Predestination in Aquinas and Calvin

CHARLES PARTEE

Until modern times the most influe ntial systematic theologians in the Roman Catholic and Protestant traditions re spectively were Thomas Aquinas and John Cal­ vin . Because each was syste matic, it is possible to evalua te hi s thought in terms of the context which he provides, and because each was influe ntial , it is worthwhil e not only to examine hi s thought in its own context, but also in relation to the other. Regarding the doctrine of predestination the relationshi p between Aquinas and Calvin e vokes sharply differing evaluations: On the one hand , Reginald Garrigou­

Lagrange sees a substantial dichotomy , 1 while J. B. Mozley recogni zes no real differ­ e nce between Thomas and Calvin. 2 A more extended and helpful treatme nt of both similarities and differe nces is found in Caspar Fri ethoffs, " Di e Pradestinationslehre bei T homas von Aquin and Calvin". 3 Ac cording to F ri ethoff there is significant agreement between Thomas and Calvin concerning the sovereignty of God and there­ fore that God's foreknowledge of the good works of man is not the cause of salvation, but rather that salvation is the cause of good work s. However, T homas believes God to have a rranged that those predestined to glory should receive salvation in connec­ tion with the good works attendant upon the predestination to grace, thereby affi rm­ ing the meritori ous nature of good works in a sense to which Calvin is irreconcilably opposed. The purpose of this essay, then, is to consider the doctrine of predestination in Thomas and Calvin , not so. much with the expectation of solving the proble ms, but with the hope of understanding the issues better. Therefore we will ( I) outline certain essential differences between the intellectual positions from which T homas and Cal­ vin approach the doctrine of predestination in general, a nd (II), delineate in particular the significance of the differing contexts in which the doctrine is discussed in the 5 11111111<1 Theologica a nd the /11stit11tes of th e Christian R eligion. 4 Indeed, these points may be regarded as of more crucial and determinative importa nce than those aspects of their doctrine of predestination which can be isolated a nd compared as Friethoff does.

I. Philosophy and Theology

While both Thomas and Calvin desire to be, and are, Christian theologians, they obviously approach the doctrine of predestination from different perspectives. Al­ though not polar opposites, Thomas and Calvin defend considerably different posi­ tions on philosophy and theology, specifically in regard to (I) Aristotle and Plato, (2) Reason a nd Revelation, (3) Being and Knowing, and (4) Intellect and Wi ll. (I) -Thomas' careful synthesis of philosophy and theology , nature and grace, reason and revelation, termed by G il son " the very essence of Thomism," 5 has no

14 exact counterpart in Calvin 's thought. Thomas calls his work a " theological synop­ sis" and Calvin call s hi s "Christian philosophy," but Thomas' exposition is more explicitly related to the philosophic tradition than Calvin's. Thomas may be called an Ari stoteli an in the sense that he considers Artistotle to be " th e Philosopher" and constantly uses Aristotle's thought as an in strume nt of analy sis and synthesis, while Calvin refers to Ari stotle only ten times in the /11stit11t es. On the other hand , Calvin may be related to the Platonic tradition by way of opposition to the Aristotelian, but thi s di stincti on is scarcely helpful in the re lati on of Calvin to Thomas since Thomas cites Plato by name in the Summa some one hundred times and Calvin in the lnsti- 111/es only twenty. Basically Calvin cites the philosophers, not as a source of insight, but as confirmation that God was not without witness even a mong the heathe n.6 Calvin's closest hi storical affinity is with theological, rather than philosophical, Au­ gustinianism. (2) According to Thomas , " Grace does not destroy nature, but perfects it " (ST. I . I. 8.). Thomas' view of the compleme ntary relation between the natural and the supernatural allows him to give a more positive evaluation of human reason that Calvin 's does. Man, as created in the image of God, is a rational being (ST. I. 93. 6) . The fa ll removes the supernatural gifts, but the natural gifts, while affected, are not totally impaired. Therefore, Thomas thinks that " ma n may progress in the knowl­ edge.of God by beginning wi th lower things and gradually ascending" (SCG. IV. I. I). Thus grace restores the natural function of reason and will which then co-operate with grace. Calvin is not so clear on this point. Reason and revelati on are not always con­ tradi ctory for him , and he can praise the human reason, but he also criticizes "carnal reason." Still , Thomas emphasizes the continuity of reason and re velati on; Calvin emphasizes the inadequacy of reason fo r knowing God. Calvi n, like Bonaventure , seems to think that any philosophy whic h is presented indepe nde ntly of Christian fa ith , while interesting and perh aps helpful in some particul ars, is bound to be, not merely inadequate as a whole, but viti ated in the parts . Calvin welcomes philosophi c in sights because he, li ke Thomas, regards all truth as belonging to God, but he does not beli eve that a philosoph y can de velop a true, even though limited, system without the aid of God's revelation. Calvin occasionall y speaks of what can be naturall y kno wn, but hi s chi ef concern is the revealed Word of God. T hu s he comes close to a kind of positivism of Christi an revelation. Calvin' s view is that " the Scriptures should be read with the aim of fi nding Christ in them. Wh oever turns aside from this object , even though he wears himself out a ll hi s li fe in learning, will ne ver reach the kno wledge of the truth" (Comm. Jn . 5. 39). (3) In ge neral Thomas' theology is more ontological and Calvin ' s in contrast more epi stemological. T hat is 'to say, that while for Thomas "first philosophy is wholly orde red to the knowing of God, as its ultimate end" (SCG. III. 25. 9), he begins with the being of God. Calvin begi ns with the knoll'ledge of God as the fi rst sentence of the /nstit11t es indi cates: " Nearly all the wisdom we possess, that is to say, true and sound wi sdom , consists of two parts: The knowledge of God and of

