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Setting the Context: Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses and Joint War Fighting in an Uncertain World Explains Why SEAD Has Changed the Basic Fabric of Air Warfare

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Setting the Context: Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses and Joint War Fighting in an Uncertain World Explains Why SEAD Has Changed the Basic Fabric of Air Warfare Disclaimer This publication was produced in the Department of Defense school environment in the interest of academic freedom and the advancement of national defense-related concepts. The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not reflectthe official policyor position of the Department of Defense or the United States government. This publication has been reviewed by security and policy review authorities and is cleared for public release. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Brungess, James R. Setting the context : suppression ofenemy air defenses and joint war fighting in an uncertain world / James R. Brungess . p. 242 . Includes index. 1. Air interdiction-United States. 2. Unified operations (Military science)- United States. 3 . World politics-1989- I. Mile. UG703.1378 1994 94-19404 355 .4'22-dc20 CIP For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents US Government Printing Office Washington, DC 20402 1.1. Contents Chapter Page DISCLAIMER . ii FOREWORD . vii ABOUT THE AUTHOR . ix PREFACE . xi INTRODUCTION . xiii 1 HISTORY AND DOCTRINE . 1 The Evolutionary Construct .. 1 Vietnam . 4 Bekaa Valley . 16 Libya . 25 Persian Gulf . 35 The Larger Context . 45 Notes . 47 2 CRITERIA FORASSESSING SEAD EFFECTIVENESS . 51 Methods of Analysis . 53 The Historical Approach . 55 The Engineering Approach . 58 The Commonsense Approach . 65 The Objective-based Approach . 69 Setting the Context: Continuums as Assessment Tools . 80 Challenges for Objective-based Criteria . 89 Notes . 91 3 SERVICE APPROACHES TO SEAD . 93 Navy SEAD . 94 Air Force SEAR . 98 Army SEAD . 111 Marine SEAD . 119 Notes . 125 4 THE MERITS OF JSEAD: THE QUESTTO ACHIEVE EFFECTIVENESS . 129 The Personality of JSEAD and the Threat . 129 The World of "Joint" and JSEAD . 135 iii Chapter Page Brave NewWorld: "True" Joint SEAD . 141 The Four Continuums: How to Use Them . 143 The Need-/Resource-based Continuum . 144 The Threat-/Capability-based Continuum . 147 The Piecemeal/Integrated Tactics Continuum . 149 The Defensive/Offensive Continuum . 150 The General Context: A New Way of Looking at JSEAD . 150 Notes . 157 5 JSEAD: STRATEGY, TACTICS, AND THE CHANGED THREAT . 159 The Essence of the Threat . .. 163 Requirements of the Information-based IADS . 170 Detecting . 170 Locating and Identifying . 171 Tracking . 175 Weapons Allocation and Employment . 176 Defeating the LADS: Information Denial . 180 Detection as Information . 181 Locating and Identifying as Information . 183 Information Denial in the "Endgame. 184 Adjusting to Fiscal Reality . 187 SEAD Tactics: Variations, Combinations, and Innovations . 190 Variations : The "IADS Sweep. 192 Combining Old Tactics: SEAD and the Modern Long-Range SAM . 196 Innovations: Information Denial via Computer Warfare . 199 Joint SEAD Strategy: Dividing the Turf . 200 JSEAD Tactics: So What? . 204 Notes . 205 6 WHERE TO NEXT: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . 207 Conclusions . 207 SEAD as an Evolutionary Concept . 208 Requirement for a Paradigm Shift . 208 The Lead/Lag Issue: Joint Doctrine and JSEAD . 210 iv Chapter Page Shifting the Focus of Criteria: Overall Objectives . 210 Recommendations . 211 Education . 211 Training . 212 Equipment . 213 Full Circle: The Strategy-Doctrine-Tactics Continuum . 219 INDEX . 221 Illustrations Figure r 1 Real versus Perceived SEAR Threat . xiv 2 Historical Benchmark/Variable Matrix . 4 3 Doctrine/Strategy/Tactics Relationships . 10 4 Evolution of Air Force SEAR Relationships . 12 5 Hierarchical/Linear Decision-making Model . 64 6 Evolution of Criteria/MOE Approaches . 71 7 Traditional Vertical Model . 74 8 Cybernetic Model . 76 9 The Cybernetic Process and the Four Continuums . 81 10 Piecemeal/Integrated Continuum . 82 11 Need-based/Resource-based Continuum . 84 12 Threat-based/Capability-based Continuum . 86 13 Defensive/Offensive Continuum and Clausewitzian Model . 88 14 Structural Differences . 102 15 Effects of Rapid Change on SEAD . 103 16 Linear versus Nonlinear SEAD Tactics Evolution . 133 17 Differences between Vertical and Cybernetic Models . 138 18 The Tension between Joint and Single-Service SEAD . 140 V Figure Page 19 Need-/Resource-based Continuum . 145 20 Threat-/Capability-based Continuum . 148 21 Piecemeal/Integrated Continuum . 149 22 Defensive/Offensive Continuum . 151 23 JSEAD Planning Matrix . 154 24 Evolution of Information-based LADS . 166 25 The Integrated Air Defense System Sweep . 193 26 Attacking the Modern Long-Range SAM . 197 27 Evolution of Army/Air Force SEAD Turf . 201 28 The JFACC's JSEAD Organization . 218 Table 1 Vietnam War Matrix . 13 2 Bekaa Valley Matrix . 24 3 Libya Matrix . 33 4 Gulf War Matrix . 43 5 Evolutionary Trends in SEAD : ABrief Summary . 45 6 Comparison of Cold War to Post-Cold War SEAR Environment . 72 7 Comparison of Critical MOE Approaches . 