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The Advanced Surface Force Fleet: a Proposal for an Alternate Surface Force Structure and Its Impact in the Asian Pacific Theater

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The Advanced Surface Force Fleet: a Proposal for an Alternate Surface Force Structure and Its Impact in the Asian Pacific Theater Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection 2015-12 The advanced surface force fleet: a proposal for an alternate surface force structure and its impact in the Asian Pacific Theater Richards, Scott K., Jr. Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/47853 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS THE ADVANCED SURFACE FORCE FLEET: A PROPOSAL FOR AN ALTERNATE SURFACE FORCE STRUCTURE AND ITS IMPACT IN THE ASIAN PACIFIC THEATER by Scott K. Richards Jr. December 2015 Thesis Co-Advisors: Daniel Moran Jeff Kline Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED (Leave blank) December 2015 Master’s thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS THE ADVANCED SURFACE FORCE FLEET: A PROPOSAL FOR AN ALTERNATE SURFACE FORCE STRUCTURE AND ITS IMPACT IN THE ASIAN PACIFIC THEATER 6. AUTHOR(S) Scott K. Richards Jr. 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING Naval Postgraduate School ORGANIZATION REPORT Monterey, CA 93943-5000 NUMBER 9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND 10. SPONSORING / ADDRESS(ES) MONITORING AGENCY N/A REPORT NUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number ____N/A____. 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited A 13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) This thesis addresses how an alternate surface fleet comprised of aircraft carriers (CVNs), guided missile destroyers (DDGs), and enhanced San Antonio class amphibious transport dock ships (eLPD 17s) of an “equal replacement procurement cost” compare in 14 measures of capabilities to the planned 2040 U.S. fleet, and how the two fleets compare in Asian Pacific Theater operations. The estimated procurement costs for the proposed eLPD 17 class ship and for the Navy’s planned 2040 fleet, and the composition of the equal procurement cost alternate fleet, The Advanced Surface Force Fleet, are determined. The two fleets are then compared using three different matrices: 14 measures of capabilities, the capability to conduct humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, and the capability to defeat an adversary in a maritime conflict. The Advanced Surface Force Fleet has more offensive capability than the Navy’s planned 2040 fleet. Furthermore, the eLPD 17 provides the Navy with an amphibious ship that can act autonomously in contested environments, with more surface ships that have offensive capability, and with a warship that can perform conventional surface combatant roles while maintaining the ability to perform traditional amphibious lift capabilities. 14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF force structure analysis, sea shield, sea strike, naval expeditionary maneuver warfare, ground PAGES and sea vehicle, power projection and integrated defense, expeditionary and irregular warfare, 89 bilateral and multilateral security building, modeling future conflicts, U.S. and allied security 16. PRICE CODE policies, planning and strategy 17. SECURITY 18. SECURITY 19. SECURITY 20. LIMITATION CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THIS CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT REPORT PAGE OF ABSTRACT Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UU NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 i THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK ii Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited THE ADVANCED SURFACE FORCE FLEET: A PROPOSAL FOR AN ALTERNATE SURFACE FORCE STRUCTURE AND ITS IMPACT IN THE ASIAN PACIFIC THEATER Scott K. Richards Jr. Lieutenant, United States Navy B.S., The United States Naval Academy, 2009 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES (FAR EAST, SOUTHEAST ASIA, AND THE PACIFIC) from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL December 2015 Approved by: Daniel Moran Thesis Co-Advisor Jeff Kline Thesis Co-Advisor Mohammed M. Hafez Chair, Department of National Security Affairs iii THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK iv ABSTRACT This thesis addresses how an alternate surface fleet comprised of aircraft carriers (CVNs), guided missile destroyers (DDGs), and enhanced San Antonio class amphibious transport dock ships (eLPD 17s) of an “equal replacement procurement cost” compare in 14 measures of capabilities to the planned 2040 U.S. fleet, and how the two fleets compare in Asian Pacific Theater operations. The estimated procurement costs for the proposed eLPD 17 class ship and for the Navy’s planned 2040 fleet, and the composition of the equal procurement cost alternate fleet, The Advanced Surface Force Fleet, are determined. The two fleets are then compared using three different matrices: 14 measures of capabilities, the capability to conduct humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, and the capability to defeat an adversary in a maritime conflict. The Advanced Surface Force Fleet has more offensive capability than the Navy’s planned 2040 fleet. Furthermore, the eLPD 17 provides the Navy with an amphibious ship that can act autonomously in contested environments, with more surface ships that have offensive capability, and with a warship that can perform conventional surface combatant roles while maintaining the ability to perform traditional amphibious lift capabilities. v THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK vi TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION..........................................................1 B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION ...........................1 C. LITERATURE REVIEW .........................................................................4 1. Alternative Forces ..........................................................................4 2. Costing Methods and Comparative Performance Models .........8 D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES .......................9 E. RESEARCH DESIGN .............................................................................10 II. THE ENHANCED SAN ANTONIO CLASS AMPHIBIOUS TRANSPORT DOCK SHIP (ELPD 17) ............................................................13 A. BACKGROUND ......................................................................................13 B. ENHANCEMENTS AND COSTS .........................................................14 1. Close-In Weapon System .............................................................14 2. Vertical Launch System ..............................................................15 3. Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles ............................................................16 4. Variable Depth Sonar ..................................................................16 5. Combat System Suite Upgrade ...................................................17 C. SUMMARY OF COSTS AND CONCLUSION ....................................18 III. CONSTRUCTING AND COMPARING THE FLEETS .................................21 A. BACKGROUND ......................................................................................21 B. THE NAVY’S PLANNED 2040 SURFACE FLEET ............................21 C. THE ADVANCED SURFACE FORCE FLEET ..................................23 D. INDIVIDUAL SHIP CLASS CAPABILITIES .....................................24 1. Large Surface Combatants: Flight IIA and III Arleigh Burke Destroyers (DDG) .............................................................24 2. Small Surface Combatants: Littoral Combat Ships and Frigates..........................................................................................25 3. Amphibious Warfare Ships: The America Class Amphibious Assault Ship, Flight I America Class Amphibious Assault Ship, San Antonio Class Amphibious Transport Dock, LX(R), and Enhanced San Antonio Class (eLPD 17) Transport Dock................................................26 4. Summary of Individual Ship Class Capabilities .......................28 E. COMPARING THE FLEETS ................................................................29 F. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................31 vii IV. HUMANITARIAN AID AND DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS IN THE EAST ASIAN REGION: AN APPLIED CASE STUDY FOR FLEET COMPARISON ......................................................................................33 A. BACKGROUND ......................................................................................33 1. U.S. Response ...............................................................................33 2. HADR Capabilities of the 2040
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