Are Trolley Dilemma Judgement Mechanisms Evolutionary Adaptations?

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Are Trolley Dilemma Judgement Mechanisms Evolutionary Adaptations? ARE TROLLEY DILEMMA JUDGEMENT MECHANISMS EVOLUTION ARY ADAPTATIONS? Lara Pourabdolrahim Seresht Ardebili Dissertation at the Graduate School of Systemic Neurosciences Ludwig‐Maximilians‐Universität München May 2018 Supervisor Prof. Dr. Stephan Sellmaier Research Center for Neurophilosophy and Ethics of Neurosciences Graduate School of Systemic Neurosciences First Reviewer: Prof. Dr. Stephan Sellmaier Second Reviewer: Prof. Dr. Dr. Hannes Leitgeb External Reviewer: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Stephan Schleim Date of Submission: 02/05/2018 Date of Defense : 28/09/2018 Contents 1 Introduction4 1.1 Brief History of Trolley Dilemmas . .4 1.2 A few preliminaries . .7 1.3 The significance of the Doctrine of Double-Effect . .9 1.4 Argumentational structure and content . 11 2 The relation between Evolutionary Psychology and different kinds of modularity: "Mechanistic Modularity" and "Functional Modularity" { A differentiation 15 2.1 Mechanistic Modularity and Evolutionary Adaptations . 17 2.1.1 Evolvability argument (watchmaker argument) and the module's properties . 19 2.1.2 Practicality argument (specific breakdown pattern argument) and the module's properties . 29 2.2 Are Trolley Dilemma Judgement Mechanisms Mechanistic Modules? Testing Mikhail's Mechanism for modularity . 36 2.3 Functional Modularity and Evolutionary Adaptations . 56 3 Are Trolley Dilemma Judgement Mechanisms Functional Modules? - Evolutionary Psychologists' main evidence re-evaluated 66 4 Development 91 5 Universality 105 5.1 What does Universality have to do with Innateness? . 105 5.2 Are the judgments in Cushman et al.'s 2007 paper really universal? Inner- cultural and cross-cultural distribution . 108 5.3 Are the judgement patterns the same cross-culturally? . 113 5.4 Inner-cultural agreement rates vary cross-culturally . 122 5.5 A different angle: How many people judge two dilemmas equivalently? . 124 5.6 Comparing judgements in Switch and Loop Type cases: Is the Doctrine of Double-Effect a universal principle? . 128 5.7 How universal is the Action/Omission Principle? . 134 5.8 \Universal Moral Grammar" or just \Moral Grammar?" . 136 6 Poverty of Stimulus 140 6.1 Different facets of the Poverty of Stimulus argument . 141 6.1.1 Definitions of \Learned" . 141 6.1.2 Adaptedness, Evolutionary Adaptedness and Inheritedness . 142 6.1.3 A general objection against Poverty of Stimulus arguments . 147 6.2 The Logical Problem of Language Acquisition . 148 6.2.1 The Logical Problem of Language Acquisition and generativity . 148 6.2.2 Generativity in the moral domain . 152 6.2.3 The Logical Problem of Language Acquisition: The issue with \Learning like a little scientist" . 160 6.2.4 LPLA arguments applied to Trolley Dilemmas . 162 6.2.4.1 Is explicit exposure to moral principles necessary or suffi- cient for acquiring them? . 163 6.2.4.2 Is explicit exposure to moral principles necessary or suffi- cient for acquiring them? . 165 6.2.4.2.1 Catholics and the Doctrine of Double-Effect: Not innate, but indoctrinated? . 171 6.2.4.2.2 Negative evidence through explicit instructions . 187 7 Alternatives to innateness: A Social Learning Account for Morality 200 8 Conclusion 208 A Bibliography 210 B Appendix 229 1 Introduction Over the last few decades, something of a 'morbid' trend has arisen in moral psychology and moral philosophy: The use of Trolley Dilemmas. Trolley Dilemmas are thought experiments in which a train is heading towards five people. The train will hit and kill those five people, unless someone is sacrificed in order to stop the train. Trolley Dilemmas are enormously useful, in a variety of ways. 1.1 Brief History of Trolley Dilemmas The first Trolley Dilemma, a version of the so-called side-track scenario, was used (amongst an abundance of other hypothetical scenarios) by ethicist Philippa Foot to evoke intuitions1 about when it is permissible to kill a person to save another one in the context of a discussion about abortions.2 Its wording was as follows: \[. ] the driver of a runaway tram [...] can only steer [the tram] from one narrow track on to another; five men are working on one track and one man on the other; anyone on the track he enters is bound to be killed." (Foot 1967, p. 7). She assumes that steering the train onto the track with the one person would be deemed permissible or even obligatory by most people (Foot 1967, pp. 7, 10). Judith Jarvis Thomson and Frances Myrna Kamm followed her in her use of train-track life/death scenarios and added more variants to the pool of Trolley Dilemmas, such as the Loop Case (Thomson 1985, pp. 1402/1403), where the track