BOLOGNA CENTER JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Somaliland: Building New Institutions and the Tradeo" between Democracy and Stability Sarah Cooper
Ever since the collapse of the central Somali state in 1991, the unrecognized northern state of Somalia, Somaliland, has operated under independent parallel institutions of governance. Upon achieving de facto independence, Somaliland faced the twin challenges of restoring peace and forming new political institutions. Development practitioners often point to the relative peace, stability and modest economic growth that Somaliland has enjoyed since this time as proof that democracy delivers. "is paper, however, seeks to debunk the myth of a democratic Somaliland and contends that a closer analysis of the history of this transition and of Somaliland’s governing institutions reveals that the territory’s leaders prioritized peace over democracy. "e composition and role of the Guurti or House of Elders, the continuing role of the clan system in politics, and the explicit limitation on the number of political parties constrict political space. However, they also encourage peace by giving all of the major political actors a stake in the territory’s governance. Somaliland’s recent political trajectory shows how to transform a politics of war into a politics of consensus, and suggests that power-sharing arrangements—rather than deep democratization—may play an important transitional role in post-con#ict countries.
Introduction bicameral legislature is divided into an upper chamber known as the Guurti “"e Republic of Somaliland, the secessionist or House of Elders, comprised of northwestern slice of Somalia that declared unelected members nominated by the independence in 1991, has a far better clan authorities, and a lower chamber, democratic track record than any of its the House of Representatives, comprised neighbors despite, or perhaps because of, a of 82 directly-elected representatives. In dearth of assistance from the international recent years, Somaliland has achieved community.” 1 relative peace and stability while the southern territories of Somalia continue Ever since the collapse of the central to su"er from profound insecurity and Somali state in 1991, the unrecognized a lack of legitimate governance. As a northern state of Somalia, Somaliland, result, there has been a tendency amongst has operated under independent parallel development practitioners to treat institutions of governance. A president Somaliland as Somalia’s photographic is elected for a #ve-year term and negative. Whereas Somalia is viewed as holds the power to nominate ministers a country beset by intractable con9icts subject to parliamentary approval. A between militarized clans, Somaliland
88 VOLUME 16 | REVISIONS is frequently depicted in development !e Somali Clan System and Political literature as a peaceable territory governed Mobilization by democratic institutions that transcend clan cleavages. Takaa ama bur ka anaw ama badhtanka kaga jiri. (Either lead or be led by your clan, !is paper seeks to debunk the myth but do not stand aside.) of a democratic Somaliland through — Somali Proverb2 a careful analysis of the history of its independence movement and political !e Somali clan system has underpinned transition. Faced with the twin challenges social relations in the region ever since of restoring peace and developing new its earliest recorded history and is crucial political institutions, Somaliland’s de to any understanding of current political facto independence leaders consistently dynamics. Somalis believe that they prioritized peace over deep democratic are descended from the same mythical reforms. !e composition and role of founding father Samaale, whose o"spring the Guurti or House of Elders, the formed the six major Somali clans: the continuing role of the clan system in Dir, the Darod, the Isaaq, the Hawiye, politics, and the explicit limitation on the the Digil and the Rahamwayen.3,4 In the number of political parties, in particular, territory of present day Somaliland, the constrict political space but encourage predominant clans are the Isaaq, the Dir peace by giving all of the major political and the Darod/Harti.5 In pre-colonial actors a stake in the governance of Somalia, clans primarily functioned the territory. !e Somaliland example as emotive kinship groups that could therefore suggests that power-sharing mobilize resources on a large scale to arrangements may play an important cope with the harsh realities of the transitional role in post-con9ict countries. Somali climate and territory. Drought Although Somaliland is not a paragon and security imperatives constantly of democracy, its populace has made rearranged constellations of power signi#cant achievements rebuilding their between the clans, preventing the rise of nation and transitioning from a politics a permanent institutionalized hierarchy. of war to a politics of consensus in a short Clan membership thus served as one period of time. !ese gains should not of many vectors for transmitting social be understated. Clan identities remain expectations. Individuals also owed central to any understanding of politics allegiance to immediate family members, in Somaliland and any future political one’s direct lineage, and clan-families reforms must strike a delicate balance comprised of several allied clans.6 between promoting consensus and power-sharing amongst clans, while also Clans #rst began to function explicitly providing ample political space for new as political units at the time of voices and actors. independence. From the late nineteenth century onwards, the British administered
