Arab Secularism's Assisted Suicide
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Arab Secularism’s Assisted Suicide A Brief History of Arab Political Discourse on Religion and the State APRIL 25, 2019 — MARK FARHA The Century Foundation | tcf.org Arab Secularism’s Assisted Suicide A Brief History of Arab Political Discourse on Religion and the State APRIL 25, 2019 — MARK FARHA Few would contest that the Arab world today is still ideological impasse. Relying on a range of Arabic primary struggling to accept, let alone institutionalize, the core pillars sources, it begins with a panoramic historical overview of of secularism and a civic state. In part, this crisis of secularism the usage of the term “madani” (meaning “civil” or “civic”) might be seen as a global phenomenon in light of the among a selection of key liberal and reformist Arab proliferation of populism tinged with communal prejudice. intellectuals, from the nineteenth century to the present.2 But while there is a global component to this problem, there The report also examines recurrent patterns in the use of are also particular regional characteristics. This report seeks “dawlah madaniyyah” as a means of either asserting or to go beyond the current crisis surrounding secularism avoiding an egalitarian, secular state in the present context as a symptom of a broader, universal failure of liberal of post-Arab-uprising states struggling with ideological and democracy and economic inequalities, and to specifically sectarian fragmentation. I explore how the concepts of the link the enfeebled state of secularism in Arab states to the civil state and citizenship have actually been used, in some region’s intellectual and political history since the nineteenth cases, to completely skirt secularism proper. century. This indigenous history is often poorly understood or intentionally misrepresented by those seeking to discredit As synonym for a nondiscriminatory state free of religious or the secular state as a mere colonial, Western implant. sectarian bias, secularism remains an ideal of vital importance This report then reviews some historical flashpoints in a to anchor Arab societies adrift in a sea of devastating longstanding Arab political discourse on secularism. It confessional storms. While generations of Arab secular investigates the origin and popularization of the concept of thinkers, stretching from the nineteenth to the end of the a civil state or “dawlah madaniyyah,” and associated terms twentieth century, have died, large segments of Arab youth such as citizen, or “muwatin,” and analyzes their currency today emotively embrace some of the ideals of secularism. today.1 Why, this report asks, has the idea of secularism, which What they lack is a coherent political discourse and leadership may still rhetorically resonate with significant swaths of the able—and willing—to forsake cheap confessional populism Arab world, ended up being marginalized—if not outright for the struggle of equality. What is more, external players, vilified—by the region’s dominant political movements and including the United States, have repeatedly sponsored official state discourse? stridently anti-secular Islamist forces in order to gain This report seeks to provide historical context to today’s influence over the “Arab street.” Thus, both the ideologically This report can be found online at: https://tcf.org/content/report/arab-secularisms-assisted-suicide/ The Century Foundation | tcf.org 1 charged, defamatory distortion of secularism within Arab freight their cause could ill afford. Sheer superciliousness political discourse and the Machiavellian strategy of foreign and lack of popular outreach has continued to bedevil the and Middle Eastern actors seeking to leverage communal campaign for a dissemination of secularism until this day. passions to further their own ends continue to stymie Arab secularism and assist in its suicide. There are also ideological phobias which have impeded the very understanding of the concepts relating to secularism for Origins of Dawlah Madaniyyah (the almost two centuries. These phobias are perhaps even more Civil State) fundamental obstacles. The crisis of the civil state in the Arab world can be further attributed to a yet-to-be-clarified Why is the mention of a secular state, or even a civil state, lineage of discourse stretching all the way back to the so- still stigmatized in Arab political discourse? In historical called “Arab Awakening,” or “Al-Nahda.” Late nineteenth and hindsight, two obstacles protrude, one sociological, relating twentieth century Arab avatars of secularism—beginning to class chasms, and one ideological, relating to the distortion with Farah Antun (1874–1922) down to Muhammad Sa’id of concepts. al-Ashmawi (1932–2013)—proposed the term “dawlah madaniyyah” (“civil state,” a