with the one man loops back to the track with the five. This dilemma reads as follows: \Let us now imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it, and it will therefore not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat, so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will therefore not reach the five. May the agent turn the trolley?" (Thomson 1985, 1403). Thomson then adds: \Some people feel more discomfort at the idea of turning the trolley in the loop variant than in the original Bystander at the Switch"(Thomson 1985, 1403). All three Ethicists use their 1Like Peter van Inwagen (Inwagen 1997) and Ernest Sosa (Sosa 2007), I will take intuitions to be (conscious) inclinations to believe, or, as Williamson rephrased Peter van Inwagen ((van Inwagen 1997, p. 309), cited after (Williamson 2004, p. 126)): \in some cases, the tendencies to make certain beliefs attractive to us". Hence, if I intuit that Person One should turn the trolley to the track with the one person, I am inclined to believe that Person One should turn the trolley to the track with the one person. The issue of whether a moral statement such as \one should turn the trolley to the track with the one person" bears truth value, hence, can be true or false (as Sosa holds for the contents of \propositional intuitions" (Sosa 2007, p. 52), is a matter for a different discussion. For a discussion of this matter, see (Stratton-Lake and Zalta 2016). For a discussion of different accounts of \intuition", see (Pust 2017) and (Kauppinen 2015). Sosa defends a somewhat narrower definition of what he calls \propositional intuitions" than the one I will apply: \S intuits that p if and only if S's attraction to assent to <p> is explained rationally by two things in combination: (a) that S understands it well enough, (b) that <p> is true." (Sosa 2007, p 52) 2This is a context in which she placed the scenario; I do not believe that abortion is a matter of one person's rights against another's. 4 (or, as in Thomson's case, their and other people's) opinions about the permissibility to kill the one and then seek to suggest normative principles that explain those opinions and can predict intuitions for further cases (and, if they are established, guidelines for further actions): 3 They look for moral principles that are coherent with all or most of those opinions and, ideally, seem to transport some moral relevance. To provide an example for coherent principles without moral relevance: If we came up with a principle like \people wearing brown shirts may be sacrificed in any case to save other people" this may not be an appropriate moral principle, even if it was coherent with all our intuitions (we had until then only deemed sacrificing people with brown shirts permissible in all scenarios and this is the only obvious feature that discerns the people whom we may sacrifice from the ones we may not). This is because wearing brown (where the color does not refer to anything morally relevant such as a political opinion) is usually not seen as a morally relevant feature (unlike, for instance, using someone merely as a means to achieve something but not as an end; see (Kant 1785, p. 38)). The requirement for those principles to reflect properties that most people would accept as morally relevant will be of some importance when we come to a different usage of Trolley Dilemmas: In 2001, neuroscientists entered the field of \trolleyology". Joshua Greene et al. (Greene et al. 2001) used fMRI to compare how their subjects' brains processed two different types of dilemmas: the classical side-track dilemma and a scenario going by the name \footbridge dilemma". If confronted with the former, many people agree that it is permissible to save the five by sacrificing the one on the side track (see, for instance, (Cushman et al. 2007) and (Foot 1967, pp. 7, 10). Confronted with the latter, in which a large person is shoved in front of the trolley to stop it, many people find it impermissible to sacrifice the large person, including \Everybody to whom I have put this case" according to Thomson (Thomson 1985 p. 1409), who invented this scenario. Greene et al. 2001 hypothesized that most people find it more permissible to turn the trolley onto the side track and kill one than to shove the person in front of the trolley and kill them not (only) because of the moral principles at work in their decision-making, but because the \footbridge dilemma" elicited negative emotions which then led the subjects to decide against the negatively connotated action. They predicted and found \that brain areas associated with emotion would be more active during contemplation of dilemmas such as the footbridge dilemma as compared to during contemplation of dilemmas such as the [side track] trolley dilemma" (Greene et al.
