Modern History: Anglo-Irish Conflict

MODERN HISTORY: ANGLO-IRISH CONFLICT How were the actions of nationalists in Northern Ireland able to bring about a renewed attempt at a peaceful settlement by the British and Irish governments between 1976 and 1985? The rift between unionists and nationalists in Ireland, which began when the British first colonised the country, has proved very difficult to subdue. Nationalists, pushing for a united Ireland, completely separate from Britain, have influenced the actions undertaken by the British and Irish governments in order to contain the struggle or reach an actual peace agreement. Over the years, nationalists have adopted many different strategies in achieving their aims. These fall under two main categories: political measures (ballot box), undertaken by the moderate SDLP and the extremist Sinn Fein, and armed struggle, undertaken by the Irish Republican Army (IRA). Dixon claims that nationalists, through politics, mobilisation and terror, have attempted to shift the political agenda in their direction. What was seen as one of the first attempts at a peaceful settlement by the British and Irish governments was the Sunningdale Agreement, a power-sharing initiative that fell apart in 1974. This again left Ireland under direct rule from Westminster and lessened the support for political routes to a settlement from the nationalists. Also, Historian Tim Coogan argues that the Agreement was used as a smokescreen for the problems in Northern Ireland and left no lasting imprint on the politics of the country. While at first the nationalists had focused mainly on one strategy at a time (politics or violence), the 1980s marked a time of equality of armed and political struggle. Danny Morrison, nationalist leader, in a speech to his supporters claimed that no one really believed that they could win the war through the ‘ballot box’. The re-emergence of the IRA in the 1970s showed a continuation of the physical force tradition in Northern Ireland. The IRA, an extremist nationalist paramilitary, saw the British as colonial aggressors and believed, as said by Walsh, that the route to a British withdrawal required violence. Many extremist nationalists felt the only way that they would be listened to would be through armed struggle. Between 1973 and 1980, 1398 people were killed in shootings, sniper attacks, bombs, landmines and booby traps. Before the 1980s, these violent attacks buffeted political initiatives and had largely negative results. The continuation of bombings and other attacks in Northern Ireland was joined by attacks on British soil in 1973 onwards. Attacks such as those on London’s Hyde Park, Harrods shopping centre and even a bombing in 1984 of a Brighton hotel in which British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was staying led to increased media coverage of the nationalist struggle in Northern Ireland. Images of these attacks, combined with images of the civil war raging in Northern Ireland were broadcast worldwide. This caused embarrassment for the British, who were seen as a world leader and did not want to appear unstable to other countries. Thus, the British again began to brainstorm ideas on how to bring the conflict to a peaceful close. There were many attempts to bring about a settlement, such as those by the Peace People. While a cease-fire was a suggested of beginning a settlement, the IRA due to previously failed cease-fires, which had not made the nationalists any political gains, did not attempt them. The Women’s Peace Movement of 1976 was again promoting the plight of nationalists in Northern Ireland, while at the same time calling for an end to violence. However, as said by Adams, the movement soon lost credibility in nationalist areas and sparked only minimal discussion of the topic in the British and Irish governments. The election of Margaret Thatcher as British Prime Minister marked a change in British policy. Thatcher was incredibly rigid on the question of Northern Ireland, refusing to discuss the problem with ‘terrorists (the IRA). This halted much of the discussion on the violence in Northern Ireland, encouraging nationalists to find new routes in order to promote their case. Sinn Fein is the political party that grew out of the IRA once a need for alternate ways of promoting the nationalist case was seen. This party and the moderate nationalist SDLP were the two main nationalist political forces in Northern Ireland. The SDLP engaged in a series of discussions at home and abroad that had an impact on how the British and Irish governments viewed the conflict. The party supports the reunification of Ireland by consent, opposing violence as a means to achieve their aims. Ideas on the how Northern Ireland could be governed in a way that would bring about peace and stability, such as the New Ireland Forum, were developed by the SDLP and supported by the Irish government. However, this initiative did not spark the political change it had hoped to, as Thatcher dismissed the results of the forum. Other attempts also failed to inspire change, and it can be argued (as it is by Dixon) that this is because they failed to harness the power of street politics and violence as the IRA did. Participation in the Atkins conference helped shape the agenda to include suggestions that indicated a shift in Westminster’s opinion of the Ireland conflict (even more support for idea of power sharing). Under the leadership of John Hume, the SDLP was able to engage in talks with the British government at Chequers. This was seen as a positive step for nationalists as it allowed for open discussion with the British on the conflict. Sinn Fein is often regarded as linked with the IRA, despite insisting the groups are completely separate. The association with the IR was a buffer to talks with the British government, who refused to talk with a ‘terrorist organisation’, as the IRA was seen by Westminster. For Sinn Fein, the greatest success in gaining support came from the protests organised by nationalist prisoners over their loss of special category status. The prisoners demanded to be treated differently from inmates jailed for criminal offences. The prisoners had five main demands: right to wear own clothes, no prison-dictated work, free association, weekly letters and visits and the restoration of all remission lost as a result of protest. Beginning with the ‘blanket protest’ in 1976, which consisted of inmates refusing to wear prison uniform and thus being confined to their cells with only blankets to wear, the protest morphed into the ‘dirty protest’ by 1980. This protest included the smearing of excrement all over prison walls and a refusal to wash by nationalist prisoners. The worldwide coverage, encouraged by the visit of Cardinal O Fiaich to the prison, brought embarrassment for Britain. In 1980, hunger strikes began. The most widely known hunger striker, Bobby Sands, first refused to eat on 1 May, 1981. Britain’s inflexibility on the issues raised by the protestors even encouraged those who did not support Sinn Fein to become more extreme in their views. The death of independent nationalist MP Frank Maguire presented an opportunity for Sinn Fein to run Sands for election, after dissuading all other nationalist candidates from partaking in the race. This was a propaganda victory of huge proportions for the IRA and caused more moderate nationalists to move left in their views. This led to an increase in electoral gains for Sinn Fein, gaining 13.4% of the vote in 1981, thus resulting in Gerry Adams’ election into West Belfast. This growing popularity of Sinn Fein, a party inextricably linked to terrorism (as seen by the British Government), ultimately led to the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) in 1985, which was a huge gain for the nationalists as it allowed the government of the Irish Republic to have a say in the affairs of Northern Ireland, which was closer to unification than they had been before when under direct rule from Westminster. The AIA also decreed that, when a majority voted for it, Northern Ireland would be separated from England and unite with the Republic of Ireland. .

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