Fact-finding mission of the Budgetary Control Committee (CONT) To and

20 – 23 September 2016

TABLE OF CONTENTS

GENERAL DOCUMENTS

1. Draft programme ...... 5

2. Background briefing prepared by the Policy Department ...... 13

EU IN THE

3. ECHO Background Briefing: Lebanon and Jordan ...... 49

4. EU-UNRWA Partnership Leaflet ...... 71

LEBANON

5. EU Support to Lebanon - ECHO Factsheet ...... 81

6. Lebanon ECHO Operations ...... 85

7. Protection briefing confidential - Palestinian refugees in Lebanon ...... 87

8. Palestinian refugees from in Lebanon - Factsheet ...... 97

9. Lebanon: Syria Crisis - ECHO Factsheet...... 99

JORDAN

10. EU Support to Jordan - ECHO Factsheet ...... 105

UNRWA

11. About UNRWA 2015 ...... 111

12. UNRWA in figures ...... 129

13. Overview of the EU assistance to UNRWA - Lebanon and Jordan ...... 131

14. EC Financial Commitments to UNRWA 2000-2015 ...... 137

Page 1 of 162 15. Donor ranking (with UN Agencies) overall ...... 139

16. EC-UNRWA Joint Declaration 2014-2016 signed ...... 143

17. EUREP note on Funding Shortfall ...... 149

18. UNRWA Operations in Lebanon ...... 151

19. UNRWA Jordan Field update ...... 155

20. ACIO Annual Report ...... 157

21. Bio UNRWA DCG Sandra Mitchell ...... 161

Page 2 of 162 GENERAL DOCUMENTS

1. Draft programme ......

2. Background briefing prepared by the Policy Department ......

Page 3 of 162 Page 4 of 162 Directorate-General for Internal Policies of the Union Directorate for Budgetary Affairs Secretariat of the Committee on Budgetary Control

Brussels, 9 September 2016

Fact-finding mission of the Budgetary Control Committee (CONT) to Lebanon and Jordan

20 - 23 September 2016

DRAFT PROGRAMME

Members of the delegation: 1. Ms Inge Gräßle (EPP, Head of Delegation) 2. Mr Tomáš Zdechovský (EPP) 3. Ms Claudia Schmidt (EPP) 4. Mr Joachim Zeller (EPP) 5. Ms Caterina Chinnici (S&D) 6. Mr Ryszard Czarnecki (ECR) 7. Ms Martina Dlabajova (ALDE) 8. Mr Dennis de Jong (GUE)

CONT Secretariat 9. Mr Michal Czaplicki (EP mobile: +32-472.580721) 10. Ms Catherine Coninckx

Advisors of Political Groups 11. Ms Edyta Tarczynska (EPP) 12. Ms Codruta-Liliana Filip (S&D) 13. Mr Aivars Berners (ALDE)

Languages covered EN, AR and passive DE and IT.

Page 5 of 162 Interpreters

14. Ms Lina Dokhgan (AR, 22-23/09/2016) 15. Ms Serene Huleileh (AR, 22-23/09/2016) 16. Ms Mirna Tabet (AR, 22-23/09/2016) 17. Mr James Hobbs (EN, 21-23/09/2016) 18. Ms Johanna Eleanor McCalmont (EN, 21-23/09/2016)

Coordination in Lebanon

EU Delegation Harbor Drive bldg., av., Saifi – P.O.Box 11-4008 – Riad el Solh Beirut 1107 2150 Lebanon Telephone: 00961 1 569400 Fax: 00961 1 569415 E-mail: [email protected]

UNRWA Lebanon Field Office Bir Hassan, Ghobeiri, Beirut (opposite City Sportive) Beirut 1107 2060 - Lebanon Telephone: (+ 961 1) 840 490 Fax: (+ 961 1) 840 466

Coordination in Jordan

EU Delegation Princess Basma St., North Abdoun P.O. Box 852099 Amman 11185 - Jordan Telephone: +962-6-460-7000 Fax: +962-6-460-7001 E-mail: [email protected]

UNRWA Jordan Headquarters Bayader Wadi Al-Seer, Amman Beyouk Street, Opposite Wadi Al-Seer Training Centre, PO Box 143464 Amman 11814 - Jordan Telephone: (+ 962 6) 580 8100 Fax: (+ 962 6) 580 8335

Transport: Bus transfers in Beirut and Amman

Page 6 of 162 Accomodation/Hotels:

HOTEL INTERCONTINENTAL (BEIRUT) Address: Minet El Hosn, Beirut, Lebanon, P.O. Box 11/846 Phone: +961-1-369100 http://www.phoeniciabeirut.com/

Date in: 20/09/2016 & Date out: 21/09/2016

HOTEL INTERCONTINENTAL (AMMAN) Address: Islamic College Street, P.O. Box 35014, Jabal Amman, Amman 11180 Jordan Phone: +962-6-4641361 http://www.ihg.com/intercontinental/hotels/gb/en/amman/ammha/hoteldetail

Date in: 21/09/2016 & Date out: 23/09/2016

Flights:

OUTWARD - From Brussels to Beirut Flight On Airport Departure time Arrival time ME 216 20 September Brussels Airport 11:00 16:10 TRANSFER - From Beirut to Amman Flight On Airport Departure time Arrival time RJ 406 21 September Beirut – Intl 20:20 22:10 RETURN - From Amman to Flight On Airport Departure time Arrival time AF 487 24 September Amman – Queen Alia Intl 01:25 05:30 From Paris to Brussels Train On Train Station Departure time Arrival time 7181 24 September Paris Charles de Gaulle 08:07 09:43 OR From Amman to Istanbul Flight On Airport Departure time Arrival time TK 813 24 September Amman – Queen Alia Intl 06:40 09:05 From Istanbul to Brussels Flight On Airport Departure time Arrival time Istanbul – Ataturk, Terminal TK 1943 24 September 10:10 12:35 I

Page 7 of 162 Programme:

Tuesday, 20 September 2016

Time Meeting Location 16:10 Arrival of the delegation in Beirut Rafic Hariri Intl airport and transfer to the hotel 19:00 Reception hosted by Head of the EU Residence of the EU Delegation to Lebanon, HE Ambassador Ambassador Ms Christina Markus Lassen

Wednesday, 21 September 2016

Time Meeting Location 8:30 Meeting in the hotel lobby, joint program with Intercontinental LIBE Phoenicia Hotel 09:00 - 10:00 Briefing with UNRWA Director Matthias UNRWA HQ Schmale (joint CONT-LIBE meeting)

10:00 - 10:15 Transfer to venue

10:15 - 11:30 Visit to Shatila camp (joint CONT-LIBE Shatila camp meeting)

Focus Education, Protection and Cash Assistance: a briefing on the protection concerns of Palestine refugees in Lebanon, a tour of an UNRWA school (supported by ENI contribution to UNRWA Program budget); observation of classrooms and awareness raising activities, focus group with beneficiaries of UNRWA’s emergency cash assistance program for Palestine refugees from Syria (supported by ENI and now also by the Madad Fund) 11:30 - 12:00 Transfer to venue

12:00 - 13:30 Visit to Bourj al Barajneh camp (CONT only, Bourj al Barajneh camp LIBE has a separate meeting)

Focus on Shelter Rehabilitation and Health: Visit to a rehabilitated shelter, a shelter being rehabilitated and a shelter waiting to be rehabilitated & meeting with inhabitants (ENI project funding); tour of health clinic and briefing on health and hospitalization by the Health Programme Chief 13:30 - 14:15 Transfer to venue

Page 8 of 162 14:15 - 16:45 Visit to Siblin Training center (joint CONT-LIBE Siblin Training center meeting)

Meeting with principal, observation of courses, career guidance sessions and a focus group with young trainees (supported by ENI through the Program budget and additional specific projects funded by ENI) 16:45 - 18:30 Transfer to the airport 20:20 - 22:10 Flight Beirut-Amman Arrival at Queen Alia Airport and transfer to the hotel

Thursday, 22 September 2016

Time Meeting Location 8:00 Departure from hotel Intercontinental Hotel 8:30 - 9:30 Briefing with Andrea Matteo Fontana, EU Delegation Ambassador, Ibrahim Laafia, Head of Cooperation, and Matteo Paoltroni, EC Humanitarian Office 10:00 - 11:30 UNRWA Wadi Seer Vocational Training Centre UNRWA HQ (supported by ENI through UNRWA program budget)

Dorothee Klaus, UNRWA Deputy for Programmes in Jordan Oroba Labadi, Chief Field TVET Programme in Jordan Khalil Hasan, Donar Relations and Projects Officer in Jordan

- Briefing on UNRWA TVET Programme in Jordan; relevancy of the programme, Parallel beneficiaries and targeting of the sessions vulnerable categories, success rates and employment of graduates, new TVET strategy and possible areas of reform, needs and future plans. (ENI support to UNRWA Program Budget- GIZ current technical support); - Tour in Wadi Seer Training Centre; look into workshops and classes; meeting with TVET students including ex-Gazan students. 10:15 - 11:15 Meeting with Eng. Yasin Abu Awad, Acting Department of Director General and Eng. Nidal Haddad, Palestinian Affairs then Director of UNRWA Directorate, General UNRWA HQ Director, Department of Palestinian Affairs Chair plus restricted group

Page 9 of 162 12:15 - 15.00 Field trip to Baqa’a Camp Baqa’a camp

Dorothee Klaus, UNRWA Deputy for Programmes in Jordan Waleed El Hajjawi, UNRWA Chief Area Officer Khalil Hasan, Donor relations and Projects Officer

- Briefing - Tour in the camp; look into JFO Solid Waste Management operations in the camp (ENI support to UNRWA Program Budget- GIZ current technical support ); - Meeting with one poor family registered with UNRWA’s Special Safety Net Programme (SSNP) benefiting from UNRWA cash assistance program (funded by ENI under the Program budget) - Possible visit to a family of Palestine refugees from Syria (outside the camp) (supported by ENI and now also the Madad Fund)

15:30 - 18:00 Field trip to Jerash Camp Jerash camp

Dorothee Klaus, UNRWA Deputy for Programmes in Jordan Mazen Omar, UNRWA Chief Area Officer Khalil Hasan, Donor relations and Projects Officer

- Briefing - Visit UNRWA Health Clinic implementing UNRWA health reform (Family Health Team approach and E-health system); (ENI support to UNRWA Program Budget) - Visit UNRWA Girls school in Jerash camp (UNRWA education program supported by ENI contribution to UNRWA Program budget); - Household visit to one shelter rehabilitated under the EU project; - Household visit to a poor ex-Gazan family residing in the camp.

18:00 - 19:00 - Bus transfer back to Amman Intercontinental Hotel

Page 10 of 162 Friday, 23 September 2016

Time Meeting Location 8:30 Departure from the hotel Intercontinental Hotel

9:00 - 9:45 Meeting with Sandra Mitchel, Deputy UNRWA HQ Commissioner General, UNRWA HQ and Marc Lassouaoui, Chief of Donor Relations and Communications Department, UNRWA HQ

9:45 - 10:15 Meeting with Saklain Hedaraly, OIC, UNRWA HQ Department of Oversight Services, UNRWA HQ

10:15 - 10:45 Meeting with Shadi El-Abed, Director of UNRWA HQ Finance, Finance HQ and Betty Cheng, Deputy Chief Accounts Division, Finance HQ

10:45 - 11:30 Meeting with Scott Anderson, Director of UNRWA HQ UNRWA Operations in Field

11:30 End of official program

Flight back to Brussels

Page 11 of 162 Page 12 of 162 Background Briefing

FOR EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT INTERNAL USE ONLY

Committee on Budgetary Control's mission to Lebanon and Jordan 20 - 23 September 2016

Authors: Beata Grzebieluch, Benjamin Rey. Policy Department for Budgetary Affairs, Policy Department of the DG for External Policies

European Parliament

PE 572.688 EN Page 13 of 162 Committee on Budgetary Control’s mission to Lebanon and Jordan: 20 - 23 September 2016

Page 2 of 34 Page 14 of 162 Committee on Budgetary Control’s mission to Lebanon and Jordan: 20 - 23 September 2016

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS 3

1. LEBANON 5

1.1. POLITICAL SITUATION 5

1.2. ECONOMIC AND SECURITY CHALLENGES 8

1.3. THE REFUGEE CRISIS 10

2. JORDAN 12

2.1. POLITICAL SITUATION 12

2.2. ECONOMIC AND SECURITY CHALLENGES 14

2.3. THE REFUGEE CRISIS 15

3. EU BILATERAL COOPERATION WITH LEBANON AND JORDAN 18

3.1. FRAMEWORK FOR POLITICAL COOPERATION 18

3.2. FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL COOPERATION 19

3.3. THE EU'S FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO LEBANON 22

3.4. THE EU'S FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO JORDAN 24

4. UNRWA IN LEBANON AND JORDAN AND THE EU SUPPORT 26

4.1. UNRWA ACTIVITIES IN LEBANON AND JORDAN 26

4.2. UNRWA BUDGET AND EU FUNDING 27

4.3. FINANCIAL CONTROL AND OVERSIGHT 30

5. POSITION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 33

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LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1: National Assembly - 128 members elected in 2009 7

Figure 2: House of Representatives - 150 members elected in January 2013 13

Figure 3: Cooperation framework EU- Lebanon/Jordan 20

LIST OF TABLES Table 1: Lebanon's political leadership 6

Table 2: Overview of the refugees in Lebanon 10

Table 3: Jordan's political leadership 12

Table 4: Overview of the refugees in Jordan 15

Table 6: Overview of financial assistance to Lebanon (in EUR million, CA) 23

Table 7: Overview of financial assistance to Jordan (in EUR million, CA) 24

Table 8: EU contributions to UNRWA in 2007-2013 (in EUR million) 29

Table 9: Estimation of the EU financial contribution to UNRWA in 2016 (in EUR million) 30

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1. LEBANON1 With a fragile government, a vacant presidency and a parliament whose original mandate expired in 2013, Lebanon is once again in a state of political paralysis. The raging conflict in neighbouring Syria has dramatically increased the country's sectarian tensions, making Beirut's official policy of 'disassociation' from the war look increasingly illusory. While and Lebanese Sunni groups take part in Syrian battles, the conflict has spilled over the border in northern and eastern Lebanon. Meanwhile, the influx of more than 1 million registered Syrian refugees - bringing the total refugee population to one third of the total population - is placing unprecedented strains on the country's economy and society.

1.1. POLITICAL SITUATION

Two blocs, many divisions Lebanese politics is organised along confessional lines, with the position of the President designated for a Maronite Christian, the prime minister's post for a Sunni Muslim and the speaker of parliament being a Shi'ite Muslim. According the 1989 Taëf Accord - which put an end to the - the 128 seats of the Lebanese National Assembly are also distributed along confessional lines. The country's demographic composition is an extremely sensitive and controversial topic. A rough estimate would situate Sunni and Shia Muslims at around 27 % of the population each, at 40 % and at 5 % (others: 1 %).

In the past 10 years, continuous power struggles have repeatedly paralysed the country's institutions. The of Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in 2005 and the ensuing '' against Syrian presence in the country have produced two opposing blocks in Lebanese politics, named after the dates of anti-Syrian and pro-Syrian protests:

− The , backed by Western countries and , is led by the Sunni-dominated of , Rafiq Hariri's son. It includes the of and the of (both Christian Maronite), as well as a dozen other parties. − The pro-Syria, -backed is led by Hezbollah, Amal (both Shia) and the of (Maronite Christian). It also includes ten smaller parties. General elections have been held twice since the Cedar revolution, in 2005 and 2009. Both were won by the March 14 alliance and followed by the (painfully negotiated) formation of national unity governments - including Hezbollah's participation for the first time in 2005. Since then the country's political life has been a succession of crises. Tensions have crystallised around a number of issues, including the investigation into the Hariri assassination; the (failed) disarmament of Hezbollah following the 2006 war against ; the control over Lebanon's armed forces and security apparatus, with rival groups competing for influence; and last but not least, controversy over the reform of the country's sectarian electoral system.

1 Last update done on 19 July 2016

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While none of these issues of contention has been resolved, the Syrian war only exacerbated the country's polarisation. In an effort to contain a spill-over of sectarian violence into Lebanon, rival political forces signed the Baabda Declaration in June 2012, setting out a policy of 'disassociation' from the Syrian conflict. Hezbollah's heavy involvement in the Syrian battle has put this policy in shatters. Some Lebanese Sunni armed groups have also reportedly joined combats in Syria. In the past three years, Syrian-fuelled violence has contaminated Lebanon's border regions, but also the capital Beirut (see next section).

In this context, a fragile 'national dialogue' among political forces has prevented the country's slide into further destabilisation. It has so far failed, however, to break the country's institutional stalemate, with a vacant presidency, a dysfunctional parliament and an ineffective government.

Table 1: Lebanon's political leadership

President Vacant since the expiration of (Maronite Christian) 's mandate in May 2014.

Prime Minister , since April 2013 Independent (Sunni) Parliament Speaker , since October 1992 Amal / March 8 (Shiite)

Vacant presidency Since Michel Suleiman completed his six-year term as in May 2014, the Lebanese National Assembly has been unable to elect a successor. A two-third majority (86 out of 128 MPs) is required to elect a new head of state. Beyond domestic politics, Lebanon is held hostage of regional power games: no breakthrough in the presidential election is expected without the green light of both Saudi Arabia and Iran to their affiliates.

Up until end 2015, each coalition stuck to its positions, supporting candidates from their respective affiliated Christian parties: the Iran-backed March-8 parliamentary block supported Michel Aoun, leader of the Free Patriotic Movement, and the Saudi-backed March- 14 coalition supported Samir Geagea, leader of the Lebanese forces. But in a game- changing development, March-14 leader Saad Hariri declared last December his endorsement of a new, unexpected bid by , leader of the March-8 affiliated . Hariri’s decision was largely seen as an attempt to divide March-8 and to strike a deal without granting victory to Michel Aoun. However the move only succeeded in dividing Hariri’s own March-14 coalition. Indeed former March-14 candidate Samir Geagea, feeling betrayed by Hariri, dropped his candidacy and endorsed his wartime rival Aoun. Hezbollah, on its side, did not move and continued to support Aoun. Dividing lines have thus shifted, but the situation remains deadlocked. Dysfunctional parliament Seats in the Lebanese parliament are distributed equally between Christians and Muslims, themselves split across 11 sub-groups2. Elected for 4 years in 2009, the parliament decided

2 Christians include 34 Maronites, 14 Greek orthodox, 8 Greek catholic, 5 Armenian orthodox, 1 Armenian catholic, 1 protestant and 1 other Christian. Muslims include 27 Sunnis, 27 Shi'ites, 8 and 2 Alawites.

Page 6 of 34 Page 18 of 162 Committee on Budgetary Control’s mission to Lebanon and Jordan: 20 - 23 September 2016

on 5 November 2014 to extend its mandate until 2017. Elections had already been postponed from June 2013 to November 2014 due to disagreements over the reform of the electoral law, a major point of inter-confessional discord. The extension of mandate was criticised by many, including the EU, for violating the constitution and depriving Lebanese citizens of their right to vote. Proponents of the decision, however, underline the need to fill the political vacuum in a context of increased regional threats. The adopted text foresees a possibility to hold elections before 2017 if a president is elected prior to that.

The Lebanese parliament is affected by chronic paralysis due to frequent boycotts and obstructing tactics. Political parties often fail to agree on the parliament's agenda. The parliament has been convened more than 40 times to try to elect a president since April 2014; all attempts have failed for lack of necessary quorum. The parliament has not been able to adopt a national budget since 2005. In November 2015 the parliament managed to meet for the first time in one year and to adopt a number of financial laws, including legislation on the fight against money laundering, on terrorism funding, on tax evasion and on the extension of World Bank loans. These laws, which shrink Lebanon's banking secrecy, responded to strong pressures from international financial institutions and from the country's central bank. Some parties threatened to boycott the session if it did not include a citizenship restoration law (for foreigners of Lebanese descent) and a new electoral law. A compromise allowed for the adoption of the first law and postponed the search of a compromise on the electoral law, on which discussions are still ongoing.

Figure 1: National Assembly - 128 members elected in 2009

Ineffective government Interim Prime Minister Tammam Salam (independent, former March-14) was appointed in April 2013 following the resignation of . His national unity government was only formed in February 2014 following lengthy negotiations. Cabinet positions are evenly distributed among March 8, March 14 and independents. However, continued polarisation has resulted in an ineffective government, unable not only to implement much needed

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political, economic, judicial and security reforms but also to perform basic services. The August 2015 'garbage crisis' saw masses of Lebanese citizens take the streets to protest the government's inability to deal with the rubbish collection problems plaguing Beirut. Beyond rubbish collection, protests turned into an anti-government mobilisation. After a plan to export rubbish to collapsed in February 2016, the issue was temporarily resolved in March, but remains a symbol of the government's powerlessness. Municipal elections Lebanon held municipal elections in four phases between the 8th and the 29th of May 2016. These were the first since 2010. Their successful holding demonstrated the authorities’ ability to organise such elections in spite of the security challenges, thus raising hopes that parliamentary elections could take place in June 2017, provided Lebanon’s parliament manages to pass a new electoral law. The poll has also re- energised the country’s political scene, as results showed a certain shift away from traditional, sectarian politics. In the capital, the independent list 'Beirut Medinati' (Beirut, My city) challenged the 'Beirut List', a government coalition led by Future Movement leader Saad Hariri. Beirut Medinati didn’t win, yet it achieved an unexpected 40% of the total vote on 8 May. In Tripoli, on 29 May, Ashraf Rifi, a former internal security chief and justice minister, won a landslide victory against the list backed by the Future Movement, reflecting the population’s desire for change.

1.2. ECONOMIC AND SECURITY CHALLENGES

Security Lebanon's political paralysis and Hezbollah's heavy involvement in the Syrian war have made many fear sectarian trouble in Lebanon. July 2015 saw street clashes between partisans of the Future Movement and Hezbollah in a southern suburb of Beirut, reminiscent of similar clashes in 2008. The dialogue between the Future Movement and Hezbollah and the broader national dialogue among all political forces have so far managed to keep the country together.

However the situation remains particularly volatile. Between 2013 and 2015, the Qalamoun and Zabadani mountains on the Lebanon-Syrian border have been the site of major battles involving Hezbollah, Syrian regime forces, rebels/jihadists and the Lebanese army. In August 2014, ISIL and Jabhat al-Nusra attacked the north-eastern town of Arsal, killing 20 soldiers and taking up to 30 Lebanese soldiers and policemen hostage. Fighting against jihadists has also taken place in and around the northern Lebanese city of Tripoli, where eleven soldiers and five militants were killed following street battles in October 2014. Violence reached Beirut on several occasions too. In November 2013 a double suicide bombing targeted the Iranian embassy's compound. On 12 November 2015, two ISIL/Daesh suicide bombers detonated explosives in a southern suburb of Beirut inhabited mostly by Shia Muslims, killing more than 40. The bombings were the worst terrorist attack in Beirut since the end of the Lebanese civil war.

On 12 June 2016 a bomb exploded outside of the main building of the Blom Bank in Beirut without causing any fatalities. No one claimed responsibility. Most analyses link this attack to the consequences of recent US legislation against banks having links with

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Hezbollah. For fear of isolation from international markets, many Lebanese banks have had no choice but to close Hezbollah-related accounts, thus triggering new tensions. The government called the bombing an attack against the country’s stability, as the banking sector is a pillar of Lebanon’s economy.

On 27 June, a series of suicide bombings rocked the eastern border town of al-Qaa in the Bekaa Valley. Two days later, Lebanese authorities imposed special measures on Syrian refugees living nearby. A night curfew was imposed, and the Lebanese army announced the arrest of more than 412 Syrians on various charges. Economy Lebanon's economic growth is estimated at a sluggish 1.5 % in 2015 by the World Bank. While such rate demonstrates a certain resilience of the country's economy - supported by a strong banking sector - it is still largely insufficient to address the challenge of raising unemployment and growing poverty. Around 1.5 million Lebanese are estimated to live under the poverty line. The influx of Syrian refugees is placing the country's infrastructure, resources and environment under severe strain. The arrival of mostly low-skilled youths from Syria has put the job market under pressure, with the unemployment rate reaching 20 % of the population and 35 % of the youth.

Lebanon’s traditional growth drivers—tourism, real estate, and construction—have received a significant blow and a strong rebound is unlikely soon. Lebanon is among the most heavily indebted countries in the world, with an overall debt ratio to gross domestic product (GDP) of about 150 %.

The Lebanese economy is based primarily on the service sector (including tourism and financial services), which accounts for more than 70 % of the country's GDP. Remittances (mainly from the Gulf) accounted for more than 16 % of GDP in 2016, making it a poverty alleviator for Lebanese families not able to rely on state support. Tourism, which in previous years accounted for roughly 20 % of GDP, sharply declined as the Syrian war raged (2.17 million visitors in 2010; 1.35 million in 2014), although 2014 and 2015 registered some improvements compared to 2011-2013. Lebanon's energy and telecom sectors have growth potential but, as the political stalemate has stalled legal reform, remain underdeveloped. Off- shore gas and oil fields are yet to be exploited, partly due an on-going dispute with Israel over maritime borders. Gulf sanctions put Lebanon's security and economy further at risk In February 2016, Saudi Arabia announced the suspension of its military assistance to Lebanon, including of a USD 3 billion deal to provide French military equipment to the Lebanese army. The decision came as part of several retaliatory measures for Lebanon's lack of support to the kingdom in its regional confrontation against Iran. The decision was taken after the Lebanese foreign minister (aligned with the March 8 coalition) abstained from an vote on a resolution condemning Iranian regional influence.

For Saudi Arabia, supporting the Lebanese army was a way not to leave the country's defence into Hezbollah's hands. The sudden decision to suspend the assistance now reflects anger at what Saudis perceive as Hezbollah's unchecked control over the Lebanese

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government. It puts the kingdom's Sunni allies in an uneasy situation, as it pushes them towards more confrontation with Hezbollah, thereby putting the national dialogue at risk.

Gulf States have since stepped up the pressure. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have called on their citizens to stop travelling to Lebanon. In March 2016, the Gulf Cooperation Council decided to designate Hezbollah as a terrorist organisation and to sanction companies and individuals connected to the group. A number of Lebanese expatriates in Gulf countries have been expelled, raising fears that Gulf governments decide to massively deport them. Other drastic measures could include trade sanctions or withdrawals of Gulf assets from Lebanese banks.

1.3. THE REFUGEE CRISIS

Table 2: Overview of the refugees in Lebanon

National population 4.5 million Lebanese

Main refugee groups 1 055 984 Syrians (UNHCR April 2016) 449 957 (UNRWA July 2014) but actual number is lower 42 000 Palestinian refugees from Syria (UNRWA 2016) Living conditions 'No camp' policy for Syrians, but informal tented settlements 53 % of Palestine refugees live in 12 camps Policy and legislation Not a signatory to the 1951 Geneva Convention Access to work greatly restricted

Lebanon is the neighbouring country hardest hit by the Syrian crisis. It hosts more than 1 million registered Syrian refugees (with the total number estimated at some 1.5 million by the Lebanese government) alongside a local population of 4.4 million and some 450 000 Palestine refugees registered by the UNRWA. This makes it the country with the world's largest number of refugees per capita.

Palestine refugees The presence of Palestine refugees dates back from the creation of the State of Israel in 1948. The current number of Palestine refugees is believed to be lower (estimated at 250 000) than the official UNRWA figure, as many have fled due to difficult living conditions. Around half of them live in 12 camps recognised by the UNRWA, where the agency provides basic services and facilities. Others live in informal settlements or among the Lebanese population. UNRWA's definition of a refugee includes descendants of persons who became refugees in 1948.

The Palestinian refugee presence, coupled with Lebanon's sectarian politics, is linked to many security crises in Lebanon, including the 1975-1990 civil war and successive Israel- Lebanon wars. Refugee camps are politically autonomous and run by Palestinian factions. State authorities have no control over the internal security of the camps. Living conditions are extremely precarious, as refugee camps are not allowed to grow and are therefore overcrowded, and Palestine refugees have limited economic and social rights.

The newly arrived Palestinian 'double' refugees from Syria are particularly vulnerable, as they suffer from severe poverty (90 % are poor according to the UNRWA) and fear

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deportation by the authorities. Lebanese authorities have reportedly sought to stop Palestinians from Syria from entering Lebanon, and imposed severe restrictions on visas and residence permit renewals for Palestinians. Nevertheless, there would be more than 50 000 of them in Lebanon (42 000 registered with the UNRWA).

Syrian refugees Lebanon's experience with Palestinian refugees underpins the government's 'no-camp' policy towards Syrian refugees. Many fear that camps for Syrian refugees would encourage them to settle in Lebanon permanently, similar to what de facto happened with Palestinians. There is also a fear that Syrian refugees, most of whom are Sunni Muslims, will upset the confessional balance of Lebanon. Most of the Syrian refugees therefore live in Lebanese communities outside of camps. However, many refugees live in informal tented settlements.

The legal status of refugees in Lebanon remains unclear. The country is not a signatory to the 1951 Geneva Convention related to the status of refugees or its 1967 Protocol, but it implements some of the Convention's provisions. The government is reluctant to use the word 'refugee': it usually refers to refugees that fled from Syria since 2011 as 'displaced individuals' or as 'persons registered as refugees by UNHCR'. In May 2015, the government instructed the UNHCR to suspend new registrations. Lebanese authorities also announced a new stringent entrance policy, stating that Syrians wishing to cross the border had to justify the purpose of their visit (with humanitarian exceptions).

The Lebanese political paralysis has greatly affected the government's response. It is only in mid-2014 that the government established a Crisis Cell. The government's policy focuses on reducing the number of Syrian refugees and easing the burden of the crisis on its own people and economy. Refugees are adding immense strain on the country's economy and infrastructure, felt in all sectors including education, health, housing, water and electricity supplies. More than 75 % of refugees that cross the border are women and children. Nearly 60 % of some 370 000 Syrian refugees aged between 6 and 14 years old are out of school. A large proportion of Syrian refugees is believed to be former migrant workers in Lebanon (e.g. in the sectors of agriculture and construction) and their families. With a limited supply of jobs and resources, tensions between Lebanese host communities and Syrian refugees have increased.

Tight restrictions against access to work, together with legal vulnerability, have led most Syrian refugees to work in the informal market. In December 2014, the government restricted a number of professions to Lebanese citizens, except in the agriculture, cleaning and construction sectors where many Syrians work. In January 2015, residence renewal procedures were changed, introducing new financial and bureaucratic obstacles. Prolonging a residency permit is now very costly (around USD 200) and requires the sponsorship of a Lebanese citizen. Many refugees are therefore set to lose their legal status (more than half of them already do not have one), which means that they could be deported. While this hasn't happened yet, the fear to be identified and deported leads many Syrians to work informally and to keep their children out of school. Due to increasingly difficult living conditions, a growing number of Syrians see no option but to try to go to or to move back to Syria, in both cases at the risk of their lives.

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2. JORDAN3 The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, which shares a 380-km border with Syria and a 180-km border with , is a stable country in a tumultuous region. Parliamentary elections are scheduled for 20 September under a new electoral system meant to strengthen political parties. Elections are not expected, however, to significantly affect the king’s control over a weak parliament. In 2011, public protests threatened to engulf Jordan in the Arab revolutionary wave. King Abdullah II reacted by enacting limited, 'incremental' political reforms. Regional security threats, together with the refugee crisis, have now overshadowed the political reform agenda. Since 2011, Jordan has received more than 640 000 registered Syrian refugees, in addition to Syrians already living in Jordan and to Palestine refugees.

2.1. POLITICAL SITUATION

Table 3: Jordan's political leadership

King King Abdullah II bin al-Hussein Since February 1999

Prime Minister Hani Mulki Since October 2012

Speaker of the House of Representatives Atef Tarawneh Since January 2013 (outgoing - the House was dissolved in June)

Jordan’s latest parliamentary elections, in 2013, were held in a general context of political reform. When protests broke out in Jordanian cities in early 2011, King Abdullah II - who acceded to the throne in 1999 -promised more . A national dialogue was established, constitutional amendments and a new electoral law were passed and early parliamentary elections were called. Reforms such as the creation of a Constitutional Court and the establishment of an Independent Elections Commission were widely welcomed as positive steps. In substance, however, the 2013 elections produced a House of Representatives4 that looked similar to previous ones - that is, much less a counter power than an institution loyal to the king. An overwhelming majority of independent candidates loyal to the palace was elected for a four-year term. The main opposition party, the Islamic Action Front (the Muslim Brotherhood's Jordanian branch), had called for a boycott of the elections, protesting against the insufficient scope of political reforms. It therefore remained absent from parliament. Despite boycott calls, 56.6 % of registered voters (40 % of the total number of citizens eligible) took part in the poll.

The EU Election Observation Mission assessed the elections as 'technically well- administered despite serious inadequacies in the recently adopted legal framework'. 'Inadequacies' included the country's 'one vote' system, which favoured conservative tribal candidates - the monarchy's support base - over political parties. Under this system voters could only cast their ballot for a single candidate, even if there were multiple seats available in their district. The one-vote system was combined with a nationwide proportional vote for 27 seats. In addition, the over-allocation of seats to rural areas favoured the 'East Bankers' over Jordanians of Palestinian origin (i.e. from the West Bank of the Jordan river), who mostly live in cities (see Section 2.3) and who form the main support base of Islamist parties.

