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Saudi Arabia FREEDOM ON THE NET 2017 Saudi Arabia 2016 2017 Population: 32.3 million Not Not Internet Freedom Status Internet Penetration 2016 (ITU): 73.8 percent Free Free Social Media/ICT Apps Blocked: Yes Obstacles to Access (0-25) 14 14 Political/Social Content Blocked: Yes Limits on Content (0-35) 24 24 Bloggers/ICT Users Arrested: Yes Violations of User Rights (0-40) 34 34 TOTAL* (0-100) 72 72 Press Freedom 2017 Status: Not Free * 0=most free, 100=least free Key Developments: June 2016 – May 2017 • The government outlined plans to significantly increase broadband penetration by 2020 (see Availability and Ease of Access). • An online campaign to end male guardianship caught the attention of the royal court and resulted in gradual reforms (see Digital Activism). • A court increased an activist’s prison sentence for advocating for human rights online from 9 to 11 years on appeal; others were newly detained (see Prosecutions and Detentions for Online Activities). • Public institutions lost critical data in major cyberattacks, including the civil aviation authority, a chemical company, and the labor ministry (see Technical Attacks). 1 www.freedomonthenet.org Introduction FREEDOM SAUDI ARABIA ON THE NET Obstacles to Access 2017 Introduction Availability and Ease of Access Saudi internet freedom remained restricted in 2017, despite effective digital activism for women’s Restrictions on Connectivity rights. Several human rights defenders were jailed for social media posts. Saudi Arabia unveiled its monumental “Vision 2030” reform and development targets in April 2016. ICT Market The plan included measures to increase competitiveness, foreign direct investment, and non-oil government revenue by 2030.1 The government also announced a National Transformation Program in June 2016 which included several ICT specific targets to be achieved by 2020, including increasing Regulatory Bodies fixed-line broadband penetration in densely populated areas from 44 to 80 percent, and increasing wireless broadband penetration in rural areas from 12 to 70 percent. The government also plans to double the ICT industry’s share of the non-oil economy to 2.24 percent.2 Limits on Content The economic and social reforms sparked criticism from religious conservatives. A handful of digitally savvy preachers—some of them with hundreds of thousands of Twitter followers—were Blocking and Filtering arrested or prosecuted criticizing social liberalizations online over the coverage period. But Saudi Arabia’s restrictive laws have been rigorously applied to silence reform-minded Saudis as well. Content Removal Human rights activists Issa al-Hamid and Abdulaziz al-Shubaily have been sentenced to 11 and 8 years in prison respectively, as well as multi-year bans on using social media following their release. Liberal blogger Raif Badawi remains in prison; he was sentenced to 10 years and 1,000 lashes in Media, Diversity, and Content Manipulation 2012. Since traditional political organizing is banned, many human rights activists conduct activities on social media. Digital Activism Ordinary Saudis have also used smartphones to document corruption and improper behavior by government officials. In 2016, the head of the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and th Prevention of Vice (CPVPV) in Riyadh was dismissed after CPVPV members were filmed chasing a girl Violations of User Rights outside a mall. This year, women’s rights activists made huge strides in an online campaign to end male guardianship of women, who are treated as legal minors under Saudi law. Tens of thousands Legal Environment of Saudis petitioned the royal court until King Salman issued a royal directive to end all informal restrictions on women’s access to public services, although those that are established by law remain in place. Another victory came in September 2017, when the king announced women would be Prosecutions and Detentions for Online Activities given the right to drive starting in June 2018. Despite the country’s highly centralized internet infrastructure and restrictions on Voice-over-IP Surveillance, Privacy, and Anonymity (VoIP), the internet remains to be the least repressive space for expression. Large numbers of Saudis use circumvention tools to access banned content and services, even if they are reluctant to express Intimidation and Violence themselves due to strict legal penalties for speech on certain political, social, or religious topics. The internet has fundamentally changed the way that young Saudis interact with each other. However, repression has been institutionalized under antiterrorism and cybercrime laws that have instilled fear Technical Attacks into activists and ordinary social media users alike. So long as the authoritarian tendencies of the country’s political and religious establishments remain fully present in the minds of internet users, their democratic aspirations remain blocked. 