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Canada • Mustafa Kemal and Sukarno: A Comparison of Views regarding Relations Between State and Religion
By Ibnu Anshori
A Thesis submitted ta the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, McGill University, Montreal, in pllrtial fnlfj1Jment of the requirement for the degree of Muter of Arts.
Institute of TaJamjc Studîes McGill University Montreal
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Canad~ TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS i • ABSTRACT ii RÉsUMÉ iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS iv NOTE UN TRANSLITERATION v
INTRODUCI10N 1
LMUSTAFA KEMAL'S lOBAS ON STATE AND RELIGION 11
A.Background: Education, Political Career and Discourse Il 1. Mustafa Kemal as the First President of Turkey 11 2.Discourse:Westemi3m,Ts1amism.Turkism 18
B.Political Thought and Approach ta ReJ:gion 27 1. TheSix AIrows of Kemplism 27 2. Mustafa Kemal's Approach ta Islam 36
C. Puadigm. of Relations Betweeu State and Religion 39 1. SecularState 39 2.Kemal'sReligionsPolicy:Expansion ofSecularization 49
ILSUKARNO'S lOBAS ON STATE AND RELIGION S6
A.Background:Education, PvliticalCareer and Diac:ourae S6 1. Submo u the FUIt President ofIndoneaia S6 2.Diac:ourse: IsJamism, NatiODalism,Marxism 60
B.Politica! Thought and Approach ta Religion 64 1.TheFive Principles ofSuJwnoiam 64 2.SuJwno's Approach ta Islam 66
C.Puadigm. of Relations Betweeu State and Religion 70 I.PancasilaState 70 2.Submo'sReligionsPolicy: Dic:hotomy 82
IILCOMPARISON:SIMD..ARITIBS ANDDIFFBRBNCBS 93
A. A RàtionaliaticandRealisticApproach ta IslaminPolitical Refonns 94 B.ThePuadigmoftheState-ReligicmRdationsbip: SecularStateandPancasilaState 101 C.TheExpansionofSee:ularization: UDific:rionandDichotomy 115
CONCLUSION 119 BmUOGRAPHY 12:.:
i ABSTRACf • Author : Ibnu Anshori Title ofThesi~ : Mustafa Kemal and Sukarno: A Comparison of Views regarding Relations Between State and Religion
Department : Institute ofislamic Studies, McGill University
Degree : Master of Ans
This work is a comparative study of the process of secularization in Turkey and
Indonesia. with reference to the thought and policies of Mustafa Kemal and Sukarno. In
their rational approach to religion and the concem to moclemize their societies the two leaders were guided by a secularist paradigm of the relationship of state and religion that each fonnulated. The abolition of the suitanate-eaIiphate system, the end of Islam a.~ the state religion and the replacement ofShari'a by Western cocles demonstrated the impact "f moclemization and secularization on Turkey. The "polity-dominance secularization" of Mustafa Kemal a10ng with, among other thing, the abolition of religious education, the
banning ofthe mystical "rders, and the mandatory use of Turkish in Islamic ritual. made Turkey a completely secular state. In Indonesia. secularization was meant not only to serve the cause ofmoclemization but alSe bas bad a special significance for ensuring the religious minority's support of the political system, Sukarno's decision to establish a quasi-secular Pancasila state was guided by a concem for political unity. However, unlike Mustafa Kemal, Sukarno avoided the strategy of overt opposition to religion, in order not to entai! unacceptable political risks. Thougb the Indonesian Islamic parties i:avp frequendy opposed Sukarno's secuIarism, the Islamic ideological orientation was significandy moclerated by Sukarno's pragmatic syncretism, as embodied in bis manifesto NASAKOM (nationalism, religion and communism). UnIike inTurkey, islamic parties were recognized, and islamic
courts and the system of religiou~ education were integrated into the structure of state in Indonesia.
ii RÉsUMÉ
Auteur : Thnu Anshori • Titre du mémoire: : Mustafa Kemal et Sukarno: une étude comparative de leur vision des relations entre l'étatet la religion. Département : Institut d'études islamiques, Université McGill Diplôme :MaJàise
Cc mémoire ce veut une étude comparative du processus de sécularisation qui a eu lieu en Turquie et en Indonésie, en analysant les politiques émises par Mustafa Kernal et
Sukarno. Par leurs approches rationnelles face à la religion et par leurs besoins de moderniser leurs sociétés.. ces deux dirigeants ont choisi des chemins différents dans la
structure des relations entre l'état et la religion. L'abolition du califat, la fin de l'Islam en
tant que religion d'état et la substitution de la Shari'a par un code légal basé sur le système occidental de justice témoignent de l'impactqu'aeu la modernisation etde la sécularisation en Turquie. Cette réforme séculaire dirigée par le gouvernement de Mustafa Kemal, de concert avec certaines réformes telles que l'abolition de l'éducation religieuse et l'interdiction des ordres mystiques ainsi que l'obligation d'utiliser le turque dans les rituels islamiques ont transf'Jnné la Turquie en un état totalement séculaire. En Indonésie, le but premier de la sécularisation n'était pas seulement de propulser cet état vers la modernité,
mais aussi de préserver l'appui politique des minorités religieuses. La décision de Sukarno d'établir un état semi-séculaire fondé sur les principes du Pancasila était guidé par le souci d'une cohésion politique. Contrairerr:ent à Kemal, Sukarno a réussi à éviter un affront public sur la question religieuse afin de ne pas prendre de gros risques sur le plan politique. Malgré le fait que les partis politiques isIanüques s'opposaient à la sécularisation de Sukarno, l'idéologie islamique fut apaisée par le syncrétisme pragmatique proposé par Sukarno, tel que le témoigne son manifeste NASAKOM (nationalisme, religion et communisme). Contrairement à laTurquie, les partis politiques islamiques furent acceptés et le système justicier islamique ainsi que les systèmes d'éducations religieuses furent intégrés dans la structure de l'étatindonésien.
iii 1 • ACKNOWLEDGMENTS My sincere thanks go to my academic supervisor. Dr. A. Üner Turgay for his encouragement and advice especially at the early St:lges of my studies at McGiII. It was un'::r his supei"Vision that 1 started this thesis. For the completion of L'lis work. 1 am indebted to Prof. Charles J. Adams for supervising my research in its later stages; he read carefully various drafts ofmy thesis and made pertinent suggestions for improving il 1 " am a1so grateful to Muhammad Qasim Zaman and Bruce Fudge who read this thesis and offered numerous comments and improvements. My thanks are a1so due to the library staff ofthe Islamic Studies library, and the Mclennan Iibrary. e.o;pecially to Salwa Ferahian and Stephen Millier for their help.
My studies at McGill University were made possible by for twO year grant from CIDA (Canadian International Development Agency Project) for which 1am grateful. 1 owe an enormous debt of gratitude to Prof. Issa Boullata, Director of McGiII Indonesia IAIN Development Project, to other members of this project, to the officiais of ClDA,
and to the Ministry of Religious Affairs Govemment of Indonesia. 1a1so wish to express my appreciation to Dr. Bisri Affandy, Rector of IAIN Sunan Ampel Surabaya, who has a1ways motivated me to pursue advanced studies.
1 wish to thank. my parents, H. Marsuki and Hj. Asfariyah, for their kindness in providîng financial support ta my wife and two children during the two years of my absence ûom Indonesia. rmaIly, 1 am very grateful and deeply appreciative of the emotional support and encouragement which my wifc, Soesantie Asji Vieta, has given me; it enabled me tacomplete this work.
iv • NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION 1 feUo" the transliu:rztion system of the Institute of Islamic Studies. McGill University though with a number of exceptions. Turkish names remain unchanged, for
example, Abdülh:mûd is not tr,,"sliterated as CAbd al-Hamei. The spel\ing of Indonesian names and terms employs the new system ofspelling used since 1972 except in quotations
where the spellinb used by the source being quoted is retained. In the new system of spelIing, ch, dj, j, sj, soe, tj, are written as kh, j, y, sy, soe, c respectively. Thus Djakarta
becomes "Jakarta, "and "Soekarno" ~s spelled Sukarno.
v • INTRODUCTION The effects of modemization most frequently manifest themselves in the
technological and economic spheres. though. as Manfred Halpern reminds us
modemization also encompasses the political. social. intellectual and religious domains. l
There is no doubt that traditional institutions. structures. and belief systems have been
undergoing erosion as a result of modemization. H. A. R. Gibb. for instance. notes that modemization has brought about a basic erosion of Islam as a value system and as a
political actor involved in establishing nation-states.2 Modemization in the non-Western
worid has been ciosely connected with Westemization though the two are not synonymous.
As Charles J. Adams observes. "modernization is not necessarily to be equated with
Westemization. there being other possibilities. but Westemization is the mode or form of
modernization."3
The Western model ofdevelopment is taken by many scholars as a reference point
for development or as an ideal type of what a modem society should be. Societies which
are, or were, removed from the West in terms of their institutional or structura!
arrangements are categorized as traditional societies.4 That it is to say. modernization is considered. to consist not ooly in moving along a traditional-modern continuum. but to be inevitable and universal as weIl. AIl societies are caught up in the process of
1Manfred Halpern. "Toward Furthcr ModcmizaIion of me SlUdy of New Nations: Wodd Po1itics, vol 17 (October 1964). 173.
2H.A. R. Gibb. Mohammedanism (New York: Oxfonl University. 1962). 190-192.
3Char1es J. Adams. "1s1amic Resurgence: ReUgiOll andPoUties in the Muslim Wood: in Nit,'C1 Bigger. Jamie S. Scou. and Wd1iam Schweiker. cds.. Ciûes of Gods: Failh. Poliûcs and Plutalism in Judaism. Christianity and Islam (New York: Greenwood Press. 1986). 179.
4Samue1 P. HuntingtOll. "The Change: ModemizatiOll. Developmenl and PoUties: ComparntillC Po1irics. 3 (April 1971). 295. For a simi1ar argument. sec DanJcwart A. RUSlOw. A Wood of Nations (Washington. D. ·C.: The Broolcing 1nstilUtion. 1967). 10.
1 modemization, and they can only move forward.5 Sorne scholars have. however,
challenged the use of tradition and modemity as autonomous concepts.6 For example. • Ward and RUSIOW have argued that within the context of Japanese modemization tradition ;nay sometimes play an important role in strengthening the acceptance of modem
institutions, SLoucturCS, and values. They pc,int out that in the case of Japan, the Meiji
Restoration of 1868 built upon tradition:ll symbols and system of values. The Meiji
leadership found a ready basis for national unity in the symbol of the Emperor and sought
to strength....n his status rather than to abolish the institution. By developing Shinttl as the
state religion, these leaders could secure discipline and obedience to the new regime.7 This
process of "reinforcing dualism," which they define as "the exploitability of traditional
institutions, attitud~ and behavior patterns for modernizing purposes''' can facilitate a
smoothertransition to modernity.8
ltisevidentthat the tranformation ofreligion, like that ofother value systems, plays
a significant role in the transition from a traditional to a modem society.9 Therefore. to
assume thatreligion is a static force which contributes little to social, econonùc, or political
change is simplistic and nùsleading. Religi'lns do not necessarily oppose change. In faet,
religiopolitical movements have undertaken reforrns and simultaneously reinforcing the
preservation of the tradition. Tradition and modernity should not therefore be viewed in
SSamucl P. Huntington. "Po1itical Developmenl and Polilical Decay,"Worid Polirics, 17 (April 1965), 386-430.
6see, for insIan<:e, S. N. Eisensladt. "Breakdowns of Modemization," Eœnomic De\Ielopment and CulIUlll1 Change, 12 (July 1964), 345-367: and Joseph R. Guslield. "Tradition and Modemity: Misplal:ed !'olarilies in the Study of Socia1 Change," American JOlIIJl:I1 of Sociology, 72 (JanU3lY, 1966), 351-362-
7Robert E. Ward and D. A. Rustow, "Conclusion," in R. E. Ward and D. A. Rustow. eds.. Po1irica1 Modemiz:Jtiœ in Japan and nutey (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1964). 445-447.
8 Ibid.. 466-
%_ E. Hagen. "Pmonality and Enll'epl'elleUlShp: How Economie GroWlh Begin: A 1beory of Socia1 Change: in JOlIIJl:I1 Of Soci:Jl Issues, 19 (January 1963). 20-34.
2 dichotomous tenns. Any understanding of modernity in a unidirectional fashion is • questionable. lt has been suggested that a better choice of term~ is "quasi-tr.lditil'nal and quasi-modern."10 The emergence of lndonesia as a Pancasi/a state exemplifies. as will be
discussed later. the theory of modernization according to which the state ideology
simultaneously accommodates two components: tradition and modernity. Societies which
undergo modernization also remain in sorne measure dependent on historical traditions.
This was not the case. however, with Mustafa Kemal's radical secularization. which aimed
atcompletely substituting Western culture for the Islamic one.
With respect to religion and political moctemization. D. E. Smith distinguishes two
types of political systems: the "traditional religiopolitical system" and "modem secular
polities."11 In a non-secular political system, the boundaries between the religious domain.
on the one band, and the socio-political domain, on the other, are eitber nonexistent or
weak: differences of status and power relationships are legitimized on the basis of
religious sanctions, and activities are uarrïed outin terms of religio-traditional values. In a
secular political system, there is greater structural or role differentiation between the
religious spbere and the rest ofsociety; these political integration and political identities are
defmed insecularratherthan religio-traditional terms.12
Secularism is an idea or ideological stance, while secularization is the actual
process ofchange. Secularization in thiscontext means the transformation from a religious
to a secular state. Sorne charaeteristics of this secular type are the following. First, the
legitimacy of the ruler is no longer derived from a divine source. The religious
tOBinnaz Sayari. Religion and PolilicaI Dcvelopment in Twtey (Michigan: Xerox University Miaofilms, 1983), 31.
11 See Donald Eugenc Smith, Religion and Polilical DcvelOpmenl (Boslon: Little. Brown and Company, 1970). 51·123.
12Binnaz Sayari. Re1igiOll and Polirica1' DcvelOpmenl in Tuttcy, 37·38.
3 organizations lose influence in politicallife except as interest groups, and religion becomes
a private matter. However, it still plays an important role in integrating specific social • groups, though not the nation as a whole. Second, the integrative function c " religion is taken over by the ideology of the state. The new sense of national identity and political
integration does not rely on religious considerations,13 though, as in case of lndonesian
nationalism, the initial development of a national identity may weil have becn based on
common religious ties.
Third, with greater secularization, the patterns of social stratification which are
based on religious tradition, such as the dominance of the 'ulamii' in Islamic societies,
unclergo considerable change. 'The effect is the opening up of class barriers and upward
c1ass mobiIity. The original source of secularization in the West was the emergence of
industrial societies which sttongly needed an autonomous sphere of activity free from
traditional controls.14 According to Hagen, socio-economic change is best facilitated by
individuals who can break away from the bonds of ttaditional society and used their
creativity for innovative purposes.15 With economic development, Sjoberg observes, that
the ttaditionalist nOI ms of preindustrial societies broke down. The role of religion in
shaping social and cultural attitudes, as weIl as in controlling secular activity, declined in
modemized societies. Economie development dernands. first and foremost, a rationalistic
approacll to economic achievernent. This signifies; for exarnple, that the content of the
educational system cao no longer be left to the control and influence of the religious
13Sce PI:Icr L. Berger, "ReIigious InstibllÏOo," in Neil J. Smclser, ed~ Sod%gy: An Inrroducûon (New York: John Wiley, 1967), 357-35S.
14Sce Gino Gcrmani, "Sccu1arizaIion, Modcmization, and Economie Development," in S. N. EisenstadI. 'l7Ie .ProresIant Ellùc and Modemiz:Uion: A COlIIpar.uive View (New York: Basic Books, 1968), 342·366, For a simiIar view, aIso sec PI:Icr L. Berger, 'l7Ie Sacred C1nopy: Elements of :1 Sociologic:J1 '17IeoJy of Religion (Garden City, N.Y ~ Doubleday, 1967),109,
15Evereu E. Hagen, "~ty and EnterpreneUlShip: How Economie Growth Bcgins: A T1lcory of Social Chanse: Joum:J1 of Soci:I1 1ssucs, 19 (January. 1963),20-34.
4 establishment but has to embody a secular scientific ration:l1e and must he control1ed by a • secularinstitution.16 In ttaditional societies, there are IWO major sources of social control: religion and
government.17 With modemization. the function ofreligious institutions as a mechanism of social control undergoes achange.l8 The breakdown ofthe traditional order brings about an intel1ectual void which leads to the disintegration of religio-ttaditional bases of
Iegitimacy. This is the rnuch taIked about cost ofmodernization. Sorne modemist élites
have tried to fill the gap with a secular ideology in an effort to rnobilize the society around
the goals of rnodernization. This would he an ideology which acts as a deterrent to
potentialconflict. The decline ofreligious influence in thepolitical sphere, especially inthe
case of new nations. is often accompanied by the emergence of collectivist ideologies
which provide the ernotional basis for political integration anddeveloprnental achievement.
D.E Smith postulates that secularization has been the most "fundamental structural and
ideological change" inthe process ofpolitical rnodemization. whereby. forexample. there
is a movement from "ttaditional Islam," through "modemist Islam," to a "secular
pragmatism." Such intellectual processes has formecl a part of the modemization of
Muslim societies. Their resuit has been to question. even eliminate the role of Islam in
public Iife.19 The "Six Arrows of Kemalism" and the "Five Principles ofSukamoism" or
PancasiIa, which are the topies in this thesis. are manifestation ofmodemizing ideologies.
AsApterpoints out, however. the effort to dismantle the political process from its religious
basis often produces in turn a political doctrine that is no Iess religious in raising the
16ci. 17D. E. Smith, RtIigion and Politica1 Devdopmenr, 57. 18Wemer Levi. "Re1igion and Politica1 Developmenr: A 1beorelica1 Analysis,· BucJcne11 Review. 15 (May. 1967), 81. 190. E. Smith, RtIigion and Politica1 Devdopmenr. 2 and 244. 5 profane to the level of the sacred, although this new religion is a religion of a different • kind.20 The secularization oftraditional societies has been a major cause of socio-political c1eavages in many developing countries. This fact indicates that secularization does not necessarily mean that religion loses its ability to influence political behavior. Among the many factors which affect political responses towards modemization, religion is undoubtedly an important one. Without neglecting other factors - racial, economic and social - religion should also be recognized as a major element in many conflicts. In several non-Western countries, there has been severe conflict between the traelitional-religious and the more modernist segments of society. A number of examples suggest that religious concerns can shape political responses to modernization and can lead to social conflict and politicalinstabi~ity. For exampl;;, in Lebanon the political system is based on confessional politics and the distribution of public offices, including t'tose of the President and Prime Mînister, is based on sectarian considerations. The outbreak ofthe civil war between the Christian and Muslim communities in 1975 demonstrated that even such institutional arrangements were not enough to muffle religiopolitical conflicl21 InSouth Asia, it was religious and cultural differences, reinforced by economic and political considerations which led to the separation ofthe Hindu and Muslim communitie~ and the creation of Pakistan in 1947. In Nigeria, the cultural differences between the Muslims of the Ncrtb, who have preserved their IsIamic traditions, and the predominantly Christian peoples of the Eastern region, who promoteWesternization, have turnedinto a political struggle.22 200avid E. Apter, The PoIitics of Modemizalion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 365-366. 21For a discussion on confessional poUlies in Lebanon, sec Michael C. Hudson, The l'h:carious &public: Politica1 Modemization in Lebanon (New Yorie Random House, 1978). 6 In severa! other Muslim countries -for example, in Egypl- the Islamic reaction 10 • modernization expressed itself through the Muslim Brotherhood. founded in 1928 by Hasan al-Banna. This movemenl aimed al reorganizing Egyptian society on Is1amic principles. By the 1940s il had become a powerful organizalion and a major source of opposition 10 the govemmenl.23 Another movemenl was the Jama'iit al-Islami ofPakistan founded in the carly 1940s by Mawlana Mawdudi. The Jama'iir. like the Brotherhood caIIed for administering the state on the basis of Islamic principles.24 The ideologies of sucb Muslim movements are irreconcilable with and a reaction to secular policies, a fact which bas led to their suppression by the govemments. In Iran. a reaction to the modernization and secularreforms ofReza Shah was reflected in the 1978-1979 revolution. This revolution sought a retum to fundamental Islamic principles. The emergence of the fùqaha as leaders ofthe revolution played a major role in the Islamic revival of the carly 19705.25 AlI these examples show !hat the IOle ofreligion on the policies ofmodemization canhe significanl, thougb its affects may vary from one Muslimcountry to another. This thesis studies the Turkisb and Indonesian experiences of secularization with reference to the secularizing programs ofMustafa Kemal and Sukarno and the implications 22Sec Charles R. N"xon, "Nigeria and Biafra," in Sleven L. Spiegel and K. N Waltz, cds., Conflicr in World Polities (Cambridge, Mass.: Wanthrop, 1971), 281-300. 23Sec Manfred Halpern, The Polities of Social Change in the Middle &st and North Aliica (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 134-150. 24see MIIIShaII G. S. Hodgson, The VenllR of Islam (Oùcago: The Un"versIty of Oùcago Press, 1974), 391-392; and Charles J. Adams, "The ldeology of Mawlana Mawducfi; "n D. E. Slnilh, South Asian Polities and Religion (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966), 371-397. 2SSec Mongol Bayai, "Islam "n Pahla.... and Post-Post PahIa.... Iran: A CuIIUra1 Revolution; m John L. EsposIIO, ed., 1s1am and Devdopmenr: Religion and Sociopolitica1 Change (New York: Syracuse UniversIty Press, 1980), 94-102; and RIchard W. Coaam, Nationalism in Iran (PIttsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 1964), 151-156. For a discussIon on IsIarnic l'e\ivalism, see Charles J. Adams, "lslarnic Resurgence: Religion and Polities "n the Muslim WorId;"n Nigel Bigger. JaJnie S. Scott, and WIlliam Schwciker, cds., Cities of Gad: Faith, Polities and Plu:alism in Judaism. ChrïslÏl"'ity and Islam (New York, London: Greenwood Press, 1986), 167-189: 7 of such programs for the role of religious institutions in the structure cf the state. The sinûlarities and differences between the programs of secularization pursued by Mustafa • this Kemal and Sukarno will be the major focus of slUdy. Mustafa Kemal (1881-1938) created modem Turkey from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire on the basis ofa new poiitical vision. He was not only the founder of the state. but also an adminîsttator. Like Mustafa Kemal in Turkey. Sukarno founded the modem Indonesian state and·served as the fIfSt President ofIndonesia. At the constilUtional level. bath Mustafa Kemal and Sukarno defmed the relation between state and religion in a different and more radical way than other Muslim reformers did. There were sorne ways in which Sukarno endorsed Mustafa KeI::al. and this endorsement needs to be examined. On the relationship between state and religion, Sukarno always quoted the ideas of Mustafa Kemal. Furthermore. many Indonesian MusIims criticize Sukarno as an adherent of Kemalisrn, and have an unfavorable overalI view of both Mustafa Kemal and Sukarno. TI-is, however. is not the view ofIslamic reformers such as Ahmad Hassan. a leader of the Persis or Persaruan Islam (the Islamic Unity); Natsir. a leader ofMasjumi or Majlis Sjuro Ml'slim;n lDdonesia (the Indonesian MusIim Counsultative Associations); and others who are critical only ofthe secularism of Kemal and Sukarno. Much ofthe dis1ike for Mustafa Kemal is based on a lack of information about bis reforms. This issue bas received little attention in the literature on comparative polilics. For!hat reason. a comparative slUdy by taking up the issue ofsecularization as viewed by these two leaders and an examination ofSukamo's endorsement ofMustafa Kemal seems appropriate. There are three propositions which willbe argued. Fm!, that Western world-views, especially rati(lnalïsm and pragmatism, are quite dominant in the thought ofboth Mustafa Kemal and Sukarno. Theirrational approach to religion and their desire to create a modem state bring theirideas into conformity witha secularist paradigmofthe relationship between state and religion. They estab1ished nation-states which avowedly lacked a religious basis 8 and put religion into the service of the state and used it merely as an instrument for • modemization and supporting the national ideal. The Kemalist modernization program was one in which it was unquestioningly accepted that no modernization or development was possible without secularization. In line with a long history of attempts at Westernization, Mustafa Kemal aimed at substituting a Western for an Islamic cultural orientation. Second, in certain important ways, Sukarno followed the path of Mustafa Kemal. However, Sukarno differed from the latter in accepting religion within the framework ofthe state ideology. For Sukarno, however, religion was not a self-sustaining ideology, but only an ethical basis for his political ideology. Third, the two leaders were different in their means ofapplication, or in the extension ofthe principle of secularization. Mustafa Kemal was completely secular, while Sukarno was quasi-secular. Such differences are attributable te the differences ofgeographical culture, intellectual discourse, and the historical experience in regard to the role ofreligion itselfin the two countries. Three questions will be addressed in this work. Ftrst, how did Mustafa Kemal and Sukarno treat religious refonn in their responses te modemization and social changes; second, what was the secularist paradigm ofthe relationship between state and religion; and third, what were the implications or extensions of secularization in spberes that were fonnerly in the bands ofreligious institutions? Before these questions are treated, however, something should be said about education, political experience and intellectual discourse in the period before Mustafa Kemal and Sukarno. The secul8rlst approaches of both Mustafa Kemal and Sukarno reflected the intellectual discourses of their periods no less than the historical changesand continuity ofthe two nations. The intellectual discourses in the perïod of both Mustafa Kemal and Sukarno were dominated by the struggle between the religious and the secular. On the basis ofthese questions, this thesis comprises three chapters. The first chapter will discuss the ideas of Mustafa Kemal on the relationsbip between the state and religion. The second chapter will deal with the ideas ofSukarno on 9 the same subjects. The third chapter is a comparison of the !WO men's ideas. ln this part. an analysis ofthe differences and similarities between the two reformers will be anempted, • and an effon will lx made to determine the degree to which Sukarno followed the path of Mustafa KemaI's secularism. 10 CHAPTER ONE • MUSTAFA KEMAL'S IDEAS ON STATE AND RELIGION A. Background: Education. Political Career and Discourse. 1. Mustafa Kemal as the First President cf Turkey. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938). the founder of the new Turkish Republic. was barn in Salonika.\ The place of his birth was a cosmopolitan port which was the province's outlet to the sea. He was barn in 1881. at a time when the region was beset by internal upheavals and external threaLS from foreign powers. His farther was a lower middle class man of Turkish stock. When he was a small child. Mustafa Kemal lost his father. Ali Riza Efendi. who was an official of the Pious Foundations and Customs Administration in Salonika. He was brought up by his mother Zübeyde Hanim, a pivus woman. Mustafa Kemal fInished his primary school in the Semsi Efendi. the fust private school for modem education in Salonika. In 1893 he entered the Military School in Monastir. He was enthusiastic and especially good in mathematics. After completing his studies at the Military School. he entered the infantry c1ass ofthe War School in 1899. His enthusiasm for mathematics and bis keenness for speaking and writing continued here. Mustafa Kemal became acquainted with Namik Kemal's political ideas on liberty. republicanism and fatherland sorne of which were published in the newspaper HUrriyet (freedom) as carly as 1868, so that his political outlook began slowly to mature.2 In 1902, at the beginning of bis studies at the War Academy. he organized debates on the \His original Dame was Mustafa. The name Kema1 was given lO him by bis teaebcr when he was studying in ~ Efendi scbool. beau... bis Dame was the same as bis teaeher's Dame. The Dame Atatllrlc was given by the Grand Nalional Assembly for bis dedicalion lO the nalian. See The TurIcish Minislry of Press Broadcasling and Tourism. Gazi Mustafa kmal Atatütk Founder of the TurIcish Republic (Islanbul: Dizerkonca Malbaasi. 1961). 11-IS. 2Pau1 Dumolll."The Origins of Kema1ist Ideology," in Jacob M. Landau. ed.. Atatütk and the Mod=izaIjon of Tu.d:ey (Colorado: Westview Press, 1984). 26-27. 11 political situation in the Ottoman Empire and began distributing hand-written newspapers • among the students.3 In 1905, Mustafa Kemal left the War Academy with the rank. ofcaptain. at the age of twenty-four. In 1906. when he was sent to the Fifth Army at Damascus. he set up a secret organization called the"Vatan Society." This. however. did not progress as he wanted. Therefore. he secretly went back Salonika for four months and established a branch ofthis organization there. Its name was expanded toVatan ve Hürriyet ("Fatherland and Freedom"). This organization was later absorbed into the most dominant faction ofthe Young Turks. called the Committee ofUnion and Progress. Shortly after the Committee ofUnion and Progress took ovec the leadership frotn Abdülhamid in 1908. Mustafa Kemal gave himself fully to bis military career of soldiering.4 Mustafa Kemal also wrote on military matters. The fICSt part of the translation of the works of the German Generai Lilzmann ("Battle Training ofthe Unit") was printed in Salonika in 1904; the second part ofthe book was published in Istanbul in 1910.5 After the conclusion ofthe Balkan War.6 Mustafa Kemal was appointed Military Attaeh~ in Sofia in 1913.7 During World War 1 (1914-1918). he served as second-in- 3Sec Lord Kinross, Aranldc A Biography of Mustafa Kemal, FIIllhcr of Modem 1ùrlccy (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1965), 7-18. 4lbid.. 32. Sorumsh Ministry of Press Broadcas1ing and Towism. Gazi Mustafa KemaI Aranldc FowJder of the Turtish &pub1ic, 19-22- 6nc Balkan Wu (1912-1913) changee! the whole SllltllS of the 0II'istians in European TurIœy. Al the peaœ conf=nc:e !bat met in London in Dec:ember 1912. The powers agreed !bat Macedonia and Western 11IIllce should be ceded to the Balkan allies and !bat Bu\garia should Iœep Edirne. The Turks reacted slwply to this. Politically, this war stimulaœd the nalional feeling of the remaining non·TlIIldsb popdation of the Empire. ~ Bnœnnica 22 (1970), S.V. "TurIœy," 384; Lord Kinross, Aranldc A BiogRphy of Mustafa Kemal, FIIllhcr of Modem 1ùrlccy, 81-86. 7He pubUshed a smali book, Discoutse wim Offi=s and CoIltllWldels, writtell wlùle be was MiliWy ~ in Sofia. This book contained bis reflections on the coDSlÏDltional period, the Balkan Wu and the war of Tripoli. }Le emphasized bere the 12 command of Ottoman forces under the German Inspector General. Liman Von Sanders.