89 BOLOGNA CENTER JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS northern Somalia—including the clan ties proliferated, as clans and then present-day territory of Somaliland— sub-clans that felt marginalized in larger primarily valuing the region as a port of parties organized to form their own supply for their military base at Aden. parties. By the time of the 1964 elections, When Southern Somalia came under Somalia had more political parties per Italian administration, the colonial capita than any other country excepting authorities played a more active role in Israel.8 Although the #rst prime minister, encouraging development, particularly Abdirashid Ali Shermaarke, took care to during the Fascist period, during preserve a regionally balanced cabinet, which time the colony was viewed as a clan-based in#ghting over the electoral potential homeland for Italy’s surplus spoils soon paralyzed his administration population. In 1948, the United Nations and paved the way for Siyad Barre’s ceded control of southern Somalia to military coup in 1969. Italy under a ten-year trusteeship. !e Italians began to prepare the colony for !e Breakaway of Somaliland independence, and the British followed suit. !e two former colonies immediately “Having experienced the devastation faced questions of how to unite di"erent wrought by a regime based on dictatorship currencies, judicial systems, police forces, and a policy of divide and rule to which the government structures, requirements for country was subjected for over twenty years; joining the army, and systems of taxation and ever vigilant of the return of such a and education. Reconciling the relative regime… "e people of Somaliland hereby underdevelopment of the formerly approve and proclaim to the whole world… British north also proved di:cult, and that this constitution has been adopted as the northern fears of marginalization in the nation’s Constitution.”9 uni#ed territory exacerbated tensions along a north-south axis that presaged Following his October 1969 military the attempted secession of Somaliland coup, Siyad Barre immediately suspended in the 1990s. For example, the June Somalia’s constitution, outlawed all 1961 national constitution submitted political and professional organizations for rati#cation bore no signi#cant and instituted a policy of Scienti#c modi#cations from a draft constitution Socialism.10 To maintain power in the the Italians had helped the south to design, absence of widespread public support, and many northerners felt excluded from particularly after the failed Ogaden the constitution-making process.7 War with Ethiopia from 1977 to 1978, Barre increasingly relied on clan-based With the introduction of electoral patronage, fostering rivalries through the politics in Italian Somalia in 1954, strategic distribution of government posts, candidates began to mobilize votes from arms, and funds to keep his opponents within their clan families. Political parties divided.11 !e government also mobilized with weak ideological platforms but clear inter-clan rivalries through explicit
90 VOLUME 16 | REVISIONS divide and rule strategies.12 Over time, religious leaders, intellectuals, and former members of Barre’s own Marehan clan army o:cers organized to form the Somali from within the Darod came to occupy National Movement (SNM) and began a disproportionate share of key posts in to carry out guerrilla activities against the the government and military. From the government in Mogadishu.18 !e ensuing 1980’s onwards, Barre also depended period from 1987 to 1991, when armed on foreign aid from the United States con9ict broke out between the central and the Western powers to maintain his government and the SNM, took a terrible increasingly tenuous grip on authority. toll on Somaliland. SNM rebels laid siege to several towns, including Hargeisa— Despite some initial enthusiasm for the regional capital and former capital Siyad Barre’s regime in the north, a of British Somaliland—and, in response, period of prolonged famine (the Abaartii the central Somali government’s air force Dabadheer of 1974-1975), caused public conducted bombing raids to recapture opinion to coalesce in opposition to the the city. !e attacks killed thousands central government, which responded of civilians, provoking an international poorly to the crisis. !e introduction of outcry and triggering the suspension of price controls under Scienti#c Socialism foreign assistance. An estimated 100,000 disrupted markets for food, e"ectively northerners lost their lives in the #ghting, halting trade along the historic Arabian- with as many as 50,000 dying in the Somaliland-Ethiopian axis, which was siege of Hargeisa alone.19 Up to 80% the traditional coping mechanism in the of the buildings in Hargeisa, including face of drought.13 Over 20,000 individuals critical infrastructure, such as schools and died in the north, and between 10 to hospitals, were destroyed in government- 15% of the population was forced into