Note N°08/2016

note n°08/2016 22 February 2016 Emmanuelle Maître Research Fellow, Fondation pour la recherche stratégique Nato, the F35 and European Nuclear Dilemmas Abstract Résumé As their current fleets are progressively retired Confrontés au retrait anticipé de leur flotte de by the 2020-2030s, the European states chasseurs bombardiers d’ici à 2020-2030, les currently involved in NATO’s nuclear sharing États européens impliqués à ce jour dans la mission will be expected to acquire new dual mission nucléaire de l’OTAN devront décider capable aircrafts if they want to preserve this s’ils veulent se doter d’avions à double capa- role. Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey have cité et ainsi préserver leur rôle particulier. already decided to procure F-35As as their L’Italie, les Pays-Bas et la Turquie ont déjà new fighter, while Belgium is still hesitating. décidé de faire l’acquisition de F-35A, la Bel- Germany has postponed any decision for a gique hésite encore. L’Allemagne, de son côté, couple more years. But no country has a repoussé toute décision pour encore quel- publicly made known its choice concerning the ques années. Mais aucun État n’a fait ability of these aircrafts to carry nuclear connaître publiquement son choix concernant weapons. Studying each specific country gives la capacité des avions à emporter des armes us a chance to better understand what are the nucléaires. L’étude de chaque pays donne stakes for each host and what will decide the donc la possibilité de comprendre les enjeux final decision to acquire – or not –dual dans chacun d’entre eux et ce qui sera à capacity aircrafts. It therefore gives an l’origine de la décision d’acheter – ou pas – understanding of the current state and des avions à double capacité. Cette étude offre foreseeable development of acquisition donc un aperçu de l’état présent des program- programs that will strongly influence the mes d’acquisition et de leur futur prévisible, future of extended deterrence in Europe. programmes qui auront une influence majeure sur l’avenir de la dissuasion élargie en Europe. In 2012, the issue of the future of the nuclear that are currently used by the states that weapons stationed in Europe received a lot of participate in the NATO nuclear mission, with publicity as NATO debated its Deterrence and new dual-capable aircraft. For most countries Defense Posture Review. This attention was flying these planes, despite life extension derived mostly from the positions taken by the programs and efforts to modernize their German Minister for Foreign Affairs Guido equipment, they will have to invest in new Westerwelle, who publicly called for the airplanes and deploy them by 2020-2030 if removal of nuclear weapons from Europe and they want to continue to be able to deliver the especially from Germany. However, the 2012 gravity bombs. This is the reason why most of summit preserved the status quo, and it was these states have informed the United States tacitly agreed that no host state would make of their interest in buying new F-35s, and the unilateral decision to ask for the some have played a role early on in the withdrawal of the weapons. Given that some process of developing the Joint Strike Fighter members are particularly attached to their (JSF). Yet, the acquisition of F-35s is a bone of presence on the European territory, such as contention for many governments. The costs Poland or the Baltic states, and that the recent of the program is seen as too high for some escalation of tensions between Russia and the who question their affordability in a time of West has if anything increased such a feeling, austerity and their military use. The popular it is unlikely that any consensus will be found opposition to nuclear weapons is another in the near future to proceed to the removal of difficult issue that leads to question as to the systems, despite the popular opposition to whether or not the current host states will opt their presence in the certain host states such to pursue their nuclear sharing commitment as Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands. in the long term. However, two factors may make it more Moreover, this program has indeed been difficult for NATO to quietly maintain this fraught with difficulties, which have led to situation. First, the B61 gravity bombs that are criticism for its technical performances and its currently deployed on six European bases will costs. Many in Europe feel that the aircrafts have to be replaced by new versions, the B61- are being shoved down their throat by the 12, maybe as early as the end of the decade. 