53 in solitary confinement in cell 2-44. The neighboring cells 2-43 and 2-45 each had identifiable prisoners according to the kartoteka, ruling out possible wall tapping communications with Wallenberg. This is the only period of solitary confinement after 1947 during Gogiberidze's incarceration in Vladimir. While Gogiberidze was known to have talked to many about Raoul Wallenberg, as described above, and is likely one of the earliest sources of information about Raoul Wallenberg in Korpus 2, this period of solitary confinement occured after Gogiberidze had shared cells with Kutepov and Shulgin. No prisoner from the Vladimir Prison who has given statements to the Swedish Foreign Ministry has implicated Gogiberidze as having had direct contact with Raoul Wallenberg as a cellmate in Korpus 2. d. Masami Okamoto (born 1916) According to the Wallenberg Archives in the Swedish Foreign Ministry, the German prisoner Ferenz Posch (born 1913) had learned in cell 6 from a Japanese prisoner Nakamura, Kumasaburo (born 1890) that another Japanese prisoner had informed him about Raoul Wallenberg's presence in Korpus 2. Posch did not give the name of the Japanese prisoner but Nakamura had stated that the Japanese prisoner had shared cells earlier with Gouaze and Maximov, a Finnish prisoner. From the kartoteka it is clear that Posch and Nakamura were cellmates, confirming Posch's statement: Cell 3-6 01/06/54-23/12/54 Posch 01/06/54 - 06/09/54 Nakamura The difficult question is the identity of the Japanese prisoner who had related this information to Nakamura. Of the Japanese cellmates of Nakamura, the most probable candidate is Masami Okamoto although admittedly the reasoning is not obvious and straightforward. We first examine the cell history of Okamoto to show its consistency with Nakamura's statements. Firstly, although Okamoto did not share a cell with the Finnish prisoner Maximov, Vasilii Nikolaiyevich (born 1918), he did share cells with two other Finnish prisoners, Puschkaryov and Narbut, before Nakamura was a cellmate of Posch's: Cell 3-63 27/03/49 - 31/10/49 Okamoto 28/03/49 - 31/05/49 Puschkaryov, Kirill Nikolaiyevich (born 1897) 27/03/49 - 31/10/49 Shulgin Cell 3-47 15/09/50-26/02/52 Okamoto 12/09/50-21/01/51 Narbut, Yurii Antonovich (born 1896) 04/10/50-05/01/51 Gouaze 12/09/50 - 26/02/52 Nakamura The interesting aspect of the cell history of Okamoto is that he was in solitary confinement in Korpus 2: Cell 2-39 01/03/50-03/03/50 Okamoto Cell 2-50 03/03/50-15/03/50 Okamoto after which he shared a cell with Nakamura: Cell 1-97 23/04/50-15/09/50 Okamoto 23/04/50 - 12/09//50 Nakamura. w Makinen/Kaplan j Final Report to Swedish-Russian Working Group Page 47 December 15, 2000 The question that must be then asked is why did Nakamura say anything about Okamoto in general to Posch unless he had obtained new information that had not been given while he and Okamoto shared cells earlier, for instance: Cell 3-37 31/10/49-01/12/49 Okamoto 31 /10/49 - 01 /10/49 Nakamura 31/10/49-01/10/49 Shulgin. While the neighboring cells to 2-39 and 2-50 where Okamoto was placed in solitary confinement were occupied by identifiable prisoners, inspection of the database shows that cell 2-48, a corner cell across from cell 2-50 with Okamoto, was empty for 52 days 04/02/50 - 28/03/50 (cf., Figure 16). The possibility, thus, exists that Raoul Wallenberg either might have been placed for a short time as a cellmate of Okamoto's or more likely he occupied cell 2-48 overlapping with Okamoto in cell 2-50. Of the 13 different Japanese prisoners with whom Shulgin shared cells, in his writings located in GARF in Moscow, as translated for us by Svetlana Zavrazhnova, Okamoto is the only one mentioned, stating that he spoke Russian and that he was a diplomat. We have no further information about Okamoto and it would be important to inspect his personal dossier and other related prison documents. Also it would be important to determine whether he was returned to Japan and is still alive for interviewing or whether he died as a prisoner. To clarify this situation further we request access to Okamoto's personal file and related documents. e. Matus Ozarvevich Steinberg (born 1904) Steinberg's name is brought up here mainly to point out that he is unlikely to have been the prisoner identifed by Larina. While his name has the syllable berg and Steinberg was noted to be a high-strung, chronic, bitter complainer, the only periods of solitary confinement he experienced in Korpus 2 are: Cell 2-26 29/02/60 - 23/03/60 and Cell 2-28 18/11/61-01/12/61. These cells are located on the 2nd floor of Korpus 2 and do not overlap with the death of Osmak. f. Voldemar Intovich Steinbergs (born 1924) Steinbergs, a Lithuanian, has not been mentioned in association with Raoul Wallenberg, but because of the syllable bergs in his name we examine his cell history also, as for Matus Steinberg above. From his arrival on 31/08//49 until his departure on 02/09/57, he shared cells with many foreign prisoners who knew of Raoul Wallenberg: von Grigori, Porzgen, Rezinghoff, Bastamov, Landwehr von Pragenau, Cumish (the latter two overlapping), Wolfin, Schellhom, Voss, Gouaze, and others, mostly in Korpus 3. He did, however, spend time in solitary in Korpus 2, as seen from the following data: Cell 3-49 30/03/53 - 20/04/53 Cell 3-43 04/20/53 - 02/06/53 Cell 2-56 02/06/53 - 17/06/53 Cell 3-43 17/06/53-01/12/53 Cell 2-21 30/06/55-19/07/55 Cell 2-19 19/07/55 - 21/07/55. We have no basis for associating these dates with Raoul Wallenberg, but point out that the series of four cells in solitary is unusual. While cell 2-56 is located on the 3rd floor of Korpus 2, the period of solitary confinement, however, does not overlap with the death of Osmak. g. Eero Danirovich Pelkonen (born 1922) Pelkonen, a Finnish prisoner arrested in Karelia, was a cellmate of Vilmos Langfelder in Moscow prior to having been brought to the Vladimir Prison. In his personal dossier, it is stated that he was hospitalized in the Makin,en/Kapl,an . Final Report to Swedish-Russian Working Group Page 48 December 15, 2000 Butirka Prison because he had tried to commit suicide in his cell in the Lefortovo Prison by climbing to the window of his cell and jumping onto the concrete floor head-first. This occurred after he was interrogated around July 22, 1947, about his knowledge about Wallenberg and Langfelder, as were other prisoners such as Gustav Richter, Horst Kitschman, Franz Langer, etc., who had similarly shared cells either with Wallenberg or Langfelder. Upon arrival at the Vladimir Prison on 03/05/51, Pelkonen was placed in solitary confinement in cell 2-1, a cell well suited for isolation (cf., Figure 15), for approximately 41/2 months. This practise of assigning the first cell in solitary confinement, as can be already seen from the data presented in this report, was commonly applied to incoming political prisoners. Thereafter, Pelkonen shared cells with a number of different prisoners, Hofstetter, Hans (born 1924); Hille, Paul-Erhard (born 1913), with whom he corresponded after their mutual repatriation to Germany and Finland, respectively; among others, until 02/07/53. There then occurs in his cell occupancy history an unexplained period of solitary confinement for about 6 months: Cell 2-56 02/07/53 - 13/10/53 Cell 3-32 13/10/53-04/11/53 Cell 2-36 04/11/53 - 22/01/54 Since no other period of solitary confinement occurs after cell 2-36 up to the time of his departure from the Vladimir Prison on 21/07/55, the three contiguous periods of solitary confinement in his record appears unusual, and should be investigated further. Although Pelkonen was interviewed by the Finnish Security Police after his repatriation, he has in general refused to discuss anything about his imprisonment in the Lefortovo or Vladimir Prisons, and his correspondence with Hille was burned by Hille's daughter by request, according to information obtained by Susanne Berger. h. Isaak Markovich Wolfin (born 1913) The possible importance of Wolfin to the case of Raoul Wallenberg was appreciated first only by independent consultants to the Swedish-Russian Working Group. After the interview of Larina conducted by Makinen in Gennadii Kuzovkin's presence in the office of the director of the Vladimir Prison described in section A. 2., upon his return to Moscow, Kuzovkin recalled from the Vladimir cards photographed in 1990 that a prisoner had been in cell 2-49 who had been an instructor of the Swedish language and found the hard copy print-out of the computerized version of the registration card prepared by Dr. Rolf Bjornerstedt. This revealed that Wolfin was an instructor of the Swedish language in a GRU institute and had been imprisoned in Vladimir as a 'Swedish spy'. The front and back images of one of his registration cards photographed in 1990 are shown in Figure 18. This case was then looked upon by us as a possible instance of mistaken identity, and in truth this possible interpretation could be moved aside only as further information was gathered. For one, when the date of Osmak's death was revealed by finding his card in the kartoteka, it was clear that Wolfin could not have been the foreign prisoner because he occupied cell 2-49 on three occasions starting 14/05/51, 13/03/54, and 02/06/54 and was released in 1956, long before Osmak's death. Wolfin's cell occupancy record suggests strongly that he was a cell informant for the authorities in the Vladimir Prison: The frequency of cell changes for Wolfin, 53 changes over a period of 1958 days spent in the Vladimir Prison, calculates as the thirteen highest of more than 8000 prisoners. This is also supported by the observation that he was required to carry out only one-half of his sentence, as seen on the backside of his card in Figure 18, similarly to the case of Kruminsh. We mentioned earlier that Wolfin had served in the Soviet Embassy in Stockholm before his arrest. It is intriguing to note that in the materials handed over from the KGB in the first session of the Swedish-Soviet Working Group in October, 1991, showing how Raoul Wallenberg's name and signature had been smeared over with ink in the registry for interrogations on August 30, 1946, the name of Isaak Wolfin is clearly seen as having been interrogated at the same time. Also, Susan Mesinai has established that Wolfin was interrogated late in the night on July 17, 1947, as were all former cellmates of Raoul Wallenberg and Vilmos Langfelder around that time. Wolfin shared cells with a large number of foreign prisoners with direct or indirect knowledge about Raoul Wallenberg. His cell occupancy record shows the following prisoners and dates for their first encounter with Wolfin (many shared cells with him on multiple occasions): Makinen/Kapl^n . Final Report to Swedish-Russian Working Group Page 49 December 15,2000 Figure 18. Front (top) and back (lower) side of the registration card of Isaak Markovich Wolfin, who was arrested as a 'Swedish spy.' The lower left-hand quadrant of the front (top) side shows that the date of arrest was August 26, 1946, and the lower right quadrant provides cell occupancy data starting from 02/02/55 in cell 3-59 until his release. (There were other cards in the kartoteka covering ear- lier periods of his incar- ceration in the Vladimir Pri- son.) The back (lower) side details the length of sen- tence and lists the dates of departure from and return to the prison in addition to providing a brief explana- tion of the basis for the order for transfer. Cell 3-70 08/06/48-23/03/49 Wolfin 29/06/48-23/03/49 Narbut, Yu. A. Cell 3-66 23/03/49-17/06/49 Wolfin 23/03/49-17/06/49 Ten Hompel, R. 23/03/49-17/06/49 Klauberg, K. 31/05/49-16/06/49 Puschkaryov, K. N. Cell 3-22 19/11/49-01/12/49 Wolfin 19/11/49-01/12/49 Bohm, J. M. 19/11/49-01/12/49 Schellhorn, F. G. Cell 3-64 21/02/50-23/04/50 Wolfin 01/12/49-31/03/50 Maksimov, V. N. Cell 2-12 13/07/50-13/09/50 Wolfin 20-06-50-21/08/50 Goldstein, 1.1. Makinen/Kapian , Final Report to Swedish-Russian Working Group Page 50 December 15, 2000 Cell 3-44 13/09/50-04/10/50 Wolfin 12/09/50-30/03/51 von Grigori, K. Cell 3-44 03/11/50-09/05/51 Wolfin 04/01/51-30/03/51 Langer, F. Cell 3-48 27/12/51-02/02/52 Wolfin 24/01/52-02/02/52 Martins, G. Cell 3-44 02/02/52 - 02/04/52 Wolfin 17/03/52-29/05/53 Beckerle, A. H. Cell 3-46 30/04/52-18/06/52 Wolfin 12/09/52-18/06/52 Rehekampf, G. 27/01/51-18/06/52 Supprian, K. 28/02/52-18/06/52 Krenner, E. Cell 2-20 11/02/53 - 14/05/53 Wolfin 31/01/53-06/03/53 Schoggl, O. Cell 2-46 27/02/53 - 14/05/53 Wolfin 16/04/53-25/04/53 Fuchs, A. Cell 2-49 02/06/54 - 02/12/54 Wolfin 28/06/54 - 05/07/54 Kupriyanov, G. N. Cell 3-57 30/04/55-26/12/55 Wolfin 25/11/55-08/12/55 Kalinskiii, A. M. 22/11/55-22/12/55 Kupriyanov, G. N. There are also numerous periods of solitary confinement throughout his incarceration in Vladimir: Cell Period of Time Number of davs_ 3-48 09/05/51-14/05/51 5 3-57 09/10/52-24/10/52 15 2-54 10/02/53-11/02/53 1 2-46 27/02/53 - 15/04/53 45 3-43 08/12/53-11/12/53 3 3-59 18/04/55-30/04/55 12 2-33 26/12/55-03/01/56 8 While the 1-3 day periods are not likely to be significant with respect to sharing cells with another prisoner, the others provide adequate opportunity to interact with a cellmate to extract information. Kalinskii has stated that Wolfin had told him that Raoul Wallenberg was on a transport with him once when he was returned from Aleksandrovsk. Kalinskii referred to Wolfin as "Sasha." The registration cards of Wolfin show only that his departures and arrivals were to and from Butirka Prison in Moscow. Thus, if Wolfin was transported from Aleksandrovsk to Moscow and then to Vladimir, only the arrival from Moscow would have been noted on his card, and Butirka is a well known prison from which prisoners were sent or where they arrived by transport. While Sasha is the nickname in Russian for Aleksandr, much as Sandy in English is the nickname for Alexander, it is known that family members of Wolfin called him Sasha. It is probable that Kalinskii learned this information when he shared cells with Wolfin, as shown above. The Swedish and the Russian members of the Swedish-Russian Working Group have been willing to reveal only scant information about Wolfin thus far. Since the circumstances surrounding his case suggest strongly that he Makinen/Kapljan , Final Report to Swedish-Russian Working Group Page 51 December 15,2000 was in some manner associated with the case of Raoul Wallenberg, all information about him must be released to determine the relevance of his activities and history to the case of Raoul Wallenberg. 4. Examining a Reported Sighting ofVilmos Langfelder An American prisoner Wilfrid Cumish (born 1915), arrested in Austria in 1948, was in the Vladimir Prison from 23/06/49 until 20/08/55. He stated in interviews that he had been for a short period with Vilmos Langfelder in Korpus 3 and that Langfelder had arrived earlier on the same transport as Dengg, Friedrich (born 1912). Through a CIA document the statement is attributed to Admiral Voss that Cumish had reportedly told Voss that he had also seen a Swedish prisoner in Vladimir in 1954. There are several inconsistencies in Cumish's statements, making evaluation difficult. However, certain statements while appearing as inconsistencies lead to the conclusion that Cumish may well have seen both Wallenberg and Langfelder. For instance, in one interview he stated that he had been in a cell with a prisoner named Wallberg, but in the following interview he stated that he had meant Steinberg, a former Gestapo person. From a large collection of photographs, however, he had picked out Wallenberg's photograph as the person he had in mind. Unfortunately, the representatives of the Swedish Foreign Ministry concluded that Cumish must have mistaken the prisoner Schluger for Wallenberg since the two had similar physical features. There is no registration card in the kartoteka for a prisoner by the name of Schluger, but there is a Schluga, Josef (born 1915) who had been a cellmate ofDengg's. The kartoteka data show: Cell 3-1 17/07/54-03/12/54 Dengg 29/07/54-07/08/54 Schluga 25/06/54 - 03/12/54 Voss, Hans-Erios (born 1897) 25/06/54 - 06/09/54 Sato, Seichi (born 1924) While we have no information whether Schluga and Cumish ever had the opportunity to see each other, for instance, in the bath, the cell histories of Schluga and Cumish show that they were never cellmates. The officials from the Swedish Foreign Ministry seem to have also concluded that Cumish meant the prisoner Landwehr von Pragenau, Kurt (born 1910) instead of Langfelder. However, Cumish in his interviews clearly described Langfelder as having reddish hair, an appropriate description, while he described Landwehr distinctly differently. It appears that only Lorentzon of the Swedish Foreign Ministry after meeting Landwehr for an interview realized that Cumish could not have not confused the two men and that he had in mind two different prisoners. Upon his arrival in Vladimir, Cumish first spent 2 days alone in cell 3-42 and was then brought to cell 3-44. The following prisoners (among others) shared overlappingly this cell: Cell 3-44 25/06/49 - 31/10//49 Cumish 28/03/49 - 31/10/49 Landwehr von Pragenau 31/03/49 - 31/10/49 Porzgen, Herman (born 1905) 02/04/49 - 31/10/49 Martins, Gunther (1917) 02/04/49 - 31/10/49 Pataridze 05/05/49 - 31/10/49 Rezinghof, Bemgard (1900) 05/05/49 - 31/10/49 von Grigori, Karl (born 1899) 31/08/49 - 11/10/49 Steinbergs Several of the same prisoners were transferred to the next cell with Cumish: Cell 3-40 31/10/49 - 05/11/49 Cumish 31/10/49 - 01/12/49 Landwehr von Pragenau 31/10/49-05/11/49 Martins 31/10/49-01/12/49 Porzgen 31/10/49 - 01/12/49 Rezinghof 31-10-49-01/12/49 TenHompel Makinen/Kaplpn , Final Report to Swedish-Russian Working Group Page 52 December 15, 2000 These cells in the very early part of his incarceration in Vladimir were the only ones that Cumish shared with Landwehr von Pragenau or Steinbergs. In further confirmation of Cumish's statement about Dengg, the kartoteka data showed that Dengg arrived in Vladimir on 28/04/54 from Verchne Uralsk. There were four other prisoners on the same transport: Vesseli, Otto (born 1911); Lanksch, Imant Karlovich (born 1925); Pritula, Pyotr Nikolaeyevich (born 1890); and Savitzkas, Antanas-Josas (born 1887). Cumish stated also that Langfelder had been earlier in a cell with Dengg. The data do show that Dengg spent a period of solitary confinement although he shared cells otherwise from the very beginning of his arrival in Vladimir with others. For instance, Cell 2-41 30/04/54-10/06/54 Dengg 17/04/54 - 10/06/54 Lausch, Henrich (born 1913) Cell 2-42 10/06/54 - 17/07/54 Dengg 01 /07/54 - 20/07/54 Okamoto indicating that Dengg was without an identifiable cellmate over the 10/06/54 - 30/06/54 period before Okamoto entered the cell. There are numerous periods of solitary confinement of Cumish, ranging from 6-35 days, but the only period that could be relevant for Langfelder as a possible cellmate according to Cumish's statements is in cell 3-54 (13/05/55 - 16/07/55). Cumish stated that Voss had been in and out of the cell prior to Langfelder. The kartoteka data show: Cell 3-57 03/12/54-16/02/55 Cumish 03/12/54-16/02/55 Dengg 03/12/54-16/02/55 Porzgen 24/01/55 - 16/02/55 Poisinger, Franz (born 1912) 03/12/54-24/12/54 Voss Cell 3-1 16/02/55 - 24/03/55 Cumish 16/02/55 - 22/02/55 Akkerman 16/02/55 - 24/03/55 Dengg 16/02/55 - 10/10/55 Porzgen 16/02/55 - 24/03/55 Poisinger Cell 3-7 24/03/55 -13/04/55 Cumish 24/03/55 -13/04/55 Poisinger 24/03/55-13/04/55 Dengg Cell 3-54 13/04/55-16/07/55 Cumish 13/04/55 - 12/05/55 Poisinger 25/04/55 - 12/05/55 Akkerman, Adam (born 1918) 13/04/55-28/04/55 Dengg thus, leaving Cumish alone in cell 3-54 for approximately 2 months. Hereafter, Cumish was transferred to cell 3-52 which he shared with Filippov-Solovyov, Ivan Yakovlevich (born 1923) until he was released for repatriation on 20/08/55. There are many difficulties in evaluation of the details of Cumish's statements, the possibility that he shared a cell with Vilmos Langfelder and possibly Raoul Wallenberg, and the inexcuseable interpretations of the Swedish officials who interviewed him to make conclusions about whom Cumish actually met in prison. Moreover, Cumish stated that the year was 1954, but he had no period of solitary confinement between 06/07/53 and 13/05/55. He confused cell numbers, but considering the large number of different cells that he had to share with others and the frequency of changes, this may not be a point to be criticized considering his weakened health upon release. Since the only statement of the Russian government with respect to the fate of Vilmos Langfelder relies on the statement of the Soviet government to an inquiry from Hungary that Langfelder died in 1948 (providing no legally compelling Makinen/Kapl^n . Final Report to Swedish-Russian Working Group Page 53 December 15, 2000 documentation), we must consider the information provided by Cumish as potentially very important. Since these data are consistent with Cumish's statements, the matter of Vilmos Langfelder cannot be considered resolved. For this reason, every detail of any document that sheds light on the case of Vilmos Langfelder should be opened and made available for further study. E. Summary and Conclusions Despite the Gromyko Memorandum issued by the Soviet government to the Swedish Foreign Ministry in 1957, alleging that Raoul Wallenberg died of a myocardial infarct on July 17, 1947, in the Internal or Lubyanka Prison of Moscow, there have been a large number of reports about him in Soviet prisons, labor camps, and psychiatric hospitals by former prisoners into the 1980s. A significant number of these reports has come from the prison in the city of Vladimir in Russia, claiming Korpus 2 of the prison as the building in which Wallenberg was incarcerated. This building of the prison is well known to have served the dual function of providing hospital and medical facilities for sick prisoners and having cells which were effective in isolating prisoners from each other for long periods of time. For this reason, we have reconstructed the chronological history of the occupancy of all cells in Korpus 2 of the Vladimir Prison from prisoner registration cards in the prison kartoteka for the period ranging from January 1, 1947, to December 31, 1972, to examine the consistency of eyewitness reports with conditions defined by these prison documents. The years 1947 and 1972 correspond, respectively, to the purported death of Raoul Wallenberg according to the Soviet government and the last sighting of him in the Vladimir Prison, in this case as reported by losif Mikhailovich Terelya from March-April of 1972. A database was constructed from the registration cards of all prisoners who were incarcerated for at least one day in Korpus 2 during their imprisonment in Vladimir between January 1, 1947, and December 31, 1972. The database was extracted from over 11,000 registration cards belonging to over 8,000 prisoners and involving over 98,000 cell changes or records. The accuracy of the data was verified by specially devised algorithms to test for chronological and other types of inaccuracies introduced during construction of the database. Where necessary inconsistencies were resolved by comparison of the computer file with the original TIFF image of the computer scanned registration card, and the database was accordingly corrected. Specifically devised search algorithms were applied to evaluate fluctuations in prisoner population on each floor of Korpus 2, the number of prisoners entering and leaving, the chronological history of the occupancy of each cell by prisoners in Korpus 2, the pairing of prisoners in cells, and the identification of prisoners in neighboring cells. It was possible to reconstruct the occupancy of each cell in Korpus 2 on a day-by-day basis throughout the entire 25 year period investigated. In addition to the large number of evidentiary statements and reports about Raoul Wallenberg examined against cell occupancy data, we have analyzed in great detail the occupancy of cells on the 3rd floor of Korpus 2 corresponding to the time of the death of the prisoner Osmak. Varvara Larina, an elderly, pensioned employee of the prison, described in interviews to Professor Makinen that a non-German foreign prisoner was held in solitary confinement in a cell on the opposite side of the 3rd floor at the time of Osmak's death. Not only was her description of the foreign prisoner's physical appearance compatible with that of Raoul Wallenberg, but she also consistently selected a photograph of a side profile of Wallenberg (not used in the international press and rarely seen) as the prisoner in solitary confinement, ignoring photographs of other individuals. Aleksandr Timofeiyevich Kukin, a retired former head guard of Korpus 2, confirmed that the picture selected by Larina was not unlike the foreign prisoner held in solitary confinement but claimed not to remember any details about name and country of origin. Analysis of the cell occupancy data showed that the prisoner Kirill Ivanovich Osmak died on May 16, 1960, in cell 49 on the 3rd floor of Korpus 2. The database showed that several cells were without identifiable occupants on the opposite side of the 3rd floor that remained "empty" for varying periods of time, ranging from 243 to 717 days, overlapping with Osmak's death. While a detailed inspection of changes in cell occupancy from June, 1960, through January, 1961, revealed a sharp decrease in prisoner population on the 3rd floor, three well known, special prisoners, Pavel Anatol'yevich Sudoplatov, Boris Georgeiyevich Menshagin, and Evgenii Stepanovich Prishlyak, continued each to occupy cells also in solitary confinement on the opposite side from cell 49 throughout this period of time. The sharp decrease in prisoner population, presumably due to renovations of the building, would also be compatible with administrative efforts to ensure strict isolation of the foreign prisoner to conceal his identity. Interestingly, the three special prisoners were separated by empty cells from each other and from the cell which likely held the foreign prisoner, providing effective isolation by preventing wall tapping communications. These results show unambiguously that these cells on the 3rd floor remained totally compatible with detention of prisoners whatever the operational reasons for the decrease in prisoner population in other parts of the 3rd floor. The confirmation of the death of the prisoner Osmak by inspection of the kartoteka demonstrates the clarity and accuracy Makinen/Kaplpn . Final Report to Swedish-Russian Working Group Page 54 December 15,2000 of Larina's description of conditions on the 3rd floor at that time. The identification of the foreign prisoner as Raoul Wallenberg by Larina unhesitatingly selecting his photograph, her description of his physical appearance, and the confirmation of the selected photograph by a former head guard of Korpus 2 leave little room to argue for a case of mistaken identity. These results, thus, lead essentially only to the conclusion that this prisoner was most likely Raoul Wallenberg and provide strong doubt about his alleged death in 1947, as claimed in the Gromyko Memorandum of the Soviet government. We have similarly examined other evidentiary statements against the database and find striking confirmation of most reports. For example, the report of losef Mikhailovich Terelya from March-April, 1972, describing cells that he occupied on the 2nd floor of Korpus 2 with respect to those occupied by an elderly foreign prisoner having physical features not unlike those expected of Raoul Wallenberg, and the transfer of this prisoner from cell 2-25 to 2-33 are confirmed in every detail by the database with respect to time and location. The long period of time that cell 2-33 remains without an identfiable occupant according to the registration cards available in the kartoteka, 233 days, provides strong reason to assume that this must have been a very important prisoner and that his idenitity has been concealed by removal of documents. We have also examined against the database the consistency of a number of statements by former prisoners about reported cellmates of Raoul Wallenberg. The cell histories of several of these prisoners, in particular that of Zigurds-Dzidris Ernestovich Kruminsh, the former cellmate of Francis Gary Powers, Marvin W. Makinen, and reportedly of a Swedish prisoner named "Van den Berg", shows unexplained lengthy periods of 'solitary' confinement that could correspond to sharing of cells with Wallenberg. Of particular importance is that Kruminsh himself admitted to Makinen in 1962 of having earlier met a Swedish prisoner who was "very sure that he would be well rewarded and acknowledged for his work upon his return home." This is not the only example of these types of statements. The German prisoner-of-war Hermann Platz stated that during transport to labor camp in 1949 other prisoners in Kirov pointed out to him a prisoner whose name was supposedly Van den Berg although they stated that he was Swedish. Similarly, Theodor von Dufving, a German prisoner-of-war, reported that while in transit in February of 1949 en route to Vorkuta, probably in Kirov, he met a Swedish diplomat who told him "Ich bin hier durch ein grosses (sic) Irrtum." Also, Julian Kaliyanskii attributes a statement to the German prisoner Wallenstein that he had met a Swede "who would be well rewarded" for his work upon return home. Furthermore, we have analyzed the history of cellmate pairings of a large number of foreign prisoners who provided evidentiary statements upon repatriation to identify the most likely original source of information among prisoners about the presence of Raoul Wallenberg in Korpus 2. The analysis indicates that the most probable original eyewitness report of Raoul Wallenberg having been transferred to the Vladimir Prison from Moscow comes from Vitalii Vital'yevich Shulgin, who reportedly stated that he was transferred on the same transport with Raoul Wallenberg. Shulgin was brought to the Vladimir Prison on July 25, 1947. The analysis confirms reports of others that the well known prisoner Semyon Levanovich Gogiberidze most likely learned of Raoul Wallenberg from a Russian prisoner in the late 1940s or early 1950s since he shared a cell for one month with Shulgin, shortly after Shulgin's arrival, and for 13 months with Pavel Anatol'yevich Kutepov, who was transferred to Vladimir together with Shulgin. In addition to examining evidentiary reports about Raoul Wallenberg, we have also determined cell occupancies and cellmate pairings from the database to evaluate the report of Wilfrid Cumish that he shared a cell for a short time in Korpus 3 with Vilmos Langfelder, the assistant of Raoul Wallenberg who was arrested with him in Hungary. The data reveal that Cumish was in 'solitary confimement' for a period of about 2 months in Korpus 3 in 1955 and find general correlation with many of the details in his report. Since Cumish described Langfelder as a man of short stature with reddish hair, as was appropriately descriptive of Wallenberg's assistant, the case of Langfelder should be similarly further explored and investigated. The possible sighting of Langfelder in the 1950s is in sharp contradiction to the report, given without legally compelling documentation, by the Soviet government to the Hungarian government that Langfelder purportedly died in 1948. These results taken together provide compelling reasons to doubt the credibility of the Gromyko Memorandum about the alleged death of Raoul Wallenberg in 1947, and they suggest strongly that he lived incarcerated in the Soviet Union at least into the 1960s and possibly 1970s and further. While the Russian government, through statements in more recent times, has begun to change the manner of death, claiming execution either by shooting or lethal injection rather than a myocardial infact in a 34-year old man who had no family medical history of heart disease and who, according to statements of two of his known cellmates, Gustav Richter and Jan Loyda, did physical exercises daily, the basic situation has not changed. There has been no compelling Makinen/Kaplan . Final Report to Swedish-Russian Working Group Page 5 5 December 15, 2000 documentation offered to substantiate the claim. There is only one legal standard that should be adhered to in the case of Raoul Wallenberg, and that is proof of death beyond a reasonable doubt. Until the Russian government is willing to provide that documentation, it is unwarranted to come to any conclusion about Raoul Wallenberg's fate. F. Acknowledgments We wish to acknowledge the guidance, encouragement, and unfailing support provided in this work by Professor Guy von Dardel, the maternal half-brother of Raoul Wallenberg. This report has benefited from frequent, insightful, and often seminal discussions with our colleagues Susanne Berger and Susan Mesinai. We also acknowledge the assistance and advice provided through members of the "Memorial" Society in Moscow who worked with us on this project, particularly Mssrs. Nikolai Valeriyevich Kostenko and Gennadii Valeriyevich Kuzovkin. Over the 1990 -1997 period, most of the travel costs for Professor Makinen were subsidized primarily through the Raoul Wallenberg Committee of the United States and in part by the Raoul Wallenberg Committee of Chicago. After 1997 costs for scanning ofkartoteka cards in the Vladimir Prison, construction of the database, and frequent travel and subsistence costs for Makinen and Kaplan to carry out the analysis in Moscow were covered through the Swedish Foreign Ministry. More recently work at The University of Chicago has been supported through numerous private gifts and by the Harry and Jeannette Weinberg Foundation. We also acknowledge support and use of facilities at The University of Chicago in the course of this work. Makinen/Kaplan . Final Report to Swedish-Russian Working Group Page 56 December 15,2000 APPENDIX I List of Programs Developed for Verifying the Accuracy and Self-Consistency of Entered Data This appendix describes the algorithms used to verify the accuracy of data in the analysis of Vladimir prison records, 1947 - 1972. The cards were carefully selected and scanned in 1998. After being scanned, ProSoft, AG was hired to scientifically enter the prison record information. Their system was to use two operators entering identical information. The ProSoft program would detect if the data were different for the two operators, at which point a manager would explicitly look at the discrepancy. As a result of this careful methodology, the prison record data were entered with a high degree of accuracy. This is described in more detail in the "Work Conditions and Procedures for Construction of the Database" section in the main report. The accuracy of the data, while conducting an analysis of this magnitude, is of primary importance. With this in mind, there were thirty-five computer algorithms developed to further check the accuracy of the data. These algorithms are useful to determine first if ProSoft's data entry was improperly made, and second to determine the accuracy of the information from the original cards. For example, a clerical mistake could have been made for a date in January similarly to the situation when one enters the previous year in writing the date in the beginning of the New Year through a conditioned response; a similar phenomenon was observed with some registration cards. As a result of these algorithms, manual inspection of the scanned images of the original cards was conducted, and, where appropriate, data were corrected. The thirty-five computer algorithms used to validate the accuracy of the data are described below: 1. Arrival after last departure: all cards where there was an "arrival" into the prison specified, but no departure or death date. Only two of the 8607 cards met this criterion. 