One Foreign Policy or Two? Finland’s New Constitution and European Policies of Tarja Halonen and Paavo Lipponen
TUOMAS FORSBERG
Finland’s new constitution that entered into force in March 2000 attempted to parliamentarise foreign policy decision-making and reduce the autonomous powers of the president. It divided foreign policy issues into two spheres: traditional foreign policy and European affairs, the former being the domain of the president and the latter that of the government. Moreover, even in the first sphere the president should act in co-operation with the government. Yet, there was no agreement among the political observers of how a potential clash between the prime minister and the president would be solved in practice. It was also evident that President Halonen and Prime Minister Lipponen, though both social democrats, held different views on foreign policy in general, and European integration in particular. This article looks into foreign policy decision-making under the new constitution and argues that although clear differences in opinion existed the president and the prime minister have been able to pull together when important issues have been at stake.
n March 1st 2000, two important personal factors caused fears that major events took place in Finland. Ms. clashes might emerge. Firstly, the new consti- Tarja Halonen started her term as tution divided foreign policy issues into two the 11th President of the Republic spheres: traditional foreign policy and Euro- Oof Finland. At the same time, Finland’s new pean affairs, the former being the domain of constitution entered into force. Both changes the president and the latter that of the govern- indicated a shift in the Finnish foreign policy ment but it was deemed difficult to draw a decision-making. Although the President re- clear boundary between them. Secondly, al- mained the leader in the field of foreign though Tarja Halonen had been a loyal for- policy and Halonen represented the social eign minister in Lipponen’s government and democrats likewise as her predecessor, the although both were social democrats, it was moment seemed to mark a beginning of a new widely understood that their worldviews and era. political preferences were largely different. Finland has traditionally been a country Halonen, as well as her successor as foreign where a strong consensus in the questions of minister, Erkki Tuomioja, represented more a foreign policy has prevailed. The post-war “leftist Nordic social democracy” whereas presidents were regarded as undisputed for- Lipponen felt affinity with “rightist German eign policy leaders. Now, both structural and social democracy”. In essence, the question
TUOMAS FORSBERG is Director of the Finnish Institute for International Affairs.
Northern Dimensions 2001 •3 One Foreign Policy or Two?
was whether this new composition would EU. The novelty was an addendum to the change Finland’s European policy oriented paragraph on the president’s role as the leader towards “the core” that had been driven by of foreign policy. The addendum separated Lipponen and the former president Ahtisaari. EU matters from the president’s general man- date and stipulated that the Government is responsible for Finland’s EU policy (includ- ing foreign and security policy). These The New Constitution amendments were not, however, regarded as sufficient and the Parliament obliged the Gov- Finland’s old constitution of 1919 stipulated ernment to carry on with the constitutional that “the relations of Finland with foreign reform “for the parliamentarisation of the powers shall be determined by the President”. powers of the President of the Republic”. Af- Originally the presidential constitution was a ter a general debate and a number of prepara- compromise between bourgeois republicans tory rounds by a committee of experts the con- and monarchists, and the President’s strong stitution bill passed the handling in the par- position reflected the idea that he or she liament in 1999 in a practically unanimous would be able to define the national interest vote. It was decided that the new constitution in a non-partisan way. Yet, the constitution would enter into force at the same time as the was flexible when applied to practice and it next president started his or her term. allowed for a significant degree of variation. The constitution aimed at tying the presi- Although the paragraph on president’s power dent to parliamentarily controlled decision- in the field of foreign policy gave a general making. Although the president still re- mandate, foreign policy decision-making did mained the leader in the field of foreign not develop as president-centric before the policy, the new constitution reduced the au- Second World War. Of the post-war presi- tonomous powers of the president, and cre- dents, Urho Kekkonen in particular concen- ated a dualistic leadership structure for for- trated all power in foreign policy onto him- eign policy: traditional bilateral foreign self, so that the Government, including the policy being the domain of the president foreign minister, unless he was Kekkonen’s while European policy belongs to the prime trusted man, let alone the Parliament, were minister. According to the constitution, “the not able to influence foreign policy decision- foreign policy of Finland is directed by the making. Although Kekkonen’s foreign policy President of the Republic in co-operation is still regarded as a success, and the lack of with the Government”. “The Government”, democracy as a necessity of the Cold War cir- in turn, “is responsible for the national prepa- cumstances, the most deeply felt problem was ration of the decisions to be made in the Euro- that too much power in domestic politics was pean Union”.2 also allocated to the president.1 A trend towards parliamentarism had al- The debate about parliamentarising for- ready appeared in practice. President eign policy decision-making was launched in Kekkonen’s successor Koivisto wanted to re- the 1970s by young leftist radicals but it was frain from interfering in domestic political af- halted by Kekkonen. The debate reemerged fairs in normal times and during Ahtisaari’s only at the beginning of 1990s. In 1991, the term as president, the centrality of the presi- constitution was modified so that the dent was seen to be further in decline – president’s powers in domestic politics were Ahtisaari made his most impressive achieve- significantly reduced. In 1994, further ment as a mediator in the international arena changes in the old constitution were intro- during the Kosovo conflict and not as a figure- duced due to Finland’s membership in the head of Finnish foreign policy. Instead, the
4• Northern Dimensions 2001 One Foreign Policy or Two?
