Islam and Islamism
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Violent Jihad in the Netherlands
Violent Jihad in the Netherlands Current trends in the Islamist terrorist threat Violent Jihad in the Netherlands Current trends in the Islamist terrorist threat 2 Contents Foreword 5 Introduction 7 The murder of Theo van Gogh: consequences and effects 7 General trends in the development of jihadism 9 Framework of terms and definitions 10 1 From exogenous threat to home-grown terrorism 13 1.1 What is a jihadist network? 13 1.2 Historical development of network formation 15 1.2.1 The traditional phase: migration of jihadists 15 1.2.2 The proliferation phase: recruitment 16 1.2.3 The ‘home-grown’ phase: radicalisation and jihadisation 17 1.3 Three types of jihadist networks 17 2 Decentralisation and local implantation of international jihad19 2.1Al-Qaeda: from ‘network of gynetworks’ 19 to trademark and ideolo 2.2 Ideology of global violent jihad 21 2.3 Decentralisation of international jihad 22 2.4 Local implantation of international jihad 26 3 Radicalisation and the emergence of local networks 29 3.1Radicalisation, recruitment and jihadisation 29 3.2 The religious context of radicalisation 30 3.3 The socio-political context of radicalisation 33 3.4 The cultural and socio-psychological context of radicalisation 35 3.5 Emergence of local autonomous cells and networks 37 3.6 Backgrounds and functioning of local autonomous networks 38 3.7 The significance of the Hofstad network 39 4 Virtualisation of jihad 43 4.1The Internet as a propulsion of the jihad movement 43 4.2 Al-Qaeda as a virtual database (top-down) 44 4.3 The virtual umma (grass -
Arab Secularism's Assisted Suicide
Arab Secularism’s Assisted Suicide A Brief History of Arab Political Discourse on Religion and the State APRIL 25, 2019 — MARK FARHA The Century Foundation | tcf.org Arab Secularism’s Assisted Suicide A Brief History of Arab Political Discourse on Religion and the State APRIL 25, 2019 — MARK FARHA Few would contest that the Arab world today is still ideological impasse. Relying on a range of Arabic primary struggling to accept, let alone institutionalize, the core pillars sources, it begins with a panoramic historical overview of of secularism and a civic state. In part, this crisis of secularism the usage of the term “madani” (meaning “civil” or “civic”) might be seen as a global phenomenon in light of the among a selection of key liberal and reformist Arab proliferation of populism tinged with communal prejudice. intellectuals, from the nineteenth century to the present.2 But while there is a global component to this problem, there The report also examines recurrent patterns in the use of are also particular regional characteristics. This report seeks “dawlah madaniyyah” as a means of either asserting or to go beyond the current crisis surrounding secularism avoiding an egalitarian, secular state in the present context as a symptom of a broader, universal failure of liberal of post-Arab-uprising states struggling with ideological and democracy and economic inequalities, and to specifically sectarian fragmentation. I explore how the concepts of the link the enfeebled state of secularism in Arab states to the civil state and citizenship have actually been used, in some region’s intellectual and political history since the nineteenth cases, to completely skirt secularism proper. -
Islamism After the Arab Spring: Between the Islamic State and the Nation-State the Brookings Project on U.S
Islamism after the Arab Spring: Between the Islamic State and the nation-state The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World U.S.-Islamic World Forum Papers 2015 January 2017 Shadi Hamid, William McCants, and Rashid Dar The Brookings Institution is a nonprofit organization devoted to independent research and policy solutions. Its mission is to conduct high-quality, independent research and, based on that research, to provide in- novative, practical recommendations for policymakers and the public. The conclusions and recommendations of any Brookings publication are solely those of its author(s), and do not reflect the views of the Institu- tion, its management, or its other scholars. Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings Brookings recognizes that the value it provides to any supporter is in its absolute commitment to quality, 1775 Massachusetts Avenue, NW independence and impact. Activities supported by its Washington, DC 20036 donors reflect this commitment and the analysis and recommendations are not determined by any donation. www.brookings.edu/islamic-world STEERING n 2015, we returned to Doha for the views of the participants of the work- COMMITTEE the 12th annual U.S.-Islamic World ing groups or the Brookings Institution. MArtiN INDYK Forum. Co-convened annually by Select working group papers will be avail- Executive Ithe Brookings Project on U.S. Relations able on our website. Vice President with the Islamic World and the State of Brookings Qatar, the Forum is the premier inter- We would like to take this opportunity BRUCE JONES national gathering of leaders in govern- to thank the State of Qatar for its sup- Vice President ment, civil society, academia, business, port in convening the Forum with us. -
Religious Fundamentalism in Eight Muslim‐
