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THE ROLE OF MU8LIbd GROUPS IN CONTEMPORARY INDONE8IM NATIOHALISM: A STUDY OF THE NAHDLATUL UNDER THE 1980s- l99b

A thesis submitted to the Faculty af Graduate Studier and Research in partial fdilhent of the rs~pkcments forthedepeeoflldrutcrofArt National Library Bibliothbque nationale of du Canada Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bibliographic Services services bibliographiques 395 Wellington Street 395, rue Wellington Ottawa ON KIA ON4 Onawa ON K1A ON4 Canada Canada

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Auteur : Su'aidi Asy'ari Titre : k rdle des group rnusulmans dam le nationalisme Indonksien contemporain: Une analyse de la Nahdlatul Uama sous I'Ordtr Nouveau durant les anndss quatre vine et quatre vingt dix. Departement : Institut des etudes Islamiqus, Utliversite McGU

Ce memoire explore le r61e jou4 par Ie (NU), une organisation islamique traditionalle fond& par KH. Hasjim Asj'ari en 1926, dam le diveloppment du nationalisme indonhien. La recherche ilaborcra particuliCrement sur les activites dc l'organisation durant 1'0rder Nouvau (1980s-1990s)suite a l'instauration de la F'ancasila comrne l'unique fondement de tous les partis politiques et autrcs organisations sociales de masse. En tant que la plus grande formation musulmane en Indonhie, le NU a it6 fondde afin dc proteger et de promouvoir Ies intMts des musulmans traditionalistes, qui suivaient Ioyalement l'icole dt penskc Ahlu d- wa al-Jama'ah. Les doctrines de cctte &ole sont montrks ici cornme ayant largement influend les intMts de l'organisation qui sont i la fois culturels, religieux et politiques.

Afh de mieux compnndc It point de vue du NU concernant le nationalisme indondsien, ee mbmoh examinera les trois phases du nationalisme indonbsicn, en cornmencant par l'wsor dt ectte organisation, son implication dam la formation de SCtat indondsicn et de son idblogie ainsi quel l'ipoque suivant linstauration de la cornme fondement unique du pays. Dc ces trois phase du nationalisme indonbien, ce memoire ddmontre le r6le significatif jout par le NU durant Its annh quatre vingt et quatre vingt dix. L'example du NU dans son acceptation de la Pancasila cornme son fondemcnt unique a semi d'inspiration a dautres organisations socialcs de masee di pays et a repttscntt une dc ses contributions majeures au bicn4trc de la nation. With the completion of this thesis, I find myself in the position of having to express my indebtedness to a number of people whose material and moral have certainly contributed the realization of this project. First and foremost, I would like to acknowledge the readiness of my thesis supervisor, Professor

Howd M. Federspiel and my co-advisor, A. her Turgay, who have given me such valuable advice, comments and criticism throughout the entire course of my research. I have relied on their advice, guidance and all-round assistance, both personal and academic. I count myself been fortunate to have benefited from their kindness and patience.

I am also grateful to Ms. Wendy men, Director of the McGill- Project, and all the project staff, in both and Montreal, who have helped me during the course of my studies. Special thanks are due to Professor Ahmad Nur Fadhil Lubis for having had the kindness to read the draft proposal for this project, and Professor Faisal Ismail, who read the first draft of the thesis itself.

Thanks are also due to the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) for awarding mc a scholarship to study at McGill University. My deep gratitude is also due to Dr. Tarmizi Taher and Dr. Abdul Malik Fajar, the former and present Ministers of Religious Affairs during my two years of study at McGill University. They provided me with the opportunity to pursue my studies at this institution. My gratitude also extends to Prof. Dr. H. Sulaiman Abdullah and

Prof. Dr. Asafri Djaya Bakri, the former and present Rectors of the State

Institute of 1slamic Studies (WN) Sulthan Thaha Saifuddin fambi, for granting me permission to set aside my duties as lecturer for two years. Thanks are also due to the staff of the McGi Indonesia Project and the

Institute of for their assistance bward the completion of my work. I would especially like to thank Susi Ricciardelli, Joanna Gacek, Lori

Novak, and Anne Yaxley, for their administrative and mod support. My thanks also go out to the helpful stdof the Library of the Institute of Islamic Studies, e*;pecially Salwa Ferahian and Wayne St Thomas, for their readiness to offer assistance at every stage of my research. I would also like to express my appreciation to Steve Millier and Andrei Pancu for their tireless help in editing my work.

It was very often the case that ideas emerged from impromptu discussions with my colleagues, especially my Indonesian colleagues, but it is impossible to mention every one of them here. I should mention, however, four of those whose support was exceedingly important: Masdar Hilmy, Asep

Saifuddin Jahar, Mujl'burrahman and Munir. Different opinions among us on certain id- actually broadened my knowledge, which in turn also influenced me to reassess previous judgements or conclusions. I bcliwe that every one of us has gained hmthe discussians we had; nevertheless, any statement in this thesis ultimately remains my own personal responsibility.

Finally, I must acknowledge that the successful completion of this thesis and the MA program at McGill University are due in largt part to the strong encouragement I rtctived from my and relatives. Therefore, I humbly dedicate this thesis to my beloved wife, Chodijah Su'aidi, my daughter,

Fadhilatul Wikmah, and my son, Haekal a1 Asy'ari. The patience of my wife, who has taken over the responsibility of looking after our two children during my absence, is a great sadice that I cannot repay. I am also indtbted to my mother, Rogayah, and my parents-in-law, Hj. Hamidah and H. Kuris, who

@ supported my decision to leave my family for such a long rime.

Montreal, May 1999

=gr= NOTE 01 TRIUQSLITP:RATfO#

In transliterating the Arabic names and terms in this thesis I have usod the transliteration scheme employed at the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGU University. In dealing with the problem of variations in the spelling of Indonesian namcs and words, I have adopted the following system: Indonesian words, terms and place-namesnot in quotations are spelled in two ways: those which are derived hm Arabic are transliterated according to the rules for

Arabic; the remainder are written employing the new hdonesian spelling used since 1972 (for example, Yo*, not Djogjakarta). Organizational names as well as Indonesian words in quotation are spelled in the original form (far example: Boedi Oetomo). For proper names, in quotation or not in quotation, this thesis employs the spelling used by the individual him/herself. The following is a transliteration table from Arabic to English and Indonesian.

Arabic English Indonesia Arabic English Indonesia

d d J 2 z 3 n n

cr S S 3 W W

2 sh SY h h

4 S sh 3 Y Y

Long vowels (isj) are indicated by placing a macron above the characters: i,j, @ TABLEOFCONTENTS

Abstract ...... ii

Resume ...... iii Acknowledgements ...... iv

Notes on Transliteration ...... vii Table of Contents ...... ix

Introduction ...... 1

Chapter I: THE RISE MDDEVBWPYE#T OF NATIOIOUISM IIIDONESU: The Role of Social. Ethnic and Religious Group ...... A The Foundations of Indonerim ...... Establishing A Broader Collective Identity ...... B . NU and Rationdam prior to the 1980s ...... The First Phase: Establishing a First Characteristic ...... The Sccond Phase: Hand in Hand in Building a new sovereign nation ...... The NU under the Soekamo's Old Order ...... Chapter U: NU'S WITHDRAWAL ?ROY POLITICS ......

A The 8ocio-Politid Siturntian in Indonesia Prior

. The Rise of the New Order and Its Model of National Deve1opment ...... The New Order's Political Policies ...... B. Todthe artubaaam Corn and XbclQ ke Khtt&h 1926 ...... The Failure of NU politicai kadcrs5lip ...... Retreat hmParities as a Solution ...... Historical Consideration hr Returning to the Khittah of 1926 ...... A New Sense of Purpose ...... Chapter 111: THE NU'S RESPOlUSE AND POLICY TO THE NATIONAL IDEOWGY AlOD POLITICS ......

A The Sodo-PoliticalBacLpamd of the ideolom Awl lbggtal Pancculla ...... The New Order's Motives of Implementing Pancasila as the Sole Foundation ...... Applying the Asas Zhg@ Panda ...... General Responses to the Proposal of Asas nmggal ...... The NU'S Response to the Asas lLtnggal Ideology ...... B . The PoWcd Participation of the NU Post the 1926 Khittrh: Non-Politid Policier of Politia of the Nu ......

. The Significant of the Rapat Akbar. March 1. 1992 ...... Reorientation of Political ...... Conclusion ......

Bibliography ...... The year 1984 marked the onset of the third phase in the develapmcnt of

Indonesian nationalism, already more than 75 years old. The thini phase can be seen as a step toward a 'mature' nationalism, one more befitting a nation- state. This phase was characterized by the policy of stipulating Pancash as the sole foundation (asas tunggd) for all political parties and social and mass organizations. The third phase was reached only after the country had passed through two other very diilicult phases, beginning at the turn of the 20th century. The first phase represented a period of some 37 years during which nationalist consciousness among the indigenous people flourished. It was also characterized by the emergence of a number of cultural movements, such as those of Raden Ajeng (1902)and Bod Oetomo (1908).