prime minister had risen as a more powerful ister Lipponen, emphasised that the new con- figure than was the case during the Cold War.3 stitution still gave the president the final say One reason why the prime minister gained in matters of foreign policy. The Government more power was Finland’s membership in the had actually modified the wording of the EU. As it was natural that Prime Minister rep- draft into a looser direction so that president resented Finland vis-à-vis his colleagues, then did not need to direct foreign policy “to- it was also necessary that he had a respective gether” but only “in co-operation” with the mandate to appear as a trustworthy partner.4 government. Ahtisaari was of the opinion that Yet, when the President still remained in “actually very little was changed”.6 In one charge of foreign and security policy, a dis- way, the constitution was seen as a codifica- pute over Finland’s representation at Euro- tion of the changes that had already taken pean Council meetings emerged. Had the place in practice. Some other politicians who President abstained from the Council meet- had been drafting the constitution in the par- ings, his power position would have been se- liament as well as political and legal experts riously eroded. The solution that was in- wanted to see a more significant change tak- vented in 1994 was “a policy of two plates”, ing place. In view of Professor Teija namely that both the president and the prime Tiilikainen, for example, the role of the presi- minister would attend the EU summit meet- dent as an independent decision-maker had ings if the president so wished. come to an end.7 Professor Antero Jyränki con- The prime example of the development to- tended before Halonen had started her term wards prime minister’s foreign policy leader- that under the new constitution the ship already under the old constitution was president’s role is to do with supervision and the decision to participate in the measures di- slowing down rather than leading,8 but ob- rected towards Austria in spring 2000. Prime served towards the end of the year that Minister Lipponen made the decision on his Halonen had taken a more powerful role than own and President Ahtisaari accepted it only that.9 Professor Esko Antola anticipated that afterwards when he was informed about it. Finland would have two different kinds of The decision was made when the old consti- foreign policies. The president’s foreign tution was still in force and the action was not policy would be based more on contacts with an EU matter, but coordinated bilateral policy the great powers and personal diplomacy. of fourteen EU countries. The obvious consti- The prime minister’s foreign policy, in turn, tutional contradiction led to public debate would focus on institutions and European over the legality of Lipponen’s decision and integration.10 Yet, it was also remarked that a even attempts to raise a lawsuit against him in constitution will always be formed in practice the Parliament. The Chancellor of Justice ex- by the personalities who occupy the posi- amined the issue and held Lipponen’s con- tions. The first term was seen of a particular duct reprehensible because he did not negoti- importance because it would set the prece- ate with the President but not illegal as the dence.11 President approved the policy afterwards.5 One obvious problem with the constitu- It was not clear how much the new consti- tion was that there was no exact definition of tution would really change the role of the where traditional foreign policy stops and President. Certainly, the President did not be- where EU policy starts. In principle, almost all come a mere representative figure, as some issues can potentially be counted as EU affairs. had wished, but could he or she still be an Yet, traditional foreign policy issues were effective foreign policy leader? Key politi- regularly handled at the European summits. cians, including President Ahtisaari, the later The practice of the “policy of two plates” re- President Tarja Halonen as well as Prime Min- mained as before. President Halonen an-
Northern Dimensions 2001 •5 One Foreign Policy or Two?