3 Last update done on 19 July 2016 4 Members of the Senate, the parliament's upper house, are all appointed by the king.

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Figure 2: House of Representatives - 150 members elected in January 2013

Note: 15 seats are reserved for women, 9 for Bedouin tribes, 9 for Christians and 3 for Circassians/Chechens

The new electoral law passed ahead of the September 2016 elections abrogates the much-criticised one-vote system. This was a key request of the opposition, which demanded a return to the system in place until the 1989 elections, in which the opposition obtained good results. The new law re-establishes this type of system: voters will now have as many votes as there are seats in their district. It also introduces a proportional system at district level. The opposition has therefore cautiously welcomed the legislation, although critics still regard the reform with suspicion5. The opposition had wanted a proportional system at national level, which it didn’t get. Besides, the electoral reform follows a period of tightening of the security grip, in particular over the Muslim Brotherhood, the strongest opposition force. In April 2016, authorities closed the Muslim Brotherhood’s headquarters in Amman, arguing that the organisation was illegal since its license hadn’t been renewed following the 2014 law. In 2015, the government had authorised the formation of a breakaway group named the Muslim Brotherhood Association, in a move seen by the ‘mother’ movement as a deliberate attempt to exploit its divisions. In the past years, opponents, most notably Muslim Brotherhood members and supporters, were arrested and brought to court in freedom of expression-related cases. In 2014, an amendment widening the scope of the anti-terror law was criticised by rights group for curtailing free speech. Other reforms have reinforced monarchical power. In April 2016, constitutional amendments granted the king the power to appoint or dismiss senior officials without consulting the government, including the heads of the constitutional council, of the judiciary, of the army, of the intelligence services and of the National Guard. The outcome of the elections will therefore show whether the new parliament looks any different from the current, and whether it can play a stronger role. In June 2016, the king dissolved the parliament and accepted the resignation of Prime Minister Abdullah Ensour and his cabinet. Hani Mulki, 65, a former cabinet minister, was named as the new prime minister until the new elections. He has taken over in a context marked by growing security and economic concerns linked to the crises in Syria and Iraq. While its main task is the successful organisation of elections, the new government is also expected to pass unpopular austerity measures in response to the country’s budget deficit.

5 Read Kirk H. Sowel, A New Chapter in Jordan’s Electoral Saga, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 22 October 2015; Curtis R. Ryan, Deja vu for Jordanian election reforms, Washington Post, 2 September 2015.

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2.2. ECONOMIC AND SECURITY CHALLENGES Security In June 2016, ISIL claimed responsibility for a car bomb suicide attack on the Jordan-Syria border, killing 7 Jordanian soldiers. The attack took place in a buffer zone opposite the Syrian refugee camp of al-Rukban. Earlier this year, in March 2016, authorities said that they thwarted planned attacks by the Islamic State, killing seven suspected jihadists and arresting 35 suspects in a major security operation in the town of Irbid, near the Syrian border (80km north of Amman). These attacks confirm the risk posed by armed jihadist groups in neighbouring Syria and Iraq, which have become both an external and an internal security threat to Jordan. It is estimated that around 2000 Jordanians have travelled to Syria and Iraq to fight alongside Jabhat al-Nusra or ISIL/Daesh. Several border clashes opposed the Jordanian army to ISIL after the jihadist group took over large swathes of territory in 2014 in Iraq's Anbar region neighbouring Jordan. In 2014, Jordan joined the US-led military coalition against ISIL, conducting airstrikes, providing logistical support and participating in intelligence gathering both in Iraq and Syria. The assassination of Jordanian pilot Moaz al-Kasasbeh in January 2015 provoked a broad public outcry against ISIL, but the kingdom's policy remains a sensitive matter domestically. Many citizens are indeed critical of their country's participation in what they see first and foremost as an American war.

Economy The Jordanian economy has greatly suffered from the worsening security situation in the past five years. Touristic activity has contracted dramatically and the volumes of exports, remittances and foreign direct investments have fallen. The influx of Syrian refugees and the need to provide them with access to basic public services have put strains on public finances, as has the disruption of cheap gas supplies from Egypt caused by attacks on Sinai pipelines. Jordanian authorities mitigated the risks of social unrest through increased public spending which, in turn, aggravated the country's fiscal deficit. In 2012, Jordan agreed with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on a reform and adjustment programme, supported by a USD 2 billion IMF loan over three years (complemented by a Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA) operation by the EU). Other external donors, including the US and Gulf States, stepped up their support.

Jordan’s macroeconomic and structural reforms are underpinned by Vision 2025, the country’s ten-year framework for economic and social policies. Given the circumstances, the country has managed to achieve relatively decent economic results. According to the IMF, real GDP growth reached 2.4 % in 2015 and is expected at between 2.5 and 3 % in 2016, supported by low oil prices and some rebound in investor confidence. The unemployment rate fell from 12.6 % in 2013 to 11.10 % in 2014 (World Bank figures), but youth unemployment, which stands at around 30 %, is a matter of particular concern.

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The country is now negotiating a new IMF-supported programme; agreement was reached at staff-level in June 2016. In the same month, the European Commission proposed additional MFA to Jordan of up to EUR 200 million in medium-term loans at favourable financing conditions. The European Parliament and the Council need to approve the new MFA programme before disbursements could start later this year.

2.3. THE REFUGEE CRISIS

Table 4: Overview of the refugees in Jordan

National population 6.6 million Jordanians

Main refugee groups 657 134 Syrians (UNHCR 30 June 2016) 2 097 338 Palestinians (UNRWA July 2014). Many have Jordanian IDs. 54 990 Iraqis (UNHCR April 2016) 17 000 Palestinian refugees from Syria registered by the UNRWA Living conditions Syrians: 78.5 % live in cities; 21.5 % live in UNHCR-administered camps (UNHCR 30 June 2016) Palestinians: 18 % live in 10 camps. Most others live in urban areas. Policy and legislation Not a signatory to the 1951 Geneva Convention, but Memorandum of Understanding with the UNHCR Access to work for Syrians recently facilitated (March-April 2016)

A country of 6.6 million, Jordan hosts more than 657 000 registered Syrian refugees, in addition to more than 2 million UNRWA-registered Palestinian refugees, almost 55 000 Iraqis and some other 5000 refugees and asylum seekers mostly from Sudan and Somalia. According to a November 2015 national census, there would be more than 1.2 million Syrians in total, including people already in Jordan before the crisis (other government estimates put this number at 1.4 million). Palestine refugees Palestinian refugees arrived in Jordan following both the 1948 creation of the State of Israel and the 1967 war. There are more than 2 million Palestinian refugees registered by the UNRWA; the agency's definition of a refugee includes descendants of persons who became refugees in 1948. However the demographic reality of Palestinian presence in Jordan is complex and multi-faceted. Many Palestinians living in Jordan have both UNRWA refugee status and full Jordanian citizenship. Jordan annexed the West Bank in 1950 (until it renounced all claims in 1988) and granted citizenship to most Palestinian refugees. Other Jordanians of Palestinian origin are not registered as refugees. The lines are blurred by inter- community marriages and years of living together. According to a November 2015 national census (preliminary results), there would be more than 634 000 Palestinians without Jordanian citizenship.

All in all, it is estimated that around half of the Jordanian population is made of Palestinians. Their presence in Jordan remains a highly sensitive political issue. While most have Jordanian IDs, their stay is considered temporary. Fear that Jordan might lose its identity and become a Palestinian state underpins the political system's unbalance against them. This fear is reinforced by the stalemate in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and the belief that a Palestinian state might never see the light.

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While many Palestinians are economically and socially well-integrated in society (Queen Rania herself has Palestinian parents), part of the refugee population remains vulnerable, including the 18 % of registered Palestinian refugees who live in camps. There are also inequalities between Palestinian refugees, some of them (known as ‘Gaza refugees’, who fled the after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war) not being granted the same rights such as citizenship. The largest camp, Baqa'a, was established in 1968 and hosts more than 104 000 refugees. Camps are administered by Jordanian authorities in coordination with the UNRWA, which provides basic services, including education and healthcare.

17 000 Palestine refugees from Syria have been registered by the UNRWA in Jordan. The majority of them suffer from severe poverty and live in a precarious legal status. The Jordanian government has reportedly sought to block Palestinians seeking refuge in Jordan. Prime Minister Ensour stated in 2013 that they should stay in Syria. The current Jordanian policy towards them is unclear.

Syrian refugees The Government of Jordan is not a signatory to the 1951 Geneva Convention related to the status of refugees or its 1967 Protocol. The country’s laws provide neither for the granting of asylum or refugee status, nor for a protection system. However, a 1998 memorandum of understanding between the government and the UNHCR, amended in April 2014, contains the definition of a refugee, confirms adherence to the principle of non- refoulement and third country resettlement for refugees, and allows recognized refugees a maximum stay of one year (renewable), during which period UNHCR must find a durable solution. The government has not forced Syrian or Iraqi refugees to return to their country of origin, although some cases of refoulement have been reported.

Jordan officially maintains an open-border policy to Syrian refugees, but the border has in practice mostly been closed since 2014. In June 2016, between 60 000 and 70 000 Syrians were reportedly stranded in miserable conditions in a desert area along the North-East border (the ‘Berm’). Jordanian authorities argue that they need to impose tight security control of newcomers before they enter. In the past months, a number of Syrians previously blocked in the Berm have reportedly been taken to Azraq, a camp opened in 2014 which now hosts more than 50 000 people.

The UNHCR administers three main refugee camps, the biggest one being Zaatari in the northeast (around 80 000 people). But most Syrian refugees (almost 80 %) live outside the camps, in urban areas.

Recent measures have recently been taken to facilitate Syrian refugees' access to work. In April 2016, a 90-day grace-period for employers in the informal sector was launched, allowing them to freely regularise Syrian employees and to avoid steep fines. Regularisation fees, which ranged between USD 170 and USD 1 270, had led many impoverished Syrians to work illegally. Since the beginning of March, authorities have also allowed Syrian refugees to use UNHCR-issued asylum-seeker cards and Jordanian Ministry of Interior IDs to obtain work permits. Previously, the only way to do so was using a passport and proof of legal entry into the country, which many Syrians lacked.

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The presence of refugees has placed a burden on Jordan’s resources, including water, education and health care. It has increased the demand on school, sanitation, housing, food, energy and water. Rent prices have tripled or even quadrupled in border zones and other areas of high refugee density. Tensions have been reported between refugees and the host communities, who perceive Syrians as competitors for jobs and are increasingly resentful of the burden on the country's resources.

Refugees have access to free primary health care and to public education. However some 40 % of Syrian refugee children remain out of school. More than half of the Syrian refugees in Jordan are children (aged 0-17). Two thirds of the registered Syrian refugees are living below the poverty line.

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3. EU BILATERAL COOPERATION WITH LEBANON AND JORDAN

3.1. FRAMEWORK FOR POLITICAL COOPERATION

While the EU cooperation with Jordan and Lebanon is perceived primarily through the lens of the Syrian refugees’ crisis, it is important not to lose the broader context of mutual relations out of sight. The two countries had been linked with the EU long before the crisis: the EU-Lebanon cooperation goes back to 1965, when the Trade and Technical Cooperation Agreement was signed; and the EU-Jordan Cooperation Agreement was signed in 1977. Today the legal basis of the EU’s relation with Jordan and Lebanon are the respective association agreements. The Association Agreement with Jordan was signed in 1997 and entered into force in 2002; the Lebanon Association Agreement entered into force in 2006 (signed in 2002). The association agreements provided a framework for political dialogue, encouraging cooperation, and provided for a gradual establishment of a free trade area between the EU, on the one hand, and Jordan and Lebanon, respectively, on the other. Those agreements are now embedded in the broader framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), launched in 2003, the two countries being included in the Southern Neighbourhood, covering ten countries in total. As part of this partnership, neighbouring countries agree with the EU on individual ENP action plans, setting out the mid-term priorities. The second Action Plan for Jordan6 was formally adopted in 2012, and the last Action Plan for Lebanon7 covers the period 2013-15. Action Plans for both countries have in common the aim to foster political dialogue, democracy, and economic and social cooperation. In 2010, Jordan was the first country of the Southern Neighbourhood to receive the ‘advanced status’ partnership, a political signal of close relations, opening possibilities of enhanced economic cooperation, trade liberalisation and progressive regulatory convergence, and allowing to start preparation of negotiations of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement. Jordan and the EU also signed a Mobility Partnership in October 2014 to manage mobility and migration. In November 2015, the European Commission and the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy presented a reviewed ENP8. A key motto of the new ENP is a greater differentiation between partner countries in order to cater for their specific needs and increase the ownership of the priorities, recognising that not all partners aspire to comply with EU rules and standards. Whereas, in the wake of the Arab Spring, democratisation was set to become a cornerstone of the ENP, the outbreak of conflicts and security concerns have made stability the main political priority in this new period. The EU is an important trade partner for the two countries: taken as a whole, it is the second source of imports for Jordan, and the most important trading partner for Lebanon. Consequently, the so-called rules of origin, applicable to products manufactured in more

6 See http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/pdf/action_plans/2013_jordan_action_plan_en.pdf. 7 See http://eeas.europa.eu/lebanon/docs/action_plan_for_eu-lebanon_partnership_and_cooperation_2013- 2015_en.pdf. 8 See Joint Communication SWD(2015)500 final on the review of the European Neighbourhood Policy, http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/documents/2015/151118_joint-communication_review-of-the-enp_en.pdf.

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than one country, are an important issue for the two countries. Jordan, in particular, has been interested in revising the rules of origin in order to facilitate the trade in this type of products, and was, in 2013, the first among Mediterranean partners to ratify the Regional Convention on pan-Euro-Mediterranean preferential rules of origin.

3.2. FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL COOPERATION

3.2.1. The European Neighbourhood Instrument

Financial assistance to Jordan and Lebanon is channelled primarily via the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), which is the financing tool of the ENP. The ENI has bilateral and multi-country components, the former being more significant than the latter in terms of amounts involved. Under the current MFF 2014-2020, an indicative envelope of EUR 7.5 - 9.2 billion has been allocated to the ten countries of the Southern Neighbourhood region.9 When it comes to bilateral cooperation, the above-mentioned ENP Action Plans (and other relevant agreements) are translated into country-specific objectives, with indicators and expected results, in the form of multiannual Single Support Framework (SSF) documents10. The SSF sets out the programming of the ENI for a country for a given period: currently 2014- 2017 for Jordan and 2014-2016 for Lebanon. The SSF is broken down in Annual Action Programmes (AAP) for each country, corresponding to the Commission’s financing decision to commit budgetary appropriations for specific projects. Beyond the bilateral cooperation, countries participating in the ENP may participate in programmes of regional cooperation, aiming at fostering cooperation and addressing common challenges in the two regions of South and East. The indicative envelope for the regional South in 2014-2017 was set at EUR 371-453 million. In 2015 a package of 8 regional projects for the Southern Neighbourhood was adopted, mobilising EUR 73.7 million for job- creation and socio-economic inclusion, civil society's integration into the political dialogue, and enhancing the regional dialogue. Neighbourhood-wide cooperation enables countries of the neighbourhood to participate in the EU programmes in various policy areas, including education, research, environmental protection, SMEs support, among others. Finally, in 2014- 20 an overall envelope of EUR 1 billion has been allocated to the cross-border cooperation programmes (CBC) under the ENI, part of this allocation covered from the ERDF. The Mediterranean Sea Basin programme adopted in December 2015 is the largest one in financial terms: the planned contribution of the EU budget in 2014-20 amounts to EUR 209.1 million. Its objectives relate to 'Business and SMEs development', 'Education, research, technological development and innovation', 'Social inclusion and fight against poverty' and 'Environment and climate change', as well as promoting institutional capacity building.

9 Source: EC website, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/neighbourhood/southern-neighbourhood/index_en.htm, consulted 14.03.2016. 10 See: http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/financing-the-enp/jordan_2014_2017_programming_document_en.pdf for Jordan; and: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/ssf-lebanon-2014-2016_en_0.pdf for Lebanon.

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The Figure below presents a schematic overview of the cooperation framework between the EU and Lebanon and Jordan.

Figure 3: Cooperation framework EU- Lebanon/Jordan

3.2.2. Other instruments

Although the ENI provides the major part of financial assistance, Jordan and Lebanon also benefit from other instruments, whose significance increased in connection with the influx of Syrian refugees on their territory. This includes in particular:

− Humanitarian aid (HUMA): whereas Palestinian refugees and, to a smaller extent, Iraqis in Jordan, were its only potential beneficiaries until 2011, humanitarian aid has quickly become the single biggest funding source for addressing the Syrian refugee crisis in those two countries. Besides DG ECHO headquarters, it is managed by ECHO offices in the countries concerned which are distinct from the EU delegations. − Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP, formerly IfS - Instrument for Stability): a crisis response, conflict preparedness and peace-building instrument, designed for the quick funding of urgent, short-term actions or longer-term capacity building operations. It complements and goes beyond humanitarian assistance by supporting actions targeting resilience and recovery such as reconstruction, education and training. EU delegations are in the frontline for managing this instrument. Other instruments disbursed in smaller proportions in Jordan and Lebanon include the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) and the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR).

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Finally, both countries benefit from loans managed by the European Investment Bank (EIB), granted based on the specific mandate received, in support of the EU's policies of international cooperation and development. The external mandate for the EIB operations in 2014-20 was granted by a Parliament's and Council's decision in 2014, and sets the ceiling for the Mediterranean at EUR 8 400 million. Moreover, the EIB manages the trust fund under the Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF) scheme, pooling resources from the EU budget and Member States' contributions, supporting public sector infrastructures, as well as SMEs investments. Jordan has also benefited from loans under a first package of macro-financial assistance (MFA) which will now be succeeded by a second one (see section 3.4).

3.2.3. EU assistance in the aftermath of the Syrian crisis

With the outbreak of the Syrian conflict in 2011 and the subsequent influx of refugees, Jordan and Lebanon have quickly become a focus of attention for EU financial assistance and have received a significant amount of additional financial allocations in order to deal with the Syrian refugees' crisis (see sections 3.3 and 3.4). The allocations were streamed via the existing financing instruments listed above, mainly from the ENI allocation (relevant priority sectors or adoption of a series of ‘special measures’) and the humanitarian aid envelope. Additionally, in December 2014, an EU Regional Trust Fund in response to the Syrian crisis was established, the so-called 'Madad Fund', aimed at bringing together various sources of funding in the EU budget as well as Member States’ contributions, and allowing for quicker and more flexible disbursement for non-humanitarian assistance in Syria, Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq. The Fund Board approved three packages of projects to support an estimated 1,5 million Syrian refugees and their host communities in the areas of education, economic opportunities, health, water and wastewater services. At the conference on supporting Syria held in February 2016, the EU pledged EUR 1,1 billion in 2016 and EUR 1.3 billion in 2017 for the Syrian crisis. While a major surge of funding in Turkey had been announced late 2015, Lebanon and Jordan were a particular focus of this conference. Therefore, the EU promised them EUR 1 billion collectively over 2016-2017 (42% of the total EU London pledge), including EUR 630 million in 2016 and EUR 370 million in 2017. On top of direct assistance in the form of grants, multilateral development banks and bilateral donors announced loans for the region, including US$ 546 million from the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and US$ 15.8 billion from the European Investment Bank (EIB). In a separate contribution, the EIB pledged EUR 15 billion in the Mediterranean countries in the coming five years, while offering to work on up to an additional EUR 8 billion. At the London conference, the EU also announced its preparedness to devise 'EU compacts' with Jordan and Lebanon, to be annexed to the new partnership priorities (negotiated as a follow-up to the ENP review). These compacts will seek to ease the living conditions of Syrian refugees as well as strengthen the economic and social resilience of Jordan and Lebanon themselves. Against the background of an apprehension that the crisis overshadows the

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regular bilateral cooperation and that the burden on the countries is underestimated, the EU has attempted to promote a win-win approach through mutual commitments:

• On the one hand, additional aid would lighten the financial burden on the two countries while also benefitting the local populations through support to education, infrastructure, local economy, etc. In addition, the countries would benefit from substantial economic and trade benefits, such as a 10-year relaxation of rules of origin for Jordan. • On the other hand, Jordan and Lebanon would undertake measures aiming at improving the status of refugees, at allowing them to reside in the country in more favourable terms, and at better integrating them (albeit temporarily) into the job market.

3.3. THE EU'S FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO LEBANON

The indicative allocation for the bilateral cooperation with Lebanon under the ENI was set by its SSF 2014-16 at the range between EUR 130 million and EUR 159 million for three years. With already a strong focus on peace, stability and crisis management, the SSF identifies three priority sectors with an indicative breakdown of the overall envelope for each of them:

• ‘Justice and Security Reform’ (15%) in order to improve the rule of law and stabilise a very volatile country; • ‘Reinforcing social cohesion, promoting sustainable economic development and protecting vulnerable groups’ (40%) against a background of low productivity, poor diversification, weak links between education and labour market needs, overstretched infrastructure and basic services – all this being even further strained by the influx of refugees. • ‘Promotion of sustainable and transparent management of energy and natural resources’ (20%) due to a lack of adequate legislation and management in the areas of environment, climate change and the exploration of maritime resources. Besides those sectors, a capacity development envelope and a civil society envelope are foreseen (25%). In practice, this indicative breakdown is hardly respected on a yearly basis: for instance, the share dedicated to the priority II has been raised to 80%, against the planned 40%. In that context, it should be noted that support to refugees is explicitly included under Specific Objective 6 of this priority: 'Improve legal rights and living conditions of refugees in Lebanon, in particular of Palestinian refugees'.

The progress report for Lebanon for 2014 published last year notes the high pressure on Lebanon's stability and institutions, economy and social situation put by the migration crisis. It notes progress as regards the respect of fundamental rights and individual freedoms.

A major challenge of assistance to Lebanon is that the dysfunctions of its political system prevent the EU from using budget support (i.e. direct funding of a public institution’s administrative budget) as a tool for channelling assistance in a cost-efficient way. Instead, assistance is provided almost exclusively on a project basis.

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Table 5: Overview of financial assistance to Lebanon (in EUR million, CA)

Programme 2014 2015 2016 2014-2016 ENI, including: 146 40 100 286 1: Justice and Security System reform 12 — 7 19 2: Reinforcing social cohesion, promoting economic development and protecting 36 30 25 91 vulnerable groups 3: Promotion of sustainable and transparent 19 — — 19 management of energy and natural resources Complementary Support for Capacity Development — 10 8 18 and Civil Society crisis-related 79.1 60 139.1 HUMA (=crisis only) 39 97 87 223 IcSP 10 20.3 30.3 incl. crisis-related 2.5 19 21.5 DCI 6.8 1.49 12.5 20.7 incl. crisis-related 5 12.5 17.5 EIDHR 0.6 0.6 0.6 1.8 incl. crisis-related 0.5 0.5 Madad (=crisis only) 125 65 190 TOTAL 192.4 274.1 285.4 751.8 Sub-total crisis 123.1 224.5 244 591.6

In line with its indicative envelope, programmed bilateral assistance to Lebanon in 2014-16 amounts to EUR 147 million over three years (a rough average of 50 million per year). However, humanitarian aid, special measures under the ENI, the setting-up of the Madad Fund and the increased engagement of other instruments in connection with the refugee crisis have multiplied by 3, and subsequently by 6 or 7, the actual spending in Lebanon, peaking at EUR 285.4 million in 2016. Since the beginning of the Syrian crisis in 2011, the Commission claims having allocated EUR 639 million in assistance to refugees and host communities in Lebanon, on top of EUR 219 million of regular programmed bilateral cooperation. Out of the more than 700 million claimed to be set aside for the Madad Fund, current commitments for Lebanon stand at EUR 190 million (around 27%). Out of the EUR 428 million of projects approved by the Board as of March 2016, EUR 130 million (30%) has been allocated to projects in Lebanon. In addition, pending loans by the European Investment Bank (EIB) in Lebanon in the past three years were all signed in 2014 for an amount of EUR 101 million.11 The projects aimed at increasing the access of local SMEs to financing.

11 Source: information on the EIB website. Corresponding amount for 2007-13 was EUR 602.5 mln. (Source: EIB)

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3.4. THE EU'S FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO JORDAN

The indicative allocation for the bilateral cooperation with Jordan under the ENI was set by its SSF 2014-17 at the range between EUR 312 million and EUR 382 million for four years, depending on the country's needs and fulfilment of conditions. The SSF identifies three priority sectors, together with an indicative breakdown of the overall envelope (which appears in fact very volatile from one year to another):

• ‘Reinforcing the rule of law for enhanced accountability and equity in public sector delivery’ in a context of transition to establish democratic standards in Jordan (25%) • ‘Employment and private sector development’ against a background of long- standing economic shortcomings and underdevelopment in this domain (30%) • ‘Renewable energies and energy efficiency’ given Jordan’s need to diversify energy sources and to save energy in a context of climate change and environmental threats (30%).

A capacity development envelope in connection with the implementation of the ENP Action Plan (10%) and a civil society envelope (5%) are also foreseen but seems not having given rise to actual commitments according to the figures communicated by the Commission for 2014-2016.

Table 6: Overview of financial assistance to Jordan (in EUR million, CA)

Programme 2014 2015 2016 2014-2016

ENI, including: 174.5 100 140 414.5 1: Reinforcing the rule of law for enhanced accountability and equity in public service 47,5 — 35 82.5 delivery 2: Employment and private sector development 57 45 — 102 3: Renewable energies and energy efficiency — 45 45 90 Other measures: civil society and capacities — — — — crisis-related 70 10 60 140 HUMA (=crisis only) 31 53 53 137 IcSP — 10 21.8 31.8 incl. crisis-related — — 20 20 DCI 2.5 — 13 15.5 incl. crisis-related 2.5 — 12,5 15 EIDHR 0.66 0.7 0.8 2.16 incl. crisis-related — — 0.5 0.5 MFA loans* (=crisis impact on public finances) — 180 — 180 Madad (=crisis only) — 83 65 148 TOTAL 208.7 426.7 293.6 929.0 Sub-total crisis (including MFA loans) 103.5 346 211 660.5 * MFA operation for 2016 in preparation. Source: information provided by the European Commission services, DG Budget.

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In connection with these priority sectors and objectives, the last progress report for Jordan, published in 2015 as regards 2014, notes the country's resilience when confronted with the crisis situation, and a good cooperation with the EU in that respect, but recommends further strengthening of democratic institutions, ensuring freedom of opinion, and restoring the moratorium on the death penalty. Macro-financial assistance (MFA) is a form of EU's aid to the partner countries experiencing a balance of payment crisis, generally in form of medium- or long-term loans. Considering the pressure on Jordan's finances put by the regional instability, notably the war in Syria, the country has obtained an MFA loan of EUR 180 million. The corresponding amount was paid in 2015, in two tranches. A second MFA operation for Jordan was proposed by the Commission in June 2016, at a level of EUR 200 million, and awaits the approval by the budgetary authority. Consequently, since the beginning of the Syrian crisis in 2011, the Commission claims having allocated EUR 686 million (including MFA) in assistance to refugees and host communities in Jordan on top of EUR 500 million of regular programmed bilateral cooperation. In addition to bilateral cooperation and assistance to refugees, contracts signed with Jordan by the European Investment Bank (EIB) in 2014-16 amounted to EUR 118.0 million.12 The projects funded aimed at, mainly, building infrastructures necessary in order to improve the availability of drinking water, and ensuring the supply of electricity from sustainable sources to peripheral regions of the country. Jordan is also a beneficiary of the funding of the loans of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, with the accumulated investment now standing at EUR 532 million.

12 Source: http://www.eib.org/projects/loans/regions/mediterranean- countries/jo.htm?start=2014&end=2016§or=. Corresponding amount for 2007-13 was EUR 399.6 mln (source: EIB http://www.eib.org/projects/loans/regions/mediterranean-countries/jo.htm?start=2007&end=2013§or=).

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4. UNRWA IN LEBANON AND JORDAN AND THE EU SUPPORT

4.1. UNRWA ACTIVITIES IN LEBANON AND JORDAN

As discussed in parts 1 and 2, both Lebanon and Jordan have had important populations of Palestinian refugees on their territory. These refugees are supported by the UN Relief and Work Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), established back in 1949 in order to carry out ‘relief and works programmes’ in support of Palestine refugees. The latter are defined as all those who lost their homes and means of livelihood because of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, as well as their descendants. Lebanon and Jordan are two of the five UNRWA’s fields of operation; the agency also works in Syria, West Bank and Gaza strip. Out of the total of 5.6 million persons registered with UNRWA in the beginning of 2015, some 2.2 million (nearly 40%) were in Jordanian territory, and 0.5 million (below 9%) in Lebanon. UNRWA runs its official camps, which host approximately 20% of the Palestine refugee population in the five fields, with significant variations from one country to another. Camps, originally constructed as transitory places of residence, gradually developed in quasi- permanent, urbanised environment. Conditions in camps are typically very poor, involving basic sanitation problems and limited drinking water access. Costs linked to the running of the camps, and those of camps reconstruction (e.g. Nahr el Bared camp in Lebanon destroyed in the 2007 war) impact heavily on the UNRWA budget. The organisation also operates schools providing free basic education, provides possibility of vocational training in UNRWA centres, and encourages pursuing the secondary and tertiary education, e.g. offering university scholarships. Due to financial shortages and demographic pressure, 70% of UNRWA schools operate in double shifts. Education services are the UNRWA activity consuming the highest ratios of the general and project budgets, corresponding to an overall 57% of general budget spent on education. The Agency runs health centres, and delivers social services or microfinance. It also provides humanitarian relief in the form of food, cash or shelter assistance. UNRWA employs 30 000 staff, including over 28 000 Palestinian refugees. Out of that number, over 3,000 persons would work in Lebanon, and over 6,900 in Jordan, according to projections13 in the current UNRWA budget. Palestinians in Lebanon rely entirely on UNRWA services for their vital needs, as they have no access to Lebanese public services, healthcare and education, and only have restricted right to work. UNRWA operates 12 official camps in Lebanon, in which some 250 000 persons are registered. Together with the Palestine refugees from Syria who have fled into the country because of war, the current number of Palestinians in Lebanon has reached over 300,000 persons. UNRWA camps are overpopulated, and shelters severely degraded; potable water supply in the camps remains problematic. UNRWA has undertaken work aiming at shelters rehabilitation, using the self-help approach scheme, and improving environmental health conditions in camps, including an increase in sources of water available.

13 estimations as per December 2017

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The Agency provides healthcare via its 27 health centres spread throughout the country, and education services: in the last school year some 36,500 Palestinian pupils, including over 5,000 Palestinian children from Syria studied in 67 UNRWA schools in Lebanon. UNRWA schools in Lebanon provide the free basic education over a nine-year cycle, as well as the secondary education over a further three-year cycle. As mentioned in chapter 2, the overall situation of Palestinians in Jordan is quite different: although part of them remain vulnerable or even suffers poverty, many are integrated economically and socially, and most are in possession of a Jordanian ID citizenship. An important caveat is the temporary character of the citizenship granted to Palestinians by the Jordanian authorities: seen as a humanitarian gesture, the passports are of a limited (and recently decreasing) validity, and the citizen’s status awarded to Palestinians is a revocable one. Moreover, an important exception are Palestine refugees from Gaza, in number of nearly 160,000 persons, who do not enjoy citizens’ rights. Accordingly, UNRWA in Jordan undertakes efforts to shift their support to those in need, rather than to all those officially registered. UNRWA operates 10 official camps in Jordan, hosting some 385 000 persons; further three unofficial camps function in parallel. A great majority of Palestinians in Jordan (over 80%) live outside of camps; at the same time, camps inhabitants are in general poorer, living in worse conditions, and more dependent on UNRWA services. The UNRWA healthcare services in Jordan are extended by 25 health centres, as well as two mobile dental clinics. Nearly 120,000 Palestinian pupils (as per Dec 2015) studies in 172 UNRWA schools, offering a free primary education over a ten-grade cycle. UNRWA social services, such as the Social Safety Net, are addressed at the most vulnerable families, providing, inter alia, cash grants.

4.2. UNRWA BUDGET AND EU FUNDING

The activities of UNRWA are financed via the UNRWA general budget and budget for the ad hoc support projects, adopted biannually and covering the ongoing work, as well as from emergency calls for contributions for humanitarian aid and crisis response. The estimations for the general budget were set at USD 757,7 million in 2016, and USD 774,8 in 2017, out of which 12% and 19% respectively would finance activities in Lebanon and Jordan. The ratio of the project budget assigned to a given field varies substantially, depending on the actual needs related to the particular projects and the schedule of financing. In 2016-17 the estimated participation of Lebanon and Jordan in the projects budget of USD 884.6 million was set at nearly 17% (Lebanon) and 4.3% (Jordan). In the past years, UNRWA has experienced funding shortages largely due to the situation in Syria and its knock-on effects on neighbouring countries on the one hand, to the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Gaza on the other hand. These relatively recent developments come on the top of financial implications of the long-term demographic trends within the Palestinian community supported by UNRWA, which grew from 750,000 in 1950 to the current population of largely over 5 million persons. UNRWA regularly comes back to its donors: in summer 2015 the organisation was particularly hit by the funding shortfalls, and it announced that the opening of the school year was at risk, creating a great

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risk of social unrest. In September 2016 the schools were opened, but funds collected so far are insufficient to cover the salaries until the end of the year. In its newsletter diffused on 2 September, UNRWA indicated that funds collected so far covered 86% of the programme budget for 2016, translating into the budget shortfall of USD 96.5 million. Budgetary shortfalls relating to projects budget and humanitarian aid are much larger: UNRWA is still short of USD 137 million (40% of the total amount) for the Nahr el Bared camp reconstruction, and of a total of USD 495 million for the two emergency appeals launched this year. Commissioner-General, Mr. Pierre Krähenbühl, stressed at the occasion of his meeting with the CONT Members in June the negative impact of financial insecurity, including instability felt by the supported communities, and the significant resources the Agency is obliged to invest in funds raising. In parallel to funds raising, UNRWA has attempted to introduce internal reforms, which also include elements aiming at an increased cost-effectiveness, in particular in the field of education and healthcare services. In the beginning of 2016 a healthcare services reform was announced, which would introduce the element of financial participation in the hospitalisation costs. Violent protests followed, including a self-immolation by a young Palestinian as a sign of protest, and the Lebanese Health Minister called on UNRWA to reconsider the implementation of the reforms. Although EU assistance to UNRWA does not count as bilateral cooperation with Jordan and Lebanon, it is indirectly a non-negligible part of the EU’s financial interventions in those two countries. Next to the US, the EU budget and EU Member States contributions are the primary source of UNRWA financing. As UNRWA representatives have stressed, the EU support remains of vital importance not only due to the high ratio of the organisation’s budget covered by the EU, but also the reliability of the EU financial engagements. In 2007-13, the EU budget covered 57% of the UNRWA total ordinary budget (General Fund and projects budget). In these years, the EU has allocated an annual average of nearly EUR 80 million to the UNRWA General Fund, with contributions steadily growing. Together with the projects budget and emergency calls, the EU was contributing an average of EUR 135 million per year, with large variations from one year to another. The EU contribution was financed from, firstly, the ENPI, which financed the contributions to the General Fund, as well as numerous ad hoc projects. Additional funds came from the MEDA programme and the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace, with the humanitarian aid budget line covering the related emergency appeals. The table at the next page presents an overview of the annual contributions from the EU budget under the last financial perspective, including some details on the financing instrument and projects covered.