The first phase (1902-1945) was also colored by the youthful spirit of the above movements. The period after 1909 saw an extraordinary pmliferation of youth organizations among the educated elite, even though most of them represented ethnic identities, indicating a narrower idea of nationalism. Ricklefs lists a number of examples of these youth movements: Pa3unda.n (a sort of

Boedi Oetomo for the Sundanesc, founded 1914); Jong Java poung Java, the fitst student body, 1918); Sarekat Ambon (Ambonesc Union, 1920); Sarckat

Sumatra (Sumatranen Bond, Sumatran Union, 1918); Jong Minaharra (Young Minahasa of Celebes); and, Perkumpulan Poltik KatoWr Jawi (Fblitical

Association of Javanese Catholics, an ethno-palitical-rcli@ous association, founded 1925). These groups reflected organiPrtional enthusiasm, and dm a strong desire for national unity. In the same period, there appeared modern and traditionalist religious movements. These religious movements usd religious teachings to encourage their members to promote and protect their interests, ultimately developing a sense of nationalism among their followers. However, the existence of a number of Mush groups in Indonesia and other Muslim countries ideologically affiliated with the idea of Pan-, spread by Muslim scholars like

Jamduddin Al-Afghani, has led many scholars to conclude that there appears to be a dichotomy between nationalism and Islamic movements. The latter have been dismissed as having little, or no, sense of nationalism &-&-zis nationalism itself. Regardless of which ideology is the better one, however, the claim that the

Islamic movements had less of a sense of nationalism cannot be accepted.

There are a number of Islamic movements that were key to the development of this sentiment in both Lndontsia and the Mush world as whole; in this thesis, for example, I take the Nahdlatul ULama as a case study. Other scholars have recognized this fact as well. John L. Esposito, for instance, in his study of the role played by Islam in some Muslim oountries argues:

The sccond phase of Indonesian nationalism (1940s) was the period when nationalist leaders, making use of the already-established forces dmzd

1 John L Esposito, ldrrm and Mtks (New York: Syrecuse U- 1984). 62. to above, prepared the country for Indonesian independence and, at the same time, established an ideology for the country. The ideology itscl€ was founded only after they had reached a consensus on establishing a religious state, although not a theacratic one explicitly based on a certain belief. It was during this phase, however, that Soekamo, supported by other nationalist leaders, succeeded in winning over those who opposed the idea of any form of religious state. Soekamo persuaded them instead to accept the Pancasila as the philosophical basis for the newly established nation. Pancasila simply means

Five Principles, and although they consist of religiously inspired values, they are not derived hm any specific religion. In both phases of this formative period, in fact religion, and specifically Islam, played a sigdicant role, one that respected followers of other religions and morewet inciuded them in the system of the nation-state. There was no conception of a minority or a majority where religion was concerned.

As mentioned carlier, the third phase (1980s-prestat) was one leading towards a more 'mature' nationalism, marked by the reaffirmation of the

Pancash as the only ideolw in the tife of the nation-state. During this phase, the New Order gwcmment succeeded in "persuading' virtually ell elements in the nation-state to accept the Pancasila as the sole foundation for all politid parties and social and masti organizations.

This thesis is concerned with the role played by the Nahdlatul Ulama, a socio-religious organization founded in 1926 by K.H. Hasjim Aasj'ari, in the evolution of Indonesian nationalism as described above. Sptdal attention will be paid to the third phase, in which the NU played such a significant role. Rior to this, however, the the& examines the sodal background of the cmtrgcncc of the NU, its basic character and its socio-political contribution to the second phase of Indonesian nationalism, when the nation's leaders struggled to dehne their idea of the new state. The main objectives of this thesis are: (1) to show the development of Indonesian nationalism in which the NU played its role; (2) to examine to what extent the NU views Islamic ideology as an important force

in building nationalism; (3)to show the significance of the Pancasila in uniting the various religions, ethnic groups and cultures in the country; (4) to show, by

presenting the above three objectives, the important role played by Islam in the

Indonesian nationalism; and (5) finally, to contribute to the study of Idam,

nationalism and national ideology in the auntry.

As far as academic work on the W is concerned, there were no specific

studies on the NU written prior to the early 1970s, when foreign scholars first

began to take an interest in this religious organization. Even then, studies of its

nationalist contribution would have been premature. According to Greg Barton,

the lack of academic interest in the NU,

reflected the ideological and pnoocupdom of schdm of Indonesian Islam during this period. Most either modernist Mulrlima or western naearchtrs who kvored innstisatiag and promoting those elements in Indonesian sodety which wen seen as hzodern-minded', 'rational' and techah@ or proEssio~ skilled. Traditionalist Muafims, with their emphasis on the classical IsIamic learning and observirsg culhual tradition, tended to be regarded with skepticism. and dbdein. They were portrayed as politidly naive and o . c, edrmnmtrativdy. . inept, and ved For most scholars at this &-'LI traditional leadem were as lar@ hdcvmt to the task of modernizing Indonesia2

Thus it was only after 1971, the year of the first general election under

the New Order, that foreign scholars began to study more seriously the NU. Its

third-place finish in the dection and the fact that it had defeated six other political parties was sufficient to awaken the interest of these scholars. Among those who undertook a closer investigation of the NU during thc 1970s were

Ken Ward, author of The 1971 Election in Indonesia: An Case Shrdy, and Mitsuo Nakamura who wrote 'Radical Traditionalism of the Nahdlahd

Ulama in Indonesia: A Personal account of its 26h National Congress, June

1970,' a reworking of the conclusion he had earlier reached in his dissertation entitled The CresW Arises over the &myan'Itee.3 Nakamura's treatment of the

NU, it must be noted, is by and large negative in tone.

The quantity and variety of research on NU-related topics by foreign scholars has grown rapidly since it became the hrst socid/mass organization to accept the Pancasila as its sole foundation in 1983. There is no doubt that the

NU'S decision to go along with the policy while other groups continued to reject it was an added motivation.

3 See the biiily. THE RISE 1510D DEVELOPMENT OF HATIONALISM

The Role of 80d.1, Ethnic and R-OP.

A. The Fooaditioas of Indonwirn Iatioa.llrm Nationalism is a human sentiment that has had a significant impact on world dairs ever since the eighteenth century, yet nonetheless defies

definitive and permanent dcfintion.1 Most scholars agree, however, that the gave the movement the momentum it continues to

possess today.2 While this may be so, it is nonetheless the case that nationalism has grown beyond its original character, evolving over time and in Merent places into an ideology that is widely inclusive. Nationalism, or

nationhood, exists when 'a significant number of people in a community

consider themselves to be a nation, or behave as if they be one.'= Benedict Anderson rewords 'consider themselves' as 'imagine themselves', He reasons that the condition is imagined because 'the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in thc mind of each lives the image of their communion.'4

When this theory is applied to Indonesia, as is done in this chapter, it can be argued that, although it is impossible for many Lndontsians to have faa- to-face contact, they build contacts and relationships by sharing certain

J For a variety of drfinitima of nntinnnlinm. eee: Setan-Wetson Hugh, NoEions and States An inquiry ir& the Origin of Ndons and the PoEtics of Ncrb'disnr (Boulder, Colo.: Westview m, 1977); Andua,n, Imogifitd CommunStiGJ (New York Verso, 1991); Elic Kdourk, Ndo& (Cambridge: Blackwtll, 1994); and Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nasm(Ithaca and New York Corndl University Ress, 1994). a G.P. Gooch, Studies in Modem history (London: Lmgnmw 193 1)

3 Seton-wafso11, Ndon and states, 5. fundamental aspects of life in common: language, culture, territory, etc. For 0 Emest Gellner nationalism is

a politid priaciple, which hdds that the political and the national unit abould k congruuu. Natbdhm as a sentiment, or as a movement, can best be drcfined in terms of this principle. Nationalist -t is tbe &din#of a-r aroused by the violation of the principle, or the feeling of sati&ction aroused by its fulfillment.= Cultual, religious, ethnic, geographic and social factors in each country

have frequently, if not always, influenced the nature of nationalism as it is understood Idy.6 In a country like Indonesia, which was under foreign for more than three centuries, the term nationalism seems to have been comprehended as the manifestation of patriotism in the face of imperialism. It is both a dream and a matter of pride for such a country to have its own identity, and to manage its own national development. It reflects the willingness of the people to sacrifice whatever is necessary for this sovereignty and for its preservation. Besides the nationalist views of religious and ethnic groups it is also important to consider individual perceptions of nationalism. For a secular Indonesian nationalist like - one of the two founding fathers of the country, nationalism was the means of achieving the brotherhood of all nations. For him this meant that a nation should identify its own national sovereignty and identi@ in order to have full and profitable relations with other nations. Another prominent nationalist pioneer worth mentioning here is Haji Agus $dm, who, at one point became a key