2. Bad Birthdays: prisoners with no birthday indicated, or with an obviously incorrect birthday, including being born before 1800 or after 1969. Five of the 8607 cards met this criterion. 3. Bad Cells; ENTERED after LEFT: prisoners that entered into a cell after they left the cell. These are due to an invalid date that was associated the cell entry or missing data that was misinterpreted by the computer. There were 150 out of 98030 cell records for this condition. 4. Bad Cells: Left after last change: prisoners that left a cell after they died or finally departed the prison. There were no such cases for the 8607 cards. 5. Bad Cells: Entered before first Change: prisoners that were in a cell before they arrived into the prison system. There were no such cases for the 8607 cards. 6. Bad Names: These are prisoners that have either a missing first, last, or patronymic name. They are not necessarily "bad", such as numbered prisoners, but this report was useful in determining if there were legitimate errors with the prisoner names. 7. Blank Cell Dates: Cells that did not have a date associated with them. This is not necessarily bad, as the computer algorithm was designed to assume the dates from previous and future cells for the prisoner, along with arrival and departure information. This is described in more detail in the "Work Conditions and Procedures for Construction of the Database" section in the main report. 8. Blank Cell Dates in Block 2: Cells in Korpus II that did not have a date associated with them. 9. Cell Dates After Final Departure: Prisoners that were recorded to be in cells after they died or had a final departure. Two of the 8607 cards met this criterion. 10. Cells not in chronological order: Cells that were not entered or listed in chronological order. Initially there were dozens of such cells, and after manual review of scanned images, all such cells were resolved. None of the 98030 cells were out of chronological order after fixing the data. Makinen/Kaplan , Final Report to Swedish-Russian Working Group Page 57 December 15, 2000 11. Cells not in chronological order - Korpus 2: Cells in Korpus II that were entered or listed not in chronological order. None of the 98030 cells met this criterion. 12. Cells with no parent prisoner: Cell occupancies that are not associated with any prisoner. No cells met this criterion. 13. Changes with no parent prisoner: Arrivals/Departures/Deaths information that is not associated with any prisoner. No cards met this condition. 14. Differences between date of filling out and first arrival (more than 7 days): Show prisoners that had a discrepancy of dates between when the date of filling out was indicated, and the date the prisoner first arrived. While not necessarily an error in data, this report flags potential problems. 15. Differences between first arrival and first cell (> 7 days): Show prisoners that had a discrepancy of dates between when the prisoner first arrived, and the date the prisoner was first placed into a cell. While not necessarily an error in data, this report flags potential problems. 16. Difference between "Date of Filling Out" and first known Cell Date, when the first Cell Date is Null and there is no Date of Arrival: This report is important for a special situation whereby there is no date associated with the first cell. If there is a date of arrival, then it is assumed that the prisoner was placed into the cell upon the date of arrival. If there is no date of arrival, then it is assumed that the prisoner was placed into the cell upon the date on which the registration card was written, i.e., filled out. This report shows the difference between the date of filling out and the first cell date, in that situation. 17. Duplicate / Multiple Cards (based on name, YOB): Shows the number of cards where prisoners share the same name and year of birth. This is used to eliminate potential duplicate cards. 18. Duplicate / Multiple Cards (based on name, YOB. Case): Shows the number of cards where prisoners share the same name, year of birth, and case number. 19. Duplicate / Multiple Cards (same name, different YOB): Shows the number of cards where prisoners share the same name, but have different years of birth. 20. Duplicate Cards with same name, same YOB, and overlapping dates between the cards (based on ceils and arrival/departures): Shows the number of cards where prisoners share the same name and year of birth, and have overlapping cell dates (were in the prison at the same time). 21. Duplicate Cards with same name, same YOB, and overlapping dates between the cards (based on cells only): Shows the number of cards where prisoners share the same name and year of birth, and have overlapping cell dates (were in the prison at the same time based only on cell information and not on arrival/departure/death). 22. Duplicate Cards with same name, same YOB, and overlapping dates between the cards (based on cells only - 2 days minimum overiap): Shows the number of cards where prisoners share the same name and year of birth, and have overlapping cell dates (not including arrival/departure/death information, and with a 2-day minimum overlap). 23. Duplicate Cards with same name and YOB, and no overlapping dates among the cards (based on arrival/departures): Shows the number of cards where prisoners share the same name and year of birth, and have overlapping cell dates (including arrival/departure/death information and not cell information, and with a 2-day minimum overlap). 24. Date of Filling Out After First Known Cell Date: Shows all cards where the date the card was filled out was after the prisoner was already registered in the kartoteka, based on cell information. While not necessarily an error, this helped to identify cards that had been rewritten. 25. Date of Filling Out After First Known Change Date: Shows all cards where the date the card was filled out was after the prison was already registered in the kartoteka, based on arrival information. Makinen/Kapl#n , Final Report to Swedish-Russian Working Group Page 58 December 15,2000 26. 4+ prisoners in a cell - detail: Displays the names, cells, and dates where there were four or more prisoners in a cell at a time. 27. 4+ prisoners in a cell - summary: Displays the cells, dates, and totals where there were four or more prisoners in a cell at a time. 28. 4+ prisoners in a cell (no blank dates): Displays cells and dates where there were four or more prisoners in a cell at a time, and no cell dates were blank. 29. 4+ prisoners in a cell, no overlap/blank: Displays cells and dates where there were four or more prisoners in a cell at a time, and no cell dates were blank, and prisoners were not arriving or departing the cell on the date. 30. Prisoners in 1990 data not in 1999 data: Prisoners that are missing in the 1999 data from the roughly 1200 prisoners scanned years earlier. This report did not help, as the 1200 cards are in English, and the 1999 cards are in Russian. 31. Prisoners who were in their last cell for at least 2 years for an undetermined amount) - Korpus II: This can determine if the final death or departure is incorrect, as this shows prisoners left in their last cell for at least two years. This is not always an error, but flags for potential errors that were reviewed against the original scanned images. 32. Prisoners with no Cell info: Shows prisoners that have no cell information. These were cross-checked with original scanned images. 33. Prisoners with no Change info: Shows prisoners that have no arrival/departure/death information. These were cross-checked with original scanned images. 34. Unresolved Unclear Cell Dates: When entering data, Prosoft indicated in a special field cell dates that were unclear to the operator entering the data. By looking at the original scanned images, many of these were resolved. This report shows all unresolved unclear cell dates. 35. Unresolved Unclear Change Dates: When entering data, Prosoft indicated in a special field arrival/departure/death dates that were unclear to the operator entering the data. By looking at the original scanned images, many of these were resolved. This report shows all unresolved unclear arrival/departure/death dates. Makinen/KapLan . Final Report to Swedish-Russian Working Group Page 59 December 15,2000 APPENDIX II List of Programs for Analysis of Cell Occupancy Data This appendix describes programs used to analyze the data of Vladimir prison records, 1947 - 1972. While Appendix I describes 35 algorithms used to ensure that the data were of the highest accuracy possible, Appendix II describes the eighty-two computer algorithms used to analyze the data: 1. Age of prisoners when departing: shows how old prisoners were at the time of their final departure or death. 2. All prisoners - alphabetical: a comprehensive list of all prisoner cards, sorted alphabetically. 3. All prisoners - by ID: a comprehensive list of all prisoner cards, sorted by computer-generated ID numbers. This is used to speed up cross-referencing of prisoners from other reports. 4. All prisoners arriving between two dates: The analyst enters a start date and an end date, and all prisoners that arrived between those two dates are displayed. 5. All prisoners arriving on a date: The analyst enters a date, and all prisoners that arrived exactly on that date are displayed. 6. All prisoners by birth: a comprehensive list of all prisoners, sorted alphabetically and by year of birth within the year. 7. All prisoners by order of entry: a comprehensive list of all prisoners, sorted by the order that they entered into the prison. 8. All prisoners departing between two dates: The analyst enters a start date and an end date, and all prisoners that departed between those two dates are displayed. 9. All prisoners departing on a date: The analyst enters a date, and all prisoners departing only on that date are displayed. 10. AH prisoners in a cell: The analyst enters a cell number, and all prisoners that were ever in that cell (1947- 1972) are displayed. 11. All prisoners in a cell on a date: The analyst enters a cell number and a date, and all prisoners that were in that cell on that date are displayed. 12. All prisoners in a cell on a date w/nullable dates: The analyst enters a cell number and a date, and all prisoners that were in that cell on that date are displayed including nullable dates. ' 13. All prisoners in Korpus II on a date: The analyst enters a date and all prisoners that were in Korpus II on that date are displayed acording to cell number. 14. All prisoners in Korpus II on a date w/nullable dates: The analyst enters a date and all prisoners that were in Korpus II on that date are displayed including nullable dates. * 15. All prisoners with cards filled out between two dates: The analyst enters a start date and an end date, and all prisoners with the "date of filling out" between those two dates are displayed. 16. Cell change date range - alphabetical: The analyst enters a cutoff for the minimum number of days in prison and the number of days in prison for each prisoner is displayed alphabetically. 1 Nullable dates occur under two conditions: (1) if the first cell (or first several cells) of a card has no date and there is no arrival information and no date of filing out; and (2) if there are no final departure or death dates after the date of the last cell in which the prisoner was held. Makinen/Kaplan , Final Report to Swedish-Russian Working Group Page 60 December 15,2000 17. Cell change date range - by dates in prison: The analyst enters a cutoff for the minimum number of days in prison and the number of days in prison for each prisoner is displayed by the order of total days in prison. 18. Cell change frequency - alphabetical: The frequency of a prisoner is the number of total cell changes for a prisoner, divided by the total number of days in prison. For example, if a prisoner was in prison 400 days and had 34 cell changes during that period, the frequency is 0.085. Frequency is important to analyze how often prisoners switched cells and to suggest if a prisoner was a cell informant by being placed in and out of many cells in order to extract information from other prisoners. The analyst enters the minimum number of days for a prisoner having been in prison, and the cell change frequencies are displayed by the prisoners' alphabetical listing. 19. Cell change frequency - by frequency: The analyst enters the minimum number of days for a prisoner being in prison, and the cell change frequencies are displayed by the most actively cell-switching prisoners to the least active. 20. Cell change frequency - by totals: The analyst enters the minimum number of days for a prisoner being in prison, and the cell change frequencies are displayed by the most total number of cell changes. 21. Cells with the longest unoccupied periods: This displays which cells were unoccupied for the longest time, along with the start date and stop date that the cells were unoccupied. 22. Cellmates with overlap and nullable dates: The analyst enters the computer-generated ID of a prisoner, and all cellmates are listed in chronological order, including nullable dates. * 23. Cellmates with overlap: The analyst enters the computer-generated ID of a prisoner, and all cellmates are listed in chronological order, even those that left the cell on the date that another prisoner entered or entered the cell on the date that another prisoner left. 24. Cellmates with overlap - Korpus 2: The analyst enters the computer-generated ID of a prisoner, and all cellmates are listed in chronological order, even those that left the cell on the date that the prisoner entered or entered the cell on the date that the prisoner left. This report is limited to Korpus 2. 25. Cellmates with overlap and nullable dates - Korpus 2: The analyst enters the computer-generated ID of a prisoner, and all cellmates are listed in chronological order, even those that left the cell on the date that the prisoner entered or entered the cell on the date that the prisoner left. This report is limited to Korpus 2, and includes nullable dates. 26. Cellmates with no overlap: The analyst enters the computer-generated ID of a prisoner, and all cellmates are listed in chronological order, exluding those that left the cell on the date that the prisoner entered or entered the cell on the date that the prisoner left. 27. Cellmates with no overlap and nullable dates: The analyst enters the computer-generated ID of a prisoner, and all cellmates are listed in chronological order, exluding those that left the cell on the date that the prisoner entered or entered the cell on the date that the prisoner left. This report also includes nullable dates. * 28. Cellmates with no overlap - Korpus 2: The analyst enters the computer-generated ID of a prisoner, and all cellmates are listed in chronological order, excluding those that left the cell on the date that the prisoner entered or entered the cell on the date that the prisoner left. This report is limited to Korpus 2. 29. Cellmates with no overlap and nullable dates - Korpus 2: The analyst enters the computer-generated ID of a prisoner, and all cellmates are listed in chronological order, exluding those that left the cell on the date that the prisoner entered or entered the cell on the date that the prisoner left. This report is limited to Korpus 2, and nullable dates. 30. Cellmates with no overlap - Korpus 2. 1947-1972: The analyst enters the computer-generated ID of a prisoner, and all cellmates are listed in chronological order, exluding those that left the cell on the date that Makinen/Kaplan , Final Report to Swedish-Russian Working Group Page 61 December 15, 2000 the prisoner entered or entered the cell on the date that the prisoner left. This report is limited to Korpus 2 and the years 1947-1972. 31. Cellmates with no overlap and nullable dates - K2. 1947-1972: The analyst enters the computer- generated ID of a prisoner, and all cellmates are listed in chronological order, exluding those that left the cell on the date that the prisoner entered or entered the cell on the date that the prisoner left. This report is limited to Korpus 2, and nullable dates, and the years 1947-1972. 32. Neighbors of a prisoner to the left: The analyst enters the computer-generated ID of a prisoner, and all prisoners in the cell to the left is displayed. This shows all prisoners that could have potentially communicated by tapping on the wall. Adjacent cells on the left or right side are defined according to their location in the cellmap calculated for that floor. 33. Neighbors of a prisoner to the right: The analyst enters the computer-generated ID of a prisoner, and all prisoners in the cell to the left are displayed. This shows all prisoners that could have potentially communicated by tapping on the wall. Adjacent cells on the left or right side are defined according to theit location in the cellmap calculated for that floor. 34. Neighbors of a prisoner above: The analyst enters the computer-generated ID of a prisoner, and all prisoners in the cell above are displayed. This shows all prisoners that could have potentially communicated by tapping on the ceiling, or by passing notes on a string from window to window. 35. Neighbors of a prisoner below: The analyst enters the computer-generated ID of a prisoner, and all prisoners in the cell below are displayed. This shows all prisoners that could have potentially communicated by tapping on the floor, or by passing notes on a string. 36. Graph of arrivals over time (DAILY): The analyst enters the start date and the end date, and a graph of the number of arrivals over time for each day is displayed. 37. Graph of arrivals over time (WEEKLY): The analyst enters the start date and the end date, and a graph of the number of arrivals over time for each week is displayed. 38. Graph of arrivals over time (MONTHLY): The analyst enters the start date and the end date, and a graph of the number of arrivals over time for each month is displayed. 39. Graph of departures over time (DAILY): The analyst enters the start date and the end date, and a graph of the number of departures over time for each day is displayed. 40. Graph of departures over time (WEEKLY): The analyst enters the start date and the end date, and a graph of the number of departures over time for each week is displayed. 41. Graph of departures over time (MONTHLY): The analyst enters the start date and the end date, and a graph of the number of departures over time for each month is displayed. 42. Graph of average prisoners per cell (DAILY): The analyst enters the start date and the end date, and a graph of the average number of prisoners in each cell over time for each day is displayed. 43. Graph of average prisoners per cell (WEEKLY): The analyst enters the start date and the end date, and a graph of the average number of prisoners in each cell over time for each week is displayed. 44. Graph of average prisoners per cell (MONTHLY): The analyst enters the start date and the end date, and a graph of the average number of prisoners in each cell over time for each month is displayed. 45. Graph of case numbers in a year: The analyst enters a year, and a graph of the case numbers over time of entry are displayed. 46. Graph of number of prisoners over time (DAILY): The analyst enters the start date and the end date, and a graph of the total number of prisoners in each cell for each day is displayed. Makinen/Kaplan Final Report to Swedish-Russian Working Group Page 62 December 15,2000 47. Graph of number of prisoners over time (WEEKLY): The analyst enters the start date and the end date, and a graph of the total number of prisoners in each cell for each week is displayed. 48. Graph of number of prisoners over time (MONTHLY): The analyst enters the start date and the end date, and a graph of the total number of prisoners in each cell for each month is displayed. 49. Graph of number of prisoners - Floor 1. over time: The analyst enters the start date and the end date, and a graph of the total number of prisoners in each cell on floor 1 for each day is displayed. 50. Graph of number of prisoners - Floor 2. over time: The analyst enters the start date and the end date, and a graph of the total number of prisoners in each cell on floor 2 for each day is displayed. 51. Graph of number of prisoners - Floor 3. over time: The analyst enters the start date and the end date, and a graph of the total number of prisoners in each cell on floor 3 for each day is displayed. 52. Graph of prisoner entries over time (DAILY): The analyst enters the start date and the end date, and a graph of the total number of prisoners entering the prison for each day is displayed. 53. Graph of prisoner entries over time (WEEKLY): The analyst enters the start date and the end date, and a graph of the total number of prisoners entering the prison for each week is displayed. 54. Graph of prisoner entries over time (MONTHLY): The analyst enters the start date and the end date, and a graph of the total number of prisoners entering the prison for each month is displayed. 55. Graph of total cell moves over time: The analyst enters the start date and the end date, and a graph of the total number of cell moves is displayed. 56. Graph of unoccupied cell percentage: The analyst enters the start date and the end date, and a graph the percent of days each cell was unoccupied is displayed. 57. Graph of numbered prisoners vs Date of Entry: The analyst enters the start date and the end date, and a graph of the numbered prisoners is plotted against the dates of first entry into the prison. 58. Graph of numbered prisoners vs Date of Arrival: The analyst enters the start date and the end date, and a graph of the numbered prisoners is plotted against all dates of arrival into prison. 59. Most common cells: Each cell, along with the total number of prisoners that ever occupied it 1947-1972 are displayed, ordered by the most occupied cells. 60. Most common cells with NULL dates: Each cell, along with the total number of prisoners that ever occupied it with NO associated date are displayed, ordered by the most occupied cells. 61. Most common days of week that prisoners entered prison: Each day of the week (Monday, Tuesday, etc.) are displayed along with the total number of prisoners that entered prison on that day. 62. Most common days of week that prisoners entered their cells: Each day of the week (Monday, Tuesday, etc.) are displayed along with the total number of prisoners that entered prison on that day. 63. Most common days of week that prisoners left prison: Each day of the week (Monday, Tuesday, etc.) are displayed along with the total number of prisoners that left the prison (or died) on that day. 64. Most common days of week that prisoners left their cells: Each day of the week (Monday, Tuesday, etc.) are displayed along with the total number of prisoners that switched or left their cells on that day. 65. Most common last names: Each last name, along with the total number of prisoners with that last name, are displayed. Makinen/Kaplan , Final Report to Swedish-Russian Working Group Page 63 December 15, 2000 66. Most common first names: Each first name, along with the total number of prisoners with that first name, are displayed. 67. Most common special marking 1: Each special marking on the front side of prisoner cards, along with the total number of prisoners with that special marking, are displayed. 68. Most common special marking 2: Each special marking on the back side of prisoner cards, along with the total number of prisoners with that special marking, are displayed. 69. Most commonly occupied cells between two dates: The analyst enters the start date and the end date, and all cells are displayed along with the total number of prisoners that were in the cell between the dates. 70. Numbered prisoners: All numbered prisoners are displayed. 71. Numbered prisoners and dates of entry: All numbered prisoners are displayed, along with their dates of entry, to determine any trends in the system of numbering prisoners. 72. 4 or more prisoners in a cell - Korpus II (including blank dates): All cells and dates that there were four or more prisoners in a cell at any time (in Korpus II) are displayed, including nullable dates. * 73. 4 or more prisoners in a cell - Korpus II (no blank dates): All cells and dates that there were four or more prisoners in a cell at any time (in Korpus II) are displayed, excluding nullable dates. * 74. 4 or more prisoners in a cell - Korpus II (no overlap/blank cells): All cells and dates that there were four or more prisoners in a cell at any time (in Korpus II) are displayed, including nullable dates. This report does not count prisoners that entered or left on a particular date into the total for that date. * 75. Unoccupied days in floor 1: Shows all days when the entire floor 1 was unoccupied. 76. Unoccupied days in floor 2: Shows all days when the entire floor 2 was unoccupied. 77. Unoccupied days in floor 3: Shows all days when the entire floor 3 was unoccupied. 78. Prisoners that were ONLY in Korpus II: Shows all prisoners that had cell occupancy information ONLY for Korpus II. If they spent any time in Korpus I or Korpus III or elsewhere, they do not show up on this report. 79. Prisoners who died in Korpus 2,1947-1972: Shows all prisoners who died in Korpus II, from 1947-1972, along with their ages at the time of death. 80. Prisoners who died in prison: Shows all prisoners who died in prison along with their ages at the time of death. 81. View Speciai Markings 1: Shows a list of all special markings on the front side of the card, along with the total number of prisoner cards with this marking. The analyst selects a special marking and all prisoner cards with that marking on the front side of their card are displayed. 82. View Special Markings 2: Shows a list of all special markings on the back side of the card, along with the total number of prisoner cards with this marking. The analyst selects a special marking and all prisoner cards with that marking on the back side of their card are displayed. LIQUIDATSIA The Question of Raoul WallenbergOs Death or Disappearance in 1947 SUSAN ELLEN MESINAI Director, ARK PROJECT of FREEDOM CHANNEL 30 Stone Avenue, Somerville, MA 02143 USA Telephone: 1-212-691-6436 © Susan Ellen Mesinai, Library of Congress, December 6, 2000 SUMMARY The attached is an interim discussion of the issues central to the determination of the fate of Swedish diplomat and Honorary United States citizen Raoul Wallenberg, primarily as determined by putting the findings related to the 1947 date Ounder a microscope.0 It is not the formal interim report, which I submitted to the Governments of Sweden and of Russia, which is fully footnoted and remains classified to honor the. rights of privacy of prisoners and their families, and of confidentiality. In those cases where this discussion otters essential findings to understand the alternative to the claims of the past fifty- five years, I have made an exception with the text for the sake of Raoul Wallenberg .and the truth. Names B except for the most celebrated D in these portions have been sanitized. Because of the above constraints, footnotes related to this OdiscussionO will not be included but will be placed on file with a lawyer. This discussion was created out of an investigative work in progress which has been carried out over the past three years thanks to the Governments of Sweden and Russia combined with ten years of archival research and Olive search investigations in Russi-a, the United States, Hungary, Britain and Sweden as director of the ARK Project. It consists of new findings plus excerpts from two chapters of a seven chapter approach to the issue of Raoul WallenbergOs whereabouts and fate in the Soviet Gulag. These areas include: 1. WallenbergOs Mission, an exploration of the OWhyO; Questions related to 2. Investigation and Sentencing, which focuses on the issue of 1947 D -from an investigative point of view being Otoo soonO; 3. Death; 4. Camps; 5. Strict Isolation and the Numbering of Prisoners, the basis of ODisappearance; 6. Medical Sightings and Forensics; and questions related to WallenbergOs status as an 7. Illegal captive and Prisoner of War. Most of the information in this interim discussion comes from Chapters 3 and 5. To summarize my findings, for those who may not endeavor to labor through the intricacies of my argument, they are as follows: 1. That the -most likely scenario is that Raoul Wallenberg did not die in July 1947, but OdisappearedO B that is, his identity was changed as either a numbered, prisoner or a prisoner under a different name although he remained in the system both for purposes of interrogation and to be available in case of a possible exchange. As this constitutes a dissent to the presentations of both the Swedish and Russian governments, I have gone to great lengths to phrase an argument that would explain this. 2. As death by execution B whether by shooting or lethal injection D would have required a -decision of leadership, an order and a witnessed act to confirm that it had been carried out, if Wallenberg was killed in 1947 as described by the Russians there should be a paper trail. The officials presenting these claims are expecting the public to accept their claims without such documentation. Insist! 3. If Wallenberg had indeed died of a heart attack in 1947 as claimed, it would be unlike Abakumov not to have registered the death in all the appropriate places since his function was both security and administrative. He himself had co-authored the regulations overseeing the reporting of deaths of foreign prisoners in 1943. In cases where heart attack is induced by lethal injection, the purpose of such a form of death would be to generate one which did not appear to be an execution but could be registered in the system to account for the death of a known prisoner. The purpose of this was for eventual accounting. The model case for this is that .of Esau Oggins= 4. If the Smoltsov document is genuine, as it does not constitute a legitimate death act D its most likely purpose was for it to be included in WallenbergOs file so that it would appear that he had died. This would be a necessary step to prevent further questions regarding his absence before opening a new file under a number or under another name. If it was contrived later D after the deaths of both Smol'tsov and Abakumov, the fact that it does not meet any of the requisites for identifying the prisoner in question as Raoul Wallenberg would leave room for yet another reversal later on. The language of the Groinyko Memorandum of February 6, 1957 which the Smoltsov document OsupportsO also leaves the door open for the entire claim that Wallenberg died of a heart attack in 1947 to be reversed. The most likely purpose of this would be, again, should it be necessary to bring Wallenberg Oback from the deadO in an exchange. We know that there were probes for such an exchange of Raoul Wallenberg for the Swedish Soviet spy in the mid- Sixties S so this is not simply a hypothetical situation. 5. The argument that Wallenberg disappeared rather than died in 1947 is multi-faceted, based first on the fact that his name and that of his colleague Vilmos Langfelder D which had been registered in all the correct places for the first two years £> were cut out of registries or blotted. (They did not kill the man, they removed his name. If they had killed him, they would have done-so under his name for p-urposes of accounting). 6. As there are only four blots in the registry of possessions for Lubyanka for 1947 D one of whom was numbered but later returned to Rome D the fate of the other three may be the same. That is, Wallenberg, Langfelder and Katona (whose relation_to this case is not yet known) may also have been numbered and. the blots correspond to the removal of traces of their names and also the transfer of their possessions to another registry for numbered or renamed prisoners only. This registry would have been in the hands of the very few, but we have established those individuals, departments and divisions who in Moscow Central would still be aware of them. 7. In an examination of the only file said to exist on Numbered Prisoners in GARF, combined with an ongoing analysis of both the prisoner cards at Vladimir Prison where Wallenberg is most often sighted after July 1947, and of the prisoner files I have studied D I made calculations based on my sequential understanding of the system. This shows that there are only six numbers available for three missing men. The Russians may have already identified three-of those numbers, which means that we now have three numbers for three men D Wallenberg, Langfelder and Katona D dating between June 1947 and May 1948. These files must be identified as they are quite probably Wallenberg et al if they were sentenced during that period. 8. If Wallenberg, Langfelder and Katona were not numbered and/or sentenced but renamed, our task is more difficult. We do however have a few official documents which state this is the case. We also have eyewitness reports of two individuals at Vladimir D one worker and one prisoner, with no knowledge of each other D who identified a photo .of Wallenberg under the same pseudonym. The Russians however -have not produced a card under that name. 9. Dr. Marvin W. Makinen and Ari-KaplanOs study of the cell occupancy of Corpus II, Vladimir Prison, back to back with my own studies for 1947 would indicate the high probability that Wallenberg was sentenced for Counter-Revolutionary activities and sent to Vladimir in July 1947 where he remained until sometime in 1948, after which he would have returned to Moscow for further questioning. There are subsequent indications that he returned at a later date (1954/1955) after many of the primary witnesses whom he had known from Moscow prisons had been repatriated and remained in Vladimir even through the Gromyko Memorandum and beyond. This raises the question of where he was held in the interim, which is one of the subjects of our follow up work. 10. The return of WallenbergOs possessions in 1989 is the strongest evidence which exists pointing to his having lived into the Eighties D as a few strong eyewitness reports would confirm. While these require verification, prison regulations regarding the valuables and currency not confiscated upon sentencing and their return to the prisoner upon his repatriation or to the next of kin at the point of death would make it necessary for the Russian side to explain why they were Olying aroundO in 1989, if Wallenberg had died in 1947 D at which point they would have been immediately confiscated. 