JOURNAL for the SCIENTIFIC STUDY of RELIGION Religious Fundamentalism in Eight Muslim-Majority Countries: Reconceptualization and Assessment MANSOOR MOADDEL STUART A. KARABENICK Department of Sociology Combined Program in Education and Psychology University of Maryland University of Michigan To capture the common features of diverse fundamentalist movements, overcome etymological variability, and assess predictors, religious fundamentalism is conceptualized as a set of beliefs about and attitudes toward religion, expressed in a disciplinarian deity, literalism, exclusivity, and intolerance. Evidence from representative samples of over 23,000 adults in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and Turkey supports the conclusion that fundamentalism is stronger in countries where religious liberty is lower, religion less fractionalized, state structure less fragmented, regulation of religion greater, and the national context less globalized. Among individuals within countries, fundamentalism is linked to religiosity, confidence in religious institutions, belief in religious modernity, belief in conspiracies, xenophobia, fatalism, weaker liberal values, trust in family and friends, reliance on less diverse information sources, lower socioeconomic status, and membership in an ethnic majority or dominant religion/sect. We discuss implications of these findings for understanding fundamentalism and the need for further research. Keywords: fundamentalism, Islam, Christianity, Sunni, Shia, Muslim-majority countries. INTRODUCTION -
Coming to Terms: Fundamentalists Or Islamists? by Martin Kramer Middle East Quarterly Spring 2003, Pp
Coming to Terms: Fundamentalists or Islamists? by Martin Kramer Middle East Quarterly Spring 2003, pp. 6577 http://www.meforum.org/541/comingtotermsfundamentalistsorislamists No one who reads or writes about events in the Muslim world can avoid the question of how to label those Muslims who invoke Islam as the source of authority for all political and social action. Should they be labeled Islamic (or Muslim) fundamentalists? Or are they better described as Islamists? The issue has been the subject of a heated debate for two decades. For a while, both general and scholarly usage in America accepted fundamentalism. Islamism emerged in the late 1980s in French academe and then crossed into English, where it eventually displaced Islamic fundamentalism in specialized contexts. More recently, the term Islamism has gained even wider currency, and since September 11, 2001, it may even have established itself as the preferred American usage. Still newer terminology may lie over the horizon. Behind the battle over usage lies another struggle, over the nature of the phenomenon itself. In fact, the two contests, over English usage and analytical understanding, are inseparable. Nor are they free of associations left by past usages. Here follows a short history of changing usage—itself a history of changing Western perceptions of Muslim reality. The Debut of Islamism The term Islamism first appeared in French in the mideighteenth century. But it did not refer to the modern ideological use of Islam, which had not yet come into being. Rather, it was a synonym for the religion of the Muslims, which was then known in French as mahométisme, the religion professed and taught by the Prophet Muhammad. -
Universal Versus Islamic Human Rights: a Clash of Cultures Or a Clash with a Construct?
Michigan Journal of International Law Volume 15 Issue 2 1994 Universal Versus Islamic Human Rights: A Clash of Cultures or a Clash with a Construct? Ann Elizabeth Mayer Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, Law and Gender Commons, and the Religion Law Commons Recommended Citation Ann E. Mayer, Universal Versus Islamic Human Rights: A Clash of Cultures or a Clash with a Construct?, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 307 (1994). Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol15/iss2/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Journal of International Law at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal of International Law by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. UNIVERSAL VERSUS ISLAMIC HUMAN RIGHTS: A CLASH OF CULTURES OR A CLASH WITH A CONSTRUCT? Ann Elizabeth Mayer* INTRODUCTION ................................................. 308 I. CONSTRUCTS OF ISLAMIC PARTICULARISM ON HUMAN RIGHTS .................................. 309 A. Conflicts Over Human Rights: A Clash of Cultures? .... 309 B. The Islamic Legal Heritage and Human Rights ......... 321 C. Formulationsof Islamic Alternatives to the International Bill of Human Rights ..................... 324 II. ISLAMIC HUMAN RIGHTS: Two NEW CONSTRUCTS .......... 327 A. The 1990 Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam .............................................. 327 1. Equality of W omen ................................ 329 2. Freedom of Religion ............................... 333 3. Freedom of the Press ............................. -
Democratic Culture and Muslim Political Participation in Post-Suharto Indonesia