sponsored bombing attacks, and as refugee camps.14 As the famine persisted, much as half of the region’s livestock the government experimented with a perished.20,21 Special troops known as the resettlement policy, transferring more Isaaq Extermination Wing ravaged the than 100,000 pastoralists from the north rural areas, poisoning wells, plundering to more arable lands in the south.15 !e livestock, and even burning down entire refugee crisis was exacerbated during the villages.22 In 1991, a Grand Conference Ogaden War. By 1979, o:cial records of the Northern Peoples held at Burco document the presence of 1.3 million declared Somaliland’s independence refugees in Somalia, more than half of under pressure from the SNM and a whom were from the north.16 According group of clan elders who would later to these statistics, one in four inhabitants be incorporated into the Somaliland of northern Somalia was a refugee, government as the Guurti. placing extreme pressure on resources and services already over-stretched in the Somaliland Electoral Politics wake of the 1974-1975 famine.17 By 1981, a conglomeration of Isaaq businessmen, “We may act as a democracy, but we know
91 BOLOGNA CENTER JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS nothing works in this country without the by an electoral college of clan elders. A clans and their interest.”23 #nal shiir beeleed convened in Hargeisa from October 1996 to February 1997, After declaring independence, adopting both a draft constitution and Somaliland seemed poised to devolve a timetable for the transition from clan- into internecine violence. During the based politics to a multiparty system.27 early days of the liberation struggle, clan- In May 2001, the new territory approved based persecution at the hands of Siyad the constitution through a popular Barre united the Isaaq and provided a plebiscite, and elections for twenty-three basis for a nascent national identity.24 district councils took place in December Soon, however, the SNM began to 2002. fracture along sub-clan lines and militant groups clashed over control of the Analysis of the institutions thus strategic port of Berbera and parts of established suggests that Somaliland’s Burco. !e Guurti negotiated a cease#re post-independence leaders sought to and called for a series of shiir beeleed (clan promote peace and prevent clan in#ghting peace conferences) to prevent a return to through power-sharing arrangements full-out civil war.25 In the absence of a while democracy was only a secondary strong central state, the Guurti emerged consideration. !e 2002 district council as national power brokers. Unlike in elections and the Somaliland Political southern Somalia, where the Juba and Party Law signed on August 6, 2000, Shebelle Rivers enabled the growth of proved especially decisive for Somaliland’s sedentary agriculture, the economy of political trajectory and institution- Somaliland remained largely pastoral building processes. Based on the Nigerian and nomadic. To be economically viable, model, the Political Party Law stipulates agreement therefore had to be reached that a party’s performance in local on important issues such as water rights council elections will determine whether and land management.26 Somali clan it should be granted legal authority to elders had traditionally negotiated such contest future elections.28 Article 9 limits agreements amongst themselves, and the total number of political parties to after the independence struggle they three and states that it is illegal for parties stepped forward into the vacuum left by to be constituted on the basis of clan or the state to again assume this role. regional identity. Parties must also obtain a minimum threshold of 20% of all votes !e 1993 Borama Conference resulted cast in four of Somaliland’s six regions to in the creation of many of Somaliland’s be recognized.29 If less than three parties present day political institutions. Notably, meet this bar, then the three parties the Conference determined that the so- receiving the highest percentage of votes called Beel System would govern the in all regions will be recognized. To territory: a bicameral parliament with further support the formation of parties members to be nominated on a clan basis with nation-wide rather than clan appeal
92 VOLUME 16 | REVISIONS alone, the Law requires each party to draft the indelible ink proved easy to bleach a program addressing peace and stability, away and all parties took advantage of the use of natural resources, environmental this discovery.36 protection, the promotion of science and industry, and the advancement of health, Overall voter turnout in Somaliland is also welfare, education, and religion.30 low, which casts doubt on the credibility of the election results. Citing statistics !e letter of the Somaliland Political from the African Elections Database, Party Law is progressive, but it generated the Somaliland Non-State Actors signi#cant controversy in practice when Forum—a local civil society coalition— the sitting governments interpreted it notes that 488,000 ballots were cast in to mean that only those three parties the 2003 presidential elections, 670,000 that met the requirements during the in the 2005 elections for the House of 2002 district council elections are to Representatives, and 538,000 for the