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CONSTITUTIONS IN CRISIS This page intentionally left blank CONSTITUTIONS IN CRISIS Political Violence and the Rule of Law John E. Finn New York Oxford OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 1991 Oxford University Press Oxford New York Toronto Delhi Bombay Calcutta Madras Karachi Petaling Jaya Singapore Hong Kong Tokyo Nairobi Dar es Salaam Cape Town Melbourne Auckland and associated companies in Berlin Ibadan Copyright © 1991 by Oxford University Press, Inc. Published by Oxford University Press, Inc., 200 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016 Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without prior permission of Oxford University Press. Permission for reprinting previously published materials is hereby acknowledged: Lines from "His Confidence" and "Sixteen Dead Men" are reprinted with permission of Macmillan Publishing Company from The Poems of W. B. Yeats: A New Edition, edited by Richard J. Finneran. Copyright 1924, 1933 by Macmillan Publishing Company; renewed 1952, 1961 by Bertha Georgie Yeats. Lines from "Those who will not reason" by W. H. Auden, from W. H. Auden: Collected Poems, edited by Edward Mendelson. Copyright © 1976 by Edward Mendelson, William Meredith, and Monroe K. Spears. Reprinted by permission of Random House, Inc. Tables and figures in chapter 3 are reprinted with permission of Taylor and Francis from "Public Support for Emergency (Anti-Terrorist) Legislation in Northern Ireland: A Preliminary Analysis," in Terrorism, vol. 10, no. 2 (1987). Table 3-5 in chapter 3 is reprinted with permission of Manchester University Press from The Prevention of Terrorism in British Law, by Clive Walker (Manchester University Press, 1986). Lines from "seven years and twenty later" by Heinrich Boll, from the University of Dayton Review, vol. 17, no. 2 (1985), are reprinted with permission of Robert C. Conrad, translator of the material and editor of the University of Dayton Review. Lines from the Civil Servant Loyalty Case, from Donald P. Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany (Duke University Press, 1989), are reprinted with permission of Donald P. Kommers. The SouthWest Case, 1 BVerfGE 14 (1951); Socialist Reich Party Case, 2 BVerfGE 1 (1952); Communist Party Case, 5 BVerfGE 85 (1956); and Privacy of Communications Case (Klass Case), 30 BVerfGE 1 (1970), from Walter F. Murphy and Joseph Tanenhaus, Comparative Constitutional Law (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977). (Translated by Mrs. Renate Chestnut.) Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Finn, John E. Constitutions in crisis : political violence and the rule of law / John E. Finn, p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 0-19-505738-4 1. Terrorism. 2. Constitutional law. 3. Terrorism—Northern Ireland. 4. Northern Ireland—Constitutional law. 5. Terrorism—Germany. 6. Germany—Constitutional law. I. Title. K5256.F56 1991 342'.02—dc20 [342.22] 90-31794 246897531 Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper In memory of my parents, September 1947. A secret between you two, Between the proud and the proud. Yeats, "Against Unworthy Praise" This page intentionally left blank Acknowledgments During the course of this work many people offered advice and encourage- ment. But only my wife, Linda (and the pets, as she so properly insists), had to suffer daily my moods and distractions: "What payment were enough/For undying love?" Others suffered only slightly less often and with no less grace. One of the many pleasurable consequences of their company is the chance now to ac- knowledge their assistance and to record my gratitude. My teachers at Prince- ton, Walter F. Murphy, Sotirios Barber, and Nancy Bermeo, read earlier drafts of the work with care and compassion. I might still be working on a disserta- tion proposal but for Walter's exhortations to be done and be gone. Sue Hemberger, Brian Mirsky, and David Aladjem also read individual chapters and offered good-natured criticism. My colleagues at Wesleyan have done much to ease the transition from thesis to book. I want especially to thank Nancy Schwartz and Russell Murphy, both of whom read much of the manuscript. Barbara Craig, Martha Crenshaw, Tony Daley, Bruce Masters, Don Moon, and David Morgan also offered assistance in various ways. Margaret Miniter, of the Wesleyan Class of 1987, Carol Conerly, Class of 1988, and Bruce Peabody, Class of 1991, pro- vided patient and helpful research assistance. In addition, Donald Kommers of the University of Notre Dame, Gerard Braunthal of the University of Massachusetts, and Peter Euben of the Univer- sity of California at Santa Cruz all read parts of the work and offered advice. John Fairleigh of the Queen's University Belfast provided assistance in locating certain materials. Whatever errors remain are my responsibility alone. I