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Table 7: EU contributions to UNRWA in 2007-2013 (in EUR million)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Contribution to General Fund 66,0 66,0 66,0 86,0 86,5 91,9 91,8 Humanitarian Aid Total 17,2 39,0 21,3 16,6 14,4 15,7 17,0 Humanitarian Aid Budget Line1 7,0 6,5 2,1 2,5 Food Aid (SHCs) 10,2 15,0 9,4 2,0 Emergency Appeal Food Distribution2 (Gaza and Lebanon) 17,5 9,8 12,1 West Bank protection 0,9 0,8 0,8 Gaza Strip food 11,0 8,8 6,3 Lebanon food 1,2 1,0 1,0 Lebanon protection 1,2 0,2 Syria crisis - Pal ref Jor Leb Syria (Syria HIP) 3,5 9,0 Syria crisis - Pal ref Leb (Leb HIP) 1,5 Crisis Response (IcSP) ( former IfS) Nahr el Bared - Lebanon 6,4 12,0 12,0 Gaza Early Recovery (job creation programme)³ 13,0 14,4 Support to displaced refugees in Northern Lebanon 5,1 Syria: addressing exclusion of Palestine refugees 4,7 Gaza Early Recovery add. (health, environment) 5,5 Building resilience conflict affected Pal Ref - Lebanon & Syria 7,5 5,0 Ad hoc support projects Food Facility - SHCs 39,7 Food Security - SHCs 4,0 5,0 5,0 5,0 5,0 5,0 Camp Improvement projects 4,0 2,0 MEDA & ENPI - Scholarship programmes (Lebanon) 3,0 4,3 2,1 ENPI - UNRWA Events in Brussels, Summer games 0,2 1.0 0,2 ENPI - Palestine (SHCs) 4,0 ENPI - Nahr el Bared Camp - Lebanon 5,0 ENPI - Palestine (Quality Education Services) 10,0 ENPI - Protecting Vulnerable Palestine Refugees in Syria 2,7 13,2 ENPI - Syria - Engaging Youth, phase II 7,3

ENPI - Lebanon "improving infrastructure in Palestinian Refugee camps in Lebanon" 6,0 8,0 ENPI - Lebanon "Education, Training & Employment support for the Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon" 13,5 5,2 TOTAL ANNUAL 100,6 120,0 175,9 104,6 142,4 143,6 157,2 Source: data provided by UNRWA As concerns period falling under the current financial framework, a Joint Declaration signed by the EU High Representative in 2014 foresees that the EU would contribute EUR 246 million in 2014-2016, i.e. an average of EUR 82 million per year to the UNRWA Programme budget (or General Fund) which stands at a total of EUR 668.6 million in 2016. This indicative amount was usually catered for in the initial budget, or has been reached and even exceeded

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via subsequent budget transfers. In 2014-2015 the EU’s contribution to the General Fund stood at EUR 87 million and 102 million respectively. With humanitarian aid at EUR 8 million (2014) and EUR 10 million (2015), and further projects support, the total EU contribution reached the amount of EUR 118,6 million in 2014 and 130 million in 2015. In 2016, the EU has already contributed EUR 82 million to the General Fund, and the UNRWA Secretary General requested an additional allocation, to alleviate the financial shortages. Within the General Fund, Jordan's share stands at 19.2% (EU contribution: EUR 15.7 million) and Lebanon’s share at 13.2% (EU contribution: EUR 10.8 million). Beyond this initial contribution, UNRWA has benefited from further financing for ad hoc support projects or as part of humanitarian aid. Most recent examples include education and protection for Palestinian Refugees from Syria (PRS) in Lebanon and Jordan, the reconstruction of the Nahr- el-Bared camp in Lebanon financed from the Instrument for Stability envelope, or humanitarian food aid in Lebanon. The table below provides some details of the latest estimations of the EU financial assistance to UNRWA in 2016.

Table 8: Estimation of the EU financial contribution to UNRWA in 2016 (in EUR million)

Projected/ 2016 FUNDING ESTIMATES received General Fund 82 Project Budget - Total 47 Syria - NEAR 10 PRS in Jordan - Madad Fund 3 PRS in Lebanon - Madad Fund 12 Shelter rehabilitation in Lebanon - ENI 5 Education in Lebanon -ENI 5* NBC – Lebanon -IcSP 12* Humanitarian Aid - Total 8 ECHO Emergency Appeal-Gaza 4 ECHO Emergency Appeal-West Bank 1 ECHO -Emergency Appeal-Syria 3 * under negotiation Source: data provided by UNRWA

4.3. FINANCIAL CONTROL AND OVERSIGHT

The UNRWA applies a model of risk management and internal financial control approved by the UN and composed of three levels:

− UNRWA operational managers are responsible for maintaining effective internal controls on a day-to-day basis. This includes identification, assessment, and control

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of risks; guiding the development and implementation of internal policies and procedures and ensuring the activities consistency with goals and objectives;

− UNRWA management supervises the design and functioning of the internal controls at the managers’ level;

− UNRWA Department of Internal Oversight Services (DIOS) provides ’independent and objective internal oversight services’. DIOS’ activities involve drafting evaluations of programmes, projects, strategies and policies; assessing the internal control systems, risk management, and governance processes as part of the internal audits; investigating on misconduct or cases of failure to comply with UNRWA’s rules, policies and procedures. The UNRWA policies include an Anti-Fraud and Anti- Corruption Policy, which was renewed in December 2015. Furthermore, the Agency also falls under the scheme of internal controls at the UN level, carried out by the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS). OIOS produces reports on individual UN agencies and programmes, and a report on UNRWA’s performance will be upcoming shortly. As part of the external financial control, UNRWA is subject to the controls of the UN Board of Auditors. The Board is appointed by the UN General Assembly and composed of Auditors General of three SAIs (currently the UK, Tanzania and India). The Board of Auditors core mandate covers the regularity audit, but elements of performance audit are also included in its controls. Besides the controls of financial reports, its representatives visit UNRWA, typically twice a year, for on-the-spot checks. Since 2012, the Board has given unqualified audit opinions on UNRWA’s activities. Additionally, the Joint Inspection Unit also includes UNRWA in its external, UN system-wide evaluations, assessing and advising on crosscutting issues. The general rules of the EU-UNRWA cooperation have been set in the Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement between the EU and UN (FAFA), which in April 2003 replaced the earlier 1999 Agreement. The FAFA, as modified by the Annex signed in February 2014, lays uniform financial and administrative cooperation rules as regards the financing of UN General Headquarters and UN organisations from the EU budget. The Agreement provides for, inter alia, the obligation of reporting for all actions financed fully or partially from the EU budget, including a financial report and a narrative, describing the actions and underlying activities. It defines the categories of costs eligible, and sets a limit on indirect costs (7% of direct costs). UN rules provide for exclusive or single audits of actions, carried out by the UN External Controllers under the responsibility of the Board of Auditors. A common agreement was achieved between the EU and UN back in 1994, by which the EU recognised this principle, and the UN recognised the need for the European Commission to ‘obtain assurance’ of the adequacy of the UN systems of financial control, to understand these systems, and Commission’s obligation to report on the proper use the EU funds. Accordingly, a verification clause annexed to the previous EU-UN agreement and to the current FAFA Agreement sets the UN obligation to provide all relevant financial information to the European Commission, and the Commission’s right to verify this information, including on-

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the-spot checks. During the BUDG Committee visit to Jordan and Lebanon in May, UNRWA representatives expressed, besides the appreciation of the EU large and stable financial support, their view on the EU controls as being somewhat too bureaucratic. The related burden relates, among others, to the verifications mentioned above, which would add up to some ten verification missions this year. Other difficulties encountered with UNRWA in its cooperation with the EU are linked to the implementation of the new contribution agreement template - the ‘Pillar Assessed Grants or Delegation Agreement’ (PAGODA). It replaced the previous contribution agreements on the 1 January 2015, in the aftermath of the revision of the EU Financial Regulation. The UN complained about the new templates complexity, the increased transaction costs on the UN side, and, not least, an increased financial risk due to potentially higher number of - real or perceived - non-compliance occurrences. UNRWA, in particular, would be concerned by the consequences of the new ‘one size fits all’ approach, which would now do not cater for the organisations specificities. As a response, new ‘PAGODA 2’ templates were adopted in June this year, which remedy some of the earlier shortcomings.

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5. POSITION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

On Lebanon and Jordan as part of the Southern Neighbourhood: The European Parliament has repeatedly expressed its awareness of and concern about the Syrian crisis leading to potential regional instability in the neighbouring countries, Jordan and Lebanon being particularly vulnerable. Throughout the last few years the Parliament has adopted several resolutions expressing deep concerns on the massive inflow of refugees to these two countries and urging the EU to provide humanitarian assistance and financial support.14

The Parliament also emphasised the importance of Jordan and Lebanon as stable partners in the Middle East. In the resolution of 10 October 2013 the Parliament welcomed the proactive and constructive role of Jordan, as a mediator, in the efforts aimed at finding lasting solutions to various conflicts in the Middle East. The EP also demonstrated its awareness of the fact that an increasing wave of refugees in the two countries poses huge socio-economic challenges, and hampers the reforms, in particular in the case of Lebanon, calling on the EU to continue supporting their implementation.15

The EP welcomed the improved cooperation with Jordan, as manifested by the signature of the Protocol for the participation of Jordan in EU programmes, and has been appreciative of the progress of political reforms. At the same time, the Parliament pointed out to persisting problems, as when it deplored limitation of freedom of expression in Jordan, in particular trials of the related cases by the military tribunals, and when it noted with disapproval that the Jordanian border has been closed to Palestinian refugees from Syria since August 201216.

Finally, the European Parliament was active in the process of the ENP review: in its resolution of 12 March 2015,17 it asked for a revised approach of the EU towards its southern neighbours in the ENP framework, based on differentiation and the ‘more for more’ principle, under which additional EU support is granted to partner governments which are committed to and make tangible progress towards democratisation and respect for fundamental freedoms and human rights.

On UNRWA:

The European Parliament has constantly supported UNRWA, as a contributor to stability and peace in the Middle East, and it has complimented the organisation on its work. In 2015, it has commended the ‘heroic work’ of UNRWA in the Gaza strip18, and expressed support for the UNRWA work in providing the education services, calling for a further cooperation in this respect19.

14 EP resolutions (2012/2543(RSP)), (2013/2621(RSP)), (2014/2531(RSP)), (2014/2695(RSP)), (2015/3035(RSP)). 15 EP resolution of 23 October 2013 on the European Neighbourhood Policy: towards a strengthening of the partnership. Position of the European Parliament on the 2012 reports (2013/2621(RSP)). 16 Resolution of 10 October 2013 (12138/2012 – C7-0008/2013 – 2012/0108(NLE)) 17 European Parliament resolution of 12 March 2015 on the Annual Report from the High Representative of the for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Parliament (2014/2219(INI)) 18 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P8-TA-2015- 0318+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN 19 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P8-TA-2015- 0403+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN

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The EP also acknowledged the organisation’s important role in providing support to the Palestinians suffering in the aftermath of the Syrian war20, and expressed concerns over the financial pressure sustained by UNRWA due to the regional instability.

The Parliament’s support to UNRWA has translated into its firm commitment to ensure a continuous financial assistance. Accordingly, the EU has adopted financial reinforcements under the corresponding budget line, most recently in the framework of the 2016 budgetary procedure.21 A similar reinforcement is under consideration within the current budgetary procedure.

20 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P8-TA-2015- 0376+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN 21 paragraph 47, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P8-TA-2015- 0376+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN Disclaimer The content of this document is the sole responsibility of the author and any opinions expressed therein do not necessarily represent the official position of the European Parliament. It is addressed to the Members and staff of the EP for their parliamentary work. Reproduction and translation for non-commercial purposes are authorised, provided the source is acknowledged and the European Parliament is given prior notice and sent a copy. Contact: [email protected], [email protected] Manuscript completed on September 2016.

Page 46 of 162 EU IN THE MIDDLE EAST

1. ECHO Background Briefing: Lebanon and Jordan ......

2. EU-UNRWA Partnership Leaflet ......

Page 47 of 162 Page 48 of 162 Lebanon and Jordan

Recent Developments in Relations with the EU

The process of signing Partnership Priorities and annexed Compacts, aiming at helping both countries deal with the impact of the Syrian refugee crisis, is advancing well. An agreement with Jordan was reached "ad referenda" at the Association Committee of 19th July in Amman and more informally, at working level, with Lebanon on 2nd August in Brussels. The agreement with Jordan was accompanied by a formal agreement on "Rules of Origin" for export of Jordanian goods using an agreed component of Syrian labour, to the EU. The agreement with Lebanon risks being complicated by difficult negotiations over a Mobility Partnership (already in place with Jordan).

Lebanon

Lebanon continues to suffer from an internal political paralysis and the spill overs of the Syrian conflict, including an influx of refugees equivalent to over a quarter of its population. This stalemate has so far prevented the authorities from adopting the necessary macro-economic adjustment and structural reform measures. Growth has slowed and while the economy has so far shown resilience despite large fiscal and current account imbalances, reflecting the prudent policies pursued by the central bank, reliance on a large inflow of foreign capital, including from the wealthy Lebanese diaspora, and the strength of the banking system, the Lebanese economic model is subject to increasing risks. In the absence of an IMF programme and a reliable public finance management system (no budget has been adopted by Parliament since 2005), the EU may not envisage granting Macro-Financial Assistance, contrary to Jordan's case. However, in coherence with the London Conference pledges, the EU is considering other forms of assistance to Lebanon, including a strengthening of EIB lending and supporting the start of the activities of the EBRD in the country.

 We have started the implementation of our London pledge of €1 billion for Jordan and Lebanon for 2016 and 2017. Close to €130 million has been allocated to Lebanon from the MADAD fund. As of July 27 2016, 5 contracts for a total amount of € 68.8 million have been signed of which €41 million for the education of Syrian refugees through UNICEF. The other projects address livelihoods, WASH (water sanitation and Hygiene), higher education, non-formal education and social services. Our projects address both the Syrian refugees and the host communities as well as Palestine refugees from Syria. ECHO has also allocated €87 million for humanitarian assistance in Lebanon (multi-purpose cash assistance, secondary health care, protection). Lebanon: State of play of the Compact/PP  The latest (and final?) round of negotiations with the Lebanese government regarding the Partnership Priorities and the compact took place in Brussels on 2nd August. The discussion was constructive and a working level agreement on the Partnership Priorities and Compact has been reached. The PPs would in principle concern the period to 2020. Nevertheless the Agreement now needs to be accepted by Lebanon's council of Ministers, as well as by Commission and Council on EU side.  It is crucial that the EU as a whole conveys the same message to the Lebanese authorities. Legal residency status for the refugees is indispensable to their protection, access to relevant services, and to allow a sound management of the assistance. According to the latest World Bank report, 25% of Syrian refugees are not registered and 70% do not have a residency permit. The situation is leading to exploitation and negative coping mechanisms. It is also a major deterrent for families to send children to school.

1/22 Page 49 of 162  Another cause of concern is the shrinking space for NGOs, both national and international. According to the Lebanese International Humanitarian INGO Forum report of March 2016, among their 32 members 20 were registered while 12 registrations were pending. In addition, pre-approval of work permits for international staff (5% of staff on average) by the Ministry of Labour is a lengthy and cumbersome issue. Many pre-approvals were received only after initial rejection and subsequent appeal. There was a 59% approval rate for 2015 with an average timeframe of 4 months.

Jordan  The text of the EU-JO Partnership Priorities and Compact was accepted "ad referenda" at the Association Committee meeting of 19th July in Amman and now requires to be endorsed by both sides at official level.  JO requested flexibility to allow for a review of the PPs when the situation requires (avoiding the alleged 'rigidity' of the EU-Jordan Action Plan). The PP should cover until 2018 with possible 2-year extension, if both parties agree.  On 07.06.16, the Commission adopted a Migration Partnership with 9 Countries of Origin and Transit of Migrants in the Middle East and Africa, one of which is Jordan. With all these countries a Compact, accompanied by financing from the EU, will be adopted and Jordan is one of the most advanced in this respect.  JO has stressed the need for additional EU financial support (post London) and for the EU using its advocacy/influence with others to support JO as well.  For 2016, the EU Delegation has communicated to MoPIC an amount of minimum €220M grants (on top of a possible new MFA for which the Commission proposal is ca. €200 million and of the "standard" bilateral allocation). To note that JO wanted to have a clearer picture of both Humanitarian and Resilience support and in particular support that is targeting Jordan and the needs of Host Communities. JO has underlined that the population has a negative perception in terms of real outcomes after London while the Government is moving at speed on fulfilling its commitments in favour of refugees (access to labour market, increased education services, etc.).  Legislative elections are taking place in Jordan the same week as the visit and an EU Electoral Observation Mission is in place.  The Commission has agreed in principle to contribute €5 million to the World Bank's Concessional Financing Fund set up for Jordan and Lebanon. There are still some issues to be resolved , notably over the geographical scope of the fund. A first meeting of the Fund has already taken place where two projects for Jordan were approved.  The EU is on track to deliver its financial commitments to Jordan made at the London Conference for 2016, in particular through allocations from MADAD TF..

Humanitarian Matters

 Lebanon and Jordan have shown generous hospitality in hosting respectively over 1.1 million (the world’s largest number of refugees per capita) and over 657.000 Syrian refugees. The EU acknowledges that the pressure of hosting such large numbers of refugees is having a heavy toll on Lebanon's political stability as well as on both countries' limited resources.

2/22 Page 50 of 162  The EU is one of the largest donors to the humanitarian response to the Syrian crisis. From 2012, EUR 356 million has been allocated for humanitarian aid in Lebanon and EUR 251 million in Jordan. The EU, through DG ECHO, is currently providing humanitarian assistance to nearly 665 000 Syrian refugees in Lebanon and more than 400 000 in Jordan (including those stranded at the border with Syria waiting to access).  At the London conference, the EU welcomed the commitments taken by the Governments of Jordan and Lebanon to facilitate access of the Syrian refugees to the labour market. It is time now for the EU to ensure that pledges and commitments made at the London conference are fulfilled.  Protection remains a key concern for the EU. Strengthening the protection framework and ensuring access to quality livelihood and education is also the best way to reduce Syrian refugees' socio-economic vulnerability and exposure to abuses and exploitation. The EU encourages the Government of Lebanon to gradually resume registration of refugees in line with UNHCR criteria and improve the regulatory framework in relation to residence permits, simplification of procedures and work permits. Indications are that this activity will be carried out by the Ministry of Social Affairs. While this is in principle to be commended, it is important that the Ministry uses accepted UN criteria for the registration process and acts swiftly.  The education in emergencies initiative has a paramount role. Beyond being a fundamental right for all children in all situations to give them hope for their future, education can act as a strong shield protecting children from radicalisation and recruitment into armed groups, forced/early marriage or entering dangerous migration routes.  The war in Syria is also having a dramatic impact on displaced people stranded at the neighbouring countries' borders. At the Jordanian North-eastern border with Syria (known as the "Berm") about 80.000 asylum seekers, mainly women and children, are stranded while waiting to receive access into Jordan on humanitarian grounds.  Following a Da'esh suicide attack that took place during a distribution of humanitarian aid in June, resulting in the deaths of 10 Jordanian soldiers at the Berm, Jordan closed its border and declared the area a 'military zone'.  While most humanitarian interventions were cancelled, GoJ allowed constant water provision, and a 'one-off' food distribution in early August. However essential medical intervention has not been possible since June. The humanitarian situation is worsening every day, and deaths due to lack of medical care are reported as well as cases of jaundic.  The UN are investigating all possible options to ensure the population will have access to lifesaving support while taking into account Jordan's legitimate security concerns. EU and other donors are following closely the situation.  Prior to its border closure, the Government of Jordan had granted access to Jordan for 20 000 individuals from the Berm now hosted in Azraq camp. Economy

Jordan

 The Syrian conflict has impacted Jordan by disrupting trade with and through Syria but also by the inflow of 657.000 refugees into Jordan that increased pressure on Jordan's fiscal position, public services and infrastructure. Jordan has so far managed to maintain macro- economic stability through a combination of prudent macro-economic policies, selected structural reforms and substantial financial support from the international community.

3/22 Page 51 of 162  During the International Donor Conference, which took place on 4 February in London, the international community decided to provide additional support of around USD 10 billion to countries affected by the refugee crisis. This amount included a EUR 2.4 billion pledge by the European Commission which in turn entailed a new Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA) operation to Jordan for the tentative amount of EUR 200 million. This will be the second MFA operation to Jordan following the successful completion in 2015 of the previous MFA programme of EUR 180 million.  This new MFA operation will be part of the Jordan Compact. Jordan has expressed its disappointment with the amount and is now asking for €350 million.

Lebanon

 Lebanon's large macro-economic imbalances (fiscal deficit, large debt, current account deficit) pose significant risk to the sustainability of the country's economic model, based on the continued attraction of foreign exchange inflows from abroad. A more ambitious and sustainable policy of fiscal consolidation is necessary.  The country must also do more to address its most pressing structural reform challenges, notably the reform of the electricity sector, public finance management and the country's regressive and weak tax system, while moving to a more inclusive economic system and stimulating job creation.  Lebanon does not currently satisfy the preconditions for macro-financial assistance from the EU, which requires the beneficiary country to have an active IMF programme. It also requires a robust system of public finance management (which is currently deficient in Lebanon, where no budget has been passed by Parliament since 2005). Under these circumstances, providing macro-economic/budgetary support would entail considerable risks.  The EU intends to support Lebanon through other financial instruments, including our regular cooperation assistance, humanitarian assistance and EIB and EBRD lending, consistent with the pledges made in London.  Following the recent accession of Lebanon to the EBRD, the EU is supportive of the process leading to making the country a full country of operations. However, Lebanon still has to pass the law enabling its EBRD membership to take effect before the country of operations status can be approved by the Board of Governors of the EBRD.  Both the EBRD and the EIB announced in London new pledges for the countries most affected by the Syrian refugee crisis, including Lebanon, although the details have yet to be worked out.

4/22 Page 52 of 162 Background

NEAR

London Conference Pledges (million EUR)

Indicative amounts for the Syrian crisis

2016 Jordan- Lebanon- Turkey Total Syria Facility

EU Budget 505 250 755 Madad Trust Fund 160 160

MFA (loan) 200 200

Total 865 250 1,115

MS pledges 1,162

Details EU Budget 2016

Jordan / Turkey Syria Sub-Total Total Lebanon Facility HUMA 140 140 280 165 445 ENI 120 50 170 18 188 IPA - 37 37 DCI - 10 10 EIDHR 1 1 1 IcSP 39 15 54 20 74 Total EU Budget 300 205 505 250 755

EU Co-operation with Lebanon

In Lebanon, all EU co-operation is implemented through grant or loan projects either with NGOs or International Organisations, more occasionally with the Government. There are no budget support programmes and Lebanon is not currently in a position where these could be envisaged. The 2014/2016 Single Support Framework (SSF) was adopted in July 2014 with an indicative bilateral allocation for the 3 year period of €130 million – €159 million. There are three focal sectors: justice and security reform; reinforcing social cohesion, promoting

5/22 Page 53 of 162 economic development and protecting vulnerable groups and promotion of sustainable and transparent management of Energy and natural resources. For Lebanon, the Commission’s total funding in response to the Syrian crisis amounts to €778.9 million (humanitarian and development assistance). This is aimed at addressing both refugees and host communities’ needs in particular when dealing with infrastructures: water, waste water, solid waste management but also in the health and education sectors. Additionally, since December 2014, most non-humanitarian aid for neighbouring countries is channelled through the EU Regional Trust Fund in response to the Syrian crisis. Programmes for a value of €390 million were adopted in December 2015. Projects for a total of €130 million for Lebanon have been adopted by the Trust Fund board on 22nd March, with around half of this being allocated to UNICEF to contribute towards Lebanon's goal of "RACE-Reaching All children in Education", Lebanon, is invited to send a representative to Board Meetings as an observer.

EU-Lebanon Compact The exercise of drafting a compact for Lebanon fits into the European Neighbourhood Policy review. It is the opportunity to design comprehensive aid and support packages which combine different policy elements within EU competencies (cooperation, trade mobility, energy…) and to align these policies towards the same objective. If the overarching objective of the ENP is stabilisation, the compact will adopt the principles of differentiation and flexibility to cater for the most pressing needs of the country. In the case of Lebanon, the most pressing needs are an upgrade of basic services (waste management, water, education and health) as well as increased economic opportunities for both the Syrian refugees and the vulnerable Lebanese. In exchange, the Lebanese government should make commitments on social and economic inclusion of Syrian refugees in order to improve their living conditions and legal residence status.

EU Co-operation with Jordan

EU bilateral allocation to Jordan EU bilateral allocation to Jordan is governed by the joint Single Support Framework agreed between the EU and the Government. The indicative Jordan allocation for the period 2014- 2020 is between EUR 567 million and EUR 693 million, allocated among the following priorities:

• The first year of the SSF (2014) concentrated on: i) support for improved Public Finance Management and Public Administration reform PFM an area where Jordan has made

6/22 Page 54 of 162 significant progress in recent years; ii) support for Technical & Vocational Education & Training; and iii) support to Students Mobility by opening a special window for Jordan under Erasmus+ programme. In addition, Jordan received €15 million additional funding under the Umbrella Programme.

• For 2015, EU has concentrated on two sectors for a total of €135 million: “Renewable Energy & Energy Efficiency” and “Support for the Development of the Private Sector”. The Renewable Energy & Energy Efficiency programme will involve commitments of €90 million over two years (2015 & 2016). High energy costs are one of the main reasons for Jordan’s level of indebtedness, with the virtual cessation of previously-cheap supplies of gas from Egypt leading to the country having to source gas and oil at market prices to provide fuel for the power stations. The National Electric Power Company has incurred losses of JD1.3 billion in 2013 alone with the same trend in 2014, while 2015 witnessed a step improvement, mainly thanks to lower oil prices. The energy sector is a cross-cutting one, in a country where fuel prices are subsidised and there are few natural resources, but a huge potential for renewable energy. Government policy has evolved over recent years to create a favourable investment framework for renewable energy strongly backed by the EU Budget Support and TA programmes in the sector. the EU has also designed a new programme to support the development of the private sector. This will aim at enhancing the performance of Jordan's economy in terms of inclusive growth and international competitiveness. The Support for the Development of the Private Sector general objectives are to support the development of a more conducive economic environment and competitive private sector while enhancing trade flows and investments between the EU Member States and Jordan.

• In 2016, the EU is preparing a support the Solid Waste Management sector by means of a large (possibly up to EUR100 million) and comprehensive programme – including Budget Support – and another programme to back Democratic, Electoral and Political reforms. The programmes will be presented to the ENI Committee on 13th September.

Follow up to the London conference • Total pledge of London conference: $10 billion over 2016-2020 period: $5.6 billion for 2016 and a further $5.1 billion committed for 2017-2020. In addition, Multilateral Development Banks and donors announced around $40 billion loans of which elements are on concessional terms. • Total EU+MS pledge: over €3 billion for 2016, with €2.4 billion for 2016-2017 from Commission budget, doubling the total EU pledge made last year in Kuwait. In addition, EIB offered €12.5 billion • EU announced its readiness to start negotiating EU compacts, comprehensive aid and support packages which combine policy elements within EU competence (assistance, trade, mobility, etc.) in exchange of Jordan & Lebanon commitments on social and economic inclusion of Syrian refugees. • The EU and Jordan have adopted a Compact, that incorporates a simplified system for Rules of Origin, expected to foster investments in Jordan and exports towards EU markets, for all the companies employing Syrian refugees and located in Jordanian designated Special Economic Zones. • Although the official distribution of resources among the beneficiary countries was not disclosed, €1 billion was earmarked for Jordan and Lebanon together over 2016-17. DG NEAR has indicatively split the resources as follows (ENI bilateral allocation as info, not part of the LND pledge)

7/22 Page 55 of 162 JO & LEB JO JO share 2016 (GRI) HUMA 53 140 38% ENI 60 120 50% IcSP 20 39 51% EIDHR 1 1 100% Madad 94 130 72% Sub-Total 228 430 53% MFA (loan) 200 200 100% Total 428 630 68% AAPs Bilateral 80

JO & LEB JO JO share 2017 (GRI)

HUMA 55 140 39% ENI 95 190 50% IcSP 19 38 50% EIDHR 1 2 50% Total 170 370 46% AAPs Bilateral 80

JO & LEB JO JO share 2016-17 (GRI) HUMA 108 280 39% ENI 155 310 50% IcSP 39 77 51% EIDHR 2 3 67% Madad 94 130 72% Sub-Total 398 800 50% MFA (loan) 200 200 100% Total 598 1000 60% AAPs Bilateral 160 Total with 758 Bilateral

• In a nutshell, the EU will engage a minimum of €758 million in 2016 and 2017 for Jordan including: • A second Macro-Financial Assistance loan (EUR200 million) • EUR 118 million worth of activities in Jordan financed from the EU TF in response to the Syrian crisis (i.e. Madad), including EUR 20 million of Budget Support to the ministry of education, livelihood and WASH programmes. • EUR 108 million humanitarian assistance • EUR 160 minimum of bilateral assistance (mainly for Waste Management and democratic governance)

8/22 Page 56 of 162 Migration Partnership

In view of substantially stepping up the impact of our actions on the external dimension of the European Agenda on Migration, the Commission and the High Representative propose a new results-oriented concept of cooperation, the Partnership Framework. The aim is to deliver coherent EU engagement, in which the Union and its Member States act in a coordinated manner. The EU and its Member States should combine their respective instruments and tools to agree compacts with third countries in order to better manage migration. This means, for each partner country, the development of a mix of positive and negative incentives, the use of which should be governed by a clear understanding that the overall relationship between the EU and that country will be guided in particular by the ability and willingness of the country to cooperate on migration management. The full range of policies, financial instruments and EU's external relations instruments will need to be used. In this context, it is also important to increase efforts to implement the Valletta Action Plan as agreed in the Valletta Summit, including its financial aspects. To ensure that the EU and its Member States work in tandem, a coordination mechanism between the EU institutions and Member States must be set up. This means exploiting to the full, for the benefit of the EU and the relevant Member States, the special relationships that Member States may have with third countries.

It is proposed in the short term to complete the compacts with Jordan and Lebanon, to explore with Tunisia how best to take EU-Tunisia cooperation to the next level and to launch and agree compacts with Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Mali and Ethiopia; as well as to stand ready to support the Libyan Government of National Accord in its efforts to manage irregular migration flows, also by making efforts to foster regional cooperation with Libya's Southern neighbours and the Sahel. With the aim of supporting the delivery of the compacts, it is proposed to mobilise nearly EUR 8 billion within 2016 – 2020, in addition to the annual Member States and EU Official Development Aid.

In the long term, the EU should increase its efforts to address the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement and to build up the capacity of host communities. In the view of the Commission, an additional EUR 62 billion can be mobilised to address these challenges, provided that all the Member States and partners, including International Financial Institutions, demonstrate the same level of commitment as the Commission and that the European Parliament strongly supports these efforts. The goal of the Partnership Framework is to enable the EU to manage the greatest migration flows the world has seen since the Second World War. In doing so, it will address all aspects of this migration crisis, from its root causes to the daily tragedies that occur in the Mediterranean. These ambitions can only be reached through close and sustained cooperation between the EU and its Member States, in partnership with the countries of origin and transit of migrants.

Migration Partnership and Compacts with Lebanon and Jordan The EU is currently finalising with Jordan and Lebanon new Partnership Priorities following the European Neighbourhood Policy Review of 2015, with the aim of reaching agreement by summer 2016. The compacts with both countries will contain mutual commitments with respect to aiding the plight of both Syrian refugees and host communities and helping these host countries deal with the crisis. The compacts will set out comprehensive packages which combine different policy elements towards the same objective, both within EU competence

9/22 Page 57 of 162 (trade, mobility, energy, security, etc.) and within national competence. In the case of Lebanon, these consist of an upgrade of basic services (waste management, water, education and health), as well as increased economic opportunities in Lebanon for both the Syrian refugees and the most vulnerable Lebanese communities. In exchange, the Lebanese government should make efforts on the social and economic inclusion of Syrian refugees in order to improve their living conditions and legal residence status. In the case of Jordan, the compact will ease Rules of Origin for categories of goods for export produced in designated economic zones by a workforce including an agreed percentage of Syrian refugee labour, as proposed by Jordan. So far, the Commission has allocated EUR 639 million to the crisis response in Lebanon, including addressing basic needs, healthcare and shelter, and EUR 637 million in assistance Jordan. In addition to trade facilitation through the targeted relaxation of rules of origin the package proposed to Jordan, includes a EUR 180 million macro-financial assistance operation in 2015; a new macro-financial assistance loan of around EUR 200 million is under consideration.1

EU Regional Trust Fund in response to the Syrian crisis – the ‘Madad Fund’  The EU Regional Trust Fund in response to the Syrian crisis aims to bring a more coherent and integrated EU response to the crisis by merging various EU financial instruments and contributions from Member States into one single flexible and quick mechanism. The Trust Fund primarily addresses longer term resilience needs of Syrian refugees in neighbouring countries, as well as the hosting communities and their administrations – NOT humanitarian aid (carried out directly by ECHO).  In its 2nd board meeting of 1 December 2015, the Trust Fund adopted a €350 million package, focusing on support in the areas of education, support to livelihoods/local development, health, and water and sanitation. With recent pledges from 21 Member States (amounting to over €66 million) and contributions from various EU instruments, the Fund is now reaching a total volume of around €730 million, of which a total €427 million have been committed by operational boards held in May 2015, December 2015 and March/April 2016.  The 3rd board meeting of the Fund was planned on 22 March 2016 but it was cancelled due to the terrorist attacks in Brussels. The meeting would have taken place for the first time with Turkey as a member and Jordan and Lebanon as observers. IFI's were also invited as observers and for a brief discussion. A package of €15m to provide support to the influx of migrants and refugees in the Western Balkans was already adopted through written procedure by the operational board on 7 March 2016. An additional measure of €25 million for higher education and training for young Syrians in the region has been adopted through written procedure following an operational board held by VC on 11 April 2016. A first additional contribution from IPA for Turkey of €55 million has been decided by the Commission. For 2016, the Fund's mandate has been enlarged to include the Western Balkans and Iraqi IDPs.  While close to 50% of the funds committed have been already contracted and mostly disbursed, the management of the Fund is currently finalizing the project contracting for the remaining funds committed. Programmes for the remaining funding are currently being developed in close coordination with government counterparts in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan in immediate follow-up of the London conference and the proposed compacts.