15 ourse lves" (Inst . I. I. I) . Thus Thomas de votes a good deal of attention to the existence and nat ure of God and then to the divine persons, while Calvin assumes the doctrine of the Trinity. without much di scussion and has comparatively little to say about the being a nd attributes of God. However, even within the framework of this generali zation , one finds more e pi ste mological considerations (e.g., human knowl­ edge as derived from the senses, etc.) in Thomas than in Calvin. Thomas' ontological interest involves the vi ew of the universe as a hierarchy of beings. The metaphysical doctrine of grades of being is utilized by Thomas in the analogy of being and to explain the bein g of ange ls. Calvin's angelology does not focus on the be ing but the activity of the a ngels. Another aspect of the scale of being, the principle of plenitude, allows Thomas to account for evil as a reality , though in a privative sense, while Calvin sees evil in a direct re lation to the will of God. Perhaps Calvin's most explicit stateme nt of God as the author of our affli cti ons (though he deni es that God is the author of evil) is this: All the servants of God in this world [are represented] as wrestlers ... Moreover, it is not said that Satan, o r a ny mortal ma n, wrestled with Jacob, but God himself; to teach us that our fa ith is tried by him ; a nd whene ver we are te mpted, our business is truly with him, not only be­ cause we fi ght under hi s a uspi ces, but because he, as an antagoni st, descends into the arena to try our strength. This, though at first sight it seems a bsurd, experience and reason teaches us to be true. For as all prosperity flow s from hi s goodness, so adversity is e ithe r the rod with which he corrects our sins, or the test of our fa ith and patience. [God] both fights again st us and./(J r us. In short, suc h is hi s apportioning of this conflict , that, while he assail s us with one hand , he defends us with the other ... we may truly and properly say, that he fights again st us with hi s le.Ii hand , and.f(1 r us with hi s righl (Comm. Gen. 32. 34). T homas' theology is an explication of the structure of being, of God as infinite being and man as created being. Calvin's theology revolves around the knowledge of God as Creator-Savior and man as creature-sinner. T hu s Calvin uses personal and noetic rather than rati onal and ontological categori es. (4) Concerning the primacy of the will or of the intellect, Thomas fo llowed Aristotle' s psychology whi ch ho ld s that the reason is the best thing in man and aki n to the gods. 7 T he will , according to T homas, is determined by the knowledge of t he good. The refore wi ll fol lows ~nte ll ect (ST. I. 19. I; yet see Ia. II ae. I). God' s wi ll , too, is determined by good though not as a second movement since willing and being are the same in God. The di vine ideas are not ontologicall y distinct from the divine essence nor is the willing of them. In this sense Thomas can say that the will of God is the cause of things (ST. I. 19. 4). Sti ll , the la nguage Thomas employs suggests a distinction between inte ll ect a nd will, and T homas' basic position is that God is the cause of things by his intellect (ST. I. 22. I). T hu s the divine will fo ll ows the divine wisdom, and God will s the good because it is good. The Occamists, in affirming divin e freedom and omnipotence a nd denying the ontology of divine ideas, see God's will as constituent of the good, though Occam regards the divine will and intellect, if taken absolute ly , as identi cal. T hi s question whether God wills the good beca use it is