nounced that she intended to represent Fin- grounds that the social democrats would con- land in the European Council, as her prede- tinue to have a “straight flush” in foreign cessor had, whenever she liked to do so, but in policy, after her election there were fears that a the Government’s view she needed the potential clash between the president and the Government’s approval for her participation. prime minister would emerge. Columnist of In any case, the new constitution revindicated the daily Helsingin Sanomat, Olli Kivinen saw the operational hierarchy. At the Nice Euro- in May some signs of the existence of two dif- pean Council the division of labour was such ferent foreign policy lines in particular with that Prime Minister Lipponen was respon- the NATO issue.14 Jussi Seppälä of the YLE sible for leading the negotiations but Halonen broadcasting company, in turn, argued that participated in the discussion whenever for- there would be two conflicting approaches eign and security policy issues were on the towards Finland’s participation in the Euro- agenda. Yet, Halonen did not draw a sharp pean defence integration at the Biarritz meet- line between traditional foreign policy and ing.15 In both cases, the contestants themselves EU affairs. In her speech at the Parliament denied that any major disagreements existed. Halonen contended that the co-operation be- Indeed, everything seemed to be smooth. Yet, tween the highest state organs had functioned if one compares the statements of the Prime well. She also hoped that the highest possible Minister on the one hand with the President degree of concord in the decision-making and the Foreign Minister on the other, clear concerning EU affairs would prevail.12 In differences are easy to observe. other words, she indicated that the President Although Halonen had served as foreign should still be a relevant actor in Finland’s minister in Lipponen’s government, it was European policy. widely understood that their political Prime Minister’s growing role also im- worldviews and practical emphases were dif- plied that the Ministry for Foreign Affairs ferent. Lipponen had been a firm EU enthusi- could not claim the authority in the EU affairs. ast for a longer period of time, whereas In the spring of 2000, this question about the Halonen had stressed the role of the Council division of labour between the ministries was of Europe. These views had clashed, for ex- on the agenda when the leaders of Finnish ample, when the government decided on the delegations to the Intergovernmental Confer- preparation of the EU charter of basic rights, ence and enlargement negotiations were as Halonen saw such a charter as undermin- nominated. The result was that Minister for ing the work of the Council of Europe. As in Foreign Affairs led the former delegation and many similar situations, it was Halonen who Minister for European Affairs the latter. A budged, and Lipponen whose policy line strong symbolic change that had also impor- prevailed. tant practical repercussions was that the EU A shift in attitude was expected in particu- secretariat that coordinates Finland’s EU lar in Finland’s stance towards NATO, as both policy was moved from the Foreign Ministry Halonen and Tuomioja were seen as repre- to the Prime Minister’s office.13 senting a pacifist tradition in comparison to Lipponen and Ahtisaari. Lipponen had de- fended the option line in the question of Finland’s membership in NATO against those One Foreign Policy or Two? who stressed non-alignment as a more or less permanent condition. For him, Finland’s po- Paradoxically, at the same time that Tarja litical latitude would be scaled down, if it said Halonen’s potential election to president was that it would never join NATO. Lipponen’s being criticised during the campaign on the second government also no longer referred to
6• Northern Dimensions 2001 One Foreign Policy or Two?