1 From: COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN INVESTMENT BANK on establishing a new Partnership Framework with third countries under the European Agenda on Migration, Strasbourg, 7.6.2016 COM(2016) 385 final.

10/22 Page 58 of 162  Main implementing partners remain EUMS agencies, European NGOs and UN agencies.

11/22 Page 59 of 162 Overview table EU and MS’ contributions and pledges

EU and Member States' contributions and pledges to the EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis, the 'Madad Fund' Last updated on May 2th, 2016 Austria* 11,50 Belgium 3,00 Bulgaria 0,10 Croatia Cyprus Czech Republic* 5,00 Denmark* 10,00 Estonia* 0,25 Finland* 3,00 France* 3,00 * 5,00 Greece Hungary* 3,00 Ireland Italy** 5,00 Latvia* 0,05 Lithuania* 0,10 Luxembourg Malta* 0,02 Netherlands 5,00 Poland 3,00 Portugal* 0,20 Romania* 0,08 Slovakia* 3,00 Slovenia Spain Sweden* 3,00 United Kingdom 3,00 Total contributed & pledged from MS 66,30 Contribution from the EU budget 640,00 Total EU 706,30 Turkish co-financing for IPA I package 24,60 Total overall incl. Turkish co-financing 730,90 Target 1000,00 Shortfall 272,10 * Already paid in ** Already paid in €3 million and pledged €2 million for 2016

12/22 Page 60 of 162 Background Lebanon:

1) Humanitarian situation in Lebanon

Number of registered Syrian refugees in Lebanon: 1.048.275 million2

Palestine refugees from Syria: 42 000

Palestine refugees in Lebanon: 450 000

Iraqi refugees: 6 000

 Lebanon is the neighbouring country hardest hit by the Syria crisis, hosting an estimated number of more than 1.1 million Syrian refugees (including registered and non- registered). Since 2012, no country has taken in as many refugees in proportion to its population. It is more than a 25% increase in population. Despite the harsh consequences on Lebanon's social, economic but also political fabric, the country remained, until 2014, the only one in the region with an unrestricted border policy. However, since August 2014, fighting in the border town of Arsal between Lebanese security forces and fighters associated with the Islamic State and Al-Nusra Front prompted a rapid rise in the tensions between communities leading to increased hostility towards Syrian refugees, including restriction of movements, increased evictions, raids, and police searches in refugees’ settlements.

 Following the stringent Government’s restrictions on access to Lebanon introduced as of January 2015, combined with unaffordable fees and legal residency requirements, the daily life of refugees is in a downward spiral. Access to legal documentation, freedom of movement and inability to get livelihood opportunities are heavily impacting on the living conditions of Syrians in the country.

 Despite the number of registered Syrian refugees remaining relatively stable in 2015, and the unprecedented level of funding, socio-economic conditions of Syrian refugees in the country have been considerably worsening. An increasing number of refugees are being forced to become undocumented, which raises concerns over their ability to move and access services and exposes them to abuse and harassment. The lack of valid residency permits seriously undermines the effectiveness of the provided assistance. The reduction of movements, the increasing detentions, child labour, harassment and exploitation are de facto barriers to the free access to services and assistance. The proportion of Syrian refugees unable to meet their minimal survival expenditures ($2.9/day) has increased from 29% to 52% from 2014 to 2015. Furthermore, 89% of Syrian refugees are resorting to increasing debt levels to meet basic expenditure needs owing an average of $842 per household.

 The no-camp policy imposed by Government of Lebanon (GoL) since the beginning of the crisis resulted in the scattering of refugees all over the country. More than half of refugees have settled in the long neglected regions of Akkar and the Bekaa, prompting competition for the same scarce resources, such as jobs, houses and basic services. 251 localities are estimated to contain two thirds of poor Lebanese and 87% of Syrian refugees. 37 of these localities have a ratio of Syrians to Lebanese higher than 1 to 1. In these areas, “demand

2 Source UNHCR, official data of registered refugees, update 31/03/2016

13/22 Page 61 of 162 for electricity, water, waste collection, education and healthcare continues to far outstrip the capacity of systems and infrastructure that have already seen years or even decades of under-investment, unreliability and high costs” and thus increasing tension between refugees and host communities.

2) The EU humanitarian response

Since May 2012, the EU has worked to provide Lebanon with support in dealing with the consequences of the conflict in Syria. The European Commission, through the Directorate

14/22 Page 62 of 162 General of the European Commission for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO), has allocated

- €269.1 million between 2012 and 2015;

- €87 million for 2016 (30 M already contracted);

Since the beginning of the crisis, ECHO assistance has focused on the most vulnerable refugees addressing basic needs with a multi-purpose cash approach, secondary healthcare for lifesaving and shelter (including water and sanitation). Protection has always been a critical sector in terms of counselling and legal assistance and service to survivors of violence.

In 2015, with a global allocation of 97 million, the EU’s humanitarian aid reached around 665.000 people.

Education in Emergencies

The main issue for the education sector in Lebanon is not about more funds but about the governance capacity of the education system to make good use of such funds. The 2015 LCRP report revealed that the education sector has been so far the best funded sector, ending 2015 in a situation of overfunding ($18 million more than requested, while other sectors remained underfunded).

The division of labour between EU humanitarian and development funds has been clearly defined with the EU Delegation funding the formal education programmes while ECHO support some non-formal projects under Education in Emergencies. In 2015, DG ECHO funded €2.4 M of activities with 2 partners. The NRC action included continuation of non-formal education programme covering basic literacy and numeracy, recreational and hygiene promotion activities for out-of-school children enrolled in community centres, while the IRC project focused on skills training, information sessions and non-formal education for young girls.

For 2016, DG ECHO is concluding a new project with Concern Worldwide including a non- formal education component that is expected to reach 2375 children, 90 teachers and 500 parent community members. The amount allocated for this component will be 540.815 EUR.

Background Jordan:

Humanitarian situation in Jordan

Jordan is one of the most affected countries in the region, hosting 657.000 Syrian refugees (around 10% of its population). More than 77% are women and children. Approximately, 85% of the refugees live outside the camps.

15/22 Page 63 of 162 The conflict in Syria and Iraq is having an important impact on the country's socioeconomic conditions. The country's community resources, infrastructure and social services have been seriously overstretched and rising rents and competition for jobs have contributed to raising tensions between refugees and host populations.

In the last months, the Government of Jordan has started to open up livelihood opportunities for Syrian refugees in Jordan.

Since the beginning of the crisis the European Commission alone has allocated more than €637 million in assistance to refugees and vulnerable communities in Jordan, including more than €251 million from the humanitarian budget. including €53 million for 2016.

.

Refugees in Camps

The EU has heavily invested in Zaatari and Azraq camps in the last years both in terms of basic infrastructure and provision of basic services.

Azraq Camp has a capacity to host more than 100 000. The US, the EU Head of Delegation and some MS (UK, SE, NL, FR) have been vocal on the situation at the border with Syria asking the Government of Jordan to allow entrance in the country. During a meeting between His Majesty King Abdullah and President Obama in Washington DC on 24 February, the situation of asylum seekers stranded at the berm was discussed. Based on recommendations from UNHCR, a proposal was made that, in order to address Jordan’s security concerns, one village in Azraq camp could exceptionally be secured (fences, additional security patrols) for screening of the berm population, allowing for a large-scale movement from the border.

Education in Emergencies

In Jordan, ECHO is complementing NEAR's formal education activities with specific child protection programmes, supporting UNICEF and Save the Children child friendly spaces (with more than EUR 3 million) and recently supporting UNICEF cash for protection programme (with EUR 8.6 million).

In Jordan this year, ECHO will support an innovative programme with CARE: it is a back to school programme targeting children working in host communities. To sensitise families to

16/22 Page 64 of 162 send their children back to school they will receive conditional cash. Moreover, with the increasing number of children stranded at the Eastern border with Syria in appalling conditions, the EU is not only assisting them with food but also supporting UNICEF in the setup of child friendly spaces and distribution of education kits. More than 1,000 children have been identified to participate in child-friendly and/or educational activities.

Economic Developments in Jordan

Despite the difficult regional situation and the need to implement restrictive macroeconomic policies to overcome a challenging balance of payments situation, Jordan has so far managed to avoid a recession. Growth averaged 2.7% in the period 2011-2014, supported by the receipt of substantial financial assistance from foreign donors (notably from the IMF, the World Bank, EU, the US, Japan and the GCC countries). However, the intensification of the Syrian crisis in 2015, through its effects on trade, tourism and investor confidence, as well as the slowdown in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) economies, which are not only important trading partners for Jordan but also an important source of tourism, remittances and financial flows, contributed to a deceleration of growth to 2.4% from 3.1% in 2014. For 2016, real GDP growth is expected to recover to around 3% supported by low oil prices and some rebound in confidence related to the assistance packages announced by donors, including trade concessions by the EU. The deceleration of the economy resulted in a sizeable increase in unemployment. After declining from 12.6% in 2013 to 11.9% in 2014, the unemployment rate increased again to 12.9% in the first quarter of 2015 and to 13.6% in the fourth quarter of 2015. The unemployment rate reached 11.1% for men and 25.1 % for women.

Helped by sharp declines in food- and fuel-related prices, consumer prices fell by 0.9% in 2015 (with core inflation at about 2%, however, reflecting the demand from Syrian refugees). They are expected to recover to around 1.2% in 2016 as fuel prices stabilise. Despite lower oil prices, the primary government deficit, excluding grants and transfers to NEPCO, the national electricity company, and Water Authority of Jordan, is estimated to have increased to 5.2% of GDP in 2015 from 4.5% of GDP in 2014, reflecting short falls in sale tax. Including grants the primary government deficit is estimated at 3.4% of GDP in 2015. With NEPCO continuing to make steady progress toward reaching a zero operating balance, the combined deficit of the central government and NEPCO (excluding grants) reached 6.1% of GDP in 2015, down from 9.2% of GDP in 2014. Despite this remarkable reduction, the combined deficit was still well above the target of 3.5% programmed under the IMF Stand-By Arrangement. As a result, the overall fiscal balance (including grants) is estimated to have declined to around 5.3% of GDP in 2015 from 10.3% of GDP in 2014 reflecting lower oil prices and NEPCO's improved operating costs. Despite the successful fiscal consolidation of recent years, Jordan's fiscal position remains fragile. The country continues to be highly dependent on foreign grants to finance its fiscal (and its external) gap, which decreased to around 1.8% of GDP in 2015 from 4.9% of GDP in 2014. A factor contributing to the strain in public finances is the refugees-related cost. The total number of Syrians amounts to 1.3 million (or 20% of the Jordanian population) although only around 638.000 are registered. Reflecting substantial borrowing from foreign donors, as well as the issuance of international bonds with guarantees from the US, Jordan's gross public debt increased further to 93.4% % of GDP end the end of 2015, continuing an upward trend observed since 2008 when the ratio

17/22 Page 65 of 162 stood at 60.2% of GDP. The public debt's dynamics are, however, judged by the IMF to be sustainable provided that the country continues to deliver on further medium-term fiscal adjustment and to be supported by the international community. Credit ratings by Moody's and S&P remain at B1 and BB- respectively. However, S&P revised, in April 2016, its outlook on the long-term rating of Jordan to negative from stable reflecting the unsupportive regional environment and the country's high dependency on foreign grants. Regarding monetary policy, the Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ) reduced the rediscount (policy) rate from 4.25% in early 2015 to 3.75% in July 2015, l as inflation had turned negative while lending to the private sector (4.4%) remained subdued. This decision was also motivated by the comfortable level of international reserves and expectations of a narrowing current account deficit. Growing confidence in the Dinar contributed to a slight reduction of the dollarization ratio from 25.4 in February 2015 to 25.0 in February 2016. The current fixed exchange rate policy (peg to the USD) has continued to serve the economy well by helping anchor inflation expectations. The escalation of the conflicts in Syria and Iraq in 2015 weighed on exports, tourism and investor confidence. Exports decreased by 6.6% as a result of disrupted trade routes while income from tourism dropped by 7.1%, reflecting sizeable decrease in tourists' arrivals from 4.1 million in 2014 to 3.7 million in 2015. Workers remittances increased only marginally by 1.5% in 2015. Despite these unfavourable developments, the current account deficit (excluding grants) is estimated to have shrunk to 11.7% of GDP for 2015 compared to 12.1% in 2014, reflecting lower oil prices, which, together with the weakening of domestic demand, led to a sizeable drop of 11.5% in imports. Since it peaked at 20% of GDP in 2012, the current account deficit (excluding grants) has been consistently shrinking, reflecting, fiscal consolidation, the replacement of fuel imports with cheaper gas imports and, the decline in oil prices from the second half of 2014. The current account deficit (excluding grants) is expected to continue declining to around 9.4% of GDP in 2016 while in 2017 is expected to widen to around 10.4% as oil prices stabilise. Including grants, the current account deficit is estimated to have increased from 6.6% of GDP in 2014 to 8.8% of GDP in 2015, reflecting the above- mentioned marked decline in foreign grants. The decline in foreign direct investment, from USD 1.8 billion in 2014 to around USD 1.2 billion in 2015 created further pressures to the external position which remains vulnerable to a sharp rebound in oil prices and fall of external inflows, in particular, to due to the less favourable financial position of GCC donors. External pressures continued in the first two months of 2016 leading to a sizeable widening of the trade deficit by 16% compared to the same period in 2015. This was the result of a significant fall in exports by 9.8% combined by a 7.7% increase in imports. Remittances contracted by 4.4% in the first two months of 2016 year-on-year. On a more positive note, in February 2016, international reserves stood at a comfortable level of USD 13.8 billion, equivalent to around 7 months of next year's imports. Credit to the private sector continued to improve and banking sector indicators remained sound. As noted before, Jordan's gross public debt stood to around 93.4% % of GDP at the end of 2015. Jordan's external public debt stands at the moderate levels of 35% of the total public debt while Jordan's external private debt is estimated to 30.2% of GDP.

18/22 Page 66 of 162 During the International Donor Conference, which took place on 4 February in London, the international community decided to provide additional support of around USD 10 billion to countries affected by the refugee crisis (namely Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey). This amount included a EUR 2.4 billion pledge by the European Commission for all the above countries. Out of this pledge, a tentative amount or EUR 547 million in grants for the next three years and a tentative programme of Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA-II) of EUR 200 million in the form of loans, will be allocated to Jordan. These amounts will be made available in addition to the resources mentioned above and will form the basis of the Jordan Compact an analytical paper, currently under discussion between the Commission and the Jordanian authorities, which specifies the financial or structural support that EU can provide to Jordan, in addition to the regular bilateral support. The new MFA operation for Jordan is included in the Jordan Compact; it depends however, on two necessary pre-conditions, namely the existence of a disbursing IMF programme for Jordan and the existence of a significant external financing gap. On 3 March 2016, the Commission received from the Jordanian authorities a request for a new programme of Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA) for an amount of EUR 350 million. Consistent with the overall EC pledge of 2.4 EUR billion at the London conference of 4th February, the Commission is preparing a new programme of Macro-Financial Assistance to Jordan in the tentative amount of EUR 200 million in loans. As noted before, the existence of a disbursing IMF programme for Jordan is a pre-requisite for a new MFA operation to be disbursed. Jordan and the IMF are having discussions on a successor financial arrangement, which is expected to be put in place in the second semester of 2016.

Lebanon

Macroeconomic developments

The macroeconomic situation remains very vulnerable: the central bank’s synthetic indicator of economic activity showed an economy growing very slowly in 2015 (by 1.99%), indicating an unexpected low GDP growth (well below 2%) for the entire year of 2015. Moreover, despite the decline in oil prices, the fiscal and current account deficits remain very large. The fiscal deficit is estimated to have widened to 6-8% of GDP in 2015, reflecting mainly the increase of interest payments, and the public debt ratio is expected to stabilize around 132% of GDP, one of the highest in the world, before resuming an anticipated growth trend. In this respect, the IMF in its latest Debt Sustainability Analysis projected that the debt ratio will continue rising up to 143% of GDP until 2020. While there are considerable uncertainties about the reliability of the new current account figures, the new estimates show a current account deficit of 24.9% of GDP in 2014; 19-21% of GDP in 2015; and 18-20% of GDP in 2016. Although declining, this very large deficit, in a context of very low oil prices and a restrained domestic demand, suggests a serious underlying problem of competitiveness. Regarding inflation, a combination of lower energy prices, a stronger dollar, against which the is pegged, and a subdued domestic demand, have resulted in deflation (CPI inflation was -3.4% for the entire year of 2015).

Despite these macro-economic risks, the Lebanese economy continues to exhibit its proverbial resilience. This resilience is based on the strength of the Lebanese financial system, backed by the competent management of Lebanese Central Bank, the trust in the currency peg against the US dollar and by a large international reserve cushion (USD 40.5 billion, including gold, at

19/22 Page 67 of 162 the end of 2015). Moreover, Lebanon continues to attract massive foreign capitals inflows into the banking system. These foreign-held deposits allow banks to finance the government’s large deficits and refinance the huge public debt but they also contribute to high rates of financial dollarization (with foreign currency deposits accounting in October 2105 around 65% of total bank deposits).

In its last Economic Dialogue, the Commission underlined, once again, the increasing risks to the sustainability of this economic and financial model, warning that the additional deterioration of macroeconomic imbalances, the complete political paralysis and persistent regional instability could lead credit rating agencies and foreign investors to reassess the risks. It encouraged the authorities, even in their care-taker capacity, to move forward with both fiscal consolidation and key structural reforms.

Syrian conflict fiscal spill-overs

Based on a World Bank study of 2013, the direct fiscal impact of the crisis over 2012–14 would be at USD 2.6 billion (5.5% of GDP) for Lebanon. On the revenue side, spill-overs from the conflict were estimated to cut USD1.5 billion in revenue collection over 2012-14, due to a combination of direct impact on key sectors (e.g., tourism) and indirect impacts through weaker economic activity. On the expenditure side, total budgetary spending by the Government alone is estimated to grow by up to USD1.1 billion over 2012-2014 because of the Syrian conflict and the associated sharp increase in demand for and consumption of public services by refugees from Syria.

Additionally, restoring public-service provision to pre-crisis levels would require, according to this study, an additional USD 2.5 billion (5.4% of GDP). These costs would be divided between Human Development & Social Impact (USD 1.4 billion), including the increase in demand for health services (USD 431 million); education (USD 627 million); the difficult labour market conditions further exacerbated and were expected to result in further unemployment and informality (USD 166 million); and poverty and social safety nets (USD 176 million); and infrastructure (USD 1.1 billion), including the Increased electricity demand (USD 310 million); an additional estimated water demand and Sanitation (USD 340 million); the demand and utilization of solid waste management and municipal services (USD 193 million); and the rapid deterioration of the transport network (USD 246 million).

These results remain the most reliable assessment of the crisis’ fiscal cost for Lebanon. Based on rough estimations, the annual cost of the crisis would be (including restoration costs) USD 1.7 billion per year for Lebanon (or 3.1% of GDP for 2015).

Structural Reforms state of play

Progress with key structural reforms remains elusive, in a situation where the Council of Ministers and Parliament are rarely meeting and where important reform measures are blocked by sectarian tensions and disagreements. For one more year, since 2005, the country will be operating without a budget passed by parliament, and without having formally closed and audited the budgetary accounts going back to the early 1990s. This has also restricted the capacity of the donor community to provide financial assistance in the form of budgetary support. Other weaknesses in public finance management include the lack of a Single Treasury Account, the insufficient independence and effectiveness of the Cour de Comptes, the frequent accumulation of expenditure arrears and weakness in the system of local government finance. Some welcome tax reforms remain stuck in Parliament, while other tax reforms envisaged by the Ministry of Finance, such as the increase in VAT rates or measures to increase the taxation of capital gains and capital income, which would help make the tax

20/22 Page 68 of 162 system more progressive, are not even being adopted by the Government. And, despite the recommendation of the IMF and experts, the substantial scope for increasing fuel taxation remains unexploited.

Lebanon has yet to address the very critical situation in the power sector, which is not only a major contributor to the budget deficit (transfers to Electricité du Liban, the state-owned vertical monopoly, explain about one third of the deficit, end-September 2015) but is unable to supply more than 50-60% of the country’s peak demand. The Policy Paper for the Electricity Sector adopted in 2010 foresaw measures to increase power supply substantially. However, its implementation has suffered important delays, reflecting sectarian disagreements over the role of privatisation and an attempt by local authorities and political groups to maintain control over energy generation facilities. Not even the short-term (3-year) plan to strengthen power generation, which would in any case only reduce by half the gap between projected demand and supply, is being implemented. Meanwhile, regular power cuts and unequal access to private generators increase enterprises costs, harm the business climate and contribute to the unfairness of Lebanon’s economic model. Other unaddressed structural challenges include a deficient statistical system, the sustainability of the pension system, weaknesses in labour market regulations and the educational system and the need to diversify an economy that remains overly dependent on the real estate, banking and tourism sectors. Some of these reforms are also crucial for moving to a more socially inclusive growth model.

Macro-Financial Assistance

The instrument of Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA) can provide support to countries experiencing balance of payments difficulties and it could in theory be envisaged to make use of it to partly absorb the impact of the Syrian crisis on Lebanon. This assistance can take the form of medium/long term loans or grants or a combination of both. Its objective would be to strengthen Lebanon's macroeconomic and financial stability, while encouraging the implementation of appropriate structural reforms.

Previously, as part of the international support package agreed at the International Conference for Support to Lebanon (“Paris III”) in 2007, on 10 December 2007, the Council of the European Union decided to provide a Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA) to Lebanon comprising of EUR 50 million in loans and a grant of EUR 30 million. The MFA was tied to two successive IMF programmes. The experience with this MFA programme was mixed, with only the first tranche having been disbursed, reflecting the lack of implementation of the structural reforms agreed in our MoU.

As Lebanon is not under an active IMF programme, contrary to the case of Jordan, the use of this instrument is not currently envisaged. Moreover, Lebanon’s high level of public debt seriously constrains the use of financial assistance in the form of loans, limiting the use of this instrument preferentially on grants only; while its very poor Public Finance Management (PFM) performance, without a budget passed in Parliament since 2005 and has been unable to formally close its state accounts since 1993, discourages at all its use. Last but not least, Lebanon's current political stalemate also means that there would be no good prospects of implementation of the policy measures that would necessarily have to accompany a programme of MFA.

EIB

At the London conference, the EIB committed to USD 15.8 billion in loans in the coming years for the countries most affected by the Syrian refugee crisis, including Lebanon, signalling its intention to go even further by offering to lend an additional EUR 2 billion for Turkey, Lebanon,

21/22 Page 69 of 162 Jordan and Egypt alone over the course of the next five years. The EU supports the EIB's operations in the countries affected by the refugee crisis with a guarantee funded by the EU budget (the EIB External Lending Mandate). It also makes available grants from the blending facilities under EU external cooperation programmes, which enable the EIB, alongside other IFIs, to provide innovative types of support, such as high-impact financing and risk capital.

At the extraordinary European Council on the refugee crisis on 18/19 February, the EIB was mandated to put together, in cooperation with the Commission, a package of interventions to address the roots of the refugee crisis. Lebanon is expected to be a key beneficiary of these interventions. EIB is expected to present its proposals to the European Council on 17/18 of March.

Despite a challenging context, the Bank continues to seek to build a selective pipeline of projects in Lebanon. Against this background, the Bank has recently started discussions with the Lebanese authorities to identify possible areas of EIB intervention (in particular within the transport, water/wastewater, electricity and environment sectors).The financing through concessional financing of these medium-term economic development needs and key sectors is currently under consideration. It also continues supporting MSMEs in Lebanon through intermediated loans with local partner banks.

EBRD

Following Lebanon's request to become a member and a recipient country of the EBRD, the process was initiated with the approval of Lebanon's membership by the Board of Governors last December. However, Lebanon still has to pass the law enabling its EBRD membership to take effect. Discussions in the Lebanese Parliament are still underway and at this point it is hard to say what the timeframe will be. Formally, Lebanon has until the end of June to pass the law. This is, however, not a strict deadline, and an extension has already been granted by the EBRD (the original deadline was end of March). Until this law is passed, Lebanon's Country of Operation status cannot be put formally on the table of the EBRD's Boards of Directors and Governors. Initially, the EBRD was aiming for a decision by 6 April and to have it on the agenda of the Annual Meetings of 11-12 May, but approval by the Governors will have to come at a later stage, depending on Lebanon's progress with the membership law, through written procedure (30 days).

While the Bank’s potential activities in Lebanon have not yet been discussed by the EBRD Board of Directors, EBRD management’s draft country assessment proposes the following operational themes to guide the Bank’s engagement: Supporting private sector competitiveness by improving the enabling environment and by extending the range and maturities of financing instruments available; Promoting sustainable energy supply, fostering energy sector reforms and enhancing energy efficiency; and Enhancing quality and efficiency of public service delivery and supporting private-sector participation in public infrastructure.

In the context of the London conference, the EBRD delivered a pledge of USD 546, of which USD 109 in grants, for the countries most affected by the Syrian conflict and the resulted refugee's crisis. The EBRD's Country Assessment and Report for Lebanon foresees an annual average investment of EUR 100 million for the triennial 2017- 2019

22/22 Page 70 of 162 southern-neighbourhood/index_en.htm http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/neighbourhood/ http://ec.europa.eu/echo/ http://www.eeas.europa.eu development oftheentire region. living conditions, thuscontributing to the employment opportunitiesandimprove their be better educated, live healthierlives, access has allowed millionsofPalestine refugees to The partnership between the EUandUNRWA through themaleline. the 1948conflict. This includesdescendants home andmeansof livelihood asaresult of 1946 to 15May 1948,andwholostboth was Palestine of1June the period during Persons place whose normal of residence Who isaPalestine Refugee? unrwa brussels eu andunrwa:adynamicpartnership www.unrwa.org for palestine refugees inthe neareast relief andworks agency Page 71 of162 The United Nationsand Relief Works for Agency Palestine UNRWA at aGlance accordance withtheagreements. verification reviews to ensure theirfundsare beingusedin Board of Auditors regular anddonorssuchastheEUconduct Bank andLebanon. Moreover, UNRWA isaudited by theUN ofUNRWAregular inspections the installations inGaza, West CommitteeSanctions list of terrorists and terrorist entities and namesagainstUN1267 checks ofstaffandbeneficiary of staff, facilitiesandbeneficiaries. This includes six-monthly has rigorous processes andmechanismsto enforce neutrality Agency’s commitment to principles, UNhumanitarian UNRWA UN agency,As a neutral and in and line impartial with the contributions. themselves. Yet, UNRWA isfundedalmostentirely by voluntary through over 30,000staff, mostofwhomare Palestine refugees providedthose normally by governments and does so directly UNRWA to that isuniqueasitprovides are akin vitalservices three yearsevery by theUNGeneral Assembly. assistance. The UNRWA mandate hasbeenrepeatedly renewed infrastructure andimprovement, microfinance andemergency education, healthcare, relief camp andsocialservices, a justsolutionto theirplight. UNRWA encompass services to achieve theirfullpotential inhumandevelopment, pending refugees inJordan, Lebanon, Syria, West Strip BankandtheGaza registered Palestine refugees. missionisto helpPalestine Its assistance andprotection to apopulation ofsomefive million by theGeneral Assembly in1949andismandated to provide established intheNearEastisaUnitedRefugees Nations agency UNRWA Services and Human Development Goals Promoting Gender Equality Relief UNRWA is committed to promote Healthcare and Social Education gender equality as a strategy to Services advance development, peace and security for Palestine refugees. As Camp such, UNRWA: Infrastructure Microfinance • Places referral pathways for and Improvement victims of gender violence in all its facilities. Victims are provided with psychosocial support, legal aid, health Long and Decent Knowledge services, and vocational training. Healthy Standard and • Teaches in all its schools curricula Lives of Living Skills free of biases and gender stereotypes. • Invests in women’s economic Human Rights empowerment through its Enjoyed microfinance programme. to the Fullest • Partners with more than 60 local women centres, providing women with unique, socially-acceptable venues in which they can socialise and Since 2000, UNRWA has been teaching human rights, conflict resolution and tolerance participate in educational, cultural as part of the curriculum in all its schools, empowering Palestine refugee students to and recreational activities. enjoy and exercise their rights, uphold human rights values, be proud of their Palestinian identity, and contribute positively to their society and the global community.

UNRWA works closely with a wide range of partners in addition to its donors and host authorities. UNRWA cooperates with other UN agencies such as WHO, UNESCO, Protecting the Rights of WFP, UNHCR, UNICEF and UN-Habitat as well as with civil society organizations such as Diakonia, Save the Children and Handicap International. UNRWA also partners with Palestine Refugees the private sector, including the World Diabetes Foundation, LEGO, Mitsubishi and Real ‘Protection’ is what UNRWA does to Madrid. safeguard and advance the rights of Palestine refugees. In practice, this has Outlook four components: UNRWA is funded almost entirely (97 per cent) by voluntary contributions from UN Member States and the European Commission. Over the years, financial support has • Delivering services in a way that not kept pace with increased demand for services caused by growing numbers of respects and promotes beneficiaries’ registered refugees, expanding needs, deepening poverty and multiple emergencies in human rights and dignity. UNRWA fields of operation, including Syria, Lebanon and Gaza. • Protection-programming to provide integrated assistance for UNRWA is currently working in one of the most difficult environments since it began operations in 1950. The armed conflict in Syria, its ramifications in Lebanon and Jordan, protection cases. and the consequences of the Israeli occupation of Palestine and the illegal blockade • Monitoring and reporting of, and recurrent hostilities in, the Gaza Strip have made Palestine refugees even more alleged human rights violations and vulnerable and dependent on UNRWA support. advocating to duty bearers to prevent them from occurring and to seek Within this challenging context, UNRWA has taken several measures to strengthen its management capacity and provide more effective and efficient services to Palestine accountability. refugees by reforming its education, health and relief and social services. Donors have • Case tracking and referral of credited UNRWA for doing more with less, acknowledging however that with 85 per detected protection cases, especially cent expenditures used to cover local salaries of frontline staff (teachers, nurses, doctors, violence and abuse of women, social workers) efficiency is reaching a limit. UNRWA also actively reaches out to new children and other vulnerable groups. donors, in particular emerging markets, Arab countries and private donors.

united nations relief and works agency for palestine refugees in the near east

www.unrwa.org Page 72 of 162 EU-UNRWA Partnership €660 million EU contribution to the regular UNRWA budget* €128 57% million of the regular UNRWA EU contribution to budget provided UNRWA humanitarian by the EU and its emergency appeals* Member States*

*2007-2013 numbers

Since 1971, the EU and UNRWA have maintained a strategic Through multi-annual Joint Declarations, the EU has provided partnership governed by the mutual objective to promote increased, reliable and predictable support to the regular stability in the Near East, facilitate the quest for peace and UNRWA budget covering the Agency’s crucial core activities. support the human development, humanitarian and protection In addition, the EU has generously contributed to UNRWA needs of Palestine refugees. Whilst UNRWA has no political humanitarian emergency appeals in response to various mandate to provide solutions to the still unresolved refugee crises across the region, including in Syria, Lebanon and in the situation, the EU recognises the vital contribution UNRWA occupied Palestinian territory, and supported ad hoc projects plays in maintaining security, stability and development in such as the construction of new shelters, schools and clinics the region. UNRWA is considered a crucial component of EU where there has been an absolute need to do so. support for Middle East peace, providing political space for the efforts to conclude a peace deal. In the course of four decades, In June 2014, the EU and UNRWA signed a Joint Declaration for this partnership has evolved with the EU becoming not only 2014-2016 that foresees a core EU contribution during these the Agency’s largest multilateral donor, but a key political ally years of some EUR 246 million, depending on funds available in committed to supporting UNRWA in the absence of a just and the annual EU budget. durable solution to the plight of Palestine refugees

united nations relief and works agency for palestine refugees in the near east

www.unrwa.org Page 73 of 162 eu and unrwa UNRWA Achievements with EU Support

• UNRWA runs the first UN television channel in the Middle East broadcasting educational programmes aimed at conflict-affected Palestine refugee children. It is watched by millions in the . • UNRWA is considered a pioneer in public service delivery and its education and health reforms serve as models for other public services in the region. • UNRWA operates one of the largest school systems in the Middle East, teaching nearly half a million children in more than 600 schools. UNRWA students are among the most highly educated in the Near East. Since the 1960s, girls have made up around half of UNRWA students. • With more than 30,000 staff, UNRWA is the largest UN operation in the Near East and a major employer in the region. • Nearly 83,000 Palestine refugee men and women have graduated from nine UNRWA vocational training centres and education science faculties, contributing to social stability and economic development in the region. • Employment rates among UNRWA technical and vocational training graduates remain high with 80 per cent of the 2012 graduates finding a job within a year. In 2013, nearly 45 per cent of the students were females. • The UNRWA microfinance programme has granted more than EUR 280 million worth of loans, creating thousands of jobs for refugees as well as host country citizens; 38 per cent of the clients are women.

