Legal and Lived Experiences of Media Crackdown Under Abdel Fattehal-Sisiof

Presentation as part of the course: “Regimes in the Middle East and North Africa” (JWSH 681; POLS 661; GIST 503)

Kara Fort 20 April 2020

1 To begin to understand how Egypt’s media landscape has changed, we need to have a basic understanding of the country. Egypt is a country in the northeast corner of Africa. Egypt is composed of the mainland, thought to be the portion of Egypt in Africa, and the , which is considered to be part of Asia. Egypt is bordered by the Mediterranean Sea to the North, the Gaza Strip and Israel and the Red Sea to the East, Sudan to the South, and Libya to the West. Egypt is the most populous country in North Africa, the Middle East, and the Arab World with a projected July 2020 population of 104, 124, 440 people. Approximately 95% of these people live within 20km of the River and its delta.

This study focuses on changes to the media in recent history, so we will only cover the most recent political changes that occurred as a result of the in 2011. The Arab Spring which started in Tunisia after the self-immolation of fruit vendor, Muhammad Bouzazi, took the Middle East by storm with widespread demands for governmental reform and improved quality of life. The revolution spread to more than 15 countries, with only Tunisia successfully transitioning into a constitutional democracy.

In Egypt, protestors began gathering in January of 2011. By February, President resigned and transferred all power to the armed forces. Mohammed Morsi, a member of the , was elected President on June 24, 2012. Protests erupted again in November of 2012, when Mubarak issued a temporary constitutional declaration that effectively granted the President unlimited powers. Morsi would annul his temporary decree in December of 2012, but the passage of the Morsi-backed Constitution of 2012 ignited a new wave of discontent. On July 3, 2013, the released a statement announcing the end of the Morsi presidency and the suspension of the new Constituion.

After a period of provisional government under as interim president, Egypt held a new presidential election in May of 2014, which Abdel Fatteh al-Sisi would win with more than 97% of the vote.

2 Before becoming president, Abdel Fatteh al-Sisi had previously served as the Director of Military Intelligence, the Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Armed Forces, and was appointed by Morsi as the Minister of Defense on August 12, 2012. Sisi retired from his military career in 2014 to run for the presidency, but the military has still seen increased power during his time in office. Many consider Sisi to be a dictator. He has consolidated power around himself and has passed constitutional amendments which extend the presidential terms, effectively allowing himself to stay in power until 2030. In his last election in 2018, after the arrest and enforced disappearance of his opponent , threats posed to opponent , and insurmountable violations issued by the elections committee for opponents and Mohamed Anwar El-Sadat, Sisi ran essentially unopposed, the only other candidate being a pro-government supporter.

One of the many features of Sisi’s increasingly authoritarian regime has been a crackdown on media organizations. Egyptian media is known for being incredibly influential in the Middle East, one reason being that Egypt was the first Middle Eastern country to get its own satellite, allowing the country to broadcast its media across the region. But a once renowned industry has taken a hit in recent years, with a media blackout across the Sinai peninsula, a requirement that only official versions of terrorist attacks are reported, and websites being banned for inciting violence or harming the reputation and interests of the country. These provisions have allowed the government to control the narratives surrounding terrorism and power in Egypt, as opposition sources are often blocked for speaking poorly of the regime. Almost all state media is loyal to Sisi, and private media and journalists may be punished if they publish information that is deemed a threat to the country’s reputation, national security, or economy.

These changes in freedom of the press have been quantified in rankings from Reporters without Borders and Freedom House. In 2010, before the Arab Spring, Egypt was ranked 130/196 in freedom of the press. By 2019, that ranking dropped to 163/196. Egypt is considered one of world’s “biggest prisons” for journalists according to Reporters without Borders.

3 Research Questions

What changes in the law has Sisi’s regime made to crackdown on the media?

How have media outlets been affected by or responded to these legal changes?