“independent” defence as a basis of Finland’s of bilateralism, the object of Moscow’s and security, but spoke only of ‘credible’ defence.16 Berlin’s policy. Lipponen thus concludes that Tarja Halonen’s speeches raised, however, Finland has to get as deep as possible into to suspicions about a change in the the inner circle of the Union where the future Government’s policy. In her inauguration of the EU is decided. This was Lipponen’s ar- speech to the parliament, she said that a need gument for joining the EMU.20 to prepare for membership of NATO was not Tuomioja, in turn, criticised Finland’s an aspect of a jointly approved position.17 EMU decision. He disputed the usefulness of Halonen also brought back the concept of ‘in- Lipponen’s historical analogy of Finland be- dependent’ when characterising Finnish de- ing left alone. Tuomioja finds the likelihood of fence.18 the renewal of Tilsit (1809) or Ribbentrop
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12345678901234567890123456789012123456789012345678901234567 interests that were at stake as Finland decided
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12345678901234567890123456789012123456789012345678901234567 does not believe that historical experiences
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12345678901234567890123456789012123456789012345678901234567 12345678901234567890123456789012123456789012345678901234567 lar relationship with the EU. Instead he has 12345678901234567890123456789012123456789012345678901234567
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12345678901234567890123456789012123456789012345678901234567 Tuomioja has explained that he was in favour
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12345678901234567890123456789012123456789012345678901234567 12345678901234567890123456789012123456789012345678901234567 22 12345678901234567890123456789012123456789012345678901234567 manage globalisation democratically. For 12345678901234567890123456789012123456789012345678901234567
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12345678901234567890123456789012123456789012345678901234567 12345678901234567890123456789012123456789012345678901234567 the EMU issue, Lipponen emphasised that 12345678901234567890123456789012123456789012345678901234567
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12345678901234567890123456789012123456789012345678901234567 12345678901234567890123456789012123456789012345678901234567 in order to be able to influence EU’s future 12345678901234567890123456789012123456789012345678901234567 development.23 This logic would give a com- The differences between Lipponen’s and pelling argument for Finland’s participation Tuomioja’s thinking can be traced back to the in strengthened defence cooperation within arguments that were used in the EMU debate. the EU. Halonen, in turn, does not think that Prime Minister Lipponen’s view was based Finland should necessarily aim at belonging on the continuing relevance of geopolitics to the “military core” of the EU. In her view, and historical experiences. He is constantly “there is no need for Finland to be in every aware of Finland’s position as a neighbour of core, but only in those that benefit Finland”.24 Russia and recalls that Finland was left alone When she spoke in Stockholm in May 2000 by the West to deal with the Soviet Union in outlining Finland’s security policy, she also the Second World War.19 Thus, according to made it clear that she did not “see a need to him, when the EU and Europe change, Fin- add a mutual defence obligation to the EU’s land is still in danger of remaining the object functions.”25
Northern Dimensions 2001 •7 One Foreign Policy or Two?
Lipponen and Halonen also gave diver- EMU. The commission should continue to gent assessments of the pace of enlargement of play the key role of an initiator and guardian the EU when they visited Estonia in May 2000. of treaties in the future. For Lipponen, the in- Lipponen contended that according to the tergovernmental method is often inefficient, prevalent view, Estonia is on the top of the lacks transparency and leads to the domina- candidates when the EU picks up new mem- tion of some over others. Lipponen also said bers.26 Only one week later, Halonen advised he was in favour of Tony Blair’s aim to de- Estonians to be patient about the membership velop the EU into a superpower in interna- negotiations. In Halonen’s view, no one tional relations but regretted that in recent should promise any privileges to the candi- months the developments in the Council had date countries, such as being among the first led to a decreasing role of the Commission in ones to join.27 external relations.30 A further example of the existence of two Lipponen wanted to take part in the de- approaches to European integration within bate concerning the finalité of the Union with the Government – as well as the Social Demo- a concrete plan. Indeed, he was the first lead- cratic Party – was given by the reactions of ing Finnish politician who proposed a consti- Tuomioja and Lipponen to German Foreign tution for the EU. In his proposal, without Minister Joschka Fischer’s speech in May. stating it explicitly, Lipponen paved the way Tuomioja rejected Fischer’s proposal out of for a bicameral institutional structure. The hand and argued that his ideas lay too far Council would operate on the basis of the away on the horizon. Tuomioja also consid- equality of member states. The Parliament, in ered it as contradicting the principle of equal- turn, would represent democratic legitimacy. ity in the Union. He did not feel that it is right The Commission should enjoy the confi- to push through decisions and models that dence of the Parliament, and its President would bind the future decision-makers to should have powers to appoint members of “what we, as a Leninist