“The EU remains a steadfast partner for Palestine refugees amid the uncertainty of the Middle East right now, and this three-year agreement offers much needed predictability. Allow me to add that this contribution is important because there is an increasing recognition among European Pierre Krähenbühl, audiences that international assistance to Palestine refugees is being UNRWA accompanied by the promotion of rights, not just to high standards of Commissioner-General, human development, but also to a just and lasting resolution of their plight.” 4 June 2014

united nations relief and works agency for palestine refugees in the near east

www.unrwa.org Page 74 of 162 Asi Fields of operation

Jordan SYRIA 1,307,014 Lebanon 2,154,486 Syria 914,192 West Bank Gaza Strip 569,645 483,375 LEBANON

Total: 5,428,712

Litani

Hasbani

MEDITERRANEAN SEA

GOLAN

LAKE

ISRAEL

Jordan

WEST BANK

JORDAN

GAZA STRIP DEAD SEA

*All figures as of January 2014 Page 75 of 162 EU Support to UNRWA on the Ground

Providing Crucial Education, Health, Relief and Social Services in the five UNRWA fields of operation On a daily basis, half a million children receive education in more than 600 UNRWA schools; 7,000 students, 40 per cent of whom are women, attend the nine UNRWA vocational and educational training centres in the region and nearly 38,000 patients are treated in 138 UNRWA primary health clinics. Almost 300,000 poor Palestine refugees receive basic food commodities along with modest supplemental cash assistance.

Lebanon Rehabilitating Camps In consultation with local refugee communities, UNRWA improves the living conditions of Palestine refugees living in the 12 refugee camps in Lebanon. UNRWA rehabilitates shelters, upgrades sewerage, drainage, and water supply systems and rehabilitates UNRWA facilities. In the Nahr el Bared refugee camp destroyed in 2007, 5,223 houses have been rebuilt so far.

Strengthening the Employability of Youth UNRWA technical and vocational education training centres and the university scholarship fund offer hundreds of young refugees the opportunities to escape poverty by improving their skills and employment prospects in the local and regional markets.

West Bank Protecting Palestine Refugees UNRWA provides emergency cash assistance to Palestine refugees who are the victims of administrative home demolitions or incursions leading to damaged property. In 2013 alone, 376 families or 2,172 individuals received cash assistance, while 857 cases were referred to specialised services. As an integral part of UNRWA operations, staff members systematically report and document protection incidents and monitor rights violations affecting refugees.

united nations relief and works agency for palestine refugees in the near east

www.unrwa.org Page 76 of 162 Gaza Strip Creating Jobs The UNRWA Job Creation Programme provides temporary job opportunities in the private and public sector to vulnerable Palestine refugees, alleviating the impact of high poverty and unemployment levels. The programme injects cash into the local economy and supports the private sector through additional human resources, which complements other EU-funded interventions in these sectors.

Providing Emergency Food Assistance UNRWA provides quarterly emergency food assistance to the most vulnerable Palestine refugees in the Gaza strip. Around 830,000 Palestine refugees receive food assistance in Gaza. Syria Providing Emergency Education Palestine refugee children in Syria have been severely affected by the crisis. To ensure continued access to education and mitigate the impact of the conflict, UNRWA has developed a holistic education in emergency response. Multi-media self-learning material – including booklets, lessons on UNRWA TV and YouTube and computer-based interactive programmes – have been developed to enable children’s continued learning, whether or not they are in school. UNRWA also provides psychological support and recreational activities.

Engaging Youth Through its training and ‘Engaging Youth’ centres, UNRWA offers Palestine refugees as well as Iraqi refugees and Syrians opportunities to strengthen their employability and improve their standard of living. Among the services provided are career counselling, vocational courses, entrepreneurship training and continuing learning opportunities. The UNRWA Youth Initiative Fund also empowers young people to play an active role in the social and civic life of their community.

Jordan Improving Living Conditions UNRWA is improving the living conditions of Palestine refugees living in Jerash camp, by rehabilitating and rebuilding the shelters of 80 of the most vulnerable refugee families and developing an environmentally friendly urban plan, including rain water harvesting systems and solar panels.

united nations relief and works agency for palestine refugees in the near east

www.unrwa.org

UNRWA is a United Nations agency established by the General Assembly in 1949 and is mandated to provide assistance and protection to a population of some 5.1 million registered Palestine refugees. Its mission is to help Palestine refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, West Bank and the Gaza Strip to achieve their full potential in human development, pending a just solution to their plight. UNRWA’s services encompass education, health care, relief and social services, camp infrastructure and improvement, microfinance and emergency assistance. UNRWA is funded almost entirely by voluntary contributions.

unrwa representative office to the european union| t +32 2 290 34 30 | [email protected] Page 77 of 162 Page 78 of 162 LEBANON

5. EU Support to Lebanon - Factsheet ......

6. Lebanon ECHO Operations ......

7. Protection briefing confidential - Palestinian refugees in Lebanon ......

8. Palestinian refugees from Syria in Lebanon - Factsheet ......

9. Lebanon: Syria Crisis - ECHO Factsheet......

Page 79 of 162 Page 80 of 162 MANAGING THE REFUGEE CRISIS

EU SUPPORT TO LEBANON

Lebanon is the neighbouring country most affected by the Syrian crisis. The EU pays tribute to the outstanding efforts the country is making since the outset of the Syrian refugee crisis. The EU remains deeply committed to assisting Lebanon in dealing with the crisis. Overall, the EU is the leading donor in the international response to the Syrian crisis, with over €6.1 billion from the EU and Member States collectively mobilized in humanitarian and development assistance. This support goes both to Syrians in their country, and to refugees and their host communities in neighbouring Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Turkey and Egypt.

At the London conference on “Supporting Syria and the region” at the beginning of February 2016, the EU pledged €1 billion for Lebanon and Jordan for the years 2016 and 2017. Lebanon is expected to receive significant additional support in tackling the refugee crisis.

Lebanon hosts more than one million Syrian refugees, which represents 25% of the country’s population, which is the highest per-capita concentration of refugees worldwide. Within a short period of time, the EU was able to mobilise a 200% increase of funding for Lebanon in order to address the country’s significant needs resulting from the refugee crisis.

Overall, the European Commission has allocated more than €769 million in assistance to refugees and vulnerable communities in Lebanon since the beginning of the crisis. This includes: • €356.1 million from the humanitarian budget, including €87 million for 2016 • close to €250 million from the European Neighbourhood Instrument • more than €30 million from the Instrument contributing to Peace and Stability to address longer term resilience needs of affected civilians, both refugees and Lebanese host communities. SYRIA adopted by the Boards of LEBANON • close to €130 million the Madad Regional Trust Fund to address longer- JORDAN term resilience needs of Syrian refugees and support Lebanese host communities and the national administration with a focus on increasing access for refugees to education and training, as well as livelihoods and health.

This support comes on top of the over €219 million in regular programmed bilateral cooperation for Lebanon under the European Neighbourhood Policy bringing overall support to €988 million. The main portion of non-humanitarian funding is allocated to the education sector, but also towards health, livelihoods and local infrastructures.

Page 81 of 162 Updated: 7. June 2016 THE OBJECTIVES OF THE EU RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS • Protect and assist Syrian and Palestinian refugees • Mitigate the impact of the Syrian crisis on Lebanon, targeting the medium and long term needs of both refugees and Lebanese vulnerable people • Reinforce the policy dialogue with the Government of Lebanon and the capacities of existing Lebanese institutions and systems in dealing with the crisis, at national and local levels • Contribute to the increased financial needs for the provision of basic services, such as free public education, primary and secondary health care, child protection systems and psycho-social support, and access to water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) • Support the most vulnerable municipalities in improving infrastructure, economic recovery, and conflict mitigation • Discussions are underway with the Lebanese authorities to agree on a “Compact” consisting of mutual commitments designed to help the country deal with the burden of the massive influx of Syrian refugees

HUMANITARIAN AID TO LEBANON healthcare for lifesaving cases, non-formal education and shelter-including water, hygiene and sanitation- to Since 2012, the European Commission has provided improve the living conditions of the vulnerable families €356.1 million in humanitarian aid to funding to mostly affected by the displacement. Protection remains Lebanon, focusing on the most vulnerable refugees. This a fundamental sector where partners conduct regular includes the €87 million recently announced for 2016. monitoring of the main protection concerns and provide awareness, counselling and legal assistance to the refugee EU humanitarian funding has contributed to cash population. In 2016 the EU’s humanitarian aid to Lebanon assistance for most vulnerable refugees, secondary reached around 665.000 Syrian refugees.

Number of registered Syrian refugees in Number of Palestinian refugees from Syria: Lebanon: 42 000 1 048 275* SYRIA Number of Iraqi refugees in Lebanon: Number of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon: 6 000 260 000 - 280 000 LEBANON

PREVENTING A LOST GENERATION OF SYRIAN CHILDREN AND YOUTH Since the start of the Syrian refugee crisis, the EU According to UNHCR, close to 417.000 Syrian refugee has committed €168 million for education and children in Lebanon are aged between 3 and 14 years old. child protection purposes. These funds are spent on While exact numbers are not available, it is estimated that formal and non-formal education, including assisting nearly half of Syrian refugee children do not have access refugee students to achieve expected competencies to any form of education, exposing them to physical and/ in core academic skills through ‘Accelerated Learning or psychological violence, child labour and exploitation, Programmes’. early marriage, and recruitment by armed groups. At the London conference, the participants committed that In particular, since 2012 EU funds, channelled largely by the end of the 2016/2017 school year, all refugee through the EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the children and vulnerable children in host communities will Syrian Crisis (Madad Fund) to UNICEF and UNHCR are be in quality education with equal access for girls and paying enrolment fees for 210,644 Syrian refugee children boys. (6-14 age group).

Page 82 of 162 *Sources: UNHCR, UNRWA, IOM DELIVERY OF AID Since 2015, an increasing part of non-humanitarian aid for Syria’s neighbouring countries to cope with the refugee crisis is channelled through the EU Regional Trust Fund in response to the Syrian crisis, the ‘Madad Fund’. The Trust Fund aims to bring a more coherent and integrated EU response to the crisis by merging various EU financial instruments and contributions from Member States and other international donors into one single flexible and quick mechanism. The Trust Fund primarily addresses longer term resilience needs of Syrian refugees in neighbouring countries such as Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and Iraq, as well as the hosting communities and their administration. In the future, the Trust Fund may start financing resilience activities inside Syria and could become a funding tool for reconstruction, resettlement and governance support following a political settlement of the crisis. With recent pledges from 20 Member States - amounting to over €63 million - and contributions from various EU instruments, the Fund is now reaching a total volume of more than €700 million. Additional funds will be committed in 2016 and beyond.

The Operational Board of the Trust Fund has already approved actions for a total amount €428 million including €130 million support to Lebanon, with a focus on increasing access for refugees to education and training, as well as livelihoods and health.

Page 83 of 162 Page 84 of 162 MaliLEBANON ECHO ECHO2014 OPERATIONSactivities

Organisations NORTH AKKAR

ACTED Tripoli, Qobbeh, Wadi Khaled, Minie, Deir Aammar, Bebnine, Biret CONCERN Bakhaaoun, Akkar, Berkayel, Halba, Tall CROIX-ROUGE , Qalamoun, Bqaa Sefrine, Enfe, Meaayan Tall Kiri, Khirbet Daoud DRC Kousba, , Bhannine, Minieh- Aakkar, Qaabrine, GVC Dennieh, , Aakkar El-Aatiqa, Meryata, Palestinian Qoubber Chamra, HI Camps (Nahr al- Rahbe IRC Bared & Beddawi)

MEDAIR COUNTRY WIDE NRC

OXFAM Matn, Qobayyat, PUI Baabda SI BEKAA & BAALBEK-HERMEL

STC Zahle, Baalbek, West Bekaa, Deir el TDH BEIRUT Ahmar, Shlifa, Housh barada, UNHCR Housh Tal Safieh, Beirut Hourtaala, Sector Rachayya, Hermel, Qaa, Deir Mar Basic Assistance Maroun Baalbek, Ras Baalbek, Fakhe, Health Zabboud, Nabi Othman, Aain Protection Baalbek, Bajjaje, Shelter Aarsal, Barr Elias

WASH

Coordination

SOUTH

Saida, , Palestinian camps Nabatieh (Saida & Tyre)

Page 85 of 162 Page 86 of 162 Confidential - Not for circulation or attribution

Informal Note on priority protection issues for Palestine Refugees in Lebanon May 2016 Introduction

In the context of the upcoming meetings of the EU-Lebanon Subcommittee on Human Rights, Democracy and Governance and the Subcommittee on Social Affairs and Migration in May 2016, this informal note provides background information for EU officials attending these meetings on protection issues in Lebanon related to: a) Palestine refugees in Lebanon (PRL), b) Non-ID Palestinians in Lebanon and c) Palestine refugees from Syria who fled to Lebanon (PRS). Several elements of the current EU-Lebanon Action Plan for 2013-2015 refer to the protection issues faced by Palestine refugees in Lebanon and have been extracted in the bellow box, for ease of reference:

Priority: “Human rights and protection of vulnerable populations, including Palestinian refugees, by legislation and other adequate measures and targeted actions. Benchmarks: - “Improvement of the status, humanitarian and social rights and living conditions of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, including through projects with the engagement of the Lebanese government, institutional framework for governance of Palestinian camps and interlocution mechanisms with UNRWA and Lebanese authorities”. - “Broadening of employment opportunities for Palestinian refugees as well as health and education standards”. - “Improvement of the status and living conditions of vulnerable populations, including refugees, “displaced persons”, asylums seekers, stateless persons, domestic workers, migrant workers, disabled, each according to their specific status; commitment to the principle of non-refoulement, of refugees and asylum seekers according to the UN Convention Against Torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, and according to international custom; and monitoring of the implementation of non-refoulement”.

UNRWA is mandated by the UN General Assembly to provide assistance and protection to Palestine refugees. As part of its protection work, the Agency compiles information regarding protection concerns, intervenes with relevant authorities to ensure that the rights of Palestine refugees are respected, protected and promoted, and cooperates with relevant human rights mechanisms, including UN special procedures and treaty bodiesi. This informal note has been developed based on information collected and assessed by UNRWA from Palestine refugees in Lebanon. It contains UNRWA’s key messages as well as background information on each of the following areas of concern:

- The limitations faced by Palestine refugees from Lebanon to access the national labor market and to secure a livelihood. - The prohibition faced by Palestine refugees in Lebanon to acquire, transfer or inherit properties in Lebanon and the negative consequences this has on their security of tenure and housing conditions. - The humanitarian consequences of the lack of valid legal status and documents for “non-ID” Palestinians in Lebanon. - The restricted access of Palestine refugees from Syria to the Lebanese territory. - The lack of legal status and difficulties to maintain valid legal residency in Lebanon; and the resulting humanitarian consequences of it, in particular in proceeding with civil registration services, access to services and risks of detention and limited freedom of movement.

1

Page 87 of 162 Confidential - Not for circulation or attribution

General context

Since 2011, Lebanon has been under remarkable pressure, facing the consequences of the Syrian crisis on its economy, social fabric and stability. It is currently hosting a considerable number of refugees that have been displaced by the conflict, including Palestine Refugees from Syria (40,739 recorded as of May 2016). This has complicated further the situation of Palestine refugees in Lebanon (PRL; 504,376 registered as of December 2015) who have been in the country since 1948. Nonetheless, Palestine refugees face substantial challenges to the full enjoyment of their human rights and are confronted with serious protection risks in their daily lives. They are marginalized and have limited access to state- provided services such as health, education, social services and the judicial system. Palestine refugees are highly dependent on UNRWA and other organizations working in the camps or within the Palestinian community. UNRWA provides primary, secondary and vocational education; primary health care services and coverage of part of the costs for secondary and tertiary health care services in contracted hospitals; as well as relief and social services to the most vulnerable Palestine refugees based on specific eligibility and vulnerability criteria. The Agency also works to repair and improve shelters, organize waste collection and water distribution in order to address the substandard living conditions in the 12 Palestine refugee camps. In the absence of Lebanese government presence in almost all of the camps in the country, Palestinian political and armed factions exert some form of control. However, no single recognized authority exercises responsibility, including in respect of law enforcement in the camps, and the Palestinians living there rely heavily on factions for protection; while those residing outside the camps rely on Lebanese security forces for security, and protection. This has created an insecure environment in the camps, with recurrent physical threats, sporadic fighting among non-state armed actors (such as the clashes in Ein El Hillweh refugee camp in August 2015), risk of arbitrary arrest and extremely limited access to safety and justice.

The Government of Lebanon’s policy of restricted access to the country for PRS fleeing the armed conflict in Syria has led to denial of entry for hundreds of PRS, while those already in Lebanon are exposed to the consequences of a protracted displacement which has resulted in a series of challenges to their well-being and protection. Many have difficulties in maintaining a valid legal status and accessing civil registration processes Lebanon; while most are extremely reliant on aid as a consequence of their difficulties to secure viable sources of livelihood. Unpredictability in aid agencies’ budgets also add to the instable situation of PRS. Due to financial difficulties, UNRWA for instance was compelled to suspend its $100 allowance per PRS household per month between July 2015 and April 2016. PRS financial instability augments associated protection risks, such as exploitation, vulnerability to abuse and negative coping mechanisms to try to meet their most basic needs, including reduce food consumption, debt, child labor or child marriage; while others are turning to smuggling networks to reach third countries and in particular Europe. The arrival of PRS also poses additional challenges to the existing ‘host community’ of PRL, placing already limited resources, infrastructure and services under additional strain, in particular in refugee camps. It is understood that more PRL are leaving the country (many do so illegally due to the limitations they face in applying for visas to third countries) because of the increased pressure they face as a result of the Syrian crisis as well as the hope of better perspectives abroad. Such situations of overcrowding, high level of poverty, lack of opportunities, widespread abuse and discrimination, absence of clear authorities in charge of security and law enforcement and limited availability of specialized service providers are particularly hazardous for Palestine refugees with added vulnerabilities, such as children, youth, people with disabilities, LGBT persons or women at risk of gender based violence (GBV). Cases GBV, child protection, children recruitment by armed groups, domestic violence and corporal punishment are regularly reported among the Palestinian community in Lebanon. However, access to specialized service providers is scarce, especially within camps; and

2

Page 88 of 162 Confidential - Not for circulation or attribution compounded by poor awareness of service availability, safety concerns, stigma and lack of confidentially in camps. Finally, accessing services outside the camps is challenging due to limited awareness, the strain on available services in the country as well as limitations on movements in and out of some of the camps. 1. Palestine Refugees from Lebanon (PRL) a) The limitations to access the Lebanese labor market and to secure a livelihoodii

Main messages

 UNRWA is concerned about the limitations faced by Palestine refugees in Lebanon in accessing the labor market and the difficulties to secure their livelihood.  UNRWA advocates for concrete steps to ensure fair access to the employment market for Palestine refugees and eventually the removal of all requirements specific to them. In particular, UNRWA calls for the following elements: - Simplification and clarification of the administrative process to obtain work permits, through the following measures: extension of the now annual work permit validity to 3 years; removal of the requirement for a notarized employment contract in line with the conditions applied to Lebanese nationals; and delinking of the issuance of a work permit from the employer, thereby allowing a work permit to be issued without any specified employer included in the application. - Access to full benefits from the National Social Security Fund [NSSF] awarded to Palestine refugees contributing to the fund; or a reduced contribution to the NSSF in line with the lower level of benefits they are currently entitled to receive. - Wider communication on the employability of Palestinians in all sectors of the economy; as well as on the principle of non-discrimination in hiring and employment, and in particular the conditions and processes that apply to them and their employers. - Stronger collaboration of the Lebanese authorities with the professional syndicates and independent professions to allow Palestine refugees to work in these professions, through the exemption of the nationality and/or reciprocity conditions in professional by laws. - Facilitated access of PRL to advanced education services [i.e. services not provided/covered by UNRWA] through special programs [scholarships, reduced fees, quotas, etc.].

Key Facts and Concerns

 Changes to the Lebanese law in 2005 and 2010 have improved PRL’s right to access formal employment and related social protection mechanisms, giving them the right to practice a number of professions in the private sector and partial access to the National Social Security Fund (NSSF)iii. However, they are still required to obtain an annual work permit which is dependent on the will of their employer and is a lengthy administrative process. In addition, syndicated liberal professions have not been required to amend their bylaws since the changes introduced to the law, and as a result, PRL are prevented from employment in at least 36 professions [including general medicine, dentistry, physiotherapy, engineering, public accountant, veterinary medicine, legal professions, etc.].  Palestine refugees consistently report discrimination in employment mostly due to bureaucracy and stigma. They face informal restrictions on the types of jobs and industries they can be hired for, as well as differential treatment at the workplace. Lack of written contracts and employment benefits as well insecure job tenure contribute to unstable working conditions. Palestine refugees also report not being able to access better paid and/or higher ranking positions, and are often paid less than their Lebanese counterparts for the same work. 3

Page 89 of 162 Confidential - Not for circulation or attribution  Most Palestine refugees in Lebanon work in menial, low-paid jobs in the informal sector. Indeed, the number of Palestine refugees holding a work permit is very low; (only 6% according to the 2015 American University of Beirut and UNRWA Socioeconomic survey) and, according to the same survey, PRL are highly marginalized, with more than two-thirds considered poor or extremely pooriv.  According to the International Labour Organization (ILO), only half of Palestinian secondary school age children (16 to 18) are enrolled in schools or vocation training centers, generally in UNRWA institutions. It is reported that some children quit school out of despair over future professional prospects, and in particular the perceived questionable value to continue studying, due to the limited access to some of the most profitable professions. b) The prohibition to acquire, transfer or inherit properties and the negative consequences it has on security of tenure and housing conditionsv

Main messages

 UNRWA is concerned about the prohibition faced by Palestine refugees to acquire, transfer or inherit property in the country and the consequences it has on their security of tenure and housing conditions.  UNRWA calls for the elimination of discriminatory practices against Palestine refugees regarding their right to property ownership and inheritance and for the protection of their security of tenure.  UNRWA is concerned with the substandard living conditions in Palestine refugee camps, in particular the poor quality of construction, infrastructures and overcrowding.  UNRWA calls for an ease to the restrictions enforced by the Lebanese authorities on the movement of building materials into Palestine refugee camps, which contributes to the limitations faced by PRL to improve their housing conditions.

Key Facts and Concerns

 More than 60% of PRL reside in the 12 official Palestine refugee camps of Lebanon, which are overcrowded and which severely impacts their standard of living (in particular for sewage, water and electricity services). For example, in Ein El Hillweh camp, it is estimated that between 50,000 and 80,000 people reside in 1 square kilometer.  The Lebanese authorities place restrictions on the movement of building materials in and out of the Palestine refugee camps, which severely limits the ability of PRL to ensure a decent quality of shelter in already extremely congested and unhealthy environments.  For Palestine refugees residing outside camps, while they were entitled to property ownership prior to 2001, due to a change in the law, they are now prevented from legally acquiring, transferring or inheriting property in Lebanon [Law 296/2001]. This has affected security of tenure as many have been forced to take informal rental arrangements and deprives refugees from benefits of property ownership.  As a result, housing opportunities for Palestine refugees are limited to (1) Palestine refugee camps, where living conditions are substandard, tenure is informal and overall security is tenuous; (2) renting a residence outside of camps and being faced to the particularly high rents of the Lebanese market; or (3) relying on semi-legal, informal and unprotected agreements with Lebanese associates who buy property on their behalf outside of camps.

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Page 90 of 162 Confidential - Not for circulation or attribution c) The potential consequences of entry and exit controls of Palestinian refugee camps by the Lebanese authorities, which may lead to difficulties to access essential services such as health and education

Main messages

 UNRWA is concerned about the potential humanitarian consequences of entry and exit controls in Palestinian refugee camps which can inhibit freedom of movement and result in limited access to essential services such as health or education, in particular during periods of heightened security.

Key Facts and Concerns

 Many Palestine refugee camps face entry and exit controls that are prone to be tightened, in particular during periods of heightened security measures, and which result in restrictions on movement in and out of camps. These restrictions on movement limit access to employment and essential services and can also expose Palestine refugees to increased risk of arrest and detention.

2. The humanitarian consequences of the lack of valid legal status for “non-ID” Palestinians in Lebanonvi

Main messages

 UNRWA is concerned about the humanitarian consequences of the lack of valid legal status for non-ID Palestinians residing in Lebanon, and in particular the situation of children of non-ID Palestinians, who will not be registered with authorities at birth.  UNRWA advocates for the Lebanese government to allow “Non-IDs Palestinians” to regularize their legal situation in the country through the following measures: - Acceptation and recognition of the Special Identity Card [SIC], delivered by the General Security Office [GSO] of the Ministry of Interior, as a sufficient proof of identity by other Lebanese administrations and offices, in particular the armed forces [to facilitate freedom of movement within Lebanon] and civil registration authorities [to allow birth and marriage registration]. - Extension of the validity of the SIC to three years [from one year, currently] and possibility to apply for renewal of the SIC without having to entirely re-apply.

Key Facts and Concerns

 There are up to an estimated 5,000 “Non-ID” Palestinians living in Lebanon. They are Palestinians who started to arrive in Lebanon in the 1960s and do not hold formal valid identification documents. As a result, they are not recognized by the Government of Lebanon as they do not have valid legal status in the country and are not registered as Palestine refugees with UNRWA in Lebanon. Children born to “non-ID” Palestinian fathers don’t receive any identity documents from the Lebanese government, thus becoming “non-IDs” themselves.  UNRWA Lebanon has extended a number of its services to Non-ID Palestinians, with up to 4.000 recorded as benefiting services.  Without formal valid civil documentation and legal status in Lebanon, “Non-ID” Palestinians face severe restrictions on their right to freedom of movement inside Lebanon. They also risk arrest or detention and face severe obstacles 5

Page 91 of 162 Confidential - Not for circulation or attribution to properly complete civil registration procedures which have acute humanitarian consequences, in particular regarding limited access to services.  The GSO has intermittently issued temporary identity cards to “non-ID” Palestinians since 2008. However, these Special Identification Cards (SICs) only serve as proof of identity and the holder cannot register vital events such as births, deaths, marriages and divorces, nor be recognized as a Palestine refugee by the Lebanese authorities. Furthermore, it appears that not all members of the Lebanese Internal Security Forces (ISF) are familiar with SICs, which can be problematic at checkpoints and thus hinder freedom of movement.

3. Palestine Refugees from Syria (PRS) in Lebanon

a) The restricted access to the Lebanese Territoryvii

Main messages

 UNRWA acknowledges that Lebanon is hosting a considerable caseload of refugees that have been displaced from Syria and calls for increased levels of international assistance to address the current refugee crisis.  UNRWA is alarmed about the restrictions faced by PRS to be admitted in Lebanon and the impossibility for them to be considered as "humanitarian cases" at the border and provided safety in the country.  UNRWA urges the Lebanese authorities to uphold the principle of non-refoulement, provide protection to all people fleeing the violence in Syria and equal treatment of all "humanitarian cases" at border, including PRS, in accordance with international standards.

Key Facts and Concerns

 At the onset of the conflict in 2011, Palestine refugees from Syria were initially granted facilitated access to Lebanon. However, since August 2013 most measures that previously had enabled PRS to enter Lebanon were removed and individuals were screened for entry at the border. The restrictions resulted in the denial of entry to hundreds of PRS.  In May 2014 additional restrictions were imposed as the Ministry of Interior announced its intention to halt the issuance of visas for PRS at the border. Since then, entry at the border is only granted to PRS with either a verified embassy appointment in Lebanon, or a flight ticket and visa to a third country. Most of these cases are issued with a 24 hour transit visa. In addition, limited numbers of PRS remain able to secure a visa for Lebanon by obtaining prior approval from the GSO while still in Syria. This requires a sponsor in Lebanon and cannot be processed at border posts.  Compared to the policy applied to Syrian nationals, tighter conditions are applied to PRS to enter Lebanon. For example, Syrian nationals can theoretically avail themselves of a formal process with the authorities permitting entry for ‘humanitarian exceptions’, which currently is not available to PRS. Furthermore, conditions on entry for PRS are not publicly communicated and are applied at the discretion of the GSO.  Some PRS have consequently sought to enter Lebanon through irregular border crossings, placing them at additional risk of exploitation and abuse. Under current regulations, irregular entry into Lebanon is also an obstacle to later regularize one’s legal status.  Overall UNRWA has recorded an extremely low number of new arrivals in its PRS database since May 2014.

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Page 92 of 162 Confidential - Not for circulation or attribution b) The lack of legal status and difficulties to maintain legal residency in Lebanon and their humanitarian consequences

Main messages

 UNRWA is concerned about the difficulties PRS face in renewing and maintaining a valid residency situation in Lebanon, which increases vulnerability to abuse.  UNRWA advocates for a facilitated, publicized and free process to obtain and renew valid residency status in the country; including for PRS who have previously been issued a departure order [due to their irregular status in Lebanon in the previous years, or due to their irregular entry in the country].

Key Facts and Concerns

 In February 2013, the GSO stipulated that PRS could, upon entry into the country, obtain residency permits valid for three months and renewable for up to 12 months at no cost. After this initial 12-month period, a fee of USD 200 per person per year was required to extend legal residency. These costs were considered as prohibitive by refugees and the majority of them reportedly did not renew their documents. As a consequence, they were considered by the authorities to be illegally present in Lebanon.  Throughout 2014 and 2015, the Ministry of Interior reportedly issued several consecutive circulars (mostly of which remained internal and unpublished) on the conditions for PRS to renew their residency permits for three month. Such conditions included payment of outstanding fees of $200 per person per year and restrictions on the number of renewals and the maximum period of stay. Other circulars allowed for the issuance of cost-free residency permits during short periods of time. On several occasions, such circulars were applied inconsistently throughout the country and UNRWA has observed that despite the possibility of renewal, many PRS did not approach the GSO for fear of arrest and/or deportation or due to the length and cost of the process. In addition, these memos have been valid for a period of one and two months and were issued with intervals of a few weeks between them, during which time theoretically no renewal was possible.  Many PRS caught without valid residency documents, or many of those who have been denied renewal of their residency documents have been issued with “departure orders”. The issuance of such orders is currently preventing PRS from obtaining legal residency status in the country.  Starting in October 2015 several memos have been issued allowing for a renewal of residency documents, free of charge, for PRS who entered legally and had not been previously issued “departure orders”. However, as previously noted, delays in issuance of such memos created gaps and refusal of files by some local General Security offices.

c) The difficulties in accessing civil registration documentsviii

Main messages

 UNRWA is concerned about the humanitarian consequences resulting from the extreme difficulties faced by PRS to obtain civil registration documents.  UNRWA advocates for PRS to be allowed and encouraged to fully complete all official civil registration procedures in Lebanon (in particular birth and marriage), regardless of the legal situation they are in, through a separation of the civil registration and the residency status administrative processes.

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Page 93 of 162 Confidential - Not for circulation or attribution Key Facts and Concerns

 A valid legal status is a prerequisite for most civil registration processes in Lebanon. Therefore, difficulties in obtaining legal residency documents and the impossibility to obtain such documents for PRS who have entered Lebanon irregularly have a wide-reaching humanitarian impact for PRS.  Of particular concern is the registration of newborns as almost 650 new-born PRS children were recorded by UNRWA as born in Lebanon in 2014 and 2015. The majority of the parents of these newborns will likely be unable to complete all the necessary steps for registration of their children with the Lebanese authorities. Lack of civil registration could result in the emergence of a newly undocumented population, with associated protection risks. Where children’s births are not registered, the consequences on living conditions and respect of individual’s rights are grave, including the ensuing risks of denial of recognition before the law, threats of being expelled, denial of access to services and the limitations of movement within and in and out of Lebanon.

d) The limited freedom of movement, access to services and risks of detentionix

Main messages

 UNRWA is concerned about the risk of forced return and refoulement of PRS to Syria and asks Lebanon to continue refraining from it.  UNRWA calls for the Lebanese authorities to ensure the fair treatment and well-being of PRS individuals arrested and/or placed in detention due to their lack of valid residency documents or their attempt to travel to third countries.  UNRWA is concerned about the potential humanitarian consequences for PRS of entry and exit controls in and out of the Palestinian refugee camps. UNRWA invites the Lebanese authorities to ensure that controls at checkpoints; are based on identity document (including the variety of documents which can serve as identity documents for Palestinians), rather than legal residency documents.  UNRWA remains concerned about the restrictions on the access to education faced by PRS children. UNRWA asks that all PRS students regardless their legal status in the country, are allowed to sit the national Lebanese exams, and obtain officially recognized diplomas.

Key Facts and Concerns

 To UNRWA’s knowledge, one isolated incident of deportation of PRS to Syria did occur in May 2014 when a group of around 40 PRS were arrested at Beirut International Airport as they were trying to leave the country in possession of allegedly falsified visa documents.  When intercepted by the Lebanese authorities, PRS who have tried to illegally leave Lebanon might face detention and in several instances were deported to the border; where, after the international community’s intervention (including UNRWA) with the authorities, they were exceptionally allowed back in the country.  PRS without valid legal status face limitations to their freedom of movement, mainly due to the fear of arrest at checkpoints and detention. In particular, a permit is required to move in and out of Palestine refugee camps, for which legal status is often a pre-requisite. Therefore, some PRS living in these areas without a valid legal status do not leave their areas of residence for fear of being apprehended (notably in Nahr el-Bared and Ein el-Hillweh camps as well as in the camps in Tyre area). From UNRWA’s observations, adult males are particularly at risk.  PRS who are arrested without valid residency documents are often detained by the GSO and then released after several days following an internal investigation. As many of those with expired visas have been issued with

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Page 94 of 162 Confidential - Not for circulation or attribution “departure orders”, they live with the ever-present risk of deportation to Syria, despite such “departure orders” not having been implemented by the authorities.  Irregular legal status, lack of up to date civil registration documents and restriction of movement, cause severe limitations on access to services for PRS also contributing to increased protection risks: - Lebanese authorities are not issuing certificates for official Lebanese school examinations (in grade 9 and 12) to PRS children without regular status in the country, preventing them from continuing their studies beyond UNRWA’s schools. - PRS who are in need of secondary and tertiary health-care may face limitations to access UNRWA contracted hospitals which are located outside refugee camps.

