✚ḲʑŁྙ: Memoria et Spes

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Does the Second Vatican Council mean a clear rupture with the ecclesiastical past - or does it stand, despite all undeniable and fundamental changements, in an organic connexion with it presenting its more or less organic development? The question is not a theoretical one; it touches the very legitimacy of the Council and at the same time the fundamental principle of Catholic tradition and of the identity of the Catholic Church. And it is linked intimately with the authentic interpretation of the Council and with the question of the fidelity to its decisions, ideas and options. Since 2005 in some Vatican circles the so-called ‘hermeneutic of continuity’ is emphasized, whose most prominent and outstanding representative is the Curial Archbishop Marchetto.2) Marchetto is criticizing especially the Bologna

1) A great part of the expositions of this article is already published under the title: “Konzil der Moderne oder der Tradition? Kontinuität und Diskontinuität im 2. Vatikanum”, in Katholische Kirche und Moderne, ed., O.J. Wiertz, (Aschendorff 2015, Frankfurter Theologische Studien 73), 91-110. 2) A. Marchetto, Il Concilio Ecumenico Vaticano II. Contrapunto per la sua storia, (Città del Vaticano, 2005).

$POUJOVJUZ *OOPWBUJPOBOE%JTDPOUJOVJUZJOUIF4FDPOE7BUJDBO$PVODJM school of Giuseppe Alberigo and his history of the Second Vatican Council in 5 volumes, which emphasizes the innovative elements.3) The ‘hermeneutic of continuity’, a bridge offered especially to the Pius brothers - but not accepted by them - understands Vatican II exclusively as organic continuation and further development of the lines of former Councils, especially Trent and Vatican I, denying any radical rupture with the earlier tradition. - The hermeneutic of rupture or ‘discontinuity’ on the other hand is defended by two opposite parties: on the one hand by the Alberigo school already mentioned, and on the other the adversaries of the Council, namely the St. Pius X Fraternity and - as its welcomed underpinning - the history of the Council by the Italian historian Roberto de Mattei ‘The Second Vatican Council. A still unwritten history.’4) I would stress only that two other questions regarding the Council and its interpretation are intimately connected with the question of continuity or discontinuity. The first is the view of the Council primarily as event or as text5). The representatives of the discontinuity thesis emphasize the Council as ‘event’, that is they stress the historical context, the struggles and conflicts, the epoch-making newness, the fact that the prepared texts, which were totally in the line of the of Pius XII, were by the Conciliar majority, in brief: the whole atmosphere, called the ‘spirit of the Council’. And they emphasize that the new aspects were expressed only imperfectly in the texts,

3) G. Alberigo - A. Melloni, hg., Storia del Concilio Vaticano II, 5 vol., (Bologna, 1995-2001). 4) R. de Mattei, Il Concilio Vaticano II. Una storia mai scritta, (Torino, 2010). - A critical recension from the author of this article: “Ein kirchliches 1789? Zu einer traditionalistischen Sicht auf das Zweite Vatikanum”, Theologie und Philosophie, 88 (2013), 47-71. 5) A little selection of the literature of this topic: O.H. Pesch, Das Zweite Vatikanische Konzil. Vorgeschichte - Verlauf - Ergebnisse �G Nachgeschichte, (Würzburg, 1993), 351-384; J.W. O’Malley, Vatican II - Did anything happen?, (New York, 2008); G. Wassilowsky, “Kontinuum-Reform-(Symbol)Ereignis? Konzilsgeschichtsschreibung nach Alberigo” in F.X. Bischof, Das Zweite Vatikanische Konzil (1962-1965). Stand und Perspektiven der kirchenhistorischen Forschung im deutschsprachigen Raum, (Stuttgart, 2012), 27-44.

ᝁ⦺ŝ ℁⦺ ᱽ⪙ and that the ‘Council event’ contains a surplus over the text. In contrast the other party argues that only what has entered the texts counts and that the so-called ‘spirit of the Council’ would be, in ultimate instance, a very subjective criterion, or that this principle, applied to former Councils, e.d. Vatican I, would lead to very problematic and exaggerated interpretations. - This problem is connected, regarding the further interpretation of the Council and its realization in the life of the Church, with the understanding of the Council as final point or as way. For those who stress the event character of the Council, Vatican II is only the beginning of a way, but of a way which will continue in the same direction begun by the Council. The other party emphasizes the letter of its decrees; for them the affirmations of the Council are not the first timid beginnings, to which must follow more courageous and less limited positions, but the utmost which could be said without falling into heresy. - I have sketched here only the ideal positions; certainly the reality is more complex, and there are many differentiated positions between the extremes. But I will show that the problem of continuity and discontinuity is of a vital practical relevance for the realization of the Council in the reality of the Church. To return to the initial problem of ‘continuity’ and ‘discontinuity’: I would first say, as a historian, that these alternatives are too simple and sweeping to be applicable to the reality of Church history. Because the question is: continuity or discontinuity with which time, with the 19th century or - what is not the same - with the time of Pius XII? And with which tradition, with the immediate past (and this means: with the post-Tridentine, post-revolutionary or anti-modernistic tradition), with the early Church, the patristic age or the tradition ‘of all times’. (But which in fact does not exist in the critical and controversial questions of Vatican II)?