~ • ln 1918. Mustafa Kemal was appointed to the Command of the Seventh Army in Palestine for the second time. Under his commando this anny repulsed all attacks of the enemy. When Mehmed VI Vahîdeddîn (1918-1922) formed a new cabinet in October, 1918, Mustafa Kemal proposed that the new cabinet be constituted under the leadership oflzzet Pasha.9 and he himseIf be made the Minister ofWar. However. he was not given any position in the cabineL10 ln October, 1918, Mustafa Kemal's troops met the British and the Arabs in battle (the forces of Sharif l;Iusayn) at Aleppo. ln this battle Mustafa defended the region extending from Antakya to the north of Aleppo. This region was later established as the frontier of the new Turkish state. This confrontation can be considered as the last battle between the Ottomans and Allied powers, and the flI'St battle ofthe war ofindependence. Mustafa Kemal's ideas about a national struggle for the freedom ofthe country crystallizcd while he was engaged in this region. Meanwhile the govemment in Istanbul signed the armistice at Mondros on October 30, 1918. According 10 this armistice the Germans were 10 retire from the Ottoman Empire. As a result the Young Turk leaders fled the country; and the central government was formed under the new Sultan, Mehmed VI Vahîdeddîn significance of the improvement of the mOIlIIe of the TurIdsh anny. Sec Lord Kill/OSS, AI:IIildr A Biogrnphy of MIISIIIfa Kemal, Fatther of Modem Turtcy,71-80. 8A treaty Iletween the 0t10man Empire and" Germany was signed according 10 which the 0U0mans were 10 Ile neullll1; but the war pany lOOk every opponunity 10 <:mUe a silUaliOll in which the 0t10man Empire wouId Ile compeUed 10 SlllIld 011 Germany's side. Sec Encyclopacdia Btitannica 22 (1970), S.V. "Turkey: 385. !lm Kemal's vl.:w lzzet PasIIa was a man of modelale but paIriotic polilica1 vicws. He consisœndy worIœd against the Commillee of Union and Progress and was favorably inclined 10 the NaIionalis1s. Sec Lord Kinross, AIalilIt A Biography of MIISIIIfa KemaJ. Ftuther of Modem Turtcy, 148; and H. E. Wortham, MIISIIIfa Kemal of Trriey (London: The Holme Press, 1930), 69. 1~ Minislry of Press Broadcasting and Tourism, Gazi Must:ûa KcmS AtaItbt FoIIIIder of the 7iriish Republic, 41-42. " 13 (1918-1922). under tutelage of the Allies. The Sultan accepted the tenns which the latter • dictated. ll Mustafa Kemal protested strongly against the terms of the Arnûstice of Mondros and tried to block the disastrous consequences for Turkey that could result from the Arnûstice. This situation forced him to oppose the central government. He pointed out that the Arnûstice would not proteet the lives or security ofthe Ottomans and emphasized that the provisions ofthe Arnûstice should he consistent with the interests ofthe nation. 12 He now became convinced that the Sultan or the men with whom he worked could not he trusted and that he himselfwould have to take whatever decisions were to he taken. ln 1918, Istanbul wasthe scene ofintense political activity. Severa! political parties were active, each ofthem offering a program for the salvation ofTurkey. and each having nationalist aspirations. They criticized the Party ofUnion and Progress, whose policies had proved abortive in the Great War, shaking the confidence in the integrity ofthe empire. A group of intellectuals, losing hope of preserving the territorial integrity of Ottoman territory, hegan to form Societies for the Defense of Right in various places.l3 In this situation, Mustafa Kemal came to the conclusion that not much could he done in Istanbul and decided to start bis struggle from Anatolia. Coincidentally, the government proposed sending bim to Anatolia as Army lnspector. He accepted this suggestion at once and with pleasure. 14 He had not ooly military but also civil duties. The Allied powers in Istanbul, for their part, felt nervous that he was being sent to Anatolia to such an important post. llEncyc1op3edia Bri/IIIIIÙca 22 (1970), S.V. "Twkey," 386- 12Lord Kinross, Atan1rt A Biography of MUSIaIà Kemal. Fanher of Modem Tudcey. 156. 13nmàsh Minislry or Press Broadcastipg and Tourism, GazI Mu.stafa KemS Al:IIiItt RlImder al the 7Wtish Republic, 44-51. 14lbid.. 52-53. 14 For Mustafa Kemal. the ultimate goal was to establish an unconditionally independent Turkish state. The outh was that the foundations ofthe Ottoman Empire had collapsed. He • had never ousted the Allies to make a reasonable peace. and he had no belief in the vil1ue ofappealing to the Allies to have pity. Unable to obtain political power and to persuade the Sultan to fight the Allies. he was determined to stan a revolutionary movement in Anatolia.1S In June 1919. the central government came to the peace conference held by the Allied Powers in Paris. Mustafa Kemal was very critical of the Sultan's delegation and argued that the people's aspirations had to be represented. In the words of Mustafa Kemal the rights that must definitely be defended by the nation are: (a) the complete independence of the state, (b) that in Turkey proper, the majority should not be sacrifiCed to the minority. It was necessary for the delegation attending the conference to defend these principles.16 Itis clear that the concept ofthe independence ofa nation-state and the significance ofthe people as the cornerstone ofMustafa Kemal's political thought had been formed. To the Sultan, cooperation with foreign powers was unavoidable. Under the influence and pressure of foreign interests, the Sultan recalled Mustafa Kemal to Istanbul. Mustafa Kemal, however, rejected this directive. and insisted on continuing his p.ltriotic attempl~ in Anatolia, even ifhe had to resign from military service. Thus the differences in the policies of Mustafa Kemal and the Sultan as regards the future of the Empire continued to be unresolved, and brought the two into a political dispute. Mustafa Kemal strengthened bis military position centered in Erzurum, and ISSee H. E. Wonham.Musta13 Kemal of Tudcey. 69-78. 16-rurkish MinisIJy of Press Broadcasting and Tourism. G:JZi Mustafa Kcmill AtlliJrIc Founder of the Tuddsh Republic. 63. . 15 began to organize political activities toward resistance to Allied occupation.!? At the Congress of Erzurum on July 23, 1919, Mustafa Kemal proposed the formation of a f;'vernment drawing its strength from the will of the people. The Congress established the Rer,resentative Council and chose Mustafa Kemal as the president of the Council.l8 The position of Mustafa Kemal as President of the Representative Council was endorsed by the chiefs of nomadic tribes and other influential people whom he knew from the time when he was commander ofthe second Army. Relying on their admiration and confidence in him, he assigned them duties in preparation for the national struggle. At the Sivas Congress on Septernber4, 1919, he was chosen chainnan for the Defense of Rights of Anatolia and European Turkey. A National Pact was decided upon calling for an independent Turkey and the liberation of aIl Turkish territory from foreign rule. The congress was to raise the Nationalist Councils from the local to the national plane.l9 The Sultan in Istanbul regarded the Congress of Sivas as dangerous, took steps ta disperse il, and asked the Governor of Elizig to seize Mustafa Kemal. However, the govemor, having achieved nothing, fled.20 ln March, 1920, one hundred and fifty Turkish nationalists were arrested in h'tallbul. This action had political consequences: a Turkish nationalist movement was organizcd ta conduct the war for independence with Mustafa Kemal as its leader. At the Sivas Congress in April 1920, Mustafa Kemal proposed the creation of a Grand National 17Enurum was the capital of castem Tudccy. It was a1ways a military stronghold and scrved as thc bastion or Tmldsb defense against a series of Russian invasions. On the Erzurum Congn:ss, sec Lon! Kinross, AIlIllIdc A Biogmphy of Mustafa Kemal. F3rrber of Modem Tartey, 202-212. 18Encyclopaedia Bril:lllllica 22 (1970), S.V., "Turkey: 386. 19See Lon! Kinross,At:III1It A Biography of Mustafa Kemal. Fanher of Modem Tartey. 211-219. 2OEncyciopaedia Britannica 22 (1970), '386. 16 Assembly with legislatiye and executive powers. The govemment in Istanbul. under Allied pressure. once more announced the dismissal of Mustafa Kemal from the army and • condemned him to death on May 1I. 1920.21 At the same time. the çentral government signed the Sévres Agreement which had been dictated by the Allies.22 This agreement not only divided the Onoman territory. but also did not recognize sovereignty for the Turkish state. The government ofthe Grand National Assembly. however. did not consider ito;elf in any way bound by this agreement Mustafa Kemal never had a moment's doubt about his leadership and was finally to be elected president of the new Turkish Republic on October 13.1923. It should be clear from the foregoing that Mustafa Kemal was not only a great Turk but also one of the greatest Muslim leaders of modern times. His title Mustafa Kemal Atatürk ("Father ofTurk" ) and Ohazi ("Vietorious") were granted by the Grand National Assembly in recognition of his dedication to his people in both war and peace.23 During World War 1. neither the Sultan nor the Young Turk coterie evidently wanted to sec Mustafa Kemal become influential at home and preventcd him from criticizing the central government in Istanbul. On one pretext or another. he was kept in the provinces and sometimes abroad as Military Attaché. However. whatcver battle he was sent to, his basic genius and his military knowledge and ability to inspire and lead his men brought vietory. These successes eventually propelled hirn to the top in a period ofOttoman disintegration. Even though the Sultan refused to acknowledge his position. Mustafa Kemal appealed direct1y to the common people for support against the central government in Istanbul. 21Turkish MiniSlIy ofPress Broadcasring and Tourism. Gazi Mustûa Kem1D AtlliJtt l1lunder of the Turtish Republic, 'Tl. 22At the Treaty of S6vres in June 1920. Turlœy was rcduced 10 nocthem AnaIoUa and ls1anbul. and the remaindcr of European Turkey was given 10 GIeeCC and Easlcm TurIœy 10 the Annenians. Sec August, Ritter YOll KIaI. Kemal AtJIiJtt~ Land. lrnIISlaIed by Kennelh Benton (Wlen.Leipzig : Walheim Br.wmOUer. 1938). 44. 23See Stanford J. Shaw &: Eze! Kural Shaw. HistoIy of the 0U0man Empïrc and Modem 7lriey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1977). 374. 17 It is obvious Liat his political experience significantly shaped his political outlook. • For him. the Sultan and his religious functions were futile for the reconstruction of the empire. His vision of a nation-state was of one which did not have a basis in religion. Certainly, such a conception was not a sudden decision but was really a reflection ofand in continuity with the political discourse of the milieu in which Mustafa Kemal appeared. Hence, it is necessary to examine the discourse as regards the religio-political system ofthe Ottomans. especially in the era ofthe Young Turks. 2. Discoursc: Wcstemism, Islamism and Turkïsm. As Stanford J. Shaw has observed, the history of the Ottoman Empire Was characterized by a certain dynamism. always having its refonners who would change institutions in response to new needs and new cha1lenges.24 In the political field. Sultan MahmQd n (1808-1839) was compelled to undertake refonns reflected for instance in the Sened-i ittifak (Contraet ofAlliance) of 1808 which recognized the property rights ofthe Ayan.2S Political refonns continued in response to the insistent demands for equality and political rights for all subjects. and were embodied in the Gülbane Hatti Hümayun (the Rescript ofRose Chamber). or the Edict of Tanzimat. promulgated in 1839.26 The Ediet promised equality to all people. Later. in the era ofAbdülmacîd (1839-1861), the Edict of 24sce Standford Jay Shaw. ·Sorne Aspects of the Aims and Achievcments of the Ni_th CenlUl)' OlIoman ReformeJS,• in William R. Polk and Ricbard L. Chambers, eds., 1kgilUJings of Modemizarion in the Middle East (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), 29-39. 2SRoderic H. Davison, "The Advent of the Principlc of Reprcsentalion in the Govemmcnt of the OlIoman Empire,. in William R. Polk and Ricbard L. Chambers, cd., BegûuJings of Modemiz;stion iD the Middle East, 95. 26ne Ediet of theTanzimat was conccived and wrinen by Rcsbid Pasba, the OlIoman ambassador in London and Paris, with the consent of Sultan Abdü1bamid. Sec H. C. J. Luke, The Old Tw1œy and the New: From BJ'%IIIItium /t) AnIœra (London: BIC$$, 1955). 47-50, and Frank Baïlcy. British Policy and the Turlàsh Refonn Movement (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1942), 38, 214, 228-229. 18 Tanzimat was followed by the Islahat Fennani (Reform Edict) in 1856 as reaffmnation of • the GülhaneP Ottoman reforms began with the promulgation of the Gülhane Hatti Humayun in 1839 by the Sultan Abdü1macÎd. There emerged the view that modern European civilization was superior in many ways to that of the Ottomans. For that reason. Westernization became a major concern in the sense that new institutions and new methods were to be imported from the West, while the old institutions and ways were to be reformed. These reforms marked Ottoman entry into theWestern "circle ofcivilization." to borrow the words of Ziya Gokalp (1876-1924). a theoretician of Turkish nationalism. Similarly. as Stanford Shaw notes. theTanzimat signified the transformation from the traditionai to the modern. A new system of schoois was introduced for the training of modern bureaucrats. While no large scaie secularization ofeducation was undertaken. the traditionai religious school system (madrasas ). conventionally under the control of the'uIama (the learned clergy). was gradually eclipsed. This trend institutionaiized and facilitated the progress of secularization. and consequently the prestige of the Islamic institution was overshadowed by secular ones.28 Nevertheless. the effects ofsecularization were limited to the upper classes; as J. C. Hurewitz puts in. it was "modernization in a closedcircuit."29 TheWestern orientation ofthe Tanzimat stimulated the emergence ofa new Ottoman intelligentsia: the Young Ottomans, and18ter the Young Turks.30 27AcconIing 10 Talla Parla the GüIbane was pennee! by the Grand Vizier. Reshid Pasha but was applOvcd by the British, whi1e the 1s1JJhat Fetmani was wrillen by the men of the Taazimat Ali Pasha and Fuad Pasha. Talla Parla, 7'1IeSocW and Politics1 Thought of Ziya GiJJaJ1p 1876-1924 (Leiden: EJ. Brill. 1985), 3. 28For a comprehensive study on the development of Ottoman sccu1arizaIion, sec Niyazi BerIces, 7'1Ie Development of Secubuism Ùl Twiey (Montreal: McGiII University Press, 1964). 29Quotcd in Talla Parla, 7'1Ie SocW and Poliôca1 77Jought of Ziya Gokalp 1876 1924. 4. 30rbe Young Ottomans were 3 group which emerged during the era of the Tanzimat and brought about the Constitution of 1876. Prominent among of thcm were Midhad Pasha, 19 The Young Turks, who were secularists, founded the Comminee of Union and Progress (Ittihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti).31 The members found adherents among junior civilians. military bureaucrats, and dissident intelleetuals in exile in Europe. The main purpose was to restore the Constitution of 1876 and to overthrow Sultan Abdülhamid (1976-1908). This Comminee symbolized the domination of the "modemist-secularist" group in the Ottoman politicaI constellation ofthe carly twentieth century. The victory of secularists ove! religious groups marked the extent to which Western ideas had affected the lives ofTurkish intellectuals. The "modemist-secularist" group was headed by Ahmed Reza Bey (1859-1930).32 He proposed that the transformation of the empire should be based on a secular approach, while remaining, however, within the framework of Oltomanism.33 ln diametrical opposition :0 the modemists, a conservative group led by Mehmed Murad Mizanci (1853-1912) aIso came into existence.34 He called for the establishment of an Islan~;c empire under a Caliph and hoped to sec the Sultan as the head of the Islamic world.35 He proposed the establishment ofa Board ofSupervisors and a Supreme Body Ali Suavi and Namik KamaJ. The Young Turks were a group of army oflicers. civil servants and inteUectuals who appeared aftcr the era of the Tanzimal, demanding the revival of the Constitution. They includcd AJuned Reza Bey, Prince Sahabaddin, Mwad Mizanci. Ziya GOkaIp. 31The period of the Young Tmks (1908-1918) was dominaled by the Committee of Union and Progress. Mer the dection of 1908, Ibis organizaIion changed into the Pany of Union and Progress and Abdl1lbamid was repIaced by Mehmed V ~ (1909-1918). 32Ahmed Reza was the fanner Minister of Agricu1l111e, Iater the Minister of Educ:alion. He resigned and Slayed in Paris for six years before reentering pofitics. ~ c:oncept of Union meant the co-operaIion of an nalionalities within the Ottoman empire, white progress impfied a social Ievo1ution through educalional and «OIlOIllic measures. Sec Niyazi Berkcs, The .Dcmopmenr of SecuIarism in Twtey. 325 326. 34 Meluned Murad was educaled in Russia and was a professor of historY. He was a victim of the party suuggles foUowing the Revo1U1ion of 1908 and died in exile. Sec Niyazi Berkcs, The De\oeIopmem of SecuIarism in Twtey, 307. 35Emesl Edmondson Ramsaur. YOllIIg Tmts, Prelude to the Revolution of 1908 (l'rinceIon: Princeton University Pœss, 1957). 38, 41-43. 20 of Shari'a under the presidency oftheShaikhal-Is/iim (the chief mufti or juristconsult). The lively controversie" belWeen the modemist and conservaùve groups conùnued under the • Young Turks (1908-1918). Besides Mizanci. the leaders of the conservaùves included Prince Sait Halim, M. Shemseddin. and Musa Kazim.36 They believed that Islam had to be the basic element underlying Onoman unity, and that the Onoman Empire's backwardness was caused by deviation from its original Islamic foundaùons. They believed that Islam was adaptable to science and progress and could regulate every level of social development; therefore, they proposed borrowing only the West's technology and unerly rejected Western cultura1, religious and social ideas which they believed were inferior to those ofIslam. They claimed that a return to "original" Islam was the sole means ofrevitalizing the empire. They proposed the abolition ofail cultura1 reforms introduced so far, and called for a strict enforcement ofthe Shari'a.37 The conservatives countered the noùon ofthe secular state with that ofan Islamic state by offering the concept of meshveret (consultation) in the meshrutiyet system (constitutional monarchy). They believed that this was the only political system taught by the Shari'a, while aulocracy was seen as absolutely incompatible with Islam.38 Clearly, their conception ofconstitutional reform was to put the state into the service of religion, and to use the government as the instrument tbrough which to implement the Shari'a. In 1908, during the constitutional struggle, they forwarded their proposai for an Islamic state, dernanding the application of fiqh and its acceptanet. as the source of law-making in parliament The Shari'a was the constitution ofthe Islamic polity; the 'u/ama were the 36For more information sec Dwight E. Lee, "The Origins or Pan ls1amism: Ametican Historical Review, January 1942, 27; Kerim K. Key "JamllI al-Dio al Afghllni and the Muslim Refonn Movemenl," 1lIe Is/amic Liœr.uure. October 1951, 5-10. 37Kema1 H. Karpat,7iutcys PoliIÏcs: 1lIe Tmnsilion ro a Mu/ti-Pany System (Princelon: Princeton Universily Press. 1959), 20-21. 38Niyazi Berlœs,1lIe Deve/opmetll of Si:cuJarism in 7iutcy. 370. 21 protectors and interpreters of the Shari'a, and the implementation of the Islamic refonn policy implied the legitimacy ofmie by the ·ulama. As reponed by the judicial committee, • the parliament did not agree with the conservatives' proposaI for an Islamic state.39On the basis of these ideas, the conservatives eventually came together in the Islamic Unity Party (Ittihadi Muhammedi) in 1909. However, this party was abolished after the Union and Progress Party came to power, which indicates that the position ofthe conservatives in the era ofthe Young Turks was marginal. Up to the era of the Young Turks, in fac!, the two slogans of the Ottomans, Westemism and Islamism, did not really resolve the problem ofOttoman disintegration, proved ineffective in checking the nationalistic movements among bath the Christian and Arab populations ofthe Empire. Meanwhile Turkish nationalism had penetrated the Young Turks and had grown into a strong ideology after passing through severa! phases of developmenL However, Turkish nationalism did not truly influence Turkish élites before the national struggle for independence (1919-1922) underthe leadership ofMustafa Kemal. Inthe beginning, the attitude ofthe Young Turks toward nationalism was rather unclear. There were two phases in the development of Turkish nationalism: cultural and political. The cultural phase, according ta Ercümend Kuran, had two phases, "scientific and litera'Y Turkism."40 The former appeared in the 18605 in the era of the Young Ottomans, al the lime when Russia invaded Central Asia. This tendency is indieated by many works on the history ofthe Central Asian Turks and their relations with the Ottoman 39Jbid., 371-372. 4Osreomend Kuran, "The Impact of Nationa\ism on the TurIàsh Elite in the N'meleellth Century ," in William R. Polk and Ricbant 1.. Ownbers , BegilllJÏngs of Modemizalioa ÙI the Middle &st, 111-116. For a SIUdy of TurIàsh nationa\ism, sec David 1Cusbner, The Rist of Twtish Nationalism 1876-1908 (London: Frank Cass, 1977); Urie1 Heyd, FoundaIions of Twtish NllôoDalism: The ure of Teaching of Ziya Gi11a11p (London: Oxford University Press, 1950); Lewis V. Thomas, "Nationa\ism in Turkcy," NatioDalism in the &st (Washington. 19S2); Bernard Lewis "Is1amic Revival in Turkcy: IntematioDal Affaia, xxvm, 19S2; and "History Writing and National Revival in Turkey: Middle Easll:nJ Atl"ain, June-July, 19S3. 22 many works on the history ofthe Central Asian Turks and their relations with the Ottoman Empire.41 Another indication is that in 1870 the official language at the Imperial Medical • School was changed from French to Turkish.42 Following (Mekrebi Tibbiye Shahane) the growth of scientific Turkism. the lirerary effon reached maturity in the late 1890's. the time of the Turco-Greek war of 1897. Mehmed Amin (1869-1914) expressed his nationalistic sentiments by writing poems to encourage the Turkish soldiers fighting the enemy. For example: "Ben birTürkum, dinim, einsim uJudur" (1 am Turkish. my religion. my race are mighty). Later. he became one ofthe most prominent nationalist poets of his time, writing poems in c1ear. intelligible and popular Turkish. The censorship of Abdü1hanûd D did not aIlow the development of Turkish nationalist literature in the last years ofhis reign. However. such lirerature flourished after the Young Turk Revolution of 1908.43 From the Revolution of 1908 to 1913. Turkish nationalism took c1ear shape in polities. Many nationalist associations made their appearance; these ineluded the Turk Yurdu (Turkish Homeland) in 1911. and the Turk Ocaklari (Turkish Hearth). in 1912. Their main purpose was ta disseminate nationaIist ideas and ta transfonn ultimarely the Ottoman Empire into a Turkish Slate.44 The Ottoman Empire was defeated in the Balkan War of 1913. and suffered the 10ss of most of its Balkan territories. Nevenheless. the Turkish nationalists intensified their effons to assimilate the Muslim minorities into the 41These inc1ude: a dietionary of oaoman Tmkish wrillen by Ahmed Vefik (\823 1891); a newspaper. WIDII focusing 011 the cullUl'a1 achievemenlS or the Turks in hislory. publishcd by Ali Suavi (1i39.1878), a y DUng oaoman from the 'uIama class. Kuran, The Impact, 113. 42En:Omend Kuran, "The Impact of Naliona1ism 011 the TurIâsh EUIC in die N'_th Ccnlllry," lll. 43\bid., 116. 44see Niyazi Berkes, The DcveIopment of SecuIarism in Twtey. 378-383. 23 Empire.45 Gradually, under the impact of the struggle of the minorities for national independence, and as a counterpart of it, Turkish nationalism shifted to political • concems.46 The rise ofnationalist movements among the non-Turkish Muslim peoples led to the political development of Turkish nationalism, and influenced indirectly the secularization ofTurkish nationalism.47 The Turkish nationalists opposed Islamism and Ottomanism. Yet at this time nationalism was not officially recognized, and Ottomanism remained the state ideology. It was only when the nationalists gained a foothold in the government under the leadership ofMustaftKemal that nationalism became a fundamental policy in the process of modemization. The Turkish nationalists condemned the Party of Union and Progress for two faults: their entry into and subsequent 10ss ofthe war, and the authoritarian government established after 1911 at the expense ofotherpolitical parties and individual freedom. The Turkish nationalists' view was that the war had Iiquidated the Islamists as a political power, and the idea of Ottomanism had alse lost meaning. Thus, by the end ofL'te Young Turks' era nationalism was the only ideology inexistence. As regards the three discourses described above, Westernism, Islamism and Turkism, Gl:ikalp tried to synthesize them into the ideological basis ofthe national revival of Turkey.48 He summed up bis theory in a single sentence: "We are of the Turkish 45Kema1 H. Karpat, 7brlœy:S Polilies: The 7iansilion ra a MuIli-Pa1ty System, 262- 270. 46urie1 Heyd, FoWJdatjOlJS of 7ùdàsb NarionaIism, 28. 47Sœ' Niyazi BerIces, The Deve1opme11t of SecuJarism in 7iutcy, 321-322- 48ziya GlSkaip was of KunIish origin. He was barn on 23 Mmch 1876 iD Diyubalcir, a provincial center in soutbeasletn TurIcey, inra a fami1y of modest civil servants. He was an activist of the Party of Union and Progress. He gJeW up and reacbed maturily iD the era of Abdll1hamid Despite bis provincial baclcground. he became the tbeoreIician of the Young Turks. He was rom between the llIIÎonalistic argumenIS imbibed from bis WestenHlriented high-school teaehers and the mystica1 ideas received from the Js1am.oriented circ1es. He wibleSSed OlIoman c!isinteglalion iD the conditions of politica1 IIImlOil, economic banIaupccy, wor1d war, and a desperale seauch for a cultura1 reorientation, Sœ Talla Parla, The SocW aDd Polirica1 Thought of Ziya GiJkalp 1876-1924. 12·35. 24 nation (millee), of the Islamic religious community (ümmee ), of Western civilization • (medeniyee)." He argued that Turkism, Islamism. and Westernism were nOI contradictory ideals, since each answered different needs. In bis view, the idea ofWesternism signified the pursuit ofthe scientific. technological, and industrial civilization of the West. It did not mean the adoption of the European "way oflife" and "moral values". Thus. change and modernization was not a defeat ofnational culture.49 Turkish nationalism represented, according to Ziya Gokalp. a cultural ideal and philosophy of life or cultural norm whose function was to reinforce social solidarity. It could not be founded only on race, geography, or political affinity, but must mainly be based on culture. that is, a common language. religion and arts.50 He opposed the "purification" of the Turkish language and also the proposed change from Arabic to the Latin alphabet on the grounds that to do so would sever the continuity ofnational culture. Turkish nationalism was a cultural norm, while the Islamic religion was an ethical system, the two supplying the bases ofsolidarity in society. As Parla has correctly pointed out. the social function ofIslam was not in its ideology.51 However. in the relation between state and religion, GOkalp strongiy advocated secularism, that is the separation of Islam from the polity. insisting that aIl remnants of theocracy and clericalism be eliminated from the political sphere.52 He favored the abolition of the position of Sbaïkh al-Islim because he considered the making and enforcement ofthe law to be the sole privilege ofthe government. Yelo Gokalp recognized the significance of Islam's role in Turkish history and that it W"..s an essential part of the 49Jbid. 25. SOsee Mmshall G. S. Hodgson, The VClltun: of IsWn. Vot. ID. (Chicaao: The University of Chicaao Press, 1974), 258-259. 51Taba Parla, The Social and Politica1 7bought of Ziya GiJb1p 1876-1924, 38. 52Urie1 Heyd, FoundatiOlJS of Twiisb Nationa1ism. 53-57 and 88-89. 2S individual's life. In matters of political organization, Gokalp was strongly influenced by • Durkheim's colIectivist philosophy, which seemed to him to coincide with the Islamic tradition offratemity and equality among the believers. Until1913 he proposed the concept ofa multi-national state as the model for Ottoman reconstruction, but after the Balkan war, he changed this idea, and opted for a single nation state, a view a1so based on Durkheim's ideas. In a sense, Durkheim's society became the nation of Gokalp.53 Interestingly, after the 10ss ofthe Arabic-speaking provinces al the end ofWorid War 1(1914-1918), Gokalp was more outspoken in his promotion ofsecularism; in 1922 he strongly supported the separation ofthe Sultanate and the Caliphate and the abolition ofthe former. How did the Ottoman discourse surveyed above influence the development of Mustafa Kemal's thought? h can be argued that the reforms ofthe Young Turks provided an important link between Ottoman secularizing reforms and the Turkish Republic. One ofthe contributions ofthe Young Turks was the commitment to rational-scientific thought which considerably enlarged the domain of secular politica1 authority. Another development was the rise ofthe idea ofthe "Turkish nation," which provided a much more realistic alternative to the Islamic umma !hanthe Ottomanismthat had been promoted since the era ofthe Tanzimat. Turkish nationalism thus became the predonùnant component of the ideology of the Turkish Republ:c. Nevertheless, the secularizing reforms of Mustafa Kemal were by no means a simple extension and consoliàation of the Young Turk reforms. The politica1 situation which prevailed in the 19205 was radically different from that of the Young Turk era. The loss of ail Arabic-speaking provinces of the Ottoman Empire facilitated basing the new Turkish Republic on a national and secular identity rather !han religious criteria. Thissecular orientation became a comerstone ofthe ideology ofthe new Turkish state under the leadership ofMustafa Kemal. S3lbid, SS-S6. 26 B. PoliticaI Thought and Approach to Religion • 1. The Six Arrows of Kcmalism. Before sketching the paradigm ofthe relationship between state and religion in the thought ofMustafa Kemal. it is necessary to examine flI'St his overall ideology in order to fonn some idea of his approach to religion. From the carly days of the war of independence (1919-1922) until his death in 1938. he articulated the basic contents of Turkish ideology in numerous speeches. prograrns and policies. This political vision. which later carne to be known as the Six Arrows ofKemalism comprised: republicanism. populislD, nationalism, reformislD, secularismandétatisme. Rcpublicanism "{Cumhuriyetcilik). The tenn republic derives from the Latin words res publica. which means public affairs. As a concept of state. the republic signifies (wo basic idcas: the absence of monarchy and popular consent or participation.54 Mustafa Kemal was not the flI'St to use cumhuriyet (republic) to defme the new Turkish state. In the 18705. (Wo Young Ottoman intellectuals, Ali Suavi and Namik Karnal had introduced the concept ofthe republic. Both proposed a constitutional monarchy based on the principle of the people's participation, though neither was to call opeoly for the elimination of the sultanate's absolutism.ss Republicanismsignified for Mustafa Kemal notooly the replacementofthe sultanate by the republic but aIso the rUmjnation of the entire Ottoman political system; Turkey's government was now to be based on the sovereignty ofthe people under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal. Republicanism became the fundarnental basis ofKemalist ideology right S4see Enc:yc1opaalia BritalJJÙca 19. S.V. "&public; 191-2- SSTo put forth bis ideas, Suavi started a ncwspaper callcd La RJ:publique, while Namik Kemal wrote a series of :uticles in 1868 on Ihe concept of Ihe republic in Ihe newspaper HlJlriyet (Frecdom). Sec Paul Dumont, '"Ille Origins of Kemalist Ideology" in Jacob M. Landau. ed., AtaIilrk and the Morkmization of Tu...... Y. 26-27. 