be recognized.31 When combined with 2010 presidential elections.37 !e total Article 6, which prohibits independent estimated population of Somaliland is candidates from standing for election, 3 million, which suggests that elected this places a signi#cant limit on political candidates have only a weak mandate space. For example, a new party, Qaran, from the public, with voter turnout of sought to begin the registration process in less than 25% in each election. Voting April 2007, but was barred on the grounds is also thought to have been particularly that no new parties can be recognized.32 low among pastoral populations, perhaps due to a provision in the electoral code Technical shortcomings of the 2002 requiring individuals to vote at the same elections also undermine the democratic polling station where they registered. legitimacy of the three currently authorized Such provisions could be expected to parties. Voting did not take place in some e"ectively disenfranchise Somaliland’s parts of Sool—a territory of eastern substantial nomadic population.38 Somaliland contested by neighboring Puntland—because of security concerns, Moreover, the political platforms of the and there were widespread occurrences of three recognized parties remain weakly multiple voting.33 Political participation developed and clan a:liation tends to by members of the Warsengeli and dictate party loyalty.39 !e three major Dulbahante clans in these regions has parties that emerged from the 2003 remained extremely low when compared elections are the Democratic United to the rest of the population since the Peoples’ Movement (UDUB), Kulmiye, 2002 elections.34 In the absence of an and the Party for Justice and Democracy o:cial census, the electoral commission (UCID). UDUB draws its support developed a process of using indelible primarily from the Gadbuursi and the ink and identi#cation by clan elders to Habar Yoonis clans, the Kulmiye is largely determine eligibility to vote.35 However, supported by the Habar Jeclo clan, and
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UCID’s supporters are overwhelmingly representation of women, even though the ‘Idagale or members of smaller clan National Electoral Commission estimates families based around Hargeisa.40 In that women have comprised a majority of 2005, UDUB campaigned on a platform the voters in every election since 2002.48 of experience and continuity, emphasizing Women may not be trusted to mobilize its track record for stability.41 Kulmiye, the clan vote, because they frequently the party of current president Ahmed marry into other clan families.49 Similarly, M. Mohamoud ‘Silanyo’, capitalized the minority Gabooye clan is numerically on its popular legitimacy during the under-represented, which may re9ect the 2005 campaign, noting that many of its limited in9uence of its elders on party members were prominent leaders of the nominations.50 SNM.42 UCID is the only one of three parties to espouse even a weak ideological !e most striking example of power- platform. Its founder, Faisal Ai Farah sharing in Somaliland is the incorporation ‘Warabe’ lived in Finland, and attempted of the Guurti into parliament. !e to model the party on Scandinavian Somaliland House of Elders is a unique social democratic parties.43 However, the innovation that bolsters the in9uence campaign trail rhetoric of many of the of clan authorities in day-to-day members of parliament who represented governance. Although the constitution UCID in 2005 suggests that they were dictates that the House of Elders should unaware of their party’s social-democratic be renewed every six years, it does not orientation.44 include any provisions detailing how this process should take place.51 As a result, A lack of party whips also contributes the current House of Elders has been to weak party platforms and clan- in power since 1997, and came under based politicking. Because members considerable criticism during the run- of parliament have no institutional up to the 2010 presidential elections incentives to vote in accordance with for unilaterally voting to extend then- the party line, their continued loyalty is President Riyale’s mandate three times, in often secured through clan channels.45 what appeared to be an unconstitutional To stand as a candidate for political o:ce exercise of its authority.52 !e members individuals must raise their own funds, of the House of Elders have also come and estimates from the 2005 legislative under criticism for allowing clan interests elections suggest that campaigns cost to be co-opted by the executive branch. approximately $30,000 USD to mount.46 However, the participation of the clan !is allows clan leaders to exercise a elders in a representative forum has vetting role in the nomination of party prevented them from acting as spoilers candidates, since most fundraising takes to the peace process. In southern place through the clan.47 !e continued Somalia, by contrast, the clans have often in9uence of the clan on the nomination positioned themselves as an alternative procedures has resulted in an under- to a centralized state, preventing the