RELIGIOUS DEMOCRATS: DEMOCRATIC CULTURE AND MUSLIM POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN POST-SUHARTO INDONESIA DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science at The Ohio State University by Saiful Mujani, MA ***** The Ohio State University 2003 Dissertation Committee: Approved by Professor R. William Liddle, Adviser Professor Bradley M. Richardson Professor Goldie Shabad ___________________________ Adviser Department of Political Science ABSTRACT Most theories about the negative relationship between Islam and democracy rely on an interpretation of the Islamic political tradition. More positive accounts are also anchored in the same tradition, interpreted in a different way. While some scholarship relies on more empirical observation and analysis, there is no single work which systematically demonstrates the relationship between Islam and democracy. This study is an attempt to fill this gap by defining Islam empirically in terms of several components and democracy in terms of the components of democratic culture— social capital, political tolerance, political engagement, political trust, and support for the democratic system—and political participation. The theories which assert that Islam is inimical to democracy are tested by examining the extent to which the Islamic and democratic components are negatively associated. Indonesia was selected for this research as it is the most populous Muslim country in the world, with considerable variation among Muslims in belief and practice. Two national mass surveys were conducted in 2001 and 2002. This study found that Islam defined by two sets of rituals, the networks of Islamic civic engagement, Islamic social identity, and Islamist political orientations (Islamism) does not have a negative association with the components of democracy. -
Leaving Islam
Chapter 7 Leaving Islam Christine Schirrmacher 1 Introduction Looked at from a global perspective, possibly more people than ever are chang- ing or leaving their religion. At the same time, while it is legally impossible to leave Islam in all Middle Eastern countries, it is considered to be a punishable crime under Sharia law, and the death penalty can be applied in a handful of countries like Saudi-Arabia or Iran. Interestingly enough, the Koran does not seem to have a clear verdict on apostasy. Muslim theologians hold different views as to whether Islam favors complete religious freedom or whether the culprit is unpunishable as long as he does not rock the boat of the community. Many Muslim theologians still hold to the death penalty. 2 Key Terms The term for “unbelief” or “non-belief” (Arabic: kufr) is used 482 times in the Koran. In at least 19 verses it is used in the sense of turning away or falling away from Islam (Hallaq 2001: 119–122). There is no mention in the Koran of the Ara- bic term for “apostasy,” which is ridda and irtidād in Arabic. However, one finds neither in the Koran nor in tradition an unambiguous definition for when apostasy from Islam (Arabic: al-ruǧūʿ ʿan dīn al-islām or qaṭʿ al-islām) is unquestionably present, how it can be determined, and whether saying the creed is sufficient in order to avert the charge of apostasy (Griffel 1998: 356). Indeed, there is widespread consensus that apostasy undoubtedly exists where the truth of the Koran is denied, where blasphemy is committed against God, Islam, or Muhammad, and where breaking away from the Islamic faith in word or deed occurs. -
The Dangers of Political Exclusion: Egypt's Islamist Problem
Middle East Series CARNEGIE PAPERS THE DANGERS OF POLITICAL EXCLUSION: Egypt’s Islamist Problem Bassma Kodmani Democracy and Rule of Law Project Number 63 October 2005 © 2005 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from the Carnegie Endowment. Please direct inquiries to: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Publications Department 1779 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036 Phone: 202-483-7600 Fax: 202-483-1840 www.CarnegieEndowment.org This publication can be downloaded for free at www.CarnegieEndowment.org/pubs. Limited print copies are also available. To request a copy, send an e-mail to [email protected]. Carnegie Papers Carnegie Papers present new research by Endowment associates and their collaborators from other institutions. The series includes new time-sensitive research and key excerpts from larger works in progress. Comments from readers are welcome; reply to the author at the mailing address above or by e-mail to [email protected]. About the Author Bassma Kodmani is associate professor at the College de France and director of the Arab Reform Initiative. She can be contacted at [email protected]. CONTENTS Introduction . 3 Mighty State . 4 Religious Establishment . 5 Political Choreography . 8 Ramifications . 12 Reclaiming Politics . 17 Notes . 23 Je ne vois pas dans la religion le mystère de l’Incarnation mais le mystère de l’Ordre social. La religion rattache au Ciel une idée d’égalité qui empêche le riche d’être massacré par le pauvre. -
The Future of Islam