27 from the moment of the birth of the new Turkish state on October 29, 1923. It was the culmination of the struggle of Mustafa Kemal and his supporters against the conservative • groups which supported the absolutist authority ofthe sultan. This was the moment of the death of the Ottoman monarchy, ofthe transformation from monarchy to republic, and from religious to secular state. Populism (Ha1kcilik). Mustafa Kemal's understanding of populism had deep roots in the histoty of the Turkish nation. Gèlkalp had argued that populism did not signify class struggle but rather the solidarity of ail occupational groups.56 Later this idea was adopted by Turkish nationalists, sorne of whom believed that the representation of the National Assembly should be on the basis ofoccupational groups.57 For Mustafa Kemal. social classes could not be clearly delimited. but class conflict had to be avoided. Therefore. solidarity and unity of the nation remained one of the basic principles of ms ideology. The populist theme adopted by both Gèlkalp and Kemal was presented as a response to the concept of class struggle advocated by Marxism and evidenced by the Russian Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. Interestingly. even though Kemal recognized t.'te existence of different strata in society. he established a single-party system as was also done in communist systems. though he rejected the communist doctrine itself. The single-party aeted as the spokesman for aIl groups and represented aIl classes, and was expected to create unity. and solidarity 56ziya Gllka1p says: "If a sociely comprises a eenain number of SlraIa or classes, tIùs means 1hal it is llOl egalilarian. The aim of popuIism is to suppress the class or SlraIa .diffcrences and to rql\ace them widl a social S1nJCtUIC composed of occupalional groups' M. Landau. ed.. AtIIiIrt :md rhe Modcmizalioo of 7iDtey. 32- S7see William Hale, Political :md Eœnomic DeveIopment of Modem Twi:ey (London: Croom Helm. 1981). 35. 28 as well as to serve as the instrument of modemization. In the dedaration of the • establishment ofthe People's Pany. Mustafa Kemal stated: Our people are composed not of social classes with conflicting interests but of classes whose co-existence is indispensable one to the other. The aim of a pc:ople's organization as a pany is not the rea1ization of the interests of certain classes. The aim is rather to mobilize the entire nation. called People. by including ail classes excluding none. in common and united action towards genuine prosperity which is the common objective for aIl.58 Landau notes that Kemalist populism was not aimed at an economic reorganization based on the egalitarian doctrine ofcommunism. but was rather a political and buream.'Tatic reorganization based on solidarity. unity and egalitarian values, such as equality before the law and no special privilege for a certain class or stratum of the population.59 Clearly. as far as Mustafa Kemal was concemed. populism had two elements: solidarity of different classes and egalitarianism in politics. Nationalism (millercilik ). The Kemalist notion ofnationalism was substantially like that of the Young Turk intellectuals as mentioned eartier. Nevertheless, Kemalist nationalism differed from that of most intellectuals before him in that itexcluded Islam from nationalism, considering Islam to be inimical to the concept ofthe nation and a symbol of backwardness and stagnation.6O Mustafa Kemal's conception of nationalism relied principally on the criteria ofculture and language and was intended to serve as the instrument ofsocial modemization. Thus. in a sense, Mustafa Kemal totaI1y accepted Western institutions and rejected ail Ottoman S8Niyazi BerIœs. TlIe Dcvdopmenr of Secularism in Twtcy. 462. In 1935. popuIism became Ihc lIIl\ior program of die Rcpub6can Pcoplc's Pany. It cmphasizcd die ncccssity of "cquality bcfore lhc Iaw: as SllIIed in die foUowing rcmarlc. "We considcrcd lhc individuals who acœpt an absolute cquality bcfore lhc Iaw. and who n:cognizcd no privUcgcs for an individua\, family. class or community. 10 Ile of lhc people and for lhc people. M. AkmaI. "KcmaIist Vicws 0lI Social Change: in M. Landau. cd. AI:J1t1rlc and rhc Modemizaûon of Turtey. 136 S9Jacob M. Landau. "Islamism and SccuIarism: The TwIdsh easc,"5lUdïes in Judaism and Is1am (Jcrusa\cm: Magnes, 1981). 368. 6OM, AkmaI. "KcmaIist Vicws 0lI Social Change: 130. 29 institutions with the justification. ironically. thatto do 50 was necessary for the protection • ofthe Turkish nation from Western aggression.61 Nationalism becarne an important factor in fueling Turkish national rcsistance. after British. French. and Italian troops occupied Istanbul on March 29. 1919 and Greek troops landed at Izmir on May 15. 1919. The nationalist groups. afterthe sufferings ofwar, did not rcact severcly to the loss ofthe external province ofRumelia; rather it was the invasion of the Anatolian homeland itself which aroused their nationalist movement. The Turkish nationalist movement was organized, and the war for independence was launched with Mustafa Kemal as leader. The struggle was legitimized in terms ofthe defense ofAnatolia against the Allied powers; religion was no longer invoked as an element of his nationalism, for it had lost credibility as a means ofpreventing imperialistic aggression. Rcformism. (inldJabcilik )• The term inldJab did not originate with Kemalism; it had been used since the • period oftheTanzimat. having becn introduced by the Young Onomans.62 The use ofthe term was intended to avoid the censorship of the régime. ln using il, those who were concemed with reformation could express their ideas rather more freely than if they had used the term ihtiJaJ; the latter denotes radical and violent change ofthe social oroer. while the term inldJab implies social change with oroer. Thus, the translation ofthe term inldJab as "revolution" does not adequately represent the sense of the original, since this English term denotes the idea ofa sudden and radical change in social and political oroer.63 Another 61lbid.. 132. 62Bemard Lewis. The Emet8= of Modem Twi:ey (London: Oxford University Press, 1959). 156 63Yusuf Akrwa explaincd in 1905 the distinction bctween inkilab and ihrilaJ as follows: "E\'CI'Y society comprises different classes. Thcsc classes are nevcr in a pcrfcet slate of cquilibrium and society is in a perpetuai Sll\lC of inkilab. But change bas a slow rhythm. •• somctimcs a1most indiscemible.... IhrilâJ on the conlraly is a suddcn and brutal break-down 30 term used by Turks in the sense ofreform was the word isJahat (sing.isJah). applied 10 the measures of the Tanzimac period. IsJahat means "improving. reforming puttin;; defeclive • things into more perfect condition." 64 Reformation in the perspective of Mustafa Kemal meant modernization and the transformation ofTurkey into a rapidly advancing country through the adoption ofWestern culture. science and technology, and through fighting against ignorance and superstition. Basically, the Kernalist reformation was the culmination of a long process which had been started in the Tanzimat period and was accelerated by the Young Turks. The proces.~ was led by military groups. not by economic reformers, neither the bourgeoisie nor the labor class. The Turkish revolution airned more at political than economic reorganization. and was inspired by European revolutions. It was greatiy different, however. from the English. French and even the Russian revolutions. Though there was sorne resemblance. the similarities seem to be superficial rather than fundamentai. European revolutions were engendered by the rise of the middle c1ass, the rebirth oftrade. the struggle for money and land, and the ernergence of the nation-state, while the Turkish revolution was in sorne degree inspired and shaped by political and military influence ofEuropean powers. Bernard Lewis and sorne other observers have seen the Turkish revolution as the prototype ofthe nationalist reformation in the sense that nationalism is a tremendous force which views imperialism as a great enemy. Nevertheless. Westernization was the major fucus of Kemal's reformation, which aimed at defending the Turkish nation against imperialism. Both nationalism and Westernization basica\ly signified for Mustafa Kemal the advancement of the nation; consequentiy, his further policies referred to these IWO conceptS, and the essential pwposes underlying them. Besides. it was the internai within a short period of lime." Quoted in Paul Dumont. "The Origins of KemaJisl Idcology' 34. 64Rodetic H. Davison. Refonn in the Ottoman Empile 1856-1876 (New Yoclc Gordian Press. 1973). S. 31 dimension of Ottoman despotism, the loss of many provinces, that made possible the • successful transformation of the Ottoman Empire into the Turkish republic.65 Sccularism (layiklik ). Mustafa Kemal used the term layiklik to denote secularism. Like other principles of Kemalist ideology, layikli.'c had also become a popular term before Mustafa Kemal's revolution. At the start of Sultan Abdülmacîd's rule the judicial institution ofthe Ottomans was under the influence ofthe French legal system; the scope and competence ofreligious law had thus come to be restrieted by the new mies adopted from France and other Western counmes. Sccularist ideas were thus gaining ground in society at large. One ofthe Young Ottomans, Mustafa Fazi!, rallied against the interVention of religion in lay affairs and emphasized that the Ottoman Empire should become a modem state through the sccularization ofitsadministrativ.:,judicialand educational institutions.66 During the reign of Abdü1hamîd (1876-1908), the secularist movement faced the régime's hostility, for the Sultan was striving to preserve the integrity of the Empire by appealing to Islam. However, after the Young Turk Revolution, intelleetual disputes on the relationship of state and religion came up once more. The Khilafatists maintained that religion still had a significant role to play in the unity of the Ottoman Empire. The secularist-modernists proclaimed their anachment to Islam, but also stressed the importance of modem constitution, law and education. ThUS, we can argue that Mustafa Kemal's secularization was not only in continuity with the modernization of the Tanzimat and the Young Turks, but also was an acceleration of a process already in motion; what he did to sccularize the Turkish nation was essentially in line with the secwarization of his 6SFor further discussion, sec Bernard Lewis, 17Jc Emergence of Modern Tudcey, 473-480. 66Niyazi Bed:cs. The Dcve10prnenl of Secularism in Turlcey. 208·209. AIso sec Paul Dumont. "The: Origins of KemaIist ldeology: 36-37. 32 predecessors. Before Mustafa Kemal, however, secularism was not an official ideology; • with him secularism came to be one ofthe foundations ofstate ideology. The major aspect the secularization process was the abolition of the Sultanate-caliphate. This will be discussed further in the section on the relationship between state and religion. Étatisme (devlercilik). Étatisme in the context ofthe Kemalist ideology has two connotations. general and specific. In a broad sense, it signifies a system of state intervention in all aspects of life, cultural, political, social and educational in the interest of prosperity and social welfare. Dumont argues that this connotation points to a patemalistic approach, in the sense that the state has the duty to organize national development. formulale the problems and find their solutions. In its limited sense, it concems the specific economic policy of the nation.67 Étatisme, as the basis of the Turkish eeonomy, was actually in effeet since the Tanzimar; however, it was Mustafa Kemal who officially laid it down as a major principle of stalc policy in the eeonomic sphere in 1937, when the constitution of the Turkish stale was amended. The question is why was étatisme not recognized a1ready al the time of the establishment of the Republic in 1923? It seems that in the beginning, the focus of the reformation was political and religious reorganization, which was expected evenlually 10 leadto economic development.68 Kemal's étatisme signified bis economic policy which aimed al improving the troubled Turkisb eeonomy after the war of independence. The policy became one of the principal components of the Kemalist ideology. According to Herslag, Mustafa Kemal 67See Paul Dumont, "The Origins of KemaIist Jdeology," 39. 68Funher delails on tIùs subjcet. sce Hers1ag, Twi:cy: An Economy in Tl'IIIISiûon (the Hague: Van Keven, 1958); and George Soule, Twi:ey: An EcollOmic Appraisal (New YorIc: TwentiClh Cenlllly Fund, 1949). 33 was influenced in this policy by the Soviet Union.69 This observation is debatable in view • of the fact that the tradition of state intervention in the economic sphere had be:n deeply rooted for a long time in the Ottoman Empire. Since 1850. the largest factories. such as arms and ammunition factories, spinning mills. textile mills and porcelain works had been controlled by the state.?o In the Ottoman Empire. however. the influx offoreign capital had remained indispensable for fmancing the great enterprises such as public services. mining, railways and harbor installations. As a result, private ownership of the enterprises was unavoidable. Hence. étatisme had coexisted with clements ofa capitalistic economy. from which the Sultan and the large capitalists benefited. For sometime after the Young Turk Revolution the supporters ofthe capitalistic economy remained dominant.71 For the nationalist ideologists led by Ziya Gokalp and Tekin Alp. Étatisme was the only workable solution; they caIIed for the creation ofa national entrepreneurial c1ass and insisted on the importance ofstate intervention to achieve that purpose. Gokalp and other nationalists campaigned for these ideas especially through their journal, 1ktisadiyat Mecmuasi (Journal ofEconomy). The core oftheir ideas was that the development ofthe Turkish economy in general, and its industrialization in particular. could not be achieved by private individuals; it had to be undertaken by means ofstate initiative and intervention for the establishment of large-scale industries. Such industries could then run and develop further with either private enterpreneurship or mixed enterprise. that is •through the use of privale as well as state capital.72 69See Herslag,Turlœy: An Economy in Transition, 63-65. 70pm Dumont, "The Origins of Kemalist ldeology: 39. 71See Feroz Ahmad, "Vanguard of a NasCCltl Bourgeoisie: 'The Social and Economie Policy of the Young Turks, 1908-1918: in Osman Oykar. Social and Economie HistDly of Ttriey 0070-1920 (Ankara: Meleksan, 1980), 336. 72Ziya G 34 With the endorsement of both the intellectuals and the government, the state • assumed an active role in advancing the economy. Government policy was laid down in the 1914 Bill, which aimed at stimulating the development of industries. For Mustafa Kemal, this BilIlater became one ofthe fundamentallaws on which the development ofthe national economy was to be based. Many great companies and industries were thus built everywhere with capital provided by the government.73 The formulation of Mustafa Kemal's étatisme was not really different from what had been attempted by his predecessors. His étatisme was in reality a direct extension of the theoretical discourse from the last decades ofthe nineteenth century onwards, which had intensified during the Young Turk Era. However, while both Kemal and his predecessors saw state intervention or étatisme as the only workable solution for rapidly improving the Turkish economy. Kemalist étatisme was more systematic, had a far larger scale and seemed to be capitalistic rather !han socialistic. Private enterprise coexisted with statc regulation; both had an important role. The forgoing account shows that religion does not figure at ail in the Kemalist ideology. Sovereignty as reflected in the principle ofrepublicanism implies the absence of any role for religion in the legitimacy ofthe state; ratheritis the will ofthe people which is the basis oflegitimacy. In nationalism too religion is no longer an element. Further. the disregard of religion negated the privileges given to the religious classes. The anti-élitist and egalitarian orientation ofhis populism is certainly a principle ofIslam, as already stated in the introduction; however. this principle was not implemented in Islamic lands in general, andcertainly not in the Ottoman Empire. In undertaking the various reforms. the state plays a dominant role through regulation and control. The principle ofétatisme is not only implemented in the eeonomy, but also in the reconstruction ofthe role ofreligion 73See Herslag.Turlœy: An Ecœomy iD TllUISÎûon. 52-54. 3S in society. The atùtude ofthe Kemalist ideology towards religion is merely a reflecùon of • Mustafa Kemal's approach to Islam. This approach is the subject of the following secÙon. 2. Mustafa Kemal's Approach to Islam. The secularizaùon ofthe state signified for Mustafa Kemal not ooly the aboliùon of the Sultan-Caliph system but also the "enlightenment" of religion. Mustafa Kemal's secularism was by no means opposed to religion. as a means ofreform, including religious reform. In order to make religion the agent ofmodemizaùon. the definition ofreligion had ta be refonnulated sa as to accommodate the modemization of the state structure. In a sense. compatibility between Islam and modemizaùon was to be realized in its proper sense. To do sa. a rational apploach to Islam was necessary. Mustafa Kemal saw Islam as a rational religion. The abolition of the Sultanate system signified freeing Islam of its irrational traditional bounds and providing the frameworlc for interpreting Islam in accordance with modem life. At the same time, this liberation of religion was to be a tool of bis reformation. He believed that the right of interpretation ofreligion should not be monopolized by a certain group ofpeople. Through reinterpretation. Islam would experience an enlightenment and humanization.74 Thus, Islam was once again to be made a rational religion, moving toward progress and advancementofthought. Hebelievedthat Our religion does not advise people to be lazy. On the contrary both God and the Prophet command people and nations to uphold their honor and dignity. Some people equate modernity with blasphemy. The real blasphemy is this belief. What is the goal ofthose who engage in such misrepresentation, but to make Muslims the slaves ofthe non-Islamic powers?7S 74August, Kemal AIlIIüd::ç Und, 484. 7sMUSIafa K. AtaIiIrk, SOylev ve Demeç1eri ( speeches and swemenlS), Vol. II, 2nd, 92, quoll:d by Turban FeziOfIu, Secuütrism: COl1ldS1OlJe of The Tudàsh Reva/uaou (lstanbul: AlIIIllrIc Way, 1982), 242. 36 Mustafa Kemal helieved that religion must never he misinlerpreled or used as an • instrument ofoppression against modemity or scientific thought. It was wrong 10 follow fatwas in matters wbich might he resolved by scientific methods. Ifrcason and revelation contradict each other, the discoveries of reason were to he accepted and the na,ç$ to he reinterpreted in order to assure full harmony with reason and science. Thus. religion can continue to have a heneficial influence on contemporary demands. Religious bigotry definitely hindered the progress ofsociety. When it was backed by state power. necessary innovations and changes were opposed.76 Halil Inalcik has likewise argued that the main obstacle on the path ofthe Turkish modemization was the dependence oftraditional society and state on religion, as weIl as the dichotomy hetween the adoption of Westemized administration on the one hand, and the retaining ofreligious law. the religious courts and the madrasas on the other.77 Mustafa Kemal held that Islam could not he separated from Turkish life, but that the guarding of religion against political abuses was necessary; hence the abolition of the sultanate did not mean the elimination ofthe Islarnic religion from the life of the Turkish people. The objective ofbis secularism was to sever the medieval fetters ofreligion and to exclude religion from ail legal and political matters. It also aimed at making religion an instrument ofenlightenment, free from absolute views. practices. and superstitions; and at the sarne lime religion was to serve as an instrument ofTurkish modemization. For Mustafa Kemal. religious reform did not consist simply of restructuring the religious institutions. but also meant reformulating the values and ideals ofreligion. Even though Mustafa Kemal had destroyed the religious institutions and replaced them by new ones. this did not mean that Kemalist reform could by ilselfsolve the cultural problems of 76Ibid.. 242.243. 77HaliI Inalcik, "The NaIUI'e of Traditional Society," in R.E. Ward and DA. RusIow. Politica1 Modemization in Japan and Twi:ey (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970). 63. 37 Turkish modernization. According to Mehmet Emin, the Turkish people were facing a spiritual chaos as a result of the destruction of their religious institutions which were • deemed incompatible with modem life. The sociologist Mehmet Izzet, too, notes that the Turkish people in the process of Kemalist modernization, were in a state ofambiguity with regard to religion. On the one hand, in the past religion had becn an obstacle to Ottoman reforms; on the other hand, Mustafa Kemal was himself aware that no society can survive without religion. ln such a situation, a new religious orientation and a new set of values were indispensable. Sorne believed that a reformed Islam wouid provide the spiritual substance to filI the moral vacuum. ThUs, a comnùttee ofreligious reform was formed in the Faculty ofDivinity. The purpose ofthis religious reform was to make religion an active element in the process ofmodernization.78 The members ofthe comnùttee agreed that The religious reform would be a rationalizing one that would bring Islam into harmony with the conditions of modem life and make it a factor in integrating nationallifewith modem civilization.79 A rational approach te Islarnie reform was t.lterefore intended to serve as a tool of Turkish modemization as welI as te create a religious eonsciousness and ethos in the national eharacter. To acbieve this goal, it was necessary that Islam should no longer remain bound within its old forms. Oearly, the relationshiJ) between state and religion in the perspective ofMustafa Kemal was based on bis understanding that Islam was originally a rational and hurnanist religion whieh appreciated the natura! rights of human beings. Religion should liberate people from ignorance and lead them towards enlightenment and advancement. In faet, however, in the past, religious s::ructureS had becn an obstacle to modernization, and religion had often been manipulated by the Sultans. Given this historical experience, Mustafa Kemal adopted a policy ofsecularization for the separation of the polity from religious ideologies and ecclesiastical structureS. The purpose was te 78Ergio, Turkiyc Maarif Tarihi. (1943). V. 1639-41, quoted by Niyazi Berkes. ibid. ?9tbid.. 493· 494. 38 make religion a source of enlightenment and liberation. This policy will be detailed in the • following pan. C. Paradigm of the Relationship Betwecn Statc and Religion 1. Secular Statc. Mustafa Kemal's view of the paradigm of the relations beIWeen state and religion was based on the principle of secularism. This principle had a most radical social and political effect on the development of Turkish modemization. The transformation from a religious to a secular state was the result of Mustafa Kemal's secularism which was based on the belief that political power and sovereignty stem from the will of people rather than from sorne religious source. The Turkish Revolution arose from the necessity to Iiberate the structures ofstate and the role ofreligion from ..ossified static fetters," and to reorganize them in accordance with contemporary demands. Thus, to assess the relationship beIWeen state and religion, IWO related points, the state structure and the role of religion, will be examined in this section. Mustafa Kcrnal's idcas were, to sorne extenl, certainly in continuity with the developmcnt of secularization in the era of the Young Turks. Thcrefore, it is important to give sorne background information before discussing Mustafa Kcrnal's own thoughL • Relations bctwccn state and religion have sccn many variations during the course of history. Most ancient monarchies wcre thcocratic states; both temporal and spiritual powcrs wcre hcld by the sarne person. Politica1 power and sovcreignty wcre considcrcd to stem from a divine source; and law, economy and social aspects of life were govemed entirely according to religious considerations. Islam in its carly pcriod was a theocratic stale, too, and the Prophet was bath the chiefauthority in religion and the head ofthe state. This re1igio-politica1 system continued in the pcriod after the PropheL Howcver, the fust 39 four caliphs were elected by a limited vote among the $~iiba of the Prophel, so that the state was a primitive republic. However, after political authority passed to the Umayyads of Damascus, the Caliphate became hereditary while its structure remained theocratic. The role of the Caliph was both religious and secular. The same continued under the Abbasids who ruled from the mid-eighth centuIy. The Ottomans, despite the rapid development of state, did not use the title of Caliph even after the conquest of Egypt by Sultan Selim in 1517. However, at the end of the 1774 Russo-Turkish war, the title was used for the flrst time in an international document, the Treaty of Kücuk Kaynarca, in order to ensure the support of the Ottoman Muslim populations against the European and Russian pOY'ers.80 At the lime, the Ottoman Empire was at its nadir; the Sultan's c1aim to be caliph was meant to create a spiritual dominion over Turks and other Muslim populations within the Empire and to c1aim the leadership of all Is1amic peop1es. Later, in particu1ar during the era of (1876-1908), the concept of pan-Islamism was promoted further to highlight the Sultan's ro1e as Caliph. But Abdülhamîd D failed to capitalize on it, because separatist movements had aIready spread among the various peop1es living in the Empire, especially in the Christian provinces, to be later followed by the Arab provinces. In the early Ottoman period, the administration and policy ofthe State did not rely only on religious considerations, but were based mostly on the interest ofthe Sultans and other political considerations. Dating from the conques! ofByzantium, however, religious considerations became more dominant, as indicatcd by the establishment ofthe institution ofthe ShaikhaI-IsIim and the increased importance ofthe fatwas.81 The Ottoman religious hierarchy became one of the mos! influential powers in Ottoman internaI politiCS; it wa.~ lIOwith this lJQly, the 0lIDman Empire bad 10 surrendcr sovereignty over d:e te:rritory nonh of the BIacIt Sea. Russia was 10 lie the proccaor of the Chrislians living within the 0lIDman boundaries. 81sec Sadri Maksudi AJsa1, 17IœaaIic w Laik Devlet, (the TheoaaIic Stale and SecuIar StaIe), in the book eX Tanzimat (IslanbuI: Ministry for NaIionaI Educalion. 1940), Vol. l, 72-76, quoced in Fcyzcglu. S«Ul3tism: Comel:srooe of Tlle Turtish Revo/uÔOll. 191-192. . 40 headed by the chief Muru of Constantinople whose fatwas were an important instrument in the Sultan's deposition. Relations between state and religion under the Ottomans were always characterized by a certain degree of uniqueness. On the one hand, the Ottomans fu11y integrated the religious institution into the state apparatus. This was done by organizing the 'ulama~ into an official hierarchy culminating in the office of the Shaikh al-Islam (the chief mufti or juristeonsult) who often enjoyed a power and standing second ooly to that of the Grand Vizier.82 On the other hand, this hierarchy never developed the ability to be able to control the temporal power ofthe sultan. On the contrary, it remained strongly dependent on him, as all members of the religious institution were appointed to their posts by the temporal authority. It was ooly the sultan's will that determined one's slatus as member of the askeri (ruling) class; either as a military or a religious official.83 The latter fact was reflected in the attitudes ofthe 'ulami' toward temporal authority. They treated the sultan respectfully and recognized his decisions. Law originated not ooly from revelation, but aise from the decisions ofthe sultans, calleJ kanun; these two systetns oflegislation were in competition.84 Given the tradition ofsecular legislation, the men of the Tanzimat (1839-1976) were therefore able to regulate large areas ofsociallife through their legal enactments. In fact, although the dicholomy between secular laws and the Sbarta persisted until the reform of the Young Turks' era, there was an unmistakable 82Howanl Rced "AIaIlIrIr.'s Secu\arizing l..cgacy and lhc Continuing Vilality of Islam in Republican TurIcey: in Cyriac K. Pullapilly, cd., 1s1am in the CoDteIIIpOIlIIy Wcrid (Indiana: Riversidc, 1980), 318. 83HaJU 1nalciJc. "'lbe Nature of Traditional Society: TurIccy: in Robert E. Ward and DanIcwart A Rustow, cd., Poliriœl Modt:nJizalion in ll1p11lJ lIlId Twfœy (Pri_: Princclon University Press), 44. 84Reganling lhc impol1aDt toIe of autonomy and superiority of temporal authority, one bas only ID remember that one of lhc greaIest Ottoman sullllllS, Suleyman 1, was aJways caJled "KJmuni" (lhc Iaw-giver or 1egisIator) by TUIles. Sec Couat Leon 0sIr0r0g. The ADp3 Rdonn (London: University of London Press, 1927), 42-48. 41 movement throughout this period toward secularization of the polity. The adoption of many Western laws and the establishment of a secular educational system side by side with the uaditional religious education facilitated the secularization of the Turkish Republic under the leadership ofMustafa Kemal. Political and religious sovereiguty remained in the hands of the Sultan during the Tanzimat ThUs. for the Young Ottomans. theTanzimat was an inadf'.quate reformation. and sc they proposed a more progressive concept of political reform aimed at creating a constitutional monarchy. Their efforts culminated in the proclamation ofthe constitution of 1876. The Young Ottomans' reformation. however, did not intend te eliminate the authority of the Sultan; they wanted rather te limit his absolute authority in order that the political regression of the Empire could be stopped. The Young Ottomans believed that Islam should serve as the basis of the cohesion of the Empire. Consequenùy. in the Constitution of 1876. the relationship between state and religion basically did not change; political and religious sovereignty continued to be vested in the Sultan, while the religious institutions were a vehicle for the Sultan's interestS, and were dedicated to enhancing his political authority.8S Their decisions could not contradiet the desires ofthe Sultan.86 The executive power was te be exercised by the Sultan and a Council of Ministers which was collectively responsible not tethe Parliament but only to the Sultan. The Constitution of 1876 retained a religious charaeter by recognizing Islam as the state religion. However, the citizens. including non-Mus1ims. were granted the right te carry on their religious teaching. For bis actions. the Sultan was responsible only te Gad. 8SAniclcs 4 and 5 of lhc Constitulion of 1876 staIe: "His Majesty lhe Sultan. under lhe litle or Supreme caJiph. is lhe proledllI' or lhe Mussulman religion. He is lhe Sovereign and PadislIa of ail lhc 0Il0mans.. Suna KiIi, TIIItisb ConsIïlUtïonaI and Assembly Debares 011 the COlISIilUtioos of 1924 and 1961 (Istanbul: Roben CoIIege, 1971), 152. 86AnicIe 42. 60 and n of lhe Constitution of 1876: "The General Assembly is composee! of IWO Chambers, lhe House of lords and SenaIe, and lhc Chambels of Depulies.·. "The ~t and lhe membels of lhe Senate are nominaœd direcdy by His Majesty lhe Sultan: "The President and lhc vice-President of Deputies are se1ectcd by His M:\iesty lhe Sultan: ibid.. 152-155. . 42 Religious symbols and institutions could still be easily manipulated. Nevenheless. the Constitution of 1876 can be considered as a step towards limited govemment. This constitution had a more profound effect on the secularization of the legal system than on political reorganization. As Dankwart A. Rustow says: The Constitution of 1876. the flfst written fundamentallaw adopted in a country outside the European tradition fmnly established the principle ofsecularization and Europeanization ofthe legal system. The wholesale adoption of European codes in the 1920s was the logical culmination ofthat trend.87 The secular impact was central to the constitutional development. As a result. the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 reinstated the Constitution of 1876. though with severa! amendments. These amendments provided for collective responsibility of the Council of Ministers to the Parliament, though the Parliament still required the Sultan's agreement to create laws.88 Also. the Sultan wa~ given the role of arbitrator between the Council of Ministers and Parliament; he could make changes in the Council of Ministers or dissolve it in case of an unresolved political dispute.89 It was very clear that, despite these amendments, the theocratic nature ofthestate remained unchanged. Thereforms initiated by the Young Turks (1908-1918) for the secularization ofthe State were not radical. However. they were not without significance. One such reform introduced in 1917, was the removal of the Shari'a courts from the jurisdietion of the office ofthe Shaikh al-Islam, to place them under the secular authority ofthe Ministry of 87DanJcwart A. Rustow. "Turkcy: The Modemity of Tradilion," in PoliticaJ Cu/lUte and PoliticaJ DeveIopment, ed. by Lucian W. Pyc and Sidney Verba (Princeton: Princeton ~niversity Press, 1965). 