6 Albert Haud, Ambic Tharght in the Libcml Age 1798-1W9 (Cmbiiacfe: Cam- UaiVdty Presq Melbo~llk~,1993), 341-344. In his -tion of endism, Emcst Geltwstnares the-nof aprincipk acceptcdbyagmrtp of people, and says that tho of sly~r.wiil be amudwkn the pMci@t is violated. Sae~Geancr,N~andN~. 1-2Inaquite r;m;tnr and mon dabrate sea3e, Elie Kedoutie calls it natinnab'an aa dtutioaal politics. It implies atWmb& to the common comxmm of a particular aociety, d&guardiagit against fortip df in the Partai . For him, Indonesian nationalism needed to be

based upon Islamic , i.e. on fnedom, equality, and brotherhood.7 From his ideas and activities in Sarckat Islam, Jong Islamiten Bond (JIB) and other institutions, he made it dear that the concept means freedom from alien domination, and equality of between men and women, the haves and the have-nots, rulers and the ruled.8 Another prominent

nationalist figure of the 1920's and 1930s was Ahmad Hassan, the founder of Pemtuan Islam. As an Islamic 'fundamentalist' figure, Ahmad Hasan felt that Indonesian nationalism should be based on Islamic principles,

seeing that the majority (90%) of Indonesians were . He stated that "like it or not, a Muslim must always employ Islam in all places and in all

things.- Secular nationalist figures like Soekarno, Muhammad Hatta and , on the other hand, believed that a national culture free of dependence on religious beliefs and ethnic associations would be stronger than a system built simply on Islam. Both views certainly had the same goal of uniting the 'Indonesian people' in order to foster national identity. Thus, both views, to dSerent dtgrees, have significantly contributed to the foundation of Indonesian nationalism. Many believe that it is mcuit to determine where and when Indonesian nationalism was born as an ideological movement. Thm are many and mediating dimpxmenta and dctamong variour groups through politid institutions, legistation and the ahhisbaticm of justia (N- xi@.

8 For more inhrmation oa~his &aa@~tad contn'buh to Indoadan nalionalirrm, see Suhatmn, TotFOh-toknh, Suradi, Hq$ Agus Sah don Knfh'k Politik datum Sareka Islam (Jaleaaa: Pustaka Shtr ha;rapan, 1997). and Panitia Buku eel. Serczau Tahun Ha$ Agus Salk (JamPustaka Sinar hara~an,1996).

9 Ahmad Hassen, Idam dcur Kebcmgsarm Puaatuan Idam. 1941), 4 1. For furrhu clhusaion on Abmad Hasssn'a thought, aee the entirety of Howard U circumstances to be considered in formulating an answer to this question. Kahinlo identifies four contributing factors to the Indonesian nationalist consciousness. The most important factor, he says, was the degree of religious homogeneity that prevailed in Indoncsia.1 At the time his research was conducted (the 1%0s), ninety pemnt of the population was Muslim. According to scholars such as Bahtiar Effendy and Federspiel, this number may not represent the number who actually fulfilled all the requirements of Idamic law (syariJahIslamiyah) as put forth historicnlly by Sunni Muslim theologians and scholars requirements which stipulate 'in the Oneness of God, confess that Muhammad is His Prophet, perform the fast of Ramadhan, undertake prayer every day and observe the commands and prohibitions listed in the Qur'an and Sunnahm12Nevertheless, this narrow definition of what constitutes a Muslim does not necessarily limit an individual's sense of being Muslim and or deny positive support to impulses of a nationalist character. Kahin also mentions the integrative influence of the development of the old lingua fmnca of the Indies, i.e. bzaar Malay, into a national language, transcending the bazaar and serving, along with Islam, to break down regional loyalties and forge an Indonesian identity. In addition, the integration of Indonesian nationalism is seen by Kahin as being, to some extent, indebtd to the existence of the Volksraad (People's Council), a representative council developed under the Dutch and designed to gin a

10 nrationcrlism clnd ~evobrtionin hrdanesicr (1- Cornen University Prtss, 1966) 41.

12 Ho&M. Fedcrspiet,~~alsMdNationol~h~ (New York Nwa Warn Pubbhem, 1992), 65. voice to local inhabitants, %reign Asiatics' , as well as Dutch. The idea may have been to provide a fonun for the expression of local concerns; instead, however, it had the effect of instilling in the population a sense of their identity, and a consciousness of unity which mnsolidated nationalist feeling. Finally, the growth and spread of Indonesian nationalist cansciousness was advanced by means of ideas disseminated by a newly created vernacular press and radio, as well as by a great increase in the geographical mobility of people and ideas. These factors were a consequence of the twentieth- century pattern of economic organization in Indonesia, and the transportation facilities which it entailed.13 Kahin therefore concludes that

there was a kind of self-awareness which gradually developed into a sense of unity among the Indies people. Nevertheless, this awareness didn't necessarily take the form of practical action. In fact, modem Indonesian nationalism only just began to emerge at the turn of the twentieth century, due primarily to the lack of any organized attempts at unifying the people in the national course. This is, howwer, in contrast to Bcnedict Anderson's conclusion that modern Indonesian nationalism did not emerge until the nationalist youth congress of 1928,1* a conclusion that he justifies by pointing to the contents of the Sumpah Pemuda (Oath of Youth). The deep-rooted feeling of inferiority imposed on Indonesians by the Dutch and the sense that they needed Dutch protection in the form of a system of , economy, politics, agriculture, and society, began slowly to be eroded, not only by Westcrn political ideas, but also by political events occurring in neighboring countries and other parts of the world where conditions were similar. The efforts of Pilipinosis to end Spanish and then American occupation, the success enjoyed by Kemal Ataturkl6 against Western militaxy power, and the activities of the Cangress Party in India all contributed to making Indontsians rtalite that they were neither inferior to the Dutch nor unable to govern themselves without foreign help. Confidence in their ability to govern themselves grew gradually as did a countxy-rjide sense of building their own identity without Dutch help." Scholars, howwer, point out that, practically speaking, Indonesian

nationalism lay dormant until it was awakened by of the Boedi Oetomo (Noble Endeavor) orgaaization in 190W (Ptnders includes STOVIA (School tot Opfeiding van Inlandsche Artsen, Training School for Native Doctors) as another essential element in the genesis of the modem Indonesian nationalist movement). The formation of Boedi Oetomo was the result of the efforts of Mas Wahidin Soediro, who spent three years (1906- 1908) raising funds for the education of children of Indonesians employed in

the colonial government administration. The first hitof his efforts was the graduation of Raden Soetomo and Rada Goeaawan Mangoenkoesoeno, two sons of aristocrats who attcndcd the medical schwi at Batavia. Boedi

l6 For Kemal A-8 apptoarh to ruliag Turkey sse William L. Ctvelaad, A Nistoy ofthe Modem A&& East, (SanFbnchs We&x&w Rem~,1994) 220-263, 165- 166 and 143264, Gcoe S. hnia -bik of lbkf in The Gocnmmatt d Pditic ofrheWEostdNwOlA~EdWdE.~aad&mardRdch(5an Francisco: Wesahw Fmm, 1995) 8-40, Tongaa God.AMudc aftd the WeNohrre of Mudem 7brJcey (London : Lutac, 1939). . . 18 Sa Chr. L. M. ~~~awrmartsonckahdsm and NationcrtiSm, 18.30-1992, (Quadad Univ+rdty of Qlr#ndand Re- 1977) 225228; John'hgbnn, Adhpmm lirdarcsio and the~~~bibl~~li~fMOL~~CIL~1923- 1928 fManaah: Me U-, 1975) 1-2, Knhin. NationcrCism, 6465 Woodman, 'Ihc Repyblic, 152-165 and 314. Oetomo's importance, however, becomes clearer when we consider the influence it had on subsequent developments, three of which stand out in particular: first, it played a role in raising native peoples' awareness of their common interests, expressed in the organization's mission statement by the words 'our people': second, Boedi Oetorna broke the ground for two new organizations; and third, it introduced a new organizational structure.19

As regards the first of these influences, it must be noted that it was the students of STOVIA who, well aware of the privileges they enjoyed over their fellow lmlonesiems in the areas of education, the economy, and @tics, originally founded Baedi Octomo. Their intentions wem clearly stated in the first paragraph of the letter published by S0eumm-o in 1908: they wanted to impm the quality of life of the native popuhtion.m It was a generational movement, the founders believing that ehe older gencrlttion wee too concerned with the possibk loss of prestie in doing such wurk, and too absorbed with matters of formality aSSOcjated with the (gentry) class. Therefote, this group of students avoided Fccruiting anyone who could

Sympathize with the idesls Of b mh~.Thus, they &St approached students from schools such as the Native Agricultural and Veterinary Science Sehd at Buitcnzorg, the Training Schds fbr Native Officials at , Maselang, and Probolingga, and the Native Teachers' Training Cdkges. The hdem of Badi Oebao bcieved that these students reagnhd the problems caud by the continued prcsmx of the Dutch colonialist gowmment.

Chr. L. M. Rsdem, Idam&, 225226. It was inevitable that Boedi Octomo should have first to raise the awareness of the 'native Javanese' towards their cultural unity. a It sought ways of reconciling itself with the needs of the modern world. Though its membership and leadership was mainly aristocratic and its early support mainly from medical school students, it attracted members from the ranks of the civil service as well as fhn the ptiayi. Nevertheless, it was soon outstripped in membership and leadership by more politically motivated organizations which included other ethnic groups,= an initiative which was later on developed by Sarekat Islam and the Indische Partij (see below) in a broader sense. Nonetheless, Boedi Oetomo is considered to have been the first stone laid in the foundation of the Indonesian nationalist movement.