16 good or whether the will of God creates the good is raised as early as Plato's £ 111/i yp­ hro. In any e vent , Calvin 's educati on had been along nominali sti c lines, a nd, whil e he objects to the di stinction between absolute and ordere d power (Ins!. Ill. 23 . 2), hi s repeated emphasis is that nothing is greater or more ultimate than the will of God. T homas' view of the intell ect also in volves the concept of exemplari sm whi ch was developed through Neoplatoni sm. Plato's metaphysics may be considered duali sti c in so fa r as he separates the eterna l ideas from temporal things. T he resulting problem of participati on could be met by Plato' s doctrine of soul as an intermedi ary between id eas and things , but the point is that fo r P lato the god (or go ds) is consid­ ered more akin to soul s than to ideas, and the ideas are considered to be expla nati ons ll"ilh o 111 being causes (if the ideas we re causes there would be no proble m of pa rti ci­ pation). However, medi eval thinkers identi fy God with Plato' s idea of the Good which is above the ideas rather than below the ideas with soul as Plato himself does. T hus Plato's eternal ideas were take n to be exemplars in the mind of God and also in some fas hi on as causes. In summary, T homas, a zealous admirer of Aristotl e, approaches the doctrine of predestinati on with the confi de nce that the intellect is capable of reasoning about be ing. Calvin , indebted to Augustine, a pproaches the doctrine of predestinati on in the co nfide nce that the will of God can be known through revelati on. T hus e ven a brief considerati on of the ge neral intell ectua l framework within which T homas and Calvin mo ve shows that di ffe re nt emphases exist a nd that essential eleme nt s of Thomas' thought are quite absent from Calvin 's. If they were recogni zed as Thomisti c and merely deni ed by Calvin and others substituted fo r them, there woul d be a basis fo r a more exact compari son between the two thinke rs, but small paralle li sm exists. The evi dence suggests, so fa r as l can ascertain , that Calvin was not greatl y in­ terested in the T homistic synthesis; at least , Calvi n utili zed Thomas' thought scarcely at all . H islo rical/y , it wpuld be pointless to compare Calvin and T homas as if he did. However, o ne may profitabl y compare their thought syslenwlic ally .

II. Providence and Predestination

The doctrines of provide nce and predestination are c losely related in both Aquinas and Calvin. However, the fo rm and content of their treatme nts indicate that T homas approaches predestinati on fro m the doctrine of provide nce while Calvin comes to provide nce from predestinati on. Thomas sees predestinati on as part of provide nce based on the divine decree. Calvin does not deny, indeed affi rms , the eterna l decree, but in most of hi s earl y wri tings Calvin treats predestination bef(1re pro vidence a nd separale.1· them in the fi nal edition of the !ns tit111 es by dealing with predestinati on as an aspect of soteri ology. To account fo r this situati on the sugges­ ti on may be hazarded that T homas' doctrine of providence and predestination is grounded in an appeal to reason a nd Calvi n's in an appeal to experi e nce. That is , Thomas' view of providence and predestination is an exposition of the ratio nal un derstandi ng of God' s causali ty and Calvin's is an exposition of man's experie nce of God's care. T hi s genera li zation helps to explain the notable differe nces between