178-179. 881bid., 179. 89Alticle 35 of the Conslitulion of 1876 stIICS: "In the event of the Chamber of Depulies lhrowing out a BilL. His Majesty the Sullan. in the exercise of his soven:ignty. onIers eilher a change of Minislcrs or dissoIulion of the Cbamber. subject 10 the n:-eleclion of Depulies wilhin the period appoinled by the Jaw: SWla lCili, Turkish ConstilutiOlLlI Dcve1opments" 155. 43 Justice. This refonn brought about a significant improvement in the legal system. Despite these accomplishments, however, the Shari'a remained the basis offamily law; the Shari'a • courts, even though brought under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice, remained an essential pan of the judicial system; Islam was retained as the official religion of the Ottoman state (Constitution, Art. Il); the Sultan, in his capacity as Caliph, was still the protector of Islam (Constitution, Art. 4) and was mandated to execute the provisions of the Sharta; the Heyet-i Ayan (Senate) maintained its constitutional authority to assess the bills passee! by the Chamber of Deputies and to pass on their compatibility with the Shalta (Constitution, Art. 64); the office of the Shaikh ai-Islam remained as a pan ofthe official state apparatus. It would be fair, viewed from the legal-institutional point of view to say that the nature of the Ottoman state until the end the Young Turk Era was far from being completely secular. Nevertheless, a development towards the secularizatiorl of the state cao be seen in the Young Turk intelleetual movement surveyed in the previous section. Even though the Young Turks did not advocate a strict separation between the religious and temporal spheres, many of their ideas did promote such a separation on the basis of a modemistdefinition ofthe religious and the temporal. Certainly, it was difficultto break sharply with Islamic values that had been rooted for severa! centuries in the empire; therefore in their discussions. the question of the relationship between state and religion remainedessentiallyunresolved. We do not know precisely when the projeet ofcreating a secular state lOOk shape in the mind of Mustafa Kemal. Neverthe\esS, judging from bis political experience as surveyed above, we may assume that the secular idea guided at least sorne of bis actions from the very start ofthe War ofIndependence. For Mustafa Kemal the war was not only the liberation ofthe land from invading forces, but had a much wider significance. It was necessary 10 liberate the Turkish nation from ,the sultanate system and 10 instill in it the 44 social and cultural values of the west. For Mustafa Kemal the establishment of a secular state signified IWO things: flfst, the sovereignty of the people and the elimination of the • sultanate and the caliphate; and second. a separation beIWeen the affairs of religion and the affairs ofstate. so that religion would be only a personal matter. Thereby. the political élites would be prevented from making use of religion for their political interests and exploiting the religious feeling of individuals. This was the kind ofthinking which guided Mustafa Kemal in creating a secular state.90 However. Turkey was not yet ready to tum her back on the sultanate and the caliphate. and therefore Mustafa Kemal and those who shared his views decided to be patient, not yet daring to act according to thelf true convictions. Creating new political institutions, they Step by step dismantied the sultanate through a constitutional struggle. In this process the intellectual friction beIWeen religious and secular components came to the surface. and the former were on the defensive. Mustafa Kemal's ideas about creating secular political institutions were expressed in the forum ofsevera! congresses and to sorne extent, were perpetuated in the constitution. First, as mentioned in the previous section, in September 1919 Mustafa Kemal signed a national pact declaring an independent Turkey and the liberation of all Turkish tenitory from foreign rule. The term "independent" should be understood as signifying his effon to free Turkey not only from foreign domination but also from the Sultanate system.91 AI the Sivas Congress in April 1920, he proposed the creation of the Grand National Assembly as the replacement ofOttoman Parliament (Mecli-i Meb'usan), whose authority was to replace the old régime. It would function not only as the legislative but also as the OOtbe Turkish Minisuy of PI1:ss Broadcasting and Tourism. Gazi Must.1f:. Kcm..rl AI::lItIdc Founder of /he 7iriish Republic. 194-195. 91Mcanwhilc, an Ottoman Parliamcnt met in IS1a11buL The majorily of its mcmbers weR: nalionalis1s and many had becn al the Erzurum and Sivas congrcsscs. They showcd sympadly with the nalionalist movcmcnl of Mustafa Kemal For thal n:ason the British occupation forces aIreSlCd many of thcm and cxi1cd thcm lO Malta and c10scd the Parli:unenL Many of its mcmbers cscapcd lO AnatoIia and joined thosc mcmbers of the Sivas Congress who had no! gone lO istanbul sec EncycJopaedia Britlllllica 22. S. V. "Tlllkey," 386. 4S executive representative of the people. Nevertheless. he did not yet express his intention of abolishing the sultanate. in order not to be obstructed in his activities by the Sultan. He • said at the meeting ofSivas Congress: 1 used the term National Assembly in my ftrSt draft. My intention was that the elected Assembly should be authorized to change :he régime right at the beginning...as soon as the Assembly opened. a drive was set in motion in establishing contactand coming to a conciliation with the sultan-caliph.92 After intense discussions which lasted for five months, from September 13, 1920. to January 20. 1921, the Grand National Assembly eleeted Mustafa Kemal as president and passed a law for the fundamental reorganization ofthe state. This law. which came to be called the Constitution of 1921. proclaimed that sovereignty belonged ta the nation and that the Grand National Assembly exercised sovereignty in its name (article 1 of Constitution of 1921).93 During the debate on this constitution the two factions were faced with the option ofdeclaring a secular state or maintaining the sultanate system. They fmally adopted a compromise in which sovereignty belonged to the nation but the sultanate and caliphate were not abolished. Mustafa Kemal made this compromise because he needed the support of the people for the liberation of Turkey from imperialism. On the internai front he faced seriousresistance from the conservatives. With the end ofthe war of liberation. the conservatives expanded their activities and refused to compromise with the Kemalists. They created an organization called Muhafazi-Mukaddasat Cemiyati (Society for Preservation of the Sacred Tradition). The aim of this organization was stated by its founders as follows: Our aim is ta preserve the rights of t.lte Caliph-Padishah and ta work for the absolute avoidance of the republican form of govemment which will create 92Sce Niyazi Ilerkes, The Dcvelopmenr of 5eculatism in Twtcy, 443-444. 93ne ConslilUtion was acccpICd by the Grand NaIionaI Assernbly on January 20, 1921 and retnaiJ=I in eftèct unlll April 20. 1924 wilh severa) amendmcnlS. It was a short constitulÏon consisling only of twenly-l1Ircc Anïclcs. and it was the fust TurI:ish constilUlion based on the principlc of the sovcreignly of the nalion. 80th cxcculÏvc and legislalivc powcrs were exercised by the Grand Nalional Assembly. (Aniclcs 2, 3 of the ConslilUtion of 1921). Sce Suna Ki1i. The TUIfdsh ConsrilUrionaI DcvelopmcnrS, 160. 46 enonnous hann to the country and the World of Islam, now and in the future, it can be sensed that the Grol'·:· for the Defense of Rights, which has been fonned by Mustafa Kemal in the NatIonal Assembly. aims at replacing the Suitanate-Caliphate • with a Republican fonn ofgovernment94 The promulgation of the Constirution of 1921 represented the victo!)' of Mustafa Kemal and his associates over the powers of the Sultan and his government. According to this Constirution, the state of modem Turkey was to be administrated by the Grand National Assembly as the replesentative ofthe Turkish people, and there was no mention of the office of the Sultan. Regarding the relationship between stale and religion. this constirution represented a transition fnm constirutional monarchy to constitutional democracy. from the religious to the secular state. In the 'lpinion of Bernard Lewis, this constirution was the flI'St decisive stage in the poiitical and 1egal process that transfonned Turkey from an "lslamicEmpire" into a secular national state.95 ThUs. we can argue that Mustafa Kemal's policy of secularization was not only in continuity with. but also the acceleration ofa process which was already in motion; what he did to secularize the Turkish nation was essentially in line with the policies or proposais of his predecessors. Before Mustafa Kemal. however. secularism was not an official ideo1ogy; in becoming a part of Kemal's reformation. it came to be one of ihe foundations of the Kemalist ideology. One major result of this secularization was the abolition of the Sultanate-caliphate. The reie of Mustafa Kemal in the process of amend:ng the Constitution of 1921 was also very significanL The initiative for these amendments came from him. the most important among them being the proclamation ofthe republican State on October 29, 1923, The proclamation signified the constitutional elimination of the Sultanate from the Turkish political scene. The republican principle was ilIusttated by the importance ofthe Grand National Assemb1y, the president and the Councii of Ministers in 94Niyazi BerIœs. The DeveIopment of SecuIarism in Twtey. 449. 95Bemard Lewis. The Emergence. of MOdem Twtey, 362. 47 the structure ofstate and govemment. One can argue that full sovereignty in Turkey. which belongs unconditionally to the nation, was achieved only after the caliphate was abolished • in 1924. Following the abolition of the sultanate-ealiphate. the reforms that were undertaken between the period 1924-1928 were aimed at the further secularization ofthe state. The most important part of the secularization was that Islam should cease to be the state religion and the reference to Allah in taking an official oath be eliminated. Larer, religion became apersonal matter as the state granted a11 people the freedom to practice their beliefs and teachings sa far as they did not contradict the Constitution. Besides the abrogation ofthe sultanate-ealiphate system in 1924. secularization led to the complete elimination ofthe role ofreligion from the structure ofthe state by 1928. The abolition of Islam as state religion; dropping the reference to Allah in the oath. and making religion a personal matter are a11 indications ofthis process. In October 1927 in his speech before the Grand National Assembly Mustafa Kemal proposed that the clause "the religion ofthe Turkish state is the Islanùc religion." be deleted from the constitution. The proposaI was unanimously accepted by the Assembly in 1928.96 From that time secularism was firmly established as the ideology ofthe state.97 96n-.c Turkish Minisuy of Press BlOadcasting and Tourism, Gazi Mustafa K=S AtaIiIlt FoundeT of /he 7iutish &public, 201. 97Mustafa Kemal faced suong resistance from some seclOlS. The fust expression of resistance was a Kurdish revoit led by Sheïk Said. He was very close to the \ale Calipb and to /he prdeIlder to /he Tbrone, Prince Selim, who was living in Syria. This movement w1ùcb used /he rallying cry "Defend /he imperiled Faith," spread over Eastem Anato\ia. Mustafa Kemal considered tbis resistance to he motivated by re\igious fanaticism: tberefore, he issued /he Iaw forbidding propaganda for the sultanate and otber politica1 interests based on religion. These &Iso was an attempt on bis Iife during bis visit to Izmir in 1926. According to August, a plot against bis lire was made by a group of conspirators, opponenlS of the new constitution, /he Young Turks who desired to creale a constitutiona\ monarcby and bis co1laborators who did not agree witb the details of bis policies. Sec August AIaII1d:~ Land. 21·23; &Iso sec Sberif ManIin, Religion and Social CJJange in Modem nriey; 7be Case of Bediuzzaman &id Nursi (Albani&: State University of New York Press, 1989). Sec Robert Oison. 7be EmerBence of Kun1ish NatiOlUl1ism: 1880-1925 (Austin, Texas: University of Texas, 1991). 48 2. Kemal's Religious Policy: Expansion of Secularization• • The expansion of secularization means the extension ofits jurisdiction into area.~ of sociallife which were formerly regulated by religious structures. The polity expanded it~ functions at the expense ofreligion. restructuring religious institutions,law, education, and cultural domains. The motive of the expansion was to make Turkey part of world civilization, and to eliminate the political and cultural influence of the religious institution and élite. ln applying his ideology of secularism, Mustafa Kemal fmt undertook to restructure the religious institutions. He established the Diniyet (the Directorate of the Affairs ofPiety) in 1924 to adnùnister the affairs ofreligion.98 The Department was to he an agencv ofpublic service rather than the supreme body ofthe religious community, and those who adnùnistered the office were not given any spiritual attributes or privileges. The task of Diniyet was translating, editing and publishing religious works, not intended to indoctrinate, but to provide the public with appropriate religious literature. The Department had branches headed by a Mufti whose job was of a largely adnùnistrative nature, such asannouncing the heginning ofthe religious holidays ete. ln the legal field, Mustafa Kemal brought an end to the dichotomy in the system of law, religious and secular, by unifying laws on the basis of secular principles. The dichotomy had come from the Ottoman Empire's recognition of Islam as the official religion and from its desire to operate within the framework of this religion. Mustafa Kemal emphasized the necessity of secularization and the need for total legal reforms based on national needs. He believed, however, that no reform could he carried out until the dichotomy was removed. The existence of this dichotomous system signified the 98Public Law No. 430, 1924, qUOlcd. by Niyazi Berkes, The Developmenl of SecuI3rism in 7iutey, 4. 49 existence of two civilizations. one conservative. the other reformative; and the country • and the assembly suffered from this duality.99 ln March 1924. Mustafa Kemal proposed that the Ministry of Canon Law and Pious Foundations be removed from the cabinet. A comminee of experts was set up to prepare the new code of Turkish Civil Law because the old one did not meet modern requirernents, especially in the sphere ofcommercial law. Mustafa Kemal believed that a new code of civil law was necessary. In 1924. the idea of adopting one of the Western codes of law as Turkish Civil law was exarnined. As a resuIt, in February 1926. the Swiss Civil Law was adopted since it was newest, most practical and most democratic code of civil law in the world.too The impact ofthis reform on social Iife was tremendous. The position ofwoman in society changed. Polygarny was abalished, and the emancipation of women and their equal status with men, not only in legal and social but also in political spheres, was ensured. Mustafa Kemal sought the absolute equality ofman and woman in Turkish society se that women couid play an important raie bath in politics and in the economy.lOI SecuIarization alse extended into the educational system. In the Ottoman Empire, the educational system had acompletely religious charaeter. In the school the students were more concemed with studying religion, morals, Qurin. Arabic language and Muslim jurisprudence. than sciences. Therefore, the men of the Tanzimat decided to set up an educational systern outside the religious schools using European models. With this reforrn, the dichotomy ofthe educational system was perpetuated. Thisduality lasted up to the f11'St years of the War of independence. Mustafa Kemal realim! that the prosperity 99nc Turkisb Ministry of Press Broadcasting and Tomism. Gazi Musrafl Kemi!1 AtIIJ1lt Founder of the 7ùJtiç1J Republic, 195. IllOJbid.. 196-199. IOIAugw.1. Kemal AtalI'ldc:S Land, 41-42. . 50 and advancement of the country depended on a national education based on secular principles. He put forward the principles of a national education which would be based on • national needs. end ignorance and backwardness and promote the productivity ofeconomic life. After the war of liberation. rnany people believed that they would star! to live in prosperity with the dual culture. Mustafa Kemal considered such a belief dangerous and destructive to the future ofthe nation. He believed that the aim ofthe war ofliberation was not ooly to liberate the land from invading forces. but also to fight against backward mentalities and ignorance.102 Mustafa Kemal emphasized that it was necessary not only to give to the young generation a knowledge of logic. but also a political education. The system of education was to be unified under the administration ofthe Ministry ofNational Education. while the Islarnic schools, which were deemed to be weak. corrupt, and a source of backwardness were ta be abolished. In 1924. the Grand National Assembly passed several laws abolishing the Ministry of Canon Law and Pious Foundations. and unifying education. In 1925. Mustafa Kemal closed the schools for Îmams and preachers. and prohibited education for religious or political purposes in minority and foreign schools. After secularizing the system of national education by these measures, he developed new educational institutions on a national and secular basis; the number of primary schools. middle schools, and Lycees increased. Trade schools were opened for girls. In 1933. the Istanbul DarülfunUn was reorganized as a university.103 In the cultural sphere Mustafa Kemal undertook language reform. He adopted a policy ofTurkification. purging Arabic and Persian words from the Turkish language. and supplanting the Arabic with the Latin script, in order ta facilitate the impact of Western I02The TIIIIàsh Minisuy of ~ Broadcasling and Tourism. Gazi Musmf., KemS AtIIiIrlI: Founder of ~ Tuttish Republic. 202-203. 103lbid., 207.213. SI influences. The abandonment of the Arabic script in 1928 in favor of the Latin alphabet • was intended to distance the future generation from the Ottoman Islamic culture. The Young Turks had considered Islam an important factor of national cohesion which could prevent the dismantling ofthe Ottoman empire. However. on the assumption that language is a product ofsociety and a reflection ofindividual and collective consciousness. Mustafa Kemal considered language reform as one of the ways to Turkish modemization. 5uch a reform was expected to facilitate the rapid absorption ofWestern ideas and institutions by the Turkish people. As the foregoing account shows, nationalism as conceived by Mustafa Kemal as being aimed principally at the cohesion ofthe Turkish republic through cultural and linguistic bonds. Besides language reform, in 1925, Mustafa Kemal prohibited the wearing of tlJe fez and turban by men and the veil by women, substituting for them the hat and ordinary European dress. 104 Immediately afterwards, he abolished the Dervish monasteries (tekke), the tariqat, and the custom of reciting at the graves of pious people, in order to curb religious prejudices and superstitions. In 1934,legislation was passed to prohibit religious titles,lOS such as Hafiz (one leamed in the QlU"'an), Had (Mecca pilgrim), Mullah (theologian) etc. The prohibition was based on the consideration that these titles were not in accordance with obtaining democratic principles. As stated by the govemment, Turkish democracy no longer permitted differences among classes of people either legally orin the I04Mustafa Kemal' aIso eslllblished the foundation of HaIk Evleri (People IDslilUtions). They WCft: llI't political organizatiODS, bul cultun11 centm serving the cause of Turkish modemization as meeting-plaœs for Iectwes and work in the field of bistorical and Iiterary resean:h. For lIIOft: information on cultunl1-tdigious reform, sec August, KenW AWilrt:ç LaDd. 31-39. 10Sn.: proIübition of the OUoman tides refencd DOl only lO the clerical, but aIso lO the civil and miliwy tides. The tide pasba was an exc:eption. Il was used lO indic:ate Iùgh military rank from Major-general upwanls, and was 181er c:onferred on the Iùghest civil c1ignitaries of the swe, such as the Presidenl of the Republic, the Prime Minister or the Supreme Commander. Sec August, KenW AWilrt:ç LaDd. 36-37. S2 form of formalities, such as titles which awakened among the people the memory of the OnomanEmpire. Mustafa Kemal's secu!<1I'Ïzing activity did not stop with these measures. He had planned in 1929 to substitute Sunday for Friday as the official weekly holiday. but poslponed this until 1935 in consideration of the feelings of the Muslim population. This substitution was the result ofthe view that official holidays in a secular state had nothing to do with religion. He alse continued turkifying the daily practices of Islam, especially the language ofworship; the azan (the cali to prayer) and the khutbah (the sermon) came to be given universally in Turkish. However, the Turkish azan was made legally compulsory only three years after his death.106 Mustafa Kemal's secularism, however, did not deny the role ofreligion in society but sought to make religion an instrument for the modemization of the Turkish state. A further target was to avoid religion's being manipulated for political interests. Thus, religion was conceived by him as a matter ofindividual conscience. Relying on his belief that Islam is a rational religion that had been politically manipulated by the Sultans, Kemal established a legal system which eroded the authority of both religion and the religious functionaries. The system was rationalistic and pragmatic. This kind ofapproach brought about an expansion ofsecularization into areas that were formerly in the grips ofreligious institutions. Simply put, aIl manifestations ofclerical influence in law, education, language and culture were dismissed, and replaced by Westem and Turkish values. As a result the Turkish stateunder the leadership ofMustafa Kemal became completely secular. 1061bid., 485-486. 53 Conclusion • Between 1918 and 1938, Turkey under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal emerged as one ofthe most important countries in the Muslim worlà. Mustafa Kemal was not only a successor to Ottoman and Young Turk modemizers, but was also the founder of the modem Turkish state. He introduced a wide ranging secularism, which eliminated the sultanate-caliphate system from political existence. His educational background, political experience, and his reduction ofIslam as a political force facilitated the course ofTurkish secularization. At the sarne time, it goes without saying that the achievements of the Young Turk secularization, bath at the intellectual and the legallevels paved the way for a greater secularization later. Mustafa Kemal's secularization was merely areflection ofhis rational approach to Islam. For him, Islam had to be re-interpreted so as to determine the applicability of Qur'in.ic injunctions to new situations and demands. To do so, a separation between state and religion was necessary sa that religion did not become an obstacle to progress orsubject to manipulation. Mustafa Kemal' s secularization signified the creation ofa political system based on the will of th~ people, a tranformation from a religious to a secular state, and the severance ofclerical influences on law, education and culture. As a result, religion became a personal matter, which could be used in the service of the Stale. Mustafa Kemal's secularism included such measures as the abolition ofthe position ofShaikh al-Isliim and the Islamic court, an end to religious schools and the introduct!':ln ofthe national educational system, and the prohibition of the fez , the turban, and the veil, ete. These reforms functioned as social engineering, that is, as a vehicle for Turkish modernization and national consolidation. As far as secularization is concemed, the reforms were a reflection ofbis understanding of modemization as being almost equivalent to Westemization, which, in tum. meant the removal ofIslam and ail its manifestations from the Turkish political system. AlI Arabic elements in both worship and culture were also made subject to 54 Turkification. As the basis of his program. Mustafa Kemal defined six "arrows" in a ma..ifesto in 1931: these "arrows." incorporated into the constitution in 1937. include • repub1icanism. popu1ism. nationalism. reformism. secularism and étatisme. ss CHAPI'ER TWO SUKARNO'S IDEAS ON STATE A..lIID REUGION A.. Background: Education, Political Career and Discourse 1. Sukarno as the Fust President of Indonesia. Sukarno was barn on June 6, 1901 in Surabaya, the capital ofEast Java. His father was Raden Sukemi SastrodihaIjo, a primary school teacher. The title "Raden" indieates a member ofJava's aristocratic priyayi class.1 His father was a Muslim, wbile bis mother, Idayu Nyoman Rai, belonged to a Balinese family ofthe Brahman class. Sukarno entered the Europese Lagere School (primary school) in Mojokerto,later continuing bis studies in the Hogere Burger School (senior bigh school) in Surabaya in 1920. From bis childhood, Sukarno had observed a discrimination between Dutch and native students, wbich became more apparent when he was in senior bigh school. The number of native students was relatively limited as indicated by the foUowing data: European students numbered 169709, the Chinese 854568, wbile native Indonesians were oniy 48304 in number.2 In 1921 Sukarno entered Technische Hoge School (now known as the Institute ofTechnology, Bandung). lin Javanese sociely, the 1mII priyayi in panicu\ar denotes desœnl from the region of Yogyakana, and Solo refcrs ID officiais in the service of the Sultans. More generaIIy, the 1mII appllcs ID a person dcscending from the administrative bierarchy of the old kingdoms of Java. such as Kediri. Majapahil and Mataram. In the era of Majapahil in the fourteenth cenlllly, priyayi wae the officiais and the Bite of sociely. When the Duteh cxtended tbcir sway in Java in the seventcenth and eightœnth centuries, tbcy prcserved this c1ass and used il for cxClcising tbcir colonial power al the levei of the pangrdI praja (telritorial service). Sukemi's priyayi origins did not open bis career in pangrdI praja; he did however, benefil from Duteh education. 2Bemard Dahm, Sukarno. the Saugglc for Indonesilln 11II1ependence translated from German by Mary F. SolDer (lthaca, London: Comell University Press, 1969), 29. 56 As a child Sukarno liked watching the wayang puppet shows through which he imbibed many values expressed in the stories of wayang,3 such as the ideas of pluralism, • cultural tolerance, harmonious order, and patriotic manners. The figure ofBima especially influenced him.4 In the contemporary conflict, Sukarno projected himself as a dalang (puppeteer)S who would shape the events of his world rather than be a passive audience. Besides being interested in the wayang world, he was also drawn to an Islamic figure, Sunan Kalijaga, a preacher of Islam who used the wayang as a tool in spreading Islamic teachings in the early period ofIslam in Java.6 Sukarno liked to identify himself with him. Both Sunan Kalijaga and Sukarno were figures who appeared during the processes of cultural tranformation. Sunan Kalijagaemerged in the era oftranformation from Hinduism to Islam, while Sukarno emerged in the era ofchange from colonialism to an independent state. In other words. the Javanese tradition became the background 10 Sukarno's intellectuaIjourney. especialiy to his ideas ofpluralism, harmony. and syncretism. Javanese culture had developed syncretic models, uniting pre-Hindu. Hindu and Islanùc elements, and such syncretism was a part ofSukarno's ouùook.7 3Wayang is a shadow puppet play. Il nOl only dcpicts the stories of warriors and giants, of gods, kings and princes, bul was a1so a source of values and exploration of man's relation 10 the universe. The da/ang (puppeteer) often iIIustrated the importance of harmony and equilibrium through the wayang. See K.G.P.A.A, Mangkunegara VII tenlang Wayang Kuüt and arti Simbolilc dan Unsur Misûknya (Djawa, Vol. xm. 1933). 4Bima was a heroic figure in the Mahabaratha, whose qualities included boldncss, courage and trathfulncss. For a discussion of the significance of Bima for Sulcamo, see Dahm, Sulcamo and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969), 26-27. SDalang means puppel ma5ter; rus manipulation of the puppet before the screen symbolizcs the magical power of the performance ta affect reality as weil as 10 dcscribe iL 6Sunan Ka1ijaga was the son of a Majapahil king in the XIV centwy, the period of transfonnation from Majapahil ( Hindu Kingdom) ta Demak (the fIlS! Islamic kingdom in Java). He spread Islam by using cultural artifaets such as the Wllyang puppets. 7Koenljaraningrat, Kebudayaan Jawa, Seri Etnograpi Indonesia. No. 2, (Jakarta: P.N. Balai Pustaka, 1984), 310. 57 While Sukarno was studying in the Hogere Burger School in Surabaya, he stayed with Tjokroaminoto. a prominent leader of Serikar Islam (the Islamic Association). It was • from him, that Sukarno derived his understanding of Islarn. At that time he was also attracted to the ideas of Ahmad Dahlan, the founder of Muhammadiyah (an Islamic social organization established in 1912). Sukarno realized that Islarn was a rational religion, and that the backwardness and ignorance ofthe Islamic community had to be removed. At the same time Sukarno also becarne acquainted with such western ideas as socialism, capitalism, and nationalism through his own reading and through discussion with a number ofintellectuals in Surabaya. A majorissue thatdominated intellectual discourse at that time was how Islam and nationalism could play a role in Indonesian State formation. Sukarno started to write on Islam and its relationship to nationalism in the Oetoesan Hindia, a newspaper published by Tjokroaminoto. The Duteh colonial educational system greatly infIuenced the formation of the Indonesian intellectual landscape. Many Indonesians developed ideas which were religiously neutraI or even hostile to Islam. Arnong these were members of the political élites, such as Sukarno (the first president), Muhammad Hatta (the first vice president), and Supomo (who played an important raie in drafting the Constitution of 1945). To borrow a term from C. Snouck Hurgronje, the Duteh, through education, had indeed becn successful in "ernancipating" sorne Indonesian élites from their own religion. That is. those who were Western-educated held the view that religion shouid be understood as a personal matter, ::nd that religion shouid be separated from the state; for them, the West was the model, where the separation of Church and State had becn achieved. Many Indonesians, especiaIly those of sanrri (devout Muslim) background, rejected this separation between state and religion. Dehates ensued arnong Indonesian leaders on state and religion, in the 1920's between Sukarno and Haji Agus Salim (of the Indonesian Islarnic Union Party, PSU), and in the 1930's between Sukarno and Muhammad Natsir (ofPersatuan Islam or 58 Islarnic unity). From 1950 to 1958 NalSir led the Masjumi or Majlis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia (the Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations). It is not surprising then that • the intellectuai and politicai disputes between Sukarno and NalSir in the pre-war period continued after independence. Sukarno's intellectuai development led to poiiticai activity aIready while he was studying at Technische Hoge School Bandung. He was involved in discussions with the nationalist élite. especially with Tjipto Mangunkusumo and Douwes Dekker. The most important problem being debated related to the basis on which the unity of Indonesia was to be founded. From these discussions. Sukarno developed his conception of secular nationalism. Sukarno thus differed with his tcacher. Tjokroaminoto, who believed that Islarn had to be the basis of Indonesian unity. This intellectuai friction appeared in the 1920s and the 1930s and is represented by the emergence of PNI or Fartai National Indonesia (the Indonesian Political Party) led by Sukarno in 1927. The main concern of Sukarno was to fight against colonialism, and his desire was to create a new nation based on secular nationalism. ln Bandung, his political activities were progressively directed at fighting colonialism. As a result, he was imprisoned for severa! years and remained jailed until 1931. However, Sukarno never gave up the struggle against colonialism. The Duteh exiled him to Ende, Flores. He fell il1 in exile, as a result of which he was moved to Benkulu. ln this region he had the opportunity to enlarge his knowledge of Islam. He wrOte many articles in a magazine called Panji Islam (the Banner ofIslarn). Most ofthese were concerned with Islam and politics and discussed the significance ofreligious reform with a rationalistapproach.8 8H. Abdul Karim, Mengabdi Ag:una, N~ dan Bangsa (Jakarta: PT Gunung Agung. 