11. Throughout this discussion, I have shown indications that essential portions of WallenbergOs file still exist D which contradicts the Russian claim that it has been destroyed or is missing. I. LIFE When Raoul Wallenberg D a Swedish diplomat struggling to save the remaining Jews in Hungary from EichmanOs OFinal SolutionO D asked to be taken to the command post of the Soviet troops liberating Pest, he set his fate in motion. On December 31, 1944 WallenbergOs name had been included on a list of Swedish diplomats and businessmen to receive Soviet OprotectionO because their government had represented Soviet interests in Hungary. By January 17th, 1945, the Oprotective custodyO being offered Wallenberg by the Soviet troops provided a cover for something more sinister. The humanitarian hero who had saved the lives of tens of thousands of Jews from Nazi OliquidationO was about to become an illegal captive of the Soviet GULAG. For two days after Wallenberg and his colleague Langfelder first made contact with the Soviet troops at the spa of the Varosliget Park on January 13/14th, he was allowed to leave the command post in order to gather his papers, some currency and valuables and to put his humanitarian affairs in order. During that time messages were being cabled to and from Moscow through the headquarters of the 2nd Ukrainian Front. By the 17th of January, Deputy Defense Minister Nikolai Bulganin had ordered WallenbergOs arrest by Smersh (ODeath to SpiesO) at the request of Victor Abakumov. When Wallenberg set forth with the motorcycle convoy that was to escort his car to Debrecen to meet with Marshall Malinowski, he seemed unaware that he was in danger from Soviets troops. Wallenberg was intent on making certain that he and his workers had accomplished everything in their power in anticipation of the transition heralded by a liberation army. Only his parting words to Eno Peto, a long term friend D said with humor D seem both tragic and prophetic in retrospect: OI donOt know if I am going with them as their guest or their prisoner.6 The Soviet troopsO orders were to round up the foreign diplomats D those who had not fled with the Germans to Sopron D and take them to safety. According to Wallenberg, the rest of the Swedish legation was to be found on the Buda side of the city. He made a point of naming the legationOs various buildings and their Osafe houses.6 While noting the various locations, the Soviet officers kept coming back to the fact that Wallenberg refused to leave the front line, to move to the rear, because he had 7,000 people in his charge in the Eastern or Pest side of the City. Although Wallenberg felt he needed to go to Debrecen to assure his safety from the Hungarian Arrow Cross, his primary concern remained the Jewish community whose welfare he had shepherded through one siege after another since July 1944. Wallenberg insisted upon meeting with the highest level of Soviet command. In short, he proceeded as a man intent upon fulfilling a crucial stage in his mission. Even before WallenbergOs arrest was ordered, ciphergram 2058 from a General Kuprianov to Major General Afonin of the 30th CK dated January 14th shows he was to be cut off from the world. Any links between Raoul Wallenberg and the outside world to be banned. Handwritten on the side of the cable, there is a notation: That Wallenberg had been found on the 13th on Benczur Street, that he came himself to the Soviet troops and that he had refused to go to the rear. Prior to this a number of pro- Allied prisoners of war, hiding out in Budapest, had also gone of their own initiative to meet the Soviet troops at a designated protection point, only to be arrested. Sir Reginald Barratt, a British warrant officer, who had repeatedly escaped German POW camps OdisappearedO into the Soviet Union (fate unknown), as did Colonel Marion Steifer a representative of the Polish Army. Dutch Lieutenant Garet van der Waals who came to the Soviet troops with anti-aircraft information was arrested, taken to Moscow prisons where he died in 1948. Van der Waals, a OBritish officerO was accompanied by Karl Schandl, a Hungarian lawyer whose family had banking and rescue ties with Wallenberg. Schandl, like the Jewish engineer Langfelder, shared the fate of the foreigner he accompanied. Other than records of his interrogations and some reports from eyewitnesses during the early phase, we do not know how Langfelder fared as a result of Raoul WallenbergOs arrest D whether he was only a shadow to Wallenberg or, in the eyes of the Soviets, important in his own right. But the case against Schandl was reportedly so weak that in the end, the evidence for the charges against him were borrowed from Van der WaalsQ file. Another American dual national, Charles Clifford Braun, an engineer working in Hamburg during the War D a probable OSS figure D also disappeared from Budapest. Braun, believed dead by the American military forces looking for him as early as May, re-emerged in Moscow prisons as a cellmate of the Slovak diplomat, Jan Spishek, also arrested and questioned by Smersh in Budapest in January before being brought to Moscow prisons. Braun was later interrogated by Daniel Kopelyansky along with Wallenberg, Langfelder and Van der Waals on July 17, 1946 in Lefortovo Prison. He was sentenced in 1951 and died in or around the Verchne-Uralsk Prison in 1953, just prior to his release and/or rehabilitation. (A number of eyewitness reports of Wallenberg show him also being held in Verchne-Uralsk Prison and camps in that region at that same time period). By January 22nd, Smersh in Hungary had issued reports to Moscow listing those arrested by nationality (Wallenberg was the only Swede) and the equipment D including radios, weapons and instruments for sabotage E> confiscated at that time. By January 25, 1945 Wallenberg and Langfelder D whose exact whereabouts in Hungary or Rumania are unclear D were on their way to Moscow by train. While they had been OarrestedO as of January 19th, their escort kept up the illusion that they were protected guests D giving them their freedom to walk around and dine at a restaurant in a depot station in Rumania. Upon arrival at the Kiev railway station in Moscow on February 6th, they were given a brief tour of the metro system and then walked into Lubyanka Prison. Here they were searched D given a registration number D their possessions recorded in a book. Then the two friends were separated, unlike Van der Waals and Schandl, Spishek and Braun, or the Swiss diplomats Meier and Feller who were sent from Budapest to Moscow in March 1945. On January 17th, Smersh operational officers in Moscow had arranged the placement of Richter and Schlitter, WallenbergOs first cellmates, together in a cell in Lubyanka Prison. SchlitterOs name, for the sake of this operation, had been changed to OShauerO to facilitate his role as informant. While seemingly coincidental, details such as the timing D an indication that the authorities were preparing for an important prisoner D highlight certain features of this case. The same can be said for the separation of Wallenberg and Langfelder: Arriving prisoners are to be placed on order from head of prison with regard to directions from the investigative bodyE Investigating bodies are to give instructions about isolating same case prisoners from each otherE On returning to prison after hearing during trial, prisoners for one case are isolated from other prisoners but not from each otherE In principle this would imply that while Raoul Wallenberg and Vilmos Langfelder never shared a cell together between February 1945 and July 1947, they could have been sentenced together in 1947B48, or sat together at a later date, if they survived their respective Odeath datesO of July 1947 and March 1948. As WallenbergOs criminal file is missing, the charges against him are not known. However, according to a discussion between General William. S. OBonnerO Key as Chief, American Military Section, with the Soviet command of the Allied Control Commission (ACC) in Debrecen in May 1945, the three neutral diplomats D Wallenberg, Meier and Feller D had been arrested by the Soviets on suspicion of Nazi collaboration. It should also be noted that in a March 8, 1945 broadcast of Radio Kossuth, Debrecen, regarding the work of Swedish Red Cross director Waldemar Langlet, it was stated: All signs indicate that Gestapo agents murdered him. This set the tone for the later conjectures of Swedish Minister Staffan Ssderblom to Stalin that Wallenberg had been murdered by robbers or had a car accident in Hungary (1946). This in turn seems to have provided some of the language for the denial by Deputy Foreign Minister Andrej Vishinsky of August 18, 1947 that Raoul Wallenberg was unknown to Soviet authorities and not to be found among the prisoners of war being detained in the USSR. Yet, again in May 1945, the Soviet ACC military official Levushkin had made it clear to American officials that Wallenberg had not died in Hungary, but was in Soviet hands. Swedish officials also stated to U. S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson at a meeting in Scandinavia in the Fall of 1945 that Wallenberg had been taken, with his documents, to the Soviet Union and that they feared he would never return. In other words, from the beginning and at successive stages, there were two signals being given by the Soviets D to the public at large dissuasive disinformation stating Wallenberg to be dead D but in closed meetings on a controlled level a clear signal that he was in Soviet hands. For some this implied an invitation to negotiate WallenbergOs return through an exchange, as the British had initiated the return of the Swiss diplomats through the ACC in Hungary. The failure of those responsible for WallenbergOs mission to act immediately during the more fluid ACC period, to set up exchange negotiations, cast still more suspicion upon him. By the Fall of 1946, Wallenberg in Moscow was drafting a letter to Stalin according to wall tapping exchanges with prisoners in neighboring cells. Wallenberg was reportedly called to interrogation and, to calm him down, told by the Commissar that he should wait until March 1947 when the fate of prisoners of war would be discussed in Moscow. In the Spring of 1947, there were not only international discussions related to the return of prisoners of war, but reorganizational changes within the Security organs as well, following those already initiated by Stalin in 1946. In April 1947 an order was sent from I.A. Serov establishing the rules governing the care of numbered prisoners to the head of Ivanovo MGB prison and, we shall assume, nearby Vladimir Prison. If the Soviet authorities are to be believed, WallenbergOs fate was not treated as a straightforward matter of a prisoner of war. The last references produced by the Russian side of the Swedish-Russian Working Group are a blotted registry of possessions for WallenbergOs arrival in Lubyanka (dated March 2, 1947) and his interrogation on March 11, 1947. Besides this we have the Vishinsky memorandum to Molotov of May 14, 1947 which has been used to establish that the authorities were calling for WallenbergOs execution and a registry entry for the Council of Ministers from Abakumov to Molotov, dated July 17, 1947 D WallenbergOs alleged death date. While we do not have the memorandum itself, 3044a D the coincidence of date has been used to prove that this was a report on his execution. In fact this document could have made any one of a number of recommendations. #Were it not for the serious sightings of a number of eyewitnesses in the Gulag and the praise of those he had saved, Raoul Wallenberg might have been forgotten as so many foreigners thought to have been taken into the Gulag, fate unknown. The Russian side of the Working Group over the past ten years has provided a number of documents to establish WallenbergOs presence in the Moscow prisons. Because of the absence of the complete sequence of documentation for 1947 D transports, searches, cell occupancy, calls for interrogation, prolongations of his investigative process, statements of jurisdiction, his medical history and his death act D the question of WallenbergOs fate remains open. Any effort to resolve it D in the absence of his personal and investigative files D must be achieved through a painstaking process of ©reconstruction.6 In this regard, we have eyewitness reports from a variety of sources related to WallenbergOs mission, his presence in camps, the verified reports of his presence in Moscow prisons until early 1947 D and the unverified ones which begin almost immediately after his alleged death date of July 17, 1947 and continue into the Eighties. In order to launch a systematic investigation to cluster and verify these reports, it has been necessary to establish a context in which to evaluate them. This includes some understanding of the step by step processing of a prisoner within a special contingent undergoing interrogation in preparation for sentencing as well as clues provided by the prison regime. A number of questions must be asked as one proceeds with this reconstruction: For example, how do the various sightings of Wallenberg alive or speculative reports of his death relate to the norm? How can we apply proper procedures for arrest and registration, regularity of interrogation, reporting of jurisdiction, sentencing, and particularly the decisions which arose with an approaching end of prison term to determine the next juncture of WallenbergOs fate? If he was sentenced at a certain time D what are the probability of the articles or charges against him and where would he have gone? How does his alleged death relate to the standard D or exceptional B reporting of any other foreign prisoner? How do the later reports in the Seventies and Eighties of WallenbergOs presence in places to the East, as well as in psychiatric facilities correspond to the general procedures or patterns of movement for a prisoner whose lengthy sentence includes both prison and camp time. Is it possible that for medical or other reasons he was eventually taken out of the MGB/MVD system altogether? How can we track a prisoner whose term has expired and yet his status has been prolonged under the label OEspecially Dangerous State Criminal.O# The details of WallenbergOs initial OarrestO B the invisible curtain which fell between him and those whom he had saved in Budapest B indicates that in the eyes of Soviet leadership, he was already considered an Oimportant State criminal.O Factors involved in confirming the charges against such a criminal were presented in a compendium of practices laid forth by MGB and former Smersh chief, Abakumov to Stalin on July 17th, 1947, WallenbergOs alleged death date. I report to you about the practice formed in the organs of the MGB of conducting investigation on the affairs of spies, saboteurs, terrorists and members of anti-Soviet underground (organizations). 1. Before the arrest of a criminal there are measures foreseen which provide for the suddenness of the ...arrest with the object of a) averting escape or suicide; b) prevention of an attempt to inform accomplices; c) staving off the destruction of evidential data. At the arrest of an important State criminal, when it is necessary to conceal the arrest from the surroundings or when it is impossible to simultaneously execute the arrest of his accomplices, in order not to give them an opportunity to slip away from responsibility or to destroy evidential data D a secret arrest is being executed in the street or in some other especially invented circumstances. The manner in which Wallenberg was allowed to prepare for his journey to Debrecen, (to fix his car, gather his documents, a great deal of currency and valuables, and make an extra stop to give final instructions to his workers in a number of different offices or clinics) D all under the seemingly casual eye of Major Demshenko D corresponds to this scheme. The question is why a neutral diplomat, a man whose time was consumed with rescue work, should be of serious interest to the Soviet authorities? Was he simply to serve as collateral for an international game, a pawn for an eventual exchange? Or were there real charges against him? The Importance of WallenbergOs Lubyanka Registration Card The fact that WallenbergOs registration card at Lubyanka Prison, dated February 6, 1945, acknowledges him as a Oprisoner of warO, that he remained under the jurisdiction of Smersh and later, the 4th Department of the Third Main Directorate (Military Counter-intelligence) raises some questions about possible military implication to his mission in Hungary. (It should be noted that of the eighty prisoner files I have studied, many of whom were also arrested by Smersh, it was not usual for Abakumov personally to request an arrest and/or that the prisoner be brought to Moscow. The only other cases I have seen were high-ranking German military or naval officers.) At the same time, one should bear in mind that wartime questions of a humanitarian nature D involving the evacuation of casualties or movements of refugees across national borders D had to be coordinated with the military strategies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in London and Washington and with the various intelligence groups stationed in Caserta and Bari, Italy. While Moscow was informed through the British and American Missions in Moscow of some of these activities, the Soviets were not fully apprised of the Western Allies intentions in the Balkans. In fact, in their respective campaigns in Southeastern Europe, and in the neutral capitals of Europe and Turkey, the Anglo-American Allies and the Soviets were already watching and keeping secrets from each other. What was WallenbergOs mission? The only non-American working as a U.S. War Refugee Board representative, his task was not simply to OobserveO in the passive sense, to sit at a desk and write reports. Wallenberg made it a condition of his service that he be permitted to save lives. We also know from his detailed record-keeping regarding the property and next of kin of those under his care, and his ONansen PlanO he was creating to assure the safe reconstruction of the Jewish community in Budapest, that his work had an economic component as well. This both originated and carried over into his special relationship with the Managing Directorship of Tungsram, also known as United Incandescent or Orion Tungsram D a General Electric, ITT, ISEC and ASEA affiliate until 1941 when, with the outbreak of war with Germany, the Americans were forced to abandon the multi-national cartel affiliates, leaving only Hungarian, German and Swedish ownership. Wallenberg openly formed his ©Humanitarian SectorO leadership out of the Managing Directorship of Tungsram, with such assistants as Hugo Wohl, while through Sweden ASEA, as a Wallenberg owned General Electric affiliate, negotiated the exchange of Leopold Aeschner, TungsramOs top director from Germany. Aeschner arrived safely in Switzerland on January 18, 1945 B the day that Soviet troops liberated Auschwitz B and one day after WallenbergOs disappearance at the hands of Smersh. (By Christmas 1944, the Wallenbergs had also arranged through Berlin for the release of the Norman Group, a number of ASEA affiliated executives arrested in Poland and held by the Gestapo. The fact that both Aeschner and the Norman Group were saved from German captivity before the arrival of the advancing Soviet troops D while Raoul Wallenberg was not B is tragic.) Early questioning in Budapest shows that the Soviets were already concerned about the true nature of WallenbergOs diplomatic status. Find out what kind of secretary he is. For Wallenberg was not a career diplomat but a businessman who traveled in Germany and the occupied countries prior to his humanitarian mission. This may have contributed to his being selected for the mission, for he was already known in Hungary and other nations. In this work, Wallenberg, like many business executives, traveled on a Kabinetpass. His Passport Number 248 returned by the Soviets in 1989 is also a Kabinetpass, only with the word OdiplomatO inscribed in gold leaf. As clearly Wallenberg relied upon his diplomatic status for his safety, it is important to compare this form of passport with that of a career diplomat such as Per Anger. Could the Soviets see on sight that there was something different about his papers? Did they realize also that the date of WallenbergOs passport had been extended in his own writing D although Per AngerOs signature is attached? One of the most cryptic results of WallenbergOs intake interview, reflected on his Lubyanka registration card, is Item 7, Profession/Specialty, where it is written Odiplomaticheskiy nadsmotr.6 Translated literally this means ODiplomatic foremanO D i.e., a diplomat who oversees other diplomats presumably to assure the productive fullfillment of an established goal. Again we come to the distinction between a passive observer and one with a more active humanitarian role D Olike a prosecutor or manager.6 Does this in some way reflect his marching orders as representative of the U. S. War Refugee Board? The fact that this label describes the way in which Wallenberg actually conducted various aspects of his mission would indicate that this was central to its structure. For example, the heroic story refers to WallenbergOs threats to his adversaries that he would make sure they were hanged if they persisted in their crimes against humanity. Was this personal bravado or, in fact, part of his function as a diplomaticheskiy nadsmotr? From the testimonies of a few individuals who worked or claimed to have worked with Wallenberg, we know that he collected evidence of atrocities D not only against the Jews but against Hungarians and B as two witnesses have testified B even related to Katyn. Some of these existed in photographic form, in preparation for war crime trials. Those photographs are missing although there is no proof that he took them with him to meet the Soviets. WallenbergOs efforts to re-establish justice were an essential part of his rescue and reconstruction mission. The atrocities he documented, the account books he kept could have been every bit as much a reason for his arrest as the rumor that he was an American agent. Iver Olsen B WallenbergOs War Refugee Board contact in Stockholm B denied that Wallenberg was ever part of the American OSS. In fact the American government B at least after the death of President Roosevelt in April 1945 B seemed to know little about the man. A CIA document dated March 31, 1955 from the American Embassy in Stockholm to the Department of State, after a meeting with Swedish official Gunnar Jarring, summarizes WallenbergOs mission in Budapest as follows: For your information, Wallenberg, who is a nephew of the influential banking Wallenbergs, was assigned by the Foreign Office to Budapest in 1944 to be in charge of their Foreign Interests Section, but, more particularly, to try to do something for the Jews who were suffering severely under the German occupation. (Underlinings mine). While this point has been debated and denied, it should be noted that the Foreign Interest Sector was the very division of the Swedish Legation in Budapest responsible for overseeing Soviet interests in Hungary against those of OFascist Germany.O If indeed Wallenberg was technically in charge of the Sector D any protection afforded German- owned property or industry in Hungary or of Hungarian national or Jewish valuables being removed to Germany/Austria in the wake of advancing Soviet troops would be diametrically opposed to representing Soviet interests. Further to this, any evidence he carried which related to the OaktionsO of General Serov (Ivanov) with the approval of Stalin in Rumania, Ukraine, or Poland put him in imminent danger D whether he realized it or not, for it has been said by at least one person who worked with Wallenberg that he was 6na«ve when it came to the Russians.6 German Police Attache Gustav Richter, WallenbergOs first cellmate in February 1945, also commented upon his return to the West that WallenbergOs official mandate was somehow coordinated with OprotectionQ or Oprotective powers.O In the course of our conversations, Herr Wallenberg told me that he had been sent to Budapest in an official capacity (amtlicher Eigenschaft) in order to carry out a protective mandate (Schutzmachtauftrag). While on the surface this might refer to WallenbergOs diplomatic status for his humanitarian mission, we must dig deeper to determine the way it was structured in order to understand its true intention. Was it to save lives or to save interests? WallenbergOs efforts to save Jews by making deals while, at the same time keeping Hungarian economy and certain interests intact, may account for conflicts between protecting Jews and their property, a mandate of Safe Haven, and protecting Soviet interests. We see signs of this in that, after WallenbergOs arrest. Sector B or the Foreign Interests Sector of the Swedish Legation was forbidden by the military command to represent any foreign powers. All foreigners (i.e., all non-Russians and non-Hungarians, therefore really also Swedes) would be referred to the City commandantOs Foreign Bureau which, as mentioned earlier was headed by the former Swedish Embassy officer, Count Tolstoy. Tolstoy, described by the head of Polish intelligence in Budapest as an anti-Semitic pro-Fascist agent of the NKVD, had kept diligent notes on both Wallenberg and the Wallenberg familyOs interests in Hungary, according to one archival expert. TolstoyOs file in the SVR (Foreign Intelligence archives) has not been shown to the Swedish side in spite of repeated requests. While we have neither enough information about WallenbergOs mission nor any known analogy for the Soviet use of the term diplomaticheskiy nadsmotr to evaluate this matter further, we do know that whatever was recorded on WallenbergOs registration card was not done arbitrarily but corresponded to materials to be found in his archival investigative file. In this case, OPassport 248, Foreign Ministry of Sweden,6 is even written on the card just underneath the term diplomatischeskiy nadsmotr. Judging from the contents of the files we have seen, we may assume that this term was not introduced by Wallenberg himself during the intake interview. Had it been, it would have been inscribed D OBy his own words.6 Furthermore, as will be discussed in II. DEATH, there are certain aspects to the incompletion of the card which would indicate that it had not been retrieved from the kartoteka of Lubyanka Prison where it belonged, but from the back of his file D which we have been told is missing or destroyed. The question is whether WallenbergOs seemingly neutral mission had more sensitive political overtones as well. We can see from WallenbergOs calendar for Budapest D returned by the Soviets in 1989 D that he had a number of meetings with representatives of the Horthy and Arrow Cross governments as well as different political factions in Hungary. One of the first was with Dr. Geza Soos, a Hungarian diplomat of both the Cultural and Scandinavian Departments of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry. By November 1944, Soos D a pastor and jurist B had become the Secretary and head of the Magyar Fucggetlensegi Mozgalom (MFM) in the absence of Domokos Szent-Ivanyi who was in Moscow negotiating the Armistice. The OSS in Caserta, in their search for Soos in November 1944, had both Per Anger and WallenbergOs names as those who would know where he was to be found. After the arrest of the military leadership of the MFM by the Gestapo, Soos D who had been in hiding D escaped to Italy with a separate peace proposal for the West. These papers, taken from him by Allied interrogators, are missing as well. In addition to all the known political figures with whom Wallenberg had meetings, he also met on November 26 and December 3, 1944 with members of EXZ, a secret nationalist society whose members included Catholic and Protestant leadership, aristocracy and clergy working together toward a pro-democratic unity in Hungary. Among these was former Hungarian Prime Minister Count Istavan Bethlen, a leader of the Smallholders Party. Bethlen had hidden from the Germans since their occupation in March 1944; the Soviets kept him under Ohouse arrest.O To prevent Bethlen from becoming reinvolved in the political life of the country, particularly because of his pro-British orientation, Bethlen was also arrested by Smersh at the orders of Molotov and brought to Moscow where D by some reports D he was interrogated by Abakumov. Bethlen died in Butyrka Hospital on October 5, 1946 from paralysis of the heart. But Bethlen was old D Wallenberg only thirty-two at the time of his arrest. Questions of espionage aside, WallenbergOs connections with a number of different international, national, and independent networks made him a valuable source for the Soviets. His age gave him, at least initially, a strong chance for survival . There is, on the other hand, another important aspect to WallenbergOs registration card that should be considered: the fact that he was registered at Lubyanka (Internal Prison Moscow) on February 6, 1945 under his name, while the Lubyanka possessions registry for 1945 shows him entering and exiting from Internal Prison with his rucksack D also under his name. The importance of this can be seen in the disclaimer introduced in the Gromyko Memorandum in 1957. The Soviet authorities thoroughly examined archives related to prisoners and their investigative files in order to find possible information about Wallenberg. But as a result of these measures, one cannot find any data that Wallenberg was in the Soviet Union. It became clear that no one who was debriefed knew anyone whose name is Wallenberg. In short, those who might have known the name of Wallenberg are dead, no longer actively involved in the administration, or not about to reveal themselves. If Wallenberg did still then exist as a prisoner in the Soviet Gulag, it could only be under a (number or) different name. This is the equivalent of being Olost in the GulagS only instead of this being a problem of a vast territory with no coordinated tracking system, we are referring to a highly centralized watch system which can recall a prisoner to Moscow from the Far East in a matter of days and which can oversee from afar a select group of special prisoners whose identities have been erased. The fact that Wallenberg, in February 1945, was introduced to the prison system under true name should be compared to the case of the members of the Polish Government in Exile, invited to Moscow for a meeting in March 1945, rounded up and arrested by Serov (Ivanov). The members of this group were immediately numbered D starting with Number 2 for the leader of the Home Army who died in December 1946 as the result of a hunger strike. Number 3 was Deputy Premier Jan Stanislaw Jankowski, an important figure in Polish counter-intelligence particularly after the death of Premier Sikorski at Gibraltar in 1943. Jankowski died just prior to the end of his term at Vladimir Prison in March 1953. The rest of the Poles who appeared in a public show trial in June 1945 were repatriated. The OPolish arrestedO were numbered solely for the period they were under investigation. They appeared for public trial under their names, after which they were known as Othe convicted Okulicki.6 etc. During the investigative period, their identities were hidden from prison personnel by their numbers, while they underwent intense interrogation under the jurisdiction of the Especially Important Matters Division. Another group that was numbered, at least by 1943, were the leaders of the Baltic nations arrested in the Penza, Kubishev or Tambov regions in 1941 (where, presumably, they too had been brought for their protection and safekeeping.) Until 1946 these families were held in Kirov Internal Prison, after which they were transferred to Ivanovo MGB in 1947 £> with a slight adjustment in numbers in keeping with what would appear to be a more centralized system controlled by Moscow Central. One member of this group D Prisoner Number 12 D was sent to Kazan Psychiatric Prison hospital to undergo treatment D again under his number, not his name. These prisoners were held under investigation until 1952 when they were brought to Moscow to be sentenced. After sentencing, they received new numbers and were sent to Vladimir where D in late 1953 D like many of the numbered prisoners whose identities are known to us, they were allowed to resume the use of their name. Except for those who died or chose to remain in exile, the majority of these prisoners were repatriated to their respective homelands in 1954. Wallenberg and perhaps LangfelderOs cases tend toward the opposite course. For the first two years of their detention D although the Soviets would not openly admit to their respective governments that they had seized them D these men had a number of different cellmates and were processed under their names. Their presence within the contingent of prisoners was known. We have seen documents indicating that by April 1947, a decision had been prepared but not yet reported regarding the fate of Wallenberg D one which could have involved his OdisappearanceO rather than his death. The evidence supporting this is that while Wallenberg and LangfelderOs names have been either cut out or blotted out of different registries (the removal of their names) no attempt has been made to account for their deaths in the regular way (register their deaths but fake the cause of death). In their case then, they may have been tried in closed session by OSO (the Special Tribunal) in a trial they probably were not permitted to attend, so they never saw the evidence or knew the charges against them. After their sentencing they would be sent out as a Numbered Prisoner or under another name, while those in charge of their case would retain their true identity (as noted on their original registration card) in an envelope at the back of their file. Even if this identity was changed from place to place, this sequence of identities could be noted by holding their registration cards. This may explain why LangfelderOs card is missing and WallenbergOs, which was returned, makes no mention of his return to Lubyanka in March 1947, much less of his death. #The documents the Russians have presented establish that Raoul Wallenberg was registered under his name from his initial registration in February 1945 through his transfer from Lefortovo Prison to Lubyanka on March 1, 1947 at least until his interrogation by Kuzmishin on March 11, 1947. Therefore, if he OdiedO or OdisappearedO some documents should exist to inform those departments whose function it was to confirm a prisonerOs status or whereabouts what had happened. Even if WallenbergOs death/disappearance constituted OexceptionalO circumstances, the process of clearing and removing his paper trail would require some order D oral or written D warning the official trying to proceed according to the normal order not to inquire any further.