A Pragmatist Case Against Feminist Theories of Truth and Knowledge and the Implications for Feminist Science
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THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL TIES THAT BIND: A PRAGMATIST CASE AGAINST FEMINIST THEORIES OF TRUTH AND KNOWLEDGE AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR FEMINIST SCIENCE by Sharyn Suzanne Clough M.A., University of Calgary, 1989 THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Under Special Arrangements in the Faculty of Arts O Sharyn Suzanne Clough SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY June 1997 All rights reserved. This work may not be reproduced in whole or in part, by photocopy or other means, without permission of the author. National Library Bibliotheque nationale 1*1 of Canada du Canada Acquisitions and - Acquisitions et Bibliographic Services services bibliographiques 395 Welltngton Street 395, rue Wellington Ottawa ON Kl A ON4 Ottawa ON Kl A ON4 Canada Canada Your hle Vorre reference Our hle Norre relerene The author has granted a non- L'autew a accorde une licence non exclusive licence allowing the exclusive pernettant a la National Library of Canada to Bibliotheque nationale du Canada de reproduce, loan, distribute or sell reprodde, preter, lstribuer ou copies of th~sthesis in microform, vendre des copies de cette these sous, paper or electronic formats. la forme de microfiche/film, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format electronique. The author retains ownershp of the L'auteur conserve la propriete du copyright in hsthesis. Neither the droit d'auteur qui protege cette these. thesis nor substantial extracts fiom it Ni la these ni dps extraits substantiels may be printed or othenvise de celle-ci ne doivent etre irnprirnes reproduced without the author' s ou autrement reproduits sans son permission. autorisation. Approval Name: Sharyn Suzanne Clough Degree: Doctor of Philosophy Title of Thesis: The Epistemological Ties that Bind: A PragmatiSt Case against Feminist Theories of Truth and Knowledge and the Implications for Feminist Science Examining Committee: Dr. Phyllis Wrenn, Chair 3r. &unnah Gay, henior Supenisor History -- / -- Dr. ~orman&nz, Superviw r Philosophy - Dr. Meredith Kimball, Supervisor Psychology and Women 3 Srudies Dr. Marilyn MacDonald Internal External Examiner Women's Studies ar. Lynn Hankinson Nelson Exrernal Examiner Philosophy & Religion, Rowan College Date Approved: ABSTRACT Feminist claims that scientific activity is intimately involved with the oppression of women, often identify aspects of the epistemology of science, or scientific method, as the primary culprit. In my dissertation I try to persuade my feminist colleagues that despite the important gains we have made through the criticism of science, our fairly recent investment in an epistemological critique is yielding diminishing returns. I begin by examining the epistemological reflections of a number of feminist critics of evolutionary biology, including Ruth Hubbard and Ruth Bleier. I then discuss the more general epistemological approaches of Evelyn Fox Keller, Sandra Harding and Helen Longino. There are a number of features of feminist epistemology which make it ineffective as a method for adequately addressing the oppression of women by science. For example, feminist epistemological examinations of science have often involved essentialist claims about "women's" experience, and over-general conceptions of science as an institution. These problems are discussed throughout the dissertation. However, the principal focus involves the philosophical details of the feminist epistemologies themselves. Specifically, I focus on their reliance on a questionable model of human psychology, that I refer to as "representationalism." My anti-representationalist approach is inspired by the work of two neo- pragamatist philosophers, Richard Rorty and Donald Davidson. For the purposes of this dissertation, representationalism is the view that beliefs are the subjective, representational end-product of a sensory process, in which the objects of our world are sensed and then screened through our subjective perceptual frameworks (the filters of our values, worldview, and language). My concern is that the representational conception of beliefs as filtered representations of the world makes coherent a global scepticism about the truth of our beliefs. Since, on this model, beliefs do not arise from direct access to the world, then they can be radically wrong. All of our representations might be completely inaccurate because they are filtered through our perceptual apparatus, language, cultural worldview andlor theory allegiance. Following Rorty and Davidson, I argue that epistemological debates are premised on the coherence of global scepticism, and that, due to the nature of the representationalist model on which the