1982), 67. 59 ln 1942, the Japanese took over the Dutch territories. Sukarno benefited from this political change by moving to Jakarta from whence he organized his political activities. In • 1945, BPUPKI or Badan Penyelidik Usaha-Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (the Investigating Comnûttee for the Preparation ofIndonesian Independence) was created, representing a variety of the Indonesian élite, both religious and nationalists. In this comnûttee, Sukarno proposed an ideology for the Indonesian state which came to be called Pancasila (Five Principles). On August 17, 1945, Indonesia Independence was proclaimed, and Sukarno was chosen as the president ofIndonesia. Later, on August 18, 1945, Panca.<;:a and the Constitution of 1945 were promulgated. 2. Discourse: Nationalism, Islamism and Marxism. From the 1920's to the: 194O's, when Sukarno had come of age, discussion on the position of Islam came to be led by IWo groups. Some considered Islam's position to be important not ooly because ofits being the religion ofthe majority, but also on account of its role in Indonesian history, especially because Islam had become a significant element in Indonesian nationalism. The Dutch government recognized the significance of Islam's position by appointing a number of advisers for Islamic and native affairs , such as C. Snouck Hurgronje, D. Rinkes and G. F. Pijper. They belonged to a schocl that realized the importance ofIslam, and they themselves contributed to an understanding cfthe history of Islam in Indonesia. Some scholars in the post-war period of independence after 1945, such as: Harry J. Benda, George Mct. Kahïn, Howard M Federspit..t. ~barc this perspc.ctive. Another group of schol31'S, however, were doubtful of the importance of Islam in Indonesia, claiming that in spite of Islam's majority StalUS, aIl Muslims were not committed to Islam as a way oflife. In other words, even though these peopl-:: were called Muslims, they were 50 ooly nominally or in a sïatisticai sense. Their beliefs were influenced by ideas from the pre-Isl~!: periods, pre- !-rindu and Hindu-Buddhist, and they 60 were also educationally influenccd by Western ideas bec:luse they had benefited from • Dutch educational programs. ln this respect, Geenz classifies Muslim society into (wo categories: abangan (1ess devout) Muslim, and sanui (devout) Muslim. He considers the position of the abangan Muslims more important than that of the sanui. Although Geem., theory has been questionc-.d by sorne scholars, for instance, Marshall G. S. Hodgson and Zamakhsyari Dhofier, it is still useful in analyzing the intellectual friction in religio-political discourse.9 The santri-abangan distinction reflects the reality of a dispute dominated by two groups: one Islamic-oriented and the other non-Islamic oriented. The former were tho~e who championed Islamic ideaIs in society and government. At the constitutional level, they were champions ofIslam as the basis ofthe state. Their viewpoint was expressed, frrst, in BPUPKI or Bacfan Usaha-Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (the Committee fc~ Investigation into lndonesian's lndependence) in 1945, and second, in 1955-1959, during the debate on the same question in the elected Constituent Assembly. The non-Islamic oriented groups held the conttary view, and stoOO for ideas which were religiously neutral. Their ideas developed into !WO main schools: nationalism and Marxism. Confronted with these three discourses. Sukarno tried to synthes'·.,: them into a political manifesto, called "NASAKOM" : nationalism, religion and communism. This manifesto was promulgated in the last periOO ofhis régime in the 196Os, though this formula was rooted in the 1920s. Sukarno had started 10 formulate his synthesis ofthe prevailing schools ofthought, nationalism, Islamism and Marxism, during the 1920's, when he was living in Surabaya as a disciple of Haji Oemar Said Tjokroarninoto, a leader of Serikat Islam (the Islami.:: Association). ln exile, Sukarno also began a written dialogue with other Islamic leaders, 9See Cliffor:l Gccnz, The Religion of Java (Chic::e-o: The Univemty of Chicago Press, 1976). For Ihe objection 10 Geer1z's theory, see Marshall G. S. Hodgson. The VenlUre of 1sJam: Conscience and HistoIy in a Wood Civùizatjon (Chicago: The University of Chicago. 1974). il, 551. and zamakhsyari DhoflC1', "SanUi-Abangan daJam Kchidupan Orang Jawa: Tcropong Pesantren: Prisma, 7, No. 5 (June 1978), 68. 61 such as A. Ha~san. His synthesis was finalized after the proclamation of Indonesian independence in 1945. 10 For Sukarno the thre~ schools of thought that existed in • lndonesia had 10 he synthesized in terms ofa "common donominator" so that they could sit side by side within :he frame ofthe nation-state. Sukarno differentiated between nationalism and Islamism. The former was limited to a particular nation, while the latter emphasized fratemity and universality among believers without being bound by geographical, racial or other factors. Nevertheless, bath ha among the nations, and in Islam there was no prohibition against èefending oneos homeland against foreigr. powers. ln the Indonesian case, historical experience showed that both nationalists and Islamists cooperated in overthrowing colonialism and imperialism. The spirit ofanti-colonialism also existed in the ideology ofMarxism. On this basis, Sukarno also recognized it as an element in the lndonesian political framework. Ye!, Islam and Marxism had extreme differences bath in historical roots and destinations. Sukarno tried to find similarities thatcould possibly be devcloped and molded into pillars of nationalism. To achieve this unity, Sukarno neither saw Islam from a dleological point ofview, nor Marxism in terms ohtheism. ln the 19205, the time when Sukarno's intellectual ideas were developing, Islamism and socialism had becn in conflic!, as indicated. for instance. by the division of Serik'lt Islam (the Islamic Association) into Iwo groups: Serikat Islam putih (right wing) and Serikat Islam Merah (left wing).l1 According to Sukarno. bath Islam and Marxisl" opposed injustice. He ;herefore tried to IOHerbert Feith. The Decline of ConsûlUûoll31 Democrncy in Indanesi.1 (Ith:lca. London: Cornc11 University Pre:;s. 1978). 594-595. lIOn Suk:IIno's vicws of religion \siam and Marxism sec Sukarno. "Nationalisme. l 62 bring Islam and Marxism together. even though they wcre different bath in their hislory • and mission. Thus Sukarno's Pancasila (Five Principles) sought to unite the three existing systems of thought into a common foundation for the nation-state under the name of "NASAKOM" (Nationalism. Religion and Communism). To show that it was possible to do so. Sukarno presented himself as a personification ofthis ideology. He wrole an aIticle in a newspaper. Pemandangan ("Opinion"). with the title "Sukarno oleh Sukarno (Sukarno by Sukarno) claïming "Saya tetap nationalist. tetap Islam. tetap Marxist" (1 remain nationalisl, Muslim and Marxist). For Sukarno. the universality of Islam could be a way of life for a nation, which is why he was conscious of the significance of Islam as the ethical basis ofideology. but did not see Islam itself as an idelogy.J2 Marxism. to Sukarno. was to be understoad ooly as a means of analysis for social. political, and economic problems, while its atheism was to be rejected. For that reason he claimed that he was not a communist. Islam and Marxism were accepted because bath opposee: colonialism and imperialism, and also because bath emphasized fraternity among the peoples.13 Commenting on these altempts. sorne scholars have questioned Sukarno's synthesis of Islam and Marxism since each has a different history and destination. Marxism a.~ a system of philosophy is conceived as historical-materialism in which changes of society are determined by economic production and distribution. "Absolute reality" is material, not immaterial. Consequently, values such as morals and religion are determined by the results of production. Un1ike Marxists, Islarl1Ïsts believe that "absolute reality" is Gad, a power who creates and maintains the universe, so !hat the destiny ofhuman beings is only 12Sukarno. "Menjadi Pembanlu Pemandangan. Sukarno oleh Sukarno Sendiri." Dib:lwah Bendern Revolusi. 509 and 513. 13Ibid.. 513. 63 to serve Goo. 14 ln other words, Marxism is motivated by economic considerations, while Islam is motivated by spiritual motives. Sukarno did, nevertheless, try to formulate these • different ideologies. Tauftk Abdullah has noted that Sukarno's synthesis was unique)5 Indeed this is not surprising when we com,ider the sources of Sukarno's intellectual syncrerism: the significance ofpluralism, harmony and unily ofthe nation. It should also be noted that Sukarno's synthesis put Islarnism and Marxism into the service of nationalism. B. Political Thought and Approach ta Religion 1. The Pive Principles (pancasila) of Sukarnoism. Pancasila was the culmination of Sukarno's polltical thoughL He had started formulating his polltical ideas while studying in Surabaya in the 1920's, and continued formulating his thought while in exile. As pointed out in the previolls section, his contact with Tjokroarninoto in particular, and with other Muslim leaders in general, led him ta make Islam one ofthe elements ofhis intellectual foundations. It is not surprising that he included religion as one of principles in his ideology which carne to be called Pancasila. Sukarno proposed his concept of state ideology on June l, 1945 at the meeting of BPUPKI or Badan Penyelidik Usaha-Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (the Investigating Committee for the Preparation ofIndonesian Independence). It consisted of fiveprinciples:" national unïty. intemationalismorhumanily,democracy, socialjustice,and bellef in God."16 14For a discus!:ion on Islam and Marxism sec KhaIifa Abdul Hakim, Islam and COOUIlunism (Lahore: Institll1l: of lsIamic Culture. 1976). 43~ 1So;auflk AbduUah. "ManIlSia daIam Sejarah: Scbuah Pengamar: in Taufik AbduUah. cd., Manusi.1 d:JIam Keme1ur 5ejarah (Jakarla: LP3ES. 1981), 15. 16soctamo. PiInc:JsiIa sd»g:Ji D=r Negara: KWIIpU1:Jn KUISIIS renrang P:uJcasiIa oJe1l P/e$iden 5ut:1mo (Jakarla: Inti ldayu PreSs. Yayasan Pendidikan Sukarno, 1986), S. 64 Before presenting his principles. Sukarno discussed tmee theorics ofthe formation of the state. The flfSt was the theory of Ernest Renan. according to which astate was • based on the will of the people. 17 The second was the theory of Otto Bouer. that astate was founded on the people's character. which derived from a common fllith and experience. 18 Sukarno criticized these theorics because neither reeognized religion. culture. or land as important components of state formation. Sukarno was attracted rather to the theory of Karl Haushofer, the "Bluur und Boden Theorie," according to wlùch astate was based on land and blood.t9 With reference to these three theories. Sukarno expressed his dream to unite the l'1donesian archipelago on the basis ofthe will ofthe people. ethnicity, religion, culture and language. That is why he put "national unity" at the top of his ideology. Consequently, religion, ethnicity and culture had to be subjugated to national integration. In other words, pluralism, ethnic, religion, and culture, were fundamental to the framework ofnationalism. Despite the ·fuet that religion was not the foundation of the state, it was not neglected. Religion was viewed as an ethical guide. It was accepted as part of the national identity as long it did not contradict the national will. To achieve this purpose, Sukarno emphasized that Indonesian Muslims would be the majority in parliament, because ooly thereby could the socialization of Islam be achieved within the framework of democracy. The presence of a religious element in his ideology was proof of bis recognition of the Muslims' role in the war of independence against Duteh colonialism. There is no doubt that religious sentiment played an important role in Indonesian nationalism. l7lbid. 17, and The N~ Encyc/opaedia Bzj/llllJJÏca (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1974), Vol. 15, 671-673. 1SsoeIcamo, PanctlsiJa sebagai Dasar Negara. 17. 19Ibid 65 For Sukarno, nationalism was not chauvinism, and for that reason he made "intemationalism" or "humanity" the second element of bis ideology. Sukamo's • "humanity" was a reflection of bis view of Tauhid; to bim Islam was a liberal religion whose oùssion was to liberate people from exploitation by a certain group in society. This view was indicated by bis fourth principle. "socialjustice". This principle signified that the purpose of the creation of the State was to make prosperity and welfare a reality for ail people. Thus. feudalism and exploitation had to be brought to an end. This principle was considered a basic stand on wbich Islam and socialism were united, both were anti exploitation,andaimedat acbievingsocialjustice. "Belief in GO lndonesian people would live according to theirown religion, butwithout relig!ous egoism. Every believer had a different comprehension of normative truth, so tolerance and harmony were called for through national integration. Religion was ex:remely significant in creating lndonesian nationalism, but at the same lime it was a possible source of disintegration if, for instance. privileges were given to followers of a certain religion. Sukamo's ideology went from the material to the spiritual. The formulation ofSukamoism differed from what was perpctuated in the Constitution of1945. ln the Constitution "Belief in God" is the fust principle, while in Sukarno's formulation, it was the fmal principle. The basic ideology, however, was the same in the sense that both have IWO main ethical elements:politicalandreligious. 2. Sukarno's Approach to Islam To assess Sukarno's approach towards Islamic reform, Bernard Dahm's classification will be used. Dahmclassified Sukarno's ideas on Islam into three categories: (1) that Islam is a religion whose ideas emphasize equality among people; (2) that Islamis 66 raùonal, and (3) that Islam is progressive.20 This section is primarily concemed with • these three principles. The f11"St principle, that Islam emphasizes equality, was expressed by Sukarno in the 1930s dialogue with the Islamic thinker, Ahmad Hassan, about the status of sayyids and non-sayyids. His letter to A. Hassan dated December l, 1934 as follows: In my opinion, one of the recen: weaknesses of Islam is the excessive respect of sayyids wbich almost amounts to eliùsm. In Islam there is no aristocracy and there is no religion that emphasizes equality except Islam. Excessive respect for a certain people kills the spi.;t ofIslam and encroaches upon Tauhid.21 This quotaùon s!lows that Sukarno strongly rejected any differenùaùon between sayyid and non-sayyid because to do so would bring about aristocracy and feudalism in Islam. This view was in line with bis poliùcal outlook: anù-èlitism, anù-colonialism and anù imperialism. Based on this principle, Sukarno decided in bis approach to Islam not to recognize the exclusive privilege of any group to interpret Islamic teachings. Thus he rejected the 'ulami's monopoly in interpreting the Qur'in because it signified the negalion ofequality among the people. The central implication of the principle of equality is that Sukarno's approach towards Islamic reform was not tied to the ideas ofcertain 'ulami'. He emphasized the significance of ijtihad, believing that if ijtihiid were not used in Islamic reform, ail 2Oseman:t Dahm, Submo and rhe SrruggJe for Indonesian Independence (Jlhaca, London: Come11 University Press, 1969), 181. 21Confliet between sayyid and non-s.tyyid in Indonesia occurred within an organizalion called Jamiat a1-Khair. Sorne of ilS members wanted equality rqardless of ethnie origin and descenl, and others wanted ta maintain the privileges of the sayyids. The Arab community in the colonial period was not eategorized as native by the DuICh in order ta avoid the integration of Ibis community with olher Jndonesians. Hamid A1gadri, C. Snouck Hurgronye, Politik BelandJJ terhadap 1s1am and Keturunan Arab (Jakarta: Sinanr Harapan, 1984), 3G-31; Deliar Noer, Gerakan Modem 1s1am di Indonesia, 70. 67 creativity would he killl".d.22 Thus. a rationalistic approach was considered to he in • continuity with the principle ofequality. and simultaneously to he an instrument of Islamic reform. because Islam itself was a rational and s\mple religion. Sukarno stated in bis letter to Ahmad Hassan "tidak ada agama yang lebih rational dan sederhana dari pada Islam" (there is no religion that is more rational and simple than Islam).23 The question was how far religion could he validated by reason. Sukarno. for example. did not accept that the Isra' and Mi'raj of Muhammad were conducted physically. because such a phenomenon was rationally impossible. But it was possible that the Mi'raj ofMuhammad was a spiritual experience or sorne psychological process.24 Sukarno's interpretation is not surprising. because it was a merely a reflcction of bis educational background in physics, wbich differed from other Islamic reformers who had mostly religious backgrounds. The third of Sukarno's principles is that Islam is progress. Dahm argues that this idea was influenced by the intellcctual di5('.()urse in Aligarh. India, concerning whether Islam was compatible with progress or an obstacle to il The Aligarh opinion came to he that Islam was progressive. One prominent Indian thinker. Ahmad Khan. was considered by Sukarno as the ambassador of Islamic resurgence.2S The endorsement by Sukarno of such ideas expressed bis approach ta Islam; he believed, for instance. that it was necessary ta view hadith critically. because one ofthe causes ofIslamic backwardness was 22Soekamo. "Memoedakan Pengenian IsIam," Panji IslIllJJ, No. 12, March 2S. 1940. 216. 23Soe1camo. Soerat-sœIlIt Islam dari Ende (Bandoeng: PersaIoen Is1am Bahagian Poestaka 1937). 4-S. 24nüs iclea was expresscd in bis leuer lO Ahmad Hassan daled March 26. 1935 and reswed in bis speech on January 16, 1961. the time of celebration of Ista' and Mi'riij in Istana MenIeka. Sec Soekarno, "Soeral·soer:Jl dari Ende," Dibawah Bendaa Revolusi, S. and Soekarno. GMihb Api Islam (Djakarta: Tjendekia, 1961). 10. 2SBemanI Dahm. Submo and the Struggle for Indonesian lntkpendenc:e. 181. 68 was the uncritical acceptance of hadith. For Sukarno. hadith was not absolute truth. it was • only one source of truth; the absolute truth was from God alone.26 The aim of Islamic law is to serve human welfare and prosperity. and law was a response to social changes. Progress. therefore. should be understood as the birth of new laws aimed at eliminating backwardness and ignorance. Progress signified something new and more complete, not the imitation of something that had been out datedP ln other words, progress could not contradict Islam, because Islam itself was identical with progress. Theessence ofprogress would be realized through the f1exibility of Islam. On the f1exibility of Islam, Sukamo quoted Amir Ali's The Spirit of 1.çJam as follows; Theelasticity oflaws is their great test and this test is pre-eminently possessed by those of Islam. Their compatibility with progress shows their founder's wisdom.28 Elasticity in Islam meant acceptance of social change and of new demands, and thus the comprehension ofIslam changes from rime to time. Forthat reason Sukarno believed that refonn was unavoidable, but criticized the kind of Islamic refonn conducted by the Muhanunadiyah and Persatuan Islam, which essentially maintained the old ways ofIslam. For Sukarno, refonn had to be radical rather than restrietl:d to old arguments. Thus. the rationalistic approach to Islamic refonn was the only way to deal with the superiority of Western civilization. Itcan be said that this tendency is the Islamic refonn which aimed at modemizing Islam inaccordance with presentdemands. 26soetamo, Soerat·soerat dari Ende. 5, and Soekarno, "Mcmoedakan PcngCltia Islam," Panji Islam. No. 16, April 22, 1940. 300. 27Sockamo. "Mcmoedakan Pcngertian Islam," Panji Islam. No. 12, March 25, 1940. 489-490. 28Sockamo. "MeP'0"'4abn Pcngertian. IsIam,"Panji Is/am. No. 13, April 1. 1940. 238. 69 On the basis of this general exposition. Sukarno might be categorized as one ofthe Islamic refonners. but he was more radical than others. It should also be noted that. according to Sukarno, there are two reasons why Islarn failed to be progressive. First. the existing customs of Muslims are influenced by traditions which are not related to Islam. Thus the need for purification is apparent Second, most Muslim refonners seek to retum to and imitate what was done in the time of the Prophet and his successors, when in faet. the circumstances of that pcriod and the present are very different29 Hence Sukarno believed that Tauhid and elasticity in legal matters were the keys to progress. Islam could adapt itself to new demands without any loss of the Islamic identity. That is caIled "cultural dynamization," to use the term of Alfian.30 ThUs. equality or egalitarianism, r.:tionaIism, elasticity and progress became the bases of Sukarno's approach to Islarn. This approach paved the way for the dynamization ofIslam in responding to social changes and new demands. C. Paradigm of the Relationsbip BetweeD State and Religion 1. Pancuila Smœ Soon after the proclamation of lndonesian independence in 1945, the question of the form of the State arose and brought about a major religio-political debate among lndonesian leaders. The debate was dominated mainly by IWO groups: IsIamic and non IsIamic. Toexaminethisdiscourse, the religio-political publicationspublished in the period ofSukarno, and how Sukarno hirnself responded ta this question will be discussed. One of the publications was Keesaan Tuhan menUlUt adjaran Kristen dan Islam (The Oncss of God according ta Christianity and Islam) written by Muhammad Arshad 29Soekamo. Soernl-soer.Jl d.1ti ElIde. 28-29. 30Alflllll. Poliâ1c Kebudayaan dan ManUsia Indonesia (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1982), 62. 70 Thalib Lubis in Medan at the end of 1945. He was a member of Djami'arul Waslijah (an associaùon belonging to the orthodox Shafi'i school). He called for a Holy War against the • Dutch, and expected that the fight would serve to promote Islam in Indonesia, in accordance with God's will, the Islamic law,31 Another book was written by HAMKA in 1946, enùt1ed Revolusi Agama (Religious Revolution). The author placed the Indonesian revolution within the framework of the liberaùon of mankind as a result of religious awakening. In the 1950s, HAMKA never completely accepted the Pancasila ideology as the unifying ideology ofthe Indonesian Republic. As a member ofParliament, he continued to defend the ideal ofan Islamic state,32 Conceming the proposai for an Islamic state. we must also mention Muhammad Isa Anshary, an Jslamic leader (1916-1969) and one of Sukarno's friends in Bandung. In 1949 he wrote a book, Falsafah Perjuangan Islam (Philosophy of the Islamic struggle), calling for a Holy War against colonialism, individualism and rationalism. He wanted to create an Islamic party which could fight for the establishment ofan Islamic state because 95 % of the Indonesian population adhered to Islam. For him, Islam was not a private matter; state and religion were therefore one, and the State was to be the instrument to put Islamic law inta operation,33 Given this world view. Herbeith Feith notes that lsa Anshary was a radical fundamentalist leader.34 Similar to Isa Anshory's ideas were those 31Arsjad Thalib Lubis. Keesaan Tuhan menwut adjuan Krisren dan Islam (Medan. 1968) quoted in M. Ridwan Lubis, Pemikiran 5uk:lrno TentJng 1s1:Jm dan Unsur-unsur Pembah3nl:Jnnya (Jakana: CV Haji Masagung, 1990). 76-7g. 32HAMKA is an abbrevialion of Hadji Abdul Malilc Karim Amru11ah (1908-1981). a religious teaeher, and editor-in-dlief of the magazine Panji Masy:u:lbt He was an ardent supporter of Muhammadiyah and Masjumi. He was the fust general chainnan of the Majlis U1:un:J Indonesia (The Ulama Counci1 of Indonesia) created in 1975. The purpose of this instibtlion is ID promote unity and solidarity amang the Muslims and n:present 1sIam to the govemmenL 33See M. !sa Anshary, Fals:ûah Pe1ju:mg:m 1s1:Jm (Bandung: Pustaka, 1949). 34Herben Feith. TIIe DecIinc of ConstilUliona1 Democr.Icy in Indonesia (Ilhaca, New York: Come11 University Press. 1964), 137. . 71 expressed by Muhammad NalSir in his book. Islam sebagai ideology (Islam as an Ideology) published in 1950. NalSir too proposed unity between state and religion on the • ground that Islam is more than a religious system, and. in lact, is a complete civilization.35 A more detailed discussion of the structure of an Islamic state is given by Zainal Abidin Ahmad in his book Konsepsi Tatanegara Islam (The Conception of Islamic Form of Govemment). He proposed four principles ofan Islamic state: (1) amana (the authority of govemment); (2) justice; (3) belief in one Gad and (4) the sovereignty of the people, or democracy.36 The concept of an Islamic state was fust proposed by the Islamic group in BPUPKI or Badan PenyeIidik Usaha-Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan lndonesia (the Investigating Committee for the Preparation ofIndonesian Independence), but it was rejected by Sukarno in the name of the unity of Indonesia. After 1955, the issue appeared for the second time and developed into a political confIict between the Islamic political parties. such as Masjumi or Majlis Sjuro Muslimin lndonesia (the Indonesian Muslim Consultative Associations), NahdJatuI Ulama (the Muslim Scholars Party), and other small Islamic parties on the one side, and the non-Islamic parties. such as PNl or Pattai NasionaI Indonesia (the Inôonesian Political Party), PKI or Pattai Komunis lndonesia (the Indonesian Communist Party), and Parkindo or Panai Krisren'lndonesia (the Indonesian Christian Party), on the other side. As a result, hetween 1955 and 1959, the political situation in Indonesia was very complicated and chaotic. Ideologically speaking, a number of issues arose, but the main issue was whether Indonesia was to he an Islamic State or Pancasila State. The Constituent Assembly created after the general elections of 1955 was to formulate a new constitution for Indonesia. In fact, however, until 1959 this Assembly 3SSec M. NaIsir, Islam sebag:û Ideology (Jakana: Pus1aka Aida, 1951). 36see Z. A. Ahmad, Konsepsi T3laIJCg:u:I Islam (Djakarta:. Wijaya. 1949). The writer origina1ly came from Medan. 1aIer moved 10 Java was a friend of M. NaISir, !sa Anshary and other Masjumi leaders. 72 failed to accomplish its task. Finally, on July 5, 1959, in the interest of public safety. Sukarno decreee! a retum to Pancasila and the Constitution of 1945. The most crucial issue • in the retuming process concemee! the principle of "Belief in God" and the possibility of the application of Islamic law through this principle. The focus below will be on this issue. The centra! question here is how Sukarno treatee! religion. The generaJ elections of 1955 showed two major political groups: Islamic and non Isiamic, which Sukarno always triee! to keep in balance. Sukarno now began to toy with the conception of Demokrasi Terpimpin (Guidee! Democracy). In a speech on February 21, 1957, he stated that Demokrasi Terpimpin was necessary to save the Indonesian Republic.37 Under this democracy, he acquired more and more power. The Communist Party also benefited from this policy, and was able to expand its influence in the circle of Sukarno. Meanwhile, the lslamic bloc gradually declinee! in power in the parliamenl Its effort to create an lslamic state met with opposition from non-lslamic parties, mainly PNI and PKI. To $Ce how Sukarno treated the relationship between state and religion, it is necessary to consider his response to the representatives who were questioning the meaning of the Djakarta Charter of June 22, 1945 and its relation to the Constitution of 1945. According to the Charter, the first principle ofPancasila is "Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa, dengan kewajiban menjaJankan syariat Islam bagi pemeluk-peme/uknya" (Belief in Gad, with the obligation ofthe Islamic community to practice its lslamic law). By the time the Constitution of 1945 was promulgated, the famous "seven words." dengan kewajiban menjaJankan syariat Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya had been removee! in order to rnaintain the unity ofIndonesia. This happenee! only after the Islamic bloc agreed to accept 37Demolaasi Terpimpin (Guicied Demoaacy) was a dClllOClllCY controUed by the president To implemenl this democracy, Sukarno formed a cabinet of golDDg royong (mulua1 cooperation) repn:scnting aIl Indonesian groups; Islamisls. nalionalisls, and communisls. 73 the aspiraùons of the non-Islamic group. A quesùon. however. dcveloped once more into a • major issue. which caused two blocs to he formed. The Constituent Assembly had already been meeting for IWO years. five months and !Welve days. but withcut achieving much. ln view of its failure. by the end of 1958 Sukarno proposed a résolution. retuming to the constitution of 1945.38 The central question of the resolution was whether the Charter was to he only of historical or also of legal significance. The Islamic bloc; Masjumi Pany. NU (Muslim Scholar) Party. PSU or Panai Sarikat Islam lndonesia (the Islamic Union Party of lndonesia), Perti (the Isl'ImÎc Educatiol'l:J PaIty). and othersmall Islamic partiesclaimed thatthe Djakarta Charter was not only a historical document, but also had il legal meaning. They moved for an amendment. obviously originating from NU, to insert the "seven words" both in the prearnble and in article 29 of the Constitution of 1945. Article 29 of the Constitution of 1945 states: (1) The ,tate is established on the basis ofBeliefin the One and OnIy God; (2) The state secures the freedom of every citizen to adhere to his own religion and to worship according to his own religion and helief,39 The amendment proposed above signifies that the "seven words" had a legal meaning and couid he used as a source of Islamic legislation for Muslim. ln return, the non-Islamic groupS, PNl (the lndonesian Political Party). PKI (the Communist Political Party). and Catholic anti Protestant Parties supported the return to the Constitution of 191,.5, but rejected Islamic amendments. They saw the "se-ven words" as no more than a historical document of the Indonesian people who were moving forward towards the Indonesian Republic. B.• ~Iang Reng Say, a spokesman ofthe Catholic Party, stressed that for his party the Djakarta Cha.'1er was nothing more than a historical document. The same 38Muhammad Yamin. Nii "':Ib Pcrsiap:Jn Und3ng.Undang D:Is:tr, 1 (Jakarta: Jajasan Pr3panlja. 1959). 487-508. 391bid.. 527.52l!. 74 point was expressed by J. C. T. Simorangkir. a spokesman of the Protestant Party. in his • speech on May II. 1959. when he said that the Charter could not be a source of law.40 Sukarno aiways tried to reconcile conflicting ideas: this was typicai of his style from the 1920's. In his responses to the question of the "seven words" Sukarno showed a friendly attitude towards the Islarnic bloc. for exarnple. in replying to Achmad Sheichu. a spokesman of NU. he was sympathetic. Sukarno maintained that the recognition ofthe Djakarta Charter as a historical document signified the recognition of its influence on the preamble and the 1945 Constitution. article 29 of which ought to be the basis for legislation in religious areas. Thus, the word "Beliefin Gad" could be explained a.~ "Belief in God, with the obligation on the lslarnic community ta apply lslamic law." With this formula, Muslims could undertake legislation in agreement with Islamic law.41 Sukarno recognized that the "seven words" inspired the formulation ofthe preamble and the Constitution of 1945; however, he did not accept the Charter as a source of law making. The struggle to achieve the recognition of the Djakarta Charter as a source of legai norms continued. The conflict reached a climax, and the Islarnic and non-lslamic groups came ta resolve this dispute through voting. In accordance with the rules, a (Wo thirds majority was required to make the decision; this could not be achieved which meant that the Assembly could not decide to accept either the "Pancasila State" based on the Constitution of 1945, or the "lslarnic State" based on the "seven words" of the Djakarta Charter. Soon afterward, the non-Islarnic bloc, particularly the PNI and PK1, dissolved itselfand left the decision concerning the constitution to the President. Finaily, an absolute deadlock came about, and the Assembly was disrnissed on June 2, 1959. 