# WallenbergOs Investigative Process Not knowing the charges against Wallenberg at the point of his initial arrest, it is difficult to predict his course. All that we know comes from the documents provided by the Russian side of the Swedish-Russian Working Group since 1991. While it has been frequently claimed that Wallenberg was accused of being an American spy, there are indications through the discussions with the Allied Control Commission in Hungary that he was initially under suspicion as a German collaborator. Eyewitnesses have on occasion suggested that he was also branded for having worked with the British. There is also the question of whether or not he was a member of Swedish intelligence. The latter was rumored particularly in Glasnost when the Russians returned WallenbergSs possessions and stated they had made a tragic mistake. In trying to identify the nature of the OmistakeO it was mentioned by Russian experts that the Soviets were looking for a Swedish intelligence agent but may have arrested the Owrong man.6 According to the authorities and his cellmates, Wallenberg was interrogated rarely in the beginning (FebruaryDMay 1945) , although the eyewitnesses recollected more frequent interrogations than the documents turned over by the Russian side would confirm. We know of only five Wallenberg interrogations through the Russian side of the Working Group, ranging from February 8, 1945 to March 11, 1947, all under Smersh or its later incarnation, the 4th Department of the 3rd Main Directorate. As the Swiss diplomats Max Meier and Harald Feller were also interrogated rarely, we may see this as a reflection of neutral diplomats being held essentially as pawns in the international game. Yet witnesses such as the Italian diplomat, Claudio di Mohr, who claimed Wallenberg was still alive in 1948, judged from the fact that Wallenberg, and his cellmate Willi Roedl, occupied an adjacent and/or audible cell stated that the two were taken out frequently at night for interrogation while in Lefortovo. And indeed one would expect a prisoner as knowledgeable and diversely connected as Wallenberg to have been a valuable source for the various Soviet foreign intelligence and counter- intelligence units as they sharpened their tools in preparation for the Cold War. A first step was always identification of personalities in other countries, for which his calendar and address books D returned in 1989 D served a useful purpose. In this regard, retired KGB officials Sergei A. Kondrashev stated that he served as interpreter for one interrogation in April 1947 in which Wallenberg answered questions related to names on a sheet D so calmly and openly that Kondrashev was convinced the man was innocent. Of the known Wallenberg interrogations, there are two which stand out because they are overlap with those of other figures potentially related to WallenbergOs fate. The first is KuzmishinOs interrogation of Wallenberg on April 28, 1945, coincidental with Burashnikov and KopelyanskyOs interrogation of Count Istavan Bethlen and RassypinskiOs of Polish Deputy Premier Jan Stanislaw Jankowski. We do not know the subject of the Wallenberg interrogation (unless Kondrashev has confused the year), nor can JankowskiOs be found, but the authorities have informed us that the Bethlen interrogation involved biographical data, connection with the Senate and Foreign Affairs Committee of Hungary, politicians in the West and withdrawal from the War B in other words, offers of separate peace. (Underlinings mine). In late August and early September 1944, a number of Hungarian peace feelers went out toward the Western Allies D in Madrid, Istanbul and Bern. The most detailed came through discussions between BethlenOs son, Othe young Count BethlenO and a British representative in Spain while Regent Horthy remained in closed council in Buda with Othe old Count BethlenO, the former Minister for Foreign Affairs de Kanya and former Prime Minister, Gyula Karolyi. While the proposals for action vacillated between turning on the Germans and making it impossible for them to hold a line on the DanubeO to relying upon German aid to defend Hungary against a Russo-Rumanian invasion, one point remained firm: Regent has ordered the deportation of Jews to cease and Hungarian Government alone (as opposed to the occupying Germans) will henceforth handle the question. In this one respect at least, one can identify the task of Raoul Wallenberg. Wallenberg, who was to have returned to Stockholm at that time, remained in Budapest while members of the Hungarian OCrown CouncilO deliberated how best to effect an armistice D to the Allies through the neutral legations in Budapest or through the commander-in- chief of the Red Army. Deputy Premier of the Polish Government in London, Jankowski, operating in Eastern Europe under the code name OSobolQ, contributed to the rescue of Jews by providing Polish intelligence to the World Jewish Congress and the Joint Distribution Committee. On April 15, 1944, for example, he wrote: From Teresienstadt in the Protectorate where the Czech Jews are concentrated, the Germans D under the guise of giving them jobs D moved 7,000 Jews to Auschwitz. Two weeks later they gassed them. Before they killed them (the Germans) took from them written letters to their cousins and friends with description of their good working conditions This is a trap for the next groupsE In Hungary there are presently 800,000 Jews. The Germans have started already their action to liquidate themE Here in Poland the action of tracking and liquidating the Jews is still onE The leaders of Poland and Hungary both faced grave danger from two opposing totalitarian forces intent on occupying their countries and subduing their national spirit. In Hungary a firm stand on the Jewish question was presented as a positive reason for the Anglo-American forces to consider a separate peace in spite of their commitment to Stalin in 1943 of ©unconditional surrender.6 As a Government in Exile, the Poles were involved in a different aspect of the Jewish question. While Hungary until the German occupation offered a safe haven to the Jews, Polish intelligence through Jankowski provided an important network for intelligence gathering for Polish, Allied and Jewish "ST questions. The Catholic component of this network, through the Prince Primate families assisted in the rescue of Allied prisoners of war and, in some cases, Jews. Their network reached from Cracow to the Vatican. It was to Baron Apor, Hungarian Minister to the Vatican, that Geza Soos of the Hungarian resistance movement MFM, carried the final Hungarian separate peace offer to the Western Allies that was intercepted. How these networks cooperated in the rescue of Jews and prisoners of war and in the documenting of atrocities through Wallenberg and through the Hungarian nationalist society EXZ or other Allied and Jews chains out of Istanbul, is the subject of a greater work. One should note in terms of the interrogation in question that none of these three men D Wallenberg, Bethlen or Jankowski D were ever repatriated to their homelands. The second interrogation which shows an overlap of case-related individuals is that conducted by Kopelyansky on July 17, 1946 D one year before WallenbergOs alleged death date. At that time, Kopelyansky interrogated Wallenberg, Langfelder, Van der Waals and Braun. In the case of Wallenberg and Langfelder there is an actual overlap in time D indicating that the interrogator went back and forth between their respective interrogation rooms to pursue his questions or that a more important person was present to carry on parts of the interrogations under his name. While we have been told that Wallenberg and LangfelderOs files are missing, we have requested protocols of interrogation for Van der Waals and Braun for that date to see if we can determine the line of inquiry. These too have not been forthcoming. Again we should note that all four of these men did not make it to freedom. Wallenberg allegedly died in 1947, Langfelder in March 1948, Van der Waals of tuberculosis on August 11, 1948, Braun of the same in Verchne Uralsk in 1953. The Question of Sentencing in relation to OLiquidationO Both the Russian side of the Swedish-Russian Working Group, and Alexander Yakovlev of the Presidential Commission for the Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repression under Stalin have stated that Raoul Wallenberg was never sentenced. This is an important claim D first it cannot be established as fact without examining WallenbergOs investigative file and/or knowing the identity of every prisoner sentenced 1947 D 1952 by the Military Tribunal or OSO, the Special Tribunal, including numbered prisoners. Secondly, as both Russian inquiries are claiming Wallenberg died from execution D whether by lethal injection or shooting D this (based on the files I have seen) would also imply a sentence or decision. (Oggins who was said to have been killed by lethal injection in 1947 had been sentenced long before D his term was about to expire. Gfrorener was sentenced by the Military Tribunal to death by shooting in February 1952 and was actually shot in April of the same year.) What is being implied by the current Russian execution claims is that WallenbergOs death was ordered while he was still under investigation. There is something disturbing about this claim. Judging from the other prisoners with whom Wallenberg sat or whose cases intersected with his, his investigative process was barely underway. Recruiting was not the only consideration of the Soviet investigating bodies D there was a tremendous amount of information to be gleaned from a Otalking man.O Valeri Boldin in an article in Top Secret, March 1999 told how StalinOs safe supposedly contained documents, discovered immediately upon his death in March 1953. Among these were stenographic transcripts of WallenbergOs interrogations as well as communications from Abakumov regarding a prisoner Mueller being held in a special site in the Urals. The investigators stated they had received all the data they needed from Mueller D and wanted to know if the person should be kept on or if the case should be closed for good, so information on the person does not leak. Again we are faced with the same question: does Oclose the case for goodQ mean Okill the manO or move him to another site where he is unknown? General Yevgeni Pitovranov, head of the 2nd Main Directorate (Counter- intelligence) while Abakumov was in charge of the 3rd (Military Counter- intelligence) stated to Swedish television in 1992: OJoseph Stalin needed him (Wallenberg) in the big political game and would never have executed himE His death was a mistake.6 And, indeed, in search of an explanation how Wallenberg could have died in 1947 B 6a mistakeO is the only possible explanation for what could have happened, if it happened then. First, none of the appropriate medical personnel are taking responsibility for what happened D they are leaving that to A. L. Smoltsov of the Sanitary Unit of Lubyanka Prison. Smoltsov, according to Yakovlev, had been dismissed for reasons of health on March 21, 1947 and was not working on July 17/18, 1947 when his note describing the death of one Walenberg by heart attack was supposedly written. By 1957 when his document surfaced in support of the Gromyko Memorandum to establish WallenbergOs death, Dr. Smoltsov was himself deceased. In short, the competent medical authority is not signing as witness to this death. Perhaps it didnOt happen, perhaps they were never asked, or perhaps they refused. Secondly, one expert has made the point that the reason it was required to witness a death act was to establish that it was not the result of violence or foul play. Item 8 of AbakumovOs report to Stalin of July 17, 1947 on procedures in dealing with a prisoner does not rule out such a possibility. The MGB organs according to the CC VCP (B) (Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party) instructions of 10 January 1939 use measures of physical coercion toward spies convicted by investigation, saboteurs, terrorists and other active enemies of the Soviet people who impertinently refuse to give away their accomplices and do not testify: In the Center D with the sanction of MGB USSR. In the regions B with the sanctions of State Security Ministers of republics and of heads of (regional) Departments of MGB. This paragraph is, however, particularly controversial to the Russian side of the Working Group who maintain that there were specific orders not to use torture and that this compilation may not be a OrealO document. The files themselves would confirm that the investigators kept watch over their prisoners, as in the cases of Kitschman or Gerstenberg, sending them to the doctors for evaluation to see if they could withstand further interrogation. Thirdly, if a decision was made to liquidate Wallenberg in the sense of OexecutionO, it would have required a sentence by Military Tribunal or a sequence of discussions within the circle of the highest level of Soviet leadership, followed by a decision and then an order, with a witnessed document to affirm that it had been carried out. No one is admitting responsibility for this either. They do however acknowledge B even volunteer the fact B that rasstriel (death by shooting) was canceled May 26, 1947 and not resumed until January 12, 1950 in anticipation of the Leningrad trials which ultimately became part of AbakumovOs downfall. Reintroduced, the penalty was to apply to traitors to the country, spies and subversive diversionaries D and other groups of political offenders. On April 30, 1954 its use was extended to apply to cases of murder. Much of the argument related to the recent speculations that Wallenberg was executed, either by shooting or lethal injection, relies on the absence of documentation to prevent contradiction. (The truth can never be established one way or the other). Conviction that such stories are true are sparked by the belief that in Stalinist times such measures as quick, angry executions were commonplace. Former KGB official Ilya Dzhirkvelov repeatedly makes the point D both in relation to purges of Party leadership or the assassinations prepared by Liter L, the OLiquidatsiaO unit under Sudaplatov D that these procedures were not done in a climate of total lawlessness organized by the NKVD and Stalin personally but were carried out in strict accordance with laws that are still in force today. Dzhirkvelov also states that the only exception to the rule of a collective decision involving members of the Politburo with a particular connection to the KGB was when Beria was in charge of Soviet intelligence and counter-intelligence: he had the right to approve such operations and to inform Stalin about them orally. While the Soviets in the Gromyko Memorandum of 1957 attributed such license-to-kill to Abakumov, BeriaOs role in defining the OexceptionO should be considered further. We do not know how far to carry the precedent of BeriaOs ©discretionary powerO to order the assassination of civilians or individuals abroad compared to orders related to the extermination of a foreign prisoner of war already in captivity. If Wallenberg Was Sentenced, When? Had Wallenberg been sentenced rather than killed, my calculations would show that the earliest date this could have happened D given the procedures in question D would have been May/June of 1947. In such a case, the charges against him would have been OCounter-Revolutionary ActivitiesO, i.e. involvement with nationalist, religious or international networks opposed to Soviet occupation or influence in Central and Eastern Europe. The preparations for this trial would coincide with his period of isolation in Lubyanka/Lefortovo Prisons starting March 1, 1947 until a decision was made and the file sent to OSO. Prisoners accused of Counter-Revolutionary crimes are to be isolated from other prisoners and from recidivists. A sentence for Counter-Revolutionary crimes was generally lighter than that for espionage. Those in the group with whom Wallenberg had been placed were not generally sentenced for 15 to 25 years for espionage until 1951D52, after more than a hundred interrogations in several cases. Bearing in mind that prisoners associated with this case did on occasion receive more than one sentence, this initial sentencing in 1947 carrying a term of ten years or less would serve the positive function of removing Wallenberg from Moscow prisons. When the sentence is passed or decision made by OSO (Secret Tribunal), the prisoner is to be moved from investigation cell to convicted cell and then sent wayE Convicted prisoners cannot stay in prison more than ten days after the ProsecutorOs decision comes into force or the OSO decision is announced. Under exceptional circumstances, the prisoner can be detained for operational purposes for up to two months by a written order from the head of the UNKVD or his deputy, with indication of the purpose. In 1947, this would have involved an order from Selivanovsky and/or Abakumov of the MGB. #This brings us to the question of concealing a prisonerOs identity by numbering him or her, or giving him or her a pseudonym. By studying the sequence of numbered prisoners sentenced by OSO at that time (the Spring/Summer 1947 until May of 1948) I was able to determine that there exist only six available numbers to account for the disappearance of three men D Raoul Wallenberg, Vilmos Langfelder and Sandor Katona who was brought with Langfelder to Lubyanka Prison on July 23, 1947 where Langfelder was questioned extensively E>- for over eleven hours. These numbers will be discussed further in III. DISAPPEARANCE but are being mentioned now to remind the reader that there existed a clear cut alternative to death/execution. Our main concern is for the Russians to help us establish their true identities.# The Question of Liquidatsia We know now, through documents provided by the Russian side, that WallenbergOs presence in Moscow prisons under the Ministry of State Security (MGB) was known to representatives of the Soviet Foreign Ministry (MID) as early as 1946. We would expect Beria, hence Dekanozow, to be aware of WallenbergOs capture soon after his arrest either directly or through lists of important prisoners forwarded to him. In a communique between Borashnikov of the 3rd Main Directorate and Chebotarev of the Foreign Ministry regarding the case, it was stated to MID: it would be desirable if Comrade Vishinsky gave a call to Comrade Abakumov on this issue. This was followed by an oral communication between Fedotov of MGB, and Rodionov of MID in February 1947 informing that Wallenberg was raspodejene. Sunder the control of the MGB.6 In a follow up report from Vietrov to Vishinsky dated April 2, 1947 we learn: Comrade Fedotov promised to report to Molotov about the reasons for WallenbergOs detention and also to give the proposals on further measures on the issue. However, according to FedotovOs information this issue has not been reported yet but has been already prepared. We therefore cannot assume that VishinskyOs denial of August 18, 1947, OAs a result of a careful investigation it has been established that Wallenberg is not in the Soviet Union and that he is unknown to us,6 was based on ignorance. The question then is whether VishinskyOs response of August 18, 1947 was intended to conceal WallenbergOs alleged execution on July 17, 1947, or was rather a standard statement issued to foreign governments inquiring after their prisoners of war to avoid endless diplomatic wrangling for their return. Similar language, for instance, has been seen in a reply by Vishinsky to the British regarding the warrant officer, Sir Reginald Barrett, also arrested in Hungary. It also was expressed by Novikov in relation to Nils Hilding Jorganson, a Managing Director of the von Oppeln Company, who disappeared on February 5th, 1945 near Dresden. Inform you that the Swedish subject is not detected on the territory of the Soviet occupation zone. While the intention reflected in the VishinskyOs memorandums of May 14, 1947 may seem ambiguous, his role as a catalyst to WallenbergOs fate is clear. The most critical document, religiously evoked to establish the Soviets intention to kill Wallenberg in 1947, is that of Vishinsky to Foreign Minister Molotov of May 14, 1947. Here Vishinsky notes that D in response to repeated inquiries from the Swedish government D he has requested clarification from Smersh (ODeath to SpiesO) and later the Minister of State Security (both Abakumov) regarding the fate of Raoul Wallenberg. Insofar as the case remains unresolved until the present moment D i.e., nothing is moving; no one cares to resolve it D I ask you to order Abakumov to present information on the subject of this affair and suggestions for its liquidatsia. Molotov wrote on the same document to Abakumov: Report to me. #The controversy that exists among experts D both scholars and former KGB officials as well as the Russian representatives D is whether this word OliquidatsiaO refers to Raoul Wallenberg, the man, or the problem generated by his presence as a captive inside the Soviet Union. Is this a simple matter of Oreporting backO or a more sinister OhintQ to execute the man?# Interpreters in the West have, with great conviction, latched upon this word OliquidatsiaO to mean OdeathS as indeed it would have meant in terms of the Holocaust. However, it is very important D particularly in the absence of WallenbergOs file D to place this language in a context. Take, for example, the parallel cases of PRISONER S and PRISONER C, two pro-Allied Hungarians arrested in the Budapest region, who were held in Lefortovo Prison for years without being interrogated. OWe inform you that according to AbakumovOs instructions, PRISONER C is to be kept in Internal Prison without the usual documentation until special instructionsEO (17 December 1946). Two years later, protesting the ongoing violation of investigative procedure, lonov, Chief of Lefortovo, wrote a succession of letters to the Chief of Section A, Major Burashnikov (October 1948), to the head of the Investigative Section for Especially Important Matters, Leonov (January 28, 1949): and the Chief of the 2nd Main Directorate, Pitovranov (December 30, 1949). lonov was particularly explicit in his letter to Leonov when he states that, in spite of repeated oral and written attempts to resolve the matter, it remained as before. The indicated sections do not wish to acknowledge them as their prisoners. I request explanation and to take all measures to move the question ahead. (Underlinings mine). In view of the parallel between lonovOs language Oto take all measures to move the question aheadO and VishinskyOs to Molotov, Oto present information on the subject of this affair and suggestions about its liquidatsiaO (meaning to Omove it aheadO by reporting on it so it can be resolved) it is important to pay close attention to the means taken to put an end to the problem in the case of PRISONER S and PRISONER C. lonov had written to a number of different offices in an attempt to determine who was responsible for these prisoners. While he applied to the division of Especially Important Matters and to the 2nd Main Directorate D both of whom prepared cases for sentencing D his reply came from Department A on the 10th of February 1950. Not to give a report on the arrest of the arrestedE PRISONER C (year of birth 1920) and PRISONER S (year of birth 1912) in Lefortovo Prison. However, on April 13, 1950, charges were finally placed against PRISONER S as an agent of British intelligence (PRISONER C was in fact a British officer). Both were sentenced on July 1, 1950 and sent to Vladimir Prison as numbered prisoners 24 and 26 respectively. Together with PRISONER P a Hungarian officer with ties D it is rumored D to both British and Soviet forces, they formed a series for sentencing by OSO on July 1, 1950. Together they traveled to Vladimir where they were placed in Corpus II. Their cards can be seen in the kartoteka along with that of another unknown Hungarian D Prisoner Number One B who card bears the label OAmerican spy.6 PRISONER S and PRISONER COs cases were, in their way, a violation of the norm. And yet when lonov sounded the alarm, the solution was not to kill the prisoners to remove the problem of an illegal or undocumented arrest. It was rather to come to a decision D i.e., arrest, sentence and send him out as a numbered prisoner D all within a matter of months. Their numbering does not reflect the systemOs desire to conceal a violation from itself D assuming that is even possible D but rather to resolve the problem by sending them into a facility that provided strict isolation, where there identities would be unknown. This was especially important because both men, who were later repatriated, were valued by the British B PRISONER S because he had housed Special Operatives Executive personnel in Hungary D and PRISONER C because he was a Lieutenant in the OBritish ArmyO in Hungary (an Army created by the British using Hungarian personnel). Their return had been repeatedly requested, as well as clarifications of their fates, by the Foreign Office. Here too there is pressure to resolve the cases (come to a decision) from without D through diplomatic channels D and within (holding to prison administration regulations). This OdisappearanceO format corresponds to information provided by one ex-KGB officials asked to comment on the Vishinsky Memorandum of May 1947. Without hesitation, he interpreted OliquidatsiaO to refer to the removal of a problem, not the execution of a man. The procedures defined to move the issue ahead, to resolve it, were common knowledge to him. The prisoner was numbered or given another name and sent either to the East D or someplace where he would not be seen D while those who had been witnesses to his presence were rounded up and interrogated as to what they knew of him. Once this information could be summarized, they were placed in isolation for a time to intimidate them not to speak of the presence of the prisoner in Moscow prisons. Which is what happened. The Primary Witnesses On July 22,1947 Kartashov as head of the 4th Department, Third Main Directorate B and Kuzmishin, interrogated a series of prisoners who had sat with either Wallenberg or Langfelder and then sent them into isolation. Those called in did not include two important witnesses D one of whom had sat with both Wallenberg and Langfelder. They did include Langfelder himself who was interrogated by both Kuzmishin on July 22 and Kartashov, for eleven and one-quarter hours on July 23. For lack of a file, we do not know if these interrogations included that of Will! Roedl who had been Raoul WallenbergOs cellmate in Moscow prisons from March of 1945 until the end of February 1947. In fact, with the exception of Roedl who died of a heart attack on October 15, 1947 en route to Camp 27/Krasnogorsk, and Langfelder whose death date is alleged as March 1948 D none of these witnesses died at that time. Those whose testimonies we have received were obviously repatriated to the West. So the situation was not so serious that it required a radical remedy D like an execution D to silence the witnesses. It required only operational circumspection. In relation to this we have the testimony of the interrogator Solovyov before the Working Group in 1991 quoted by Ambassador Magnusson in his Report. According to Solovyov, sometime in 1947: Section Chief Kuleshov made a list and a diagram which showed which prisoners had sat with Raoul Wallenberg. On the diagram was noted all information about cell numbers, etc. so that the paths of his cellmates in the future should not be crossed with other prisoners who did not know Raoul Wallenberg. It should be noted that the result of this diagram was not simply calling the prisoners Richter, Schlittler, Krafft, Pelkonen, Huber, Kitschmann for questioning on July 22, 1947. After Hille was brought from Krasnogorsk and Loyda from Odessa Repatriation Camp in January 1948, the prisoners were paired for years, moving together even from prison to prison. Loyda was placed in a cell with the Swiss spy Hans Hoffstetter while Hille became the long term cellmate of Pelkonen. From then on, with very few interruptions, Richter sat with Kitschman, Schlitter with Huber, while Grossheim-Krisko, (the only other member of the Swedish Legation besides Wallenberg to be arrested and brought to Moscow) sat with Janos Sokets (Sokachs) the Hungarian Trade Attache. Krafft D who does not appear to have been interrogated at that time, although he was for some time a cellmate of Langfelder D sat with Reiner Stahel in Moscow and later with von Kleist D all three of whom died in Vladimir Prison before they could be repatriated. The one exception to this system occurred with the move to Butyrka where Huber, for a few days on March 8, 1951 was placed with Pelkonen and Hille, both Langfelder witnesses. From that point on, it would appear that he had been separated from Schlitter and indeed, upon sentencing, each was sent to a different prison to be placed in strict isolation B Huber to Vladimir, Schlitter to Alexandrovsk MGB in the Irkutsk region. While many of the others D like Grossheim-Krisko and Richter, both of whom were held because of their connection to an especially important prisoner D were also supposed to be isolated after their conviction, within a reasonable amount of time they were again sharing a cell with their old mates. As noted by Hans Magnusson, one interesting side effect of this pairing is that none of these Oprimary witnessesO ever concluded that either Wallenberg or Langfelder were also being held in Vladimir. Their discussions and turmoil over the issue was contained within their group, in some cases to a dangerous point, but they had insufficient access to other prisoners to be aware that WallenbergOs presence was being discussed among the Russian and German/Austrian prisoners. Testimonies that Wallenberg and Langfelder were to be seen came from witnesses from scattered networks, individuals who had been held in deep isolation in Corpuses I, II and III of Vladimir Prison D without record of their cell changes for several years. (Two of the most interesting examples of these were the American Wilfred Cumish who informed one of his cellmates at Vladimir in December 1954 that he had sat with a Swede and who also claims to have sat with Langfelder D successfully identifying both; and the Latvian Zigurds Kruminsch discussed at length in Dr. Marvin Makinen and Ari KaplanOs report). Others of these witnesses had been brought back to Vladimir from the East D isolateurs like Alexandrovsk or Verchne-Uralsk MGB or camps in the Vorkuta, Rochnoi or Ozerny regions. Their reports standing alone did not have the cohesiveness of those who had sat with Wallenberg and Langfelder when they first arrived in Moscow prisons D i.e. when their presence was not being heavily concealed within the prison system. Of all these primary witnesses, Schlitter and Huber fared the worst. Huber, who had been sentenced to ten years in 1945, was called back in the Spring of 1947 and in 1951 given a second sentence of 25 years for espionage. Schlitter, generally regarded as an informant, was given a fifteen year sentence, which did not take into account the ten years he already had served. Schlitter was placed in strict isolation in Alexandrovsk Central until he emerged in March 1954 to sit with Prince Konoye in Cell 49. Huber was strictly isolated when sent to Vladimir or forced to share a cell with Numbered Prisoner 28, who was experiencing severe psychological trauma at the time, threatening to any cellmate. When Huber was finally brought out years of isolation in Vladimir to share cell 17 in Corpus II with Reiner Stahel, Victor Hahn and Walter Schmidt, he interpreted this to mean that the Wallenberg matter D had been taken care of. He was therefore very surprised to learn upon his release that it was still unresolved. Huber attributed his extreme isolation in Vladimir D correctly or incorrectly S to having sat briefly with Langfelder in Lubyanka Prison in the Spring of 1945. Pelkonen and Lpyda shared similar fears, understandably when prisoners were often not informed of the reasons for their arrest or the evidentiary basis of the charges against them. In HuberOs case one might also question whether the severity of his punishment did not reflect confidences shared with Schlitter over a period of four years. In May of 1956, after the Swedish government had presented the testimonies of the returning eyewitnesses D Richter, Kitschman, Hille, Pelkonen, Supprian, Wallenstein, Rensinghoff, and von Hinkeldy (the last four communicated with Wallenberg and Roedl through wall tapping) D the Soviets specifically raised the question whether Schlitter had come forth to testify. They did this carefully D using his assumed name of Schauer and stating that he was presumably in a cell with Wallenberg when a call for his file or to the 1st Special Department would tell them that he had been in Cells 121-123 with Richter and Wallenberg, staying on even after Richter was moved to another cell. Why did the Soviets risk raising SchlitterOs name? As Richter had already testified as to WallenbergOs presence in Cells 121 and 123 from February 6 until March 18, 1945 SchlitterOs testimony would cause little concern unless he had sat with Langfelder or had sat with Wallenberg again, at a later date. In my Preliminary Report to the Russian side dated November 1998, I have already noted how SchlitterOs cell changes in 1947 are consistently coincidental with significant dates in WallenbergOs case at that time. The question should be raised whether Schlitter sat with Wallenberg again in Internal Prison as early as March 1, 1947 or at any point until his alleged death date D in which case he could have provided facts that would have brought us much closer to the truth. Alternatively, he could have sat with Wallenberg in Butyrka while Huber was sitting with Hille and Pelkonen in Cell 287 D or from any time until Schlitter was sentenced in 1951 and sent out. He also could have shared his isolation with Wallenberg D or Langfelder B in Alexandrovsk Central (1952D54). Again, however, it should be noted that both Schlitter and Huber were repatriated. While Huber testified to the Swedish government, he was very afraid of his testimony being handed over in his name. Huber died in 1957; Schlitter in 1960 D around the time of the Gromyko Memorandum when, for the first time, WallenbergOs presence in the Soviet Union was formally acknowledged. Using the Smoltsov document as supporting evidence, the Memorandum also implied that Wallenberg had died of a heart attack. In response to this, Gustav Richter D whose testimony had done much to reverse the Vishinsky position of August 1947 D wrote to the son-in-law of a fellow prisoner: Now that the Russian note has been presented, the matter has become even more mysterious because the contradictions are obvious. How can a man have died in 1947 when three witnesses confirm they were together with him in one cell in 1950/1951? RichterOs remark is but an introduction to the hundred or more sightings that date after the 1947 alleged death date D including those unknown from the past thirty years which remain classified in Sweden. Verifying these reports will be part of our follow up work. I have refrained from releasing materials related to the other chapters: historical, investigative and sentencing, sightings of