Governmental Justifications for Crackdowns How is independent media finding ways to Importance of these questions: survive? How can we trust news coming out of Egypt?

The fast pace of degradation of freedom of the press in Egypt made me wonder what legal changes had been made under Sisi’s regime that would allow the government to crackdown on the media. I also wondered how independent sources have been affected by or responded to these legal changes. Are there ways for outlets to circumvent regulation?

These are important questions to answer because they will help to uncover whether action taken by the government is truly covered under Egyptian law or if these actions are extrajudicial. It will also help us discover how independent media is surviving in Egypt and if we can truly trust any information that is being released by state-sponsored sources.

4 The first major legal change instituted during the Sisi era was the adoption of the 2014 constitution. The constitution states that “Freedom of the press and printing…is guaranteed,” but later states that the law regulates ownership and establishment procedures for visual, radio, and online news publications. This wording ensures that the government still has the power to deny the establishment of an outlet. The constitution also states in Article 72 that the state will ensure that press and media outlets remain neutral and express all opinions (Egypt’s constitution of 2014). The vague language included does not specify how the government can ensure neutrality and essentially makes legal any number of actions. This language has allowed for the state to censor many media outlets as a way to ensure neutrality, but even still, Sisi has complained that outlets do not cover his activities fairly, often comparing the negative coverage of himself to the overwhelmingly positive coverage of Gamal Abdel Nasser (Saad, 2017).

In its part, the parliament has responded to Sisi’s complaints by tightening the grasp of the state on media production. In 2016, parliament passed the Law for the Establishment of Press and Media Organizations, which established three new organizations: the Supreme Council, which creates standards which outlets must follow to protect national security, the National Press Organization, which manages state publications, and the National Media Organization, which regulates broadcast media. Sisi appoints the heads of each of the organizations, which ensures that the regulations that are created in these bodies are beneficial to Sisi’s reputation and public image. The parliament also instituted a state of emergency in 2017, which has since been extended 11 times, which allows the government to charge citizens under criminal statute based on what they publish in the press or on social media (Saad, 2017). The parliament also has limited the reporting on its activities by giving exclusive access to some stories to Al-Youm al-Sabaa, an outlet believed to be owned by the General Intelligence Services (Egypt Parliament watch: Session four report, 2019).

One of the most threatening pieces of legislation passed under the Sisi regime is law No. 180 of 2018. This law redefined who could be considered a journalist, requiring that to be considered a journalist, a person must be registered with the syndicate of journalists or media professionals. These organizations have complex requirements which make entry difficult. This change stripped many people of the limited legal protections provided to journalists and further limited what is considered to be legitimate press (Shawqi et 5 al, 2018). The law also prohibits the publishing of false news, defines any social media account with more than 5,000 followers as a media outlet, and requires that outlets store any issued content for a 12 month period in which the Supreme Council has access to the content (TIMEP brief: The law regulating the press, media, and the supreme council for media regulation, 2019).

5 To answer these research questions, I performed two content analyses on two separate sets of sources: Egyptian constitutions from 2011, 2012, and 2014 and six articles from , an independent Egyptian news source.

For the first content analysis of Egyptian constitutions, I focused on differing language and attitudes regarding media and the press. I chose to use the 2011 version of the Constitution because it included some of the original demands of the protestors, while the 2012 version showed changes made under Morsi, and the 2014 version showed changes under Sisi. I used translated versions of the Constitutions, most of which were linked to the official Egyptian government document library.

For the second content analysis using Mada Masr articles I focused on specific mentions of governmental actions against Mada Masr or about legal cases Mada Masr was involved in. I also looked at ways that Mada Masr was continuing to publish despite governmental action against them. Mada Masr is an online newspaper founded in July 2013. It is the ocountry’s leading liberal newspaper and has been blocked on Egyptian internet service providers since 2017. I chose to focus on Mada Masr because they regularly publish updates regarding their legal battles and also have an English version of their website. I have also used Mada Masr as a source in the past, and I am familiar with their content and style. I chose six of their articles spanning from 2017 when they were initially blocked to December of 2019. These articles were chosen because they spanned a variety of topics including, a response to being blocked, interviews with various staff members after being blocked for 300 days, the website’s decision to apply for a license, discrimination against journalists, legal battles arising from a profile on Sisi’s son, and the website’s decision to launch a Tor mirror for Egyptian readers.