4OJbid.. n, 476 and 664. 41lbid., 621. 75 III accfJrdance with Sukamo's desire to impiement the Demokrasi Terpimpim (Guidee Democracy) by retuming to the Constitution of 1945, OTt July 5, 1959, he issued • the "Decree of the President of the Republic of Indonesia, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, with regard to the return to the Constit'.ltion of 1945." The Decree made five points. FITSt, the Assembly was not able to arrive atan agreement on retuming to the Constitution of 1945. Second, the majority of the memhers of the Assembly refused to attend the meeting any longer, so that the Assembly could not complete its work. Third, a danger;,us situation had arisen threatening for the unity of the country and the people. Fourth, the President was supported by the people to ~.ave the country. Fifth, the President was convinced that the Djakarta Charter ofJune 22, 1945, inspired the 1945 Constitution. Based on these considerations, Sukarno decreed (1) dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and (2) retum to the Constitution of 1945.42 Conceming the dispute ove~ state ideology, the most important ofthe above points is the fifth one which claimed that the Djakarta Charter inspired the Constitution of 1945, and that the two are linked. It was made clear, however, that the words "inspired and Iinked" were understood as having ethical, not legal significance. This kind ofinterpretation is in accordance with Sukarno's approach to Islam, wherein Islam in the context of the nation-state is no more than an ethical, source ofmotivation, Iiberation and solidarity ofthe Indonesian people. Another point, the creation of Islamic law through legislation, is possible as far as it is accepted by the legislature. That is why he a!.ways emphasized that Mus1ims must he educated in order to he able to struggle for Islam through socialization and democracy. Itis ob'lious that even though Sukarno established Indonesia on the basis ofreligious pluralism, he wasespecial1y appreciative ofIslam. 42Ibid.. m, 661. 76 Qur'iin and Hadïth do not lay down how the govemment should he realized; they offer only moral guidance. Based on this fac!. Sukarno came to argue that Islam is a divine • revelation. not a social system which regulates the organization ofthe political system; only in general terms does Islam give guidance for sociallife.43 Sukarno rejected the idea of an Islamic state because it was not found in the na,ç$ and there was no ijmii' on il.44 He helieved that state and religion were separate in order th"t religion not he manipulated by rulers for pl'llitical interests.45 Religion was a private matter, and the state had no right to force the application ofIslam on society. Ifthe state was involved in religious matters and integrated religion into the state. that could retter human creativity.46 For Sukarno, the integralistic paradigm signified that the state had the obligation to force people, and this contt'adicted the essence of Islam, which basically emphasized the significance of deliheration (musyawara). The second reason was that Indonesia was a pluraIistic society, multi-cultural. multi-religious and multi ethnic; the integralistic paradigm would lead to long political disputes.47 Nevenheless, for Sukarno the separation of State from religion did not imply neglect ofreligion. He said so when he was criticized by those who proposed an integraIist relationship of state and religion. Muhammad Natsir, for example, argued that Islam was not only a religious system. but aise provided a numher ofsocial regulations. Islam wa.~ an ideology that guided human heings both in worldly and religious matters. Hence, pobtical matters could not he separated from the religious will. Through institutionalization rr-:igion 43SoekamO, "Memoedakan Pengcrtian Islam: Panji lsIam. No. 15, April 15, 1940, 277. 44Sec Soekarno, "Apa sebab Turlà Memisah Agama dari Negara?:Panji M1sy:u:Ik:u, No. 20. May 20. 1940. reissued in Dibawah Bcndt:m Revolusi. 1965, 403-445. 45Soekamo, "Apa SCbab Turlà Memisah Agama dari Negara ?..Dibawah Bcndem Revolusi. 405. 46lbid., 443. 471bid., Soekarno, "Sl.ja Kocrang Dùwnis: 447454. 77 could be upheld perfectly because it had its foundation in the state.48 In other words, Natsir claimed that without any power or institution behind il, the law and order ofIslam • could not be implemented. Thus he called for unity between religion and state.49 According to Herbert Feith, Natsir considered Islam as an ideology encompassing bath religious and temporal spheres. The acceptance of such ideas signified seeing Islam as a totality oflife.50 Thus there were obvious differences between Natsir and Sukarno. Natsir postulated bis ideas on a legal formalistic approach, which held that the implementation ofIslam that had to be realized by law-making, while Sukarno formulated his ideas on the basis of a cultural and political approach according to which the application of Islam was not to be forced by any institutional means, but rather was to be achieved through comprehension of ail the people. Sukarno believed that Islam as an absolute truth has been accepted by Muslims. The problem was how the Islamic teachings ought to be implemented. He argued that Islam had become an inherent part of Indonesian life and culture.51 For Sukarno. the struggle of Islam through a cultural approach would give birth to a new generation which could develop the role ofIslam indifferent areas oflife. His formulation of the separation between state and religion was expressed by Sukarno in the meeting ofBPUPKI or Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdelœan Indonesia (the Investigating Committee" for tbe Preparation of Indonesian independence) on June 1. 1945. He offered bis concept of the five principles of state ideology. cal',.;d 48M. NalSir, Islam sebagai ldeology (DjaJ:ana: Penyiaran !\mu, 1951), 65. 4!oA. MoechJis, "Persatuan Agama dan Neglllll," Panji Islam,. No. Zl. July 8, 1940, 509. SOuerbeith Feith, Lance CaslIe, eds.,Indonesian Politica1. Thinlcing, 1945-196S (lthaca, London: Cornell University P;ess, 1970). 214. 51Soekamo, "Is1am SonlO1oyo,"Dibawah Bendera &volusi. 497. 78 Pancasila: "National Unity. Intemationalism or Humanity. Consensus or Democracy. Social Justice. Belief in God."52 This formulation has two main elements: spiritual and • material. Thus, the religious element too was important for Sukarno. He believed that without spiritual values dictatorship could not be avoided. He affirmed his ideas on the occasion ofthe celebration ofIndonesian independellce in 1947 in Yogyakana: Would you establish a civilized nation? Remember God. h Uow the leadership of God. A nation without guidance ofGod will be governed by c. ·spotism. Man must be govemed by God or he will be govemed by tyrants.53 The quotation above should be understood to mean that Islam is not the formai basis ofstate. but rather the ethical basis ofthe nation. ln other words. Sukarno wanted to preserve the spirit of Islam in the heart of the umma. He affirmed that it was not necessary to fear the separation between state and religion because through democracy the struggle for Islam could be accomplished.54 Therefore. the role ofreligion in the r.ation state should be conceived in terms oftwo complementary points. Firs!, coma:;rehension of religion leads to national harmony. Second. each religion must appreciate the existence of the others.55 The application of religion had to be through deliberation (musyawarah). based on Indonesian culture. Thus, religion was not forced by the Stll'~ but promoted by democracy. He clairned that his choice was democracy, and c1aimed "1 am Muslim, and 1 am a democrat be.~ause 1 am Muslim."56 52See Nugroho NotosusalllO,Proses 1'r:tumus,,; P:mcasila c.'JS3I" Ncgam (Jakana: Balai =ustlka. 1981). 53Presiden Sukarno. Am:Inat 1'roIdam:Jsi l, 1945-1950 (Jakana: PT Inti ldayu Press- Yayasan Pendidikan Soclcamo. 1985). 28. 54S0ekam0. "Saya Kocrang Dinamis," Dibaw:lh Bcndct:J Revolusi. 5SO. 55S0ekam0. Pancasila scb3gai Dasar Ncgara 43. 5~o. "Indonesia versus Fasismc,"' Dibaw:lh Bt:ndt:t:J Revolusi, 457-458. 79 For Sukamo, democracy was a political system that was in accordance with Islam, because Islam recognizes neither theocracy nor autocracy. Hence the process of • Islamization did not star! from the top, but proceeded from the bonom, signifying a cultural approach that would bring about a new generation that could develop Islam through constitutional struggle but still be within the frarnework of national identity. In this perspective, a rationalistic approach to religion was unavoidable in the sense that Islam would be powerful if the Muslims could elaborate Islam in a rationalistic manner. To achieve this quality, according to Sukamo, the separation between state and religion was necessary in order that religion not be manipulated by ruIers. as had happened in the Ottoman Empire where the Shaikh al-Isliim became the tool of the govemment Such manipulation created serious obstacles to religious reforms weakening both religion and the state.57 On the relation between state and religion, Sukarno supported the ideas of Mustafa Kemal and of 'Ali 'Abd al-Riiziq. In the OrHan there were no verses that integrated the structure ofstate and religion. Sukamo expressed bis ideas in a speech at the University ofIndonesia under the titIe of "Negara National dan Cira-ciraIslam" (National Srate and Islarnic Ideals).SS According to Sukarno, Mustafa Kemal's secularism in the 1920's led MusIim thinkers to discuss Islam as having an ethical or political basis, and further they questioned the mission of Muhammad, whether he was a political leader or only a messenger whose role in political affairs was exereised in bis capacity as a human being rather than a Prophet In this respect Sukarno quoted the ideas of 'Ali 'Abd al Raziq, according to wbich Islam was ooly religion (al-dïn ), not politics (al-siyiisa ). According to Sukarno, 'Abd al-Riiziq classified sovereignty into spiritual (waliiyat-al- 57lbid_ SoeIcamo, "Apa Sebab Turlà Memisah Agama dari Negara?: 473. SSSee SoeIcamo, "Negara Nalional and Cita-cita Islam: Brmg Kamo dan Isl:un: KumpuI:m Pid:Uo tenl:Jl/g 1s1:un. 1953-1966 (Jak:uta: CV Haji Masagung, 1990), 1·29. 80 ruhiya ). and material (waliiya-al-madaniya ). The two insùtutions were separ.lte. the former derived from belief. while the lant.:r derived from material consider.lùons. In the days of the Prophet the [wo were integrated in the hands of Muhammad. The sovereignty ofthe Prophet ended with his death given that religious authority was not hereditary.59 'Ali 'Abd a1-Rliziq had supponed the aboliùon of the Sultmate-ealiphate by Mustafa Kemal. Sukarno argued that the caliph was the product ofhistorical circumstances and was not instituted by Muhammad. The caliphate was a product of Greek-Byzanùne. Arab. and Persian traditions. The integration ofreligious institutions into the state structure was influenced by Byzantium. The Islanùc element gradually lost meaning. making Islam become backward and weak.60 Speakîng of Mustafa Kemal. Sukarno desl.;ribed the three steps he teok in abolishing the sultanate-caliphate system: fus!, the elimination ofthe sultanate; second. the abolition of the caliphate. thirdly. the detachment of religion from state. According te Sukarno. Mustafa Kernal's anempts represent a turning point for Islanùc reformers in formulating thefuture ofIslam. Sukarno's thoughtcan thus be summarized in the following [wo points: that religion is exrremely imponant, bllt as ethics, not as the basis of State; second. that Tauhid (belief in oneGod) was the fundamental religious concept thatfunctioned to define the spirit ofthe nation and to make religion rational. and thus the instrument of progress. Further discussion on the role of!Cligion in society will be undenaken in the context of Sukarno's religiouspolicy. 59See 'Ali 'ADC1 AI-lUziq. A/-Is1am W3 UshuI A/-HuIan. Baltth li A/-KhïIafaI W3 A/-HuIan A/·IsIamiyal (Kairo: Musahamat Mishriyyal, 1344H1192S). cd. m. ll4-85. and Seyyed Hossein Nasr. Ideals and ReaIiûes of Is1am (London: George Allen & Unwin lld.. 1975). ff1. 161. 6Os0ekam0. SIUIJl-SIUIJl d:lri ElIde, 19•. and Soekarno.·Apa Sebab Turlà Mcmisah Agama dari Negara?,"432. 81 2. Sukarno's Religions Policy: Dichotamy. As noted in the previous section, Sukamo sought to strengthen the Muslim community rather than to create an Islamic state. He wanted to promote religion in a positive manner. To do so he accepted the proposai for the creation of a Ministry of Religious Affairs. This acceptance was based on his formula that Islam was concerned with spiritual and material affairs. or dunyii wa al iikhira (this world and the world to come). PoliticaIly speaking, it was a means for the materialization of a muiti-religious society. According ta this formula, religious freedom and the co-existence of various religions were granted by the state to all religions without interfering in their internai affairs and without discriminating against any of them. The state was to treat equally a11 five religions recognized in the country: Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, and Buddhism. The establishment of the Ministry of Religion was based on the fust principle ofPancasila , .. Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa (Oneness ofGod, Divine Omnipotence)," and Article 29 ofthe 1945 Constitution which says: The state is based on the Oneness ofGod and the state guarantees the freedom of every inhabitant to embrace bis own religion and exercise services according to his own religion. Historically speaking, the establishment of the Ministry was rooted in the Duteh colonial period. At that rime, religious affairs were handled by various departments: Islamic education was supervised by the Department of Home Affairs. religious courts were onder the administration of the Department of Justice, and religious services were under the Department of Education. Many Muslims had misgivings about this dispersed administration, since they did not expect that a colonial govemment wouid promote Islam; rather it wouid seek ooly ta control the spread of Islam. For that reason, in 1941, MIAI or Majlis Islam A 7aa Indonesia (the Indonesian Supreme Islamic Council), proposed a single Department of Religious Affairs for a future Indonesian government. The Duteh government, in terms of administrative reforms, preferred to deai with religiously neutral 82 groups. so that the Islamic groups felt discriminated against. It may be noted here that the Japanese exploited this disappointment of the Islamic group with the Dutch. However. the • nationalists expressed disagreement with Fascism. and therefore. the only national organization which recognized the Japanese was the MIAI (the Indonesian Supreme Islamic Council). Later. in 1943. this organization. was changed inio Masjumi or Majlis Sjum MusIimin Indonesia, (the Indonesian Muslim Consultative Associations).61 The Japanese needed support from the Muslim society in facing the power of the Allies. This led to the establishment of Shumubu. the Offiœ of Islamic Religion. headed by Husein Djayadingrat (Muhammadiyah). and later. in 1944. by K.H. Hasjim Asj'ari (the founder ofNahdlatul Ulama, NU). This organization was devised to continue the activities o~ the Office for Native and Islamic Affairs of the Duteh period with hopes that it would fulfill the Muslims' desires. It is understandable that the existence of a religious organization as pan of the structure of state shouid have been a crucial issue between Islamic and nationaiist groups ever since the Japanese occupation. The question fim arose at a meeting ofPPKI or Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (the Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian's Independence). The nationaIist and Christian groups rejected the proposai for the founding of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, as they preferred that religious affairs be handled by the Ministty ofEducation or the Ministry ofHome Affairs. They felt that creation of a new ministry wouid only create uneasy feelings among Christians and cause disunity among the people; economicaIly. it could not benefit the state.62 In the first days ofinc'ependence. the Islamic groups felt considerably disturbed by the nationalists. BPUPKI or Blidan Penyelielik Usaha-Usaha Kemerdekaan Indonesia (the 615ee Deliar Noer. The Modemist MusIim Movement in lndonesi:t (Kuala Lwnpur: Oxford University Press. 1973). 271-75. 62Muhammad Yamin. Naskah Persï3p:l1l Und3ng-Undang D:Jsar. 1. 457. 83 Investigating Committee for Preparation of Indonesian Independence) deleted various points from drafts of the constitution which the Islamic group had fought for and which • had previously been approved by nine comminees; for exarnple Muqaddimah (an Indonesian word derived from Arabic, meaning "foreword") was replaced by Pembukaan and the "seven Words," dengan kewajiban menjalankan syariat Islam bagi pemeluk pemeluknya, were eliminated. This action signified that the nationaiists rejected any reference to matters "Islamic", which was contraIy to nationai aspirations. The result was resentment within the Islamic group toward the religiously neutrai nationalist leaders. Thus, during the period of Sukarno, the political disputes between Islamic and nationaiist groups continued ,md dominated the politicai scene. Reaiizing the disappointment ofthe Islamic groups, and given that the govemment needed the full support of Muslims, Sukarno finaily accepted their proposai, founding the Ministry of Religious Affairs on January 3, 1946.63 There is no doubt that the Ministry of Religious Affairs was created primarily on account of Muslim interests and as a compensation for the rejection of an Islarnic state. Geertz has noted that the activities ofthis institution were concemed mostly with Islarnic interests, which for ail intents and purposes were santri affairs from top to bottom.64 In this respect, Boland has argued that it became "a usefu] middle way between a secular and an Islarnic state." This positive appreciation is especially applicable for the time when Muslims failed a second time in 1959 to create an Islarnic state. Gradually, the Ministry of Religious Affairs was recognized by the Muslims as a ~, ntrai body which would look after the interests of the umma, because the idea of an 63nùs insIibltion al present bas four seclions, for MusIim, ProICStallt, Roman Catholie and Hïndu-Buddhists. Ead1 of the four seclions in administered by a Direetor General who is direedy responsible lO the Minister. The Is1amie seclion is me largest, and the Minisler bas a1ways been a Muslùn. See B. J. Boland, The Sauggle of Is1:lm in Modem Indonesi.1 (The Hague: M:utinus Nijhoff, 1982), \06. 64 Clifford Geenz. The Religion of Ja~. 200. 84 Islamic state proposed by the Islamic political Party. Masjumi. did not ever sueeec:d. In 1955, Wahid Hasyim was appointed Minister of Religious Affairs by Sukarno.65 • According to Wahid Hasyim himself. his period might bc: concc:ivc:d as "the starting point of a clearer rea1ization of the task of the Ministry of Religious Affairs."66 Since 1955. there had bc:en a change in Muslim orientation, as to how Islam should bc: implemented. Many Muslims bc:gan to concentrate on strengthening the socialization of Islam through da'wah (Islamic mission) rather than on a political orientation, bc:cause the general eleetions of 1955 brought only political instat'ility, economic collapse and frustration. Wahid Hasyim formulated the task ofMinistry ofReligious Affairs as follows: (a) To make Belief in the One and Only God an op<:rative principle in public life. Cb) To bc: watchful that every inhabitant is free to adhere to his own religion and worship according to his own religion and bc:lief. Cc) To assist, support, proteet and promote ail sound religious movements.67 The quotation above shows us the significance of religion in society; given this significance, the ministry was expçcted to bc: meaningful to believers and to promote harmony among the adherents ofvarious religions on the basis offreedom. The most important task ofthe Ministry of Religion was in the educational sphere. Up te the present, lndonesia has a dichotemous educational system with public and religious schools. Religious instruction is given in all state schools from elementary to the university level. The proposaI for compulsory education flfSt came from an lslamic party, Masjumi. in 1948. This proposalled te the law ofeducation in 1950. As stated in article 20, Education By-Law No. 4, 1950: (1) Religious instruction is given in all state schools; parents who have objections tan decide whether their children will follow the lesson or not. (2) The way in 65 Wahid Hasyim was the son or Hasyùn As'ary Ibe rounder or Nahdhalul UJama (NU). CSlllblished in 1926. One or Wahid Hasyim's sons was Abdurrahman Wahid, General Chainnan or Nahd1alul UJama up lU Ibe presenL 66 B. J. Boland. The Struggle of Islam in Modem Indonesia, 107·108. 67 Ibid., 108. 85 which religious instruction is given in state schools will be explained in a regulation of the Ministry of Education.68 • ln the following years a number of modifications and improvements were made. The Ministry looked after the publication of textbooks for religious instruction, especially for Islam, while Protestant and Roman Catholic affairs were left to their own religious bodies. Thus, even though the Ministry was meant for ail religions, in fact Islam got a number of privileges. From this policy, one can argue that in the multi-religious state promoted by Sukamo it was difficult to avoid giving certain privileges to Islam. This was perhaps due to Indonesia's Muslim majority and a response to Muslim demands. Regardless of certain privileges, however, there is no doubt that the existence of this Ministry has been beneficial not only to Muslims, but also to non-Muslims. During the Duteh colonial period and the Japanese occupation, Islamic education was organized by Muslims themselves through private schools: madrases and pesantre1ls The subjects were limited to recitation of Qur'an and learning the main principles of lslamic teachings such as imiin. and the general principles regulating salat (prayer), fasting and the charity tax ete. However, since the early twentieth century, a modem system of education has al50 been introduced. Consequently, the Islamic organizations began to create schools in which religious and general subjects were both taught.69 Meanwhile, the nationalist groups org;..lized education that emphasized "general knowledge", with a neutral character with respect to religion. From the above description, it is clear that since the Sukamo period, Indonesia has developed two kinds ofeducation: the Western educational system and the Islamic educational system. The former was 68lbid.. 1\0. 69For information about lsIamic modem education see Deliar Noer. The Modemisc Muslim Movemcnc Taurlk AbduDah. SchooIs :I1Id Pollues: The K:ium Muda Movemenc in Wc:sr Sum:ttr.l, 1927-1938 (Ithaca. Now York;' CorncU Modem Indonesia Project. 1971). 86 administered by the Ministry of Education. and the latter by the Ministry of Religiol's • Affairs. The recognition of the Islamic educational system was also a reflection of what Sukamo saw as the wishes of Muslim society. As a result . until the 1960's, the position of Islamic education developed both in scope and quality. The government established many Islamic schools. both private and state, and improved the qua1ity of religious teachers and administrators. By the middle of the Sukamo administration. in 1954. the number of madrases reached 13.849. with 2,017,590 pupils. According to Mahmud Junus, basing himself on statistics of 1954, the government subsidized more than 1300 ibtidaiyah,776 tsanawiyah and 16 filiyah schools. Other religious schools were financed by themselves. It is estimated that by 1965, there were 22000 pesantren and madrases.70 It also should be noted that since 1960, religion has been taught not only in religious schooIs but also in "generaI" (secular) schools. from the elementary to the university level. This policy was enforced especially after the Communist Party's coup anempt in 1965.71 The government's concern with the development of Islamic education not only irnplied its recognition of Islam. but also reflected the significance cf religion in society. The governrnent's concern was indicated by its response to the desires of the Muslim community to create an Islamic university. ln 1945. Masjumi decided to set up an lslamic university in Djakarta. A preparatory committee was set up under the leadership of Muhammad Hana, Vice President of lndonesia. The purpose of this institution was to train well-educated 'ulama. This university was opened on July 8. 1945. but was closed by the Allied Forces in December. The desire of the Muslim community to create the 70MaJunud Yunus, Sedjarnh Pendidikan Islam di Indonesia (Jakana: Pus1aJca MaJunudiyah. 1960). l1S-17 and 216. and sec A/·Djamiah. No. S-6. SCplemœr.November 1965, 46. 71De1iar Noer. AdminisU:llion of Islam in Indonesia (Ilhaca. New York: Comell Modem 1ndonesian Prcjecl Souteast Asian Progriun. 1978), 37 and 40. 87 Islamic university did not cease. and on April 10. 1946. it was opened by Sukarno. Later. in 1947. it beca:ne the Islamic University oflndonesia with faculties of Theology. Law. • Education. Economy al!d Technology. In 1950 a numtc~ vi ulam:! a:so founded an Islamic University in Solo. Later in 195I. these universities were united under the name of UII or Universicas Islam Indonesia (the Islamic University of Indonesia). which has continued to the present. Meanwhile. the Indonesian nationalist.~ created th" Gajahmada University which in 1949 became a scate university. Politically speaking. it can be said that the existence of IWO universities reflected the political competition beIWeen Ml1s1im-minded groups and nationalists in developing the new Indonesian state. As mentioned in the previous section. the Ministry of Religious Affairs represented a middle way that bridged the concept of lslamic state and a secular Slate, for religion remained an important pillar of the nation-state. For this reason, the government always undenook campaigns to make religion a positive power in the nation by supervising religious institutions. Therefore. the govemment promoted Islamic higher education. ln 1951, the govemment established PAIN or Perguruan Tinggi Agama Isl;1IlI Negeri (the State Islamic Higher Education); and in 1957 PHIN or Perguruan Hakim Islam Negeri (the State Islamic College for Jurisprudence), and ADIA or Akademi Dina.~ Ibnu Agama (the Government Academy for Religious Studies) were established. Soon afterwards these institutions were united into a single name, IAIN or Institure Agama Islam Negeri (th... State Institute for Islamic Studies), which still exists today. By the end ofthis period, in 1964, there were nine State Islamic Institutes (lAlN). with 72 faculties spread throughout Indonesia. This institution is under the supervision of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. It is obvious that Sukarno's religious policy. in terms of education. gave religion a significantrole in society. The involveTllent ofSukarno'sadministration in making religion a positiveelement in nationallife can also be seen especially in ho.w the govemment treated the application of 88 hlamic law in society. Observing how the Shari'a is applied in society might help ass~ss the position of lslarr. under Sukarno. Our focus will he on Islamic courts. Islamic courts • in Indonesia are concemed only \Vith family matters such as marriage, divorce, and ruju' (reconciliation) and, to a certain extent, faraid (inheritance). The treatment ofIslamic courts in the period of Sukarno should he understood as a continuity from the colonial period. Dcring the Dutch colonial rule, lslamic courts had vety limited power and jurisdi..:tion. The jurisdiction covered marriage, inheritance and waqf.72 However, from 1937 for the areas ofJava and Madura, inheritance and waqf disputes were referred to secular (civil) courts, and the decision was based on adat (tradition) rather than lslamic law.73 For the areas outside Java and Madura, lslamic law was handled by sultanate courts, a:ld if there were no sultanates. the application of lslamic law was left to the Muslim society at large.74 On matters ofinheritance, the decision ofthe lslamic court had to he confmned by the secular courL This policy was considered a manifestation ofDutch aims to reduce orifpossible to eliminate the use of Islamic law. These developments signify that, since the Duteh period, attempts te secularize Islamic law had been undertaken by encouraging pre-lslamic adat law. ThUs, the Islamic law of inheritance could he applied only insofar as it had been received by adat law. This kind offormula was known as the "reception theory," te use the terminology ofVan den Berg. During the Japanese period the position of lslamic courts was questioni:d by nationaliSt groups. In 1944, Supomo, an expert in adat OocaI) law and adviser to the Departrnent of Justice, proposed the abolition of lslamic courts. However the Japanese govemment wanted te maintain the status quo; and therefore this court system was not 72St:lalSblal 1882 No. 152. 73St:latblal 1937 No. 116. 74 Deliar Noer, Acbr.ùùstr.llion of 1sJam in Indonesia. b78), 43. 89 changed. and remained under the Ministry of Justice.7S The Japanese poliey in this regard is not surprising because at that time the Japanese needed suppon from the Muslims in • facing the Allies. Saon after the proclamation of Indonesian independence. in 1946. the Islarnic couns began to be administered by the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Later. in 1951, sultanate couns outside Java and Madura were abolished and replaced by religious couns, which had jurisdiction over inheritance maners.76 Meanwhile. Islamic couns in Java and Madura continue their usual activities, handling marriage disputes, and sometimes advising on maners ofinheritance. Many Indonesian nationalists opposed the existence of Islarnic couns for a number of reasons, ranging from economic to ideological: however, Sukarno preferred ta maintain the status quo for political reasons. Up to the end of Sukarno's period, the position of religious couns as formulated in the Govemment Regulation of1957 remained unchanged. Clearly, Sukarno's policy in the legal field was not completely secular; rather a dichotomous panern of religious couns and secular couns was established. The latter consists of IWO kinds: military and civil courts. Thus farnily law (marriage, divorce, inheritance, and 50 on) has been the last area to undergo secularization in the Indonesian case. Indeed. from the time of independence in 1945, the Sukarno's administration promu1gated various codes based on Dutch commercial. criminal, constitutional and civil codes. Those 1aws are wholly secularized; however. in the farnily law Shari'il remained basically unchallenged. Furthermore in formallaw. the IWO systems of law were applied in separate tribunals: secu1ar or public and religious courts. The religious court dealt with 7Snte confliet between adat and IsIamic Iaw in Indonesia dates from the DUlCh period. The Duleh tried lO revive the applicalion of ada1 Iaw in various ~ of persona! law, aiming al dismissing the influence of lsIamic Iaw. see C. van Vollenhoven, Hel Adatm:t van Nederlands Indie, 3 vols (Ieiden: BriII, 1918): R. Supomo, Poliûk Hu1cum Mal di Indopnesia (DjakarIa: Djambatan, 1940), and Daniel lev, 1s1amic Courts in Indonesia (Berkeley: University California Press. 1972), 20-35. Taufdt Abdullah suggests that ada1 and lslamic Iaw should IlOt Ile understood lO Ile a dichotomy, becausc the IWO are the way of Iife. Sec, Taufdt Abdullah, •Adal and Islam," lndonesia, 2 (OclOber 1966). 1·24. 76Pet:1lur.m Pemerinrah. No. 45. 1957•. 90 family law applied specifically for Muslims, they are staffed by religious judges mostly from among the 'ulama, under administration of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. The • public court of civil 1:lw is for ail lndonesian people; most of their judges have graduated from the public law faculty, while religious judges have graduated from the shari'a' faculty of an IAIN (the State lnstitute for Islamic Studies). However, during the Duteh period and in the post-colonial period in the 1950s, the post ofr~ligious judge was monopolizeci by the 'ulama class, mostly adherents of the Syafi'i school. Conclusion Sukamo's conception ofthe relation between state and religion was formed by two conditions: his intellectual development and bis dream to liberate the Indonesian people from the grips ofcolonialism and imperialism. TItree components constituted his thinking in this regard: Javanese syncretism, lslarnic modemism and a Western orientation. The last wa.