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Page 95 of 162 Confidential - Not for circulation or attribution

i UNRWA has adopted a protection policy (2012) and also a framework for effective engagement with the International Human Rights System (2011). Further information on UNRWA’s protection activities and mandate are outlined in the Protection Brochure available here: http://www.unrwa.org/resources/about-unrwa/protecting-palestine-refugees ii Lebanon is a party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights that guarantees the right to work (Article 6) and the right to social security (Article 9). Those rights are protected by the fundamental principles of non-discrimination (Article 2). As established in the General Comment 20 of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the rights guaranteed by the Covenant apply to non-nationals including refugees. iii The amount that Palestinians in Lebanon should contribute into the NSSF is not equivalent and consistent to the level of benefit they are entitled to as per the law, as they continue to be excluded from family allowances, sickness and maternity leaves and only benefit from the end of service indemnities part of the NSSF. iv The poverty line used in the survey was set at US$ 208/person/month; which reflects the cost of minimal food and non-food livelihood requirements. v Lebanon is a party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights that guarantees the right to adequate housing (Article 11) and it’s corollary, the security of tenure (General Comment 4 of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights). Lebanon is a party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights that guarantees the right to adequate housing (Article 11). vi Lebanon is party to International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child which protect the right of a child to be registered immediately after birth (respectively article 24 and article 7). These provisions, by ensuring that children are registered and provided with identification documents, aim at safeguarding the enjoyment of human rights of individuals throughout their life, irrespective of their legal status in the country. vii Lebanon is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention or its 1967 Protocol. It is, however, a party to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 3 of the CAT explicitly provides that no State Party shall expel, return ("refouler") or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture. Article 7 of the ICCPR, which provides that no one shall be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, has been interpreted by the Human Rights Committee (HRC) as extending to a prohibition on States parties exposing individuals to the danger of such treatment upon return to another country by way of extradition, expulsion or refoulement. In addition, the United Nations Security Council reaffirmed the importance of the principle of non-refoulement in the Statement by its President on 2 October 2013and encouraged “countries neighbouring Syria to protect all people fleeing the violence in Syria, including Palestinians”. viii Lebanon is party to International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child which protect the right of a child to be registered immediately after birth (respectively article 24 and article 7). These provisions, by ensuring that children are registered and provided with identification documents, aim at safeguarding the enjoyment of human rights by individuals throughout their life. This right applies to PRS, whose current absence of legal status impact their enjoyment of fundamental human rights. ix According to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, children should have access to primary education (article 28), and refugee children shall receive appropriate protection and humanitarian assistance in the enjoyment of applicable rights set forth in the Convention (article 22).

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Page 96 of 162 through theendof2015US$7.3millionisrequired. continue cashfor food assistance at US$27perpersonthrough order theendof2015.In to continue cashfor assistance for housing Provision ofcashfor food assistance for to PRSremains UNRWA. thepriority With available resources US$1.33millionisrequired to return to Syria ordangerous migration to Europe. pressure to employment, seekhigh-risk ofSGBV, risks reduced to maintain ability legalstatus andincreased likelihoodofunsafe assistance to PRSfamilieswillexacerbate removal refugee increasing vulnerability ofeviction, therisk ofchildren from schools, of living, legalstatus. lackofaccess UNRWA to anduncertain thejobmarket isdeeplyconcerned that thesuspensionofcash UNRWA cashassistance representing themainsource of income for 95%ofthePRSinLebanon where refugees face ahighcost suspended following theJune2015crediting. This isat atimewhenPRSinLebanon are becoming increasingly vulnerable, with half of 2015 which has been essential for However, their survival. UNRWA has announced that cash for housing assistance will be Since February 2014,UNRWA cashassistance hasmanagedto critical to extend PRSfor bothfood andhousingthrough thefirst Cash Assistance • • • • • • Key Statistics 12% ofPRSfamilies, individualslive in money neededto feed theirfamily 91% experience lackoffood orthe are indebted for more thanUS$600 78% PRS are indebted and 24% PRS with oneormore families 60% of PRS families live in a household income 2014) (75%asofApril source of assistance astheirprimary 95% of PRS families rely on UNRWA family livingoutsidecamps family isUS$257and303per The average monthly rent perPRS 3.5 m extremely crowded conditions with unrwa Lebanon Palestine from Refugees Syria inLebanon 2 orlessperperson www.unrwa.org for palestinerefugeesinthenear east united nationsreliefandworks agency on thehostPRLcommunity. suspension willleadto increased hardship for PRSandplace greater pressure suspension ofcashfor housing assistance to PRSeffective asofJuly2015. This the needsofPRSinLebanon, asaresult. May 2015,UNRWA In announced a to meet fundingchallengesaffecting itsability The isfacingserious Agency provider ofaidto PRSinLebanon.the leadcoordinating andprimary agency inLebanonand security andtheregion attime. thiscritical UNRWA remains of PRS,heightening tensions community andnegatively stability impacting The challenging conditions for deteriorated PRL have with the influx further and campinfrastructure was indire needofmaintenance andrehabilitation. onwhichPRLdepend,education andrelief were services already stretched andemployment. accessrestricted to public services The UNRWA health, refugees inLebanon (PRL)were highlymarginalized, withlimited rightsand toprior theoutbreak theapproximately ofthisconflict, 270,000 Palestine (PRS) whofledtheviolence in areSyria currently residing in Lebanon. Already internally andacross theregion. Around 44,000Palestine refugees from Syria Since in March has 2011,theconflict Syria resulted inlarge scaledisplacement PRS inLebanon Page 97 of162 Palestine Refugees from Syria in Lebanon

UNRWA Services

PRS continue to receive education at 61 UNRWA schools across Lebanon. As of May 2015, 5,449 PRS students were regularly attending classes. Mental health PRS RECORDED PER AREA (May 2015) and psychosocial support activities are facilitated for PRS students to mitigate the psychological consequences of the challenges they face. UNRWA provides primary AREA Camp Non-Camp TOTAL health care services to all PRS in Lebanon, as well as lifesaving hospitalization support BEIRUT 3,946 3,506 7,452 to all Palestine refugees from Syria through coverage at UNRWA contracted hospitals. BEQAA 381 7,051 7,432 Services include medical consultations and free medications which are made SAIDA 6,554 7,765 14,319 available at all 27 health centres in the Lebanon Field. Considerable strain on camp infrastructure, namely sewerage and water lines and increased amounts of garbage TRIPOLI 5,967 1,046 7,013 and waste heighten the risk for infectious disease outbreaks in the overpopulated TYRE 4,991 2,966 7,957 camps. In response, UNRWA is working to urgently upgrade water, sanitation and TOTAL 21,839 22,334 44,173 solid waste infrastructure.

PRS Legal Status Since the enhanced restrictions imposed on PRS in May 2014, PRS have been facing increasing difficulty entering Lebanon. Lebanese government restrictions continue to disallow PRS entry into the country despite an increasingly dire situation in Syria. Entry has now been limited to a 24-hour transit visa, provided PRS present a valid ticket and visa for their country of destination or a confirmed embassy appointment in Lebanon. PRS already residing in Lebanon are facing challenges renewing their existing residency permits, citing an inconsistent enforcement of regulations by the General Security Office (GSO). UNRWA has identified very few cases of successful renewal. In February 2015, the GSO issued an internal circular, valid for one month only, allowing PRS to renew their residency permits for up to three months upon payment of a US$ 200 fee. This circular was re-issued at the beginning of April valid until the beginning of May. Neither of the two circulars has been published and implementation has been PRS are becoming increasingly vulnerable inconsistent. Some PRS reported that they were issued with a departure order by the © 2014 UNRWA GSO, despite paying the fee. UNRWA continues to closely monitor the situation at the photo by Mustafa Abdel-Aal border through a dedicated border monitor.

PRS Funding 2014-2015 The 2015 UNRWA Lebanon appeal, in line with the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan for the Syria crisis, outlines the needs for US$ 63.5 million to meet the minimum needs of up to 45,000 PRS in Lebanon suffering profound hardship as a result of the protracted crisis in Syria. This builds on UNRWA’s Syria response efforts, which have been on-going since the beginning of the crisis to cover PRS needs in all sectors. While UNRWA in Lebanon is well supported in some areas, a number of funds are earmarked for specific activities. Urgent donor support is still required to continue much needed cash assistance and health services for PRS in Lebanon. UNRWA is facing serious challenges across its five fields of operation. Regional conflicts and the current state of the global economy make it very difficult for UNRWA to meet the needs of the Palestine refugee population. At this time, the Agency’s General Fund has a shortage of more than US$ 100 million with wide implications for programming at both the regional and local levels. critical funding gaps remain in cash assistance and health

united nations relief and works agency for palestine refugees in the near east

www.unrwa.org

UNRWA is a United Nations agency established by the General Assembly in 1949 and is mandated to provide assistance and protection to a population of some 5 million registered Palestine refugees. Its mission is to help Palestine refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, West Bank and the Gaza Strip to achieve their full potential in human development, pending a just solution to their plight. UNRWA services encompass education, health care, relief and social services, camp infrastructure and improvement, microfinance and emergency assistance. UNRWA is funded almost entirely by voluntary contributions.

Page 98 of 162

Lebanon: Syria Crisis ECHO FACTSHEET

shortage

Facts & Figures

Number of registered Syrian refugees in Lebanon: 1.048 million

Number of Palestine refugees from Syria: 42 000 Number of Palestine refugees: 450 000

Number of Iraqi refugees: 6 000

(Source: UNHCR, UNRWA)

© EU/ECHO/Peter Biro Total European Commission funding for Lebanon since Key messages the start of the crisis:  Lebanon is the neighbouring country hardest hit by the Almost €552 million, Syria crisis, hosting more than 1.1 million Syrian refugees. including With other refugee communities also living there, Lebanon has the world’s largest number of refugees per capita. €269.1 million  Access to Lebanon by those fleeing the conflict in from the humanitarian budget for Syrian Syria has become close to impossible since the beginning of refugees and host 2015 with the enforcement of strict regulations by the communities Government of Lebanon.

 The European Commission commends the government and people of Lebanon for its generosity but it is increasingly

concerned about the deteriorating protection space and Humanitarian Aid and living conditions of the most vulnerable refugees. An Civil Protection increasing number of refugees are being forced to become B-1049 Brussels, Belgium undocumented, which raises concerns over their ability to move Tel.: (+32 2) 295 44 00 Fax: (+32 2) 295 45 72 and access services and exposes them to abuse and email: harassment. [email protected]

Website:  The European Commission is committed to continuing its http://ec.europa.eu/echo support to Lebanon and the humanitarian community in providing assistance to Syrian refugees and vulnerable

* All the latest ECHO Lebanese. For 2016, €87 million have been allocated for Factsheets: humanitarian assistance in Lebanon. bit.ly/echo-fs

ECHO Factsheet – Lebanon: Syria crisis – May 2016 Page 99 of 162

Humanitarian situation and needs

Background

Lebanon, a country of 4.4 million inhabitants, is hosting around 1.1 million Syrian refugees (including non–registered), 42 000 Palestinian refugees from Syria, 6 000 Iraqi refugees and nearly 450 000 refugees from Palestine. This makes it the highest per-capita concentration of refugees worldwide, where one person out of four is a refugee.

Since the outbreak of the Syrian crisis in 2011, hundreds of thousands of refugees have crossed into Lebanon seeking safety and shelter, more than 75% of which are children and women. This influx has added strain on the country’s economy and infrastructure. The pressure is felt in all sectors including education, health, housing, water and electricity supply. As time goes by, competition for jobs and resources is also fuelling tensions in certain areas between Lebanese host communities and Syrian refugees.

Security along the border areas, particularly in Akkar and the northern Bekaa Valley, make humanitarian access and the delivery of assistance very challenging. The fighting in Arsal in August 2014 was a turning point. It led to a much more restrictive policy and crystallised tensions between Lebanese and Syrian refugees, including increased evictions and police raids, mistreatment and restrictions of movement.

Major needs and related problems

Lebanon has voiced its intention to reduce the numbers of Syrian refugees living on its territory in order to ensure security as well as to ease the burden on its people and economy. On January 13, 2015, the Government of Lebanon announced a new and amended policy regulating entry of Syrian refugees: all Syrian refugees wishing to enter Lebanon have to justify the purpose of their visit. As a result, access to territory has significantly decreased with the border ‘de-facto’ closed for people fleeing violence. Palestinian refugees from Syria also face increased challenges in accessing the territory since May 2013.

The high fees (approx. €200 per adult/year) and complicated administrative procedures for refugees to renew their legal residence have been pushing an increasing number of refugees into becoming undocumented. This raises concerns over their ability to move and access services and exposes them to abuse and harassment.

There are no formal refugee camps because of the "no camp" policy, adopted by the Government of Lebanon. Syrian refugees are scattered in more than 1700 localities across the country where they live in apartments, collective shelters, tented settlements, unfinished houses, garages, warehouses or worksites. Refugees in Lebanon have to pay for food, rent, clothes, medicine etc. Almost 9 out of 10 refugees live in 251 locations, which are some of the poorest and most vulnerable neighbourhoods in Lebanon.

The Lebanese healthcare system was already stretched before the influx of Syrians and relied heavily on the private sector. Syrian refugees face several obstacles when accessing healthcare including the expensive cost of services, geographical challenges,

*All the latest ECHO Factsheets: bit.ly/echo-fs ECHO Factsheet – Lebanon: Syria crisis – May 2016 - Page 2/3

Page 100 of 162 and restricted coverage criteria. Refugees who suffer from long lasting and costly chronic diseases (cancer, renal failure, etc.) are not covered.

According to UNHCR, close to 417,000 Syrian refugee children in Lebanon are aged between three and 14 years old. While exact numbers are not available, it is estimated that nearly half of Syrian refugee children do not have access to any form of education, exposing them to physical and/or psychological violence, child labour and exploitation, early marriage, and recruitment by armed groups. The Ministry of Education has committed to increasing the capacity of schools to welcome up to 200 000 Syrian children - but this would only account for half of all school-aged Syrian children.

The European Union's Humanitarian Response

Funding Between 2012 and 2015, the European Commission has provided €269.1 million in humanitarian funding in Lebanon to respond to the Syria crisis.

In 2016, the European Commission will allocate EUR 87 million of additional funding for humanitarian assistance in Lebanon.

Since the beginning of the crisis, this assistance has focused on the most vulnerable refugees, either newcomers (until mid-2014), living in the worst housing conditions or with the highest socio-economic vulnerability.

EU humanitarian funding has mostly contributed to: cash assistance so that the most vulnerable people can meet their basic needs, secondary healthcare for lifesaving cases, and shelter (including water and sanitation) to improve the living conditions of families living in substandard dwellings. Protection remains a critical sector in terms of counselling and legal assistance and service to survivors of violence.

Given the protracted nature of the Palestinian refugee crisis in Lebanon, other EU instruments have continued to provide support to the Palestinians.

*All the latest ECHO Factsheets: bit.ly/echo-fs ECHO Factsheet – Lebanon: Syria crisis – May 2016 - Page 3/3

Page 101 of 162

Page 102 of 162 JORDAN

10. EU Support to Jordan - ECHO Factsheet ......

Page 103 of 162 Page 104 of 162 MANAGING THE REFUGEE CRISIS

EU SUPPORT TO JORDAN

The EU pays tribute to the outstanding efforts Jordan has made and is continuing to make since the onset of the Syrian refugee crisis. The EU remains deeply committed to assisting Jordan in dealing with the crisis. Overall, the EU is the leading donor in the international response to the Syrian crisis, with over €6.6 billion from the EU and Member States collectively mobilised in humanitarian and development assistance. This support goes both to Syrians still inside their country, as well as to refugees and their host communities in neighbouring Jordan, Lebanon, as well as Iraq, Turkey and Egypt.

At the London conference on “Supporting Syria and the region” in February 2016, the EU pledged €1 billion for Jordan and Lebanon together for the years 2016 and 2017. Jordan is expected to receive significant additional support in tackling the refugee crisis.

In Jordan, there are over 657 433 registered Syrian refugees, equal to over 10% of the country’s total population before the crisis. In addition, a large number of Palestinian and Iraqi refugees have been residing in Jordan since before the outbreak of the Syrian crisis, although the vast majority of the former hold regular Jordanian citizenship.

Overall, the European Commission has allocated more than €754 million in assistance to refugees and vulnerable communities in Jordan.

This includes inter alia:  more than €251 million from the humanitarian budget, including €53 million for 2016  €180 million from the Macro Financial Assistance Instrument  €171 million from the European Neighbourhood Instrument  €33 million from the Instrument contributing to Peace and Stability.  €118 million worth of activities in Jordan adopted by the Boards of the Madad Regional Trust Fund to address longer-term resilience needs of Syrian refugees. Those actions support Jordan's host communities and the national administration with a focus on increasing access for refugees to education, training, as well as livelihoods and WASH.

This support comes on top of the more than €500 million in regular programmed bilateral cooperation for Jordan under the European Neighbourhood Policy, which brings the overall amount earmarked for Jordan to over €1.25billion since 2011.

Number of Syrian refugees in Jordan: 657 433 Number of Palestinian refugees in Jordan: 2 097 338 Number of Iraqi refugees in Jordan: 54 586

HUMANITARIAN AID TO JORDAN

Page 105 of 162 Since the beginning of the crisis, the European Commission has contributed more than €251 million, providing services such as health, food and basic needs assistance, winterisation, shelter, water and sanitations, psychological support and protection programmes to refugees in camps, urban settings and to asylum seeker at the border. The provision of basic services in villages and towns across the country has consistently included vulnerable Jordanian families as well. Specific programmes support children’s and women’s needs, since approximately 51.5% of the refugees are children and 25% women. With 78.5 % of the refugees in Jordan living in urban settings, the EU supports the most vulnerable refugees through programmes including cash assistance, which is considered the most cost-efficient and dignified way of helping people in need.

EU humanitarian aid in action: Since 2012, UNICEF has received a total of €30 million from the EU humanitarian budget for child protection, water and sanitation and the current child cash programme. Since February 2015, UNICEF is assisting about 56,000 girls and boys from 15,750 of the most vulnerable Syrian refugee families in host communities with 20 Jordanian Dinars per child per month. EU humanitarian funding to UNICEF supports the work of the organisation at the North-Eastern border with Syria providing the distribution of water and child protection and nutrition activities for young children.

In 2016, the 53 Millions € of EU humanitarian funding is supporting the emergency needs of the more than -70.000 refugees stranded along the North-Eastern border. Working with international organisations such as WFP's for food distribution, UNICEF for education and water provision, ICRC for health and UNHCR for registration of new arrivals. Next to these interventions, ECHO is pursuing its support in favour of the most vulnerable (refugees and most vulnerable Jordanian) funding projects in several sectors like protection, health, winterization and basic needs ECHO si also responding to the need of the refugees that were admitted lately in Jordan, ensuring their basic assistance and shelter in the Azraq Camp.

DELIVERY OF AID

The EU’s Humanitarian Aid is channelled through the United Nations, International Organisations, and international NGO partners, and is responding to life-threatening needs in the areas of basic need, food aid, health, water, sanitation and hygiene, shelter, protection and education in emergency

Since 2015, an increasing part of non-humanitarian aid for Syria’s neighbouring countries to cope with the refugee crisis is channelled through the EU Regional Trust Fund in response to the Syrian crisis, the ‘Madad Fund’. The Trust Fund aims to bring a more coherent and integrated EU response to the crisis by merging various EU financial instruments and contributions from Member States and other international donors into one single flexible and quick mechanism. The Trust Fund primarily addresses longer term resilience needs of Syrian refugees in neighbouring countries such as Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and Iraq, as well as the hosting communities and their administration. With pledges from 21 Member States - amounting to over €69 million - and contributions from various EU instruments, the Fund has now reached a volume of more than €700 million.

The Operational Board of the Trust Fund has already approved actions for a total amount of €628 million including €118.3 million support to Jordan, with a focus on increasing access for

Page 106 of 162 refugees to education and training, as well as to livelihoods and water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH).

PREVENTING A LOST GENERATION OF SYRIAN CHILDREN AND YOUTH

The European Union has dedicated substantial resources to addressing the educational needs of children affected by the crisis in Jordan (more than €200 million in 2011-2016), such as support for basic education, youth programmes, vocational education and higher education in Jordan. The funding has enabled Jordan to admit over 140,000 Syrian children into their public schools and to follow those who could not attend mainstream education.

In particular, the EU has been directly assisted the Jordanian Ministry of Education through two subsequent Budget Support Programmes that contribute to payment of school fees, teachers' and administrators' salaries, textbooks and so on for Syrian refugees' education. They amount to:  €59.6 million for the years 2011-2014 (of which €29.6 million were dedicated to Syrian children)  €55 million for the school years 2015-2017, with a top-up of €20 million currently under preparation.

An additional €8 million has been devoted to Higher Education activities and scholarships in Jordan for Syrians and vulnerable Jordanians through the German Jordanian University and the British Council. Given the success of the former initiative, the EU TF Madad has already approved a follow-up action worth €11 million to ensure an extended availability of scholarships in Jordanian faculties.

Thorough UNICEF, the EU has also financed some €35 million worth of informal education activities since 2011 and continues providing assistance through the EuroMed Youth programme, which aims at the promotion of youth projects through study visits and voluntary work.

TRADE INITIATIVE – RELAXATION OF RULES OF ORIGIN

At the London Conference on 4 February 2016, as part of its response to the Syria crisis, the EU announced a trade initiative in accordance with earlier Jordanian requests. The initiative, eventually agreed at the 19th July 2016 EU-Jordan Association Council, has allowed a temporary relaxation of Rules of Origin for a large number of products manufactured in selected development zones in Jordan with a contribution from Syrian refugees' labour.

The initiative was designed to last ten years, with a mid-term revision allowing the parties to make adjustments in light of experience.

Page 107 of 162 Page 108 of 162 UNRWA

11. About UNRWA 2015 ......

12. UNRWA in figures ......

13. Overview of the EU assistance to UNRWA - Lebanon and Jordan ......

14. EC Financial Commitments to UNRWA 2000-2015 ......

15. Donor ranking (with UN Agencies) overall ......

16. EC-UNRWA Joint Declaration 2014-2016 signed ......

17. EUREP note on Funding Shortfall ......

18. UNRWA Operations in Lebanon ......

19. UNRWA Jordan Field update ......

20. ACIO Annual Report ......

21. Bio UNRWA DCG Sandra Mitchell ......

Page 109 of 162 Page 110 of 162 about unrwa

Page 111 of 162 © 2015 United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

This page: Palestine refugee Bedouin children in the West Bank © 2013 UNRWA Photo by Alaa Ghosheh Cover photo: Psychosocial activities for UNRWA students in Gaza following the summer 2014 conflict. © 2014 UNRWA Photo by Fadi Thabet Page 112 of 162 contents

4 about unrwa

6 education

7 health

8 relief and social services

9 microfinance

10 infrastructure and camp improvement

11 protection

12 emergencies

13 unrwa and its partners

14 unrwa in figures

16 map of unrwa areas of operation

Page 113 of 162 4 about unrwa The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) was established as a subsidiary organ of the United Nations General Assembly on 8 December 1949 and became operational on 1 May 1950. It is one of the largest United Nations programmes. Created as a temporary agency until a just and durable solution for Palestine refugees was achieved, the UNRWA mandate was set to expire in one year. Sixty-five years later, the Agency continues to provide essential services for the well-being, human development and protection of Palestine refugees, pending a just solution.

Palestine refugees The operational definition of Palestine refugees is people whose normal place of residence was Palestine between June 1946 and May 1948, who lost both their homes and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict. Descendants of Palestine refugee males are eligible to register as Palestine refugees.

UNRWA services are available to all those requiring assistance in the Agency’s areas of operation who meet the definition of a Palestine refugee and are registered with the Agency, and to some other groups.

UNRWA students in Syria. © 2014 UNRWA Photo Direct Service Delivery UNRWA is unique among UN agencies in that it delivers services directly. These services include education, health care, relief and social services, microfinance, infrastructure and camp improvement, emergency assistance, and the protection of refugees’ rights under international law. UNRWA services are delivered in accordance with the United Nations humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and operational independence.

UNRWA operates in five fields: Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem.

UNRWA Health Centre, Jaramana Camp, Syria © 2014 UNRWA Photo

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5.6 million UNRWA employs more than people are registered for UNRWA services, including 5.15 million registered refugees 30,000 and 440,000 other registered persons staff, including more than 28,000 2 emergency programmes who are Palestine in the occupied Palestinian territory and Syria (in addition to the refugees themselves reconstruction of Nahr el-Bared refugee camp in Lebanon)

UNRWA Today Palestine refugees today are facing a human UNRWA itself relies on voluntary funding from donors, development and protection crisis. Food insecurity prioritizing the limited resources among its most and poverty levels are high and rising, and youth critical services, with particular emphasis on the most unemployment rates are alarming, especially among vulnerable. Financial support for the Agency has not young women. Despite possessing strong human kept pace with an increased demand for services caused capital as a result of the education and health care by growing numbers of registered refugees, deepening provided by UNRWA and host authorities, many poverty and conflict. As a result, the Agency’s core fund, Palestine refugees lack the assets and opportunities which supports essential services and most staffing required for sustainable livelihoods. costs, operates with a large deficit.

Palestine refugees are also facing increasing protection In this context, UNRWA service delivery is guided by threats from armed conflicts in Syria, the West Bank and the Medium-Term Strategy 2016-2021, which works the Gaza Strip. A growing number are denied the same towards five strategic outcomes designed to deliver the basic human rights as other citizens due to their legal most effective support for Palestine refugees. status, and are excluded from key aspects of social, political and economic life.

unrwa strategic outcomes 2016-2021

1. Refugees’ rights under international law are protected and promoted

2. Refugees’ health is protected and the disease burden is reduced

3. School-aged children complete quality, equitable and inclusive basic education

4. Refugees’ capabilities are strengthened for increased livelihood opportunities

5. Refugees are able to meet their basic human needs of food, shelter and environmental health

Page 115 of 162 6 493,500 students 22,000 education staff 685 schools 7,200 vocational training places

UNRWA Goodwill Ambassador and Arab Idol Winner Mohammad Assaf - himself a former UNRWA student - visits students in the West Bank © 2013 UNRWA Photo by Alaa Ghosheh

to local job markets through a range of trade and semi- professional courses, as well as short-term needs-based education training. Each year, more than 7,200 trainees develop skills in traditional and modern trades including fashion, UNRWA operates one of the largest education systems plumbing, carpentry, pharmacy, graphic design, business in the Middle East, opening the doors of 685 schools and computing, and architecture and surveying. to nearly 500,000 pupils each day. High-quality basic education helps young Palestine refugees develop The Educator the skills to thrive as adults in an evolving, challenging The professional development of teachers is key to quality landscape. Host government curricula are enriched with education and occurs throughout UNRWA teachers’ United Nations principles through the Agency’s human careers. The UNESCO-UNRWA Institute of Education rights, conflict resolution and tolerance (HRCRT) policy. empowers teachers to embrace new ‘active learning’ methods to equip students with critical-thinking skills. School-age Palestine refugee children are eligible to enrol in UNRWA schools for free education across nine grades in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, Syria and Tools and Resources Lebanon, and ten grades in Jordan. Secondary education Resource constraints are an ongoing challenge. Since is offered in Lebanon because Palestine refugees cannot the 1950s, UNRWA has operated many of its schools on a ‘double-shift’ basis, with one group of pupils attending a access government education. Refugees in the other morning shift and a second an afternoon shift. Today, 408 four fields generally continue their education within of the 685 UNRWA schools have double shifts, including government schools. 90 per cent of schools in Jordan and 76 per cent in the Gaza Strip. UNRWA prioritizes inclusive, pupil-centred education that engages communities. This approach focuses on The UNRWA Education in Emergencies programme identifying and supporting children with diverse needs supports Palestine refugee children affected by and abilities, and varied socio-economic backgrounds. conflict. The framework includes psychosocial support, UNRWA schools have built a reputation for high interactive self-learning materials for children who academic achievement and low drop-out rates. Ground- cannot access schools, and other practical measures to breaking progress has been achieved in gender parity, support continued education. with girls making up around 50 per cent of UNRWA students since the 1960s. Today, Palestine refugees’ One self-learning initiative is the educational satellite literacy and educational levels are among the highest in channel UNRWA TV. Based in Gaza, the channel the Middle East. broadcasts math and lessons, and other educational and entertainment materials throughout Eight UNRWA technical and vocational training colleges the region. equip refugee youth with skills and knowledge relevant

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Mobile health clinic in the West Bank © 2011 UNRWA Photo by Alaa Ghosheh

long-term doctor-patient relationships. The FHT also addresses factors that impact health, such as diet and health physical activity, education, gender-based violence, Guided by World Health Organization standards, the child protection, poverty and community development. UNRWA health programme offers comprehensive primary health care to Palestine refugees and facilitates The FHT brings UNRWA health programming in line access to secondary and tertiary health care. The Agency with global standards of quality health care, and has also works to ensure healthy living environments in the been implemented together with an electronic medical 58 official Palestine refugee camps. record and appointment system, e-health.

The health-care needs of refugees have evolved Life-Cycle Approach considerably over the years; from responding to UNRWA adopts the life-cycle approach to health outbreaks of air- and waterborne infections in the services, serving Palestine refugees at every stage of first refugee camps, to combating widespread their lives, from pre-conception to active ageing. malnutrition among children and reducing infant and maternal mortality. Today, people are living longer The Agency offers both preventive and curative and developing different health needs, particularly services, including mother and child care, family related to non-communicable diseases and chronic planning, adolescent and adult care, active ageing and conditions that require lifelong care, such as diabetes, oral health. Secondary prevention and management hypertension and cancer. of diabetes and hypertension is also provided. Communicable diseases – in particular vaccine- To address the evolving preventable diseases – are controlled through high 9.5 million needs of Palestine vaccination coverage and the early detection and annual patient visits refugees, UNRWA control of outbreaks. undertook a major reform initiative in 2011, Healthy Environment introducing the Family The UNRWA environmental health programme focuses Health Team (FHT) on reducing the morbidity and risk of outbreaks 3,300 approach. The FHT offers health staff associated with poor environmental conditions and comprehensive, holistic practices. This includes the provision of safe drinking primary health care water within refugee camps, sanitation, disease vector- services for the entire control and rodent-control services. 137 family, emphasizing primary health- care facilities

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© 2011 UNRWA Photo

humanitarian relief through food aid, towards programmes that further the socioeconomic relief and empowerment of vulnerable Palestine refugees and safeguard their rights.

Today, UNRWA estimates that 1.9 million registered Palestine refugees live in poverty. The Agency social continues to provide food and cash to families who are unable to meet their basic food needs though its Social Safety Net programme, while a team of dedicated social workers link refugees to training, services disability services and social support programmes. The UNRWA Relief and Social Services programme assists the most vulnerable Palestine refugees, supports Community Empowerment community empowerment, and is custodian to a digital UNRWA works with a wide range of civil society archive that maintains the records of over 5 million partners to strengthen Palestine refugees’ capacity people who fit the legal definition of Palestine refugees to overcome vulnerability to social and economic in the West Bank, Jordan, Gaza, Syria and Lebanon. hardships. The Agency partners with over 100 community organizations, public sector entities and The UNRWA archive preserves more than 17.5 million other UN agencies that provide services including historical documents, including birth certificates, skills training, rehabilitation and recreational property deeds and registration papers dating back to activities. Through these initiatives, UNRWA helps pre-1948 Mandatory Palestine. improve the situation of many women, youth and people with disabilities to help them maintain UNRWA support for the most vulnerable has evolved productive lives. over time, from the emergency provision of basic 294,000 refugees supported by the social safety net 5.6 million people registered for UNRWA services, including 5.15 million registered refugees and 440,000 other registered persons Page 118 of 162 about unrwa 9

A female entrepreneurs in Syria © 2012 UNRWA Photo by Carole Al Farah

Women and Youth microfinance A youth start-up loan called Mubadarati is available to men and women aged 18-30 to start new businesses that create self-employment and employ others. The UNRWA microfinance programme extends credit and Mubadarati is the first loan of its kind in the region. complementary financial services to Palestine refugees

and other poor or marginalized groups who live and work Women entrepreneurs can access women’s household near them. Microfinance clients include families, women, credit to sustain enterprise and support household youth, entrepreneurs and small-business owners. Their spending on education, health and basic needs. investments create and sustain jobs, reduce poverty and Women’s household credit accommodates women’s empower communities, particularly women. home-based enterprises, allowing them to build household assets for business use. Many microfinance clients operate small – often informal – businesses on the margins of the economy. Clients include fishermen, garage-owners, at-home Small Business seamstresses and vegetable stall-owners. UNRWA Small businesses can access a range of financial focuses microfinance outreach on poor urban areas, products, including microenterprise credit, which where refugees often live, and which tend to be centres targets the overwhelming majority of regional of commercial and industrial activity. businesses that employ fewer than five workers. Most of these businesses have no access to formal credit and are vulnerable to shocks. Microenterprise Families credit plus helps successful small businesses expand Family services include personal loans for poor and low- their capital and increase employment. Small-scale income families with no access to bank credit. These enterprise lending provides larger loans that typically loans help families build household assets and support support capital investment, modernization and education, well-being and other social expenses, such market expansion. as weddings and funerals. Families with no access to mortgage facilities can access loans to improve, expand or acquire housing. US$ 403m 360,000 worth of loans awarded since 1991 loans awarded since 1991

UNRWA runs a training programme for small UNRWA financial services operate in business owners in the Gaza Strip, offering accordance with global standards and customized training in subjects such as book- microfinance industry best practice. keeping, taxation, computing and e-commerce.