73 8 Airlnand Battle-Future Key Systems . 116 9 Differences between Airlnand Battle and Airland Operations . 119 10 Traits of Modern LADS Weapons . 177 11 Comparison of Old to New SEAD Paradigm . 209 Vi Foreword Suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAR) has long been a critical concern to advocates of air power. It is especially critical to Pacific Air Forces because air power offers a primary means of responding rapidly and effectively to areas of conflict within the Pacific arena. Lt Col James R. Brungess was selected in February 1991 to conduct research into developing joint SEAD tactics that would be useful in the Pacific Command area of operations-specifically for the Far Eastern Military District of the Soviet Union. We deemed it an important subject, and Colonel Brungess had the necessary credentials to conduct the study. The world, however, changed dramatically while he was conducting his study. This altered both the character and direction of his research effort. In a few short months from March to December 1991, the United States entered a new era heralded by Desert Storm and the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the span of less than a year, the United States Air Force vindicated the time-honored doctrine and strategies of air power in Desert Storm and lost its most powerful adversary with the demise of the Soviet Union in December 1991 . While the same weapons continue to exist, these events have irreversibly changed the context in which they will be used. Both events have not only changed the shape of the world; they have forever altered the way we look at air power and, more importantly, the way we must use air power. Setting the Context: Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses and Joint War Fighting in an Uncertain World explains why SEAD has changed the basic fabric of air warfare. In discussing the familiar themes of the past and the emerging paradigms of the future, Colonel Brungess weaves a web of changing inter- relationships among services, politico-military structures, and research and development strategies, as well as developing a novel methodology for assessing events critical to air power's future. It places SEAD within the context of a changed world by defining relationships, explaining evolutionary patterns, and establishing a criterion to measure success, as well as pointing the way for future acquisitions, research, and joint Vii tactics development . It is a tour de force in acquiring the big picture of where we have been, where we are, and where we need to go . This is an important book. It not only provides scholarly research on historical and pragmatic issues, it grapples with key issues affecting real warfighters fighting real wars-the kind of information that tacticians and strategists can use to save lives and win wars. You will find the book intellectually challenging and exhilarating; Colonel Brungess has provided new ways of looking at new phenomena as well as an iterative, logical way of relating SEAR to the past. Without a doubt, the most important feature of the book is its emphasis on the continued importance of SEAD to air power. Colonel Brungess provides a compelling argument that the technological cat-and-mouse game between air attacker and ground defender will accelerate over the next several decades. This will occur, paradoxically, during times of peace, and not because of national policy but because of international market forces. The evolution of air defense technology is only beginning to share in the same technology that has made air power preeminent, and, in times of dwindling fiscal resources, this is something for the air warrior to worry about. We need to make the most of what we have . Setting the Context gives us some good ideas to get the most from our air power defense dollar in terms of electronic combat and SEAD. I urge you to read this book carefully. It provides a unique and original view into the world of electronic combat and SEAD that will enrich as well as inform. To use the author's words, "For the brief while that the world may give us, now is the time to reflect on our purposes and the time to create visions of the future-a future we have a golden opportunity to influence, to build, and to protect." Lt Col James R. Brungess holds a master of arts degree in international relations from the University of Southern California, United Kingdom Program. He is a career electronic warfare officer (EWO) with extensive experience in tactical aviation. He has flown in all three tactical air forces-Tactical Air Command (TAC), United States Air Force Europe (USAFE), and Pacific Air Forces (PACAF)-and served on the staffs of two of them. Colonel Brungess began his EWO career as an AC-130A/H gunship "black crow" in Thailand . He was responsible for the defense of the AC-130 from radar-guided weapons. Colonel Brungess served from 1975 to 1986 as a squadron EWO for four separate F-111 and EF-111 squadrons, among numerous other responsibilities . In 1981 he was selected for the EF-111 initial cadre where he helped to develop EF-111 tactics and spearheaded major initiatives to integrate EF-111 aircraft into the general tactics schemes of other fighter aircraft.
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