debates are based, the battle with global scepticism is futile. Surveying feminist contributions to epistemological debates in science, I show how these contributions invite the coherence of scepticism. In the end, each contribution either accepts scepticism, with relativist resignation, or attempts to defeat it with various claims to objectivity. While the latter response has proven futile, for both feminist and traditional epistemologists alike, the former response is equally problematic. Either way, issues of relativism and scepticism can be used against our well-justified claims that women are being harmed by science. In the latter half of my dissertation I offer a pragmatic alternative based on Davidson's philosophy of language. Davidson argues that, on a non-representationalist model of language use, global scepticism is not a coherent option. His views undermine the motivation for participating in the epistemological debates that attempt to address scepticism as a coherent and ever-present concern. By undermining the motivation for these philosophical pursuits I hope to encourage my feminist colleagues to return to their important work in science and science criticism with the assurance that our concepts of "error" and "truth" are not always enemies that need feminist epistemological reconfiguration. Acknowledgements My thanks go first to my mother Darline Gough, and my mentor and friend Bjgrn Ramberg. Their material, emotional, and intellectual support throughout this entire project has been a great source of strength for me. I have been lucky to be surrounded by many other generous and supportive colleagues and friends. I am forever thankful to Ian Hollingshead for getting me to Vancouver to start this project in the first place; to Hannah Gay for taking on an interdisciplinary task of immense scope and helping me to whittle it down to a manageable size; to the Philosophy of Psychology reading group at SFU, and especially Jeff Sugarman and David Hammond, for introducing me to the work of Richard Rorty, and for providing a space where intellectual vigour and skill were encouraged and expected; to Dave Carter for suggesting that Bjgrn Ramberg was someone I REALLY SHOULD MEET; to Lou Bruno for long philosophical conversations over very good food; to Sam (Vanda) Black and Paul Reniers for the links they helped me forge between feminist theory and the real world of labour politics; to Bernie Comeau whose love and support helped me carry this project to completion; and last, but not least, to Edrie Sobstyl who has no idea how much her humour, grace and intellectual guidance have made this project much better than it would have been otherwise. Table of Contents Abstract Acknowledgements 1. Introduction 1.1 Epistemology defined 1.2 An important distinction remains 1.3 The feminist move from epistemology to Epistemology 1.4 Lessons from pragmatism 1.5 Chapter highlights 1.6 Concluding remarks 2. Feminist Epistemology: Problems in Practise & Theory 2 6 2.1 Symptom: Scepticism; Diagnosis: Representationalism 3 2 2.2 The Epistemological failure to defeat scepticism 3 8 2.3 Another look at correspondence 4 8 2.4 Summary 5 1 3. Feminist Epistemology and Evolutionary Theory 5 4 3.1 The Darwinian theory of sexual selection 5 5 3.2 Blackwell: The Sexes Throughout Nature 63 3.3 Second-wave Epistemologists 68 3.4 Science, objectivity and masculinity 79 4. Keller's Epistemological Reflections on Gender & Science 4.1 Keller and psychoanalytic object relations theory 4.2 Object relations, objectivity and science 4.3 A mid-point review 4.4 Accepting biological determinism at what cost? 4.5 Complicating sexlgender 4.6 Object relations and feminist standpoint theory 4.7 Representationalism continued in "The gender/science system" 5. From Objectivism to Relativism in Feminist Epistemology 113 5.1 Harding on objectivity 115 5.2 From objectivism to relativism 123 5.3 Longino and feminist science 127 5.4 Longino, underdetermination theory and relativism 1 3 0 5.5 Symptom: Relativism; Diagnosis: Representationalism 132 6. A Pragmatist, Davidsonian Alternative 137 6.1 "A reason for belief that isn't evidence for belief" 139 6.2 Telling the sceptic to "go away" 147 6.3 Evaluating Davidson's escape from Epistemology 151 7. Feminist Science and Science-Criticism from a Pragmatist Perspective 159 7.1 Davidson on underdetermination theory 160 7.2 Feminist science without Epistemology 164 7.3 A pragmatist view of sex/gender categories 169 7.4 Summary 175 8. A Pragmatist Case Study: Back to the Theory of Evolution 8.1 A pragmatist view of biological function 8.2 The function of "(European) male superiority" 8.3 The function of menstruation 8.4 "The physiology of menstruation shows adaptive design" 8.5 The etiological account: Some concerns 8.6 A pragmatist prescription 8.7 Conclusion Works Cited 211 Chapter 1: Introduction Feminist claims that the oppression