For Kahia however, the emphasis of Indonesian nationalism prior to 1912, though often political in overtone, was essentially cultural rather than politid.24 In addition to the above movement, Kahin cites the example of the school established by Raden Ajeng Kartini (1879-1904), the daughter of a Javanese regent in Jcpara Kartini's activities rcpmented the 5rst manifestation of the important role which women came to play in the Indonesian nationalist movcment2s

The first clearly Muslim effort was to establish the Sarekat Islam. It was

at first named Satckat Dagang Islam (Islamic MeAsxuiation), a group established by H. in 1911 in Solo. The name was later on change4i to Sarcht Islam for political reasons. Originally, Sarekat Islam was established for two purposes: religious and canomic. Many Muslim scholars realiaed that the Christian missionaries, with suppart ftom thc Dutch Indies government, wcre having considerable success in propagating their faith. The strong bundations of the societies behind these Christian missions made Muslims realize that they had to be better organized if they wanted to develop thcmselvcs and the local Muslim community. In addition, Muslim traders felt that Chinese merchants were gaining an advantage throc.& their own connections. This feeling enmuraged them b fm an association that would allow them to compete with their commercial rivals. Christine Dobbin points out that one of the main problems of lacat Muslim entrepreneurs was lack of credit, which was met by that offered interest-& lms to indigenous merchants in need of credits

At the fvst congress of the Sfin January 1923, Tjo~otounveiled a

clearly defined program designed to ensure that the 8SSOCiBtion would not become a political party. He declared that the goals of Serckat Islam's programs were: (a) to promote commerce among Indonesians; (b) to encourage mutual support among members who cncountctcd economic ~culties;(c) to promote the intellectual development and material interests of Indonesians; and (dl to oppose the incorrect interpretation of religious dogma and promote a more religious lilc among Muslim Indoncsiana~These goals secm to have met with a positive response hm Muslims because of their focus on the cmntproblems of the society. There arc a number of scholars, among them Kahin and Ncklds, who agree that the pcriod after 1912 saw a gnat expansion in the number of

26 For more inkmathon . tbe. bu- ampetition in kdik k~ Chinese and ~entrcprrneurs,=- Dobbin, ' for the Failure of the Mudm Javaner Bushsn CLr. Ramplea horn =d (~1880-1940); Arehipel 48 (l994),87- 10 1. modem organizations and movements founded by educated people and members of the elite. Most of these gmups boasted strong ethnic identities. Some of the organizations that feu into this category were Pasundan (founded 1914). a sort of Boedi Oetomo for Sundanese; Sarekat Sumatra, or Sumatranen Bond (founded 1918), a student group; Jong Minahasa (Young Minahasa), founded in the same year as Sumatranen Bond: Sarekat Ambonese, founded two years later in 1920; Timarsch Verbond (Timrese AUiance, founded 1921); Kaum E3etawi tPeoplc of Batavia), founded in 1923 and claiming to represent the 'oAgiml' Indonesian citizens of Batavia; and Pakernpalan Politik Katolik Jawi (Political Associaiton of Javanese Catholics, founded 1925).28 Religious nationalist organizations and movements were, to some extent, Werent from the ones we encountered earlier. Generally speaking, religious organizations and movements in the Indonesian context expected Islam to play a major role in unifjing members and in giving them the sense of a common purpose, one of the characteristics of nationalist sentiment. It can be argued, on this basis, that feclings of unity can be traced back as fat as the coming of Islam to the archipelago. In addition to the general circumstances underlying the latent political-nationalism of the masses, there were other important factors involved as well9 The greatest of thew, for many scholars, such as Kahin, Ricklefs,m Hany J. Bendas1 and Deliar Noer,3* was the impact of modernist Idamic thought23 One year after the foundation of Sarekat Islam, the , the second largest Islamic organization in present-day Indonesia, was established by K.H. . After having previously been involved in Boedi Oetomo and Sarikat Islam, Ahmad Dahlan was inspired to establish an association which could accomplish what the two main existing organizations were not doing: propagating Islam and working for the improvement of education - two goals which were of great importance to him personally.34 Ultimately he transformed these personal goals wider into educational effort and then into a large social w&e association, whose influence is still felt at the end of the twentieth century. Following this period, nationalist ideas began to flourish on the basis of diEerent interests or objectives. It would be impossiiIe to mention every one

of these, and so only a general account of them will be offered hem, dividing them according to the decades in which they emerged, i.e. the 1910s, the 19209, and the 1930-1940s. Ideology was, for instance, served by a political

31 Hany J. Beds, TheCnsamtd thcRisrng~~Islurnunderthe Japanese Ocarpdon (The Hague and Bend- W. van Have, 1958).

33 See the motivation behind the tStablishment of Muhammradjgh above.

3' Mitsw Nakamura, 'Ihe Cnsaent Arises Oua the Barya~7ke A Study of the Muhammadiyah ddouement in a Centmt Jawnese Torun IyogyahUx Gajah Mada University PreJS, 1983), 47. Far mom intDnndm on Mubammadjah, see 'Abdul Mu'ti 'Ali The M-Movement A-lntrodu- (MA tk&, Will University, 1957). In this wcuk Mu'ti 'Ali pmvides a mea&@d introduction to a study of the complete history of the Muhamrnadjah lr~ovenwt6rom 19 12 to 1956. See also m JL~I~- . . yak ZRe PkaEtid Behau'or ofa MushModsnist Olganizaiion Under lMch~(Y~~MadaU~~1989).InthismrkAIdan prioritizes the politicrJ aspct of this oqaambm. . ~the6rBttkdecadeaSee atsOMuhammadyIdris,'Kj.ai~AhmadDahlPn:His~andTho~~'~thtsis, McGill University, 1975). party advocating racial quality, socioeconomic justice, and ultimately, independence. This was the National Indische Party (National Indies Party), founded in December of 1912 through an Eurasian-Indonesian effort. In the years that followed, another ideology emerged when a branch of Sarekat Islam in Semarang led by Semawn and Dmno launched the Communist Part of the Indies (Perscritaktan Komunis di India) or PKI, on May 23, 1920.35 men though the Pa, on account of its 05cial atheism, faced considerable opposition hm Islamic forces, both before and after independence, it cannot be denied that the PKI contributed to the establishment of nationalism.% During the colonial and eras, the PKI founded a number of branches across the country, particularly in the form of labor parties and unions,s7 with the aim of achieving national independence and Indonesian unity. Three years later, there appeared Persaturn Islam (Islamic Union),3s founded by a group of Muslims interested in religious study and propagation. The very htleaders and members of 'as group rane fiom Sumatra, and Java, with two leading figures being Hadji Zamzam and Hadji Muhammad Junus. Persatuan Idam was formally established on September 12, 1923 as a fonun for Islamic activists to discuss Idamic teachings. It was also often rcfmtd to as Kaum Muda

Ncrtionniisn, 74, Bcmard KM. M,Msan&vq A Ksby of the East In& Archipelago Hague and Beacfune: W. van Hoeve, 1%9), 353 and 356 and Ricklefs, A History, 173- 178.

36 See Carlton J.H. Hap, Ndhakm A R* (New York lrhc MeaniUen Company, 1960) 4-5 and James Andtnon V- Ideology and Territory' in RJ. Jahasboa, Devid 8. h&ht and Elranarc hhan, Niztbdbm Sef OetenmMhon. . and Po~h'calCengmphg (NewYork Cnnun Helm, 1988) 18-37. JI See Kahin, Nationalism, 86 and RkUtk, A History, 174175.

3 See Howard M. Fedcrspiei, ?he Aarwfum Islam Islome Refom in lbdefh cwuq lndonesiQ (I- New Ynrk Modera fnllmvdr PtOjCCf, Southcast Asia 1970). Scc also, Mk Nw, 'Ihe cmd 132-169. See also Ricklof4 A History, 177,182 d 190. (Young Group), as opposed to Kaum Tua (Old Gmp) which promoted the more traditional practices of Islam." Religious movements having on important role in the development of Indonesian nationalism also grew rapidly in Sumatra, especially in West

Sumatra. In 1906 the Malay-language paper al-Imam began to be published in Singapore, which, according to Ricklefs, was the ktreally serious presentation of the modernist analysis of social, religious and economic issues.40 Among those involved in &ham was the Minangkabau scholar Skaikh Tahir bin Jalaluddin (Muhammad Tahir bin Jdaluddin al-Azhar, 1869-1957). Following in his steps, were SWMuhammad Djamil Djambek (1860-1947) and Haji Rasul (Haji Abdul Katim Amrullah, 1879- 1945). These three scholars had been students of Ahmad Khatt'b (c.1855-