Wallenberg in prisons and camps outside of the Moscow and Vladimir regions, and the psychiatric/medical because the data is incomplete. In certain cases, particularly where it involves travel to regional archives throughout the former Soviet Union, this also has been set aside for the Ofollow upO phase In other cases, the research has been crippled by the failure of the Russian D and Swedish D sides to produce much needed information known to exist. These include files, registries, transport records, medical records on the Russian side and the sightings B in their complete form B still classified for the past thirty years on the Swedish side, without which one cannot possibly properly cross-reference and apply the evidence at hand. It is my hope that those who carefully study these materials will find themselves more equipped to deal with the question of OliquidatsiaO D whether it means the death of an important man, or his disappearance as a means of resolving a problem. In so doing, I ask the readers to put aside their previous beliefs or convictions D as I have had to do D to examine the materials as they are. The tools I put before you are the building blocks of this work. I ask the reader to consider, while reading, a few important questions: The first is: Why 1947? What is so special about that year that B if the Soviet claim is true D the Wallenberg case became the exception to every rule? Did he die OaccidentallyO? Or was he involved in an initiative against the Soviet Union so threatening that he raised the most violent opposition out of Soviet leadership of the time? If such is the case, we do not yet know what precipitated such an explosion. Certainly the fact that the Swedish government was making periodic inquiries as to WallenbergOs fate D or that Wallenberg refused to be recruited on the first round D is insufficient reason to kill a man who was so useful to the international game. The other side to this question: If Wallenberg did not die in 1947, but disappeared only to die later D why did the Soviet authorities choose that particular time to place his alleged death? While the answer to the first may reflect Soviet hostilities to forces abroad D the second seems directly related to the question of accountability within. In order to explain WallenbergOs death D some history had to be given, some scapegoat had to be blamed B preferably prior to the USSR signing on to the Geneva Convention related to prisoners of war of 1949. In this one must be willing to consider a real death in later times, when WallenbergOs investigation would have been over, his refusal to be recruited seen as final while his presence in the Soviet Union was now known through the returning eyewitnesses. For logically, this convergence of events, combined with his term coming to an end, would create an urgent situation not only diplomatically but from within the system. Here too we must raise the question whether the Soviets had a Swedish agent in place, like a Stig Wennerstrom, as early as 1947. For if this was the case, Stalin would not have killed him. II. DEATH Given the official claims of the 1957 Gromyko Memorandum suggesting Wallenberg died of a heart attack in July 1947 B and the recent competing claims of execution by lethal injection or shooting D one would expect the evidence produced in the year 2000, to offer conclusive proof of WallenbergOs death D or at least argue the case Obeyond reasonable doubt.O It does not. In fact, where the essential issues of WallenbergOs death are concerned, the few pieces that have been added to the puzzle over the past ten years are riddled with the same ambiguity as before and so contradictory as to leave one with nothing to grasp. This is a direct function of the failure of the Soviets to substantiate their claims. The Gromyko Memorandum of February 6, 1957 is OsupportedO only by the Smoltsov Document, a handwritten note to file which B in terms of actual accounting of a death D has no legal validity. The lethal injection claims put forth by Pavel A. Sudoplatov in his book. Special Tasks, has been strengthened by the analogy offered in the case of the American Communist Esau Oggins D but upon closer examination, and particularly as a number of documents in the Oggins sequence are missing, the parallel falls apart. The ©execution by shootingO claim presented by KGB defector Gordievsky, retired KGB official Kondrashev and now Commissioner Yakovlev is contradicted by the fact that rasstriel was canceled in May of 1947 and not restored until the early Fifties. Since the alleged hint by Vishinsky to OliquidateO Wallenberg came on May 14, 1947 there would be not enough time to make such an important decision and carry it out. In fact, this would be true in both cases D whether by lethal injection, as in the case of Oggins, or shooting, as in the case of Gfrorener in 1952 D an execution did not happen overnight. Behind the scenes discussions were followed by formal recommendation to leadership (from Abakumov to Stalin in the case of Oggins, while Gfrorener was formally sentenced by the Military Tribunal eight months after Abakumov himself was arrested. Abakumov, it should be noted, sat as a numbered prisoner in Moscow prisons from July 1950 until his execution in 1954 and, according to experts, did not even know when Stalin died). Deliberation was followed by a decision on the highest circle of government D after which an actual execution order could be written on the prison administrative level. In both forms of execution, the death act would be witnessed to establish that the order had been fulfilled. No such documentation has been presented to substantiate the death claims regarding Wallenberg. This waiver of any of the normal form of evidence required for proof of death is part of the overall image of WallenbergOs case being an ©exception.6 This takes us nowhere unless we can define what OexceptionO means? Are the authorities referring to the Ocause of deathO, a OmistakeO D in which case is it one of mistaken identity or of an accident, a death that shouldndt have happened? Or does it refer to some internal conflict D the nature of which I would not dare to guess S in which Wallenberg proved an unfortunate hostage in a vicious battle between security chiefs? Or does it mean quite simply that those who believed he died are mistaken? Short of explaining the 6exception6 D which would require the naming and access to files of comparable cases D we are left with only the barest sketch upon which to base our conclusions. There is no actual proof of death and no documentation to give further weight to the Soviet claim, other than the presumption that in those times killing was commonplace and there was no attempt to record acts which were blatantly criminal. This has a detrimental effect on our ability to properly evaluate the Smoltsov D the only document afforded us D which could conceivably have been one small part of a greater body of documents describing a death, but on its own cannot serve as proof of death for reasons which will be discussed below. This in turn brings us face to face with the deeper question of why the complete body of materials D multiply-witnessed medical history, autopsy and burial certificate D were not produced in the case of Raoul Wallenberg from the onset. For this would have resolved the question of his fate decades before, rather than allowing the ambiguities which have surrounded it to fester. This question is all the more valid for 1947 as we know, through the partially documented case of Oggins, that Abakumov D the very man to whom WallenbergOs death was attributed D was perfectly capable of ordering a false medical history, autopsy and alteration of the actual date of death to conceal the true facts. Why would he draw attention to WallenbergOs absence by failing to note his death in ways that were in keeping with the normal procedures of the system? One must bear in mind that in 1943 Abakumov co-authored the regulations for reporting the death of a foreign prisoner both to State Security and to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As a good introduction to the watchfulness of the system, I quote this below. As will be noted later, none of the criteria for reporting the death of a prisoner mentioned are observed correctly in the Smoltsov note. Certain heads of prisons and camps have not informed the NKVD and KGB USSR about deaths of foreign citizens, convicted or under investigation, in which cases the above bodies cannot inform the Ministry for Foreign Affairs USSR who is to inform embassies and missions. (1) Heads of prisons, etc. are to telegraph the information about foreign prisoners to the 1st Special Department NKVD USSR; (2) Heads of 2nd Departments NKGB-UNKGB are to telegraph about deaths of foreign prisoners under investigation to the 2nd Department of NKGB-USSR; (3) The information is to include the name, birth date, citizenship, arresting body, date of arrest, convicting body and sentence date, term of punishment, date and cause of death. The telegram is to be followed by a death act (sent through special communications) Signed by Deputy Narkom, Minister of State Security Abakumov and Deputy Narkom, Commmissar of State Security, Kobulov . There can be little to no doubt that Abakumov was fully aware of the administrative value of documenting a death in a timely manner. He also was in the ideal place to manipulate the system D whether in arranging for WallenbergOs disappearance or by providing simulated documents such as a false medical history. It is also possible that he had a specific responsibility for arrested foreign prisoners not under the Directorate of Prisoners of War and the Interned. For these three reasons alone, Abakumov would have been approached by Vishinsky and Molotov to recommend a procedure for the elimination of the problem caused by reports of WallenbergOs illegal detention. One need not jump to the conclusion that the documentOs purpose was to elicit a proposal for how to go about killing him. Abakumov had the capability of phrasing the solution in terms of the norm D the procedures which he himself governed. He could have applied the same technique for documenting Wallenberg death on July 17, 1947 as he did that of Oggins only a few days before. Apparently he did not. At least there is to date no evidence that such documents ever existed, as there should be since the reporting of a death was and is a significant act. We have only the mysterious reference in the Council of Ministers registry of Memorandum 3044a from Abakumov to Molotov dated July 17, 1947 which presumably clarified WallenbergOs fate. As Susanne Berger has noted, there is evidence in the Soviet files that this document was missing from the Foreign Ministry/Council of Minister files at least by 1952, as per an inquiry prepared by the Executive Chief of the 5th European Department, June 5, 1952. On the basis of the documents we have seen, there would seem to have been a secrecy surrounding the Wallenberg case even under Stalin. Such silence D or ignorance as to his true fate D is hard to believe in the long run but possible when referring to isolated instances of individuals inquiring after the truth? Again we are faced with the question of the nature of the reply D whether OliquidatsiaO of the problem (isolation and disappearance) or of the man (execution). Either way, a very important question is: who was responsible for this act, if Wallenberg died, or who had him under his control, if he disappeared but lived? Is this a collective guilt or are we dealing, as the Gromyko Memorandum would have us believe, with the schemes of just one security figure and his henchmen? #This brings us again to General Yevgeni PitovranovOs cryptic observation to Swedish television in 1992 that Stalin needed Wallenberg and therefore would never have executed him. As in 1947 the Komitet Informatsii, Committee on Information, was being formed by Stalin to focus on political as well as military intelligence gathering, it seems logical that whoever allowed WallenbergOs death under his watch would have been reprimanded for the loss of a Stalking manO valuable to the international game. And yet there is no mention of recriminations against Abakumov until 1957 and the Gromyko Memorandum when the death of Wallenberg for the first time falls under the list of AbakumovOs many crimes.# Projections Based on the Absence of Documentation The absence of any form of valid Odeath documentations D whether the contents were fabricated or true D can only be counteracted by an open study of annual and decade registries for the various prisons, a comprehensive study of medical files as well as those of the regional civic authorities and prison department records for the registration of both executions and deaths. But the bottom line remains in WallenbergOs case as well as that of other prisoners D the essential story is to be found in his personal, investigative and operative files. While the operative should have already been destroyed in any case, WallenbergOs personal and criminal files are reported destroyed or missing. However, the return of his identity papers and valuables in 1989, as well as the repeated claim by the authorities that Wallenberg was never sentenced, would imply access to at least some portion of his file. It has been explained that while Stalin kept files of prisoners, however controversial, with the inscription that they should be Okept foreverO, Serov as head of the KGB oversaw the destruction of many records. He has reportedly admitted to destroying part of WallenbergOs file D but not all. Before examining the question of probable cause of death, if in fact death in 1947, we should first consider the possibilities for WallenbergOs fate as projected from the absence of documentation. This has proven a useful tool overall, as will be seen in III. DISAPPEARANCE, for placing what information that exists against a proper background. For in the search of a dead or disappeared man, relating that which is also missing to the evidence at hand can be helpful in defining the problems that attend the case. These possibilities are: 1. that there never was any such OlegitimateO (witnessed) body of materials pertaining to WallenbergOs death to facilitate its registration because he did not die in 1947 or even by the date of the Gromyko Memorandum in 1957. In this regard then the Smoltsov document may have been contrived to support the illusion put forth by the Gromyko Memorandum that Wallenberg died in July 1947. The recent disclosure by Alexander Yakovlev, Chairman of the Presidential Commission on the Rehabilitation of the Victims of Crimes in the Stalin Era, that Smoltsov was not working in the Sanitary Services at Lubyanka during this time period would support this view. The objective then would be to establish the illusion of his death in 1947 while using the name OWalenbergO, identity unclear, to forestall further discussions. The door would thus be left open should WallenbergOs aliveness prove expedient, as in the case of an exchange. By this projection, Wallenberg lived not only past 1947 but beyond the period of the Wennerstrom-Wallenberg exchange described by Swedish Police chief Otto Danielsson. Such negotiations began in 1965 but, according to Susanne Berger, continued into the early Seventies; 2. that Wallenberg died and the evidence exists in his file which has not been produced because the material it contains contradicts some portion of the claim put forth in the Gromyko Memorandum suggesting that Wallenberg died in 1947 at the hands of Abakumov. He could have died naturally D from prison attrition D in the early Fifties as certain eyewitnesses have reported. Or he could have been executed at a later date, most tragically in keeping with the Gromyko Memorandum. In support of this possibility we see that the documents offered by the Russian side in 1991 showed that in 1955/56 a number of scenarios were being considered to account for WallenbergOs fate in 1947. The very fact that they were considering these various versions of the truth rather than the one that eventually emerged with the Smoltsov document could indicate that they knew the truth but were looking for a substitute D or these could have been actual rumors circulating at the time. Finally, Wallenberg could have died in the Eighties as would be suggested by the return of his possessions and the report of one Pavlov through Switzerland in addition to a few strong eyewitness sightings. 3. that, as the Soviet/Russian authorities have claimed, the file had been removed or destroyed and the authorities preparing the Gromyko Memorandum of 1957 were ignorant of the real circumstances of WallenbergOs imprisonment D whether as disappearance or death. Here we return to the example of the Vishinsky Memorandum of 1947, which the Gromyko Memorandum was to overturn. If Vishinsky was really ignorant of WallenbergOs presence in the USSR, then his memorandum of May 14, 1947 could only have referred to the OliquidatsiaO of the problem, not of the man. To elaborate on this, one must note the fact that in 1954, Gromyko wrote to Serov as head of KGB inquiring OWhen and under what circumstances Raoul Wallenberg died.6 SerovOs only response was to refer to the reply of Ignatiev of 1952 which was in essence a repetition of the Vishinsky Memorandum of August 1947 denying that Raoul Wallenberg was to be found in the Soviet Union. From this it would seem that this denial was policy both in government and without. The circle that knew the truth of Raoul WallenbergOs fate would be very small. Again, this does not help us establish that Wallenberg died in 1947. I have noted in section III. DISAPPEARANCE two instances where numbered prisoners Oslipped through the cracksO and were only dealt with because some situation forced the competent authorities to wake up to their existence. #The Soviet claim that the Wallenberg file was destroyed D or is not to be found B is of course central to our problem. We need this evidence to establish whether or not Wallenberg died or disappeared in 1947 D and if he died at a later date, where, when and under what circumstances. Given the nature of the file, one should consider the possibility that the issue at stake is not simply that Raoul Wallenberg died while under investigation, i.e in 1947. Rather it is that he was sentenced and went on to serve one or more terms or a life Obeyond the limitO as an especially dangerous State criminal. The Russians D both in the Working Group and the Presidential Commission for the Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repression Under Stalin D have insisted that Raoul Wallenberg was never convicted, at least under his name. And yet charges had to exist against him even before his initial capture in Budapest in January 1945 for Bulganin to have produced his arrest order at the request of Abakumov. What we are not being allowed to see B either because his file was destroyed or would cause a controversy D are the details of the suspicion and proof, i.e the nature of WallenbergOs alleged criminal activity. This would tell us why Wallenberg was arrested and explain the context in which his death B in 1947 or at any later time D was ordered or some of the circumstances that prevented his return, particularly if he had knowledge which was threatening to certain factions in the West.# Examples of Cases of Other Foreign Prisoners The Wallenberg case has been described as an Oexception.O We can neither evaluate that claim nor qualify in what form it may accurately be described as an OexceptionO if we do not have a firm understanding of the OnormO where the registration of the deaths of other foreign prisoners are concerned. How much of that Ostatus of exceptionO center around the fact that Wallenberg may have been considered an important prisoner? How much of this status had to do with the fact that he was a foreign prisoner, as opposed to a Russian national? Until we understand this, there will be speculation after speculation D and not only in the case of Raoul Wallenberg. Again we return to the question of the full and proper documentation of the death of a foreign prisoner. Of the eighty files I have studied, those who died in captivity, all included medical histories, autopsies and burial records, to a varying degree of meticulousness. As these materials remain classified to guard the rights of privacy of the prisoners and their next of kin so cannot be included here. The following should be noted however: a) On the cover of a few of these prominent files where there is some question as to the legality of their arrest or their death, there is often the designation: OTo be kept forever.O So the act of destroying the file D whether under Stalin or Khruschev (Serov) D does not necessarily follow upon a Ostrange death.6 Until I am able to study some of the others on my list, however, it is difficult to be more precise about what kind of detailing leads to concealment. b) Among the foreign prisoners who did die in Moscow prisons during the 1945D1947 time period whose files I have seen, autopsies were provided by the team of Moscow Medical Forensic specialist Semenovsky and Lt. Colonel of Butyrka Medical Services, Finayev with a third doctor occasionally in attendance to witness. This can be seen in the cases of Van der Waals, Okulicki, Mraek and Roedl. All of these men presumably died in Butyrka Prison Hospital. c) The fact that a prisoner did not die in the hospital but in his cell or elsewhere is noted in the file and in the act. d) The prisoner registration cards at Vladimir Prison almost always state with precision the full cause of death. In the case of Polish Deputy Premier, Jan Stanislaw Jankowski, the card says only "He died." This death was also not recorded in the office of the regional authorities under specific instruction from the Head of Prison. e) Whether before or after sentencing, deaths were reported by the Head of Prison to Deputy Head, 1st Sector, Department A of MGB; with a copy to the head of the Prison Directorate MGB. In addition reports had to be made to 1st Special Department MVD and to the 2nd Department. In the case of a prisoner who died while under investigation, the head of prison would notify the investigator in charge of the case. This has been confirmed by a subsequent study of the regulations. That is, there exists even in the Stalinist regime a form of checks and balances to limit abuse D all the more visible when dealing with the minutiae. In a system where every prisoner must be accounted for, a death does not go un-noticed. If unreported, this would have to be explained. A specific document would have to exist ordering those who made inquiry Onot to ask anymore,0 those who must arrange for the disposal of the body not to Obury in the general grounds as usualO, and in certain cases D not to report the death to the regional civic authorities, i.e. outside the MGB or MVD system itself. ACCOUNTING AND ACCOUNTABILITY Before proceeding with our discussion of the Smoltsov document, it is essential to introduce four general considerations against which one must weigh the claims of the Gromyko Memorandum of February 1957: a) the thoroughness of Soviet accounting D the counting, grouping and categorization of prisoners as a way of Okeeping close watchO in a society that was both utilitarian and totalitarian. In relation to the utilitarian aspect of this issue, (to be developed more fully in my chapter on Investigation and Sentencing), it is becoming increasingly clear that from an investigative and political point of view, death for Raoul Wallenberg in July 1947 would have occurred Otoo soon.O This is both a function of his good health at the time and of the strong need of the security organs to amass a great deal of information quickly about the thought processes, personalities and capabilities of those in a number of nations. As stated above, WallenbergOs calendar alone would show the level of those with whom he had meetings in Budapest. In addition to this, there are his contacts in Sweden, Germany and the United States to consider in terms of the political game. Ruling out problems of health (applicable to older prisoners who died during the 1945D1947 time period such as Bethlen, Marek, and Roedl but not to Wallenberg born in 1912), one must examine more closely the fact that the intense interrogation processes of related prisoners like Gfrorener, Gerstenberg, Bentivegni, Richter, Hatz were just warming up at that time. If there exists no real evidence for WallenbergOs death in 1947, it may be because it did not happen then. In fact, the testimonies of certain eyewitnesses would indicate that, after a hiatus of time, Wallenberg did undergo an intense period of interrogation in Moscow prisons 1948D49 and was formally charged during that period as well. He refused to sign for or accept the authoritiesO decision. #In terms of the SovietQs ability to Okeep close watchO what is definitely missing from our joint research are the documents which exist in the 1st Special Department, the 2nd Special Departments MGB and MVD as well as in the secret archives of the Secretariet MVD related to Wallenberg. These agencies, whose function it was to keep track of prisoners, has to have corresponding information regarding the prisoner Wallenberg on some level. This includes documentation regarding his death, for the MGB/MVD required periodic reports on prisoners under investigation and if these were suspended, there had to have been paper work ordering those lower on the chain of command Onot to askO any more. (It should be noted that these offices were consulted to confirm the testimonies of the primary witnesses in 1956. The Russian side has notified of the discovery in GARF of a cover note for a report of 8 August 1956 by A. Sirotin as head of the 1st Special Department MVD concerning the return of materials on R. Wallenberg to be kept at the Archive of Special Importance of the Secretariet of the MVD USSR. While it has been stated that these materials actually refer to the witness Wallenstein whose papers were being returned, it would appear that there is definitely some contradiction here with the claims of the Gromyko Memorandum that a thorough search had been performed and nothing had been found.# In terms of evaluating WallenbergOs OusefulnessO, it is important to ask again for the reports from MGB to MVD to be forwarded to higher instanzas D presumably reports of interrogations passing from Abakumov via Beria to Stalin E> for the 1945D1947 time period. That is D if indeed Wallenberg was killed or died of a Oheart attackO in 1947, this would most likely have come about as the result of especially intensive interrogations and/or Oactive measuresQ to get him to talk which backfired on his investigators. In short, from the perspective of OusefulnessO D Wallenberg was too valuable a commodity to have sat for years without much interrogation, then to be intentionally killed. ^Either we are missing a very intensive series of interrogations leading up to the July 17, 1947 alleged death date or this event came much later D not under the competency of men already dead when the Gromyko Memorandum was prepared and issued (1956D57).# b) the seriousness D and respect D attributed to and surrounding the act of death, so that if one were to die, and particularly a foreign prisoner of some prominence, not only is there a strictness of accounting but certain amenities were observed in the documentation of the death. Never D apart from the Wallenberg case D did I find among the prisoner cases studied such an absence of documentation related to a death. Normally it covers a fair percentage with the documents placed near the front of the file, after the sentence, and sometimes on the first page. In addition to this, there are records of special efforts made to honor certain dead D burying a Jewish Communist in a Jewish cemetery; a German general in his uniform or a Japanese leader with photographs of his loved ones. In my zeal to substantiate the Soviet claim that Wallenberg died in July 1947, I soon realized that my questions in and of themselves were disturbing to the authorities D not because of their effect on this case but because I had trespassed on a certain ethos formed of respect for the dead (Orest in peaceO) and the reticence which has shrouded those who may prove accountable (Olive in peaceO). This ethos which has emerged from the Communist regime seriously effects D on a psychological level D our ability to get to the heart of the matter and resolve this case. In this regard I want to thank the Russian side for providing more in-depth information regarding the place and date of Oggins death in 1947; c) the issue of future accountability both internally D i.e. being named as person or group held solely responsible for an illegal act ordered in the present but blameworthy under a future regime; and externally, in terms of the smoothness and success of diplomatic relations, then and in the future. This was important to the Soviet authorities, even before the USSR signed on to the Geneva Convention in 1949. In this regard, it should be noted that the deaths of Marek, Bethlen, Okulicki, Akikusa, Roedl, Oggins, and Van der Waals D among others D were meticulously documented. Why should the Soviets do this for Hungary, Austria, Poland, Holland and Japan but not for Sweden? d) Faith in the propaganda machine. Until the research of the Swedish-Russian Working Group, the public did not have access to the prisoner files to realize the possible nature and extent of documentation, nor did they have access to those documents produced by the Russian side which point to the fact that the Smoltsov document was not the only scenario being considered for presentation. Those preparing the Gromyko Memorandum of 1957 could rely on the powerful impact of Gromyko's official statement combined with the sketch put forth in the Smoltsov Document to serve their purposes. The fact that forty-three years later our investigation is stronger and more demanding than ever reveals the extent of the publicOs disbelief of such claims. The Question of Competency The concept that Abakumov could 6hide6 Wallenberg D or his Qdeath in 19476 D from his co-workers, starting with the heads of prisons like Mironov of Lubyanka and lonov of Lefortovo is a Omyth.O These men were not without power in their own right. We have seen instances where both lonov and Mironov protested detention of certain prisoners without interrogation as an illegal act taking place under their physical jurisdiction. We also know that both Kartashov and Burashnikov ordered moves of prisoners related to WallenbergOs detention in Moscow prisons, with reference to his name. We have established the names of some of WallenbergOs interrogators D Sverchuk, Kopelyansky and Kuzmishin D even if we donOt know who his primary investigator might have been. As long as Wallenberg was still Sunder investigationO, this investigator would have had to be informed of the death of a Raoul Wallenberg in Moscow prisons. That Smoltsov B head of Sanitary Services in Lubyanka Prison, not even head of the Medical Services D could oversee the cremation of Wallenberg would over-ride MironovOs responsibility. If Wallenberg had not yet been sentenced but was still under investigation, SmoltsovOs ordering of a cremation would also have ignored MironovOs responsibility to inform Kartashov as head of the 4th Department, 3rd Main Directorate or WallenbergOs main investigator. Since Kartashov was informed by Mironov orally and in writing of the death of Roedl, WallenbergOs long term cellmate, in October 1947 D there is no reason to think that either Mironov or Kartashov could have been left Oout of the loopd where the death of Wallenberg was concerned. We also should not ignore the fact that WallenbergOs name does not appear in the (Emergency) Registry for Unusual Events in Lubyanka/Internal Prison for the period from July I to August 1, 1947 as shown to us by the Russian side. This does not rule out the possibility that it may have happened somewhere else. For example, Roedl died in transport and therefore his death still fell under the jurisdiction of Internal Prison rather than that of Camp 27, even though he was not in Internal Prison at the time. For the system to function efficiently, a death must be reported in a number of different directions. This is the strongest argument that exists toward Odigging deeperO especially when we have seen through the Russian response to our queries that indeed the information exists, if approached correctly. In the prisoner files where deaths occur, accounting of a death takes up a good percentage of the pages. Even if the prisonerOs death is not registered in the local or regional registry of Civil Acts (CAGS/ZAGS/OAGS), it must be reported to the Prison Department in Moscow and to a number of other persons and divisions in the overall Gulag structure involved in the all important question of OwhereaboutsO such as Special Department Numbers 1 and 2, MGB or MVD. #The very limited death documentation presented to us, however, leaves the viewer with no choice but to go in the direction that Wallenberg died as the result of a conspiracy between Abakumov and Smoltsov while the entire Prison and Investigative systems OsleptO or turned their backs. With due respect, this does not conform with the reality of a very active and vigilant administrative structure, where those in high level position remain in power because they know the importance of generating a paper trail to protect themselves. (Even the Smoltsov Document, if genuine, may be just that.) The only alternative I can see is that there was no actual death but Abakumov ordered Smoltsov to prepare the note to be inserted in WallenbergOs file to convince those who read it of his death. This would be a necessary step to opening a new file under another name or as a numbered prisoner. This could have occurred around that time without involving the rest of the prison administration D thus cicumventing their vigilance.