17 Thomas and Calvin on (I) the textual locations of providence and predestination, (2) the discussion of the relation of providence and predestination, and (3) the exposition of predestination. (I) The distinction in the Summa Theologica between God's movement to man (ST. I) and man's movement to God (ST. la. Ilae.) is not dissimilar to that between Books I-II and III-IV of the Institutes. The traditional division of Calvin's work along the lines of the Apostles' Creed; God the Father (Book I), God the Son (Book II), God the Holy Spirit (Book Ill), and the Church (Book IV) could be modified accord­ ing to Calvin's programmatic affirmation that the sum of wisdom consists in the knowledge of God and man (Inst. I. I. I) . At the beginning of Book III, Calvin writes that as long as Christ remains outside of us, all that he has done for us is usele ss. Thus it is possible to view Books I-II as an exposition of what God does.for us and Books III-IV as what God does in and with us. Thomas' basic discussion of both providence (ST. I. 22) and predestination (ST. I. 23) is treated as part of the doctrine of God (yet see ST. III. 24). In sharp contrast Calvin discusses predestination in his soteriology as an implication of the response of faith which is the work of the Holy Spirit. Thus in the S umma T/ieologica (though not in the Summa Contra Gentiles) Thomas deals with providence, but also predestina­ tion , as part of the understanding of God, before considering creation. In this a number of Reformed theologians, including Theodore Beza and Hieronymus Zan­ chius, follow Thomas. However, as Calvin's Institutes develop there were three stages in the location of the doctrines of providence and predestination. In the edition of 1536 providence is expounded as part of the belief in God the Father Almighty, creator of heaven and earth. Predestination is treated in connection with the doctrine of the church to which the elect belong. The second stage is found in the edition of 1539. Here Calvin devotes a single and separate chapter to predesti­ nation and providence. In this edition providence, as the less polemical topic, fo llows the exposition of predestination. The third stage is reached in the final and definitive edition of 1559. Now the main exposition of providence precedes the treatment of predestination. Providence is placed in Book I as part of the doctrine of God the Creator (returning to its location in the 1536 editi on) while the doctrine of predestina­ tion is placed in Book III (before the development of the doctrine of the Church in Book IV) as part of the reception of the grace of Christ. It is in the light of the differing contexts that the doctrines of Thomas and Calvin must be compared. (2) In Thomas' theology predestination is the particular aspect of divine pro­ vidence concerned with each person individually. Thus predestination is a part of God's universal providence. Calvin also affirms God's universal providence, but the distinction, if any, between God's particular providence toward man and predestina­ tion is blurred. One might conclude that Calvin's doctrine of predestination is simply a fuller exposition of his view of particular providence, but it seems more Likely that his view of predestination explains his emphasis on particular providence. According to Thomas, since God is the creator, " the causality of God extends to all beings which are therefore subject to providence" (ST. I. 22. 2) . In explaining this doctrine Thomas emphasizes the causality of the intellect of God. Quoting Boethius,

18 Thomas defines" 'Providence [as] the divine reason itself which, seated in the Sup­ reme Ru ler, di sposes all things'; which disposition may refer either to the exemplar of the order of things toward an end, or to the exemplar of order of parts in the whole" (ST. I. 22). Since Thomas holds that the doctrine of government belongs to pro­ vidence (ST. I. 103. 4), he distinguishes between providence as the eternal exemplar of order towards an e nd and government as the temporal execution of order. Within the operation of God Thomas attempts to make room for the co-operation of man by adding di stinctions between immediate and intermediate, universal and particular, primary and secondary, and necessary and contingent causality . Thus predestination is said to achieve its effect certainly and infa llibly but not necessarily since divine provide nce has ordained some things to happen contingently (ST. I. 23 . 6). It is surely a perplexity, if not a contradiction, to think that events certainly a nd infallibly but not necessarily occur. How an omnipotent and omniscient God could know future contingent events without being responsible fo r them is unexplainable. Calvin, on the other hand, emphasizes the will of God, rather than the inte llect of God in providence and predestination. He writes, "God's will is so much the hi ghest rule of righteousness that whatever he wills, by the very fact that he wills it, must be considered righteous. When, therefore, one asks why God has so done, we must reply; because he has willed it. But if you proceed further to ask why he so wi lled, you are seeking something greater and higher than God's will, which cannot be found " (Inst . Ill. 23 . 2). Similarly, Thomas, citing Augustine, concludes, ·'Why [God] chooses some for glory and reprobates others has no reason except the divine will" (ST. I. 23. 5). Nevertheless Calvin asserts that man is free , but he does not attempt to ground this assertion in an ontology. Calvin vigorously objects to those (including Aquinas) who think concerning universal providence "that nothing hin­ ders all creatures from being contingently moved, or man from turning himself hither and thither by the free choice of his will. And they so apportion things between God and man that God by His power inspires in ma n a movement by which he can act in accordance with the nature implanted in him" (Inst. I. 16. 4) . It should also be noted that Calvin's view of government and providence are not clearly differentiated. Further, while Calvin seems to give greater place to secondary and intermediate causality than Zwingli , he really does not have a logi call y coherent theory of contingency as evidenced in the assertion that God's providence " is the determinative principle of all things in such a way that sometimes it works through an intermediary, sometimes without an intermediary, sometimes contrary to every in­ termedi ary" (Inst. I. 17. l ). In summary, Thomas' doctrine of predestination must be understood in terms of hi s doctrine of providence. In contrast, Calvin's doctrine of providence must be approached from the standpoint of his doctrine of predestination. The major problem with Thomas' view is the limitation of God's action . The major problem with Calvin 's view is the limitation of man' s responsibility. This becomes clearer.in their respective expositions of predestination. (3) Thomas believes that God' s providence includes predestination and allows reprobation. Calvin sees predestination as a separate topic involving both election

