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The Joint Strike Fighter: Solution Or Wishful Thinking?

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The Joint Strike Fighter: Solution Or Wishful Thinking? POLICY Edwards AFB Photo by Steve Zapka Edwards Boeing’s X-32A Joint Strike Fighter. THE JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER: SOLUTION OR WISHFUL THINKING? by Dr. Paul T. Mitchell hile acquisition of a replacement of the JSF AS SOLUTION CF-18 will not take place until the 2017- 2020 time frame, the Air Force is estab- ecent operations conducted by Western military lishing a project office to examine a next R forces suggest that air power is likely to remain generation fighter. One of the most promis- the first and most popular option for states wanting to Wing programmes for that replacement is the American flex military muscles. Air power offers a high degree Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), which may do to the interna- of flexibility, precision and lethality when looking at tional fighter industry what the F-16 nearly did: elimi- military options. Air operations can be carried out at nate all competition. The question this paper asks is long range with relatively low risk to military person- whether the JSF represents a real solution for the Air nel and low exposure to the nations conducting the Force or merely a case of wishful thinking on the part of operations. As an Air Command discussion paper air power enthusiasts. This paper will argue that if the points out, air power should prove to be the West’s best Canadian Forces choose to retain an offensive air capa- ‘asymmetric’ response to deny adversaries the option bility, the JSF certainly represents its most likely choice of conducting large-scale conventional ground cam- for a number of reasons.1 However, the future of the JSF paigns aimed at inflicting casualties and thus under- is not entirely assured, even within the United States, mining Western will.2 where the programme faces significant budgetary and technical problems, together with a certain degree of Given these initial assumptions, the JSF appears to service scepticism within the US armed forces. The be a strong contender for replacing the CF-18. The JSF most significant challenge facing the Air Force about is shaping up to be the largest acquisition programme in the JSF is that the case for a fighter replacement has not recent aviation history. Close to 3000 aircraft are likely been made convincingly to the Canadian public. to be procured by the United States and the United Whether and how well this is done may prove to be the most significant factor in whether the CF ultimately Dr. Paul T. Mitchell is Director of Academics at the Canadian acquires the JSF. Forces College in Toronto. Summer 2002 ● Canadian Military Journal 33 Kingdom alone, and there are significant export possi- compete with American products on an even playing bilities.3 Aircraft analyst Richard Aboulafia has long field. In particular, the Mirage 2000 saw somewhat of a suggested that the JSF is more an industrial policy than rebirth with orders coming from India, Taiwan and sev- an aircraft programme.4 With well over 6,000 fighters eral Middle Eastern nations. Greece is committed to a needing to be replaced in air forces around the world, slow procurement of the Typhoon, along with the pro- the JSF would serve a market niche that could cement ducing nations Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. the dominance of the American aerospace industry in South Africa will purchase nine Gripens, with options this key sector.5 While an initial operational capability for an additional nineteen. The Czechs have chosen of 2008 is late by the standards of its competitors — Gripen to replace their MiG 21s and Sukhois, and Gripen, Typhoon and Rafale — the JSF would truly be a Hungary is strongly interested in that airframe as well. fighter for the 21st century, rather than technology of The Rafale has yet to secure any firm commitments the last one. aside from the 61 ordered by France, although French officials plan to price it competitively against the JSF.9 The JSF programme already has strong internation- al participation. The United Kingdom has invested £200 But, can the European fighters really compete million and is negotiating a further £100 billion for the against the JSF? This is an important question given the engineering management and development (EMD) phase incomplete development of the JSF. Both the Rafale and scheduled to commence this fall. The Netherlands, the Typhoon compare favourably against the capabilities Norway and Denmark have together invested $32 mil- of the F-15, while the more modest Gripen is compara- lion, and Canada has already spent over $10 million as ble to the F-16, even despite its somewhat limited oper- well. In the EMD phase, Canada will invest a further ational parameters. While the Gripen will perform $150 million. Shortly after the Canadian decision, the