THE FUTURE OF ISLAM THE FUTURE OF ISLAM PETER RIDDELL n the wake of World War II, as the world emerged from devas- tating conflict and entered the post-colonial era, some com- Imentators predicted that rising prosperity would herald a new, post-religion age. The secularizing tendencies that were carving huge slices off religious allegiance in the West would be replicated across the world, according to this view. Such commentators also anticipated that religion, in its surviving form, would be rational- ist, liberal and concerned with the here-and-now rather than the Hereafter. Instead, the world of Islam has experienced massive resur- gence across the globe since the 1970s. Calls for the implementation of Sharia Law in its diverse forms have multiplied. Much of this Islamic resurgence has had clear apocalyptic overtones, suggesting that existence in the Hereafter can be helped by greater piety in this world. The movement of Muslims into hitherto non-Muslim coun- tries has contributed to changing the demographic face of the West over the last 50 years. Public discourse has become preoccupied with Islam and issues surrounding it: Islamophobia, terrorism, Islam as a religion of peace, oppression of women and religious minorities, and so forth. The resurgence of Islam across the world has been fueled and sustained by vast funding from Arab oil-producing nations. This 47 RENEWING MINDS is seen in the rapid growth in non-Muslim countries of mosques, Islamic centers, university departments of Islamic studies, Islamic banks, and the like. So where to from here? Given the dynamic and unpredict- able nature of Islamic resurgence in the recent past, are we able to predict the future of Islam over coming decades? It would be useful to approach this task by outlining those developments which are either certain or highly probable. -
“The Rise of Islamism Is, Paradoxically, Both a Product and a Rejection of Modernity” by Samuel DICKSON
“The rise of Islamism is, paradoxically, both a product and a rejection of modernity” By Samuel DICKSON Written for the course: International Relations in the Middle East Taught by Fawaz Gerges Fall 2014 This paper has received the KSP Student Paper Award of the Kuwait Program at Sciences Po The copyright of this paper remains the property of its author. No part of the content may be reproduced, published, distributed, copied or stored for public or private use without written permission of the author. All authorisation requests should be sent to [email protected] Samuel Dickson ‘The rise of Islamism is, paradoxically, both a product of and a rejection of modernity.’ Discuss. The 1979 Iranian Revolution provoked a crisis in western modernisation theory. For much of the twentieth century, scholars claimed the Middle East was faced with a choice: it was either ‘Mecca or mechanization’.1 The successful transition of Iran into a rational Islamic republic occasioned a debate on the relationship between Islamism and modernity that continues to this day. Defined broadly for present purposes as the attempt to build an Islamic state, there are conflicting ideas about Islamism’s ideological content, the social origin of its advocates, and its status either as a social grouping or a discourse. Islamism, evidently, is itself an important point of contention; indeed, much the same can be said of ‘modernity’. The mutable nature of the meanings of these terms is both responsible for, and reflective of, the now dominant theoretical approach in studying them: constructivism. With its roots in critical Marxism, post‐colonialism, post‐ modernism, and the questioning of dominant realist and liberalist paradigms, constructivism posits a theory of international relations in which social and cultural phenomena are not coherent pre‐existing categories, but the products of a mutual process of constitution in relation to the external world. -
Post-Islamism in Tunisia and Egypt: Contradictory Trajectories
religions Article Post-Islamism in Tunisia and Egypt: Contradictory Trajectories Houssem Ben Lazreg Department of Modern Languages & Cultural Studies, University of Alberta, Edmonton, AB T6G 2R3, Canada; [email protected] Abstract: In the wake of the Tunisian Revolution of 2011, Ennahda leader Rached Ghannouchi distanced his party from the main Islamist paradigm, which is spearheaded primarily by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and announced the separation of the religious movement entirely from its political wing (al-Siyasi and al-da’awi). In addition to reassuring Tunisians that Ennahda’s socio- political project is rooted in its “Tunisianity,” these measures aimed at signaling Ennahda’s joining the camp of post-Islamist parties and Muslim democrats such as the AKP in Turkey and the JDP in Morocco. In this article, using the comparative case studies, I examine the patterns, similarities, and differences between the Tunisian Ennahda party and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in terms of their evolutions from an Islamist to a post-Islamist discourse and identity. I argue that the Ennahda party outpaced the Muslim Brotherhood in that shift considering the local/regional realities and the new compromises dictated by the post-revolutionary political processes in both countries. Although the Muslim Brotherhood managed to come to power and govern for only one year before being deposed by the army, Ennahda’s political pragmatism (consensus, compromise, and coalition) enabled it to fare well, ultimately prodding the party to adapt and reposition itself intellectually and politically. Keywords: Ennahda party; Islamism; Muslim brotherhood; post-Islamism; political Islam; Rached Citation: Ben Lazreg, Houssem. Ghannouchi 2021.