Recommended publications
  • Gibson's Ecological Approach: Perceiving What Exists
    1 TRENDS IN INTERDISCIPLINARY STU DIES AVANT The Journal of the Philosophical-Interdisciplinary Vanguard AVANT Pismo awangardy filozoficzno-naukowej 2/2012 EDITORS OF THIS ISSUE / REDAKTORZY TEGO NUMERU Witold Hensel, Dawid Lubiszewski, Przemysław Nowakowski, Nelly Strehlau, Witold Wachowski TORUŃ 3 ISSN: 2082-6710 AVANT. The Journal of the Philosophical-Interdisciplinary Vanguard AVANT. Pismo Awangardy Filozoficzno-Naukowej Vol. III, No. 2/2012 (October-December 2012), English Issue Toruń 2012 The texts are licensed under / Teksty udostępniono na licencji: CC BY-NC-ND 3.0. Graphics design / Opracowanie graficzne: Karolina Pluta & Jacek S. Podgórski. Cover/Okładka: pictures by / obrazy autorstwa: Teresa Young (front/przód: "The Ripple Effect"; back/tył: " Flight Of The Humblebee"). Graphics inside by / Grafika wewnątrz autorstwa: Karolina Pluta. Address of the Editorial Office / Adres redakcji: skr. poczt. nr 34, U.P. Toruń 2. Filia, ul. Mazowiecka 63/65, 87-100 Toruń, Poland www.avant.edu.pl/en [email protected] Publisher / Wydawca: Ośrodek Badań Filozoficznych, ul. Stawki 3/20, 00-193 Warszawa, Poland www.obf.edu.pl Academic cooperation: university workers and PhD students of Nicolaus Copernicus University (Toruń, Poland). Współpraca naukowa: pracownicy i doktoranci Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu. The Journal has been registered in District Court in Warsaw, under number: PR 17724. Czasopismo zarejestrowano w Sądzie Okręgowym w Warszawie pod numerem: PR 17724. ADVISORY BOARD / RADA NAUKOWA Chairman/Przewodniczący: Włodzisław
    [Show full text]
  • 1 Merleau-Ponty for Cognitive Science
    Chapter 1 1 Merleau-Ponty for Cognitive Science Preamble: A Remarkable Convergence My attention was first drawn to the relevance of Merleau-Ponty for cognitive science through reading Andy Clark's Being There (1997). Clark indicates that Merleau-Ponty's depiction of everyday intelligent activities in terms of "the playing out of whole organism-body-world synergies" is close in spirit and execution to Clark's own project. Moreover, Clark is particularly fond of Merleau-Ponty's stress on the activity of the organism in perception, and he coins the term 'continuous reciprocal causation' to describe this interaction between perceiver and perceived. Clark thus sees Merleau-Ponty as presenting a kind of 'free-form interactive dance' view of perception, which he endorses on the grounds of its compatibility with "recent work in the computational foundations of animate vision." (Clark 1997, p172) I want to take a moment to look at the compatibility that Clark refers to – with the findings of researchers in animate vision – which I think is surprisingly compelling. I offer this as a kind of intuition pump for appreciating the affinity between Merleau-Ponty's writing and certain developments within cognitive science. In the main part of this chapter, I'll go through the ways in which this affinity has been cashed out, supported, and formalised. Merleau-Ponty and animate vision Animate vision is a new engineering paradigm of robot vision which seeks to replace the traditional account of a system which constructs and updates an accurate 3-D model of the viewer's surroundings. This traditional approach is often unfavourably referred to as passive or pure vision and is generally criticised on the grounds that it makes infeasible computational demands on the observer robot, especially when it comes to tasks involving a moving object, a moving observer, or, in the worst case, both.