would, however, much prefer a system of joint (and not several) liability. vii This page intentionally left blank Contents Introduction 3 PART I Constitutional Maintenance and the Legal Control of Political Violence 11 Chapter 1 A Theory of Constitutional Maintenance and Constitutional Crises 13 Afterword: Constitutive Principles and Right Answers 44 PART II Constitutional Maintenance and Dissolution in Northern Ireland 47 Chapter 2 Constitutional Dissolution and Reconstruction in Northern Ireland 51 Chapter 3 Political Violence and Antiterrorism Legislation in Great Britain and Northern Ireland 84 PART III Constitutional Maintenance and Reconstruction in Germany 135 Chapter 4 Constitutional Dissolution in the Weimar Republic 139 ix X Contents Chapter 5 Constitutional Reconstruction, Militant Democracy, and Antiterrorism Legislation in the Federal Republic of Germany 179 Conclusion 219 Notes 222 Selected References 255 Index 265 CONSTITUTIONS IN CRISIS Those who will not reason Perish in the act. Those who will not act Perish for that reason. Auden, "Those who will not reason" Introduction In Book Twelve of The Odyssey, Lady Kirke draws Odysseus aside from the celebration of his success at the houses of death to warn of the trials that still await him on his long journey home.1 The loveliest and most perilous of these are the Seirenes, whose soulful melodies bewitch and entrance mere men. Anxious to hear their serenade and yet keep his mind, Odysseus, with Kirke's assistance, devises a plan: His crew must lash him to the mast of his ship and plug up their ears with beeswax so as to hear neither the Seirenes nor his cries to release him. Odysseus must then remain there, back to the mast, lashed to the mast, until the Seirenes' song is faint in the distance. Implicit in this one of Odysseus's many travails are questions of enduring significance for students of constitutional theory.2 Odysseus's decision to be bound to the mast is an admission of weakness: He knows that when the Seirenes sing he will not be fully rational, that he will not wish to be restrained. If we respect his earlier desire, later pleas to the contrary aside, do we do so because the original statement is now morally or legally binding, or because we doubt the rationality of the second?3 And who should make such a decision? Surely not Odysseus, for he has admitted weakness in the face of temptation. He cannot now make the judgment that his earlier decision to be bound is more (or less) rational than his current wish to be released. And what of his crew? Their judgment cannot be fully rational either, for they do not hear the call of the Seirenes and so cannot judge whether the temptation is worth the cost. Consider also that the crew acts under orders directed precisely to this situation. What are they to do if yet another calamity, this time unanticipated, arises while Odysseus is still bound? What should they do, for example, if a sudden and severe squall besets the ship while Odysseus is lashed to the mast? Like Odysseus, we as individuals seek to manipulate future experience in our own lives. In all manners of fashion we lash ourselves to the mast, aware that in a moment of weakness we may later wish to be free of our self-imposed restraints. The commitments we make to loved ones, the favors we promise to friends, the contracts we make with business associates—all are bonds we may later wish to break. When are we compelled to honor these self-commands, and when, if ever, should an unforeseen contingency release us from them? Does it matter that we assumed such commitments precisely to guard against 3 4 Introduction temptation, or that they contain stipulations meant to influence and determine the conditions in which we voice subsequent desires? Communities also agree to bind themselves, and constitutions are the (more or less) written evidence both of the binding and of the rules that bind.4 But in our efforts to interpret these rules, to apply the majestic generalities of constitutional language to the vagaries of everyday political disputes, we occasionally lose sight of the vanity that gives rise to constitution making as a political activity. Constitutional self-commands embody our confidence in our ability to overcome human weakness and the whims of fate, a point Alexander Hamilton emphasized when he observed that "it seems to have been reserved to the people of this country . to decide the important question, whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force."5 In this respect constitu- tions, much like promises, are nothing less than attempts to fashion the future—to forge the institutional patterns and cultural folkways of political and social experience.6 Indeed, carried to a logical extreme, an extreme fairly implied by Article VI, the ratification provisions of Article VII, and the limitations, both substantive and procedural, of Article V, the U.S.