# More on WallenbergOs Lubyanka Registration Card I would again argue that a prisoner whose presence is already known to the authorities D and the Russian side has helped established that this was the case with Raoul Wallenberg D cannot just Ovanish in thin air.6 There must be a paper trail. What is remarkable is that LangfelderOs card is still missing, while WallenbergOs has been produced. Comparing WallenbergOs card with that of his cellmate Will! Roedl D who moved with him from Internal Prison Cell 140 in May 1945 to Lefortovo and would have traveled back to Lubyanka with him in late February 1947 had not Roedl and Wallenberg been separated at that time D it is remarkable that WallenbergOs card does not show, as RoedlOs, the return to Lubyanka in 1947. RoedlOs card shows his death, gives his archival registration number indicating where his file is to be found, even though it is now evidently missing. WallenbergOs card indicates neither the crossing off (completion) of the Lefortovo portion of his detention (May 1945DMarch 1947) nor his death. I can only conclude from this that either the authorities did not inform the clerks of the kartoteka that Wallenberg was in Lubyanka Ounder his nameO or that they had the card removed from the kartoteka and put in his file so that no further markings on it would be necessary. It is therefore quite interesting that when WallenbergOs identity papers and valuables or currency were returned, the card was also handed over D incomplete as it appeared D at that time. To repeat: WallenbergOs card only shows his arrival in Lubyanka Prison and his departure for Lefortovo Prison with Roedl in 1945. It does not show his return on March 1, 1947 to Internal Prison D an event we know took place because it is documented in the file of Kitschman, who replaced him in Cell 203 Lefortovo, in the Lefortovo transport registry and in the alphabetical 1947 Lubyanka possessions registry, although his name is blotted out. This raises very interesting questions as to the nature and length of WallenbergOs stay in Internal Prison on March 1, 1947. We have been led to believe that he remained there until his death on July 17, 1947 and yet there is no proof of this other than his March 11, 1947 interrogation and the report of the interrogator Solyvov that he delivered a sealed packet with papers pertaining to Wallenberg. Why wasnOt such a simple thing as a move documented on his registration card? Was this a matter of being brought to Internal for only a few days interrogation, as I have seen in other files? Or was Wallenberg becoming a Onumbered prisonerO D so that wherever his name appeared it was being removed D sliced out of the 1945 alphabetical incoming registry, blotted out of the interrogation registries and 1947 Lubyanka possession registries, and his card pulled from the kartoteka to be kept in an envelope in the back of his file. And/or was Wallenberg soon returned to Lefortovo as the proposed amendment to the draft of the Gromyko Memorandum has implied in the proposed speech to be given by the USSR Ambassador to Sweden to Swedish Foreign Minister Unden in early 1956. This was one of the scenarios being considered by the Soviet authorities as a response to the Swedes. Needless to say it was never handed over until 1991 when it was offered by the Russian side of the Working Group: OEexamination of the archives of Counter-intelligence established that Wallenberg was kept in Lefortovo Prison under personal order of Abakumov D under special conditions. The prison personnel around (him) did not know his name. In July 1947 he died in the prison hospital and his body was cremated.6 This document, if the authorities can be believed, would imply that WallenbergOs death, occurred either in Lefortovo or, if time allowed, at the Butyrka Medical Unit D as has also been suggested in the exchange between Molotov and Serov on this subject. This as mentioned previously would predicate another set of medical signatures on the medical history and death act than that of Smoltsov. Without judging the Smoltsov document as true or false, one can see from the fact that it was the version selected to support the Gromyko Memorandum that the following decisions were made: 1) not to describe him as numbered or name unknown prisoner, implying severe isolation; 2) not to place him in Lefortovo (for reasons to be established): and 3) not in a prison hospital where one might expect very accurate reporting of medical circumstances. WallenbergOs OSo-Called Lefortovo FileO In support of the version that Wallenberg remained in effect in Lefortovo in 1947, there is a testimony by Sergei Antonovich Stepanov, given to the Swedish Embassy in April 1992. Stepanov had worked for the KGB and later both the Interior and Foreign Ministries. Between 1950 and 1953 he worked in the Archives of the First Main Directorate (Foreign Intelligence), 5th Department. As mentioned previously, this directorate (presently the SVR) has not opened its archive in regard to the Wallenberg case, although it has been reported that the file of Count Michael Tolstoy-Kutuzow who reportedly spied on Wallenberg in Budapest is kept there. This archive was, however, the source for the information on the deaths of Oggins and Konoye released by Primakov in 1992 0 after the ARK ProjectOs discovery of dual national Victor Hamilton in a psychiatric facility proving that indeed foreign prisoners were being kept anonymously or under pseudonyms in prison psychiatric facilities and asylums. According to Stepanov, he had been requested by his chief Kukin to bring WallenbergOs file from the Archive in October or November of 1950. The file, Stepanov reports, carried the heading OSwede WallenbergO which is customary in that the cover of a foreign prisoner file often states his nationality/citizenship. At that time, Stepanov, says, Wallenberg had been moved from Vladimir Prison to a small house in East Moscow where an attempt was being made to recruit him, at the orders of Beria. After one or two weeks, Stepanov received the file back Owithout any new notationsE or any new documents having been added. The last noteE the last entryE was a stamp which said OK.M. nietOE Ono compromising materials.6 In StepanovOs embellishment of the story, he added the following details which while not always accurate from what we know are of great interest in terms of the question of a later death. The weaknesses in this part of the testimony may stem from the fact that Stepanov was speaking from things he had heard rather than his own experience. I have inserted commentary where appropriate. Wallenberg was arrested in Vienna (actually Budapest) where he made a great effort to save human beings from the Nazis. After his arrest, he was taken to Lubyanka. According to official statements (the Gromyko Memorandum), he died as a result of an illness (heart attack) which he contracted or obtained in captivity long before the Fall of 1950 (1947), but in reality he was fresh and healthy during that time. Wallenberg had first been taken to a hospital (Butyrka) and after that he had been taken awayE (on the basis of which) it was reported that he was dead. After that he was taken to Vladimir. Stepanov supports his statements with those of Dzjerkvelov, author of the memoir, Secret Servant, where he repeatedly makes the point that executions were not performed randomly, but according to laws existing into the Eighties. Dzjerkvelov also emphasizes that the decision to execute D in the sense of OliquidateO through assassination D was a high level collective one. According to Stepanov, Dzjerkvelov confirmed that this was WallenbergOs so-called OLEFORTOVO FILE. Putting aside the question of how Stepanov was able to make contact with Dzjerkvelov D who presumably was still living in Britain D it is important to focus on the term OLefortovo file.6 One archivist with whom I have worked for many years commented that Wallenberg and RoedlSs move to Lefortovo in May of 1945, like that of Hatz and Kitschman in February of 1947, indicated a Ocertain stage of developments in the investigative process of a Ospecial contingent.6 He would go no further. Further to this, in my work I was introduced D only in a few cases such as Van der Waals, Spishek, Meier and Feller (all Budapest detainees) D to what is known as an Oarrest file.O These files are smaller in size and of a different color than the files generated after the sentencing of the prisoners. The arrest file is for those who are not sentenced but either died in captivity at an early phase (van der Waals), were repatriated/exchanged (Meier and Feller) or returned to their homeland to stand trial (Spishek). The normal files contain all the materials related to a prisonerOs sentencing, but even before that, the various transport slips, search and medical slips and interrogations (conducted usually by some of the same interrogators as before, only now under the jurisdiction of the Second Main Directorate at Butyrka Prison) as well as the materials of their investigative stay at Lefortovo Prison. The usual file also contain records of their transport post-sentencing to whichever special camp or prison, documents reflective of their routine in that prison and either their death, repatriation or exile. The arrest file is limited to their being picked up and brought to Moscow, the various documents related to their intake and cell placement, any medical matters as well as their interrogations. There is usually a document attesting to the fact that they are being placed in Lefortovo as part of a Ospecial contingentO D often with a cellmate but sometimes alone. Stepanov makes the point that the file he saw in the archives of the 5th Department 1st Main Directorate included the WallenbergOs OLefortovo FileO S according to which Wallenberg Oshould have died the 17th of July 1947O D plus other documents about Wallenberg. In those other documents, however, Wallenberg figured under a different name. If what is being described is true, it would appear that Wallenberg was renamed, his arrest file was kept to document his death if need be, along with all the materials that showed his further detention under another name while efforts continued to recruit him. Stepanov states, in the name of Dzjerkvelov, that the latter saw the file for Wallenberg one more time D in April or May of 1953, immediately after the death of Stalin. This in fact corresponds to a time period when a number of files of prisoners like Grossheim-Krisko and Richter, whose arrests were connected to that of a IIII Especially Important Prisoner III were being reviewed. Grossheim-Krisko who, like Wallenberg, had been an employee of the Swedish Legation in Budapest (in Grossheim-KriskoOs case, definitely of the Foreign Interest Sector) was released rather unexpectedly on the grounds that his presence in the Soviet Union was Ono longer necessary.6 Stepanov erroneously states that the file in 1953 was being reviewed on the basis of an order from Abakumov. This cannot be correct because Abakumov was himself a numbered prisoner in Lubyanka Prison at that time. Here too we would expect the name of Beria. Stepanov also offered the following details concerning WallenbergOs captivity in the Soviet Union: 1. Lefortovo until the 17th of July 1947; (hospital to establish his death); 2. Lubyanka 1947D1951 (under a different name); 3. Vladimir Prison 1951D52; 4. Yaroslavl Prison (in the same approximate part of the USSR), first half of 1952; 5. MGB Prison in Smolensk (mid-1952 until 1953); 6. Move to prison in Tobolsk from 1953, unknown for how long. According to Stepanov this was a notorious site where prisoners were shot when no longer of use to the MGB/KGB. Another retired official has claimed that WallenbergOs file is to be found Onot in Moscow but a place to the East, starting with T.6 (which could also be Tomsk). To repeat: there are some problems with StepanovOs testimony, but it is important to include it now D particularly in light of the recent Yakovlev testimony that Wallenberg was shot. If we remember that rasstriel was canceled until January 1950 D the possibility that Wallenberg was executed later is that much stronger. I also present this testimony because it is very rare that one gets a sequence such as this which shows the prisoner, reportedly renamed, moving further and further East. Even though it does not conform to our own findings, at this stage in the investigation into WallenbergOs fate, it must be considered as well and the proper steps taken for its verification. This testimony could be regarded as a model for examining the possibility that Wallenberg was not sentenced and numbered as I will introduce in my DISAPPEARANCE chapter, but D as the authorities have said D Onever sentencedQ and held under a different name. We also should consider the possibility that the Smoltsov document, with the page number 059O or O159O in the upper right hand corner, was kept in the Wallenberg OLefortovo-fileO to establish his death as a prelude to changing his identity. A CLOSER EXAMINATION OF THE SMOLTSOV DOCUMENT The note accompanying the Gromyko Memorandum is ostensibly a handwritten report to the former Minister of State Security of the USSR, Abakumov from Chief of the Sanitary Services of Lubyanka Prison: Reporting that the prisoner Walenberg who is known to you has died suddenly in his cell, presumably as a result of infartka karda. Because of your personal instruction to watch Walenberg, I ask your instruction whom should make an autopsy to determine the cause of death. July 17, 1947. Signed: Chief of Sanitorium Service. Smoltsov. NOTATION: Reported personally to the Minister. Got the order to cremte the corpse without autopsy. July 17. Smoltsov. While acknowledging the potential of the Smoltsov document D if genuine D of referring to the death of Raoul Wallenberg in 1947, there are a number of flaws in this document which must be acknowledged before proceeding further. 1) It is not witnessed. A legal death report or act requires by Soviet law at least two, and usually three signatures. According to one expert, the purpose of this witnessing by three individuals was to establish that the personOs death was not the result of a violent act. In that case, assuming the Smoltsov document to be valid, one must consider the possibility that WallenbergOs death was neither the result of a heart attack nor of a planned execution but of a OtraumaO caused by an attack on his bodily person. (See The Question of a Young ManOs Death, following. 2) The cause of death is Opresumed, not conclusiveO which is unprecedented among the files I have studied. As cause of death is a fundamental requirement of all reports on a death, uncertainty regarding the true cause should have made an autopsy D routine for a heart attack D an absolute necessity. (See below). (61) The doctor or expert must have the medical history if the prisoner dies of a disease or act of discovery if he is murdered or committed suicide, but no other informations 3) There is no medical act to our knowledge and no autopsy was performed. According to the regulations: (60) an autopsy is made only by order from the investigating or supervising body, when head of prison or Prison Department has doubts about the causes of death stated in the medical actEThe Medical Act is to be signed by Deputy Head of Prison and doctor, approved by head of prison after he examines the body in person, sees his personal file and checks the circumstances; (61)EThe autopsy act is to be signed by the doctor and approved by the head of the prison. (65) Copies of the medical examination or autopsy act for the body of prisoner who was under investigation by the NKVD go to the investigating body, to the Prison Department and to the personal file. 4) The Smoltsov document not only mis-spells the prisonerOs family name as OWalenbergO when the proper spelling of the name occurred on surrounding documents at that time, but he gives no first name or patronymic as required by the Soviet system B for all intents and purposes leaving the identity of the prisoner open to being a mistake. This is, of course, useful for later reversal of a claim that Raoul Wallenberg died in 1947 as proven by this particular document. 5) The document does not state the year of birth, a fact also required by the Soviet system to help identify one prisoner of same name from another. At the arrival of a prisoner in every prison, or after a search, or on medical slips, the prisoner himself must sign his name D family, first and patronymic, year of birth and give his signature. 6) The document does not denote the time (hour and minute) of death, thereby skipping over one of the most fundamental pieces of information in reporting a death. If the document is genuine, this could indicate that Smoltsov did not know B i.e. was not actually present. In that case, it could not have served as the act or report notifying Abakumov of WallenbergOs death but only as a routine sharing of information for which one might expect similar slips to other officials D that is, Smoltsov could have been reporting on the basis of something he heard, since no attachment of any act is mentioned on the document. 7) The document does not state the citizenship and/or nationality of the deceased as required by Soviet reporting regulations. In the case of foreign prisoners, The information is to include the name, birthdate, citizenship, arresting body, date of arrest, convicting body and sentence date, term of punishment, date and cause of death. 8) The document implies that Smoltsov had the power to dispose of the body. (69) Bodies of prisoners charged under Article 58 and those of internal and central prisons cannot be given to their families; (70) The body will be buried on order from head of prison, which fact will be recorded in the copy of the medical examination or autopsy act that goes into the file. 9) The document implies that the body could be disposed of without reporting to the proper authorities: (62) The Prison Administration is to report the death to the investigating or court body under whose jurisdiction the prisoner is, the Department for Acts of Civil Status (DACS) on the territory where he lived before the arrest on the Form given here (Supplement Number 2) or, when the address is unknown, the DACS of the republic or region to which the prison belongs. Page 59 or 159 There appears to be a page number of the upper right hand corner of the document, either 6590 or O159O merged with the words OTop Secret.O This suggests that the Smoltsov document was part of a file, presumably D if we were to follow the standard pattern of prisoner files D WallenbergOs personal or investigative files. Such files were stitched unless a specific order was given Onot to stitchO, meaning the authorities expected to have to add, remove or re-arrange documents in the future. Pages were numbered in pencil but could be re-numbered in different colors as they were re-arranged, combined with other files or cut down. Certain files had three different pagination systems on some pages. If not a contrived special effect on an inauthentic document, this page could have been taken from Raoul WallenbergOs personal or investigative files, SmoltsovOs correspondence file to Abakumov and/or the Especially Grave Matters Investigative Unit whom he served D filling out forms for changes of ration or qualifying a prisoner for labor camps. The testimony of Stepanov above, if true, would indicate that the document could have indeed been written by Smoltsov at the request of Abakumov (July 17, 1947) to establish WallenbergOs 6death,6 as a step toward disappearing him under a different name. If this is true, then Memorandum 3044a from Abakumov to Molotov could have described exactly what procedures had taken place to Oliquidate the problemO without killing Wallenberg so that he would be available for further interrogation and/or efforts to recruit him over a longer period of time. This being the case, WallenbergOs death would have occurred at a later date. A serious attempt should be made to determine from which file this document was found or, alternatively, if the document referred to another prisoner who died in cell his in Lubyanka July 1947 whose name was OWalenbergO since there is no full identification of the alleged deceased. The third and more controversial option is that Page 59/159 came from a document referring to another prisoner which was used as the basis for a forgery and the page number was kept to act as a Ospecial effectO to support the illusion that this was an authentic document. OBecause of Your Instruction Personally to Watch WalenbergO The implications of this statement in the Smoltsov document lends strength to the claim projected by the overall effect that there existed special circumstances which would explain the unusualness of Smolstov being the attendant physician as opposed to the Head of Medical Services of Internal Prison, or Doctors Colonel Larin and Lt. Colonel Finayev of the Butyrka Medical Services who usually cared for the sick prisoners from all three Moscow prisons D Lubyanka or Internal Prison, Lefortovo and Butyrka. There is, however, an intermediate set of documents missing from here which would make this claim more logical D namely that there is no evidence as yet that Wallenberg had been shifted from the jurisdiction of the 4th Department of the 3rd Main Directorate to the Investigative Unit of the Especially Grave Matters/Especially Important Cases Division under Leonov. Colonel Vinogradov has stated that Wallenberg remained under the jurisdiction of the 4th Department until his death. SmoltsovOs signture D in the files I have studied D appears only in relation to those under the jurisdiction of the Especially Important Cases unit. This shift could have taken place, as Stepanov claims, July 17, 1947 or D as I am suggesting D this date could have marked his sentencing as a numbered prisoner being shipped to Vladimir, as the witness testimonies would indicate. We know from the computer study of Dr. Marvin W. Makinen and Ari Kaplan that there were unidentified cell occupancies for long term starting at that time. As yet, we also do not have an accounting for all of the prisoners arriving at that time, although we know that their numbers are distributed sequentially. In view of this I renew my request that the Russian side review its interrogation and other registries for proof that Wallenberg was shifted to the Especially Grave Matters Unit. All numbered prisoners under investigation held under their jurisdiction after the March 11, 1947 interrogation with Kuzmishin until October 1947 should be considered as being possibly Wallenberg, particularly Number 7. As I have repeated in my formal report, we should also be looking for prisoners being interrogated under the 1st and 2nd Main Directorates. The Question of OWatchQ Normally this expression is used to imply OcareO or to Oprevent escape.6 If a prisoner is under a guard or a doctor or a wardenOs OwatchO or the Owatch of the MGB organsO in a prison hospital or asylum, he is their direct responsibility. Should anything happen to him, the one in charge of the watch would be accountable. Along these lines we can see, for example, the watch of the guard when a Polish leader went on hunger strike. The guard reported at frequent intervals whether Othe convicted PoleQ was in a reclining position, whether he slept or not, his smoking habits and so on. The implication was that if things got worse D should an emergency occur B it would be reported immediately in order to keep him alive and the situation under control. Indeed a special surgeon from the Medical Services MGB was called in to perform surgery in an attempt to save the Polish leader during his final hunger strike. This operation was performed however in Butyrka Prison Hospital, not on site. The Emergency Registry for Unusual Events at Lubyanka Prison for the July IDAugust 1, 1947 time period , provided by the Russian side of the Working Group, does not make reference to the death of Raoul Wallenberg or any other prisoner. It does make reference to the attempted suicide of a female prisoner. I have asked to see this registry for the date of October 14/15, 1947 when WallenbergOs cell mate Willi Roedl died on his way to Krasnogorsk, but still under the jurisdiction of Internal Prison. This would confirm that we are studying the right journals to determine who died during that year under the OwatchO of the head of Lubyanka Prison. I would also like to use this occasion to point out that prisoners long disappeared D particularly those suffering from psychiatric problems or being sent into exile rather than being repatriated, such as was intended for Jankowski except that he died D were to be held in special facilities Ounder the watch of the MGB (later KGB) organs.6 While this is subject for later segments of my final report, it should be noted now that the MGB had a number of safe houses where a prisoner such as Wallenberg could be kept after a certain stage to hide him from the mainstream. In this regard we have a number of testimonies which have been disregarded until now D dating from the Sixties into the Eighties, reporting WallenbergOs detention (with a few others) in a OvillaO or Osmall house,6 a OpensionO or special site for Poles or Baits. OPresumably by Myocardial InfarctO D The Question of a Young ManOs Death At the request of Dr. Marvin W. Makinen, Dr. Harry A. Fozzard, a highly respected cardiologist at the University of Chicago, gave his assessment of myocardial infarct as the presumed cause of the death of Raoul Wallenberg, born 1912 D at the age of 35. In terms of SmoltsovOs statement Opresumably by myocardial infarct,O Dr. Fozzard points out that myocardial infarct could not be determined on the basis of an external examination, only through autopsy correlating a coronary occlusion with an infarcted area of heart muscle. The muscle changes are only present typically 24 hours after the onset. If the patient dies before 24 hours, even the post-mortem diagnosis was unreliableE In summary, a physician could suspect the diagnosis if he were to be with the patient during the acute chest painE Short of having been with Wallenberg in his cell for a long period of time, Smoltsov should have had access to some medical documentation of previous complaints of angina or chest pain, in making his assessment of the Ocause of death.6 So again we must call for the missing medical records. While concluding that myocardial infarct is extremely unlikely in a young man of 35, based on the evidence as it exists to date, Dr. Fozzard raised the question of trauma. For example, soft tissue trauma or bone fractures have a close association with pulmonary emboli, which can result in sudden death especially if the individual is restrained or dehydrated. Head trauma resulting in intracranial bleeding can lead to cardin arrhythmia and sudden death. #This raises the question D if Wallenberg died in 1947 D was it really the result of a planned execution or rather from a trauma induced by heavy beating or a blow to the head. In conjunction with this, it should be noted that on July 17, 1947 D WallenbergOs alleged death date D Abakumov not only communicated with Molotov about the Swede. He also reported to Stalin regarding the general practices of arresting, handling and maintaining a prisoner under investigation. The original of this document, which exists as a copy among the papers of General Dmitri Volkogornov in the Library of Congress, has yet to be found in the Presidential or other archives so its veracity is under question by the Russian side. However, one of the more controversial aspects of this document D which Colonel Vinogradov describes as a Ocompendium of instructionsO D is the reference to torture in order to extract essential information from a prisoner under investigation. According to Colonel Vinogradov such practices were explicitly forbidden.# Dr. Fozzard also makes the point that the chances of a young man of 35 D who has no history of heart disease in his immediate family D would have been one in a million. Acorrding to FriedbergOs text, only 5 per cent of myocardial infarcts occurred before the age of 45. Stress, dehydration and recent surgery can promote a hypercoagulable state that would incresae the likelihood of myocardil infarction, but only in individuals with severe pre-existing arterioschlerosis. Here too another analogy comes into question D the case of Prince Fumitake Konoye who, like Oggins, was reportedly executed to prevent his repatriation. KonoyeOs death took place in October 1956, only a few months before the Gromyko Memorandum was issued. He was 41 at the time. His death records state the cause of death as Ohypertensive disease and generalized arterio-schlerosisE Nephroschlerosis and pyelitis.6 There has been some question regarding KonoyeOs medical history. Konoye died when the question of his repatriation to Japan had become a pressing issue. While there had previously been definite indications that he was to be repatriated, he was recalled from the East. While he maintained hopes of seeing his wife again, he realized just beofre his death that a negative decision had been made in his case. If Wallenberg survived in 1947, the 1955D56 period appears the more OdangerousO for Wallenberg D logically speaking. By then, all investigative purposes would have been served, the question of his recruitability firmly determined. This is all the more the case because, at that point, his presence in the Soviet Union had been proven through the testimony of the repatriated eyewitnesses whereas, in 1947, it could quite simpy be denied. A report of the nature of the Gromyko Memorandum was necessary to countermand the obviously false claims of the Vishinsky Memorandum of 1947. It is also possible, as I have noted in my report on Strict Isolation and the Numbering of Prisoners that other internal pressures existed to make a decision regarding WallenbergOs future at that time D namely that in early 1957 a possible sentence for Wallenberg from 1947 was about to come to an end. This would have made the decision whether to repatriate or exile him all the more necessary. Execution was the third, most extreme alternative at that time. EXECUTION BY SHOOTING With the exception of Franz Rudolph Gfrorener, executed by shooting in April 1952, most of those sentenced to capital punishment had their sentences commuted to fifteen years of ITL or hard labor. For this reason it was recommended by experts that I actually see GfrorenerOs execution act since it was not actually in his personal file D only the sentence itself, not assurance that it had been carried out. In the end I was shown this proof of his execution D which includes a list of others who were executed at that time D as well as documents related to the disposal of the body. This is another instance of Russian cooperation which has proven helpful to properly understanding the steps leading up to an execution. The problem remains however that D if GfrorenerOs file is a true example B the proof of execution by shooting would be found only in WallenbergOs investigative file which is reportedly missing or in other classified records where the execution is reported D place and time of execution, those parties placed before the firing squad, disposal of bodies. Where the death date of July 1947 is concerned, however, we have another discrepancy. While a number of retired Soviet KGB officials have reported that Wallenberg was killed in July 1947 by shooting, rasstriel was canceled on May 26, 1947 and did not resume until 1950. Even after it was reinstated, it was introduced in a number of documents I have seen more as a threat to certain generals to emphasize the gravity of their war crimes. That is, even though rasstriel was indeed in effect they would pretend it was not. The signal given with the punishment was: OWere it not for the fact that rasstriel has been canceled, you would have been executed.6 A twenty-five year sentence for espionage became the next most severe punishment. In short, among the prisoners whose files I have studied D and these include a good portion of important or controversial cases D Gfrorener is the only one to have been shot. It is extremely important to know why, although it would seem on the surface that the fact that he was already a triple agent may have effected the Soviets sense of his future usefulness. The reason this is particularly important, however, is because of GfrorenerOs role in Jewish rescue and cooperation with the Joint out of Budapest, pre-dating WallenbergOs own mission. The fact that Gfrorener was arrested by the Gestapo in May of 1944 for his contacts with the Allies and transferred to Vienna where he was re- arrested by the Soviets only days after his release in 1945 meant that someone was desperately needed in Budapest to carry on his function from the Allied Jewish rescue perspective. It should also be noted that while the authorities of Domskoi Crematory wrote a document in 1991 stating that there is no evidence of Raoul Wallenberg being buried or cremated there, the experts on the Russian side have informed me that those executed were disposed of without recording the names at Domskoi. One would expect, however, a list within the Prison Administration itself to coincide with a list of executions because D as was pointed out to me by the Russians themselves D unless one sees a full sequence of documents to the end, there is no guarantee of what happened. Also, as Stepanov hints, WallenbergOs death by shooting might have taken place in Tobolsk sometime after 1953. Again, it is up to the Russian side to substantiate their claim. Nobel Laureate Andrej Sakharov, in the English edition of his Memoirs, has provided further information regarding the documentation of rasstriel which he learned from a KGB officer who dealt with such files in the Thirties and Forties: NKVD and KGB investigative files are stamped OTo be preserved forever.6 In rare instances specific pages may be removed on instructions from the top leadership, but a file is never completely destroyedE In every case, the first page of a file was retained. If a person had been executed, an affidavit that the death sentence had been carried out was included, with a record of the serial number of the pistol usedE EXECUTIONS MADE TO APPEAR DEATH BY DISEASE The lengths to which the authorities could go to account for a death, even if death was induced, may best be seen in the case of the American citizen, Esau Oggins. In Memorandum 2733A of May, 1947 Abakumov had recommended to Stalin that Oggins D whose term had expired and therefore a decision was necessary regarding his fate D be OexecutedO. This was necessary to prevent Oggins from returning to the United States where, as a Communist, his testimony before the House Un American Activities Committee would turn world opinion and that of Ofellow travelersO against the USSR. To facilitate this, however, it would be necessary to provide a false medical history and autopsy as to the Ocause of death.0 Abakumov recommended that Oggins be executed, the date of his actual death be altered to occur just prior to the end of his term (presumably so there would be no question of illegalities in the form of prolonged detention), and that his death be attributed to Oaggravated tuberculosis of the spine.6 In relation to Oggins, Abakumov writes: OIn the archives of the NorilOsk camp, we will reflect the course of OgginsO illness, medical and other help given him. OgginsO death will be registered officially as a result of illness by an autopsy document and a burial certificate.6 AbakumovOs memorandum to Stalin, censored in part, as well as his death certificate have been studied. We still do not have a copy of the false medical history or autopsy to see how and to what degree AbakumovOs recommendation was acted upon or modified by Stalin or others involved in the final resolution of his fate. The Oggins case has been presented to the Wallenberg investigators as analogous to that of Raoul Wallenberg who allegedly died during the same time period. Here two there are a number of comparative details that should be noted: 1) AbakumovOs response regarding Wallenberg, Memorandum 3044A D contents unknown D was addressed to Molotov of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His recommendation for the execution of Oggins was addressed directly to Stalin. Susanne Berger has pointed out that already, by the year 1952 this Memorandum regarding Wallenberg was already missing from the Council of Ministers or Foreign Ministry files. This, like the blots in the registries discussed in the DISAPPEARANCE section to follow, could have been part of a systematic effort to remove traces of WallenbergOs name from the regular registries, potentially making it possible for him to take on another existence or existences as a numbered prisoner or under a series of names. 