6 The 2011 Constitution had very few mentions of the press or opinion. Details are outlines in Articles 12 and 13, where the freedom of opinion is guaranteed along with the freedom to share said opinion within the confines of the law. These confines are never outlined. Freedom of the press and publishing are also guaranteed along with a ban on censorship and ceasing publication, but exceptions could be made during a national emergency for the purpose of national security.

The 2011 Constitution was incredibly vague, but still allowed basic freedoms of the press. The government could not control the establishment of outlets and could only alter content during a national emergency.

7 The preamble of the 2011 constitution mentions the freedom of the press as a core tenant of Egypt’s intellectual and cultural role, signaling an importance of media. However, later sections of the constitution introduce increased restrictions. Article 45 indicates that freedom of thought is guaranteed, and does not include the stipulation on publication of thought “within the confines of the law” that was in the 2011 version. Article 48 guarantees freedom of the press and publishing, but limits these freedoms based on the needs of national security, differing from the 2011 version. Article 48 also says that closure of outlets may only happen through a court order and that monitoring of what outlets publish is prohibited except in times of war or public mobilization.

Article 49 is an entirely new section of the constitution from 2011, stating that the law organizes the establishment of outlets. This is clarified in Article 215, wherein the National Media Council is established as the regulatory body for media. One of the council’s roles is to fight centralization and monopoly of the press.

The 2012 Constitution restricts freedom of the press by adding stipulations on establishing an outlet and limiting freedom of the press based on the requirements of national security. Neither of these restrictions are clearly defined and allow the government to decide what issues constitute a threat to national security and what the requirements for establishing a new media outlet will look like.

8 The 2014 constitution further clamps down on freedom of the press. Like the 2012 version, freedom of the press is guaranteed and establishment of outlets is regulated by law, but a new provision dictates that newspapers may only be issued once notification is given. The vague new language seems to indicate that outlets must tell the council or the government about new publications, going against the 2012 provision that outlawed monitoring content.

Another new guideline is issued in Article 71, which states that publications can be charged with inciting violence or discrimination. Once again these terms are not defined and leave the decision up to the government on what content may incite violence or be discriminatory. Meanwhile article 72 stipulates that press institutions must maintain “neutrality.” This term is not defined and is likely used to ensure that outlets are not opposition leaning.

The description of the council is also changed in article 211. The council is no longer responsible for preventing the centralization of the press, likely because the state had taken more control of the press at this point. The council is, however, responsible for ensuring the neutrality mentioned in article 72 and for establishing the regulations for media outlets to adhere to national security.

The 2014 constitution is by far the most repressive of the versions covered here. It introduces new stipulations on neutrality and notification, and also allows for publications to be charged with inciting violence.

(I am sorry this is so small on the notes preview! It should be high enough resolution that you can read the constitution if you zoom in.)

9 In the first article, Mada Masr details their experience finding out that they had been blocked from Egyptian internet service providers the day after it occurred. The website found out they were blocked from an unofficial statement from a high-ranking government official to a state news agency. Mada Masr was not informed it had been blocked or that any entity had filed legal charges against the website. This seems to contradict the 2014 constitution which states there would be punishment for inciting violence, but did not specify that punishment to be shutting down access to the website, a power only allowed during times of war or public mobilization.