19 and reprobation. "We call predestination God's eternal decree, by which he deter­ mined with himself what he willed to become of each man. For all are not created in equal condition; rather, eternal li fe is foreordained for some, eternal damnation for others. Therefore as any man has been created to one or the other of these ends, we speak of him as predestined to li fe or to death" (Inst. III. 21. 5). Thomas defines predestination as " a kind of exemplar of the ordering of some persons towards eternal salvation, existing in the divine mind" (ST. I. 23. 3). The rational creature, while capable of eternal Life, must be Jed towards it by God. To providence belongs the permission of certain defects in things, and the permission of certain men to fall away from eternal life is the negative side of providence. God's love wishes some good for all men but not every good. Therefore eternal Li fe is not for all. Those who are predestined are divinely ordained to eternal salvation; those who are reprobated and deserted by grace freely choose to sin. For the elect God wills the end necessarily, but the means conditionally thus guaranteeing their freedom of choice. The elect are given grace in order to earn glory. "God pre-ordained to give glory because of merit, and ... he pre-ordained to give grace to merit glory" (ST. I. 23 . 5). The doctrine of reprobation is not symmetrical with election. The reprobate cannot acquire grace, not because it is absolutely impossible, but because it is condi­ tionally impossible, i. e., because he chooses to sin. To explain predestination Thomas uses the distinction between universal and particular causality, but whether a dual causality which includes God as one cause allows freedom to man is a moot point. One might adopt the panentheistic position that God is a whole with self-determining parts, but presumably the resulting denial of God's perfection and omniscience would have made this view unacceptable to Thomas. In any case, Thomas holds that while the particular cause excludes all defects, the universal cause permits some defects for the good of the whole. Thomas seems to believe that God as universal cause could not logically prevent all evil without destroying some good. That is, without tyrannical persecution, there would be no patient martyrs. This point has been challenged in the contemporary discussion of God and evil. 8 However, Thomas' identification of God's providence and univer­ sal causality is in sharp contrast to Calvin's emphasis on God's particular pro­ vidence. Thomas' doctrine places God directly before and after the life of man but only vaguely with the events of earthly life, thus endangering the concept of the constant care of God. Calvin places God so directly with the life of man that the assertion of the freedom of man is unsupported. For Thomas, God's providence includes the positive permission of evil, and predestination includes the just reprobation of the evildoer. Though God does not positively will evil and reprobation, he positively permits both as a way of justifying the freedom and destiny of man. On the other hand, Calvin understands Augustine's statement that "the will of God is the necessity of things" as a denial of the distinc­ tion between God's will and his permission (Inst. III. 23. 8). Calvin's emphasis on particular providence and predestination as the work of God leaves the freedom and destiny of man in the hands of God.

20 The resulting situation is something Like this. God has made a wonderful house with a heavenly attic and a hellish cellar. Man is placed in the living room. According to Thomas, some men are given a floor plan and these, with the plan and through their own efforts, ascend the stairs. Jhose without the plan can only, but through their own efforts, descend the other stairs. According to Calvin, God is the real estate agent who leads some upward and others downward. The proper attitude for those on the upward way is praise and gratitude to God and hope for the others. In both Thomas and Calvin, God is ultimately responsible for all men, but in different ways. For Thomas, God is directly involved in giving or withholding the floor plan which man is said to be free to follow if he has it, and yet bound to get lost if he does not. For Calvin, God directs the entire tour. Thus it seems that in terms of salvation the freedom of man in Thomas is basically illusory and in Calvin essentially non-existent.