2) In May of 1947, when Abakumov wrote this recommendation to Stalin to execute Oggins and fake his medical history and autopsy, rasstriel D death by shooting D as mentioned above had just been or was about to be canceled in a matter of days. Nor was AbakumovOs recommendation acted upon over night. Assuming the order to cancel rasstriel to have been strictly observed, OexecutionO of Oggins would have been through injection, liquidation by poisoning, or other forms of biochemical manipulation. In this regard, the text of the Smoltsov document could describe a doctorOs watch after having given an injection to make certain that it fulfilled its intended purpose. The statement that the prisoner OWalenbergO died ©presumably as a result of infarcta cartaO could be read as a recommendation for the language to use in stating Ocause of deathO on the actual death certificate. We are however still haunted by the question why, having gone this far, they did not document the matter entirely in 1947, particularly given the precedent of Oggins. This failure to fully document would indicate that Wallenberg did not actually die at that time under whatever means. 3) While the Russian side has not stated how exactly Oggins was killed, they have not only disclosed the information that he was OexecutedO but, in answer to my letters of November 3, 1999 and January 10, 2000 D that he died on July 5, 1947 in Penza where he was buried in the Jewish cemetery. Contrary to popular belief, Oggins was not in Lubyanka Prison in Moscow at the time of his execution. The close timing of VishinskyOs memorandum to Molotov, calling for the OliquidatsiaO of the problem of WallenbergOs detention and AbakumovOs letter to Stalin recommending that Oggins be executed back to back with the fact that Oggins died on July 5, 1947 and Wallenberg allegedly on July 17, 1947 is a compelling argument. I have considered the possibility that for the sake of secrecy both died in the same manner in the same place. Results of independent field work related to this question are not yet forthcoming. WHY THE LACK OF SUBSTANTIATION: 1957 AND BEYOND Why A Fake Medical History Could Not be Contrived in 1957 In 1956, when the Gromyko Memorandum was being prepared, the Smoltsov document was either genuinely uncovered or contrived. As I have repeatedly emphasized in this chapter and elsewhere, if an authentic document, there should be more to give us the complete picture of WallenbergOs medical history, murder or suicide. If inauthentic, why stop with this one piece of paper that has no legal validity as a death certificate? Why not fake the entire body of documents and silence the whole matter, as Abakumov suggested in the case of Oggins in 1947? There are several possible answers to this. One is that the goal was not to declare Wallenberg dead but to create a document sufficiently ambiguous that its implications could be easily reversed at a later time. All the flaws in the Smoltsov Document work toward this end, one which presumably would be employed if the Government of Sweden agreed to enter into an exchange. As we know the Soviets had at least one spy in place in Sweden in 1957 D Stig Wennerstrsm D the inconclusiveness of the Gromyko Memorandum leaves the door open to an exchange while correcting the impression that Wallenberg was not to be found in the Soviet Union. We should add to this that if StepanovOs testimony is correct, initially this document may have been generated by Smoltsov at the request of Abakumov to be placed in WallenbergOs OLefortovo fileO for deception purposes D establishing his death while his identity is changed. Afterwards, at the time the Gromyko Memorandum was being shaped, it may have been decided that it was a useful tool to convince the outside world as well. The misspelling of the name is of course suspect. The second possibility is that the policy makers of the times might have considered providing a full, but contrived, body of evidence to establish that Wallenberg was dead B but they could not because of the mechanics of their own legal and accounting system. In short, by 1956/1957, the Obooks were closedO on a death in 1947. It would be too late to introduce the proper documentation into all the registries and files of all the appropriate offices. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs directive to Soviet Ambassador to Hungary, Uri V. Andropov of September 17, 1957, the Sovets claimsed that Langfelder died on March 2, 1948. This directive also states: Unfortunately we couldnOt discover any reason to think that all materials regarding Langfelder as well as all materials about Wallenberg were not destroyed by the former leadership of State Security in the USSR. But the list of the prisoners in Lubyanka was found and there is the name of Langfelder with a remark: ODied on March 2, 1948.6 Our request to see this list, made in my first Preliminary Report of November 1998 should be repeated. In fact, we should ask for the right to see these Oprisoner listsO for the period 1945B48 to see if, on a regular basis, these notations were made of the death of prisoners B as for example in the cases of Marek, Bethlen, Van der Waals, Okulicki and Roedl. Does LangfelderOs name really appear as stated? Did this list apply only to prisoners who died in Lubyanka? Are there comparable lists for other prisons? Does the name Wallenberg appear on this list of prisoners in Lubyanka B as it should since we know he was there through the 1947 Lubyanka Possessions Registry. What notation is next to his name, if any? Was his name blotted out? We should also point out the fact that Vilmos LangfelderOs Lubyanka prison registration card is missing. How is it possible that LangfelderOs name appears on the list of prisoners for Lubyanka prison with the notation that he died on March 2, 1948 B while his card has disappeared from the kartoteka? WallenbergOs registration card, on the other hand, is to be found in the kartoteka for Lubyanka prison and it does not state that Wallenberg died on July 17, 1947 or at any time. These contradictions are compelling and should be analyzed with greater depth. Finally we should repeat our request to study the annual listing of prisoners who died throughout the Moscow prison complex during the period 1945B1948, to acquaint ourselves more fully with the system and to see if there is any indication whatever of the death of Raoul Wallenberg, even as a nameless or numbered prisoner. The Decade Listing Of more importance in terms of accounting, as well as Oprotecting the books,6 we now know from prison administration regulations that there also existed a Odecade listing.6 To introduce Raoul Wallenberg as dead in 1947 much after the fact B i.e. when the books for the Forties have been long closed by 1957 and especially if the decade registry is in chronological and/or alphabetical order B could not be done without alerting a number of different competent authorities. This may explain why we are left with the Smoltsov document D a handwritten note to file that can claim no legal value and therefore does not constitute an illegal act. CONCLUSIONS REGARDING AN EARLY DEATH 1. The first conclusion was best expressed already by the French prisoner Lucien Goaze, an officer of the Deuxieme Bureau stationed in Budapest both during and after the War, in his analysis of the Gromyko Memorandum to WallenbergOs mother, Maj von Dardel. Finally it seems impossible to me that the Soviet Government could justify lack of precision (in WallenbergOs case) from an objective point of view as well as the lack of proper care leading to death D simply by reference to the great number of prisoners kept in the camps and by the cruelty of an Abakumov. Raoul Wallenberg, Swedish diplomat, was too important a character in and of himself, and also in their game 0 I mean the SovietsO intentions and calculations D for him not to have been monitored very precisely in his movements in the USSR and in the evolution of his health. While this will be developed more fully lately with the completion of my study on OInvestigation and the Sentencing of PrisonersO, this is the bottom line of what can be observed in the Soviet prison system. There are two categories of prisoners D those where a clear effort is made to sustain certain figures of importance, although they still must struggle to endure the survival course of less rations and strenuous interrogations. Others seem to Ofall awayO just prior to their time of release. With the aging, this was of course more problematic. But Wallenberg was young at the point of his arrest and as noted by Dr. FozzardOs analysis of the Smoltsov document, for him to die of a heart attack would have most likely resulted from a sharp blow to the head during interrogation. 2. There are a number of death dates which should be considered in determining the fate of Raoul Wallenberg, not just one. The significance of the 1947 death date is primarily supported by the fact that Soviet officials have given it credence D first through the Gromyko Memorandum and then through subsequent oral reports, especially in the past decade, which would indicate Wallenberg died in 1947 but as a result of execution rather than natural causes. Apart from the Gromyko Memorandum/Smoltsov presentation and these oral testimonies, there is no documentation to support WallenbergOs death at that time D which is odd considering that a number of other important cases of foreign prisoners death are well documented at that time, even though the cause of death may have been a fabricated one. The only plausible explanation I can give for this time period is that Wallenberg was killed D not by execution but as the result of excessive measures during interrogation D and that no one was willing to take responsibility for his death by signing onto or witnessing any sort of document. The second OdangerO period of 1952D53 is drawn from a number of eyewitness reports which state either that Wallenberg was very sick during that time and in the hospital (in various parts of the country) or that he was very sick and died at that time or, as we have seen in the unverified Stepanov testimony, that Wallenberg was being held at that time in the Tobolsk MGB where prisoners no longer of use to the authorities were shot. These reports have to be studied with more care and in conjunction with the Medical investigation D but even more with the question of WallenbergOs long term value for an exchange. Therefore they will be dealt with in a later chapter. The third Odanger pointO is that of the 1955D56 period when a new response to Swedish inquiries as to the fate of Wallenberg were being prepared, reversing the Vishinsky Memorandum of 1947. While these are not as readily documented, it has been claimed by Soviet experts and ex- KGB officials that the Khrushchev period was marked by as many atrocities as that of Stalin. WallenbergOs case is closely analogous to that of Prince Fumitaka Konoye, more so than to that of Oggins because at the time Oggins died D WallenbergOs presence in Soviet prisons was not officially known. This was only established through the testimonies of the repatriated primary witnesses returning from 1953 and following. Had Wallenberg survived until this time, the question of whether to repatriate or execute him would have been much more urgent than in Stalinist times. Further study of the Konoye case in the Archives of Foreign Policy would be useful in analyzing this analogy more precisely. The fourth date of death which has been completely overlooked, but for which there is evidence, is that which relates to the return of WallenbergOs possessions (money and valuables) to his next of kin in 1989. This death scenario most appropriately conforms to the standard prison regulations for the disposal of belongings and valuables following a prisonerOs death. In any case, as I have noted, for these valuables and money to still be available in 1989 when his real death should have occurred in 1947 is completely in opposition to standard practice of confiscation within a set period of time after the date of death, or in instances where the real ownership of such valuables could not be established. If Wallenberg died in 1947, 1952/53, or in 1956 these moneys should have been confiscated by the State decades before. As the valuables and currency follow a prisoner after his sentencing from prison to camp, hospital to asylum to be used in his credit/debit account; the availability of these objects in 1989 under normal conditions would establish that Wallenberg lived until that time. The Russian side must explain D if they can D this Oexception.6 3. The reason for the absence of documentation is, in and of itself, grounds for projecting what really happened in the policy makers attempts to shape a view, while skirting contradictions in the details given or avoiding unwanted accountability. 4. At the same time, the Russians repeated statement that Raoul Wallenberg was never sentenced combined with the return of WallenbergOs identity papers and other personal documents, as well as his valuables and currencies, would indicate that some portion of his file still existed in 1989. 5. The existence of not only annual death registrations but decade listings should either verify WallenbergOs death in 1947 or explain why a full set of legal documents related to his death could not be introduced ten years after the fact. Separate from this, I have noted the different offices within the Prison Administration which, at one point or another, would have to be informed of the death of a known prisoner D which Wallenberg was. Their records have never been made available to us. This is part of the Soviet failure to substantiate their own claim and should be rectified. 6. While the Russians showed courage in producing AbakumovOs recommendation to execute Oggins and alter his medical records, this inevitably opens a Scan of wormsQ because one cannot help but look more than once at the medical records and autopsies of a death D especially if it involves a reasonably young man. This is particularly the case of Oggins vis a vis Wallenberg, where an analogy has been suggested by the Russian side. It should be noted, however, that the false death which Abakumov had recommended to Stalin was not the one which appeared on his death certificate. Therefore, it is clear that a number of different voices were heard in the preparation of this fairly OexceptionalO action. Until we can study Oggins file, or do so with a Russian counterpart, we cannot know step by step the procedures that brought this unusual solution into force. We do not know, for example, Molotov or VishinskyOs involvement in the planning process D if any. Until we have articulated this process, we cannot make use of the information to determine if Raoul Wallenberg may have also died in this manner in 1947 or beyond. As for death by shooting, rasstriel, the Russians would have to provide us with an analogous case of a foreign prisoner shot in July 1947 or thereabouts and give us the opportunity again to examine the procedures, then check relevant files to determine if there are indications of another death which could be Raoul WallenbergOs. Until this is done, it should be understood by the public at large that both stories of execution are conjecture. On the other hand, I have already identified for the Swedish and Russian governments the only numbers which could have been given to Raoul Wallenberg, Vilmos Langfelder and possibly Sandor Katona during the 1947Dearly 1948 time period as models for the DISAPPEARED. Until these persons are properly identified, both those sentenced and those under investigation, the option that this could have been WallenbergOs fate at that time remains highly probable. III. DISAPPEARANCE One of the most powerful tools that existed in the Soviet system to isolate prisoners Ounder investigations and to limit awareness of their identity even after sentencing was that of OnumberingO. Thus the name, and other pertinent data about a prisoner, could be concealed not only from fellow prisoners but from everyone who guarded him or her D except for those on the highest level. While this system no doubt dated from Czarist times, it proved particularly useful to the Soviet prison authorities in the handling of nationalist leaders and others arrested during World War II. In keeping with MGB/MVD organizational changes which took place in the Spring of 1947 regarding the categorization of prisoners and their placement, the system governing the OcontingentO of numbered prisoners would seem to have become even more centralized as well. Thus, on April 19, 1947 Central in Moscow sent the Directorate MGB for Ivanovo Region regulations for keeping the newly arrived contingent of Baltic numbered prisoners: General Rules: Head of Internal Prison, his deputies on duty and guards are responsible for: a) keeping secret the very fact that numbered prisoners are kept in the Internal Prison; b) keeping secret their names, last names, background, etc.; c) prevention of their attempts to escape, contacts with the outside world and with each other; and d) making sure that the numbered prisoners obey the regulations for their regime. None of the personnel is to know about the numbered prisoners, except the head of the Internal Prison. The guards are not allowed to speak to numbered prisoners, by any means. No conversations about them are allowed in the presence of the guards, personnel or workers of the MGB Directorate. When necessary, in official conversation, the guards are to use the prisoners© numbers or the numbers of their cells. Only the following guards are to guard the numbered prisonersE We may presume that similar instructions went to the heads of MGB Directorates in other regions which housed isolateur or maximum security prisons, particularly the neighboring Vladimir Oblast where political prisoners and prominent figures were often kept in Prison Number 2. This doesnOt exclude the possibility that other numbered prisoners were also kept under Ospecial conditionsO in more minor or less known prisons D or special sites D throughout the former USSR. This is particularly pertinent to Wallenberg who was described by one former Soviet official as well as one informant/Vladimir prisoner as having been kept, particularly after psychiatric difficulties set in, in a villa with two or three other prisoners. Through the files of the numbered prisoners we have been allowed to see, we now know that a personal file, rather than traveling with the prisoner as is the norm, would be started and maintained only by the warden or deputy head of the facility where held at that time. The complete personal file D including identifying documents, orders and decisions, his investigative processing, or details of his stay in other special prisons or camps D was kept in the Prison Department in Moscow, so that the very few knew not only the identity of the prisoner but the history of the case and the pattern of his whereabouts. In some cases the prisoners were informed of their numbers D in others they were not. Registration cards, corpus and cell cards D rather than being included in the various prison kartoteka D were all returned to the head of the Prison Department/Directorate of OCentral.O All information regarding these prisoners was passed in sealed packetsO. As noted in Ambassador MagnussonOs Final Report, sometime in 1947 the interpreter Solovyov was asked to carry a sealed packet from Section Chief Kuleshov (under Kartashov) to the Archive Chief MGB Gertsovsky: On the package was written OPackage with materials concerned the arrested Number 7, can only be opened with permission of MGB leadership.6 Package included certain pages and personal documents (although not the personal file) which concerned Raoul Wallenberg. The Russian authorities have acknowledged that this is a clear indication that Raoul Wallenberg was temporarily a numbered prisoner while under investigation in Moscow prisons, starting at a date presumably after March 11, 1947 since Wallenberg signed the interrogation registry for his meeting with Kuzmishin at that time under his own name. We can also be assured that Wallenberg was at that time still alive, not yet sentenced insofar as he is described as the arrested rather than the convicted or the deceased. As we have seen from other prisoners who were numbered while under investigation in Moscow prisons and then sentenced under a number, the sentenced number was different. For example, convicted Prisoner Number 15 was called the arrested Number 30 while under investigation. Our findings would show that if Raoul Wallenberg OdisappearedO in 1947 rather than being executed, he was most likely sentenced by OSO in June of 1947 as Prisoner Number 14 and sent for approximately a year to Vladimir Prison soon thereafter. The warden of the prison, where numbered prisoners were concerned, had to turn to his overseer in the Prison Department MGB or Prison Directorate for instruction on every detail related to the prisonerOs care D which did not prevent the nachalnik from expressing his personal opinion regarding orders to his superior. In turn, the Prison Directorate under Colonel Kuznetsov D who personally signed most of the special orders regarding Numbered Prisoners D was consulting the Investigative Unit of the 1st Main Directorate MVD D at least by 1953. The mental stress on individual prisoners whose contact with the outside world had been severely cut was very great. Psychiatric breakdowns are well documented. Prisoners would go to great lengths to make their identities known. The punishment of kartser did not deter convicted Prisoner Number 15 at Vladimir from painting his number and cell number on his valenki or boots, so that vigilant prisoners watching from the window as he took his walk could be made aware of his existence. Or, Hungarian Prisoner C might shout his name and number at the top of his lungs from his cell, demanding that his Embassy or previous contacts in Allied intelligence be notified. Such behavior created problems for those guarding them. Personnel who came in contact with a prisoner determined to reveal his identity would have to report this incident in such a way as to make clear that he had not Oheard or understood© the name D for such knowledge was strictly forbidden. After StalinOs death, Kuznetsov as head of the Prison Directorate pressured those to whom he reported to re-evaluate their practices of imposing serious periods of isolation on an unstable single prisoner, such as Hungarian Prisoner C. On the other hand, a numbered or seriously isolated prisoner who was so intimidated that he did not dare to defy the system by drawing attention to himself might sit forever and indeed get lost. This was further complicated by the fact that those numbered, renamed or in strict isolation were denied the right to write protests to their detention, their sentence or specific conditions in their regime. Hungarian Prisoner C writes about this in his appeal to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, not forwarded because of its anti-Soviet content: I was absent from my trial in 1950 in Moscow. Since then I have been demanding re-examination of my case, but my appeals were blocked by the local authorities and the medical personnel pronounced me mad. And so my petitions were not valid. If 1947 appeared to be a year for centralization, 1953 D after the death of Stalin D seemed to indicate the beginnings of reform D and, for some, re-numbering. As early as April, amnesty was proposed for Vladimir long term Prisoner Number 3, (born 1896) Dsentenced on November 30, 1946. On July 13, 1953 Deputy Head of the Prison Department, Prison Directorate MVD Dwrote to I.A. Serov as Deputy Head MVD suggesting that PRISONER Number 3 might even be Oreleased without exile.6 This was a favor as many of the older numbered or heavily isolated prisoners, upon release, were sent into internats (asylums) in remote regions. It is important to note SerovOs decision-making role at critical points in the fate of some of these numbered prisoners. By September 1953, the names of many of the numbered prisoners had been restored. As their numbers were released, fresh prisoners from Moscow or others in isolation prisons to the East could be renumbered (their number in the series usually lowered) before being brought to Vladimir. By 1954, those on the Ostrictly isolated© list, including at least one reported Wallenberg witness, were already being brought back to Vladimir from Verchne-Uralsk and Alexandrovsk Central. By 1955, others came from Irkutsk. Both our calculations and eyewitness reports would suggest that Raoul Wallenberg was also brought to Vladimir during this time period, although there is indication that he may have been there previously, as early as 1947. (See Vladimir Corpus II study of Dr. Marvin W. Makinen and Ari Kaplan). **•*•**•** The isolated fate of a Onumbered prisonerO was shared equally by leaders of the Baltic nations arrested in 1941; members of the Polish Government in Exile invited to Moscow in March of 1945 until their show trial in June of that year; StalinOs in-laws such as Anna Sergeyevna and Eugenia Alexandra Allilueva sentenced in 1948 ; Boris Menshagin D the chief witness to the truth of the Katyn Forest Massacre and an unknown Ukrainian national leader D among others. It is not difficult to understand the goal in concealing prisoners as prominent or controversial as those mentioned above. The same could be said of the case of numbered prisoners like former Ministers of State Security, Abakumov and Yezhov D arrested in what can only be described as a reshifting of power. Few guards would refrain from bragging about the important prisoner under their watch, some might even be sympathetic. The precautions expressed in the April 1947 instructions were to the point. Though rare D there was at least one instance of escape as the result of a numbered prisoner successfully bribing a guard. Beyond this, one must bear in mind that zealous nationalist networks were constantly seeking information about their leaders and rewarded well those who informed or made communication possible between them. It is less easy to follow the reasoning behind the imprisonment of such numbered prisoners as the Armenian Jesuit priest, Prisoner AA (Vladimir Prisoner Number 15); Wolfang Johann Meiners (Vladimir Prisoner Number 27) about whom we know little as his file was never requested; or the convicted Mexican Communist Vadillo (Vladimir Prisoner Number 28) who sat for some time in Vladimir Prison with the Langfelder witness, Ernst Huber. Huber, while not numbered, was under strict regime at Vladimir. According to HuberOs own testimony, he endured heavy isolation from his arrival May 27, 1951 until October 26, 1952. Then Vadillo D who had psychiatric problems D was brought into his cell. Because of his strict isolation status, however, Huber was not allowed to write letters to protest his cellmateQs threatening behavior until the 15 of February 1954. Numbered Prisoner AA who arrived in Vladimir in 1947 was not allowed to write a letter regarding his missing possessions until 1953. This gives some indication of the interaction of closely related but different forms of isolation. The fact that a numbered prisoner and a prisoner in Ostrict regimeO were allowed to share a cell together establishes that it would also be possible for Raoul Wallenberg to have sat with others on the isolation list for a certain corpus. In Vladimir, the prison where much of our research has been concentrated, there is clear evidence of isolated prisoners whose cards do not give any cell history for them for at least five years. We also have cases like Herbert von Richthofen, former German Ambassador to Bulgaria until June 1941, recalled from Alexandrovsk Central MGB to be forwarded to Vladimir Prison. His card is not in the kartoteka suggesting he never arrived. Von Richthofen seems to have vanished into oblivion. Calculating the Possible Number for Wallenberg & Others in 1947 (Excerpted) In terms of calculating the number which might have been WallenbergOs, it should first be understood that there could be D at one and the same time B two persons bearing the same number O15O D one Ounder investigations in Moscow or other prisons D and another convicted by OSO (Special Tribunal) on June 28, 1947 and sent away from Moscow as of his sentencing. Of these two systems D Ounder investigations and OsentencedS, the convicted numbered prisoner series is by far the clearest to follow because itSs more stable. Changes are less frequent. The numbers are sequential, referenced to the date their verdicts were handed down by OSO. At the same time, we can also see that D in terms of those brought to Vladimir B re-numbering began at the end of February 1952. In short, for the 1947 time period, we have a limited number of sentenced numbered prisoners with a very specific gap of numbers for which there is no identification. NAME OF PRISONER NUMBER DATE SENTENCED Number 14 Prisoner AA Number 15 June 28, 1947 Number 16 Number 17 Number 18 Number 19 Number 20 Stalin Relative Number 21 May 29, 1948 Stalin Relative. Number 22 May 29, 1948 Stalin Relative. Number 23 May 29, 1948 Hungarian Prisoner C Number 24 July 1, 1950 Hungarian Prisoner P Number 25 July 1, 1950 Hungarian Prisoner S Number 26 July 1, 1950 German Prisoner M. Number 27 August 14, 1950 Vadillo, Martinez Number 28 March 3, 1951 Menshagin, Boris G. Number 29 September 12, 1951 Stulchinskis, Alexandras Number 30 February 27, 1952 Shilingas, Statis Number 31 February 27, 1952 Gonkunas, Jozis Number 32 February 27, 1952 {(Alternatively, if the numbers of the Baltic prisoners Ounder investigations were included in the sequence as part of centralizing the system, then we have Prisoner One B Hungarian OAmerican spyO arrested in 1940, sentencing date unknown. Prisoner Two B unknown in all details. Prisoner Three, Georgian, sentenced and already at Vladimir, with Merkis and the others sitting in Ivanovo MGB or Kazan Psychiatric facility part of the chain. In this case, the only numbers which are unaccounted for in 1947 remain 14, 19 and 20.# By April 1952, the Baltic leader numbered prisoners Ounder investigations in Ivanovo MGB began to be sentenced by OSO in Moscow. The new numbers they received as Prisoners were reduced in a number of occasions. Merkis, Anton Number 1 April 16, 1952 Merkis, N. Number 2 April 16, 1952 NUMBER 3 ALREADY IN VLADIMIR PRISON Merkis, H. Number 4 April 16, 1952 Urbshis, I.K. Number 5 April 16, 1952 Urbshis, M. Number 6 April 16, 1952 Munters, V.N. Number 7 April 16, 1952 Hunters, N. Number 8 April 16, 1952 Balodis, Number 9 Balodis, E. Number 10 Laidoner, I. Number 11 May 20, 1952 Laidoner, M. Number 12 Already Sentenced Prisoner Number 13 was dead, so that number may have become available at that time. So again the numbers for sentenced prisoners allows for the numbers 14 and above. OAAO: Prisoner Number 15 On the 29th of July 1947 a transport order was prepared to send PRISONER AA to Vladimir Prison as sentenced Prisoner Number 15. PRISONER AA, an Armenian national Jesuit priest, had been a chaplain in the Italian Army and had served also as a medic on the Soviet front. He was arrested in 1942 as a military officer with the rank of Lieutenant and held in camps as a prisoner of war. Upon arrival in Moscow prisons in December 1945, he was still listed as a prisoner of war but placed under the jurisdiction of the 1st Main Directorate NKGB USSR. Throughout his interrogations under the 1st Directorate, PRISONER AA was called up under his name. On the 2nd of May 1946, jurisdiction shifted to the Investigative Department for Especially Important Matters (OBD). His arrest was undocumented as late as October 11, 1946. By December of 1946, PRISONER AA was known as OPrisoner Number 30,0 whether at Lubyanka or Lefortovo. PRISONER AA was at that time Ounder investigation© but on June 28, 1947 he was sentenced according to Articles 58.4 and 58.11 of the Criminal Codes of the RSFSR to ten years in prison for OCounter- RevolutionaryO activities D at which point he became convicted Prisoner Number 15. In a letter to his sisters which appears in his file (meaning it was never mailed), PRISONER AA explains the charges against him as follows: OEmembership in a counter-revolutionary organization D that is, for the fact that in 1937 when I entered the Jesuit order in Rome, I became a member of that religious organization D which they consider counter-revolutionary.6 However, prior to his military service and work in Rome, PRISONER AA B a scholar of classical and modern languages, has served as Assistant to the Bishop of Lwow and also served in Teheran D two points that later became important intelligence-gathering sites. The Blotting of Names in the Alphabetical Possessions Registry Our argument that Wallenberg, Langfelder and the unknown Hungarian D Sandor Katona D are candidates for these missing numbers is strengthened by the fact that PRISONER AA was sentenced by OSO on June 28, 1947 and sent to Vladimir on August 3rd as Prisoner Number 15. For PRISONER AA shared one aspect of Wallenberg, Langfelder and KatonaOs fates D his possessions had also been blotted out of the 1947 Lubyanka Alphabetical Possessions Registry. Until now, the fact that the names of Wallenberg, Langfelder and Katona were blotted out has been taken to mean that all three died. However, there are four blots in the possessions registry, not three, and the authorities on both the Russian and Swedish sides have puzzled over the possible connection between these three prisoners from Hungary and PRISONER AA. One might ask, for example, were they all D like PRISONER AA D taken for OBritish spies?O Did they all have connections with international religious organizations D whether Catholic or Zionist? Were they involved in the same underground rescue network? The fact that Wallenberg arrived in Lubyanka on March 1, 1947, his knapsack registered but seemingly never transferred elsewhere has been used to imply that Wallenberg died. The blotted line for Wallenberg is compared with the case of his long term cellmate, Roedl, whose possessions were withdrawn when he was transferred to Camp 27. This is a fallacious argument because D while AAOs name is also blotted out of the possessions registry D he did not die in captivity. Rather he was released on the 7th of February 1954 to the Italian authorities and returned to Rome. Also, it is critical that forensics be done on the Wallenberg blot for 1947 to establish whether he brought his rucksack with him D as in the transfer from Budapest to Lubyanka and Lubyanka to Lefortovo in 1945. If instead he brought only Opersonal documentsO, this would give us some idea as to the actual length of his stay in Lubyanka at that time. #Perhaps then the blotting of these particular names in the registry has nothing to do with death. Instead, it may indicate the transfer of important information regarding possessions to a different registry with more limited access. We are assuming a registry which dealt exclusively with the possessions of numbered prisoners and was under the control of a separate division, department, directorate or even individual. Such a registry would be necessary to properly assist in every aspect of a numbered prisonerOs daily maintenance D which includes the receiving of possessions upon request from storage or making use of moneys in their account to buy food through authorities at the prison kiosk.