In the second article, Mada Masr staffers speak about their experience for being blocked for ten months. The outlet still had not received formal notification that it had been blocked. Other staffers remarked at the political nature of blockings, saying that they felt the government did not want them to publish and that if you were not affiliated with the government you were likely to get blocked. Once again, these statements do not fall in line with the constitution, which did not allow for publications to be completely shutdown.

In the third article, Mada Masr discusses their decision to apply for a permit under the 2018 media law, which required all publications to be registered with the government. The article notes that in the legal battle surrounding being blocked, the outlet was unable to formulate the legal basis under which they were blocked, partially because they never received formal notification from the government of their discretion. The article also details that the outlet decided to apply because while they are “adversarial journalism” they want to continue publishing, and if registering will allow them to continue their work they would do so.

10 The fourth article details a Mada Masr journalist’s encounter with authorities at the airport. When Mamdouh reached passport control, she was pulled aside and asked whether she had any foreign currency or if she travelled abroad often, the answer to both was no. Her luggage was retrieved from the plane and searched. Mamdouh was told her name had been added a watchlist, when she inquired as to why an officer said that was the normal way of dealing with journalists. If the officer’s statement is true, this would appear to be an intimidation of the press, which would not appear to be legal under the constitution. Mamdouh was a registered journalist and had not been notified of anything she published violating the law.

The fifth article details the government’s response to a Mada Masr story that was published, titled “President’s eldest son, Mahmoud al-Sisi, sidelined from powerful intelligence position to diplomatic mission in Russia.” The offices of the outlet were raided and computers were collected. Three journalists were temporarily detained, while another employee’s house was raided in the middle of the night. Someone high up intervened to prevent the employee’s detention. They could have been charged with terrorism or inciting violence for a story that seems like a run of the mill expose in the US. While the actions of the government may not violate the constitution, they demonstrate how few rights independent journalists in Egypt truly have.

Finally, the sixth story details Mada Masr’s launch of a Tor mirror which would be incredibly difficult to block because of the way that Tor networks are set up. Mada Masr had previously launched 21 mirrors of the website to allow Egyptian readers access to their website. This article displays the creativity and tenacity of independent media outlets in Egypt. Mada Masr could have given up on the Egyptian market, but continued to launch new ways to circumvent restrictions, partially to show that they could.

11 Each new iteration of the constitution introduced new provisions that would allow the government to control the establishment and the content of news. Vague language like national security or inciting violence was used to allow the government to define the terms to ensure the opposition supporting outlets would not be allowed under the law. These vague terms allow the government to control the national narrative and to ensure that Sisi and his regime maintain power because there would not be any mainstream, published opposing views.

Mada Masr is just one of many independent organizations in Egypt trying to continue their work despite increased government crackdowns. Their articles demonstrate that the government is using extralegal searches and arrests of journalists, the blocking of websites, and the registration of websites as a way to ensure that news that does not agree with their point-of-view is not published or widely available. They work to intimidate the press into submission to ensure that the only press is good press. Yet independent news agencies have been creative, and have taken crackdowns to be an affirmation of their importance. Launching Tor mirrors is one of many ways that websites are coping with being blocked from Egyptian ISPs, but it demonstrates the willpower of independent journalists to continue their work under conditions that appear insurmountable.

Still it is important to note that some independent agencies may water down their coverage to avoid government crackdowns, making the question of what Egyptian news sources to trust even more complicated. This amplifies the importance of knowing the affiliations and the history of the news sources that you are reading, so that you are aware whether news has been framed to benefit one side or another.

12 In closing, I thought this quote from about her arrest was especially fitting in summarizing the spirit of the Mada Masr staff, who continues to work and publish news three years after being blocked from Egyptian ISPs.

13 Acknowledgements

Dr. Rami Zeedan

Thank you to Dr. Zeedan for his guidance on topic choice and research methods. I have greatly enjoyed having him as a professor and I am thankful for his caring and kind nature. He is always willing to help students during (virtual) office hours and goes out of his way to ensure that we understand concepts. I wish I had the time to take another class with him.

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