$POUJOVJUZ *OOPWBUJPOBOE%JTDPOUJOVJUZJOUIF4FDPOE7BUJDBO$PVODJM Certainly Vatican II has been very anxious to stress, if at all possible, the continuity with the former doctrinal tradition and to avoid the impression of a rupture; the frequent citations of former , not least of Pius XII, the most cited authority of Vatican II, are a sufficient proof. And the interventions of Paul VI to satisfy the conciliar minority were motivated especially by this concern. But on the other hand the historian knows that the frequent and emphatic imploration of past authorities can be also a strategy to conceal real paradigm changes. And here it can be said with certainty: Vatican II meant a change of direction in relation to the post-Tridentine, anti-liberal und anti-modernistic periods and their prevalent tendencies. And therefore, if one starts only from Trent and Vatican I, from the papal doctrinal texts down to Pius XII, and from the consensus of the contemporary theologians, who were in the line of Roman orthodoxy without limitations, as the unique criterion, without placing them in the wider context of the whole tradition as well as of the Holy Scripture, then the consequence will be inevitable, that Vatican II was in certain essential decisions against the tradition. That makes the discussions with the Pius Brothers unfruitful; on this base they have the stronger arguments.

Therefore I will now sketch some elements of discontinuity: 1) The first is the peculiar character of Vatican II and of its documents. This peculiarity does not consist simply, as is often said, in the fact that is has defined nothing. Also previous councils have not only defined; the definitions in Trent and Vatican I (where it is said: whoever rejects or asserts a certain statement, is anatema) form only the appendix of their doctrinal documents, while the main part is the positive presentation of the doctrine in the Corpus Doctrinae - and one can say certainly: at least the two dogmatic Constitutions of Vatican II, namely the Constitution Lumen Gentium about the

ᝁ⦺ŝ ℁⦺ ᱽ⪙ Church, and the Constitution Dei Verbum about the revelation, have the same doctrinal authority as the Corpus Doctrinae in Trent and Vatican I. The decisive novelty is another: previous councils have intervened only partially in areas under threat, reforming, putting in order or clarifying doctrinally. Understandably that was done largely in a negative and condemning manner, It was a tradition which considered the task and purpose of the council on the one hand doctrinally in the condemnation of ‘heresies’, on the other hand, regarding discipline, in the reform by juridical regulations. The party represented at the beginning of Vatican II by Cardinal Ottaviani and his theologian, the Dutch Jesuit Sebastian Tromp, intended to continue this line; and the fascinating drama of the first session consisted in the fact, that another understanding of council prevailed, not yet clearly articulated and named ‘pastoral council’. Its essence can be outlined in this manner, that it does not understand the task of the Council in a negative and partial way (as condemnation of ‘heresies’ and fighting against ‘abuses’), but rather as a theological and spiritual response from the word of God to the call of the times, which is not conceived merely and prevalently as danger and threat, but more as a positive challenge. 2) What is new is the concept of reform as aggiornamento. Nearly all councils have dealt in some way with the reform of the Church. But they understood this reform in conservative manner: as restoration of a previous state, as suggests the term ‘re-form’, that is abolishing later ‘deformations’ and restoring an ideal state conceived as out of change. In reality nearly always a new reality has been created by these reforms and not a former ecclesiastical state has been restored; and naturally it was known that many ecclesiastical laws were new. But in principle reform was considered as abolition of temporary ‘abuses’; the concept of reform was static, not dynamic. Reform as ‘aggiornamento’, as positioning in a new time, as

$POUJOVJUZ *OOPWBUJPOBOE%JTDPOUJOVJUZJOUIF4FDPOE7BUJDBO$PVODJM opening oneself to its challenges, to the ‘signs of the times’, with the conviction that these challenges cannot be considered only as dangers, but also or prevalently as a chance, is a specific note of Vatican II and historically new. In fact the Catholic Church before Vatican II was not in great need of ‘reform’ in the traditional sense, at least in comparison with other times like the pre-Reformation period or also the first half of the 19th century. Ist main problem were not ‘abuses’, but ‘anachronisms’. 3) doctrinally new is the differenciation or modification of the ‘exclusivistic’ elements. The ‘exclusivistic’ elements of ecclesiastical doctrine which contain a certain historical ‘fixation’ of salvation, and which present the principal point of offence to modern thinking since the time of Enlightenment, such as the necessity for salvation and infallibility of the Catholic Church, its hierarchical structure, the identification of the Church of Christ with the concrete Roman Catholic Church, are certainly not abandoned, but modified, relativized, differentiated6). By emphasizing plurality, change and internal historicity as essential elements of the Church, by recognizing in the Constitution Dei Verbum the historical-critical methods of research, and by overcoming the narrow conception, that all which is affirmed and said directly by the authors of the Holy Scripture (and what does not belong to the literary form), is infallibly true, there is an approaching to central concerns of modern thinking. On the other hand, the fact that these difficult and ‘bulky’ elements of exclusivism can be only modified, but not abandoned, means that these central concerns of European modernity cannot be fully integrated and that the dialogue with it will remain conflictual.