elite, have seen to be the Commission. Lipponen stressed that any right”.28 Lipponen in turn regarded Fischer’s moves towards a European constitution need address as praiseworthy independently of to be solidly supported by the public and sug- whether one subscribes to his thesis. In view gested that the preparation should occur on a of Lipponen, Fischer’s ideas were radical, but broad basis. The best model would be a Con- a constructive reply cannot be ”no-no-and- vention that should include the governments once-again-no”. Yet, Lipponen criticised and national parliaments of the member states Fischer for naming countries of the core and the candidate states and the EU institu- group beforehand. In Lipponen’s view it is a tions and representatives. sign of a narrow view of Europe. If core coun- Tuomioja’s speech that he held a few days tries are qualified on the political basis of their later in Paris was tuned very differently. geographical location, the Union would lose Tuomioja first explained the virtues of the its credibility.29 Nordic welfare state tradition and reminded Lipponen himself presented his approach that the integration process in Europe was to European integration in his speech in from the Nordic point of view not considered Bruges in November 2000. The speech was a to be sufficiently open, indeed it is closed to classical defense of a communitarian ap- the rest of the world and even protectionist. In proach to European integration against inter- Tuomioja’s view, the efforts to deepen integra- governmental trends. In Lipponen’s view, the tion can be considered to constitute a threat to community method has brought enormous the Nordic welfare model. According to benefits through the single market and the Tuomioja, the Nordic approach to member-
8• Northern Dimensions 2001 One Foreign Policy or Two?
ship of the EU is essentially characterised by steps backward as well as forward. Halonen pragmatism and evolution. The fragile equi- contended that the European Union is not “a librium between intergovernmental and bicycle” that needs constant pedalling in or- communitarian thinking as well as between der not to stop leading to the rider falling off. the small and big countries should be main- She said she is not planning to ride a bike all tained also in the future.31 the time but a better metaphor for her is a As to the debate concerning the finalité of home where one can live and act.32 the Union, Tuomioja stressed that there is no Yet, the Nice European Council summit established programme for how to proceed. showed that despite of their different ap- He emphasised that in the majority of Euro- proaches to European integration the leaders pean countries, the citizens are not ready for a were capable of effective cooperation when European federation. Actually, Tuomioja real issues were at stake. Despite their alleged wanted to halt the debate: “Although it is in- disagreements, the social democratic troika teresting and important to exchange opinions formed by the president, the prime minister about what we would like Europe and the and the foreign minister were able to pull to- Union to look like after 20 to 40 years, it is nec- gether. After the meeting President Halonen essary to accept the fact that, at the moment, gave credit to Lipponen for his efforts at the we cannot make decisions that would be summit. Obviously, one reason for this binding on future decision-makers nor do we smoothness was that Finland was not put into have the right in principle to do so.” In a difficult situation by the items on the sum- Tuomioja’s opinion, there is “something very mit agenda. The Parliament was also tied to disgusting and deeply undemocratic in the the negotiations closer than in any other EU way of thinking according to which we must, country. The Prime Minister had presented now at the latest”, before the new member the position of the government in the parlia- states have been accepted to the Union, “con- ment and the negotiators were also in contact struct an everlasting vision of future Europe.” with the chairman of the Grand Committee Furthermore, Tuomioja critisised those during the summit. who wanted to see the European Union be- The Finnish Government was largely dis- come a superpower. He found it hard to dis- satisfied with the spirit and uneasy about the cover anything positive in such endeavours, results of Nice European Council, although it because there should be no room nor need for was content with Finland’s own lot. manners that have been traditionally adopted Lipponen was reported to have said during by superpowers in the first place. Tuomioja the meeting that European ambition was be- was also wary of Finland’s participation in the low zero level and afterwards he threatened any further form of strengthened cooperation not to accept the treaty. In Tuomioja’s view the and reminded the audience that other coun- summit took the easy way out and decisions tries should not depend on the assumption concerning the share of the votes in the Coun- that Finland and the Finns would be always cil and the seats in the European Parliament prepared to accept any pursuits related to the were groundless and illogical. The President deepening of integration. noted in her New Year’s speech that problems Lipponen’s speech in Bruges can also be and challenges of cooperation have been de- contrasted with Halonen’s remark just before liberated quite openly. For all three, the im- the Nice European Council on the need to portant point of satisfaction was nevertheless think about the possibility of exiting a core that the conference succeeded in its basic ob- group within the European Union. She jective, namely that the European Union was would like to know, how one is able to take ready to admit new members.33
Northern Dimensions 2001 •9 One Foreign Policy or Two?