term more akin to the Latin The progenitors of secularism and political change in the “civitas” or the German “Zivilstaat”) as all but a synonym for segmented, confessional societies of the Middle East a secular, laic state devoid of religious discrimination.5 In the were clandestine and exclusive forums.3 Two of the most words of Antun in 1908, “there is no peace and progress to determined and effective champions of secularism in the be found without a division of the religious authority [‘sultah Middle East, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in Turkey and Antoun diniyyah’] from civil authority [‘sultah madaniyyah’].”6 Saadeh in Lebanon, both abjured membership in the secret societies that had incubated their ideas, and explicitly Antun was clearly unambiguous in his use of “madani” as proscribed secret society participation for members of their a synonym for “secular.” Yet as the polemic heated up, the political parties—parties that tellingly attracted a far larger term “madani” began to betray an effort by some writers to following than those of any prior or subsequent leader eschew the more explicit notion of a secular state, or “dawlah espousing a full-fledged, unambiguously secular platform.4 ‘almaniyyah,” due to the latter’s chronic association with Atatürk and Saadeh thus succeeded, albeit with somewhat atheism. In some cases, such attempts to name secularism dictatorial means, in translating bold secular ideas into well- by its proper Arabic cognate (“‘almaniyyah”) reflected not organized parties and concrete policies. By doing so, they only strategic and linguistic reservations, but also a basic liberated secularism from its confinement in clandestine cells reluctance to endorse a nonreligious state or to accept its and abstract debate into the public sphere. Unlike Atatürk in egalitarian premises. Turkey, however, Saadeh could not stage a coup and rise to the top of the Lebanese political system in order to enforce Even some of the most outspoken and bold advocates of his secular vision. Instead, he saw his career cut short by the secularism, who rarely minced words in their scathing critique collusion of Lebanese and Syrian political establishments of religious fundamentalism, have felt the need to substitute bent on preserving the confessional status quo. ‘“almaniyyah” with more neutral terms. Often, these carried less transparent implications with respect to a separation The propositions of the early elite generation of “enlightened” of religion and state, which was still a controversial idea. (“mutanawwiroun”) intellectuals who supported secularism Etched in the collective Arab awareness is the 1925 case of were avant-garde. These elites saw themselves as being Ali Abdel Raziq, an Egyptian religious scholar at Al-Azhar elevated and removed from society, and this attitudinal University in Cairo. Abdel Raziq made the bold claim that condescension toward the majority of their less fortunate and the first Muslims “were proceeding to set up a civil worldly less educated compatriots burdened them with an additional government [‘hukumah madaniyyah dunawiyyah’], nothing The Century Foundation | tcf.org 2 more.” He was quickly removed from his position at Al- Wajih Kawtharani has lamented a “veil [‘hijab’] of vocabulary” Azhar as a punishment for what was seen to be a heretical which stands in the way of a self-critical acknowledgement denial of Islam’s theocratic origin.7 of the negative role religion could play in Islamic history as an instrument of political exploitation and oppression.10 These controversies have continued to reverberate until Rather than confront this history squarely in the way genuine the present day, and have not been settled. Some have secularists like Farag Foda or Sayyid al-Qemany have done, even yielded to an uncritical, reflexive rejection of all terms prominent Islamist-reformist intellectuals like Mohammed associated with secularism, to the degree of identifying it Abed al-Jabri or Fahmi Huwaidi have called for a removal of as the root cause of regional religious militancy. “Religious” the very term “secularism” from the Arab political dictionary, terrorism is still habitually misdiagnosed as the all-but-natural succumbing to the facile equation of secularism with reaction to prior repression by “secular” dictators. atheism.11 Lastly, the apologetic against secularism in the Arab world By contrast, barely a generation earlier, the Lebanese Sunni is often informed by a skewed, binary view of the political religious leader Abdullah al-Alayli devoted his life’s work history of a Muslim, intrinsically religious Orient and a to the obverse cause of boldly confronting and liberalizing Christian, essentially agnostic Occident, whereby a secular key ossified theocratic tenets so that they might cohere or civil state is