6) Cf. H.J. Pottmeyer, “Modernisierung in der katholischen Kirche am Beispiel der Kirchenkonzeption des I. und II. Vatikanischen Konzils”, in Vatikanum II und Modernisierung. Historische, theologische und soziologische Perspektiven, hg., F.X. Kaufmann - A. Zingerle, (Paderborn, 1996), 131-146.

ᝁ⦺ŝ ℁⦺ ᱽ⪙ 4) Further it must be acknowledged that Vatican II means in many fields rehabilitation of previous reform movements in the catholicism, which have been rejected as more or less ‘unorthodox’ by the ultramontane mainstream which prevailed since the middle of 19th century. These are above all three: the ‘Catholic enlightenment’ from 1750 until 1830 (especially for many ideas of reform in the inner life of the Church, e.g. in the liturgy),7) the ‘Liberal Catholicism’ of the 19th century (regarding the relation between Church and State und the position of the Church toward modern liberal rights, above all the religious liberty)8) and finally the different currents named ‘modernism’ of the time of 1900 (regarding the problems of historicity of Church, faith and theology).9) Vatican II means that these formerly condemned currents were judged as correct, if not totally, but at least in many respects. 5) To go into greater detail after these global constatations: It cannot be denied that some conciliar affirmations do not only complement, but really correct the magisterial assertions of the immediate preceding time. That can be said regarding the concept of Church membership: in the Mystici Corporis of Pius XII in 1943 only the Catholics are ‘reapse’, really, members of the mystical body of Christ, the others only intentionally, ‘voto’.10) Vatican II speaks instead of different stages or ranks of membership, without abandoning the essential relation to the Catholic Church, in which ‘subsists’ the Church of Christ. It can be said similarly regarding the other Christian Churches as media salutis: before Vatican II only the individual non-Catholic

7) E. Hegel, Die katholische Kirche Deutschlands unter dem Einfluß der Aufklärung des 18. Jahrhunderts, (Opladen, 1975); H. Klueting, ed., Katholische Aufklärung - Aufklärung im katholischen Deutschland, (Hamburg, 1993). 8) G. Schmidt and G. Schwaiger, ed., Kirchen und Liberalismus im 19. Jahrhundert, (Göttingen, 1976). A short general view in K. Schatz, Kirchengeschichte der Neuzeit II, (Düsserdorf: Patmos, 2008³), 67-74, 78-85. 9) The best general view can be found in Cl. Arnold, Kleine Geschichte des Modernismus, (Herder, 2007). 10) DS 3821.

$POUJOVJUZ *OOPWBUJPOBOE%JTDPOUJOVJUZJOUIF4FDPOE7BUJDBO$PVODJM Christians, if they were bona fide, shared in salvation, but rather despite being members of their Church, not because they were members of their Church. Clearly corrected is also the affirmation of the absolute freedom of error of all statements in Holy Scripture, as affirmed in the encyclical Providentissimus Deus of Leo XIII in 1893,11) modified in the encyclical of Pius XII a half century later only insofar as it distinguished between the ‘literary genre’ and the affirmation intended by the author, this latter being only free of error.12) In addition, it can be said that essential parts of the magisterial anti-modernistic documents of the time of Pius X have lost their validity. Even if the ‘modernism’, as it has been defined in the encyclical Pascendi of Pius X in 1907, is still nowadays incompatible with Catholic faith (but it can be questioned who has ever really taught ‘modernism’ in this pure form!), essential concerns of former ‘modernism’ have been accepted and integrated, and not only by theologians, but also in magisterial documents. Surely also today a theology, which will remain Catholic, must affirm that there can be no evolution of dogma, which leads to a sense that has nothing to do with the original one. But on the other hand the concrete dimension and extent of historical evolution of dogma accepted today is such that it would not have escaped the reproach of ‘modernism’ until the time of Pius XII. Above all the identity of dogma in history is not any more defined in terms of scholastic concepts, but in salvific importance. An encyclical which can no longer be sustained in essential aspects after Vatican II, is of Pius XII of 1950, which opposed the introduction of historical thinking in the theology and the relativization of the Scholastic tradition by turning to the Patristic age.

11) DS 3292 f. 12) DS 3829 f.