# The second point to be made is that the possessions of the numbered prisoner whose files I have studied were not confiscated. They were still available to him. Examination of PRISONER AAOs file shows that PRISONER AA appealed from Vladimir more than once for the return of his Oprecious possessionsO taken from him at successive points during his transfer to Moscow between 1943 and 1944. This particular letter was written in October 1953 D just after he had been given permission to resume the use of his name: OComrade Citizen Head. According to your oral order of the 14th October 1953, I inform you of the following: On the 29th of July 1943 in Internal Prison (Kazan) they took from me for storage D military rucksack with precious possessions under receipt Number 1146 and 67 rubles of money (donOt remember number of the receipt). During several transfers from prison to prison they took from me money receipt on 19 June 1944 in Butyrka Prison and receipt for possessions on the 8th December 1946 in Internal Prison, having merely said: OYour money will be given back afterwards E Precious possessions cannot be given personally. They are forwarded to the destination.O With this everything was over and there is no money or precious things. I spoke about this in due time with the heads of Internal Prison and Lefortovo prisons. I wrote about this to the Center from Vladimir on the II October 1947 and on the 23 February 1951 according to the advice of the respective heads of prison. To this date I have not seen any result. With respect. [PRISONER AA]. P.S. Small list of precious possessions: Pocket watch with chain; alarm clock in leather case; Medallion D gold; Chain D gold; wedding ring of gold; cigarette case of silver; small vase of white metal; Waterman pen with gold tipEO This same list of possessions appears in PRISONER AAOs file, Page 118/123, with the handwritten note: To be filed. Receipts for possessions and money rewritten for Number 15. 8 March 1949. The items, listed below, are clearly those of a soldier/chaplain. While unable to retrieve possessions of ritual value, PRISONER AAOs possessions were still being guarded for him, in spite of the fact that they offered an ideological threat to the Communist system. They eventually could be made available to him, depending upon the discretion of those who watched over him. Copy of Receipt for Possessions S To be filed. 1. Small case with church Outensils.6 2. Bag for possessions D used. 3. Bag, canvas D 1. 4. Leather boots D used D one pair. 5. Church clothes 0 black wool D used D 1 set. 6. Lighter D copper 7. Saucepan, metallic D 1. 8. Uniform, overcoat in green D used. 1 item. 9. (Illegible) D green. 1. 10. Gray blanket E> used (1) . 11. Metallic flask B 1. 12. Fountain pen D 1. 13. Spectacles with case D 1. 14. Copper chain and cross D 1. Belongings received by (ILLEGIBLE) SIGNED: Prisoner Number 15. By 25 April 1952, AA had access to at least one of the possessions on this list: To Mr. Citizen Nachalnik. 11-24. I ask for your permission to make a bridge on my own account and to exchange the wide belt for lumbago which was prescribed for me by doctors five years ago, because the old one is getting shabby and sags in parts. Also for the receipt from storage D my aluminum saucepan. Also for the demonstration of my possessions received in parcels Eas you so friendly promised me. (Underlining is mine). The fact that these possessions were saved for the numbered prisoners, to be made available to them at a later date, can be established also in the case of the three Hungarian Numbered Prisoners. When the three Hungarians arrived in Vladimir in 1950 to be put in Oisolation cells in strict isolations, Zhuravlov wrote to Yevsenin of the Prison Department: Prisoners 25 and 26 had, among their possessions, copies of receipts Number 258 and 36 with their surnames and first names. They are not notified of their numbers. Give your instruction whether they should be notified. For your information D the other numbered prisoners here know their own numbers. When Hungarian Prisoner C was sent to Butyrka Prison Hospital by special convoy as if 6for especially dangerous State criminals in June of 1953, he took with him an array of possessions which he had brought with him from Budapest. These are listed under Receipt for Number 24. Presumably these personal possessions followed him to Leningrad Special Prison Hospital, back to Vladimir and then to Kazan. Prisoner C was the Olast remaining Hungarian citizenO to be repatriated from Kazan Prison Hospital. After he returned to Budapest, a letter was sent from the Prison Department on the 10th of December 1958 to the Head of Registration, Archival Department KGB: In reference to [Hungarian Prisoner C], sentenced July 1, 1950 by OSO....When in Internal Prison MGB, [Prisoner C] was given Receipt Number 258/4 of 4 June 1946 for his watch, foreign money (13,000 Hungarian pengoes and 200 U.S. dollars) and Receipt Number 122/ of 7 II 50 for ten foreign coins and six foreign bank notes; plus Receipt Number 453/le of April 12, 1950 for personal documents and papers. By decision of the Military Collegium Ehe was repatriated on the 14 of June 1957 and has requested the return of his valuables, money and personal papers We are sending copies of his receipts and requesting that you resolve (reshitvopros) (the question of) the return of his valuables D or compensation for them D also of returning his personal papers. For your information, [former Prisoner C] lives in HungaryE Enclosed three receipts. Signed OVO. #The return of Raoul WallenbergOs personal documents, his cigarette case and moneys in Octobez of 1989 should be evaluated in light of the above. As we already know from the file of German Prisoner HM, personal identification papers were kept for the prisoner in his Archival Investigation File, not his personal file. German Prisoner HMOs valuables, removed at his arrest, had already been turned over to the State Treasury because they were confiscated when he was sentenced. But German Prisoner HM was not a numbered prisoner. In the case of Hungarian Prisoner C all three categories of significant possessions D his personal papers, valuables and moneys D were under the control of the Registration Archival Department KGB.# If Wallenberg died in 1947 when suggested, would not his valuables have already been turned over to the State? If sentenced without number, would they not have been confiscated? Why were they still around in 1989, waiting to be turned over to WallenbergOs next of kin? Is the currency handed over the exact same bills that had been in WallenbergOs hands, or does this represent a compensation, as mentioned in the case of the repatriated Hungarian Prisoner C? If compensation, where is the receipt? Ramifications of WallenbergOs Returned Possessions The fact that the authorities expected Hungarian Prisoner COs valuables to be retrieved raises very important questions regarding WallenbergOs possessions. In October 1989, when Raoul WallenbergOs next of kin D Dr. Guy von Dardel and his sister, Nina Lagergren B were invited to Moscow by the Russian Government to bring closure to the Qtragic mistakeO of WallenbergOs arrest, the following items were handed over to them. WallenbergOs passport Number 248 WallenbergOs car registration WallenbergOs address book and calendar for 1944 Cigarette case E> gold (1) Money in the following currencies: 1,000 U. S dollars (issued in 1934) 500 Swiss francs 30 Swedish crowns 153,443 Hungarian pengoes 25,750 in Bulgarian currency At that time, the next of kin were also handed a document to sign as a receipt for these possessions. As this document contained a clause acknowledging that Wallenberg was dead, they were not prepared to sign. If Wallenberg died in 1947 when suggested, would not his valuables have already been turned over to the State? If sentenced without number, would they not have been confiscated? Why were they still around in 1989, waiting to be turned over to WallenbergOs next of kin? Is the currency handed over the exact same bills that had been in WallenbergOs hands, or does this represent a compensation? If compensation, where is the receipt upon which the correct amount was calculated? It could only be found in one of his files or on file in the Financial Department MGB in which Mironov, head of Moscow Internal Prison, would appear to have kept a direct hand D overseeing the transfer of monies and parcels to prisoners formerly under the OBD. While we do not have the original receipts and therefore cannot verify that these are all of WallenbergOs valuables and currency, we can begin to study the ramifications of the return of these few simple belongings in terms of normal Prison regulations. Gennadi KuzovkinOs study of the declassified Prison Directorate Archives of GARF teaches us that: a) such valuables were taken from the prisoner within 48 hours of arrest; b) they followed him from prison to prison, until such time the court decided they were to be confiscated, or he died or escaped, c) during the investigative period, the investigative body kept the prisonerOs precious metals and savings account records until the sentencing; d) currency turned over to the UNKVD Financial Department was put in a sealed parcel or envelope with a cover letter indicating name of the arrested, description of valuables by number and weight, the number and date of the receipt. Form Number 2 was placed in the Investigation File. This sealed parcel was reviewed at least four times a year by at least two persons to establish that the contents of the parcel matched those on the receipts. This confirmation was inscribed in a ledger with annual accounts. Any money or valuables kept for periods beyond the confiscated term (meaning I presume periods where one would expect them to have been confiscated) were checked for potentially collectible sums and valuables. When the prisoner was sentenced, both his case file and his valuables were sent to court on the basis of the decision made by the investigating bodies. After the sentencing and the courtOs ruling whether the valuables were to be confiscated or returned, the 1st Special Department would inform the Financial body responsible for storing money and valuables. All confiscations made without the corresponding sentence (were) considered illegal. (NOTE: This would reinforce the Russian position that Raoul Wallenberg was never sentenced, but the possibilities must be analyzed thoroughly, not on the surface.) If the Court ruled to return the possessions, a sentenced prisoner received his precious metals back within three months D otherwise it was turned over to the State bank. An owner had to receive his money within three months D otherwise it was turned over to the State Budget. The convicted prisonerOs valuables were sent to his destination. When the valuables arrived at the prison a report was sent to the Financial Department of the Prison within three days, a second copy was to be sent back to the sender within one day, with confirmation that the moneys were to be transferred to the prisonOs address. The sender was to transfer the moneys within two days by post as Ovaluable parcels.6 When the owner (was) unknown, money and valuables (went) to the State Budget using the same procedure as for confiscation D only with specific indication that in this case the owner is unknown. A special investigation was required D with interrogations etc. to try to re- establish the identity of the owner D prior to the decision to hand it over to the State. Of those who died in camp, their money went to the State budget if not claimed by the heirs. Furthermore, among the Prisoners of War and Interned, there existed a Special card index of the Special Information Bureau MVD ordered by Serov where valuables in parcels were listed indicating owner, year of birth, rank, citizenship, when and where left one detention site for the next, the number of receipt and so on. Finally: If the prisoner dies in prison, his possessions are returned to the family D as a rule D if they can confirm the right. If the possessions are not claimed within six months, the valuables go to the State budget D his other belongings are destroyed and an act is made. Signed: OVO, Captain of State Security Head, Revision Department GTU NKVD USSR To conclude, if Raoul Wallenberg had indeed died in 1947 and there existed somewhere an act or registration of this fact, these valuables and possessions could not have been returned in 1989 as they would have been turned over to the State. Nor is it possible to claim that the owner of these valuables and possessions were unknown to those competent authorities who watched over them and periodically re-confirmed that they had not been diminished, or that confiscation had not been ordered, or D one would presume D that the prisoner had not died or escaped. WallenbergOs identification papers, valuables and currency had to have followed him to the end D meaning they would be available if the need arose, either from him or some internal decision. The most logical explanation is that Raoul Wallenberg died earlier in 1989 and that the authorities, holding to proper procedure, were offering these valuables to the next of kin and requesting D as is proper D that they acknowledge with the receipt that their half-brother was dead. I would further emphasize the importance of the fact that the various forms of foreign currency are presumably intact. Foreign citizens having visas for going abroad receive (back) foreign currency within limits established by legislation, at their request. In short, this money D as passport, car registration and cigarette case D were sitting around for the day when Raoul Wallenberg would have gone home D either because he was repatriated with his end of term or, more likely, through an exchange. Blots and the Numbering of Certain Prisoners If we were try to co-ordinate a search for the route taken by WallenbergOs possessions in keeping with his disappearance, it would be most helpful to know which Number was his. The same applies to Langfelder and/or Katona. In this regard, it is very helpful that the unidentified numbers 14, 16-20 form a series around Prisoner Number 15. These blots in the alphabetical possessions registry dispels the argument of OcoincidenceO in favor of a coherent organized processing of a group of foreign prisoners. We can therefore explore further the hypothesis that Raoul Wallenberg D rather than dying in July 1947 D may have OdisappearedO as Prisoner Number 14 or Number 16, depending on whether or not he was OsentencedO and shipped out prior to Prisoner AA or after him. There are arguments for both. Other possibilities are: 1) that Wallenberg, Langfelder and Katona are sentenced Prisoners Number 16, 17 and 18; 2) that Wallenberg is sentenced Prisoner Number 16 while Langfelder/Katona who arrived in Lubyanka together on July 22/23, 1947 as sentenced prisoners could be any of the two adjacent numbers in the series D that is, Prisoners 17 and 18; 18 and 19; or 19 and 20. If, however, we are speaking of prisoners still Ounder investigations D and if there is a centralized count D then the only possibilities are 14, 19 and 20 in the Spring and Summer of 1947 for Wallenberg, Langfelder and/or Katona. (NOTE: The Russian sideOs recently identified prisoners 16, 17 and 18 at MGB Prison in response to this report. If these numbers are from Lubyanka they most likely reflect prisoners under investigation (and we believe this to be the case because one of these prisoners was held at Vladimir post- sentencing, under his name). If, however, these reflect sentenced numbered prisoners, then we have only three possible numbers for three possible men: 14, 19 and 20, for Wallenberg and Langfelder/Katona respectively. It should be noted that there are corresponding openings for the arrival of a prisoner or prisoners undergoing isolation at Vladimir Prison in 1947. Dr. Marvin Makinen and Ari KaplanOs computer analysis of the cell occupancy of Corpus II, where most of these prisoners were isolated at Vladimir, shows a sequence of unoccupied (unaccounted for) cells. These are: 1) April 11, 1947 to July 23, 1947 D Cell 11-25; July 24, 1947 - to June 1, 1948 D Cell II-2. After early June 1948, according to their analysis, there are no other long term unoccupied cells to add to the sequence. This could suggest two different isolated prisoners whose cards have been removed from the kartoteka D one arriving in April 1947, the other on July 23rd or 24th, at a point coincidental with the rounding up and interrogating of many of the primary Wallenberg/Langfelder witnesses. Or it could suggest one prisoner who arrived in April and was transferred to Cell II-2 on July 23, 1947. A third cell, II-3, became vacant from July 28, 1947 until May 2, 1948. In all three cases D the April or July 1947 arrivals D the period of unaccounted for isolation ends in the Spring of 1948 (early May or the beginning of June 1948). This is also of interest to us because we are currently documenting a number of eyewitness reports showing Wallenberg in Moscow prisons from the winter of 1948/49 extending into 1949. In this regard, Grossheim-Krisko, also known as Heinrich Tomsen, who worked at Sector B of the Swedish Legation in Budapest has stated in an original testimony that he is OconvincedO that Wallenberg was among a group of 100-110 prisoners who were transferred from Lefortovo Prison to Butyrka in March of 1950. De Latri has also reported that when he complained to a Soviet official in Butyrka in the early Fifties about the severity of his treatment, he was told: OWhat are you complaining about? We have a Swede here who is much worse off than you.6 #We have repeatedly requested to study the Butyrka incoming registry for the time period March 30/31 to April 5, 1950 when almost all the prisoners under the 4th Department Third Main Directorate were passed to the jurisdiction of the Second Main Directorate. In spite of the absolute meticulousness of ButyrkaOs record keeping D outranking either that of Internal Prison or Lefortovo S we have been told that such registries no longer exist because they were OdestroyedO along with the kartoteka soon after the death of Stalin. Examining this registry, or reconstructing the list of those who crossed to Butyrka in March/April 1950, is critical to understanding whether or not Wallenberg was still under investigation by the 4th Department Third Main Directorate until that time, as opposed to OBD. For with the exception of those prisoners sentenced soon after their arrival D up until 1948 D the original corps group of prisoners of war were sent to Butyrka for further pre- sentencing investigation under the 2nd Main Directorate in 1950, and convicted mostly in 1951 and 1952. Because of the importance of this registry, we are requesting its actual destruction document as was given to us by the administration of Vladimir Prison for their incoming registry for a number of years in the Fifties and Sixties, but not including the important years of 1947 and 1957. # I should emphasize, while the above-referenced numbers apply to sentencing in the 1947-48 time period, there is the possibility that the number was relinquished at a later date and either replaced with a different number or a pseudonym. For this reason, in our studies, careful attention has been paid to other names which end in 6-berg6 or where the first name and patronymic are the same D i.e. Ivan Ivanovitch D since Raoul Wallenberg had the same first name as his father. OTemporarilyO Misplaced While there are many missing pieces of information in this study D one of the most important is the question of control. In the limited information shown to us, we have seen nothing that would indicate that Raoul Wallenberg was under the OBD, 2nd or 1st Main Directorates. And yet those who support the rumor of his death by execution very often point toward the sinister OBD D as though they were synonymous with execution. OBD is the very unit that had jurisdiction over Prisoner AA, Okulicki, Pannwitz, Gottlieb, Pataridze, Shulgin, Goldstein and Hungarian Prisoner Number One. While not everyone under their control died, this was the more notorious division. When stories are told of Abakumov being arrested with his deputies D or that the deputies made every effort to destroy the files D the raconteurs are referring to Leonov, head of the OGB and his colleagues. The relevance of who had control of Raoul Wallenberg in the summer of 1947 may be understood through a document which emerged from a file of the Prison Directorate NKVD/MVD USSR. In this document, Colonel K writes to the Head of Investigative Unit of the 1st Main Directorate requesting that certain prisoners be permitted to resume the use of their names: According to the data of the 1st Special Department of MVD of the USSR D some time ago in keeping with the Order of the Investigative Unit of the 1st Main Directorate MVD of the USSR D the below-mentioned convicts, kept in Vladimir Prison, were to be kept under numbers, as follows: 1) Prisoner Number 15 D [PRISONER AA] also known as sentenced by OSO MGB 28 VI 47 to 10 years of prison, 2)Prisoner Number 24 D [PRISONER C] D Hungarian subject- former officer of English Army, sentenced OSO MGB on the 1st July 1950 to 25 years prison; 3)Prisoner Number 25 S [PRISONER P] former officer of the Hungarian imperialist army D sentenced by OSO MGB, 1st July 1950 D 15 years. 4)Prisoner Number 26 D [PRISONER S] D former auditor and lawyer of the Budapest [XXXXX] D sentenced by OSO MGB 1 July 1950 to 25 years; 5)Prisoner Number 27 E> [PRISONER M] D former soldier of the German Fascist Army, sentenced OSO MGB on the 14th of August 1950 to 25 years; 6)Prisoner Number 28 B [PRISONER V] B Without any special occupations. Sentenced OSO MGB 3 March 1951 to 20 years in prison. In connection with the fact that E> keeping convicts as numbered prisoners for a long period of time causes certain inconveniences D I ask you to inform me whether the need to keep the above-mentioned prisoners under numbers has not expired. Besides that, an order was given regarding some of the above-mentioned prisoners D particularly Number 24 D to keep them in prison in solitary OorderO (in total isolation). Solitary detention for such long periods of time negatively effects the psyche of prisoners and leads to psychiatric disordersE EIn connection with the above-mentioned, the Prison Directorate of MVD of the USSR thinks it reasonable not to impose solitary detention on prisoners with long terms of imprisonment. I ask you to inform me of your opinion on this subject. At the same time, I ask you to inform me of your agreement to send Prisoner Number 24 to Kazan Prison Psychiatric Hospital MVD USSR for treatment. Signed: M. K, Head, Prison Directorate. 26 August 1953. The reply to KOs letter from S, Deputy Head of the 1st Main Directorate MVD, on the 4th of September 1953 is surprising, to say the least: To K. RE 34/2/2637 of 26 August 1953. 1. Not against the cancellation of solitary detention for convicts [PRISONER C, PRISONER P, PRISONER S, PRISONER M, PRISONER V] and their detention henceforth will be under their real names D with other prisoners also sentenced for long terms of imprisonment. Doing this, establish such an order that the number of prisoners who know about the detention of the above-mentioned prisoners in Vladimir should be as small as possible... 3. [PRISONER AA] kept under guard in Vladimir Prison is unknown to us. (Bolding and underlinings mine.) It should be remembered that the Hungarian prisoners C and S had been originally under Abakumov but, in response to Prison Warden lonovOs protests to their lengthy detentions without moving the case forward D which took place in 1949 D they were turned over to the 2nd Main Directorate, under Pitovranov, for sentencing in 1950. Their numbering presumably began with their sentencing, at a point when they were no longer under AbakumovOs control. Prisoner AA was numbered while under investigation in 1946, at that time under the jurisdiction of the Especially Important Matters Division D i.e., Leonov, et al, deputies of Abakumov. He was sentenced by OSO in June of 1947 and brought to Vladimir on August 3, 1947. #The statement that Number 15 Obeing guarded at Vladimir is unknown to usQ would imply a splintering of responsibility and/or deeper levels of secrecy even on the higher levels at OCentral.6 What we must now consider is whether PRISONER AA had D temporarily at least D Ofallen through a crackO generated by the arrest of Abakumov and his deputies in July 1951, the death of Stalin in March 1953 and/or the arrest of Beria and his deputies in June of that year. # While we still do not know the specific charges against Wallenberg, Langfelder and Katona B if they were all numbered at the same time they may well have had the same control. Thus if Prisoner Number 15 was unknown to the Investigative Unit of the 1st Main Directorate MVD on September 4, 1953, there could have been a Oblack outO on this entire series between, say, July 1951 B when Abakumov and his deputies heading the Investigative Unit of Especially Grave Matters were arrested B and August 1953. Ignorance of the existence of a particular Numbered Prisoner in one section of Central would not prevent his continuing under the appointed prisonOs regime. Again, it is of utmost importance whether or not the isolated, numbered or long term prisoner had the right to appeal and, psychologically, whether he made use of that power B writing appeals, demanding to communicate with the nachalnik, or simply acting up in a negative way that required a decision from Central. Even then, we have the possibility of a Odisappearance within a disappearanceO, of a temporary crack in the system. September 23, 1953 Begun, Head of Vladimir Prison, replied to the Deputy Head of the Prison Directorate MVD in regard to the second point in SOs letter: I inform that among numbered prisoners as well as the other contingent of prisoners kept in prison there is no [PRISONER C]. We ask you to give an order to check this and inform me of the results. Handwritten across this document is the comment: OTo Comrade KE EHe is now in Butyrka and is subject to being sent to Kazan. 28 IX 53.6 PRISONER C had been transported from Vladimir to Butyrka no earlier than June of the same year. Handwritten in the margin of this already handwritten memo, someone has inscribed OButyrka, Mil nowherelO In the case of PRISONER AA we see that in early 1953 B when he was unknown to the 1st Main Directorate MVD D he was drawing attention to his warders at Vladimir by refusing to clean latrines. But this was a matter that could be decided upon locally. At the same time, money was being forwarded to Begun on Number 15Os behalf by Mironov, still head of Internal Prison MGB, who oversaw the passing of parcels or transfers of money from abroad even after sentenced prisoners went under the MVD. These funds came from Italy, as did subsequent parcels. Here we have an instance where those abroad knew of PRISONER AAOs incarceration under his name, while some of those overseeing his detention as a numbered prisoner or named did not know of him. Unresolved Fate and End of Term There is one further point to be made in the PRISONER AA analogy which can lend valuable new insight into the circumstances surrounding the Gromyko Memorandum of February 1957 which is the basis for the 1947 alleged death claim. Like Shulgin, Volkov, and Kutepov, PRISONER AA was sentenced on June 28, 1947 for Counter-Revolutionary activities according to Articles 54.8 and 54.11. The three Russians received a term of twenty five years, but PRISONER AAOs term was for only ten. This term did not begin from December 19, 1942 when he was first captured in the Verchne-Kovsky Region as a prisoner of war, nor from January 15, 1945 when he first arrived in Moscow. Rather it begins February 11, 1947. I can find no documents in PRISONER AAOs file to serve as a reference point for this date. Therefore I can only comment that on the 13th of February 1947, his Order for Prevention and coupon were issued, and with it an order from Department A ONot to give any reports on the prisoner of Lefortovo B [PRISONER AA]. This order was followed to such a degree that the coupon remains in the file intact. lonov has written: OCO OLeave it as it is.O It should be remembered that at the end of February, 1947 both Wallenberg and Roedl were ordered to be transferred from Lefortovo to Lubyanka, Prison but in the end Roedl went alone. Wallenberg was held back until March 1, 1947. We consider the possibility that similar steps were being prepared for him to be processed along the lines of PRISONER AA. In short, this marks the point where he was separated from Roedl for the reason that he was to be numbered and sentenced by the Especially Important Matters Unit, while Roedl was to continue under the 4th Department 3rd Main Directorate. If Wallenberg was to have been sentenced around the same time as PRISONER AA and if similar exceptions applied to him, then his term of ten years would have also been counted from that same point D whatever it might have been in his case. This means that his ten year term would have expired in February/March 1957 or thereabouts B the date of the Gromyko Memorandum upon which the Soviets have based their official claim that Wallenberg was dead. CONCLUSIONS As most of my essential findings in relation to this particular aspect of my research into the fate of Raoul Wallenberg are listed in my SUMMARY at the beginning of this Interim Discussion, I will conclude with this note: In our previous hypotheses regarding WallenbergOs destiny, we have been studying the case through the prism of the Cold War. Usually, for me as an American, this meant interpreting Soviet interests through a political view of the USSR D that is from the attitudes of my own nation. Raoul Wallenberg became an image of the ideals of freedom and human rights thrown, like the Biblical Joseph, into the pit. As indeed he was. However, to determine his whereabouts and fate, it is necessary to let go of that icon of perfection D and of the worst case scenario D and start with an open mind, moving step by step forward into the realities of Eastern Europe at the end of World War II, the realities of the Soviet arrest and investigative process, of the GULAG for a foreigner prisoner, of a death there. We do not know enough of the Soviet interests and security concerns in Hungary D or in Scandinavia D to be certain why Wallenberg was taken in January 1945. Until we do, we are all the more handicapped in our predictions regarding 1947 D forced to work in the manner I have done with the only tools afforded us through working with the eyewitness reports and the documents handed over to us through the working group that contain direct reference to Wallenberg. It is very important to proceed both from without and within D with an emphasis on the latter. Raoul WallenbergOs case has been described by the Russians as an OexceptionO, but we have no other analogies or real details to define that exception. In my own work, I have attempted to define it by breaking down WallenbergOs fate as we know it into junctures which forced a decision D and to project his fate from there, using this as a measuring tool also to evaluate the various eyewitness reports. At each point, it is necessary to penetrate further E> to grasp the procedures as well as interests/concerns D which lent OurgencyO or OimportanceO to the decision of what to do with him. Policy is of course an essential part of that evaluation D but not all. There are a number of such Odefining momentsO: 1) That which transformed his Oprotective custodyO into long term detention as opposed to Osafe conductO to Sweden; 2) that which placed him as long term cellmate with Willi Roedl, of the German Embassy in Bucharest; 3) that which separated him from Roedl in 1947; 4) that which defined AbakumovOs recommendations for disposing of the OproblemO of WallenbergOs unlawful detention, in world opinion, and/or the possibility that nothing was particularly OmovingO in his investigation as well; 5) if he lived, and was sent out D that which defined any subsequent periods of interrogation for which he might be brought back to Moscow; 6) that which determined the sentence; and 7) the decision regarding his repatriation which had to be made at his end of term. These in their way, are more pressing than repeated appeals for clarification of his fate. Into this pattern, we must add one other factor: his value for an exchange and whether or not the Soviets by the end of 1946 had a Swedish spy in place D and an important one at that D for whom Raoul Wallenberg alive was valuable collateral. The model of Prisoner A is the model of a fairly OinnocentOman, who D by some formula unknown to us D had OBritishO connections. The model of Prince Konoye is that of the son of the former Prime Minister of Japan, a soldier brought into conflict with the Soviet Union at the very last stages of the war D a prestigious figure who, like Esau Oggins in 1947, could not be returned because of what he knew of Soviet KGB interests, the Gulag and those it contained. The first lived and was repatriated D in time. The second was fated because of his prominent family. When he refused to be recruited D as it is said B Wallenberg also refused to betray his country. Again we return to the question of an exchange. Why didnOt Sweden accept the early ouvertures of 1946 for an exchange, as in the case of the Swiss diplomats? Or to enter into discussions at other times as well? Why E> in the sixties E> did Jarring refuse to pursue a discussion regarding Wennerstrsm with a Soviet counterpart D because of the strict orders to keep the two matters D Wallenberg and Wennerstsm D separate from each other? How can you separate these two men if in reality, the fate of one depends D or depended upon the other? To conclude: if one places oneOs ear to the ground, one will understand as I have DEthat there is too much insistence, and has been over time, that there is Onothing to be foundO, that this case is now OhistoryO D when in fact the real investigation has barely begun. This is because too much energy has gone into Oother mattersO than the fate of this one exceptional man. I hope in this Interim Discussion I have proven what can be done and that those who read this will insist upon an investigation that is thorough, that moves in the right direction, that is healing because it is born of the most truest of cooperations D that which would restore not only Raoul Wallenberg to our midst through a real accounting of his fate D but would honor all the values for which he took such an unselfish and courageous stand, for the sake of mankind.