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Construction in Lebanon © 2010 UNRWA Photo

School and Health Facilities infrastructure UNRWA oversees the design, construction and maintenance of Agency schools and health centres. All newly-constructed facilities are built to comply with and camp international standards and provide universal access for people with disabilities. improvement Environmental Infrastructure and Environmental Health The UNRWA infrastructure and camp improvement UNRWA collaborates with host authorities to assure programme improves the living conditions of Palestine access to safe drinking water, adequate sewerage refugees by implementing projects that respond to camp systems and storm water drainage. This helps promote improvement plans developed in partnership with camp a safe and healthy urban environment for Palestine residents. refugees and controls outbreaks of waterborne diseases. Environmental health includes solid waste- Over more than six decades, the 58 official Palestine refugee removal services and rodent-control services. camps in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip have transformed from ‘tent cities’ into congested Housing masses of multi-storey buildings characterized by poverty Substandard and overcrowded housing is an acute and extreme overcrowding. The camps are considered to problem in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and the Gaza Strip be among the densest urban environments in the world, due to financial constraints and the needs of growing and because shelters were built for temporary use, many refugee populations. The UNRWA response prioritizes are critically substandard and even life-threatening. Under improving the critically substandard shelters of international law, refugees – like everyone else – have the the most vulnerable refugees. In Jordan alone, 500 right to an adequate standard of living, including housing. substandard shelters have been earmarked for urgent This is without prejudice to their other rights as refugees. upgrading.

Camp Improvement The UNRWA camp improvement programme is not Refugees are involved at every stage of the camp funded by the Agency’s core budget. It depends on improvement process – providing input through working project funding from donors. groups and needs assessments, helping to define a vision, and participating in the implementation of improvements to public open spaces, roads, alleyways, play spaces and markets. Projects contribute to social development and 500 substandard shelters inclusion, economic growth and environmental aspects in in Jordan alone camps.

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The West Bank Barrier © 2014 UNRWA Photo

• Implementing programmes that respond to protection threats and promote the resilience of protection Palestine refugees; Protection is what UNRWA does to safeguard and • Addressing cases of violence, abuse, neglect and advance the rights of Palestine refugees under exploitation of vulnerable groups, including women international law. and children; and • Promoting the rights of Palestine refugees under Increasing conflict and displacement across the region international law, through monitoring and reporting means that today, more than ever, Palestine refugees of violations, and by engaging in private and public are in need of protection. UNRWA has significantly advocacy. strengthened its protection capacity in recent years through the introduction of dedicated protection Protection Priorities staff, protection training and protection activities. Each UNRWA field of operation has its own priorities; The Agency adopted a protection policy in 2012 however, Agency-wide protection focuses on: and has developed tools and standards for service • Protection challenges from the ongoing occupation delivery. Progress is measured through annual internal in the West Bank and Gaza; protection audits. UNRWA has an extensive gender- • The impact of armed conflict in Syria and Gaza; based violence programme and is currently developing • The plight of Palestine refugees from Syria in Jordan, a child protection framework. Lebanon and elsewhere; • The lack of legal status and denial of certain rights UNRWA Protection Framework for Palestine refugees in host countries; UNRWA applies a holistic approach to protection, which • Protection risks facing women, children and persons includes an internal dimension focused on realizing the with disabilities; and, rights of Palestine refugees through service delivery • Protection challenges within the Agency’s own and an external dimension that engages with relevant service delivery programmes. duty bearers to ensure respect for Palestine refugee rights. There are four complementary elements to the Community partnership is vital to the UNRWA Agency’s protection approach: protection approach and the perspective of Palestine • Providing protection in and through service refugees is taken into account in the planning and delivery programmes by meeting minimum protection implementation of all services. standards;

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Yarmouk residents gather to await an UNRWA food distribution. Syria, January 2014. © 2014 UNRWA Photo

Jordan face increasing vulnerability due to difficulties emergencies maintaining a legal status and increasing poverty. UNRWA has acted over the past 65 years to mitigate the The Emergency Appeal for the occupied Palestinian effects of emergencies on the lives of Palestine refugees. territory supports refugees living under Israeli occupation in the West Bank and surviving the The Agency operates in a challenging context and works devastating results of the ongoing blockade and three closely with UN country teams to develop contingency conflicts in the past eight years in Gaza. and emergency response plans through the prevention, preparedness, response and recovery phases. UNRWA also continues to appeal for support to address the humanitarian crisis and rebuilding needs stemming The UNRWA emergency programme currently supports from the 2007 destruction of the Nahr el-Bared refugee Palestine refugees impacted by the conflict in Syria, camp in Lebanon. where an estimated 95 percent of the 480,000 Palestine refugees remaining in Drawing on its vast operational capacity and expertise, the country are fully UNRWA is able to provide quick and responsive dependent on UNRWA support to Palestine refugees in crises. Emergency humanitarian assistance to responses are context-specific and based on acute 456,000 meet their minimum food, refugees in Syria are fully dependent humanitarian needs. Responses may include, but are shelter, health and water on UNRWA humanitarian assistance not limited to, food aid, water and sanitation, temporary and sanitation needs. In shelter, emergency cash assistance, cash-for-work, addition, 60,000 Palestine emergency education, emergency health services and refugees who have fled reconstruction. from Syria to Lebanon and almost 140,000 refugee homes were damaged or destroyed in 2014 Gaza conflict

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local knowledge and deliver direct services to some of the most vulnerable Palestine refugees. unrwa and • International NGOs provide financial support and expertise, and contribute to advocacy and service delivery. its partners • Universities conduct research to support evidence- based policy making and programming. • Private companies and foundations make Partners play an increasingly vital role in the delivery important financial contributions to UNRWA and help of human development and emergency assistance to foster creative thinking and innovation in service Palestine refugees. UNRWA offers unique partnership delivery. opportunities across diverse sectors, including health, • United Nations agencies share skills and expertise, education, camp infrastructure and relief and social engage in policy dialogue, and provide financial and services. Partners contribute financial and in-kind operational support. support, expert knowledge, operational capacity and advocacy. Partnering with UNRWA Means: Who Partners with UNRWA? 1. Helping the largest and most experienced United Nations agency in the Middle East provide services • Millions of individuals who share the UNRWA and assistance to over five million Palestine refugees, vision support advocacy campaigns and contribute including education for 500,000 school children and one-off or regular donations. primary health care in 137 clinics. • Local NGOs and community-based organizations, 2. Visible support for United Nations values and the which are firmly rooted in their communities, contribute empowerment of a vulnerable group.

UNRWA National Committees The Spanish Committee of UNRWA American Friends of UNRWA (UNRWA (UNRWA España) is the oldest and USA) is an independent nonprofit largest national committee. UNRWA with a mission to promote dignity España implements education and and human development for awareness-raising activities across Palestine refugees by informing the Spain and raises funds from the American public about UNRWA and public and private sectors. generating support for the Agency’s programmes through fundraising, education and advocacy.

The Italian Committee of UNRWA The Swiss Committee of UNRWA (UNRWA Italia) promotes solidarity (UNRWA Switzerland) is currently and respect for the rights of Palestine being established to raise awareness refugees through awareness-raising about Palestine refugees in among the general public and Italian Switzerland and raise funds to institutions. support UNRWA operations.

Runners at the start of the third annual Gaza 5km run in Washington DC, organized by UNRWA USA © 2014 UNRWA Photo by Malikah Photography

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unrwa in figures as of 1 Jan 2015 JORDAN LEBANON SYRIA(1) WEST BANK GAZA STRIP TOTAL/AVE GENERAL REGISTERED REFUGEES (RR) 2,117,361 452,669 528,616 774,167 1,276,929 5,149,742 OTHER REGISTERED PERSONS 95,556 40,465 63,164 168,017 72,544 439,746 TOTAL REGISTERED PERSONS (RP) 2,212,917 493,134 591,780 942,184 1,349,473 5,589,488 INCREASE IN RP OVER PREVIOUS YEAR (%) 2.7 2 3.9 3.9 3 3 % OF RP EACH FIELD OF OPERATION 39.6 8.8 10.6 16.9 24.1 100 OFFICIAL CAMPS 10 12 9 19 8 58 RP REGISTERED TO CAMPS (RPCs) (2) 385,418 249,410 178,666 228,560 560,964 1,603,018 RPCs AS % OF RPs 17.4 50.6 30.2 24.3 41.6 28.7 EDUCATION - 2014-2015 ACADEMIC YEAR SCHOOLS (ELEM, PREP + SECONDARY IN LEBANON) 174 68 94 97 252 685 EDUCATIONAL STAFF 5,301 1,915 2,503 2,783 9,422 21,924 FEMALE EDUCATIONAL STAFF (%) 49.1 53.5 57.8 58.5 59.5 56.2 PUPIL ENROLMENT 118,546 38,173 45,802 50,566 240,413 493,500 FEMALE PUPILS (%) 48.8 52.6 48.9 58.4 48.4 49.9 COST PER ELEMENTARY PUPIL (US$) (2013-2014) 805 1,469 563 1,375 709 878 COST PER PREPARATORY PUPIL (US$) (2013-2014) 1,072 2,228 678 1,726 1,082 1,249 VOCATIONAL & TECHNICAL TRAINING CENTRES (VTTCs) 2 1 1 2 2 8 VTTC ENROLMENT 2,451 1,143 930 1,093 1,617 7,234 EDUCATIONAL SCIENCES FACULTIES 1 0 0 1 0 2 EDUCATIONAL SCIENCES FACULTY ENROLMENT 1,295 0 0 662 0 1,957 HEALTH PRIMARY HEALTH CARE FACILITIES (PHCF) 23 27 23 42 22 137 HEALTH STAFF 739 357 437 789 1,016 3,338 FEMALE HEALTH STAFF (%) 58.2 48.5 53.5 61.6 60.5 58.1 PHCFs WITH DENTAL SERVICES (including mobile units) 33 19 14 23 21 110 ANNUAL ANTENATAL CARE PATIENTS 26,634 5,165 3,600 13,670 39,546 88,615 ANNUAL PERINATAL CARE PATIENTS 20,838 4,421 2,228 10,871 37,589 75,947 ANNUAL DIABETES/HYPERTENSION PATIENTS 73,557 28,058 20,210 37,869 71,433 231,127 TOTAL ANNUAL PATIENT VISITS 1,721,440 1,276,153 983,635 1,293,960 4,181,967 9,457,155 RELIEF & SOCIAL SERVICES SOCIAL SAFETY NET/SPECIAL HARDSHIP CASES (SSN/SHC) 58,889 61,648 38,752 35,993 98,870 294,152 SSN/SHC AS % OF RPs 2.8 13.6 7.3 4.6 7.7 5.7 WOMEN'S PROGRAMME CENTRES 14 8 13 19 7 61 COMMUNITY REHABILITATION CENTRES 10 1 5 15 6 37 COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT CENTRES 1 0 3 0 0 4 COMMUNITY-MANAGED FUND SCHEMES 11 7 5 15 0 38 RELIEF AND SOCIAL SERVICES STAFF 123 146 113 188 349 919 FEMALE RELIEF AND SOCIAL SERVICES STAFF (%) 71.5 65.1 61.9 47.9 45.3 54.5 MICROFINANCE & MICROENTERPRISE (Gaza & West Bank) NUMBER OF LOANS 2014 11,288 - 9,788 10,924 2,967 34,967 VALUE OF LOANS 2014 (US$) 11,778,457 - 3,159,691 14,669,492 4,768,590 34,376,230 NUMBER OF LOANS AWARDED (cumulative)3 68,043 - 82,035 101,290 108,593 359,961 VALUE OF LOANS AWARDED (US$) (cumulative)3 83,171,394 - 50,085,717 143,212,582 126,093,693 402,563,386 STAFF POSTS AREA STAFF 6,880 2,882 3,305 4,820 12,488 30,718(4) INTERNATIONAL STAFF 10 15 17 24 30 182(4)

(1) All Syria figures represent a working estimate as the situation in Syria remains volatile (2) This figure is based on data supplied voluntarily to UNRWA by registered refugees, and hence may not represent statistically-valid demographic data (3) Totals since programme inception: 1991/92 in Gaza, 1996 in West Bank, 2003 in Syria and Jordan (4) Agency total includes staff in HQ Amman Page 124 of 162 General Fund Expenditure* General Fund Budget* General Fund Deficit aboutUNRWA unrwa is funded almost15 entirely 2014 2015 by voluntary contributions, and financial support has not kept education pace with increased demand for health services due to growing numbers relief and social services of registered refugees, deepening poverty and conflict. As a result, infrastructure and camp the UNRWA General Fund, US$ US$ improvement 732 744 which supports core essential support departments million million services and most staffing costs, faces chronic deficits. UNRWA emergency programmes and key projects are funded through separate funding portals and face large deficits. *Biennial cash and inkind budget prepared in 2013. The General Fund requires a cash budget of US$ 677 to maintain operations in 2015.

Persons Registered for UNRWA Services Pupil Enrolment at UNRWA Schools 5.6 million 2014 5.3 million 2012 479,000 485,500 493,500 5 million 2008-2009 2011-2012 2014-2015 2010

Non-Communicable Disease (NCD) Care UNRWA Gaza Emergency Shelter Programme

NCD cases 231,000 Palestine under care 138,630* refugees receiving NCD Palestine refugee care from UNRWA in 2014 homes impacted: 250,000 9,117 200,000 totally demolished 150,000 US$ 720 = million 4,979 severe damage 100,000 required to support shelter 3,635 50,000 needs resulting from major damage the 2014 conflict 0 120,899 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013* 2014 minor damage

*2013 figure excludes data from Syria *Figures as of 6 July 2015 and pending final assessment results

Occupied Palestinian Territory Emergency Appeal 2015 Syria Emergency Appeal 2015

$129m food assistance $58m food assistance $249m cash $1m explosive remnants of war assistance $127m education $33m education shelter $2m protection $17m environmental health $5m emergency health $17m health * $5m operations support officers * US$ 414 US$ $17 capacity and management $5m Gaza summer fun weeks 415 support $6m environmental health million million $12m non-food items $8m community mental health $3m safety and security $8m emergency education $3m protection $15m coordination, safety, $3m livelihoods security & management $2m emergency repair and $20m cash assistance maintenance $84m emergency cash-for-work $1m shelter

*Gaza US$ 366.5m, West Bank US$ 47m, HQ US$ 1m *Syria US$ 329m, Lebanon US$ 64m, Jordan US$ 16m, Regional US$ 6m

Page 125 of 162 16

Asi Fields of operation LEBANON Population by eld*

1,349,473 2,212,917

942,184

Litani 591,780 493,134

Hasbani Jordan SYRIA Lebanon MEDITERRANEAN SEA Syria West Bank Gaza Strip

Total: 5,589,488 GOLAN

LAKE TIBERIAS

ISRAEL

Jordan

WEST BANK

JORDAN

DEAD SEA

GAZA *Total persons registered with UNRWA. STRIP Page 126 of 162 All gures as of January 2015 about unrwa 17

Asi Fields of operation LEBANON Population by eld*

1,349,473 2,212,917

942,184

Litani 591,780 493,134

Hasbani Jordan SYRIA Lebanon MEDITERRANEAN SEA Syria West Bank Gaza Strip

Total: 5,589,488 GOLAN

LAKE دائرة العالقاتاخلارجيةواالتصال TIBERIAS األونروا - القدس العنوان البريدي: ص.ب: 19149، 91191 القدس الشرقية هـ : القدس: 5890224 )2 972+(، ف : 5890274 )2 +972( هـ : غزة: 7527 / 6777533 )8 972+(، ف : ISRAEL )+972 2( 6777697

communications division Jordan unrwa jerusalem po box 19149, 91191 east jerusalem

t: jerusalem (+972 2) 589 0224, f: jerusalem (+972 2) 589 0274 t: gaza (+972 8) 677 7533/7527, f: gaza (+972 8) 677 7697

WEST www.unrwa.org BANK

JORDAN وكالة األمم المتحدة إلغاثة وتشغيل united nations relief and works agency الالجئين الفلسطينيين في الشرق األدنى for palestine refugees in the near east

DEAD SEA

GAZA *Total persons registered with UNRWA. STRIP All gures as of January 2015 Page 127 of 162 Page 128 of 162 in figures as of 1 jan 2015

JORDAN LEBANON SYRIA(1) WEST BANK GAZA STRIP TOTAL/AVE

GENERAL REGISTERED REFUGEES (RR) 2,117,361 452,669 528,616 774,167 1,276,929 5,149,742 OTHER REGISTERED PERSONS 95,556 40,465 63,164 168,017 72,544 439,746 TOTAL REGISTERED PERSONS (RP) 2,212,917 493,134 591,780 942,184 1,349,473 5,589,488 INCREASE IN RP OVER PREVIOUS YEAR (%) 2.7 2 3.9 3 3 3 % OF RP EACH FIELD OF OPERATION 39.6 8.8 10.6 16.9 24.1 100 OFFICIAL CAMPS 10 12 9 19 8 58 RP REGISTERED TO CAMPS (RPCs) (2) 385,418 249,410 178,666 228,560 560,964 1,603,018 RPCs AS % OF RPs 17.4 50.6 30.2 24.3 41.6 28.7 EDUCATION - 2014-2015 ACADEMIC YEAR SCHOOLS (ELEM, PREP + SECONDARY IN LEBANON) 174 68 94 97 252 685 EDUCATIONAL STAFF 5,301 1,915 2,503 2,783 9,422 21,924 FEMALE EDUCATIONAL STAFF (%) 49.1 53.5 57.8 58.5 59.5 56.2 PUPIL ENROLMENT 118,546 38,173 45,802 50,566 240,413 493,500 FEMALE PUPILS (%) 48.8 52.6 48.9 58.4 48.4 49.9 COST PER ELEMENTARY PUPIL (US$) (2013-2014) 805 1,469 563 1,375 709 878 COST PER PREPARATORY PUPIL (US$) (2013-2014) 1,072 2,228 678 1,726 1,082 1,249 VOCATIONAL & TECHNICAL TRAINING CENTRES (VTTCs) 2 1 1 2 2 8 VTTC ENROLMENT 2,451 1,143 930 1,093 1,617 7,234 EDUCATIONAL SCIENCES FACULTIES 1 0 0 1 0 2 EDUCATIONAL SCIENCES FACULTY ENROLMENT 1,295 0 0 662 0 1,957 HEALTH PRIMARY HEALTH CARE FACILITIES (PHCF) 23 27 23 42 22 137 HEALTH STAFF 739 357 437 789 1,016 3,338 FEMALE HEALTH STAFF (%) 58.2 48.5 53.5 61.6 60.5 58.1 PHCFs WITH DENTAL SERVICES (including mobile units) 33 19 14 23 21 110 ANNUAL ANTENATAL CARE PATIENTS 26,634 5,165 3,600 13,670 39,546 88,615 ANNUAL PERINATAL CARE PATIENTS 20,838 4,421 2,228 10,871 37,589 75,947 ANNUAL DIABETES/HYPERTENSION PATIENTS 73,557 28,058 20,210 37,869 71,433 231,127 TOTAL ANNUAL PATIENT VISITS 1,721,440 1,276,153 983,635 1,293,960 4,181,967 9,457,155 RELIEF & SOCIAL SERVICES SOCIAL SAFETY NET/SPECIAL HARDSHIP CASES (SSN/SHC) 58,889 61,648 38,752 35,993 98,870 294,152 SSN/SHC AS % OF RPs 2.8 13.6 7.3 4.6 7.7 5.7 WOMEN'S PROGRAMME CENTRES 14 8 13 19 7 61 COMMUNITY REHABILITATION CENTRES 10 1 5 15 6 37 COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT CENTRES 1 0 3 0 0 4 COMMUNITY-MANAGED FUND SCHEMES 11 7 5 15 0 38 RELIEF AND SOCIAL SERVICES STAFF 123 146 113 188 349 919 FEMALE RELIEF AND SOCIAL SERVICES STAFF (%) 71.5 65.1 61.9 47.9 45.3 54.5 MICROFINANCE & MICROENTERPRISE (Gaza & West Bank) NUMBER OF LOANS 2014 11,288 - 9,788 10,924 2,967 34,967 VALUE OF LOANS 2014 (US$) 11,778,457 - 3,159,691 14,669,492 4,768,590 34,376,230 NUMBER OF LOANS AWARDED (cumulative)3 68,043 - 82,035 101,290 108,593 359,961 VALUE OF LOANS AWARDED (US$) (cumulative)3 83,171,394 - 50,085,717 143,212,582 126,093,693 402,563,386 STAFF POSTS AREA STAFF 6,880 2,882 3,305 4,820 12,488 30,718(4) INTERNATIONAL STAFF 10 15 17 24 30 182(4)

(1) All Syria figures represent a working estimate as the situation in Syria remains volatile (2) This figure is based on data supplied voluntarily to UNRWA by registered refugees, and hence may not represent statistically-valid demographic data (3) Totals since programme inception: 1991/92 in Gaza, 1996 in West Bank, 2003 in Syria and Jordan (4) Agency total includes staff in HQ Amman Page 129 of 162 General Fund Budget* General Fund Budget* General Fund Deficit 2014 2015 UNRWA is funded almost entirely by voluntary contributions, and education financial support has not kept pace with increased demand for health services due to growing numbers relief and social services of registered refugees, deepening infrastructure and camp poverty and conflict. As a result, US$ 732 US$ 744 improvement the UNRWA General Fund, support departments which supports core essential million million services and most staffing costs, faces chronic deficits. UNRWA emergency programmes and key projects are funded through separate funding portals and face large deficits. *Biennial cash and inkind budget prepared in 2013. The General Fund requires a cash budget of US$ 677 to maintain operations in 2015.

Persons Registered for UNRWA Services Pupil Enrolment at UNRWA Schools 5.6 million 2014 5.3 million 2012 479,000 485,500 493,500 5 million 2008-2009 2011-2012 2014-2015 2010

Non-Communicable Disease (NCD) Care UNRWA Gaza Emergency Shelter Programme

NCD cases 231,000 Palestine under care 138,630* refugees receiving NCD Palestine refugee care from UNRWA in 2014 homes impacted: 250,000 9,117 200,000 totally demolished 150,000 US$ 720 = million 4,979 severe damage 100,000 required to support shelter 3,635 50,000 needs resulting from major damage the 2014 conflict 0 120,899 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013* 2014 minor damage

*2013 figure excludes data from Syria *Figures as of 6 July 2015 and pending final assessment results

Occupied Palestinian Territory Emergency Appeal 2015 Syria Emergency Appeal 2015

$129m food assistance $58m food assistance $249m cash $1m explosive remnants of war assistance $127m education $33m education shelter $2m protection $17m environmental health $5m emergency health $17m health * $5m operations support officers * US$ 414 US$ $17 capacity and management $5m Gaza summer fun weeks 415 support $6m environmental health million million $12m non-food items $8m community mental health $3m safety and security $8m emergency education $3m protection $15m coordination, safety, $3m livelihoods security & management $2m emergency repair and $20m cash assistance maintenance $84m emergency cash-for-work $1m shelter

*Gaza US$ 366.5m, West Bank US$ 47m, HQ US$ 1m *Syria US$ 329m, Lebanon US$ 64m, Jordan US$ 16m, Regional US$ 6m

COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION, UNRWA HEADQUARTERS, JERUSALEM, June 2015 Not an official documentPage 130| For information of 162 only | www.unrwa.org Commission services (DG NEAR leading) non-paper for the upcoming EP CONT mission to Jordan/Lebanon. 4th August 2016

OVERVIEW OF EU ASSISTANCE TO UNRWA - LEBANON AND JORDAN

General overview Originally envisaged as a temporary organisation to meet the needs of refugees from Palestine in 1948, the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) is the largest UN operation in the Middle East, currently responsible for over 900 installations with 30,000 staff across the five fields of operations (West Bank, Gaza Strip, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon). UNRWA's ability to provide services is almost entirely dependent on voluntary contributions from donors. UN HQ funds only the salaries of the relatively small number of expatriate staff. Despite increased funding from most of the Agency’s traditional donors, and successful efforts to broaden and diversify the income sources in the last years, these have been outpaced by demand caused by the prevailing conflicts in most fields of operation and deteriorating economic conditions in all of them. Since 1971, the EU has contributed annually to UNRWA's core budget. For the period 2014-2016, contributions to the core budget (now referred to as the Programme Budget) have been framed within the EU-UNRWA Joint Declaration indicatively committing annually €82 million. This agreement has offered the agency much needed predictability in sustaining its core programmes. This year's EU contribution was disbursed in May 2016 and came at a crucial time allowing UNRWA to continue its core operations without disruption while carrying out crucial reforms. A new Joint Declaration agreement for the upcoming period 2017-2020 is currently in preparation and at the time of writing the Inter Service Consultation is about to be launched. Compared to the existing Joint Declaration, the new draft version underlines UNRWA's commitments towards i) focusing on its core priorities, ii) pursuing its internal reform process, iii) developing its resource mobilization strategy towards non-traditional donors and iv) ensuring better transparency and complementarity of all UNRWA programmes in the region. In the event of additional EU contributions, priority will be given to support for the Programme Budget. A harmonized approach will be adopted across all EU financing instruments: all project funding would be aligned and subject to 7% Project Support Costs (PSC), while the EU contribution to the Programme Budget would remain without PSC or management fees of any kind. Such costs will therefore be charged for projects funded from Lebanon's bilateral ENI allocation.

Financial Situation Despite UNRWA's commitment to a zero growth budget in 2016, reform initiatives and cost containment measures, its financial crisis is far from over. The Agency is again forecasting a USD 74 million ((against USD 101 million in 2015) deficit threatening to disrupt UNRWA's core education, health and relief programmes. The Agency is targeting Gulf Co-operation Council countries (Saudi Arabia, UAE and Kuwait) as well as Canada to fill this gap (with US$ 20 million each) and has requested top donors' political commitment and support for this effort. The EU and its Member States support internal measures taken by the Agency’s management to contain costs, increase efficiency and continue the implementation of unpopular reforms. These are seen as necessary to protect UNRWA's core programmes.

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Page 131 of 162 Despite the crises in the region the EU, along with its Member States, remains the largest–and most predictable-provider of international assistance to Palestine refugees, contributing over half (US$ 184 million) of all donor support to UNRWA's Programme Budget, and about 40 % (US $ 214 million) of all contributions to the Agency's 2016 overall operations. In addition to our financial contributions, we also assure UNRWA of our continued political support necessary to mobilise needed resources and enhance the operational environment. The funding to UNRWA general budget from the EU budget for the period 2014 - 2016 amount to €246 million (on average €82 million per annum), as per the Joint Declaration signed between the Commission and UNRWA. In 2015, an additional €20 million were allocated by the Commission from ENI funds for the Agency's General Budget, bringing the total GF contribution to €102 million.. These funds were transferred from the Emergency Assistance Reserve. In addition to this regular contribution, UNRWA receives funding from the EU budget by implementing projects financed through Humanitarian Aid, Lebanon's bi-lateral allocation from the European Neighbourhood Instrument, ENI funds allocated for the Syria Crisis and, most recently the EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis (Madad Fund).. In recent years, the budget of UNRWA has been affected by a chronic deficit, due to a high birth rate among the refugee population, increased financial needs following the Syria war and renewed conflict in Gaza, decreased contributions by some donors, negative exchange rate and a growing percentage of the Palestinian population needing assistance. The 2016 EU budget contribution to UNRWA of EUR 82 million has been already made, thereby allowing the Agency to continue its activities without disruption, while at the same time being enabled tp pursue its reforms in order to regain financial sustainability. Recently, members of EP Budget Committee have been on an exploratory mission to Jordan and Lebanon. During their mission they received complaints from the Agency that the Commission is carrying out an excessive number of Verifications (audits).. In fact the Commission is in the course of performing 12 such verifications over 2015 and 2016 in Lebanon, which were all part of the Commission services' audit plans for these years due to the medium risk profile of projects implemented by UNRWA. Since 2000, EU has provided over €1.6 billion to UNRWA out of the allocation for Palestine from the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) and its predecessors. Most EU aid for UNRWA, in particular the €82 million per year for the period 2014-2016, has gone to finance its General Fund (now called Programme Budget). On top of this, there are ad hoc temporary projects financed via other instruments managed by ECHO and FPI. ECHO funding to UNRWA amounted to €5 million in 2015 (of which, €4 M for shelter assistance in Gaza). In 2015, the EU also contributed €10 million to the UNRWA Syria Emergency appeal for Palestinian refugees. In 2016 EU contributed already with € 82 million to the programme budget, € 10 million from ECHO and the Madad Fund is preparing a programme for €15 million to assist Palestine Refugees from Syria who have fled to Lebanon and Jordan.

UNRWA in Jordan With 2.1 million registered refugees, Jordan is the largest of UNRWA's 5 Operational fields. Nevertheless, despite representing around 40% of the total number of registered refugees, Jordan accounts for only around 20% of the expenditure. The reason is principally due to the fact that 95% of the refugees have full Jordanian citizenship, entailing the right to employment. The exception is the 150,000 "Gaza "refugees who do not have citizenship and cannot work in the public sector (very largely defined in Jordan as including hospitals, schools, banks, insurance companies etc). Only around 20% of registered refugees, generally the poorest, live in camps. UNRWA is the second largest employer in the country behind the government. Schools follow the Jordanian curriculum 2

Page 132 of 162 and respect Jordanian pay scales for teachers. This was problematic in the recent past when the government increased teacher salaries and UNRWA was obliged to follow suit, despite having no budgetary provision for such an event. The organisation's financial reserves have been wiped out many years ago. Jordan is perhaps the classic case of the tension between donors and host countries, which manifests itself in the Advisory Committee (ADCOM), held in Jordan every June and November. Donors traditionally call on host countries to shoulder part of the burden, particularly in the case of Palestinians holding citizenship. Host countries respond that they did not create this crisis and should not pay the cost. Given Jordan's already over-burdened budgetary situation in the context of the Syrian refugee crisis, this is probably not the most appropriate time to ask for a greater effort on its part, although some gestures could no doubt be made. The Jordanian government "Department of Palestinian Affairs" is affiliated to the Foreign Ministry.

UNRWA in Lebanon As of May 2016, there are 40,739 Palestinian refugees from Syria (PRS) and around 270,000 Palestine refugees living from Lebanon (PRL; 504,376 registered). Lebanon’s stability, including its security and economy, are likely to continue to be negatively affected by the ongoing conflict in Syria and the more than one million Syrian refugees it is hosting. It is assumed that stresses generated by a large refugee population, including PRL, PRS and Syrian refugees, coupled with limited national resources and a challenged economy, will further impact on Lebanon’s policy towards refugees from Syria. Due to this, it is anticipated that Palestine Refugees from Syria (PRS) will continue to remain particularly vulnerable due to the lack of their legal status, and at risk of "refoulement".

Within this context, and even under normal circumstances, UNRWA in Lebanon struggles to meet the needs of a refugee population with limited rights and severely curtailed access to public services and job opportunities. In the absence of access to public services and infrastructure, UNRWA is responsible for coordinating the provision of education, health, relief and social services and the delivery of infrastructure within each of the twelve camps in Lebanon. The arrival of additional refugees from Syria substantially increases the burden on both Palestinian host communities and UNRWA's already stretched services. With no immediate end in sight to the crisis in Syria, it is likely that PRS in Lebanon will continue to remain for the foreseeable future although some movements towards third countries (especially to Europe) were noticed in the past year.

Palestine Refugees in Lebanon (PRL) have been present in the country since 1948. Among the PRL today, 62% live in the 12 camps across the country, whilst the remaining population reside in the 42 gatherings spread over five areas of operations (Tyre, Saida, North Lebanon, Central Lebanon (including Beirut), and Bekaa).

Palestine refugees in Lebanon, often qualified as a ‘protracted refugee population’1, have limited rights and curtailed access to public services and job opportunities. The restrictive Lebanese labour law prevents PRL from accessing liberal professions (36 syndicated professions in total) and reinforces social exclusion. Palestine refugees have no right to own land and significant numbers reside in camps – often with access difficulties as a result of closure and controls.

As confirmed in the survey on the socioeconomic status of Palestine refugees (American University of Beirut 2015), levels of food insecurity and poverty in Palestine refugee camps and gatherings in the country are high and increasing. Rates of unemployment, especially for women and youth, are alarming. Despite Palestine refugees having strong human capital as a result of the education and health structures provided by UNRWA and in some respects the Government of Lebanon as well as other actors, the majority of Palestine refugees do not have access to the full range of assets required for sustainable livelihoods, including those required to develop coping strategies and build resilience. Pockets of poverty, exclusion and marginalization are a major concern and the camps and gatherings in Lebanon need to receive more attention and greater efforts need to be made to bring Palestinian

1 Source: AUB Survey 2010 3

Page 133 of 162 communities and neighbouring communities together.

The Palestine refugee population in Lebanon is very young with an average of 30.3 years old in average (PRS are even younger). UNRWA provides primary and secondary education services through a network of around 67 schools and 1,483 teachers. Early Childhood Education is not covered by UNRWA. It is believed that less than 50% of the children attend kindergartens. Most of the kindergartens are operated by Islamic civil society organisations and there are no minimum qualifications for their teachers. This creates lack of school preparedness amongst many children and hampers normal teaching processes especially in key grades 1 to 3. While PRL enrolment is close to 97.2 per cent in elementary, 84.2 per cent in preparatory and 61.2 per cent in secondary schools, PRS enrolment is 88.3, 69.6 and 35.8 per cent for the same respective cycles for the same year. PRS enrolment is significantly higher for camp residents (93.7 per cent) compared to students residing in areas outside the camps (82.6 per cent), indicating the negative impact that restrictions on movement and a lack of access to means of transportation may have on children accessing education outside of camps.

Drop-out rates are very high. This is linked in part to the quality of education, the overcrowding in schools, lack of proper diagnostic of learning disabilities and the socio-economic situation of most of the Palestine refugees families. Those children with parents with low or no education are more at risk of dropping out. The poverty headcount rate is significantly higher when the head of the household has a low level of education. According to UNRWA, there are 900 PRS students in Lebanon with special education needs. Many more may not have been properly diagnosed and others do not receive any type of support. Children with disabilities and with special needs are especially vulnerable.