94 VOLUME 16 | REVISIONS consolidation of power and perpetuating independent party. Most of Somaliland’s con9ict. By incorporating the clan current political leaders were also active elders into government, the leaders of during the Siyad Barre regime, and likely Somaliland seem to have avoided this retain vivid memories of the chaotic party pitfall. Moreover, as state institutions have politics of the 1960’s. By contrast, the become stronger, the overt intervention three authorized parties in Somaliland of the clan elders in politics has declined. are big tent parties, and have had to Clan elders are more likely to in9uence forge alliances across clans to broaden their representatives in the political their base of support.55 Kulmiye, for parties through back-door channels such example, counts amongst its members as patronage networks and vote-buying.53 the Red Flag (a group of former SNM o:cers with Marxist tendencies), a Entrenched corruption may be expected number of religious activists and the to pose a challenge for Somaliland’s Hargeisa Group of civil activists who longer-term political development. In initially took a stand against Siyad Barre’s the short-term, however, the system regime.56 Although the parties campaign has undeniably brought peace and on messages of regional identity, they stability and corruption does not seem regularly participate in multi-stakeholder to have negatively a"ected popular and inter-party forums to publicly perceptions of the government. Opinion rea:rm their commitment to transparent polling conducted by the International and inclusive political processes.57 Republican Institute between September 28 and October 8, 2011 con#rms that Conclusion the government has widespread public support, #nding that individuals had a !e complex system of grassroots largely positive view of the administration institutions that has taken root since and gave the Somaliland government the Borama Conference of 1993 has more credit for taking the territory ‘in transformed a politics of war into the right direction’ than the Somaliland a politics of consensus, delivering people.54 Nor has the preponderance of a signi#cant peace dividend to the the clans in politics prevented peaceful territory of Somaliland. Yet contrary transfers of power from taking place. to the conventional wisdom of many development practitioners, Somaliland’s !e Political Party Law also arguably leaders after the independence struggle helps to di"use inter-clan rivalries. consistently prioritized peace over Limiting the total number of recognized democracy when developing the parties to three has prevented a return territory’s independent institutions. to the fragmented party system of the Many issues remain, including the fact 1960’s when every clan family and sub- that the political space is limited to clan grouping sought to maximize its three weakly di"erentiated parties that share of the political spoils by forming an campaign along ethno-regional lines,
95 BOLOGNA CENTER JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS women and minorities are signi#cantly Sarah Cooper is a second year M.A. student underrepresented in political bodies, and Bologna Center alumnus concentrating and an unelected House of Elders in Con#ict Management. Prior to graduate exercises substantial in9uence over the school, she worked for the National political process through vote-buying Democratic Institute of International and patronage. !ese observations are A!airs in Washington, D.C. backstopping not meant to diminish the signi#cant democracy and governance programs in the achievements of Somaliland’s institutions, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Central which have paci#ed a war-torn region, African Republic, Rwanda and Burundi. revived infrastructure devastated during She holds a Bachelor of Science in Foreign the civil wars of the 1980’s, and helped Service and a certi%cate in International to foster economic growth. Development Development from Georgetown University. practitioners would do well to recall, Although she has never traveled to however, that these institutions arguably Somaliland, she spent a summer teaching function not because they are democratic, English to high school students in Awaaday, but because they accord all of the major Ethiopia. actors a stake in the political process without giving way to the fractious multi- party politics of the 1960’s. For those Notes wishing to apply the lessons learned from Somaliland to peace processes in the 1. Seth Kaplan, “!e Remarkable Story southern parts of the territory, a push for of Somaliland,” Journal of Democracy, Vol.19, No. 3. (July 2008):143. deeper democracy seems to be the wrong 2. Hussein M. Adam, “Clan Con9icts and conclusion. Instead, the Somaliland Democratization in Somalia,” in Ethnic experience suggests a need for careful Con#ict and Democratization in Africa, power-sharing arrangements as a ed. Harvey Glickman, Georgia: !e transitional step on the path to democracy. African Studies Association Press, 1995: !ese arrangements should take clan 199. interests and dynamics into account and 3. David D. Laitin and Said S. Samatar, should prioritize stability and peace over Somalia: Nation in Search of a State, other potentially competing imperatives. Boulder: Westview Press, 1987: 29. 4. Laitin and Samatar, Somalia, 30. 5. Markus V. Höhne, “Political identity, emerging state structures and con9ict in northern Somalia,” Journal of Modern African Studies (2006), Vol. 44. Accessed 24 November 2012.