admirably in a Swedish environment, its short range, Netherlands announced that it would invest another limited ‘beyond-visual-range’ capabilities and low pay- $800 million. Turkey, Italy, Denmark and Norway are load capacity make it less attractive in the export mar- also negotiating participation.6 Officials are, of course, ket, although Saab seems willing to re-design the air- careful to point out that even if Canada invests in some craft to improve the performance of export models. degree of partnership status, this does not necessarily However, the Swedes insist that Gripen’s small size will mean that the JSF will be procured7. make it difficult to detect, and its design philosophy of rapid mission turnaround, easy maintenance, and unim- Despite this international participation, US require- proved runway capability give it an edge against its ments may result in an aircraft less than optimally more sophisticated competitors.10 designed for the export market. From a USAF perspec- tive, the aircraft is meant to replace the F-16 in its role as The Rafale will mount one of the most sophisticat- a ‘bomb truck.’ Other nations will, however, be looking ed radars among the competing fighter designs. The for a multi-role aircraft that can easily switch between air RBE2 is a phased array radar which will simultaneously superiority missions and close air support/precision reduce the Rafale’s radar cross section, permit tracking strike missions. Certainly the flexibility of the CF-18 and engagement of multiple targets and extend detection during Operation “Allied Force” demonstrated the utility and tracking of targets beyond the range of existing of such a capability. But, with the JSF designed to be a medium range air-to-air missiles. While the F-22 pro- component of the USAF ‘system of systems’, “virtually gramme includes development of the APG-77 phased the only way for an export customer to use its JSFs to array radar, no other design, current or projected, will their full potential would be in the framework of multi- carry such a system.11 national operations, that would also involve US forces to provide air superiority and C3ISR assets.”8 Overall, while all three European aircraft will be highly capable, the fact remains that all three were European fighter programmes provide clear alterna- developed in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Although tives to the JSF. In the 1990s, European aerospace man- both RAND and the UK Defence Research ufacturers reduced their costs by industrial restructuring Establishment studies rated the Typhoon as superior to and modernized production methods, allowing them to the F-15, all three European fighters fell far short of the Parameter Typhoon Rafale Gripen F-16C Block 40 F-15E Max Wt. Lbs. 46,305 47,4000 28,000 42,300 81,000 Design Wt. Lbs. ~33,000 ~33,500 ~20,000 27,185 ~49,000 Empty Wt. Lbs. 21,495 19,973 14,600 18,238 32,000 Internal Wt. Lbs. 8,818 9,420 5,000 6,846 13,123 Max Ext. Load Lbs. 14,330 17,673 ~10,000 12,000 24,500 Store Stations No. 13 14 7 9 11+ Max Spd. M2.0 M1.8+ M2.0 M2.0+ M2.5 Source: Lorell, et al., The Gray Threat: Assessing the Next Generation European Fighters (Santa Monica: RAND, 1995) Figure 1 – Technical Comparisons between Fighter Programmes 34 Canadian Military Journal ● Summer 2002 a b Fighter Effectiveness Score Inferred Exchange Ratio F-22 .90 9:1 Typhoon .75 3:1 POLICY F-15E .55 1.2:1 Rafale .50 1:1 F-18E/F .45 1:1.2 Gripen .40 1:1.5 Mirage 2000 .35 1:1.8 Tornado F.3 .30 1:2.3 Source, Lorell, et al., 1995 Figure 2 – DRA Combat Simulation Results aApproximate values bAssumed exchange ratio (enemy to friendly killed) inferred from effectiveness scores F-22.12 How well they will compare to the JSF is yet to radically in the next years, discretion may be a wise be determined, although it seems likely that the JSF will course, particularly in light of the large sums of money prove to be superior to both Rafale (aside from its radar) that would have to be invested in new fighters. and Gripen. Because of the numbers involved in the joint American/British production, it seems likely that Indeed, the Air Force has begun just such a re-eval- the Europeans will find it very difficult to compete on uation. Vectors 2020 raises the question whether com- price against the JSF without giving steep discounts. bined or joint capabilities should be emphasized in the event that the Air Force can afford only one or the WISHFUL THINKING: CAPABILITY PLANNING other.15 A joint option would see the Air Force increase its capabilities to support maritime and land forces, nder the capability-planning context adopted by the emphasizing programmes such as strategic airlift, close UCF in June 2000,13 programmes are now focused on air support, maritime strike and surveillance and recon- core capabilities rather than on the platform-based plan- naissance, while decreasing emphasis or eliminating ning that predominated throughout the Cold War.
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