~ more dominant than the others. The three ingredients were shaped by his dream to unify the whole lndonesian arcbipelago inta a modem nation-state. For this reason, he placed nationalism and the unity of lndonesia in the first tank of his ideology. Religion, however, could not be dismissed because Islam too had undoubtedly been a significant factor in creating Indonesian nationalism. Sukarno was a produet ofthe Duteh colonial system, and acquainted with Western ideas such as capitalism and socialism. Like other people who had graduated from the school system, his way of thinking was rationalist, pragmatic and religiously neutral, ln this respect, Duteh political ethics, orto use the term ofSnouck Hurgronje "emancipation", was relatively successful as many Indonesian élites were wi1ling to associate with the Duteh government Sukarno and bis like, however, did not want ta associate thernselves wit!l the colonizers; instead, he and bis associates, tagether with Islarnic groups, struggled against Duteh colonialism and Japanese occupation. Nevertheless, bisWestern educational 91 background selVed as the basis of his liberalism. and interestingly. he used Marxism to oppose capitalism. His opposition to capitalism WOlS symbolized in his popular lerm. • Marhaenism (a name for poor people) which meant Indonesian socialisl!l. Modemization was the major concem of Sukarno's programs. Islam could not be ignored as a factor in nationallife. due to its role in the struggle against the colonial power. However. Muslim society was backward and not ready for modemization. Sukarno's suggestion to Muslims was to return to the true nature of Islam: rationalism and progres.~. He preferred a secularist model of the relation between state and religion rather than an integralistic mode!. ln this respect, Sukarno was attracted to the ideas of Mustafa Kemal. and to sorne extent, was influenced by him. However. given the role of religion in Indonesian nationalism. Sukarno unlike Mustafa Kemal. recognized religion as one of the elements of his ideology. The place ofreligion in the Indonesian state has, till the present. remained a crucial issue among lndonesian elites: between Islamic oriented and non-Islamic oriented groups. Sukarno's compromise as regards religion can also seen in his acceptance of the proposai for the establishment of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. This was meant to be a compensation for his rejection ofan Islamic stale. This ministry WOlS to be a bridge between the Islamic stale and the Pancasila stale. ThUs, it cOIn be argued that Olt the stale level. Sukarno was religiously neutra1. and not complelely secular as Mustafa Kemal was. because he recognized the significance and the role of Islam in Indonesian nation building. Religion was one of the elements of his political manifesto: NASAKOM (nationalism.religion andcommunism). 92 CHAPTER THREE COMPARISON: SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES • " .. The ideas of Mustafa Kemal and Sukarno on the relationship between stale and religion have been discussed in previous chapters. The similarities and diff=rences between the two and the extent to which Sukarno was influenced by Mustafa Kemal will now be discussed. In assessing Mustafa Kemal's influences on Sukarno. two things will be discussed: Sukarno's endorsements of sorne of Mustafa Kemal's ideas; and how sorne Indonesian Muslim thinkers responded to Sukarno's secularism. The latter's responses were concemed with two issues: the position ofreason in the "rethinking ofIslarn" and the concept of separation between state and religion. Both Mustafa Kemal and Sukarno formulated the state-religion relationship in terms ofa secular paradigm. In fac!. however. they differed in placing religion in the framework ofthe state ideology. as well as in their religiouspolicies. To analyze the state-religion relationship according to the ideas ofthe two leaders. Donald Eugene Smith's theory of secuiarism will be used. He classifies the secuiarist paradigm ofstate-religion relationship into four aspects: the "separation ofpolity" from the religious structure; the "expansion of polity" to extend its functions into the socio economic spheres formerly reguiated by the religious structure; the "transvaluatioll of political culture" emphasizing temporal purpose through a rationalistic and pragmatic approach. and the "polity-dominance secuiarization.,,' Based on this classification. this analysis is struetured according to three major concems: the approach of Mustafa Kemal and Sukarno towards Islamic reforms, their perspectives on the paraàigm of state-religion relationship; and their religious policy in the restrueturing ofreligious institutions. 1Donald Eugene Smith.ReligiOII and PoIiticaJ Dcve/opmellt (Boston: Linte. Brown and Company. 1970). 87. " 93 A. A Rationalistic and Realistic Approach to Islam in Political Reforms. • Both Mustafa Kemal and Sukarno were rationalist in their Islamic reforms. and realistic in seeking political solutions to the problems oftheir peoples. Rationalism in this respect denotes the preference for the legal-rational over traditional and customary modes of legitimation and law-making. Their legislation did not have a foundation in religion. The justification of their actions was sought in nationalism and in the concern for modemization. With their Westem educational backgrounds. the two figures preferred a rational approach over bcing tied to the na,,,,ç. or scriptural authority. Unlike other Islamic reformers' they had never studied in formai religious schools. From 1923 10 19211 Mustafa Kemal made various experiments with religious reforms. He believed that Islam was essentially a "natural" anJ rational religion that had to be liberated from the monopoly of the Shaikh al-Isliim over its interpretation. For him radical religious reform was the only way to free reasoning. As Berkes has put il, "Freeing the conscience could be effected ooly when and insofar as the theocratic concept was eliminated from the body of the religious outlooks."2 Mustafa Kemal and Sukamo were religiously neutral, and saw Islam as a personal matter. Both were convinced ofthe need for a "rethinking of Islam" in order to adjust it to new demands in accordance with places and circumstances. If revelation, the n~ contradieted reason, the former had to be reinterpreted. The na,,,,ç was therefore subjeet to reason. Thus, Sukarno and Mustafa Kemal are categorized as rationalists. On the question of how lndonesian Muslims have responded to reforrns. Howard M. Federspiel has classified them into three groups. FlISt, those who identified themselves with the Middle East tradition in 'aqïda (beliefs), 'ubudiyya (worship) and law, and trled to bring these in line with the dernands of modemization. These groups are represented by 2Niyazi Berkes.T1Je DeveJopmcnr of SecuJarism in Twtcy (Montreal: McGiII UnivelSity Press. 1964), 482. 94 the Persis (the Ishmic Unity) and Muhammadiyah. Second, those who identified themselves with the existing local tradition, tried to adjust it to Islam, and remained • committed to the four schools of IsIamic Iaw, especially that of Shafi'i. These groups are represented by the NU (the NahdlaruI UIama ) and the Perti (the Association of Religious Education). Third, those who accepted secularism and viewed religion as a personal matter or as something which affected the life ofsociety and govemment only in cthical and moral terms.3 These groups were represented by the PNl (the Indonesian National Pa.."ty) led by Sukarno. His rational approach to Islamic reform was stl"ongly criticized by both the flI'St and the second groupS, a1though, the former was more active than the latter. ThUs, Ahmad Hassan, a leader of the Persis or Persaruan Islam (the Islamic Unity), criticized strongly Sukamo's reforms, especially as regards the position ofreason in lslamic reform. He viewed Sukarno's reforms as exciuding the Qur'iin and the role of 'ulamii' and as contradicting the'aqida (beliefs) of Islam.4 Similarly, Natsir, a leader of the Masjumi or Majlis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia (the Indonesian Muslirn Consultative Associations) argued that not aIl Isiamic teaching could be reinterpreted. Ifthe nJ$~ was unarnbiguous on a particular matter, there was no room for a rethinking.5 Obviously, for Hassan and Natsir, the position ofreason was subordinate to that of the n~ in the sense that reason functions as a tool for the explanation of the ~ while for Mustafa Kemal and Sukarno, the na,çs ought to be subject to new dernands. If the reason and na$,ç contradicted each other, it was reason which was to be followed. These difIerent views were, among other thingS, due to the difIerent educational backgrounds ofthose who held 3See Howanl M. Federspie\, PemImn IsIam: IsIamic Refonn in Twenrieth CenlWy Indonesi:J (lthaca, New York: Modem Indonesian Project Soutbcast Asia Program, Corncl1 University Press, 1978), üi. This book is the ffiost comprehensive source in English on PeIsaIuan Islam. 4AI-lisan. No. 51. Seplember 5, 1940, 9. Al-lisan was a momh1y magazine issue 5A. Mocchlis, "Is1am dan Akal McnIel,a: Panji Masyarnkat. No. 20. May 20. 1940. 367: sec also M. NaIsir, Capit! Select! (Djalaina: Bulan Bintang. 1973), 238-262. 95 them. Unlike Hassan and Natsir. Mustafa Kemal and Sukamo were never educated in religious schools: the entire education of Mustafa Kemal had been in military school. while • Sukamo had been trained as an engineer. The "elasticity of Islam" that Sukarno emphasized. was considered by Ahmad Hassan as amounting to subordinating the Quriin to new demands.6 In fact. Sukamo did not challenge the authority of the Quriin over ail aspects of life. religious or profane. In worldly affairs, in order that Islam be compatible with modemization, Sukarno sought to understand the Quriin in terms of the "spirit" of the text rather than the literai text itself. Both Sukarno and Ahmad Hassan. as weil as Natsir, promoted the significance of Islamic reforms. However, they differed in determining the limit between worldly and religious maners. For example. in the legal sphere. Sukarno considered the law of wearing thetabir (sereen), jilbab (veil); and the procedure for cleaning something licked by a dog as worldly affairs. and hence it was not necessary to follow the sacred texts or the 'Ulamiï' s views in such matters. Such matters were not prescribed by Islam. and were no more than a product of the Muslirn historical experience. In the case of clea.'ling something Iicked by a dog. Sukamo suggested the use of a delergenl instead of using soil. Uniike Mustafa Kemal and Sukarno, Hassan and Natsir considered these matters 10 be a pan of 'Ubudiyya (worship), so that reference to the sacred texts and to the ideas of 'ulamii' was obligatory. ln the .>}/here of political reforms, a rational and realistic approach produced a number of new ideas. After independence, the ideas of democracy. liberalism and sociaIism merged \ërith nationalism. Nationalist élites promoted them as the comerslone of state ideology, though the masses usually did not comprehend such currents of thought. Therefore, it was necessary ta create a new formulation ofideology, or such .. ideological 6A. Hassan, "Mernocdakan Pengel1ian ISlam," AI-Lis:uI. No. 48. June S. 1940. 17. 96 bridges," to use the term of Donald Eugene Smith, as "Islamic socialisrn" and "Islamic theo-democracy" and others? Thus, Mustafa Kemal enunciated "the Six Arrows of • Kemalism," while Sukarno formulated "the Five Principles" called Pancasila. Later Sukarno summarized these principles into a political manifesto: the NASAKOM (nationalism, religion and communism). lnterestingly, Sukarno was close to Marxism while Mustala Kemal rejected it The principle of populism in Kemalism does not Mean c1ass struggb b:n rather is a reflection of his egalitarianism. Egalitarianism for Kemal was reflected in populism, while for Sukarno it was reflected in socialism. The question is how they were different in treating Marxism. This question must he answered in the Iight ofthe different intellectual and political discourses in the two countries. When Mustafa Kemal was emerging as a nationalist leader, three discourses, "Westernism, Islamism, and Turkism" defined the milieu. As was elaborated in the flfSt chapter, up 10 the era of the Young Turks (1908-1918) neither Islarnization nor Westernization could arrest Ottoman disintegration. Under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, Turkish nationalism became a strong ideology clirecting the transformation of the Ottoman Empire into the modern Turkish Republic. He was convinced that Islam was no longer effective as a means for maintaining the Empire. Ir. the era of Abdülhanûd (1876 1908), the Ottomans seeking suppon from Muslim subjects in fighting against Western powers, used the slogans of Islarnism; however, the strategy did not work very successfuIIy. Furthermore, a pan ofTurkish territory had becn occupied by the Greeks and the Allied Powers. ln such a political situation, Mustafa Kemal with the Anatolian people struggled against the foreign powers. Seeing the position of Mustafa Kemal among the masses, the Sultans. under the tutelage ofthe Allied powers. had the Shaikh al-lslim issue a farwa calling for the death penalty for Mustafa Kemal. It is thus not surprising that Mustafa Kemal should have built a secular nation-state, destroying the Sultanate system. 7DonaJd Eugene Smith, Religion and Polirical Development, Il. 97 Mustafa Kemal believed that seeularizaùon was the only way to achieve r.lpid • modemization. Unlike the Turkish case, three issues, Islamism and Marxism and Nationalism. dominated the Indonesian politieal diseourse from the early years of this century to the I94Os. Islamism came to prominenee in the political discourse with the birth of the SOI or SarekatDagang Islam (the Islamic Commercial Association) established by Samanhudi in 1911. This organization was a response to the activities of the Chinese dominated economy and enjoyed many privileges from Outch colonial authorities. This was the fll"st major religiously based nationalist organizatior..8 In 1912. the name of the SOI was changed to the SI or Sarekat Islam (the Islamic Association). and came to he led by a prominent Islamic leader. H. O. S. Tjokroaminoto (1883-1934), a teacher ofSukamo.9 He was the fust Indonesian lsiamic leader to propose Islam as a factor of cohesion for Indonesian unity. Under his leadership, this organization was transformed from a conunercial to a political organization.10 and it became one of the most imr-'Ortant Indonesian politicai organizations in the early twentieth century.11 Tjokroaminoto thought that the SI would establish an Islarnic state by following the example ofthe Prophet's state at Medina. To do 50. the independence ofIndonesia was absolutely necessary.12 ln 1917. the SI, in its congress made the decision to achieve Indonesian freedom through a gradual 8See Fred R. von der Mehden,Religion and Nationalism in Sourhe.1st Asia (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1963). 94. 9See Tunur Jailani. The S:Jrebt IsJam Movement: Ils Conllibution ID Indoncsian Natiooalism. M. A. thesis. McGiU University. Monueal. 1959. 35; aIso George McTuman Kahin. Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (lthaca:. New York: ComeU University Press. 1963). 28. l000nald Eugene Smith, cd.. Religion and Politics. and Social Change in Ihe 1hird Wor/d (New York; The Free Press, 1971), 109. 11 Robert Van Niel. The Emergence of /he Modem Indonesian Elite (The Hague: W. V'dl! Hoeve. 1970). 2. 12H. O. S. TjoIaoaminoco.Tafsir Progrnm-~ dan Progrnm Tandhim Panai Syarïkal IsJam Indonesia (Jakarla: Ù\inah·Tanfidziyah PSU. 1958). 30. 98 evolution.13 Two things which Sukarno learned from Tjokroaminoto were Islam and ami colonialism. As mentioned in the second chapter, though Sukarno first becarne acquainted • with Islam through Tjok:'oaminoto, he came to disagree with the latter's view that Islam was an ideology. Marxism was fust introduced into Indonesian politics in 1914 with the establishment of the ISDV or Indische Sociaal Democratiche Vereeniging (the Democrat Social Organization of Hindia Belanda) by H. J. F. Sneevlied.14 This organization also infiltrated the SI. aiming at bringing it into the fold ofcor.:ununism. As a result, the SI split into two groups, the left and right wings. Later, in 1920, the name of the ISDV was changed into the PK! or Panai Komunis Indonesi::! (the Indonesian Communist Party). Gradually, the right wing lost credibility, because the PK! was more radical than the latter in opposing colonialism. As Fred R. von der Mehden stated: Left -wing came to sec in the Sarekat Islam their weapon in a class struggle with non-!slamic colonial capitaiist groups, and Marxism and nationalism rather than Islam became for them the chief motive forces. But the Muslim bourgeoisie regarded the !slamic movement primarily as the expression of group solidarity, integrated along the religious-culturallines ofmodern Islam.15 The main concerns of the PK! were ~"lCialism and anti-colonialism. In 1921, the PK! separaled from the SI, because the leaders of the SI, Tjokroaminoto and Salim rejected class struggle as postulated by Marxism.16 From 1926 to 1927, the PK! rebelled against the colonial government, and was consequently banned by the government.H It is 13Bemard H. B. V1ekke. Nusanrara (The Hague: W. van Haeve, (960). 354. 14Nagazumi Akira, The Dawn of Indonesian Naôonalism (Tokyo: InstilUte of Developing Economies, 1972). 91. tSJ. M. van der Kroef. ll1donesia ill the modem Wood (Bandung: Masa Baru. 1954), 74. tlia. M. Kahin. Naâonalism and RevoluâOll ill Indonesia. 76. 17Donald Hindley. The COlrmwùst Party of Indonesia, 19SI·1963 (Berkeley: University of Califomia Ptess, 1964), Ig and 358. Aftcr the rebellion of 1926 and 1927, the founder of the Communist Party. Sneevliet, was expe1led from Indonesia. and Samaun. 99 is obvious that since the 1920's and 1930's the two discourses. Is1amism and Marxism were in competition. In this respect Syafii Maarif has observed that Marxism was more • powerful than Is1amism in that Marxism was offensive in its stance. whi1e Islam was defensive.'8 It seems that intel1ectual1y. Islam was not ready to face the modern ideology. ln the intel1ectual discourse. the Muslims were mostly apologetic. c1aiming that socialism was inherent in Islam itself. As Tjokroaminoto argued. "We are Muslim. so we are socialist"'9 However. they failed to recognize that the principle of egalitarianism and social justice. though emphasized by Islam. were not reflected in its polit1l.:al system. The Westemized Indonesian élite such as Sukarno w~re attracted to naùonalism r.lther than Islam. They believed that making Islam the basis ofnationalism would create obstacles in mobilizing support from communities composed of a variety of religions. ethnicities and cultures. To achieve an lndonesian unity and drive out the Dutch colonialists. Sukarno. soon after the banning the PKI in 1927 established the PNI or PilTtÙ National Indonesia (the Indonesian National Party). The main purpose of this organization was to achieve lndonesian independence in the basis of a nationalisl, r.lther than either Pan-Islamic or communist ideology.20 Why Sukarno was more attracted to Marxism than to Islamism. can be accounted for by severa! reasons. Cultura\ly. with his Western education. his thinking was religiously neutrai and he did not see Islam as an ideology. Secondly. the kind of Islam represented by Tjokroaminoto and other Islamic leaders was not an ideology. while Marxism. on the other hand. had a clear ideological appeai. viewing colonialism as the !he Iirst chainnan of Communist Pany. escaped 10 Moscow. For mon: informatiun on this uprising sec Ruth Mcvey. The Conunrmist Uprising of 1926-1927 in lndoncsia (11haca: Comell University Press, 1960). 18Ahmad Syafii Maarif. 5/Udi IeIIt:IlIg Pcrc:IIW':III da/am Konstiru:UIIC: 151.111/ dan Masalah Keneg:uaan (Jakarla: LP3ES. 1985). 8&. t9Quoted in Timor Jailani. The 5y:uilcal Islam Move:menl: Ils ConUiburion 10 lndonesian N:uion:tlism. 59. 20 G. M. KaJùn. Naâon:tlism and Revolution in Indoncsian.91. 100 culmination of capitalism.21 and insisting on a class struggle against capitalism. For Sukamo. the support given by Muslims to the Sarekat Islam was expressive more of a • relibious feeling than of an ideological orientation. Thirdly. politically the Islamic world was very weak. being mostly in the grip of the Western powers. while communisrn after the Boishevik Revolution in 1917 had become powerfuI. Though the PKI was abolished in 1927. Marxism did not lose its significance. Many intellectuals including Suk~rno were anracted to Marxism's opposition te capitalism. Shafii Maarif has argued that the SI did not really oppose capitalisrnand colonialism, butpreferred to achieve independence through evolution rather than revolution.22 Therefore. it is understandable that Marxism and nationalisrn dominated the Indonesian political scene in opposing the colonial govemment. It was obvious that Marxism and nationalism. rather than Islam were more effective ideologies to fight against colonialism, Islam functioned ooly as a tool of solidarity rather than as an ideology. B. The Paradigm of the State-Rcligion Re1ationship: Secular State and Pancasila State. How did Mustafa Kemal and Sukarno define the relations between state and religion in their secularism. Mustafa Kemal understood secularism as an anernpt to liberate society from the domination ofthe Sultan and the Shaikh al-Isliim, who sought to regulate aIl aspects oflife. particularly law and education. In other word$, secularism for Mustafa Kemal was a prerequisite for Turkish modernizarion. In the Ottoman Empire, secularizarion had in faet becn underway since the rime of theTanzimac. Secularizarion 21 Anthony Reid. The Indonesian National Revolution: 1945-1950 (Hawthom. Victoria: Longman. 1974). 6 22A, S. Maarif. SIUdi tenl3llg Pl=Ilw:ln daIam KOIISliruanre: Is1am dan Masalah Keneg;u:l:lll. 90. 101 during that period of Ottoman history was limited to law and education however. Right up to the Young Turk period. the political !,osition of the Sultan was unchanged. It was • only after the secularizing reforms of Mustafa Kemal that radical changes occurred. The Sultanate-caliphate was abolished in 1924. and was replaced by the sovereignty of the people as embodied in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. Mustafa Kemal's secularism was motivated by the com;ern to prevent manipulation :'lf religion according to the political interests of the rulers. He haà seen himself how religion was manipulated by the Sultan through the fatwas of the Shaikh al-Isliim in fighting Mustafa Kemal's attempts to create the Turkish state as a new entity. He had ais\) realized that religion no longer provided the basis for the cohesion of the Ottoman Empire as indicated by the rise of Arab nationalism at a time when the Ottomans were trying to maintain political unity by using the slogan of Islam. Since the middle of the nineteenth century, the Sultanate political system had staned to he questioned. and demands for it~ reform began to be made, by the Young Ottomans in the 186Os, and the Young Turks in the 1890s. Though they proposed secularization, religion remained an important element oftheir ideology. The result was a dichotomous pattern in law, education and politics. It was only after Mustafa Kemal rose to power that this dichotomy completely disappeared. Thus. bis secularization was a completion of what had been undertaken in the previous period. Atarime when therole ofreligion in society had reached its nadir, Mustafa Kemal was becoming inCTeaSingly popular among the masses. owing 10 his sttuggle against the Western powers and bis vietories on the battlefield. Therefore, it is not surprising that his program ofseeularization wasalso accepted byrnost ofthe Anatolian people. Mustafa Kemal's seeularism meant a process that was indispensable for creating a modem T!!I'key. He believed that Western modemization should be followed as a mode\. Moreover, ail manifestations of Islam were 10 he removed from Turkish culture, and replaced by a Western culture which would upr~t the influence ofreligiousdominance and 102 eliminate fetters to modemization. Such a policy does not mean, however, that he was anti-religion. For him religion could not be separated from Turkish life, but he preferred to • use it as an instrument of modemization. To do 50, Islam had to be reformed through a rationalistic approach by redefining the role of religion in society and State in terms of national needs and the demands ofmodemization. Both Kemal and Sukarno held te the separation of State and religion, bath being guided by the assumption that Islam is not an ideology and that it does not offer a model for a specific political system. Unlike Mustafa Kemal, however, Sukamo considered religion to be one aspect of bis State ideology. Basically for Sukamo, Islam is egalitarian, hence, any model ofa political system was te be based on this principle. The monarcbical . system and its various manifestations were contradictory to Islam. Both Mustafa Kemal and Sul:amo inc1uded nationalism as an element oftheir ideologies, and used nationalism as a powerful weapon against Westem powers. Nevertheless, the role of religion in the context of the:' nationalisms differed. In Turkey, by the time of the Ott. .lan collapse religion had lost rneaning by being constantly manipulated. In contrast, in the Indonesian case, religion played an important role in the solidarity of the community in the struggle against colonialism. At that time, nationalism was a part of Muslirn sentiment. Because of the power that religion held over the people, Sukarno came to adopt religion as an element of bis ideology. Oearly, the different bistorical roles of religion made the two figures differ in their use ofreligion in state ideology. As discussed in the fust chapter, Islamism could not compete with Westemism in Turkey. Politically speaking, Islam was manipulated on behalf of the Sultans' political interests. This situation was different from what was happening in Indonesia. From 1910, Indonesian Islam had backed political parties aiming atacbieving freedom. However, after the infiltration of communism inte the Islamic organization, the SI or Sarekat Islam (the Islamic Associations), and the birth ofthe PNI (the Indonesian National Party) in 1927 led 103 by Sukarno, the Sarekat Islam becarne weak, as we have mentioned earlier. Nevertheless, in the 1930's, Islarn came to the fore again, competing with Marxism and • nationalism. This resurgence was indicated by the establishment ofthe Islamic federal body called the MIAI or MajJis Islam 'A1a Indonesia (the Indor,esian Islamic Council) in 1937, pioneered by the NU and Muhammadiyah.23 During the Japanese occupation {I942 1945), due to Japanese cooperation with the'ularna' (or as Benda put il, "Nippon's Islamic Grass-roots policy"), the role ofIslam in politics became sO'onger.24 Unlike the Duteh, the Japanese recognized the significance ofthe'ulamâ' in politics. Thus the Japanese cooperated with the'ularna' aiming at mobilizing the Indonesian people to face the Allied powers in the Pacific War. Shumubu, the Office of Religious Affairs was established.25 ln the military field, HisbuIlah (the Party of Gad), and Sabilillah (the Path ofGad) were created in 1944. The former was for the Muslim youth, while the laner comprised the'ularnâ' and functioned as supervisor ofHisbuIlah.26 These initiatives ofthe Japanese made Muslims experienced both in governmental and rnilitary affairs, and gave them confidence to compete with the secularélites.27 This situation motivated Sukarno to recognize Islam as an important political power in the struggle for lndonesian independence. 23Sec K.H. ~ Mansur, "Riwayat Berdirinya Majelis Islam TeninggiM in Amir Hamzah cd..Rangkain Mutu ManiJ:am: Buah F"I1ciran Budiman J(jyahi Haji Mulsur (Surabaya: Penyebar Drnu &. Iksan. 1968), 85. 24see Harry J. Benda, The O=ent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian 1s1anr under rhc Japanese OCCupation, 1942-1945 (The Hague and Bandung: W. van Hoevc. 1958), 134; aIso sec MA. Azis, Japan's CoJonia1ism and 1ndonesia (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. 1955), 206. 2Snùs insliwtion was flISt led by Prof. Husein Djayadiningt3l, laIcr by K.H. Hasjim Asj'ari,!he founder of NU or NahdIa1ul UIama' (The lise of 'UIama), a gIlIIldfalher of Abdunaiunan Wahid, !he present chairman of NU. Usee SeriaI Media Dakwah, No. 62 (Agustus 1979), 18-19. 27A. S. Maarif. SIUdi tentang PercaIutan da.lam KOIlSÛIUanIe: Islam dan M:ls:J1a1J Kenegaraan, 99. 104 The Muslims' power in politics was reflected in their involvement in formulating a state ideology in competition with secular groups. In April, 1945, BPUPKI was created • with 68 members: 20 % of these proposed an Islamic state and 80 % pi"oposed a secular state.28 The members of this organization eventually reached a political compromise, agreeing that the state be neither Islamic nor secular, but rather what carne to be called the Pancasila state, a nation-state based on the following five principles : Belief in God, Humanity, Unity of Indonesia, Democracy and Social Justice. In the preceding debates. Sukarno proposed the narne Pancasila, but his concept ofit was slightly different from the later formulation in that he made "Belief in God" the fifth principle and "Unity of Indonesia" the fast. Faith in God. in Sukarno's mind, was a deconfessionalized rather than a specifically Islamic concept.29 For hirn. Pancasila could be summarized into three components: socio-nationalism, socio-democracy. and socio-religion. Later. he argued that three components could be sumrnarïzed into Ekasila (one principle): Gotong Royong (mutual cooperation). ThisEkasila is not a c1ear concept, butitcan be interpreted as a kind of socialism adjusted ta Indonesian culture, wbich emphasizes mutual cooperation arnong competing forces in society. We can argue. therefore. that ideologically. Sukarno completely secular. was not very different from Mustafa Kemal. However, due to his inability to implement his ideas. he had to recognizereligion as an elementofbis ideology. Unlike Mustafa Kemal. Sukarno did not have rni1itary power. Mustafa Kemal's political career had begun in the army after ail. whileSukarno was a politician and an intellectual. 280r the 68 mernbcrs of BPUPKI. 15 Icprescnted IsIamic organizaIions. They were: K.HJ. Sanusi and K.H. Abdul Halùn from the PU! (The Unity or Islamic Community). Ki &gus Hadilcusumo. K.H. Mas Mas.J1aIr and Abdul Kahar Muzakkir from Mubammadiyah, K.H.A. Wachid ~jim and K.H. Masjkur from the NU. Sukiman Wrrjosandjoyo frorn the PU. the Unity or Indonesian Islam. Abikusno Tjolaosujoyo from the psu, the Indonesian IsIamic Party. and Agus SaJùn from (Exs SI. IsIamic AssociaIion). sec PraWOIO MangkusasmiIO. Penumbuhan Historis RWllus Dasar Negara dan Sebu:Ih Proje/csi (Jakarta: Hudaya, 1970). 11-12. 29See C. A. O. van Nicuwenhuijze, Aspects of Islam in l'ost-colOllÏ31 Indonesia (The Hague: W. van Hoevc LId., 1958). 180-243. . 105 Under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal. the Turkish National Assembly was dominated by nationalist military groups. Islam. as alrcady noted. had eeascd to he a • politieal force since the end ofthe Young Turk period (1918). This political situation was completely different from the Indonesian case. in which the Islamic parties. mainly the NU andMasjumi were powerfuJ. The NU or Nahdacul U1ama (the Resurgence ofthe'U1ama) hac!. from 1952 onwards. started to function as a political party. and in the 1955 general elections had emerged as the largest party after the PNI and the PKI.30 The Masjumi or Majlis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia (the Indonesian Muslim Consultative Associations) under the leadership of Natsir. played a major political role in the decade after independence. leading the f1I'St two cabinets. For his part. Sukarno tried to keep a balance among the three powers by proclaiming the national ideology ofNASAKOM. an acronym fo: the three forces on the Indonesian political seene: nationalism, religion and cOlIUUuniSm.31 The impact of the Islamic parties on Sukarno's view of the relations between state and religion was that when he proclaimed bis Decree of July 5th. 1959. retuming to the Pancasila and the Constitution of 1945. Sukarno declared that the principle of"Beliefin God with obligation for Muslims to perform their Islamic practices" inspired that Constitution. The significance ofthis statement was that law-making on the basis of religion was givenlegalrecognition. 3~ NU or Nahdatul U1:l11Ul was eslablished in 1926 to plOvide orthodox leadership 10 the Muslim rnass..s on questions of Islamic law, relations with govemment, Iaw and education. By 1935, it bad developcd a strong basis in East Java and claimed 67, 000 members. II now claims 10 have aboUI 35 million members (according 10 Abdurrahman Wahicl, generat chairman of the NU). Unlike the NU, the Masjumi's ideologica1 IOOts lie in the modemist Islam of Muhammad Abduh. The Muhammadiyah providcd a large part of the Masjumi's leadership and ideologica1 suppon. ln 1960, this party was banned by Sukarno for its alleged complicity in revolts in Sumatra and Sulawesi. For the cultural and ideologica1 bacIcground of both the NU and the Masjumi, sec Robert R. Jay. Religion and Po/iôes in Rural CeornJ Java (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Sludies, 1963); and aIso sec Clifford Geenz, The Religion of Java (Glencoe, DL: Free Press, 1960). 