ᝁ⦺ŝ ℁⦺ ᱽ⪙ But the issue where the ‘hermeneutic of continuity’ cannot help in any way, is the religious liberty. There can be no doubt, that religious liberty understood as human right, principle and ideal solution - and not only as concession and political solution where the ideal of ‘Catholic State’ could not be realized - has been condemned in high level papal documents in the 19th century, especially in the Mirari Vos of Gregory XVI in 1832 and Quanta Cura of Pius IX in 1864.13) Between these documents and Dignitatis Humanae of Vatican II no harmonization is possible and the contradiction irreconcilable - in this I agree with the Pius brothers. And it is no solution to secure the 19th century documents by saying that they reject (only) a liberal and indifferentistic concept of religious liberty (in the sense that it does not matter which religion one confesses). For that is clearly not true: really these statements were directed against believing and even ‘ultramontane’ Catholics, who propagated a genuine Catholic idea of religious freedom and anticipated the ideas of Dignitatis Humanae: so Mirari Vos against Lamennais, Quanta Cura against the French Liberal Catholic Montalembert and his Malines speech of 1863. Here and in some other questions Vatican II has in fact rehabilitated Liberal Catholicism’, previously calumniated as unorthodox and not really Catholic. I said that I agree in this with the Pius brothers. But my objection against those who see in Vatican II a rupture with ‘the’ tradition, is that there does not exist an homogeneous tradition. For the respective official doctrine under Pius XII, manifested also by the minority in Vatican II, was not identical with that under Pius IX and even less with that in the time of

13) Especially in the latter is condemned the thesis, “that the best condition of civil society is such, in which it is not acknowledged that the authority has the duty to take legal sanctions against the violators of the Catholic religion, unless the public peace does require it” (“optimam esse condicionem societatis, in qua imperio non agnoscitur officium coercendi sancitis poenis violatores catholicae religionis, nisi quatenus pax publica postulet”: Pii IX Acta I/3, 690).

$POUJOVJUZ *OOPWBUJPOBOE%JTDPOUJOVJUZJOUIF4FDPOE7BUJDBO$PVODJM Counter-Reformation. For it accepted that a Catholic State could not violate the conscience of Non-Catholics, but must concede them at least private exercise of religion.14) Such an obligation of tolerance, except by political reasons, e.g. to avoid civil war, would not have been recognized in the time of religious wars. But yet a pure hermeneutic of discontinuity cannot be the last word. Eventually it would be a capitulation before the spirit of the age, without legitimation in the own tradition. Its consequence would be the forming of a new Church - or the traditionalism of the Pius brothers, for whom Vatican II is betrayal of the tradition. Benedict XVI preferred therefore the term of ‘hermeneutic of reform’. Unlike a pure ‘hermeneutic of continuity’ it gives place for the innovative elements, but underlining the organic evolution from the past15). But then the question is: how can such an higher continuity be described faced with real ruptures, discontinuities and paradigm-shifts? Here three reflections seem important to me: 1) Vatican II has not fallen from heaven. It is rooted in long-term ecclesiastical developments, e.g. the Bible movement, the liturgical movement, the new missionary conception, and in many other sectors, which began more or less a half century before the Council. Here the Council has continued

14) B.E. in the scheme of the Theological Preparatory Commission under Cardinal Ottaviani “De relationibus inter Ecclesiam et Statum necnon de tolerantia religiosa” (Acta et Documenta Conilio Oecumenico II Vaticano Apparando, 23 vol., (Città del Vaticano, 1960-1969), here Ser. II Praep. II/4, 657-661). In the session of this commission of June 19 and 20 1962 Ottaviani declared that the Catholic Church would not apply double standards, claiming for itself what it does not grant to others: for in wholly Catholic states it cleims for itself a privileged status, conceding tolerance of private religious exercice for the Non-catholics; in mixed states it claims legal equality; in states with a small Catholic minority it claims only tolerance (Ibid., 687 f.). 15) Regarding the discussion of this model G. Wassilowsky, “Kontinuum-Reform-(Symbol-)Ereignis? Konzilsgeschichtsschreibung nach Alberigo”, in F.X. Bischof, Das Zweite Vatikanische Konzil (1962-1965). Stand und Perspektiven der kirchenhistorischen Forschung im deutschsprachigen Raum, (Stuttgart, 2012), 27-44, here 33-36. Wassilowsky concludes that such a “model of interpretation in the sense of organic evolution” could not be applicated without restrictions to Vatican II.