19 16)in for many years. When they returned to Indonesia, they built a riumber of modern schools such as the Adabiph School in Padang and the Thawalib School in Padangpanjang. These schools had a strong influence on the development of society there - an influence that is felt there even today. The establishment of the NU, which is at the core of this discussion, will be descll'bed more fully in the next section of this chapter. tdabU.hLrrg A header Co&ledhfaerrtlty On July 4&, 1927, Sukamo, along with the members of his Bandung Study Club, took the initiative of founding the PeIgetikatan Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Nationalist Association), with himself as chairman. Their secular nationalist approach, as Sukanro exprcsscd in his articles published the previous year, tended to subordinate ideologies such as Islam and Manrism to that nationahm.4l Sukamo's politid acumen, supported by a mdem education and a strong nationalist sentiment, provided the impetus which eventually allowed him to lead the muntry to independence in 1945. At that time, however, Sukanzo wanted to capitalize on the support that could be offered by such groups as the Partai Serckat Islam, Bocdi Oetomo, the Study Club and the main regional and Christian organizations. By tbe end of 1927, ht was able to unite most existing nationalist organizations in a body known as PPPKI (Pcrmufakatan Perhimpunan-perhimpunan Palitik Kebangsaan Indonesia, Agreement of Indonesian People's Wtical Assaciations). Nevertheless, while Indonesians welcomed this development, the Dutch government regarded it as a threat to their authority in the archipelago. Sukamo, along with many other Indonesian politicians, was put in jd,a an action which prompted a popular acceptance of nationalism, rather than the reverse. In the same decade, there tmerged new Eitcrary works employing new terms and using Roman script and modern terminol- thc (Bahasa Indonesia) grew out of the Malay language, which was heavily literary, written in Arabic script and tied to a rural lifestyle. It was chosen over Javanese because Malay's roots as a trade language were spread throughout the archipelago. The linguistic vehicle of national unity was thereby b0rn.a The use of Indonesian was to grow rapidly though the media of newspapers, weekly and monthly magazines and other

publications, including nwels and poetry. One of the most famous publishers at the time - and still exists today - was Balai Pustaka (Office for literature).M Balai Pustaka peiformed three main functions: the publication of older classical works and popular stories in regional languages, the translation of Western literature into Indonesian and the publication of the new Indonesian literature. This office at one and the same time helped to keep regional cultures alive even wbile exposing Indonesia to more universal literary values, a proccss that contributed to the creation of an all- Indonesian culturc.4s Three very important ingredients of nationalism were established by Indonesian youth in October 1928 at a congress held in Batavia (now Jakarta). In its Youth Pledge (Sumpah Pemuda), the Congress adopted three ideals: one fatherland, Indonesia; one nation, Indonesia; and one language, Bahasa Indonesia, the language of unity. This event, hown as the Haxi Sumpah Fkmuda (the Youth Pledge Day), has ever since ban commemorattd in recognition of the importance of the event to the growing

43 Ricklch, A hisbq, 185-6 and Houraai, Arabic, 342. HourPni claims that language is at the root of tk str0-a kind of nationaliga consciousness of Indonesian unity.* In making this statement, young

Indonesian intellectuals made it clear that they recognized themselves as

Indonesians first, and only secondly as , Minangkabau, Buginese, Javanese, Muslim, Christian and so on.47 The general trend in the evolution of political organizations continued with the establishment of Parindra (Pirtai Indonesia Raja, Greater Indonesia Party). This party was formed in 1935 through a federation of study clubs, such as Persatuan Bangsa Indonesia, Boedi Oetomo and other smaller Javanese and non-Javanese nationalist organizations. Among the leaders of this party were Dr. Raden Soetomo, Mohnmmad Hasni Thamrin and Mr. .* One of the final developments in the building of Indonesian nationalism prior to the end of the Dutch occupation was the formation of Gapi [Gaboengan Politiek Indonesia, Federation of Indonesian Political Parties) in 1939. This was prindpally accomplished through the efforts of Mohammad Hoesni Thamrin of Parinda. Among the parties involved were Gerindo, Parindra, Pasoendan, Persatoam Minaham Partai Katolik Indonesia, Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia, Partai Islam Indonesia,

47 Rickleb, A Hstory, 186. Kahin. N~o~95 and Ri- AHistary, 191. and Partai Arab Indonesia. Oapi's goals were directed towards the shaping of Indonesian nationalism in 1945, even though the coming of the Japanese in 1942 interrupted this process temporarily. The principal aims of Gapi were: (1) the right of self-determination for Indonesia; (2) national unity founded upon 'political, economic and social '; (3) a democratically elected Indonesian parliament responsible to the people of Indonesia; and (4) solidarity between Indonesian political groups and the in order to maintain a strong anti-Fascist front4 In 1939, at the Indonesian People's Congress sponsored by Gapi and attended by ninety ditrercnt nationalist, political, religious, sxhl and economic organizations, the Indonesian language (Bahasa Indonesia) was officially adopted as the national language, the red end white flag as the national flag, and the song fndonesia Raya (Greater Indonesia) as the national anthem. The commitment of Indonesians to nationalism made first in 1928 through the adoption of the Youth Pledge was rca5med. Although the three-year-long Japanese occupation was to have an impact on attitudes towards the nation, Indonesian nationalism had certainly been developing steadily since 1908 when Botdi Oetomo was founded. Indonesian nationalism was N1 flower in the 1930s and early 19409, when all political factions that existed at the time and other social organizations were amalgamated under umbrella groups. And, while the role of individuals cannot be dkegarded as a factor in shaping Indonesian nationalism, that of social, ethnic, and religious orgaahtions and movements sctms to have had the strongest impact A brief summary of nationalist progress during the Japanese occupation is presented in the next chapter. 8. The IW and Iatiendhm prior to the 1980s

The intention in this section is certainly not to @vc a camplett survey of the history of NU from its establishment in 1926 to the early 1980s. Nonetheless, in order to better undmtaad what the NU accomplished in

1984 by returning to its 1926 kh&& (standard),%one has to have a general

sense of what the NU stood for, the issues surrounding its establishment, who was involved, and hm the pupevolved wer the course of the period in question. In his study of Ptrsatuan Islam, Howard Fedempiel divides Indonesian nationalism into three main streams of political thought: the Muslima who

followed Tjokroaminoto and the Sarekat Islam; the Secularists led by Soekamo; and the Chmmuni~led by , and .sl Although the NU was not initially founded as a political party, and had no apparent political alliance at that time, its later development is unquestionably relevant to the current study. If the NU could be categorized

as rnereIy a Muslim organization, it would be enough to place it in the first stream, LC., the Muslim nationalists. If it were consided a traditiodst~ group, as opposed to a modernist one, Persatuan Islam might be put in this category, and then the first stteam might need two further divisions: Muslim modemists and Muslim traditionalists. Actually, in order to evaluate the NU'S contribution to the Indonesian nationalist movement prior to 1984, we must look at the three phases of its existence since its tstabtishmcnt. The

fmt of these represents its initial period as a mainly &-based socio- religious organization,s a period which lasted from its founding in 1926 until the onset of the Japanese occupation. The second extends hm the coming of the Japanese in 1942 until the collapse of the Old Order in 1967.

The third stage comprises the New Order period under Soeharto (1968- 1980s). This last phase will be discussed in the next chapter.

The First Phase: Establisbing a First Characteristic With the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, the number of pilgrims travelling hm Indonesia to the HijG increased dramatically. and thought gained through study in Mecca and other areas of the

Middle East was brought to Indonesia by these pilgrims, encouraging younger Indonesian intellectuals to make the same journey to the Mush

holy places. Among those in this early generation to go were Syekh Name Al-Bantani ftom Banten in , Syekh Mmdz Al-Tarmid from Pacitan in east Java, and Syekh Ahmad Chatib Sambas from Kalimantan. All these of figures became influential in their respective regions and same had reputation in the broader Islamic world.

Those among the second generation to go wmK.H. Hasjim Asj'ari,a KH. Abdul Wahab Hasbullah55 and K.H. Bisjri Sjamsuri, all d whom became involved in the discussion of Islamic reform promoted by

Jamdud& al-Afghid (1839-97) ,56 his follower (1849- 1905),= and Muhnmmad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, founder of the Wahhabi movcment~Many scholars, however, have drawn different conclusions in analyzing the response of Hasjim Asj'ari and his companions to these three reformist thinkers, and have consequently misunderstood how the term traditionalist applies to the NU in particular. Since the early 1980s, however, other scholars, among them, Mitsuo Nakamura,59 Greg Barton, Mark Woodward,m Chokul Anam,61 and Martin Van Bruinessen,62 have

56 Jd&Din al-Af@&ii was a Muslim scholar who promoted the idea of Pan- I- I- i.e., the universality of Islam, in the late 19th century. Hourani, Arabic, 103- 129. Sa also H.A.R. Gibb, Modent 'bends in I.(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1946); and Fazlur Rahman, Islam (Chicago and London, 1979) in the sections The Philosophical Mweme~lt'and 'Modern Development'.