    [Show full text]
  • Bibliography.Pdf
    Bibliography AAAAI 2000 Allergy Report vols. I–III. The American meta-analysis.” Annals of Epidemiology 8:64–74. Academy of Allergy, Asthma and Immunology, ACS 1999 Cancer Facts and Figures – 1999. Atlanta, GA: in partnership with the National Institute of American Cancer Society. Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID). 2000 “How has the occurrence of breast cancer http://www.theallergyreport.org/. changed over time?” Atlanta, GA: American Abdulaziz, Abuzinda and Fridhelm Krupp 1997 Cancer Society. http://www.cancer.org/ “What happened to the Gulf: two years after statistics/99bcff/occurrence.html. the world’s greatest oil-slick.” Arabian Wildlife Acsadi, George and J. Nemeskeri 1970 History of 2:1. http://www.arabianwildlife.com/past_arw/ Human Life Span and Mortality. Budapest: vol2.1/oilglf.htm. Akademiai Kiado. Abell, Annette, Erik Ernst and Jens Peter Bonde Adams, John 1995 Risk. London: University College 1994 “High sperm density among members of London Press. organic farmers’ association.” The Lancet Adams, W. C. 1986 “Whose lives count? TV coverage 343:1,498. of natural disasters.” Journal of Communication Abelson, Philip H. 1994 “Editorial: adequate 36(2):113–22. supplies of fruits and vegetables.” Science Adleman, Morris A. 1995 “Trends in the price and 266:1,303. supply of oil.” In Simon 1995b:287–93. Abrahamsen, Gunnar, Arne O. Stuames and Bjørn AEA 1999 Economic Evaluation of Air Quality Targets Tveite 1994a “Discussion and synthesis.” In for CO and Benzene. By AEA Technology Abrahamsen et al. 1994c:297–331. for European Commission DGXI. 1994b: “Summary and conclusions.” In http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/ Abrahamsen et al.
    [Show full text]
  • Challenges to the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition*
    1 Challenges to the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition* In recent decades, an intriguing view of human cognition has garnered increasing support. According to this view, which I will call ‘the hypothesis of extended cognition’ (‘HEC’, hereafter), human cognitive processing literally extends into the environment surrounding the organism, and human cognitive states literally comprise—as wholes do their proper parts— elements in that environment; in consequence, while the skin and scalp may encase the human organism, they do not delimit the thinking subject.1 The hypothesis of extended cognition should provoke our critical interest. Acceptance of HEC would alter our approach to research and theorizing in cognitive science and, it would seem, significantly change our conception of persons. Thus, if HEC faces substantive difficulties, these should be brought to light; this paper is meant to do just that, exposing some of the problems HEC must overcome if it is to stand among leading views of the nature of human cognition. The essay unfolds as follows: The first section consists of preliminary remarks, mostly about the scope and content of HEC as I will construe it. Sections II and III clarify HEC by situating it with respect to related theses one finds in the literature—the hypothesis of embedded cognition * I would like to thank Aaron Meskin, David Chalmers, Philip Robbins, and Josh Osbun for comments on earlier drafts of this essay. Shorter versions of the paper were presented at the Mountain-Plains Philosophy Conference (2001), Texas Tech University, and the 2002 meeting of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association.