ᝁ⦺ŝ ℁⦺ ᱽ⪙ lines which existed previously, though perhaps not in all countries. But in this respect it meant a qualitative leap forward. For these innovative elements, previously rather tolerated or existing alongside older ones, now became central and dominating, being liberated from restrictions and limitations still imposed on them under Pius XII. But then the objection can be made: Does not mean that a rupture of tradition? Therefore here is another consideration: 2) As I have already suggested, ecclesiastical tradition is not a static, uniform and homogeneous reality, but a dynamic and living network of convictions, options and practices. Here is also the place for ‘Renaissances’, that is recovery of former traditions connected with the dismissal of traditions and doctrines of the immediate past. And naturally these recoveries are never a pure restoration of a past reality, for example of the Church of patristic time, but always something new, connected with modern concerns. That is what can be said of many ‘innovations’ of Vatican II, namely of the liturgical reform and the concept of the Church. Indeed regarding the different currents in the Council, the usual designation of ‘progressives’ and ‘conservatives’ is not false, but incomplete. It is not false, because the relation to modernity was a crucial point of dissent of the two currents of Conciliar fathers. That was manifested especially, but not only, in the question of religious liberty. The ‘conservatives’ lived from the central option of anti-liberalism and the counter-position to the principles of 1789, as these were developed in the 19th century. But in a larger historical scale one could define the conservatives as a current which would continue in the same direction the historical crossroads of the second millennium (that is the Gregorian, the Counter-Reformation, the Anti-Liberal) with their specific mentality and tendency. They were linked more to the immediate tradition, to its accents and historical decisions. In contrast, the reform current tried to correct or relativize these historical biases, relying on older and partially

$POUJOVJUZ *OOPWBUJPOBOE%JTDPOUJOVJUZJOUIF4FDPOE7BUJDBO$PVODJM forgotten elements of tradition. But by going back to these older traditions, they saw also a chance of a dialogue with modernity. Certainly that was in some respect a revolution, for since the time of Counter-Reformation the official Catholic position was not to tolerate a relativization of the immediate tradition in doctrine, piety, liturgy or ecclesiastical structures with reference to the patristic era or the ancient Church. Such a reform tendency by going back to the beginnings was present not only in the Reformation, but also in some Catholic reform movements, especially in Jansenism and in the Catholic enlightenment. But the ‘ultramontane’ mainstream of Catholicism, which prevailed clearly since the mid-19th century, considered these tendencies in the worst case as heresy, at best (if it could not be denied that they were historically in the right) as a naive and archaic construction. The argument was that the Church as a living organism could not return to former stages of evolution, just as an adult cannot return to his childhood, but that it can only develop organically its present life, namely the tradition which is living in it. And also the encyclical Humani Generis of 1950 is linked to this concept of tradition. Therefore it opposes efforts to minimize the scolastic and neo-scolastic doctrinal tradition by going back to the Patristic age. But it must be said that this concept of tradition is to narrow. The biologic model of a living organism, adopted since the time of romanticism, cannot be applied fully to human history. To human history belong Renaissances, returns to former times and to forgotten traditions. Especially in the history of the Church, it often happens that in these older traditions elements useful for the needs of the present time can be found, because they are less ‘specialized’, less focused on historical problems of the past. 3) This answer will be helpful for many things, for most ecclesiastical innovations, but not for all the new fundamental insights of Vatican II. Especially for the new relation to the worldly realities in Gaudium et Spes,

ᝁ⦺ŝ ℁⦺ ᱽ⪙ for religious liberty, for the esteem of the non-Christian religions, for the optimism regarding the possibility of salvation of Non-Christians and even atheists, for the new valuation of judaism and the rejection of the Church’s own anti-Jewish traditions, - for all these, elements at most can be found in the early tradition. However the positions as such are something historically new and in this form and stress are available neither in the New Testament nor in the early and later tradition of the Church. But that does not mean that they have no roots in the Christian conception of God and the human person and that they would pure adaptation to the modernity. But their roots are deeper: namely in the dignity of the individual person called by God. For example, if one considers in the question of religious liberty only the doctrine of the Christian State and of tolerance and compares then the papal documents of the 19th century with Dignitatis Humanae, the conclusion will be that there is only rupture and discontinuity. But the conclusion will be different if one takes as point of departure the fundamental value of personal dignity before God, as such a fundamental Christian value from the beginning; then one will recognize that this value can have consequences which will be acknowledged only in the course of times, and in this case only by the challenge of modernity and its conscience of liberty. In a certain moment the fundamental value of personal dignity will break the shell of a doctrine like that of the ideal of ‘Catholic State’. If one desires to choose an organic comparison, one can see in it a ‘sloughing’ phenomenon of tradition: a certain doctrine will be shed, like the skin of a snake, a process certainly not free of frictions, wounds and conflicts, but finally proceeding from an interior vital principle. Or, theologically speaking: ecclesiastical tradition must go through death and resurrection; the continuity of the Spirit proceeds through the discontinuity of the death which is temporary and historically relative.