Towards a Conclusion The conclusions reached in this essay is that there are critical differences between Thomas and Calvin in the general intellectual frame-work from which they approach the doctrine of predestination and in the form and content of their discussion of it. More than that, one must conclude that serious intellectual problems remain. The most evident examples are Thomas' distinction between predestination to grace and predestination to glory, which seems to be a logomachy, and Calvin's distinction between the will of God and evil, which seems to be an antinomy. However, this essay should not be construed as an attack on the doctrine of predestination in general nor on that of Aquinas and Calvin in particular. That inten­ tion presupposes that the author has answers rather than questions. The Socratic stance toward the possession of ultimate knowledge still has much to commend it. Further, it does not follow from critical objections that the doctrine itself should be dismissed as an abortive conception of a bygone era. As long as men believe in a God who ~ares for them directly and individually, some attention will be devoted to the doctrine of predestination. Moreover, none of the major schools of contemporary thought provides an entirely satisfactory basis for dealing with these issues. For example, theistic existentialism offers an agonized description of the brokenness of human life and thought, but a description is not a solution. Process theology is able to explain the purpose of God and the freedom of man, but only by denying the tra­ ditional theistic views of God's perfection and omniscience, an expedience which many will be unwilling to grant. The analytical tradition, as represented by John Hick, sees the Christian's religious interpretation of his experience of dependence on God's providence related to his scientific understanding of the sufficiency of the world as "two-fold and indeed paradoxical. " 9 According to Hick, the two-fold paradigm of Christ as completely human and completely divine parallels the Chris­ tian's view of the spheres of science and religion. Thus the "paradox" of the crucifix­ ion as the greatest crime of man and the greatest blessing for man is regarded as the pattern for viewing the responsibility of man and the purpose of God. This appeal to mystery and paradox is not unlike the appeal of Thomas and

21 Calvin to revelation and reason, nor indeed of Kant to the noumenal and phenomenal realms, but it is open to many of the same objections. How is one to determine the difference between true and fal se in mystery and paradox or the relation of one realm to the other in a dual-adequacy truth theory? Perhaps the logical objections to the doctrine of predestination are unresolvable, at least on the basis of discussions to date. However, this situation may point to a psychological solution. That is to say, while experience is corrigible, and likewise the interpretation of experience, for some (though not for a ll) God's care is an experienced fact. Thus the only evidence for the care of God is the experience of it. Hick consciously adopts this stance and Calvin suggests it. 10 Thus, without having arrived at an explanation of all the logical issues in the doctrine, fa ith continues to seek understanding.

FOOTNOTES 1 Regina ld Garrigou-Lagrange, La Pr~ desti11atio11 des Saints et la Grace (Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1935). p. 136. 2 J .B. Mozley, A Treatise 011 th e Augustinian Doctrine vf Predestination (2nd ed.; New York: E. P. Dutton, 1878), p. 267 and note 2 1, pp. 393ff. 'Caspar Friethoff, "Die Pradestinationslehre bei Thomas von Aquin und Calvin ," Di\>//s Thomas , III, 4 ( 1926) , 71 -91 . 195-206, 280-302, 445-466. 4 The S11111111a Th eolog ica (ST) of T homas Aquinas is cited in th e translation of the Fathers of the Engli sh Dominican Province, rev. by Daniel J. Sul li van (Chicago: William Benton, 1952) ; the Summa Contra Gentiles (SCG) with various translators (Garden City, N . Y.: Image Books , 1955). The citations from Calvin are found in the In stitutes of the Christian R elgio11 .1· (Inst .. ), ed. by John T. McNeill , trans. by Ford Lewis Battles (Phi ladelphia: The Westminster Press, 1960) . Calvi n's Old Testament citations are from the Co 111111 e11taries Society, 1843-55). The New Testament cit ations are from Call'in' s Ne11 · Testament Co111111 e11 taries. ed. by David W. Torrance and Thomas F. Torrance , various translators (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1959- 1972). ' Etienne G il son, The St>irit of Thomism (N ew York: P. J. Kenedy, 1964) , p. 73. 6 C f. Charles Parlee, Cali •in and Classical Philosophy. (Leiden: E. J. Brill , 1977), pp. 95 ff. 7 Ethica Nico111achea. X, 8. 11 79 a 25. 'For example, J. L . Mackie in Mind. LXIY ( 1955), 200-21 2. ''John Hick, Faith and K1101rledJie (Ithaca: Co rnell University Press. 1957) , pp. 209- 17 . 1° Cf. my essay, ··calvin and Ex perience," Scottish Journal 4 Theology, 26, 2 (May, 1973), 169-8 1. See also John E. Smith , Experience and God (London: Oxford University Press, 1968) and his The Analogy of Experimce (New York: Harper and Row, 1973).

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