    [Show full text]
  • NARRATIVE Directions in Econarratology
    ENVIRONMENT New NARRATIVE Directions in Econarratology edited by ERIN JAMES AND ERIC MOREL ENVIRONMENT AND NARRATIVE THEORY AND INTERPRETATION OF NARRATIVE James Phelan and Katra Byram, Series Editors ENVIRONMENT AND NARRATIVE NEW DIRECTIONS IN ECONARRATOLOGY EDITED BY Erin James AND Eric Morel THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY PRESS COLUMBUS Copyright © 2020 by The Ohio State University. This edition licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: James, Erin, editor. | Morel, Eric, editor. Title: Environment and narrative : new directions in econarratology / edited by Erin James and Eric Morel. Other titles: Theory and interpretation of narrative series. Description: Columbus : The Ohio State University Press, [2020] | Series: Theory and interpretation of narrative | Includes bibliographical references and index. | Summary: “Collection of essays connecting ecocriticism and narrative theory to encourage constructive discourse on narrative’s influence of real-world environmental perspectives and the challenges that necessitate revision to current narrative models”—Provided by publisher. Identifiers: LCCN 2019034865 | ISBN 9780814214206 (cloth) | ISBN 0814214207 (cloth) | ISBN 9780814277546 (ebook) | ISBN 0814277543 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Ecocriticism. | Environmental literature. | Narration (Rhetoric) Classification: LCC PN98.E36 E55 2020 | DDC 809/.93355—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019034865 Cover design by Andrew Brozyna Text design by Juliet Williams Type set in Adobe Minion Pro for Ben and Freddie, my favorites From Erin for Grandmaman, an avid reader and early recommender of books From Eric CONTENTS Acknowledgments ix INTRODUCTION Notes Toward New Econarratologies ERIN JAMES AND ERIC MOREL 1 I. NARRATOLOGY AND THE NONHUMAN CHAPTER 1 Unnatural Narratology and Weird Realism in Jeff VanderMeer’s Annihilation JON HEGGLUND 27 CHAPTER 2 Object-Oriented Plotting and Nonhuman Realities in DeLillo’s Underworld and Iñárritu’s Babel MARCO CARACCIOLO 45 II.
    [Show full text]
  • Evolution and the Origins of Disease by Randolph M
    The principles of evolution by natural selection are finally beginning to inform medicine Evolution and the Origins of Disease by Randolph M. Nesse and George C. Williams houghtful contemplation of the human body elicits awe—in equal measure with perplexity. The eye, for instance, has long been an object of wonder, T with the clear, living tissue of the cornea curving just the right amount, the iris adjusting to brightness and the lens to distance, so that the optimal quantity of light focuses exactly on the surface of the retina. Admiration of such apparent perfection soon gives way, however, to consternation. Contrary to any sensible design, blood vessels and nerves traverse the inside of the retina, creating a blind spot at their point of exit. The body is a bundle of such jarring contradictions. For each exquisite heart valve, we have a wisdom tooth. Strands of DNA direct the development of the 10 trillion cells that make up a human adult but then permit his or her steady deterioration and eventual death. Our immune system can identify and destroy a million kinds of foreign matter, yet many bacteria can still kill us. These contradictions make it appear as if the body was de- signed by a team of superb engineers with occasional interventions by Rube Goldberg. In fact, such seeming incongruities make sense but only when we investigate the origins of the body’s vulnerabilities while keeping in mind the wise words of distinguished geneti- cist Theodosius Dobzhansky: “Nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evo- lution.” Evolutionary biology is, of course, the scientific foundation for all biology, and bi- ology is the foundation for all medicine.
    [Show full text]
  • Scientific Enquiry and Natural Kinds: from Planets to Mallards
    Scientific enquiry and natural kinds: From planets to mallards a philosophical monograph by P.D. Magnus pmagnus<at>fecundity.com This is the authors' final draft. Any citations should refer to the final typeset book, published by Palgrave Macmillan. In addition to canonical pagination and nice binding, the book has a cool picture of mallards on the cover. DOI: 10.1057/9781137271259 c 2012 P.D. Magnus, except where indicated; some figures are used by per- mission or under open licenses Acknowledgements5 Introduction7 1 How to think about natural kinds 10 A Why history is no help...................... 11 B Some criteria considered..................... 13 B.1 The induction assumption................ 14 B.2 The essence assumption................. 24 B.3 The science assumption................. 25 B.4 The law assumption................... 26 B.5 Artifacts and artificial kinds............... 28 B.6 The sharpness assumption................ 31 B.7 Starting with language.................. 34 B.8 The intrinsic feature assumption............. 37 B.9 The hierarchy assumption................ 41 1 B.10 The scarcity assumption................. 43 B.11 The implicit simpliciter assumption........... 44 C Keeping score........................... 50 2 A modest definition 52 A First formulation......................... 52 B More or less natural kinds.................... 54 B.1 Lessons from underdetermination............ 55 B.2 The lessons applied.................... 57 C Induction redux.......................... 59 D Natural kinds for settled science................. 61 D.1 Example: the domain of chemistry........... 62 D.2 Fungible kinds....................... 66 3 Natural kinds put to work 72 A Eight planets, great planets................... 72 A.1 Numerology and asteroids................ 74 A.2 Enter Pluto........................ 75 A.3 The constraints of astronomy.............. 78 A.4 Natural kinds and the fate of Pluto..........