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Alberigo, G. - Melloni, A., ed., Storia del Concilio Vaticano II, 5 vol., Bologna, 1995-2001. Marchetto, A., Il Concilio Ecumenico Vaticano II. Contrapunto per la sua storia, Città del Vaticano, 2005. Mattei, R. de, Il Concilio Vaticano II. Una storia mai scritta, Torino, 2010. O’Malley, J.W., Vatican II - Did anything happen?, New York, 2008. Pesch, O.H., Das Zweite Vatikanische Konzil. Vorgeschichte - Verlauf - Ergebnisse �G Nachgeschichte, Wüzburg, 1993. Pottmeyer, H.J., “Modernisierung in der katholischen Kirche am Beispiel der Kirchenkonzeption des I. und II. Vatikanischen Konzils”, in Vatikanum II und Modernisierung. Historische, theologische und soziologische Perspektiven, ed., F.X. Kaufmann - A. Zingerle, Paderborn, 1996, 131-146. Schatz, K., “Ein kirchliches 1789? Zu einer traditionalistischen Sicht auf das Zweite Vatikanum”, Theologie und Philosophie, 88 (2013), 47-71. , “Konzil der Moderne oder der Tradition? Kontinuit? und Diskontinuit? im 2. Vatikanum”, in Katholische Kirche und Moderne, ed., O.J. Wiertz, (Aschendorff 2015, Frankfurter Theologische Studien 73), 91-110. Wassilowsky, G., “Kontinuum-Reform-(Symbol-)Ereignis? Konzilsgeschichtsschreibung nach Alberigo”, in F.X. Bischof, Das Zweite Vatikanische Konzil (1962-1965). Stand und Perspektiven der kirchenhistorischen Forschung im deutschsprachigen Raum, Stuttgart, 2012, 27-44.

ᝁ⦺ŝ ℁⦺ ᱽ⪙ "CTUSBDU

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The problem of continuity and/or discontinuity of Vatican II is linked with other problems regarding the authenticity of its interpretation and the fidelity to its intentions: Continuity Council as text as final point Discontinuity Council as event as way

Elements of discontinuity: Generally a certain change of direction in relation to the prevalent tendencies of the preceding (post-Tridentine, anti-liberal and anti-modernistic) times. More especial: 1) The peculiar character of Vatican II: understanding the task of the Council not in a negative and partial way (as condemnation of ‘heresies’ and fighting against ‘abuses’), but rather as a theological and spiritual response from the word of God to the call of the times. 2) Reform as ‘aggiornamento’ (not primarily as abolition of temporary ‘abuses’ returning to an ideal state, but opening to the needs of time). 3) Differenciation or modification of the ‘exclusivistic’ elements of ecclesiatical doctrine.

$POUJOVJUZ *OOPWBUJPOBOE%JTDPOUJOVJUZJOUIF4FDPOE7BUJDBO$PVODJM 4) Rehabilitation of previous reform movements in the catholicism, which formerly had been rejected as more or less ‘unorthodox’ (Catholic Enlightenment, Liberal Catholicism, ‘Modernism’). 5) Some conciliar affirmations do not only complement, but really correct the magisterial assertions of the immediate preceding time. - Especially in the question of religious liberty no ‘hermeneutic of continuity’ is possible.

But: there was not a ‘rupture’ with a preceding homogeneous tradition! The problem: How can be described an higher continuity faced with real ruptures, discontinuities and paradigm-shifts? Here some reflections: 1) Vatican II is rooted in long-term ecclesiastical developments, which began more ore less a half century before the Council. 2) Ecclesiastical Tradition is not a static, uniform and homogeneous reality, but a dynamic and living network of convictions, options and practices. Here is also the place for ‘Renaissances’, that is recovery of former traditions connected with the dismissal of traditions and doctrines of the immediate past. The biologic model of a living organism, adopted to the Church since the time of romanticism, cannot be applied fully to human history. To human history belong Renaissances, returns to former times and to forgotten traditions. 3) But for many new perspectives of Vatican II, as for the new relation to the worldly realities in Gaudium et Spes, for religious liberty, for the esteem of the non-Christian religions, for the optimism regarding the possibility of salvation of Non-Christians and even atheists, for the new valuation of judaism and the rejection of the Church’s own anti-Jewish traditions, this answer cannot be sufficient. These positions are historically new. But that does not mean that they have no roots in the

ᝁ⦺ŝ ℁⦺ ᱽ⪙ Christian conception of God and the human person and that they would pure adaptation to the modernity. E.g. in the issue of religious freedom: In a certain moment the fundamental value of personal dignity will break the shell of a doctrine like that of the ideal of ‘Catholic State’. Or, theologically speaking: ecclesiastical tradition must go through death and resurrection; the continuity of the Spirit proceeds through the discontinuity of the death which is temporary and historically relative.