The Education reform continues to move in the right direction but monitoring of results is still weak. A new EMIS system has been designed and its implementation should provide more and better data and information for decision making and monitoring and evaluation of interventions.

The general cooperation programme for Palestine refugees in Lebanon target four main pillars: 1) infrastructure, 2) Education and Employment, 3) Humanitarian aid and 4) PRS. The EU, in partnership with UNRWA and NGOs, focuses its support on improving the physical living conditions in the camps and on children and youth who constitute over half of the Palestinian population in Lebanon.

There are two Vocational Education and Training (VET) centres: a small one in the north of the country and the Siblin Traning Center (STC) that has more than 1,000 students per year. UNRWA VET system is believed to be better than the Lebanese public VET, but requires urgent upgrading and more applied relevant competence and skills driven practice otherwise it is at risk of becoming outdated. Equipment is old, some programmes are too traditional and trainers lack proper technical and pedagogical skills. VET could provide access to the labour market for Palestine refugees although salaries in semi-skilled jobs in Lebanon are very low. Some UNRWA VET graduates end up working in a foreign country, especially in the Gulf. However, this is getting increasingly more difficult due to visa restrictions.

Assistance to UNRWA in Lebanon

The last contract signed with UNRWA was for PRS education (contract ENPI/2014/351-221) at the end of 2014 which supported the agency in providing education and vital psycho-social support to the additional case load of Palestine refugees from Syria. €5 Million are scheduled for signature in 2016 in support to shelter rehabilitation.

The EU has been a key supporter of the reconstruction of Nahr el-Bared Camp (NBC). This intervention – which constitutes the single largest endeavour undertaken by an UN agency – is notably supported since 2012 under the Instrument for Stability (€ 12M). This intervention has allowed UNRWA to return to date 297 families to their newly reconstructed apartments and the completion of

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Page 134 of 162 62 retail units. Following the request made by the Lebanese authorities during the London Conference in February 2016, the EU is now considering the possibility to provide further support under the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP).

To avoid duplication and maximize the effects of interventions, UNRWA has several coordination mechanisms including donor meetings, partner meetings and working groups. Furthermore, UNRWA stays in consistent dialogue with partners and donors in order to ensure that funds are allocated where most urgently needed.

UNRWA will build its resilience interventions on previous actions supported by the EU. The proposed action builds on the following projects: ENPI/2012/301-709 and ENPI/2014/351-221. In Lebanon, the EU is the largest donor to UNRWA’s education programme, with the most recent contribution under the project ENPI/2012/301-709. In addition, actions are complemented by the European Union’s support to Emergency education for Palestine refugees from Syria in Lebanon most recently through ENPI/2014/351-221 and actions have been coordinated with proposed interventions under the MADAD Fund.

On 22 June 2016 the board of the Madad EU Regional Trust Fund took a decision amounting to EUR 15 million to support UNRWA in Lebanon and Jordan for a programme of 2 years to build the resilience of Palestine refugees from Syria displaced to Lebanon and Jordan. The Jordan component will focus on cash assistance whilst the Lebanon component will support cash assistance and education. The education activities to be supported by the Lebanon component include the following activities inter alia: additional teaching staff capacity, remedial and recreational programmes, health education, back to school campaign, transportation, etc.

The MADAD project and the proposed AAP 2016 intervention will be mutually reinforcing and complementary. UNRWA will build on the most successful and adaptable components of these projects, and bring them together to support an integrated approach to building the resilience for Palestine refugees in Lebanon.

Assistance to UNRWA in Jordan With the exception of the projects for supporting Palestine Refugees from Syria (PRS) cited above, the only recent funding to Jordan was in 2012 to improve shelters in Jerash Camp, occupied mainly by "Gaza" Refugees. A new project to support PRS in both Lebanon and Syria, for a value of €15 million was approved by the Madad EU Regional Trust Fund in June 2016.

Humanitarian background (ECHO) Background on Palestine ECHO, in 2016, provided €22.65 million of humanitarian funding. This support was used for emergency response and preparedness to unpredictable but recurrent humanitarian needs emerging from occupation and International Humanitarian Law breaches (demolitions, evictions, settlers’ violence, the Gaza blockade). Out of this amount, €5 million was allocated to UNRWA to provide humanitarian assistance in Gaza (€ 4 million) and the West Bank (€ 1 million). ECHO and UNRWA officials in the field are currently conducting the necessary technical discussions ahead of the 2016 grant signature in order to support the relocation of IDPs in the severely damaged houses. The grant agreement for UNRWA protection operation in the West Bank (€1 million) is already signed for 2016.

Background on Syria Since the beginning of the crisis, ECHO has supported UNRWA operations with a total of EUR 24 million, mainly for inside Syria operations (€22.2 million) with €1.5 million allotted to UNRWA in Lebanon and €0.29 million in Jordan..

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Page 136 of 162 EC FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS TO UNRWA 2000-2014 (in € million) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Contribution to General Fund 40,24 57,25 55,00 57,75 60,64 63,67 64,41 66,00 66,00 66,00 86,00 86,46 91,86 91,79 87,00 102,00 Organisational development 1,00 1,00 Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system 1,00 Humanitarian Aid Total 28,92 32,82 16,43 26,67 21,63 22,50 36,40 17,15 39,00 21,33 16,56 14,37 15,75 17,03 7,95 Humanitarian Aid Budget Line1 15,78 18,77 2,19 11,76 8,63 8,50 21,40 7,00 6,50 2,13 2,49 Food Aid (SHCs) 13,14 14,05 14,24 14,91 13,00 14,00 15,00 10,15 15,00 9,38 2 2 Emergency Appeal Food Distribution (Gaza and Lebanon) 17,50 9,82 12,07 West Bank protection 0,92 0,75 0,75 1,00 1,00 Gaza Strip food 11 8,78 6,25 5,00 4,00 Gaza Crisis Response * Lebanon food 1,248 1,00 1,00 Lebanon protection 1,2 0,22 Syria crisis - Pal ref Jor Leb Syria (Syria HIP) 3,50 9,03 1,95 5,00 Syria crisis - Pal ref Leb (Leb HIP) 1,50 Crisis Response (IcSP) ( former IfS) Nahr el Bared - Lebanon (coord. & rubble removal) 6,40 Mitigate conflict triggers in gaza 5,2 3 Gaza Early Recovery (job creation programme)³ 13,00 14,36 5 Support to displaced refugees in Northern Lebanon 5,13 Syria: addressing exclusion of Palestine refugees 4,73 Gaza Early Recovery add. (health, environment) 5,50 Nahr el Bared - Lebanon 12,00 12,00 Building resilience conflict affected Pal Ref - Lebanon & Syria 7,50 5,00 Ad hoc support projects Food Facility - SHCs 39,70 Food Security - SHCs 4,00 5,00 5,00 5,00 5,00 5,00 Peace Agreement - Emergency Gaza Package 20,00 Camp Improvement projects 14,60 7,43 4,00 2,00 MEDA - Employment opportunities (Leb, Syr, Jor) 10,00 10,00 MEDA - Refugee records and data collection programme 1,00 1,00 MEDA & ENPI - Scholarship programmes (Lebanon) 1,09 3,00 4,28 2,10 ENPI - UNRWA Events in Brussels 0,20 0,20 ENPI - Palestine (SHCs) 4,00 ENPI - Nahr el Bared Camp - Lebanon 5,00 ENPI - Palestine (Quality Education Services) 10,00 ENPI - Summer Games 1,00 ENPI - Protecting Vulnerable Palestine Refugees in Syria ENPI - Protecting Vulnerable Refugees in lebanon 1,50 ENPI - Protecting Vulnerable Refugees in jordan 2,00 ENPI - Protecting Vulnerable Palestine Refugees in Syria 2,70 13,20 10,00 10,00 ENPI - LebanonSyria - Engaging "improving Youth, infrastructure phase II in Palestinian 7,30 Refugee camps in Lebanon" 5,95 8,00 5,00 ENPI - Lebanon "Education, Traning & Employment support for the Palestinan Refugees in Lebanon" 13,45 5,20 ENPI - Lebanon/Syria "Infrastructure Palestine Refugees" ENPI - Lebanon/Syria "Education for the Palestinan Refugees in Lebanon" TOTAL ANNUAL 83,76 90,07 71,43 91,85 103,27 97,26 111,81 100,55 120,00 175,87 104,56 142,39 143,60 157,22 118,65 130,00 1 includes Emergency Appeal Food Distribution in Gaza until 2007, Flash Appeal Gaza 2009, Protection West Bank 2009/2010 and Protection Lebanon 2010 2 as of 2008 funded out of the Food Aid Budget Line ³ 2011 contribution part of Socio-Economic stabilization support package for the Gaza Strip * Under approval procedure updated: 02.03.16 Page 137 of 162 EC FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS TO UNRWA 2000-2014 (in € million)

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Contribution to General Fund 40,24 57,25 55,00 57,75 60,64 63,67 64,41 66,00 66,00 66,00 86,00 86,46 91,86 91,79 87,00 102,00 82,00 Organisational development 1,00 1,00 Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system 1,00 Humanitarian Aid Total 28,92 32,82 16,43 26,67 21,63 22,50 36,40 17,15 39,00 21,33 16,56 14,37 15,75 17,03 7,95 Humanitarian Aid Budget Line 1 15,78 18,77 2,19 11,76 8,63 8,50 21,40 7,00 6,50 2,13 2,49 Food Aid (SHCs) 13,14 14,05 14,24 14,91 13,00 14,00 15,00 10,15 15,00 9,38 2 2 Emergency Appeal Food Distribution (Gaza and Lebanon) 17,50 9,82 12,07 West Bank protection 0,92 0,75 0,75 1,00 1,00 1,00 Gaza Strip food 11 8,78 6,25 5,00 Gaza Strip shelter 4,00 4,00 Gaza crisis response Lebanon food 1,248 1,00 1,00 Lebanon protection 1,2 0,22 Syria crisis - Pal ref Jor Leb Syria (Syria HIP) 3,50 9,03 1,95 5,00 5,00 Syria crisis - Pal ref Leb (Leb HIP) 1,50 Crisis Response (IcSP) ( former IfS) Nahr el Bared - Lebanon (coord. & rubble removal) 6,40 Mitigate conflict triggers in gaza 5,2 Gaza Early Recovery (job creation programme) ³ 13,00 14,36 5,00 3 Support to displaced refugees in Northern Lebanon 5,13 Syria: addressing exclusion of Palestine refugees 4,73 Gaza Early Recovery add. (health, environment) 5,50 Nahr el Bared - Lebanon 12,00 12,00 Building resilience conflict affected Pal Ref - Lebanon & Syria 7,50 5,00 Ad hoc support projects Food Facility - SHCs 39,70 Food Security - SHCs 4,00 5,00 5,00 5,00 5,00 5,00 Peace Agreement - Emergency Gaza Package 20,00 Camp Improvement projects 14,60 7,43 4,00 2,00 MEDA - Employment opportunities (Leb, Syr, Jor) 10,00 10,00 MEDA - Refugee records and data collection programme 1,00 1,00 MEDA & ENPI - Scholarship programmes (Lebanon) 1,09 3,00 4,28 2,10 ENPI - UNRWA Events in Brussels 0,20 0,20 ENPI - Palestine (SHCs) 4,00 ENPI - Nahr el Bared Camp - Lebanon 5,00 ENPI - Palestine (Quality Education Services) 10,00 ENPI - Summer Games 1,00 ENPI - Protecting Vulnerable Palestine Refugees in Syria ENPI - Protecting Vulnerable Refugees in lebanon 1,50 ENPI - Protecting Vulnerable Refugees in jordan 2,00 ENPI - Protecting Vulnerable Palestine Refugees in Syria 2,70 13,20 10,00 10,00 ENPI - Syria - Engaging Youth, phase II 7,30 ENPI - Lebanon "improving infrastructure in Palestinian Refugee camps in Lebanon" 5,95 8,00 5,00 ENPI - Lebanon "Education, Traning & Employment support for the Palestinan Refugees in Lebanon" 13,45 5,20 ENPI - Lebanon/Syria "Infrastructure Palestine Refugees" ENPI - Lebanon/Syria "Education for the Palestinan Refugees in Lebanon" TOTAL ANNUAL 83,76 90,07 71,43 91,85 103,27 97,26 111,81 100,55 120,00 175,87 104,56 142,39 143,60 157,22 118,65 130,00 92,00 1 includes Emergency Appeal Food Distribution in Gaza until 2007, Flash Appeal Gaza 2009, Protection West Bank 2009/2010 and Protection Lebanon 2010 2 as of 2008 funded out of the Food Aid Budget Line ³ 2011 contribution part of Socio-Economic stabilization support package for the Gaza Strip * pipeline updated: 8.4.16

Page 138 of 162 Pledges to UNRWA (Cash and In-kind) for 2015 - Overall Donor Ranking in USD As 31 December 2015

Donor Programme Non - Programme Budget Grand Total Donor Budget Projects Syria Appeal Gaza Recovery Emergency NBC Relief NBC Total Ranking Appeal & Reconstruction (oPt) Reconstruction

USA 158,732,992 7,372,884 97,487,240 20,000,000 95,000,000 2,000,000 221,860,124 380,593,116 1

European Union 111,539,994 14,176,693 5,530,973 5,504,283 25,211,949 136,751,943 2

United Kingdom 51,349,547 2,891,933 42,279,731 3,081,664 48,253,328 99,602,875 3 Saudi Arabia 21,000,000 23,500,000 36,500,000 15,000,000 75,000,000 96,000,000 4

Germany 11,173,785 11,376,085 17,271,715 32,870,849 15,735,280 3,296,703 80,550,632 91,724,417 5

Sweden 35,859,431 4,803,389 4,770,423 9,573,812 45,433,243 6

Islamic Development Bank (IDB) 0 40,000,000 40,000,000 40,000,000 7

Japan 24,956,393 270,470 200,000 14,034,375 14,504,845 39,461,238 8

Kuwait 17,000,000 15,000,000 15,000,000 32,000,000 9

Norway 21,794,642 2,670,361 1,593,892 1,992,397 576,967 6,833,617 28,628,259 10

Switzerland 23,761,329 933,182 933,182 24,694,511 11

Netherlands 16,932,211 166,375 4,326,347 4,492,722 21,424,933 12

U.A.E. 16,799,937 0 16,799,937 13

Australia 11,448,688 4,347,799 32,495 4,380,294 15,828,982 14

Denmark 14,077,077 188,287 188,287 14,265,364 15 UNICEF 378,384 9,819,686 2,970,702 12,790,388 13,168,772 16

Belgium (including Flanders) 6,991,206 300,307 1,641,138 2,680,525 4,621,970 11,613,176 17

Italy 7,853,844 620,638 1,089,325 1,709,963 9,563,807 18

France (including Municipalities) 8,025,596 455,572 3,989 459,561 8,485,157 19

UAE Red Crescent 0 8,004,634 8,004,634 8,004,634 20

Ireland 4,241,782 1,106,195 1,629,124 2,735,319 6,977,101 21

Finland 4,781,759 459,375 1,083,424 1,542,799 6,324,558 22

Islamic Relief USA 96,554 1,224,942 250,000 4,598,390 6,073,332 6,169,886 23

CERF 0 6,050,035 6,050,035 6,050,035 24

Luxembourg 5,734,517 137,033 137,033 5,871,550 25

Turkey 1,500,000 4,105,397 4,105,397 5,605,397 26

Spain (including regional governments) 2,230,222 772,720 1,579,306 945,893 3,297,919 5,528,141 27

Education Above All Foundation 0 4,612,022 4,612,022 4,612,022 28

WFP 0 4,539,528 4,539,528 4,539,528 29

Brazil 705,659 1,066,266 2,015,773 3,082,039 3,787,698 30

Korea R.O 1,202,074 1,584,822 1,584,822 2,786,896 31

Russia 2,000,000 0 2,000,000 32

Austria 1,686,683 0 1,686,683 33

American Friends of UNRWA 20,000 57,000 381,756 1,208,020 1,646,776 1,666,776 34

Jordan 1,525,152 0 1,525,152 35

Opec Fund For International Development 0 1,500,000 1,500,000 1,500,000 36

Palestine 1,426,821 0 1,426,821 37

India 1,000,000 0 1,000,000 38

MBC Group MBC Al-Amal 0 499,978 499,978 999,956 999,956 39

ICRC 0 940,780 940,780 940,780 40

OCHA 0 899,955 899,955 899,955 41

Al-Khair Foundation 777,605 0 777,605 42

Oman 0 741,879 741,879 741,879 43

New Zealand 708,200 0 708,200 44

RKK 540,552 43,000 43,000 583,552 45

Saudi Committee 0 574,400 574,400 574,400 46

WHO 385,754 144,712 144,712 530,466 47

Toms Shoes 0 420,213 420,213 420,213 48

UNRWA Spanish Committee 263,802 64,814 89,191 154,005 417,807 49

Page 139 of 162 Jordanian Hashemite Charity Organization 0 414,309 414,309 414,309 50

Iceland 50,000 342,014 342,014 392,014 51

Poland 378,519 0 378,519 52

Estonia 87,173 270,856 270,856 358,029 53

League of Arab States 0 300,000 300,000 300,000 54

UNESCO 282,500 0 282,500 55

Lebanon 253,304 0 253,304 56

Interpal 0 245,146 245,146 245,146 57

IR Canada 0 216,606 216,606 216,606 58

China 200,000 0 200,000 59

Mexico 200,000 0 200,000 60

OXFAM 0 183,315 183,315 183,315 61

Microclinic International 0 180,000 180,000 180,000 62

Tkiyet Um Ali 163,215 0 163,215 63

IF Charity 0 152,672 152,672 152,672 64

UK Care for Children 0 152,672 152,672 152,672 65

Czech Republic 0 122,916 122,916 122,916 66

Italian National Committee 0 19,584 102,752 122,336 122,336 67

Probitas Foundation, Spain 0 109,529 109,529 109,529 68 Liechtenstein 108,696 0 108,696 69

Syria 108,277 0 108,277 70

Lavelle Fund for the Blind (thru AFU) 0 100,003 100,003 100,003 71

Malaysia 100,000 0 100,000 72

Khalifa Bin Zayed Foundation 0 99,701 99,701 99,701 73

UNFPA 82,137 0 82,137 74

Qatar Red Crescent 0 77,643 77,643 77,643 75 Slovak Republic 70,652 0 70,652 76

Vitamin Angels 69,475 0 69,475 77

Real Madrid Foundation 0 58,492 58,492 58,492 78

Norwegian Refugee Council 0 57,551 57,551 57,551 79

Bulgaria 57,050 0 57,050 80

Slovenia 0 56,689 56,689 56,689 81

Malta 22,497 27,655 27,655 50,152 82

Bahrain 50,000 0 50,000 83

Portugal 47,380 0 47,380 84

Thailand 40,000 0 40,000 85

INA/OPSI, Germany 0 35,098 35,098 35,098 86

Bank of Palestine 0 30,182 30,182 30,182 87 Chile 25,000 0 25,000 88

Hungary 22,082 0 22,082 89

UNHCR 0 20,113 20,113 20,113 90 Iran 20,000 0 20,000 91

UN Women 0 18,000 18,000 18,000 92

Aramex 0 17,410 17,410 17,410 93 The Asfari Foundation 0 15,152 15,152 15,152 94

WEFA Humanitarian Relief Organization 0 10,603 10,603 10,603 95

Kazakhstan 10,000 0 10,000 96

The World Federation of KSIMC 0 10,000 10,000 10,000 97

UNDP 0 9,629 9,629 9,629 98

American University of Beirut 0 7,800 7,800 7,800 99

Health Care Society 6,145 0 6,145 100

Japan Asia Cultural Exchanges 0 5,220 5,220 5,220 101

World Bank 4,320 0 4,320 102

Australian Volunteers International 0 3,320 3,320 3,320 103

UNIFIL 2,500 0 2,500 104

Page 140 of 162 United Nations 25,833,701 0 25,833,701

Various Private Donors 3,301,832 427,496 413,872 194,738 1,036,106 4,337,938

Grand Total 622,098,646 96,482,089 212,532,643 92,870,849 201,912,222 2,032,495 18,873,670 624,703,968 1,246,802,614 External Relations and Communications Department

Page 141 of 162 Page 142 of 162 Page 143 of 162 Page 144 of 162 Page 145 of 162 Page 146 of 162 Page 147 of 162 Page 148 of 162 Ref. Ares(2016)4782799 - 25/08/2016 EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE

DELEGATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION TO WEST BANK and GAZA STRIP, UNRWA The Deputy Head of Delegation

Jerusalem

NOTE FOR THE ATTENTION OF MR. CHRISTIAN BERGER, DIRECTOR, EEAS MR. MICHAEL KÖHLER, DIRECTOR, NEAR B

Subject: UNRWA 2016 Programme Budget shortfall update

Summary In a meeting with traditional core donors present in Jerusalem UNRWA Deputy Commissioner General Sandra Mitchell informed on 23 August 2016 that the Agency was facing a gridlock with Gulf Countries' (KSA, Kuwait, UAE) reluctance to commit funds to close the Agency's core budget deficit which is now estimated to stand at USD 96 million. Consequently UNRWA is likely to convene an extraordinary AdCom meeting on 5 September to endorse a special report before bringing the situation formally to the attention of the General Assembly. Should no additional funding materialise, cuts in services (health and relief) would have to be enacted by October. Schools, on the other hand, will open on time in the coming days. Assessment Even if Gulf countries were ultimately to step in – which the EU should proactively encourage and support – given the size of the deficit, traditional donors (including the EU) will inevitably once again be pressured to provide UNRWA with additional funds in order to face its deficit once more. In the short timeframe available, predictably difficult negotiations following a possible PLO/Jordan attempt to increase the UN's regular budget stake in UNRWA's core budget will not help addressing UNRWA's immediate financial needs but could become one element to secure better long-term financial sustainability. Detail

On 23 August Deputy Commissioner General Sandra Mitchell briefed DFID, the US, Sweden, Norway, Japan and EUREP on UNRWA's financial position.

Main office: Hotel ArcMed Al Mashtal Gaza, # 1/1000 Salah Khalaf Street, Al Mashtal Area, Gaza Temporary and unofficial address: P.O.Box 22207, Jerusalem. Tel : (+972) 02-5415888 - Fax : (+972) 02-5415848 e-mail: [email protected] Website : http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/westbank/index_en.htm Page 149 of 162 Despite UNRWA's cost containment measures and efforts to raise more funds, the Agency’s deficit projected as USD 74 million at the May 2016 Advisory Commission (AdCom) meeting now stands at USD 96 million, as initially predicted donor income did not materialise or is now considered at high risk. No further details were given, but outside the meeting we learned that the Norwegian Parliament has apparently cut the country's contribution by USD 4 million and also the Saudi Fund for Development is withholding an anticipated USD 15 million in Programme Budget support.

While still hopeful for a breakthrough, Mitchell emphasised that the Agency was facing a gridlock with Gulf Countries' (KSA, Kuwait, UAE) reluctance to commit funds to close the Agency's core budget deficit. Although keen on reengaging with UNRWA there was also no clarity yet on a possible pledge from Canada.

In terms of immediate steps, UNRWA committed to work hard to secure an indication of potential financial commitments by the end of this week. Should commitments fall short of meeting October requirements (USD 40 million) an extraordinary Advisory Commission session is likely be held on 5 September to endorse a special report before bringing the situation formally to the attention of the General Assembly, as was the case in 2015 when the shortfall stood only slightly higher at USD 101 million.

Reporting from her meetings with host countries, DCG Mitchell highlighted that hosts (primarily the PLO and Jordan) were eager for a longer term solution to UNRWA's chronic fundraising difficulties. For that reason host countries were planning to push for a broader assessed contribution from the UN's regular budget in support of UNRWA's core programmes during the upcoming 4th and 5th committee deliberations in New York this autumn.

DCG Mitchell concluded by requesting collective diplomatic support with Gulf Countries (KSA, Kuwait, UAE) to close the 2016 gap. Without dwelling on contingency plans, DCG Mitchell stressed that should no additional funding materialise, cuts in services (health and relief) would have to be enacted by October. Schools, on the other hand, would open on time in the coming days.

David Geer

Chargé d'affaires a.i.

Cc: EEAS: R. Fuentes Milani, K. Nikolov, T. Seiler, J. O'Rourke NEAR: M. Miller, G. Fine, A. Borgogni ECHO: J.-L. De Brouwer, J. Correia Nunes, C. Gadrey Heads of EU Delegations in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, UAE and New York EUREP: R. Tarraf, U. Hauer, A. Viezzer, M. Vögele, M. Mansour

Electronically signed on 25/08/2016 14:16 (UTC+02) in accordance with article 4.2 (Validity of electronic documents) of Commission Decision 2004/563

2 Page 150 of 162 4 3 2 1 In order in ongoing conflict Syria. to promote the continued integration of Palestine refugee children from intoSyria theschool education for Palestine refugee children inLebanon. This now includesapproximately 5,318PRSchildren displaced dueto the schools, auniqueprovision –including9secondary amongUNRWA’sa doubleshift) fields–and remains themainprovider of For thescholasticyear 2015-2016,UNRWA provided schoolingto 36,549 students in67schoolsacross Lebanon (5ofwhichrun education until ajustsolutionisfound for theirplight. vocational centres, 27healthcentres, continue andvariousprojects to for bethemainsource Palestine ofvitalservices refugees Palestine refugees in Lebanon rely entirely on UNRWA in lack of other alternatives. services As such, the Agency’s 67 schools, 2 work andright to own property. access to thegovernment’s publichealthandeducational facilities, noaccess ontheirrightto restrictions to publicsocialservices, Palestine refugees remain sociallymarginalized andhave limited civil, very political, socialandeconomic rightsincludingrestricted (are unabletopoverty meet essential food requirements). to overcountry (cannotmeettheirbasicfood 300,000.90%ofPRSlive andnon-food inpoverty needs),and10%live inextreme approximately 42,000 PRS are recorded with UNRWA in Lebanon. This has brought the total number of Palestine refugees in the As aresult in a oftheconflict Syria, considerable numberof Palestine refugees from (PRS)fledSyria to Lebanon. Currently substandard shelters, poorinfrastructure, highrates ofunemployment anddire environmental health. gatherings, adjacent to the camps. ofthe260,000-280,000PalestineThe majority refugees livinginLebanon (PRL) overview AUB, AUB, 2015survey UNHABITAT Profiling andUNDPreport, MayDeprivation,

American University American ofBeirut, ofPalestine‘Socioeconomic Survey inLebanon, Refugees 2015’ (publication forthcoming).

2015 unrwa about survey www.unrwa.org for palestine refugees inthe neareast united nations relief andworks agency lebanon fieldoffice: operations 2 56% are under the age of 25. Page 151 of162 4 2014 3 The camps in Lebanon are overcrowded and characterized by 1 reside inthe12officialcampsor42unofficial © 2016 UNRWA/FrancescoRomagnolo lfo: operations environment, PRS students have been combined into regular classes. The large number of additional students has increased the workload for teachers and administrators and has stretched services in the schools. Despite the current challenges and the difficult circumstances in which UNRWA operates, the Agency is committed to provide all Palestine refugee children with quality, equitable and inclusive education.

As part of UNRWA’s strategic objective in Lebanon to enhance the employment prospects of Palestine refugee youth, the UNRWA Siblin Training Centre (STC) delivers technical and vocational education and training to prepare young people for employment opportunities available in the local market. STC offers 28 semi-professional and trade courses for its student body of around 1,100 trainees in its two campuses located in the south and north of Lebanon in addition to 300 PRS and PRL students who are taking part in short-term afternoon VET courses. Until 2014, degrees offered by UNRWA were not officially recognized, and students were not eligible to participate in the Lebanese official TVET examinations. In the spring of 2014, STC passed the first of two phases of accreditation by the Lebanese Ministry of Education and is currently awaiting full accreditation. UNRWA is currently awaiting the second phase of accreditation. health Thanks to the generous contributions from donors, UNRWA is covering the cost of primary health care services for PRL and PRS including medical consultations and free medications through its 27 health centres located throughout the country.

In January 2016, UNRWA adjusted its hospitalization policy in Lebanon to achieve greater sustainability for its support for Palestine refugees living in the country. The change brings a number of important benefits, including increased support for tertiary care, which has been a long-standing request from Palestine refugees living in Lebanon. The adjusted policy also reduces dependence on private hospitals, which tend to be the most expensive.

The announcement of the adjustments in mid-December 2015 led to strongly-voiced concerns from refugees about the cost- sharing element that was introduced for secondary care. As a result the Agency has worked together with other stakeholders in establishing a technical working group of experts to review the implementation of the policy. To ensure space for such dialogue, the Agency has suspended the implementation of the cost sharing element of the hospitalization policy from March 21. UNRWA continues to raise funds for a complementary fund, set up to ensure the most vulnerable retain the access to secondary care they need.

The Agency also contributes towards tertiary hospitalization for emergency and life-threatening conditions. Additionally, UNRWA provides financial support for Emergency Room Services at Palestine Red Crescent Society hospitals and partially covers these services at UNRWA contracted hospitals. environmental health The growing population in Palestine refugee camps throughout Lebanon, especially since the outbreak of the conflict in Syria, exerts additional pressure on water-supply sources and networks, sewerage and drainage systems, as well as operations related to the camps’ solid waste management. One of the most acute needs of the Palestine refugee community in Lebanon is access to potable water within the camps. In response, UNRWA with the generous support of its donor community is upgrading the infrastructure systems in the camps through the provision of additional water sources including the drilling of new boreholes, rehabilitating and upgrading existing water wells, and connecting © 2016 UNRWA / Francesco Romagnolo shelters to water supply distribution systems.

united nations relief and works agency for palestine refugees in the near east

www.unrwa.org Page 152 of 162 lfo: operations

shelter rehabilitation UNRWA camps in Lebanon face the continued challenge of accommodating a growing population inside a constrained geographical space. The camps suffer from severely degraded shelters, overcrowding and poor environmental health conditions. To address shelter needs, UNRWA undertakes shelter rehabilitation, using its self-help approach scheme to promote a sense of self-reliance among refugees and positively impact the health and well-being of Palestine refugee families. The total number of petitions made by camp residents appealing for shelter rehabilitation currently stands in excess of 6,000. Of the shelters that were prioritized in an assessment conducted in 2010 by the American University in Beirut, 2,120 shelters have been rehabilitated to date.

nahr el-bared camp reconstruction The reconstruction of Nahr el-Bared Camp (NBC), following its destruction in 2007, is the single largest project ever undertaken by UNRWA. The estimated cost of the project is USD 345 million, of which USD 208 million has been raised to date, leaving a shortfall of USD 137 million. Of the 27,000 people who were originally displaced following the crisis, about 22,000 are expected to return. Despite this funding shortfall and complex legal, logistical and engineering challenges, UNRWA reached the half-way completion mark for reconstruction works at the end of 2015. As of October 2015, 9,247 residents (2,119 families) have been returned to newly reconstructed apartments in NBC. To date, 569 shops have been provided to traders helping to rejuvenate the camp’s economy and social fabric.

With the funds currently available, a further 3,100 residents are set to return by April 2017. This will leave just under 10,000 still displaced. UNRWA remains committed to finding a sustainable solution to the NBC crisis and the ongoing displacement and is doing its utmost to continue reconstruction of the camp.

The completion of the reconstruction of NBC is one of the Agency’s overall priorities. It is also a top priority of the Government of Lebanon, as reflected in the project’s inclusion as one of the top three infrastructure projects in the Lebanon Compact which was submitted to the London Conference in February 2015.

protection, legal status and advice Francesco Romagnolo © 2015 UNRWA /

UNRWA Lebanon’s protection response focuses on providing assistance to those most in need through a multidimensional approach, which includes: the identification and referral of protection cases (related to the Syrian crisis); the provision of legal aid services; access to specialized services for victims of gender-based violence and child protection; protection mainstreaming; and engagement with duty bearers to advocate for Palestine refugees’ rights. In 2014, UNRWA Lebanon’s protection team identified 476 protection cases and assisted almost 2,000 Palestine refugees facing protection concerns. The Legal Aid Unit also provided legal services, including legal counselling and legal representation, to over 4,000 Palestine refugees.

united nations relief and works agency for palestine refugees in the near east

www.unrwa.org

UNRWA is a United Nations agency established by the General Assembly in 1949 and mandated to provide assistance and protection to some 5 million registered Palestine refugees. Its mission is to help Palestine refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, West Bank and the Gaza Strip achieve their full human development potential, pending a just and lasting solution to their plight. UNRWA services encompass education, health care, relief and social services, camp infrastructure and improvement, protection and microfinance.

unrwa lebanon field office| +961 1 830400 Page 153 of 162 Page 154 of 162 

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Page 159 of 162 Page 160 of 162 united nations relief and works agency for palestine refugees in the near east وكالة األمم المتحدة إلغاثة وتشغيل الالجأين الغاسطينيين في الشرق األدنى

sandra mitchell deputy commissioner-general biography

Ms. Sandra Mitchell is currently the Deputy Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and has nearly 20 years of experience in international peacekeeping, human rights, humanitarian and electoral field missions, including seven years within the United Nations system. She also held senior management roles at UNRWA from 2011 to 2013; first as the Director of UNRWA Operations in Jordan and later as Chief of Staff. Previously she spent four years as Director of Elections with UNAMI in Iraq.

Ms. Mitchell started her career in the legal field, first with a commercial firm and later in more senior roles with the American Bar Association and the International Human Rights Law Group. Between 1996 and 2004, she alternated between the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the International Rescue Committee (IRC) in various roles, and she served as Chief Humanitarian Affairs Officer of the United Nation’s Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo in 2006.

Ms. Mitchell holds a Bachelor’s degree in Accounting from Washington State University and a Juris Doctorate from Oklahoma City University School of Law.

About UNRWA UNRWA is a United Nations agency established by the General Assembly in 1949 and is mandated to provide assistance and protection to a population of some 5 million registered Palestine refugees. Its mission is to help Palestine refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, West Bank and the Gaza Strip to achieve their full potential in human development, pending a just solution to their plight. UNRWA’s services encompass education, health care, relief and social services, camp infrastructure and improvement, and microfinance.

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