    [Show full text]
  • A Canary for Climate Change Pages 6-14 Researchers Find a Strong Correlation Between Northern Hemisphere Seabird Diversity and Environmental Stressors
    FALL 2014 VOLUME 6 No. 3 www.nescent.org Newsletter of the National Evolutionary Synthesis Center, an NSF-funded collaborative research center operated by Duke University, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and North Carolina State University. IN THIS ISSUE: RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS Research Highlights 1, 15 Director’s Letter 2 Call for Proposals 3 Coming Soon 3,5 In the Media 5 New Publications 5 New Awards 14 10 years of NESCent A special look back at a remarkable decade of Seabirds like puffins and auks are especially sensitive to climate and environmental shifts research, outreach and PHOTO COURTESY OF U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, WIKIMEDIA COMMONS collaboration at NESCent. A canary for climate change Pages 6-14 Researchers find a strong correlation between Northern Hemisphere seabird diversity and environmental stressors odern-day puffins and auks have long Next proposal Texas at Austin examined 28 extinct species in Mbeen recognized as environmental indi- addition to 23 living species. Whereas previ- deadlines cator species for ongoing faunal shifts, and fos- ous research focused primarily on surviving sil records now indicate that ancient relatives members of the alcid family, this study was able Dec. 1: Short-term visitors, were similarly informative. Researchers have to paint a more comprehensive picture of their journalists-in-residence found that puffins and auks may have been at evolution. The findings, which were just pub- Feb. 1: Summer 2015 their most diverse and widespread levels during lished online at the Journal of Avian Biology, graduate fellows (off-site) a relatively warm period of Earth’s history.
    [Show full text]
  • A Deweyan Pragmatist Philosophy of Science
    UC San Diego UC San Diego Electronic Theses and Dissertations Title Science and experience : a Deweyan pragmatist philosophy of science Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/08q037x9 Author Brown, Matthew J. Publication Date 2009 Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO Science and Experience A Deweyan Pragmatist Philosophy of Science A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy by Matthew J. Brown Committee in charge: Professor Paul Churchland, Chair Professor Nancy Cartwright, Co-Chair Professor Michael Cole Professor Gerald Doppelt Professor Roddey Reid Professor Donald Rutherford 2009 Copyright Matthew J. Brown, 2009 Some rights reserved. Licensed under the United States Creative Commons (BY-NC-ND). The dissertation of Matthew J. Brown is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm and electronically: Co-Chair Chair University of California, San Diego 2009 iii DEDICATION In memory of Professor Jon J. Johnston (1928-2008) Teacher, Mentor, Friend iv EPIGRAPH To work exclusively within the context provided by the sciences themselves is to ignore their vital context. The place of science in life, the place of its peculiar subject-matter in the wide scheme of materials we experience, is a more ultimate function of philosophy that is any self-contained reflection upon science as such. | John Dewey, Context and Thought (LW 6:19-20) v TABLE OF CONTENTS Signature Page................................... iii Dedication...................................... iv Epigraph......................................v Table of Contents.................................. vi List of Figures................................... ix Preface.......................................x Acknowledgements................................