~7 For more ideas on his thought and contnitlon, see also Mulpmmd Raehid Ric& Tdiikh d-UsMd-hiin d-Shaykh Muhrunmod XMuh (Ceiro.. 19311, 31 and Muhammad Abduh. Al-Idcim wa al-Nasmniyya (Cairo: 1367 [1947-81).

a For mom on the WM~OVULKI~~ see Ira M. Lapidus, A Mstoq of ldmc Soczktk (New York: University Re* 1988), 258, 673-675. See also Hourani, Ambic, 37-38; Ma& G.S. Hodgsm The Venhcrc of Idam, vol. 3 (Chicago: The University of Chi- Press, 1974), 160-161,229-230; HAR GIN, Modem 'Prards in Islm (Chicago: The Unksdty of Chi- Rea8, 1946), 26-32; Ignaz Goldziher, lntrdudm to Id& 'Ihcdogy and Luw (Translated by Andras and Ruth Hamori. Prinaton: Princctoa UPiversity Pnss, 1981), 241-245. approached the NU from a different perspective and have come to new a conclusion, taking into account the original idea behind Hasjim Asj'ari's decision to form the NU upon his return hrn Mecca in the early 1920~63 Hasjirn Asj'ari and his colleagues were not in hct opposed to the nfoxm of Islam; what they basically disagreed with, in spite of their Merent interpretations, was the idea of breaking away tram the four schools of which the modernists felt were too rigidly based on the Qur'zih and the traditions of the F"rophet.6+ Looking at the basic doctrine of the NU promulgated at the time of its establishment, it appears that there were two main reasons why Hasjirn Asj'ari and his coUeegues decided to found the

organization.65 First, they wen not convinced that the average Indonesian Muslim was able to study the Qur9&and the traditions of the Prophet directly without the benefit of the accumulated knowledge of previous generations of scholars, such as was agerod by representatives of the four schools of law. Indonesian Muslims therefore should not be denied the benefit of this body of learning in trying to arrive at their own understanding

when he dedaed them as anti-moded& But I think this is morc a result of the ktthat Geertt adopttd tht mbjcctive impressions of those who were anti- traditio~This latter cese needs qdal matmeat and study. Following this list, Bnrinessen provides a number of *rhniata whbavc contributed vahmbk nee9rch on this association of u&mn --+.g., Benedict Anderson (1972 and 1977), Ken Ward (1974). Sidney Jones (1985),Dclisr Noer (1973),Chokul Anam 11989, Zuhri (1987) and Haidar Ba& (1991) Van Bdntmm, NU R&ReIrui Kwsa, PerrcM'm Waa~Bm (YogyakarW LEtiS, 1994). ~see~ChoinllAanm,FahunbuhcrndanPerloankurgcmNrrMhabtu7ama(Sala: Jatayu, 1985); A. Gdtk Karim, M- MI dm PbEiW Islcun di Indonesia (Yugyak;arta: Pustaka Majar, 1995); and bxmg man, Quo V.Mf sdeIcrh kembd ke Wtittah 1926 [JaJLarta- -bit Erlangga, 1992). Chow Anam is tbe Chief of the PBK (a new political party founded by NU Me18in July 1998) in East Java pmvincc. of the Qur'an and the traditions of the Pr0phet.U Second, as Muslim scholars, they felt that they were responsible for preventing other lay

Muslims in Indonesia from going too far in implementing reformist ideas.

It is therefore understandable that Bruinessen should atgut that the establishment of the NU was due to international factors rather than local ones, i.e., the downfall of the Ottoman and Muslim concern with

replacing that institution as a representation of the world Muslim community.67 This is not, howmer, to deny the fact that local issues played a role in the emergence of the NU. One such factor was the desire of Indonesians to align thcmsclves with a group that avoided the aggressiveness and militancy shown by so-called reformist groups, such as the Serekat Islam and Muhnmmadiyah. Another was the controversy that led to the founding of the Komite Hijaz,a which was again a response to the activities of reformists in the country. In response to these problems and others - the problems of urnmat or nation, in the sense that Benedict Anderson treats the question in his scnninal work39 Wahab Khasbullah, Hasjim Asj'ari and other prominent traditionalist ulrrmn established the NU on January 31, 1926.70

See Statuten of NU prmqpph 3.

a The Komite Hijat or Hijar Committee was a committee that waa fbun&d in Surabaya by the Nahdlatd Wathan'a lrndcra hr enabling them to aend thdr delegatea to King Ibn Su'ud to deal with the problem of the ANu d.sunncrh wa dJama7ah and Wahhabi movemmt ha that country. Tkydid w So becauat thdhnbt leadem ignored the of the fw.For lnort inhrmatiadl on Hijat Committee, aee Bnrinessen, NU. For modaaist and trsditiozmbt appadm, e Ikliar Nocr, The Rise and 13eYelopment of the h%dem&t MWh in IdOlUSiQ UnivUaity Microfilms, 1%3),326-404. The NU undertook considerable activity in at least four areas prior to Independence:71 The first of these was the foundation, during the first two years of its existence, of 27 branches throughout East Java This number doubled over the course of the following eleven years. Branches were soon to be found not only in Java, but also on the three other large islands:

Sumatra, Kalimantan (Borneo), and (Celebes).72 The second accomplishment was spreading the view - reflected in the statement made by Hasjim Asj'ari in Banjarmasin (1936) - that it was better for people to concern themselves with important problems, such as the struggle with the Dutch, than with polemics between the NU, the Muhammadiyah and Partai

Serikat Islam.73 The thud was the agreement by NU leaders to become involved in the MIA1 (Al-MadjXs al-Islami al-A'la Indonesia), an association which allowed Islamic organizations to debate among themselves issues of common interest.74 And fourth, there was the decision by NU leaders to found pesonttens which would later on provide the strongest foundations of the traditionalist camp.

The pescurtrerz is a traditional system of Islamic education found mostly in Java and Madura in its early development; it later spread to other islands, such as Sumatra and Kalimantrm (Borneo). On the one hand, due to the traditionalist image of the system and to certain weaknesses, such as

f2 M. Ali Hdar, 'Nahdatul 'tlIcuM dan Islam di Indam& pendeka!an 6kih ddam politiK (WD.dbuhtion, lAIN Syarif Hidayahrllah, Ciputat, 1991), 140-141 and H. Aboebakar Aixh, S@@uh Iiidup KHA. Wahid Hc~sjimdm Kcyrmgan Tasiat (3- fanitya Buku Perinltatan, 1957), 477.

73 Se, a- ohmBarton, NU, adBnhesm, NU, and a?e abo Nurchoh Majid, 'NU clan Pernilsiran falam Indonda," Aulq(Scpbemk 1994), 62- 77. 7~Thuthanant~~(1998)tari#mbyM;zansyl~nim~Wthat- not availahte to me at the time of writing. limited access to modem literatwe, and on the other, to limited knowledge of the pesantren itself.7Wost studies of the institution have in fact ignored the huge contribution they made to the development of urnmat, both before and after independence. On the other hand, there are studies that have recognized this fact.76 As a sub-cultural system, the pesantren in its later development contributed to a number of areas of national life. The majority of students in the LAINS (Institute Agama Islam Negeri, or State Institute of Islamic Studies), for instance, have a pesantren background. In today's Muslim intellectual circles, many are likewise graduates of a pesantten A number of studies of such circles have uncovertd a new phenomenon: since the late 19709, there have begun to appear 'nco-modernist' scholars who make use of their traditionalist background and modem Western knowledge in order to develop the Indonesian ummdn

The Second Phase: CaoperrSEon h Bullding a Sovereign Nation The second phase of the NU'S development corresponds to the period leading up to the declaration of independence in 1945 and the subsequent administration under Soekamo as the htst president of Indonesia To understand the NU'S role in this phase, it is more helpful to divide it into two periods: the period of Japanese occupation up to 1945, during which time

73 As quoted by Dbaktt AH. Johns admits that many ppkhavc a very limited kmmkdp of psanrmL See hi8 t;aofk, AX. John, ldam in Southeast W in Indo* C.W., 19,40 Pod Zllamat)lNari Dhafitrt Zhadhi Srudi tentmg Padbgan XapKiai (J- LP3ES, 1985),16.

~Saetar~hiPrlrRW~dTdahhrP~8m,GregBorton"Iht~ ofNto.MnCcmicmon~frlrmicT1#lght,~inDnid~radJobn~~in Indoacria 195lk and 1991b. (aoyton, ViCcara d Sall~Sllrirn StPdiq Ma& UnirCrsit~, 19%) and Greg B;aon WWUdlaPise A ViSyUb&," SMaljloni&u 5 no 3 (199S), 50. the NU joined Masjumi;'S and the period during which it became an e independent political party under Sockatno. In terms of the Indonesian nationalist movement, this latter phase has to be viewed separately from the others, because it marked a period of NU concentration on the purely political aspects of nation-building.

There were two aspects to the NU'S role during thc three and a half years

of Japanese occupation. One was to protect the country from foreign

artack,79 while the other was to answer society's needs by providing education and essential services. In protecting the country from foreign attack, in this case to anticipate the invasion of Java by Allied forces (including the Dutch), the NU'S leaders became actively involved in PETA (Tentara Sukarela Pembela Tanah Air - Volunteer Amy of Defenders of the Fatherland), a volunteer armed force formed by the Japanese government in 1943. It was PETA which was to became the backbone of the Indonesian Republic's .m Upon finding out that PETAnl was, in fact, more nationalistic than supportive of the Japanese, the Japanese replaced it with Perhimpoenan Kebakttian Rakjat (People's Royalty Ckgmbtion) or Djawa Hokokai. In this new organization the role of the uhwas more apparent

. . 7.9 bbsjumi (Madjelis Sjum Mu?rltmur tnrlnnraa- - consultative. Council. of Indonesian Modems) ia an €mmaafl'mowrpoaedof~Muaim~ -the NU, the M 7 lirphandSarckatlatnm-to~fheirdZkzeatafitPirsunder the Japanwe cpvtr~mt~t.This tmmcMon waa reestablished on N~vtmbcr7,1945. For mar+ ipformation about hbsjumi Asyari M~~dThe Rhof bh&mi Perty in Indonesia and tbe Rale of the 'Uhmrr in its Early Dcvebpmmt, 1945-1952,' (MA thesis, McGill Wxhdty, 1976).