1 “Full text of Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030,” Al-Arabiya, April 26, 2016, https://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/ features/2016/04/26/Full-text-of-Saudi-Arabia-s-Vision-2030.html. 2 The National Transformation Program 2020, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, June 2016, http://vision2030.gov.sa/sites/default/ files/NTP_En.pd . 2 www.freedomonthenet.org FREEDOM SAUDI ARABIA ON THE NET 2017 Obstacles to Access Overall, infrastructure is not considered a major barrier to access except in remote and sparsely populated areas, where the governmental has allocated funds to introduce high-speed connections. Internet penetration is highest in major cities such as Riyadh and Jeddah, as well as in the oil-rich Eastern Province. Young Saudis make up the majority of the user population throughout the country. Availability and Ease of Access Key Access Indicators 2016 53.2% Internet penetration (ITU)a 2015 44.1% 2011 19.0% 2016 100% Mobile penetration (ITU)b 2015 93% 2011 74% 2017(Q1) 4.7 Mbps Average connection speeds (Akamai)c 2016(Q1) 3.5 Mbps a International Telecommunication Union, “Percentage of Individuals Using the Internet, 2000-2016,” http://bit.ly/1cblxxY. b International Telecommunication Union, “Mobile-Cellular Telephone Subscriptions, 2000-2016,” http://bit.ly/1cblxxY. c Akamai, “State of the Internet - Connectivity Report, Q1 2017,” https://goo.gl/TQH7L7. Saudis have enjoyed a rapid growth of internet and communications technologies (ICTs). Internet penetration increased to 74.9 percent in 2016, up from 47 percent in 2011.3 Saudi Arabia is home to around 24 million internet users. The number of those with household fixed broadband ADSL subscriptions decreased from 49.7 percent in 2015 to 42 percent in 2016, which corresponds to the general decline in the fixed telephony market due to competition with mobile services In March 2017, the Communications and Information Technology Commission (CITC) awarded a project to expand high-speed, fiber-optic connections to less competitive, underserved areas in the country to the company Zain. The project aims to increase national broadband coverage to 70 percent by 2020.4 Mobile broadband penetration fell from 102 percent in 2015 to 78.8 percent in 2016, with 25 million mobile broadband subscriptions. Overall, the number of mobile subscriptions fell from 54 million in 2011 to 51.8 million in 2016. The fall was due to the deportation of thousands of undocumented workers and the deactivation of their prepaid mobile accounts,5 in addition to new requirements for all mobile subscribers to register using their fingerprints in order to obtain service (see “Surveillance, Privacy, and Anonymity”). 3 International Telecommunications Union, “Percentage of Individuals using the Internet,” 2011-16, http://www.itu.int/en/ ITU-D/Statistics/Pages/stat/default.aspx. 4 “CITC awards broadband expansion project to Zain Saudi,” TeleGeography, March 13, 2017, http://bit.ly/2nKxMdZ. 5 Matt Smith, “Saudi mobile subscriptions shrink on labor crackdown, hajj limits,” Al Arabiya News, January 26, 2014 https:// bit.ly/1HaGC9I. 3 www.freedomonthenet.org FREEDOM SAUDI ARABIA ON THE NET 2017 Restrictions on Connectivity Regulators and telecommunication companies have taken an aggressive stance against free or low-cost VoIP call services that threaten the use of standard mobile calls, circumvent the regulatory environment and in some cases bypass the surveillance apparatus. All internet providers have blocked VoIP over Viber (since June 2013),6 WhatsApp (since March 2015),7 and Facebook Messenger (since May 2016).8 As of May 2017, call functions were still operational on Signal and Telegram.910 The CITC denied responsibility for the ongoing restrictions, stating in September 2016 that it is evaluating the situation with telecommunication companies.11 The CITC had previously acknowledged responsibility.12 Saudi Arabia is connected to the internet through two country-level data services providers, the Integrated Telecom Company and Bayanat al-Oula for Network Services, up from a single gateway in the past. Their servers, which block a long list of sites, are between the state-owned internet backbone and global servers. All user requests that arrive via Saudi internet service providers (ISPs) travel through these servers, making them subject to censorship at a centralized point. International internet bandwidth increased from 318 Gbps in 2010 to 1484 Gbps in 2015.13 ICT Market The two country-level service providers offer services to licensed ISPs, which in turn sell connections to dial-up and leased-line clients. Broadband and mobile phone services are provided by the three largest telecommunications
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