31 Sec Justus M van der Kroef. "Communism and Islam in Indonesia: A Western View; India Quarrer/y, Vol. 10 (October 1954), 314; also Allan A. Samson, "Islam in Indonesia Politics, "Asiao Survey, Vol. 8 (December 1968), 1001-1017. 106 Sukarno's political manifesto, NASAKOM, symbolized his syncretism. He preferred to synthesize existing ideologies rather than to choose one over the others, as Mustafa Kemal did. Interestingly, Sukarno's way of thinking is similar to that of Ziya Gokalp in this regard. Gokalp also forrnulated the Ottoman discourse into a "Tri-Partite Synthesis" of Nationalism, Westemism and Islamism. It is important to note that both Gokalp and Sukarno held that the social function ofIslam is ethical rather than ideological. According to Harun Nasution, Sukarno was attracted to and quoted Gokalp's slogan" Kira datang dari Timur. Kira berjalan munuju Barat" f:îNe came from the East, we move to the West),32 a slogan which emphasizes the significance ofsynthesizing Western and Eastern world views. As regards the relationship between Westemism and nationalism. Gokalp differentiated between culture and civiIization. For him, Westemization was to be limited to the frame ofcivilization, while culture was the basis ofTurkish nationalism. The concept of culture in the nùnd of Gokalp included the values of Islam. In this respect, Sukamo was similar to Gokalp and differed from Mustafa Kemal. Gokalp ~jected the elinùnation ofArabie from Turkish. Oearly, in the concept ofnationalism. Sukarno was closer to Ziya Gokalp; unlike Mustafa Kemal's nationalism. the nationaJtst ofGokalp and Sukarno could not be detached from Islam. The secularism of Mustafa Kemal was meant, for its part, to establish the nation as a modem entity. He declared in 1925: The Turkish Revolution signifies a transformation far broader than the word revolution suggests...Itmeans replacing an age-old political unity based on religion with one based on another tie, that ofnationality...This nation has also accepted the principle .~atall its laws should be based on seculClI' grounds only.33 Mustafa Kernal's understanding of modemization ~ows a linear pattern; he believed Western nations had achieved their modernity after passing through traditionalism. This 32Harun NlRIÎOll. Teologi Islam (Jakarta: Yayasan 1'alerbit UniversilaS Indonesia. 1978), 129. The wrileT is Dean of Posl.gmduate programs of IAIN Jakarta. 33Quolcd in Niyazi BeIkcs. The DeveIOpment of SecuIarism in Turicey. 470. 107 process was uni'. ~rsal. and had to be followed by other nations who sought progress: to • achieve modemity. secularization was a prerequisite. Returning to the problem of the state-religion relationship. we must now ask about th~ extent to which Sukarno was influenced by Mustafa Kemal. To answer this question. sorne of Sukarno's references to Mustafa Kemal's ideas will discussed. Ridwan Lubis has made a list of 20 Islamic reforrners who influenced Sukarno. as indicated in the table beIow. Table 1 A Iist ofIslamic Reforrners Quoted by Sukarno in his Works and SpeecheS34 No. Nama NIM KP SIDE TALP MPI TMDN SKO MOMKU IS IAKP TOTAL ------_._-_._ _. 1926 1928 1934 1939 ______1940 1940 a ______1964 •• 1. Al·Afghani S 6 2. Muhammad Abduh 2 2 3. 'Arabi Pasha 1 4. Muslofa Kami! 1 2 S. Farid Bey 1 1 6. 'Ali Pasha 1 1 7. Ahmad Bey 1 1 8. Muhammad 'Ali 1 3 2 3 10 9. Shaukati Ali 1 1 10. Muslofa Kemal 1 1 34 2 38 11. Zaghlu1 Pasha 2 2 12. Amir Ali 11 2 IS 13. K. Kama1uddin 4 S 14. Essad Bey 4 2 7 IS. Farid Wajdi 4 3 7 16. Halidc Edib 2 21 24 17. 'Ali 'Abd Al.Riziq - 1 3 4 18. Qasim Amin 3 3 19. Ahmad Khan 2 2 20. Ziya Goka1p 1 3 ------4 Explanation: tideofarticles. NIM = Nationalisme, Islamisme, Marxisme (Nationalism, Islamism, Marxism). KP = Kearah Persatuan (To Direction ofUnity). SIDE = Soerat-soerat dari Ende (Letters from Ende). TALP = Tabir adaIah Lambang Perbudakan (Seree is the Syrnbol ofSiavery). MPI = Memudahkan Pengertian Islam (To malte Understanding Islam easy). TMADN = Apa sebab Turki Memisahkan Agama danri Negara (Why Turlcey Separated Religion from State). 34Muhammad Ridwan Lubis, Pemikiran Submo /eflrang Islam dan WISlIf·WISlIf Pemb3hanl:lnnya (Jakarta: CV Haji Masagung. '1990). 132. 108 SKD = Saya Kur-.:ag Dinamis ( 1am legs dynamic) MOMK{J= Masyarakat Onta dan Masyarakat Kapal Udara (Camel and Aircraft Society). iAKP = Islam adalah Agama Kehidupan dan Perjuangan (Islam is Religion ofLife and • Struggle). Lubis divides the above rnentioned figures into three groups: 1) Afghani. and 'Abduh; 2) Halide Adib. Ziya Géikalp. Mustafa Kemal and 'Ali 'Abd AI-Raziq; and 3) Arnir Ali and Ahmad Khan. From the first groups. Sukarno leamed the importance of reason in Islamic reforms. As was men understand Islam from Tjokroaminoto. a leader ofSarekat Islam. and was also atttacted to the reforms proposed by K. A. Dahlan. a leader ofMuhalnmadiyah. The former preferred to conduet his struggle by means of a socio-political movernent, while the latter did 50 through a socio-religious movement. ln accordance with his Western educational background. Sukarno was atttacted to the ideas of Afghani and 'Abduh about the need to adopt a rational approach to religious reform; however. Sukarno went farther than they. as indicated by the fact tha. he was wiIIing even to reinterpret the nll$,ç if it contradicted reason. Thus he did not agree with Tjokrominoto's calI for creating an independent Indonesia on the model ofthe Prophet's state at Medina. Sukarno wanted rather to base the new state on rel:gious neutraIity. Consequentiy. he was drawn 10 the ideas of Mustafa Kemal on the separation of state and religion. As shown by the table above Sukarno quoted Mustafa Kemal 38 times. more often than any other reformer. Halide Adib came second. with 21 times, and Anùr Ali third. with 15 limes. As noted in the second chapter. in 1920's and 1930'5, Sukamo had become acquainted with other secular nationalists. Mustafa Kemal's concept of a nation-state which was religious1y neutral came to rnerge with Sukamo's outiook. Both Mustafa Kemal and Sukarno were educated in the Western tradition, and both he1d that Islam was not an ideo10gy, but rather a persona! matter. and therefore Islam was not the business or the responsibility of the state. Islam rather was necessary to preserve unity ofthe nation. and to make religion a 1001 for modernization and .e to free the peoplefrom ignorance andclerical manipulation. 109 The quantitative data above shows that Sukarno was more influenced by Mustafa Kemal than any other reformer. This conclusion can he strengthened by looking at how • Sukarno commented on Mustafa Kemal's reforms. Sukarno wrote several articles. entitled Apa sebab Turki Memisahkan Agama dari Negara (Why Turkey Separated Religion from State), Memudakan Pengertian Islam (To Malee Understanding Islam Easy), Kear.w Persatuan (To Direction ofUnity) and Tabir adalah Lambang Perbudakan (Screen is the symbol ofSiavery).35 These articles show his deep interest in Mustafa Kemal's experiment in Turkish secularism. Sukarno always quoted Mustafa Kemal's ideas when involved in debates with other Islamic reformers who stood for the unity of state and religion. Most debates were between Sukarno and M. Natsir, with Natsir criticizing Sukarno as an adherent ofKemalism. According to Sukarno, as discussed in the second chapter, the Sultanate-ealiphate system did not originate from Islarn, but rather had elements of three civilizations, the Arabs. Byzantine and Persian. This system was a "dictatorship." Under the leadership of Sultan Mehmed il (1444-1481), Selim 1 (1512-1520) and Sü\eymân 1 (1520-1566) the system could function properly. However, after these three Sultans, these was a weakening of the Empire.36 The Sultanate-caliphate system was not consonant with Islam; when empire was powerful, the ruler becarne a dictator, and when the empire was weak, the Shaikh al-Islâm and the religious hierarchy becarne obstacles to Islamic reforms,37 Referring to the ideas of 'Ali 'Abd AI-Riiziq, Sukarno indicated that in Islarn there is no obligation to unite state and religion, there is no ijmir to this effecl38 For Sukarno, the 35nese articles were published in Pan)ï Islam in the 19405 and n:published in Dibawah Bendera Revolusi. Sec Sukarno, Dibawah 1kndern Revolusi 1Ojakarta: Panitya Penerbit Dibawah Bendelll Revolusi, 1963), 349-455. 36soekamo. •Apa sebab TurIâ Memisahkan Agama dari Negara?: l'anj; 1sL1III, No. 26, July 1, 1940. 493. 37Soekamo. •Apa sebab Twlci Memisahkan Agama dari Ncgara?: Panji Islam, No. 23, June 10, 1940, 455. 110 existence ofthe caliph was merely a historical development. ln other words. any country could create a political system in accordance with new situations and demands. The • Muslims were free to abandon the Sultanate-caliphate and to adopt any other that seemed more suitable to their circumstances. The separation ofstate from religion was necessary in order to restrict the influence of religion in politics; if religion was in the hands of the rulers. it could easily be manipulated.39 Religious teaching was the responsibili:y of the individual, and the state did not have the obligation to force people to carry out their religion. The state's involvement in religious maners would restrict the life ofreligion, as happened in the Onoman Empire. Sukarno also quoted Halide Edib 10 similar effect.40 Further, Sukarno believed that Islam did not recognize autocracy and theocracy. The only political model which was in accordance with Islam was democracy; as stated by the Qur'an. Wa amruhum ShllIil bainahum andwa shawirhum mamri. 41 This verse was a meeting point between Islarn and democracy. Sukarno affmned: "My choice is democracy because 1 am a Muslim."42 Thus, for him, democracy is equivalent to the principle of mushiiwara in Islarn. Briefly, as Sukarno saw il, there were three steps in which Mustafa 38Soekamo. "Apa sebab Turki Memisahkan Agama dari Negarn". Panji Islam. No. 20. May 20. 1940. 370. 'Ali 'Abd A1-R:lziq was an Egyplian 'ifIim who wrote a book in 1925 in which he endorsed the secularization of MUSlafa Kemal. According to mm. 1s1am is religion (a1-din) and ROI po1itics (ai-siy4Sal ). He argued tbal the position of the Prophel ended al bis deatb • it could not \le inberited by human \leings: therefore, the position of mlers does ROt inc1ude authority in religious affaiIs. For that reason he supponed the abolition of the calipbate. The institution of the calipbate, acconling to him. does not bave a basis in the Qurlfn. it is only a demand of new situations. Sec 'Ali 'Abd A1- R:lziq. Al IsIam W3 Usul Al-Hukum. BalIr fi Al-KhiIaf.tl W3 Al-Hukum Al-Islamiyyar (cairo: Musablur.al Misbriyyat, 1344H 1 1925). ll4-8S. 39Soekamo. "Memoedakan Pengenian Is\am," Dibawah Bendera RevoIusi. 378. 4Osoekamo, Memoedakan. Dibawah Bendeta Revoiusi , 443. 41Soekamo. "lndonesia versus Fasisme: Dibawah Bendeta Revo1usi. 457-558: sec aIso Herbert Feith and Lance ~ eds., 1ndOIIesian PoHûcaI of T1Iinking: 1945-1965 (1thaca, London: ComeU University Press). 70. 42 Sukarno. P:lncasila sebag:Ji D=r Negiua, 43. 111 Kemal's refonn was undenaken: the abolition of the Sultanate: the elimination of the • caliphate system: the detachment ofreligion from the state.43 Both Mustafa Kemal and Sukarno held that the separation of state and religion did not mean an elimination of the role of religion: it meant rather. developing the role of islarn in the framework of the nation-state. Mustafa Kemal was more successful than Sukarno in realizing this secularization. as indicated by the intellectual and political disputes between secular and religious groups which continued up to the end of Sukarno's administration.44 Even though Sukarno used religion as one element of his ideology and showed interest in religious activities such as the commemoration of Maulid Nabi (the birth of the Prophet). Sholat Id in Istana Merdeka (the Palace of Independence). the building of two large mosques. Baitumlhman and Istiqlal. his separation of state and religion was strongly opposed by Islamist groups. However. it should be noted that Mustafa Kemal was politically stronger than Sukarno. and the position of Islam in Indonesia was stronger than in Turkey; as wc have seen. in Turkey at the end of the Young Turk period Islam was a marginal force. while in Indonesia it reached the height of its power during Sukarno's reign. Therefore. for Sukarno to undenake ideological compromise with the Islamists was the politically expedient course. Deliar Noer states that Sukarno's compromise is a reflection of the influence ofJavanese tradition on him. which emphasizes harmony and syncretism.45 To use the expression ofHoward Federspiel. "the Javanese-secularist approach" of Sukarno was fust reflected in the Tise of the PPPKJ or Pennoefakatan Perhimpunan-perhimpunan PoIitik Kebangsaan Indonesia ("Consultation 43Soekamo•• Apa sebab Turki Memisah Agama dari Negata?: Panji 1s1:un. No. 26. July 1. 1940. 493. 44Herbert Feith. Lance Caslle. eds.Jndonesian Poliâcal Thinking: 1945-1965 (Ithaca, London: Comell University Press. 1964). 211-213. 4SSee Deliar Noer. Penganmr ke Pemiki1an Poliûk. 192; also sec AlfI3ll. PemikÏI:III dan Perubahan Poliûk Indonesia (Jakana: PT. Gramedïa. 1983). 118. 112 of National Political Organizations in Indonesian) an organization which accornmodated both Islamic and seculari~t factions. This organization was established by Sukarno in the • belief that a cooperative style of politics was imponant for achieving lndonesian independence.46 Donald E. Weatherbee too has portrayed Sukarno as balancing competing existing groups. As a balance. Sukarno defined his ideologicallimits in such a way that existing thoughts were recognized so long as they did not go beyond the pararneters of the nation stare.47 Sukarno tried to be a balance between competing groups. As discussed in the second chapter. for Sukarno pluralism was an imponant principle for maintaining the nation's unity. D.E. Smith postulates that pluralism is a basic feature of modem society. To use his term, Sukarno's pluralism may be called a n functional-valuational pluralism,n in the sense that the religious system co-existing with other spheres of Iife can play a positive role in the process of modemization.48 The logie of pluralism is that of an ideological and political arrangement by which al1 existingideologiescancoexistpeacefully in sute and society. M.NatsÏT criticized Sukarno bath before and after indepenr.ence. his criticism of Sukarno focused on the separation between sute and religion. NatsÏT stood for unity between state and religion. For him, Islam was not only a philo5Ophy of Iife but also an ideology which was tied to 'ubudiyya (worship) of God 50 that worldly matters could not be detached from religious values.49 NatsÏT argued that there were twO ways of 46Howanl M. Federspiel, l'eIsalIIan ls1am: IsJamic Refonn in Twenlielh Cemwy Indooesia, 85 47Sec Donald E. WeaIberbce, ldeoIogy in 1ndonesia: Sulœmo~ 1ndonesian Rewlulioo. Monograph Series No. 8. Soulheast Studies Yale University. 1966, 96. 48Sec D. E. Smith. Rdigioo lUId Po1iIica1 DeveIopmenr, 12. 49M. NaIsir. ls1am sebagai Idtc10gy (I)jakana: Penjiman Dmu. 1951). 65. 113 realizing Islam as an ideology: through socialization of Islamic morllity in society. and through the authority of the state. In other words. the state and society were responsible • for implementing Islamic teaching. because without the power of the state. religious practices could not be realized. These views led Natsir to insist on the unity between state and religion. Obviously, unlike Mustafa Kemal and Sukarno. Natsir's approach to Islam clearly was legal- formalistic. Natsir rejected Mustafa Kemal's secularism as a comerstone of the state ideology. According to Natsir, this idea was the result ofa rnisunderstanding of the history of Islam. The Sultanate-caliphate system ofthe Ottoman Empire should not be considered as the only possible model of an Islamic governrnent Thus, it was not proper to separate state and religion based solely on the Ottoman political experience. Again according to Nat~ir. it was not proper to blame the backwardness ofOttoman politics and economy upon the unity between state and religion.50 Commenting on Sukarno's statement regarding the absence of an ijma' (consensus) on the unity between state and religion. he asked if there wa.~ no ijmii' ':ln the matter, was there an ijmii' on the separation ofthe two'! He also rejected the view of 'Ali 'Abd AI-Raziq that the leadership of the Prophet in Medina was only :hat of prophecy, and did not extend to the political field. For Natsir, the leadership of the Prophetembraced bothreligious and political authority, and hence Islarnic govemance also consisted of religious and political aspects.51 It seems that in opposing Kemalism Natsir wanted to idealize Islam into a political system, but he could offer no specifie model ofan Islarnic political system. That was a weakness of Natsir and other Islarnic reformers in facing thesecu1arization ofKemalism. 50A. Moech\is, "Persa!uan Agama dan N...".,.,."_....._ r"'l>.... ~;I· Islam• No. 28• Juy..1 IS 1940, 529-530. 51A. Moechlis, "PasatOCD Agama dan Ncgara." Panji Islam. No. 36. Scptcmbcr 9. 1940. (KT. 114 The question is, could Sukarnoism be categorized as a secular ideology? To answer this question, the following three criteria will be used: basis of legitimacy, source oflaw • making, the role ofreligion and the existence ofreligious institutions in the structure ofthe statc. Mustafa Kemal and Sukarno both believed that the state's sovereignty derived from the will of the people. Religion thus ceased to be a potent source of legitimacy for govemmenL The goals of govemment were no longer determined by religious ideas. Where religion conflicted with the program of social welfare, the dogma of relig':>o was ignored or repudiated. Mustafa Kemal completely rejected Islam as a source oflaw, while Sukarno seems to have recognized that basing a certain law on Islanùc law was possible, even if only in a Iimited sense., as in the case offarnily law. As for the status ofreligion in the constitution, although 90% ofthe Indonesian population is Muslim, Islam is not the official religion. However, it cannot be stated that Indonesia is a secular state. Included in the rive principles of Sukamoism is a religious principle, "Belief in Gad." This is alse elaborated in Article 29 ofthe Constitution of 1945, where ilis stated that the state is based on "Belief in Gad." However, it is important to note that the principle of "Belief in Gad" is conceived as an ethical, not an ideological principle. Thus, we may conclude that the paradigm of the relationship between the State and religion in Sukarno's thought is ideologically secular, butculturally religion continues to be recognized as the ethical basis of the state. One may say that the state is quasi secular. Unlike Sukarnoism, Kema1ism was both ideologically and cultura11y secular. C. The Expansion of Secularization: Unification and Dichotomy. Both Mustafa Kemal and Sukarno believed that the programs of mademization were obstrueted by the fact that the areas of iaw and education were controlled by traditional religious structures. Both leaders tried to bring these vital areas directly under state control in order to make religion an instrumentfor mademization and not an obstacle 115 to it The difference between the two is. however. that Mustafa Kemal abolished the old religious institutions and their cultural manifestations. while Sukarno maintained them. • Discussing this issue. we shall examine three major areas which were affected by secularization. These are: the Department of Religious Affairs. the religious educational system and the IsIamic courts. For the sake of modernization Mustafa Kemal put religious malters under the supervision of the Ministry of Education. Sukarno. on the other hand, created a separate ministry of religious affairs. In the Indonesian case. the Ministry of Religious Affairs administered two major fields: religious education and religious courts. In Turkey. under the policy of Mustafa Kemal, the two fields were completely secularized. The case of Indonesia, is historically, similar to the period of theTanzimar in Ottoman history, when they existed a dichotomy in law and education. This was to continue into the era of the Young Turks. The pattern ofsecularization of law in Indonesia is somewhat more complex than . that in Turkey. The Shan--a remained basically unchallenged, even though sometimes it bccame mixed with adat (local tradition) law. Criminal and commerciallaw became wholly secularized, while family law remained Islamic. Anderson argues that family law is the Jast area to undergo secularization.52 Kemal' s secularism is an exception to this generalization, however. Family law was also completely secularized by Mustafa Kemal. Under Sukarno, two systems oflaw were applied in separate tribunals: PeradiJan Agama (Sium--a court) and PengadiJan Negeri (secular court). Thus, we can sec that the secularism ofMustafa Kemal was more radical than that of Sukarno. We cao also argue '. that modemization does not always wholly imitate the ideas expressed in Western values; rather, it may sometimes maintain traditional elements. Thus unlike Mustafa Kemal, . 1 52J. N. D. Anderson, 1s1amie Law Û1' Mod= Worid (New York: New York '-' UDiversity Press, 1966), 474475. 116 Sukarno considered Western ideas as instrumenta! elements for national modemization• rather than as a way oflife. • The religious policies of bath Mustafa Kemal and Sukarno were clearly realistic. Their approaches emphasized what could be done in the actual world rather!han what ought to be done in an idea1 world. It has been stated by D. E. Smith !bat tw~ 'of the characteristics of secularization are rationalisrn and pragmatism.53 In Indonesia, for instance, the establishment of the Ministry ofReligious Affairs was a politica1 expedient to reduce the dissatisfaction ofMIIslim groups when their desire to create an Is1amic State was rejected by Sukarno and his associates. Legally, the Ministry is charged to serve all recognized religions, but in reality, a certain priority is given to serving Is1amic interests especially in the legal and educational spheres. We cao see !bat recently underthe leadership of Suharto, Indone~ia has !slamic courts and a religious educational system recognized as being at the same level as the Indonesian national system of law and education. Thus Indonesia bas become a unique country in the sense tlu!t even though itis nc:t a religious State, Is1amic courts and a religious educational system are recognized. In • addition, as stated by Munawir Shadza1y, Indonesia does not have an Is1amic party, bllt the interests ofthe Is1amic wnma are thereby servedbetter.54 There is no doubt that the unified system oflaw under the name ofsecularism, and the abolition ofreligious institutions in Mllstafa Kemal's Turkey and the dichotomy oflaw and the Ministry of Re1igious Affairs in Sukamo's Indonesia demonstrate differences between the two countries in both theory and practice. In Turkey. the religious educational S3D. E. SDÛth, ReligioII PoHticaI Deve1opment, 85; Roger Scruton, A DicdcItwy of PoHticaI 7JJouBht (London: The Macmm'n Pœss, 1982), 367-68. 54Munawir Shadzaly maIœs this argument in bis seminIr al Mc 117 system was completely abolished. while in lndonesia it is recognized as part of the national educational system. The dichotomous system of education in Indonesia signifies a • recognition of Islamic aspirations. Clifford Geertz has remarked that the religious educational system which has been adjusting to modem needs. was not an enemy of modemization but rather an ally ofil. The dichotomy allowed and encouraged students to hold on to religious tradition while coming to terms with the modem world. ln other words. they neither rejected it nor capitulated to il, but becarne part ofil.55 Clearly. Mustafa Kemal sought to create a unified system of secularism. while Sukarno maintained a dichotomous system. The policy of unification. to use the term of Donald Eugene Smith. signifies an "expansion ofsecuh.tization ofpolity." as motivated by two basic concems: to uphold the complete sovereignty ofthe state. and to undertake major social reforms.56 The result Was that all manifestations of religion in politics. law. education and culture were prohibited by Mustafa Kemal. Unlike him. Sukarno recognized such manifestations as co-existing with secular aspects. In these respects. the two were different. The question is. why were they different. A nl.!mber of reasons can be suggested. FlfSt of all. as mentioned before. Mustafa Kemal's modemization meant Westemization in the framework ofnationalism. while Sukarno preferred to synthesize the existing world views. modernism. socialism and Islamis!U. in the framework of nationalism. Secondly. the historical roles ofreligion were differenl in the two countrie!:. By the tirne Mustafa Kemal appeared on the Turkish political stage. religion had lost its role and meaning in politics. while at the time Sukarno came to power. the role ofreligion was developing and growing steadily in political prominence. 5Saifrord Geertz. "Modemizalion in MœIim Society: The Indonesian Case: in Robert N. BeUah. ed.. Rt:ligion and Pl'Ogll~ss ÜI Modem Asia (New York: Free Press, 1965). 106-107. 560. E. Smilh. Rt:ligion and, PoIitica1 Deve1opmenr, 'Tl. 118 CONCLUSION Under the Sultanate system, the relations between state and religion were defined in tenns of an integralistic paradigm, in which bath religious and temporal power rested within the Sultans. The religious hierarchy was integrated into the structure ofthe state and controlled much of law and education. In addition. the Sharica was a source of law making. These characteristics were retained by the Ottoman Empire for about six centuries ofits existence. Under the impact ofWestem ideas. the integralistic paradigm began to be questioned by Ottoman thinkers. fust by the Young Ottomans. and later by the Young Turks. Under the leadership of the Young Turks. a process ofsecularization had already begun. The achievement, however. was limited to the secularization ofgovernment; the process ofsecularization neversucceeded in encompassing state-secularization as a whole. The secularization ofgovemment is identical with constitutional government, while the secularization ofstate is identical with constitutional democracy in which the legitimacy ofstate is based on the will ofthe people. Up to the era ofthe Young Turks the political existence of the Sultan who was responsible only to Gad remained unchanged. Nevertheless, from an intellectual point ofview. the achievement ofthe secularization of the Young Turks paved the way for the total secularization of Mustafa Kemal. He created a constitutional democracy under the principles ofthe "Six Arrows ofKemalism," include republicanism. populism, nationalism, reformism. secularism and étatisme. His secularization was a constitutional revolution never before seen in the Islamic world. Turkey cao thus be said ta have pioneered constitutional movements in the Muslim world. Mustafa Kemal's secularization signifies a transformation from an integralistic ta a secularist paradigm. His secularization cao he viewed from two perspectives. FIISt, itwas a political solution to Ottoman disintegration. Thepolitical confliet in Istanbul between the Sultans and the great powers on the one band, and Turkish nationalists in Anatolia on the 119 oL'Ier. cor.vinced Mustafa Kemal ofthe need to create a nation-state based on the will of the people. without any influence of the Sultans. The second was that Islam at that time had • lost meaning as a political force. The 'Shaikh al-Islam functioned only as an instrument of the Sultans. Consequently. both the Sultan and the Shaikh al-Islam had lost credibility. and the people seem to have preferred supporting Mustafa Kemal rather than the Sultan and his associates. Although the Sultan condemned Mustafa Kemal to death, he was not successful in destroying him because Mustafa Kemal had a1ready won the suppon of most Anatolian people and the endorsernent even of the religious groups. Total secularization. Mustafa Kemal believed, was essential for creating a modem Turkish state. To that end the Sultanate-caliphate had to be eliIrlnated from the Turkishpolitical scene. Sukarno's view of the relations between stale and religion was influenced by Mustafa Kemal. However, he differed from Mustafa Kemal on the question ofthe place of religion in state ideology. Sukarno recognized religion, as an ethical element, as a pan of his ideology, while Kemal rejected il completely. This difference in approach can t-e explained by the following two reasons. FII'St, in Mustafa Kemal's view, the modemization of Turkey meant its comple!e adaptation ta a Western style of life. Sukarno's view of modernization was different; for hirn, itcould be a combination ofthe existing world views, Westernism, socialism and lslamism. The implication is that modemization in genera1, and secularization in particular did not put aside religion. Secondly, the differences in the historica1 role of religion in the two nations account for differences in the two leaders' outlook. By the time of Mustafa Kemal, Islam had lost its power ta keep the Ottoman Empire from disintegration. Consequently, the Sultanate and the religious institutions were completely abolished and replaced by a nation-state independent ofreligion. Conversely. in Sukarno's Indonesia, the role ofreligion had been growing and religion became a pan of Indonesian nationalism. The imponance ofreligion in nationallife motivated Sukarno ta create a synthesis of Indonesian ideology under tJoe name of Pancasila (Five Principles), 120 which he later summarized inta a political manifesto called NASAKOM (nationalism, religion and communism). Whatever change there was in the formulation of his ideology, • religion remained an element of Sukarnoism. In general terms, it may be said, however, that both Kemal and Sukarno put religion in the service of the nation-state. There is no doubt that Mustafa Kemal was more radical in his secularizing policies than Sukarno. The former abolished all religious institutions from the structure ofthe state, as weil as from the legal , educational, and cultural spl:eres. Sukarno, on the other hand, maintained religious institutions bringing them under the Ministry of Religious Affairs, which was established to regulate matters ofreligion primarily in farnily law and education. The policies of each leaders should, however, be understood as political solutions to problems of their respective countries. In Turkey, the abolition of Shaikh al-Isliim. religious courts and religious schools were meant ta avoid manipulation ofreligion for the sake ofthe Sultans, and simultaneously to promote rapid modernization. ln Indonesia, the creation ofthe Ministry ofReligious Affairs was also a political solution to internai conflict between Islarnic and nationalist parties. Through this ministry, the government could bridge its interests with the interests of the Islarnic community and of other religious communities. It is important to note that the secularist paradigm ofthe relations between state and religion in the thinking and policies ofthe two figures studied here does not mean negating religion. Both historically and sociologically, religion cannot be separated from the life of people in Turkey or lndonesia. However, both Mustafa Kemal and Sukarno perceived religion as a purely private matter of faith, while adopting secular policies in political matters. Religion was ta !Je a persona! matter and was ta !Je subordinated to national interests. ln order that religion !Je meaningful in the framework ofmodernization, it had ta !Je reformed and understood in rationalistic and pragmatic terms in accordance with national dernands. ThUs, the interpretation ofIslam in adjusting ta new demands was not to 121 be monopolized by a certain class. the'ulam5'. but was to be a right for ail people. We have suggested that Islam. not being a monolithic entity, could play a more meaningful role • in society ifit co-existed with other existing values. It may finally be observed that Mustafa Kemal' s secularization and its expansion in major areas of national life could be achieved without serious obstacles because the process, through legislation, was widely approved by the dominant élites. This radical form ofsecuiarization reflected a compelling desire to establish the true sovereignty ofthe modem state, to break the hold which traditional religion had on the people, and to overcome ignorance, superstition, and generai backwardness. 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