79 See lllpdVson, hnoginad, 7. Scc PlaD Hayed utptPaation on patriotism, Carlton J. Hayeq Naft'mdimc A Religion (New York: The bkdhnCompany, 1%0), 9- 10. ~F~moz~~on~SocloPrao,~attaaadotherk~kedershvatd ~~~~intoamarr-~a-pointdvitwonly"-andh~ the Japanese rep- it with bbahthn mat CPeopk'a Royalty 0rg;anizatian) or Djawa Hokolrai, aee Kahb, N- 108- 110. than in PETA because the Japanese wanted to win support from Muslims with the objective of arousing resistance to the Allies on the basis of defense of Islam against infidels bent upon again enslaving the Muslim population of the country. Soon after the Japanese announced their promise to allow Indonesia to declare its independence, another armed force or home guard, Hizbullah (Army of ) was founded which drew directly on the santn' Muslim community and was attached to Masjumi, the Muslim unity association conceived by the Japanase. Wahid Hasjim, an NU leader, who was also the vice president of Masjumi, was the 6rst Muslim leader to pay an official visit to Hizbullah. Actually, during this period, Muslim nationalists used this paramilitary project and other activities as a means of preparing for independencc.82 Because the Iciais who led pesantras had strong connections to Muslims in the villages, the Japanese government made them propagandists in promoting Japanese initiatives with the compensation that these traditionalist Muslims would obtain scnrices from the Dqmrbnent of Religion (Shumubu) more casilp. The relationship between the Idrds and Muslims at the village level led to cooperation in other aspects of their lik.

The NU'S involvement in Masjumi aud in the Shumubu are further evidence of its role in promoting nationalist sentiment during this period. Masjumi was a symbol of unity for Indonesian Muslims which ultimately made a great contribution to the Indonesian drive for indepcndenct.~*Unlike

* Bruineplm, NU,52-54.

MSCChbin,N;Oh4ROh9m,0. 111 und XC. RicWcfj, A History, 206-209. the Masjumi that was to bc founded in 1945, this Masjumi was a council designed by the Japanese government to channel the voices of all Indonesian Islamic organizations or groups. The Masjumi supported the e~stcnccof Dai Nippon, the Japanese armed forces because they were seen as a bulwark against the so-called Asia Tirnur Raya (Greater East Asia). Although Masjumi was founded by the Japanese, its supporters were not necessarily affiliated to them. Rather, its members were often nual based, and while they came from every comer of the archipelago, they retained strong feelings of unity. The officers of Masjumi were members of the Muhammadiyah and the NU. Kiai Hasjim Asj'ari was president and his son, Wahid Hasjim (NU), and (Muhammadiyah)served as the vice- presidents who were in charge of activities in Jakarta. Kiai Wahab Chasbullah and Ki- Bagus Hadikusumo, chiefs of the NU and

Muhammadiyah respectively, were appointed as advisors to the executive board. The Shumubu, which was part of the formal government administration on the other hand, was run by Hasjim Asj'ari and Wahid Hasjim together with leaders fram the Muhammadiyah, also played an important role in uniting Muslims. Accordingly this policy of cooperation with the Japanese administration allowed Muslims to gain considerable experience in government and administration, produced para-military force and allowed the Zurther development of a rural national-political network on Java. All of the would later on become important in the Indonesian national life. The NU'S leader at this time, K.H. , played a crucial role in the establishment of Indonesia when he became involved in the BPKI (Badan Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia, or the Committee of Reparation of Indondm Independence), which was established on 29 May 1945 by the Japanese before they left Indonesia. The founding of this committee was one of the most important events in the history of Indonesian nationalism because it officially produced the foundations of Indonesian nationalism, i.e., Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. At first Hamchose to be in the group which sought to establish an in Indontsia, while the other camp opted for a secular state.= After the lkst meeting, the Committee founded Sub Komite BPKI (a smaller commission) consisting of 9 members, namely Soekamo, Muhammad Hatta, AA. Maramis, k Wahid Hasyim, Abikocsno Tjokrosuyoso, Abdula Kahar Muzakkar, Haji , Ahmad Subardjo, and Muhanunad Yamin. This committee succeeded in reaching a decision dealing with fvst draft of the Indonesian Constitution signed on 22 June 1945. This draft is now best-known as the Pi* Jakarta or . In the next meeting, held on June 10-16, 1945, the committee concentrated on discussing the reluctance of same members about the phrase 'dengun kewajiban menjatankan syan"at tslam bagi pemefuk- pmduknya,' or 'with the obligation of practicing Islamic law for Muslims.' As an u&ma, Hasyim played an important role in mediating the different views. Ln the meeting of June 13, 1945, Hasyim proposed phraacs for articles 4.2 and 29. Article 4.2 says that "those who are eligible to be the candidates for president and vice-president must be an Indonesian by origin and must be Muslim.' Article 29 rays that "the religion of the state is Islam, but guarantees that believers of other religions may practice their religions.'= On August 18, 1945, one day after Indonesian independence, the PFW (Panitian Persiapan Kemerdckaan Indonesia, or the Committee of Preparation of Indonesian Independence) was founded. It consisted of 27 members, one of whom was Wahid Hasyim; Sotkarno was the principal while Muhammad Hatta was the vice-principal. In the first meeting of this committee, the members discussed a number of important changes to the Constitution which would hater play an important role in shaping the foundation of Indonesian nationalism. The changes were: (I) the word 'Mukaddimah' (an Arabic term) was replaced with 'Pernbukaan' (a Malay word) or 'opening'; (2) the phrase 'Berdasarhn bpd~Ke-7Wmmq dengan kewajiban rnenjdankun symM'atIslm bagi pemeluk-pemeluknyu,' or 'bad on the Divinity, eth the obligation of practicing Islamic law for Muslims* was rephoed with 'beatatas Ke-'IWuIm Yang Maha Esa,' or 'based on thc Oneness of God'; (3) from the phrase 'Mdetz blah omng Indoeas& dan &ragama Mam' ('those who eligii1e to be the candidates of President and Vice-Resident must be an Indonesian by origin and Muslim), the words 'dm bergama Islam' were deleted; and (4) in line with the above points, article 29 was revisal to read 'Negrrta bmhmkan Ke h32anan Yang Maha Esq" or 'the state is based on the Onmess of Ood.'fl The cumnt Indonesian Constitution is still based on the work done by this committee. In general, the changed were apparently intended to produce language that reflected the Indonesian context in language and meaning.

References to God were clearly dated to Islam, but specific mention of Islam or things Muslim was avoided. Othdsc Islam was awarded no favors, but neither was it paralyzed in any way. After independence was declared on August 17, 1945 the NU committed itself to defending Indonesia's status as an independent and swcreign state. This was dramatically demonstrated when British troops supporting the return of the Netherlands Indits Civil Administration (NICA) to Batavia (Jakarta) landed in the countxy. Fotlowing a pattern that they had demonstrated in the past and still do today, NU members rallied in defense of their land. Once the British militaxy action plan to occupy the major cities in preparation for a return of Dutch administration was made known and the reluctance of the Central Government to take action clearly noted, the NU'S members gathered together in Surabaya on October 21-22, 1945 to discuss the issue. The gatherinp was held in order to produce a f6 (a statement made by religious scholars based on the Qur'h and the Prophet's Traditions) so that any fight undertaken by Indonesians against such occupation could bt interpreted as a According to Bruinessen, this NU meeting was an implicit criticism of the new Indonesian government's leadership, which had not acted very fordully in dealing with the Briitsh action which imperiled Indonesian independence. This fatwti or declaration came to be known as the Resohi Jihad (Holy War Resolution), The Re. Jihad was announced for a secand time by the NU in March 1946. It stated that every Muslim was obliged to defend the country's tmitbrial integrity [which at this time extended only to Java and Madura) as the AUied action posed pave constgumces for the Muslim oommunity. In the ensuing November 1945, NU membets participated in large numbers. Throughout the Revolution NU Icadcrs participated in the government while younger NU members sewed in the armed forces.