Conclusions develop into an acute crisis. In fact, one could say that the debate demonstrates that Finnish foreign policy decision-making was no longer Since Finland entered the EU, it had system- as sensitive and confidential as it used to be atically tried to get “into the core” of the during the Cold War. Moreover, despite their Union. Prime Minister Lipponen was often obvious differences in opinion, one should seen as the personification of this policy. He not lose from sight that the common stand- was supported by President Ahtisaari, and he points were considerable: in the social demo- did not seem to have any significant challeng- cratic troika all support the development of ers in the government, while the opposition crisis management capabilities of the EU but remained weak. During the year 2000 a discus- not that of the EU’s common defence, as well sion about the endurance of this foreign as intensive cooperation with NATO but not policy doctrine emerged. The new President Finland’s membership of NATO, and their Halonen and Foreign Minister Tuomioja views on Finland’s and the EU’s relations seemed to represent a swing towards the left with Russia were congruent. The Nice sum- and Lipponen’s position within his own mit also showed that when real issues were at party was seen as weakening. Ironically, stake, the Finnish foreign policy decision- Lipponen was more popular among the con- makers were able to rely on national consen- servatives than among his own party mem- sus that has been characteristic of post-war bers. Finnish foreign policy. Criticism of Lipponen was to some extent but not chiefly connected with his European policy. It seemed that most people did not ap- Notes prove the federalist-sounding ideas of the Bruges speech and Lipponen was seen as fur- thering more the interest of the EU than that of 1 Mikko Majander, “Paradoxes of Finland.34 Halonen’s foreign policy, in turn, Finlandisation”, Northern Dimensions. received a good grade from the people.35 In Yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy (1999, 85- this sense, one could conclude that 94). See also Paavo Lipponen’s assessment Lipponen’s policy on European integration of Kekkonen, at the Urho Kekkonen centenary seminar, 3 September 2000, rests on the constitutional mandate, but
10• Northern Dimensions 2001 One Foreign Policy or Two?
6 Martti Ahtisaari, Suomen Kuvalehti (24 June, 21 Erkki Tuomioja, ”Suomi matkalla Euroopan 1999). ytimeen”, Ulkopolitiikka (34:3, 1997, 40). 7 Teija Tiilikainen, “Kaventuuko presidentin 22 Erkki Tuomioja, “Management of ulkopoliittinen valta? Kyllä”, Ulkopolitiikka Globalisation and the legitimacy of (35:2, 1998, 35-37). democracy as challenges of Europe”, 8 Antero Jyränki, “Perustuslakiuudistus ja speech at the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in ulkopolitiikan johtaminen”, Ulkopolitiikka Berlin, 10 May 2000. (37:1, 2000, 32-39). 23 Paavo Lipponen, “Tiiviimpi unioni on 9 “Halonen tar för sig av makten”, interview Suomen etu”, Turun Sanomat, 29 May 2000. with Antero Jyränki, Hufvudstadsbladet, 22 24 “Halonen perää Natolta vastuuta”, interview October 2000. with Turun Sanomat, 2 July 2000. 10 Esko Antola, “Suomen kahdenlainen EU- 25 Tarja Halonen, “At the Core of Europe as an ulkopolitiikka”, Helsingin Sanomat, 28 May Non-Participant in Military Alliances – 1999. Finnish Thoughts and Experiences”, talk at 11 E.g. Unto Hämäläinen, “Pääministerin asema the University of Stockholm, 2 May 2000. tukevoituu ulkopolitiikassakin”, Helsingin 26 “Lipponen: Viro kärkipäässä EU- Sanomat, 16 February 2000. jäsenkilvassa”, Helsingin Sanomat, 9 May 12 Tarja Halonen’s address at the opening of the 2000. 2001 annual session of Parliament, 2 27 “Halonen hillitsi Viron EU-kiireitä”, Helsingin February 2001,
Northern Dimensions 2001 •11