1 United States. This impression is accentuated This change, which could be interpreted as a by the fact that European host states are all mere technical formality, will probably lead to concerned to some extent by budgetary a political challenge, since the action of taking concerns and may find it difficult to obtain the away old weapons and bringing in new ones resources necessary to pay for the program. could cause a public outcry, especially if media Finally, if and when the dual-capacity of the F- report on the last part of the process in a 35 is made public in recipient countries, it is biased way, as seen in September 2015 when not certain if these countries will find a certain German newspapers and Russian consensus to acquire a capability that will media – mistakenly - announced the “provo- commit their nation to the NATO nuclear cative arrival of new nuclear weapons in mission for the decades to come. Europe” and forgot to mention or downplayed While the question of the B61 stationing in 2 the removal of the old ones. Moreover, the Europe is rather confidential (there is no B61-12s are associated with a series of official data on stationing and numbers), the F negative reports linked to the escalating costs -35 is more openly debated, which gives an of the program, its delays, the new military opportunity to test the opinion on this capabilities of the weapons, and the issue of important question in host states and to have 3 burden-sharing within NATO. a preview of the sustainability of NATO’s The other element that could threaten the nuclear sharing mission in the coming 20 to status quo is the need to replace in the near to 30 years. If it is useful to do an update of the medium term the F-16s and Tornado airplanes contracts and purchase promises in each host states, it is also important to understand what 1. Hans Kristensen, B61-12, “Nuclear Bomb Integration is at stake in each country and what On NATO Aircraft To Start In 2015”, Federation of American Scientists , 13 mars 2014. arguments and considerations will be instrumental in shaping the final decision. 2. “US to bring in new advanced nuclear bombs to Germany – report”, RT , 22 September 2015 or Dirk Overview of the program Hautkapp and Alexander Kohnen, “USA planen Stationierung neuer Atombomben in Deutschland”, Die The F-35 program is a multinational initiative Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 23 September 2009. launched in 2001 which aims at replacing 3. Jeffrey Lewis, “A Steal at $10 Billion”, Foreign different aging aircrafts currently used by the Policy , 5 September 2012. 2 American Air Force, Navy and the Marine some officials from NATO indicated that the Corps, as well as by eight other international new B61 could be made “platform- partners (Australia, Canada, Denmark, Italy, independent”, which means that host states the Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, and the would be able to choose another fighter- United Kingdom). Its main assumption back bomber (like the Boeing Super Hornet, the when it started was that a single design would Dassault Aviation Rafale, the Saab Gripen or be able to, with three principal variants, the Airbus Eurofighter Typhoon) which would assure a variety of missions and thus save later receive the necessary adaptations to costs throughout the life of the program. The carry nuclear weapons. 8 But this option does three main variants include conventional not seem very likely. Not only would it be takeoff/landing (CTOL), carrier variant (CV) more expensive to adapt many different and short takeoff/vertical landing (STOVL) systems to the bomb, than one, but it is aircraft. 4 doubtful that foreign companies would readily Relying on many technological innovations, agree to share industrial secrets with the the F-35 program has over the years made United States to receive the necessary license 9 itself a name for its difficulties, cost and for nuclear missions. Airbus in particular setbacks rather than for its successes. By 2015, might by hesitant to transfer all technical it was almost 70% over initial cost estimates, details of its Typhoon to the Pentagon and and years behind schedule. The original sin Sweden, with its well-known pro- seems to come from the idea of building a disarmament stand, might not allow Saab to single core platform whose development undergo modifications that would make its 10 happened to be much more difficult and aircrafts nuclear-capable. expensive than expected. Moreover, in If the F-35 therefore appears to be the most January 2015, it was disclosed that Chinese obvious choice for this mission, it is still not hackers had stolen many sensitive documents clear who is going to pay the extra-cost of regarding the program, adding another layer giving the aircrafts a dual capacity. While the of weakness for this contested aircraft. European buyers are supposed to finance this However, after many years of overcoming adaptation, some have apparently already let technical hurdles, the program seems to have on to the United States Air Force that they achieved some level of progress, including in needed support to afford the price.

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