    [Show full text]
  • The Red Queen: Sex and the Evolution of Human Nature
    About the Author MATT R I D L E Y is the author of Nature Via Nurture: Genes, Experience, and What Makes Us Human; the critically acclaimed national bestseller Genome: The Autobiography of a Species in 23 Chapters; The Origins of Virtue: Human Instincts and the Evolution of Cooperation; and the New York Times Notable Book The Red Queen: Sex and the Evolution of Human Nature. His books have been short-listed for six literary awards, including the Los Angeles Times Book Prize. Formerly a scientist, journalist, and a national newspaper columnist, he is a visiting professor at Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory in New York and the chairman of the International Centre for Life in Newcastle, England: THE RED QUEEN Sex and the Evolution of Human Nature MATT RIDLEY Perennial An Imprint of HarperCollinsPublishers For Matthew This book was first published in Great Britain in 1993 by Penguin Books Ltd: 1t is here reprinted by arrangement with Penguin Putnam. THE RED QUEEN: Copyright © 1993 by Matt Ridley: All rights reserved: Printed in the United States of America: No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews. For information address Penguin Putnam, 375 Hudson Street, New York, NY 10014: HarperCollins books may be purchased for educational, business, or sales promotional use: For information please write: Special Markets Depart- ment, HarperCollins Publishers 1nc., to East 53rd Street, New York, NY 10022: First Perennial edition published 2003. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Ridley, Matt.
    [Show full text]
  • A LOOK INSIDE HUMAN REPRODUCTIVE ACTIVITY:AN INCOMPLETE VIEW How We Do It: Te Evolution and Future of Human Reproduction, by R
    Human Ethology Bulletin 29 (2014)1: 70-76 Book Review A LOOK INSIDE HUMAN REPRODUCTIVE ACTIVITY: AN INCOMPLETE VIEW Nicholas P. Armenti Rutgers University, Te Center of Alcohol Studies and Department ofPsychology, NJ, US [email protected] A Review of the Book How We Do It: Te Evolution and Future of Human Reproduction, by Robert Martin. 2013. Basic Books. New York. 304 pages. ISBN 978-0-465037841 (Hardcover, $27.99). _________________________________________________________ INTRODUCTION Several sciences, like chemistry, physics, biology/medicine, genetics, and engineering, have a long history of generating knowledge that transitions to practical applications to solve to human problems, and thus, improve the human condition. Evolutionary science is not among those with a long history in applying its research to practical problem solving. Recently, a number of evolutionary scientists have provided support for this position in publications like Darwinism Applied (Beckstrom, 1993), Applied Evolutionary Psychology (Roberts, 2012), Pragmatic Evolution (Poiani, 2012) and the journal Evolutionary Applications. Others have made an efort to encourage this position with special interest in evolutionary science (see www.aepsociety.org). With this in mind I was particularly interested in reading and reviewing the book by Dr. Robert Martin, a well-respected evolution-based biologist/anthropologist. He ofers to provide evolutionarily informed practical information regarding human’s most highly motivated activity: sexual reproducing. Upon reading the title “How We Do It: Te Evolution and Future of Human Reproduction” my atention was captured. Te title itself elicited an anticipation of new insights into human evolved sexual behavior. I was additionally encouraged upon reading that “Te scientifc mysteries explored will, I hope, lead readers to beter decisions on their reproductive journeys.
    [Show full text]
  • Notes for an Undergraduate Course on Behavioral Genetics and Evolution
    Notes for an Undergraduate Course on Behavioral Genetics and Evolution © 2008 M. Frank Norman ([email protected]) University of Pennsylvania 8/10/2008 (revised 10/2/2008) My course at Penn covered, first, Behavioral Genetics, and, second, some facets of evolution and evolutionary psychology. These notes derive from concise handouts posted online in connection with each lecture. The handouts were intended to reinforce most of the main points. The original handouts contained cuttings from books and articles that have been removed from this edition. The distinctive feature of the course (and the notes) is the heavy emphasis on equation-based modeling in both Behavioral Genetic and evolution. The course had no formal mathematical or statistical prerequisites, and the main tool used was high school algebra, but there was a steady diet of modeling and the course would not have been appropriate for students who disliked mathematics or statistics. In fact, about half of the students had had a college statistics course, and all students were asked to read a survey of elementary statistical concepts at the very beginning of the course. This is certainly not an “online textbook,” and I doubt that anyone will be tempted to base a course on these notes, but I do hope that some of the material will make its way into more conventional courses in these areas. Some of the material is novel, e.g., the use of data from studies with both twins reared apart and twins reared together to assess the (in)accuracy of 2(rmz - rdz) for estimating heritability from twins reared together.
    [Show full text]