Key Words: Second Vatican Council, Continuity, Discontinuity, Innovation

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ⓕ௝ᬑᜅ ᕅ⊁ 4+

ᱽ2₉ ၵ❑⋙ Ŗ᮹⫭᮹ ᩑᗮᖒ əญŁ/⪚ᮡ ᇩᩑᗮᖒ᮹ ྙᱽ۵ əä᮹ ⧕ᕾ᮹ ᱶ☖ᖒ ŝ ə ᮹ࠥॅ᮹ ∊ᝅᖒᨱ š⦽ ݅ෙ ྙᱽॅŝ ᩑđࡹᨕ ᯩ݅. ᩑᗮᖒ    ↽᳦ᱱᮝಽᕽ  ▮ᜅ✙ಽᕽ᮹ Ŗ᮹⫭ ᇩᩑᗮᖒ  ᩍᱶᮝಽᕽ  ᔍÕᮝಽᕽ᮹ Ŗ᮹⫭

ᇩᩑᗮᖒ᮹ ᫵ᗭॅ: (ᯝၹᱢᮝಽ ᯕᱥ ᜽ݡᨱ ᬑᖙ⦹ᩡ޹ Ğ⨆ॅ (✙ญᨵ✙ ᯕ⬥, ၹᯱᮁᵝ᮹᪡ ၹɝݡᵝ᮹ ŝ᮹ šĥᨱ ᯩᨕᕽ ᨕਅ ႊ⨆᮹ ᄡ⪵ᅕ݅ ✚ᄥ⦽ ä: 1) ᱽ2₉ ၵ❑⋙ Ŗ᮹⫭ Łᮁ᮹ ✚Ḷ: Ŗ᮹⫭᮹ ₦ྕෝ ᇡᱶᱢᯕŁ ᇡᇥᱢᯙ ʙಽᕽ ௝, ᜽ݡ᮹ ᗭ໦ᨱ ݡ⦹ᩍ ⦹۱ܹ᮹ܩᯕ݉’ᨱ ݡ⦽ ྙ₦ŝ ‘ԉᬊ’ŝ᮹ ᝙ᬡ)a ᦥ‘) ⧔ᥡᮝಽᇡ░ ᝁ⦺ᱢᯕŁ ᩢᖒᱢᯙ ᮲ݖᮥ ⦹۵ äᮝಽ ᯕั Ʊ⫭ ⩥ݡ⪵’ಽᕽ᮹ }⩢ (ᵝಽ ᯥ᜽ᱢᯙ ‘⠱᜖’ᮥ ℁⠱⦹ᩍ ᯕᔢᱢ ᔢ┽ಽ ࡹ࠭ಅ‘ (2 (௝, ᜽ݡ᮹ ᫵Ǎᨱ }ႊ⦹۵ äܩäᯕ ᦥ ۵״ 3) Ʊ⫭ Ʊญ᮹ ‘႑┡ᵝ᮹ᱢ’ ᫵ᗭ᮹ ᄡ⩶ŝ ₉ᄥ⪵ 4) ᯕᱥᨱ ݅ᗭ ‘እᱶ☖ᱢ’ᯕ௝Ł Ñᇡࡹᨩ޹ (a☉ฎ ĥ༞ᵝ᮹, ᯱᮁᵝ᮹ a☉ฎ᜽᷹, .ɝݡᵝ᮹’), a☉ฎ᜽᷹᮹ ŝÑ ᘥᝁᬕ࠺᮹ ᰍÕ‘ 5) ໨໨ Ŗ᮹⫭᮹ ⪶ᯙᔍ⧎ॅᯕ ݉ḡ ᅕ᳑ᱢᯙ äᯝ ᐱอ ᦥܩ௝, ᝅᱽಽ ᷪbᱢᮝಽ ḥ⧪ ᵲᨱ ᯩ۵ ᜽ݡ᮹ Ʊࠥǭᱢ ᵝᰆŝࠥ ฿ᦥॅᨕu݅. - ✚ᄥ⯩ ᳦Ʊ ᯱᮁ᮹ ྙᱽᨱ .ḡ ᦫ݅⦹܆ᯩᨕᕽ ‘ᩑᗮᖒᮝಽᕽ ⧕ᕾ’⦹۵ äᯕ a ə్ӹ ᯕᱥ᮹ Ɂᯝ⦽ ᱥ☖ŝ᮹ ‘݉ᱩ’ᮡ ᨧᨩ݅.

