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China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress

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China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress Ronald O'Rourke Specialist in Naval Affairs October 17, 2012 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL33153 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress China Naval Modernization Summary The question of how the United States should respond to China’s military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, has emerged as a key issue in U.S. defense planning. The question is of particular importance to the U.S. Navy, because many U.S. military programs for countering improved Chinese military forces would fall within the Navy’s budget. Two DOD strategy and budget documents released in January 2012 state that U.S. military strategy will place a renewed emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region, and that as a result, there will be a renewed emphasis on air and naval forces in DOD plans. Administration officials have stated that notwithstanding reductions in planned levels of U.S. defense spending, the U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific region will be maintained and strengthened. Decisions that Congress and the executive branch make regarding U.S. Navy programs for countering improved Chinese maritime military capabilities could affect the likelihood or possible outcome of a potential U.S.-Chinese military conflict in the Pacific over Taiwan or some other issue. Some observers consider such a conflict to be very unlikely, in part because of significant U.S.-Chinese economic linkages and the tremendous damage that such a conflict could cause on both sides. In the absence of such a conflict, however, the U.S.-Chinese military balance in the Pacific could nevertheless influence day-to-day choices made by other Pacific countries, including choices on whether to align their policies more closely with China or the United States. In this sense, decisions that Congress and the executive branch make regarding U.S. Navy programs for countering improved Chinese maritime military forces could influence the political evolution of the Pacific, which in turn could affect the ability of the United States to pursue goals relating to various policy issues, both in the Pacific and elsewhere. China’s naval modernization effort, which began in the 1990s, encompasses a broad array of weapon acquisition programs, including anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), submarines, and surface ships. China’s naval modernization effort also includes reforms and improvements in maintenance and logistics, naval doctrine, personnel quality, education, training, and exercises. Observers believe that the near-term focus of China’s military modernization effort has been to develop military options for addressing the situation with Taiwan. Consistent with this goal, observers believe that China wants its military to be capable of acting as a so-called anti-access force—a force that can deter U.S. intervention in a conflict involving Taiwan, or failing that, delay the arrival or reduce the effectiveness of intervening U.S. naval and air forces. Observers believe that China’s military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, is increasingly oriented toward pursuing additional goals, such as asserting or defending China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea; enforcing China’s view—a minority view among world nations—that it has the right to regulate foreign military activities in its 200- mile maritime exclusive economic zone (EEZ); protecting China’s sea lines of communications; protecting and evacuating Chinese nationals in foreign countries; displacing U.S. influence in the Pacific; and asserting China’s status as a major world power. Potential oversight issues for Congress include the following: whether the U.S. Navy in coming years will be large enough to adequately counter improved Chinese maritime anti-access forces while also adequately performing other missions of interest to U.S. policymakers around the world; the Navy’s ability to counter Chinese ASBMs and submarines; and whether the Navy, in response to China’s maritime anti-access capabilities, should shift over time to a more distributed fleet architecture. Congressional Research Service China Naval Modernization Contents Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 1 Issue for Congress ..................................................................................................................... 1 Scope, Sources, and Terminology ............................................................................................. 2 Background...................................................................................................................................... 3 Overview of China’s Naval Modernization Effort .................................................................... 3 Date of Inception................................................................................................................. 3 Elements of Modernization Effort....................................................................................... 3 Limitations and Weaknesses................................................................................................ 3 Goals of Naval Modernization Effort.................................................................................. 4 Selected Elements of China’s Naval Modernization Effort....................................................... 9 Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs)................................................................................ 9 Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs)................................................................................. 11 Submarines........................................................................................................................ 11 Aircraft Carriers and Carrier-Based Aircraft..................................................................... 18 Surface Combatants........................................................................................................... 23 Amphibious Ships ............................................................................................................. 33 Land-Based Aircraft and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) .......................................... 36 Nuclear and Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Weapons ....................................................... 37 Maritime Surveillance and Targeting Systems.................................................................. 37 Chinese Naval Operations Away from Home Waters.............................................................. 38 Numbers of Chinese Ships and Aircraft; Comparisons to U.S. Navy ..................................... 40 Numbers Chinese Navy Ships and Naval Aircraft ............................................................ 40 Comparing U.S. and Chinese Naval Capabilities.............................................................. 42 DOD Response to China Naval Modernization....................................................................... 44 Renewed DOD Emphasis on Asia-Pacific Region............................................................ 44 January 5, 2012, Strategic Guidance Document ............................................................... 45 January 26, 2012, Document on Selected FY2013 Program Decisions............................ 46 September 2011 Press Report About New Defense Planning Guidance........................... 48 October 3, 2012, Remarks by Deputy Secretary of Defense Carter.................................. 48 Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Concept .......................................................................................... 50 Navy Response to China Naval Modernization....................................................................... 50 Force Posture and Basing Actions..................................................................................... 50 Acquisition Programs........................................................................................................ 55 Training and Forward-Deployed Operations..................................................................... 59 Statements of Confidence.................................................................................................. 59 Issues for Congress........................................................................................................................ 61 Future Size of U.S. Navy......................................................................................................... 61 Air-Sea Battle Concept............................................................................................................ 62 Navy’s Ability to Counter China’s ASBMs............................................................................. 62 Breaking the ASBM’s Kill Chain...................................................................................... 63 AAW and BMD Capability of Flight III DDG-51 Destroyer............................................ 64 Endo-Atmospheric Target for Simulating DF-21D ASBM............................................... 67 Press Reports..................................................................................................................... 68 Navy’s Ability to Counter China’s Submarines....................................................................... 73 Navy’s Fleet Architecture.......................................................................................................
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