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7. Although a majority of southerners not immediately an explicit aim of the rati#ed the constitution, less than #fty SNM when the group formed in 1981, percent of the north voted in favor of the group’s rejection of Siyad Barre’s accepting the document. See Laitin and authority was rooted in old fears about Samatar, Somalia, 71. southern political domination at the 8. Laitin and Samatar, Somalia, 69. expense of northern groups. Eventually, 9. Jama, Ibrahim Hashi, !e (Interim) the SNM would develop a unique Constitution of Somaliland (1997), political identity based on the shared 18 March 2013,
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and Mark Bradbury argue that the 49. Ibid., 470 decision to shift towards a democratic 50. Interpeace/Academy for Peace and system was primarily motivated by a Development, “A Vote for Peace: How desire for international recognition. Somaliland Successfully Hosted its First Stig Jarle Hansen and Mark Bradbury. Parliamentary Elections in 35 Years,” “Somaliland: A New Democracy in the (September 2006) 10 December 2012 Horn of Africa?” Review of African
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Hansen, Stig Jarle and Mark Bradbury. Kaplan, Seth, “!e Remarkable Story of “Somaliland: A New Democracy in the Somaliland.” Journal of Democracy. Vol.19, Horn of Africa?” Review of African Political No. 3. (July 2008):143-157. Economy, Vol. 34, No. 11 (September 2007): 461—476. Laitin, David D. and Said S. Samatar. Somalia: Nation in Search of a State. (Boulder: Höhne, Markus V. “Political identity, Westview Press, 1987). emerging state structures and con9ict in northern Somalia,” Journal of Meredith, Martin. "e Fate of Africa: A Modern African Studies (2006), Vol. History of Fifty Years of Independence. (New 44. Accessed 24 November 2012. York: Public A"airs, 2005).
Jama, Ibrahim Hashi. !e (Interim) Constitution of Somaliland (1997). 18 March 2013.
Jama, Ibrahim Hashi. “Somaliland Electoral Laws,” Somaliland Law Series (2009)
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Appendix A
Clan Composition in the House of Representatives from 1998 to 20051
Sub-Clan Old House New House Difference Habar Awal 8 16 +8 Habar Yoonis 7 17 +10 Ciidagele 5 2 -3 Habar Jeclo 11 16 +5 Cimraan 3 0 -3 Toljecle 3 0 -3 Arap 7 5 -2 Ayub 3 1 -2 Gudibiirsi 11 13 +2 Ciise 5 1 -4 Wersengeli 5 4 -1 Dhulbahante 9 6 -3 Hawiye/Fiqishini 1 1 0 Minorities: 4 0 -4 Somali-Arabs (1) Gabooye (1)
Original Somalis: Jibraahiil (1) Gurgure (1) Total 82 82
Cumulative Vote Received by Candidates from each Sub-Clan2
Candidates’ UCID Kulmiye UDUB Sub-Clans Votes % Seats Votes % Seats Votes % Seats S. Muuse* 23,149 13 2 48,558 21 5 40,448 16 2 C. Muuse* 14,703 8 3 10,936 5 1 21,980 8 3 H. Yoonis 61,025 34 8 18,504 8 1 51,588 20 8 H. Jeclo 12,831 7 2 69,881 31 9 32,299 12 5 Gudibiirsi 31,315 18 3 26,198 12 3 80,143 31 7 Arap 3,476 2 --- 29,005 13 3 11,612 4 2
Ciidagele 29,559 17 2 3,981 2 --- 6,791 3 --- Dhulbahante 1,746 1 1 3,368 2 3 3,705 1 2 Wersengeli 25 ------5,198 2 2 4,480 2 2 Ciise ------140 ------5,717 2 1 Ayub ------5,095 2 1 ------Toljecle ------4,409 2 ------Gabooye 615 ------1,967 1 --- Hawiye ------726 ------1 Total 178,444 100 21 225,999 100 28 260,730 33 666,173
1 Interpeace/Academy for Peace and Development, “A Vote for Peace”, 44 2 Ibid., 42.
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