ᝁ⦺ŝ ℁⦺ ᱽ⪙ ᮡ ᩑᗮᖒᮥ ᨕਜí׳ ᱽ: ᝅᱽ᮹ ݉ᱩ, ᇩᩑᗮᖒŝ ᯙ᜾᮹ ᱥ⪹ॅᨱ Ḣ໕⦹ᩍ ᅕ݅ྙ ᖅ໦⧁ ᙹ ᯩᮥʭ? ໨ aḡ á☁⦽ ᱱॅᯕ ᯩ݅. ᱽ2₉ ၵ❑⋙ Ŗ᮹⫭۵ Ŗ᮹⫭ ၹᖙʑ ᯕᱥᇡ░ ݅ᗭe ᜽᯲ࡽ ᰆʑᱢᯙ Ʊ⫭ ၽᱥ (1 ᨱ ᐭญෝ ࢱŁ ᯩ݅. ,əäᮡ ᝁֱŝ .݅ܩƱ⫭᮹ ᱥ☖ᮡ ᱶᱢᯕÑӹ, ⧎ᔢ ᯝᱶ⦹Ñӹ Ɂᯝ⦽ ᝅᰍa ᦥ (2 ᖁ┾ŝ ᝅ⃽᮹ ᔕᦥᯩ۵ ᩎ࠺ᱢᯙ օ✙ᬭⓍᯕ݅. ᯕŔᨱࠥ ᩎ᜽ ‘෕օᔢᜅ’᮹ ḡᩎ ᯕ ᯩ۵ߑ, əäᮡ ၵಽ Ḣᱥ ŝÑ᮹ Ʊ᮹᪡ ᱥ☖ᯕ ᔍ௝ḡŁ ᩼ԁ᮹ ᱥ☖ᮥ ⫭ᅖ äᯕ݅. Ԏอᵝ᮹᜽ݡ ᯕ௹ ₥┾ࡹᨕ᪉ ᔕᦥᯩ۵ ᮁʑℕ᮹ ᔾྜྷ⦺ᱢ ༉ߙᮡ ۵⦹ ᯙe ᩎᔍᨱ ∊ᇥ⯩ ᱢᬊࢁ ᙹ ᨧ݅. ෕օᔢᜅᨱ ᗮ⧩޹ ᯙඹ ᩎᔍᨱᕽ۵ ŝÑ᮹ .᜽ݡಽ ࡹ࠭ᦥuŁ ᱥ☖ᮡ ᯫ⩡Ჭ݅ ⩤ ə్ӹ ᱽ2₉ ၵ❑⋙᮹ ฯᮡ ᔩಽᬕ šᱱॅᨱ ݡ⦹ᩍ,ⷤᔍ༊ ⨭ᰆⷥᨱᕽ᮹ ᖙᔢ (3 ᝅŝ᮹ ᔩಽᬕ šĥᨱ š⦽ ä⃹ౝ, ᳦Ʊ᮹ ᯱᮁᨱ š⦹ᩍ, እəญᜅࠥƱ ᳦Ʊᨱ ݡ ⦽ ᳕ᵲᨱ š⦹ᩍ, እəญᜅࠥƱᯙŝ ྕᝁುᯱ᮹ Ǎᬱ a܆ᖒᨱ š⦽ Ӻšᨱ š⦹ ᩍ, ᮁ݅ᯕ᷹ᨱ ݡ⦽ ᔩಽᬕ ⠪a᪡ Ʊ⫭᮹ ၹᮁݡᵝ᮹ ᱥ☖᮹ Ñᇡᨱ š⦹ᩍ, ᯕ ݖᯕ∊ᇥ⧁ᙹ۵ᨧ݅. ᯕ్⦽ ᯦ᰆᮡ ᩎᔍᱢᮝಽ ᔩಽᬕ äᯕ݅. ə్ӹ ᯕäᯕ ۱ܹŝ ᯙe }ᯙᨱ ݡ⦽ əญᜅࠥᯙᮝಽᕽ᮹ }ֱᨱ ᐭญෝ ࢱḡ ᦫŁ ɝݡᖒᮥ⦹ ᙽᙹ⦹í ᱢᬊ⦽ äᯕ௝۵ äᮥ ᮹ၙ⦹ḡ۵ ᦫ۵݅. ᩩෝ ॅᨕ ᳦Ʊ ᯱᮁ᮹ ྙᱽᨱ ᯩᨕᕽ ᨕ۱ ᙽe ᯙe ᳕ᨥᖒ᮹ ɝᅙᱢ a⊹a ‘a☉ฎ ǎa’ᨱ ݡ⦽ ᯕᔢ zᮡ Ʊญ᮹ ̮ḩᮥ ˑ äᯕ݅. ⪚ᮡ ᝁ⦺ᱢᮝಽ ั⧕ᕽ Ʊ⫭ ᱥ☖ᮡ ᵞᮭŝ ᇡ⪽ᮥ ☖ ᩍ ӹa᧝อ ⦽݅. əญŁ ᖒಚ᮹ ᩑᗮᖒᮡ ᙽeᱢᯕ໑ ᩎᔍᱢᮝಽ ᔢݡᱢᯙ ᵞ⦹ ᮭ᮹ ᇩᩑᗮᖒᮥ ☖⦹ᩍ ӹᦥe݅.

ᵝᱽᨕ: ᱽ2₉ ၵ❑⋙ Ŗ᮹⫭, ᩑᗮᖒ, ᇩᩑᗮᖒ, ᘥᝁ

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