The MU under the Soekudr Old Ordw Generally speaking, Ihe period of Soeloarno was divided into two eras, namely Parliamentary Democracy (1949-1957) and Guided Democracy (1957-1%5). During these eras, the NU'S political activity took two forms: as

a component of Masjumi (1945-1952) and as an independent political party (1952-1966). As was mentioned earlier, Masjumi was reestablished after Indonesia had won its freedom. This time it had more members than before, and included such new members as the PUII ( Persatuan Ummat Islam Indonesia) and PUI (Persatuan Ummat Islam) from West Java and the PSIl.m

This be,however, the NU received a reduced proportion of representatives compared to other organizations, both within the Masjumi and in ministerial positions. The usual reason that many scholars cite is that the NU did not have enough educated people to !ill positions of rcsponsiiility. There may

have been subtle, cultural reasons at work as well. In this cast NU leaders preferred to be offered positions of responsiiility, rather than ask for them. They expected leadership tole on the basis of their standing, but if thcy were not given a post, then they tended to stcp back and let others take it without protest. When not given posts thcy expected thcy were privately disappointed and, sometimes, angry. This was one of the reasons why the NU withdrew &om Masjurni in 1952 and became a political party on its

own,m it., they were ignored as potential leaders and were seldom givm positions by acclamation. Culturally, they were out of stcp with the times where open and direct competition was an important factor in choosing people. The NU'S adherence to the legal medm' al-mafW muqaddam 'ala jalb al-qai to avoid disadvantages before considering the advantages, may possi'bly explain this attitude. It was better in their eyes to avoid conflict among Muslims than to gain positions of influence in the government. Furthermore, ideologid reasons may also have contributed to this phenomenon. The rise of the Masjumi party in 1945 was a positivc response by Muslim leaders to the government's declaration of political plurality and its willingness to allow Momto establish political parties91 This declaration was a sign of victory for the younger generation who had called for a multi- party system as opposed to a single party. The idea of having a single national party, Partai National Indonesia (Indonesian National Party) had actually been proposed by President Soekarno at the national address of August 23, 1945. He argued that in such times, it was necessary to unite all elements in the nation. Ultimately pressuns from various quarters caused the matter to be resoIved with an open political system. This announcement, which was nldby vice-president Mochnmmad Hatta, lad to a historical moment for lndonesian Muslim involvement in politics. On November 7-8, 1945 a number of Indonesian Muslim leaders held the Urnmat Islam congress in Yolgyakarta This congress arrived at three important decisions. First, the decision was taken to form a political party called Masjumi, in conscious imitation of the name given to the council formed under the Japanese occupation. This Maqjumi, however, was different in that, it clearly saw itself as a political party, while the former was

not. Second, the congress decided that Masjumi was to be the sole Muslim political party in the country. The original hope was that it would sem to unite politidy the Muslim urnmat, even thought in the end it became more a source of division than unity. Third, the congress made it clear that there

were certain differences of view among Muslim leaders as to the character of the nation-state they wanted to build. Wahid Hasjim's lack of success in managing the hjj transportation for

the 1952 season gave rise to the htsi5 of conflict between NU leaders and other members of Masjumi, conflict which would lead to the NU'S withdrawal from it one year later. lnstead of trying to -lain the problems in managing

the transportation, Wahid Hasjim, demonstrating the attitude typical of NU leaders,= chose to resign from his position as Minister of Religious Affairs rather than explain the problems and fight for his position. Chasbullah's attempt to replace him with other NU candidates, such as Masjkur or Fathurrahman, was not acceptable to the general Mdumi leadership. The appointment of Faqih Usman of the Muhnmmadiyah to the cabinet post hstrated the NU leadership - tbey apparently regarded the position as belonging to them- and they saw it as a violation of an understanding they had with Masjumi in gmeral.93 A proposal by the NU to

See page 38 on the masfahat and m~~jkadahand II the Wtid attitude of the NU. For mom appma&, .se Muhsmmad ILhelid Marnrd, Idamic Legal PhiZosaphy ~~~te,1977')andirarIdyt al- S-6 Al-Mamahqat eM'44 vola (Beirut Dir al-KuNb d-Ilmiyy& ad) federate with Masiurni, a responsible compromise given the needs of both groups was rejected by the Mag'umi leadership. At an NU conference in Palembang, South Sumatra, not long after this event, the decision by the NU executive to become an independent political party was approved. The unsympathetic stance of Masjumi leaders and the inability of association leaders to articulate their organizational expectations also led the PSII to leave Masjumi. The NU invited the PSII and Perti, a politid party connected the West Sumatra which had earlier left Masjumi, to establish the Indonesian Muslim we.This organization came into being in August 1952. The general election of 1955, which is believed by many to have been the most democratic election in the to date, shoued the NU to have strong backing on Java, Madura and Southern Kalimantan. Overall, the NU won the third largest share of the vote aftcr the PNI and Masjumi. The following table shows a break-down of the voting and seat distxibution in this election:

has baa given little attentian in the u&u@of Idamic movemmt4 political or orgdaionsinthe country. Itiahopedthatthe~t~study~~thsgap. The figures are even more striking when we compare the number of seats

held by the NU before and after tte election.

Election 1 rnection PNI 42 57 22.3% - Masjumi 44 57 20,Wo NU 8 45 18.4% PKl 16 39 16.4% The above figures show us that the number of seats gained by the NU increased dramatically from 8 to 45 seats and raised the NU'S position fiom tenth to third in overall share of the vote. The PKf (Partai Komunis Indonesia, or Indonesian Communist FWty} also made considerable gains, increasing its share of seats by over fifty percent compared to previously. This also indicated that the PKI played a role during the period in question. During the periods of Parliamentary and Guided Democracy under Soekamo's Old Order between 1950 and 1965, the NU participated in all but one cabinet, that of Wilapo.94 In view of the many crises that took place during the transition from Parliamcntaxy to Guided Democfacy, such as the installation of the extra-parliamentary Kabintt Karya (working cabinet) in April 1957, the establishment of the National Council in May and the proclamation by Residential Decree of the 1945 Constitution, and finally the dissolution of the elected parliament in March 1960, the NU decided against defending the existing system of liieral parliamentary democracy, preferring instead to back the

. . 94~eyutbtkbs~~~~portnysd~~~~ aadinordiaaleiyr~~~-~ll~l~~thPttbt~~oftraditioarJialslamis ~rrorsrbthiprlimtaarldSacGngF~,"RawingipaTypboon'NabQomtC941M~tht Decline of- Ihuzq,'' m Ddd BOufcbjer and John Legge, aanwaCy in Indonesia 1950s Md 1993s (Chqtm, Victoria: Cmtv of Southeast AsfePl Studitq Mona& UnhdQ, 1994), 88 and N.R Heddic, ed., Sdrdars, Scdnfs, and SuJk Musfim ~~tidll8h~~~~1500~~EwlImsAagelw, University of Californip Pncsa, 1972),5-6. proposals of Soekarno and the ~taq.95This attitude to the state and the nrling government in power was justified on the basis of precepts set forth by prominent medieval Sud thinkers such as al-Mgwardi, d-GMand al- Biqillw, who regarded de facto governmental authority as the determinant of political conditions with an obligation on the part of Muslims to accept it and work with it. For these types of ulomq the ummat must be obedient to the state, even a despotic one, for authority was vastly prtferable to anarchy. During this period the NU leadership was dominated by kiais and politicians noted for their willingness to compromise with the government leaders. The most irriluential figure leading the NU at this period was K.H. Wahab Hasbullah, one of the founding fathers of the organization. Ha seems to have had a flexible and highly practical approach to politics. The other inauential figure was , who occupied the post of general party chairman from 1956 until 1984. These two key figures,together with the secretq general of the NU Saifuddin Zuhri, K.H. Masjkur, Zainal Arifin and Djamaluddin Malik, were in charge of conceiving policies and tactics for the NU. What was the theoretical basis for the actions taken by NU leaders during the period in question? As was later on Rdmitttd by , the NU usually based its actions on references to &h (law),especially to the twin principles of mastahat (benetit) and nu$'. (harm). According to al-Ghazali any actions to protect religion, life, intellect, lineage and property constituted maslahat; anything inimical to them was mafscrdah Prevmting something that led to mafsaduh was also considered to be mcls- Thus, before arriving at a dtcision, the ulama should calculate what was the benefit or ham that would occur from a particular action.%This gave the MI leadtrship an opportunity to be eclectic, reactive and innovative in response to problems confronting it Ultimately, this 'good-bad' approach to political difficulties allowed the NU leadership to withdraw it supports &om the Sakarno regime in 1966 and to give its allegiance to the new government headed by Saharto. The NU leadership at that time understood that structural changes \Rere to occur in the political system. To reject those proposals would be extremely dangerous. Any party that did so could be labeled 'counter-revolutionary' and subjected to intimidation and oppression. This politid policy of the NU, however, led the NU to its being labeled opportunist and not a real contributor to Indonesian democracy. One might argue, however, that in certain situations, political opportunism remained important.

The second reason, as Abdunahman Wahid admitted, was that in any continuation of the Soekarno government, the Communist Party would certainly have gained in power and that NU would have lost influence accordingly. A change of allegiance was therefore a political necessity. The uncertainty of the economic and political situation and the fact that President Soekarno was seriously ill, plus the bloody revolt engineered by the PKI in September 30, 1965, all led to a major historical turning point for Indonesia The Soekarno period ended when the young General Soeharto took over and began his rule over the country - one which would last for 32 years. Thus began the New Order phase of Indonesian history. CHAPTER I1 NU'S WITHDRAWAL FROM POLITICS

A. The Socio-Political Sitantiom in Indon& Prior to 1980

Indonesian nationalism during almost the entire first half of the New

Order period centered on maintaining national stability and promoting

national economic development. One of the policies of the New Order

Government for maintaining national stability (and to help the government

itself remain in power) was to curb any social movement which the

government could not ditectly control. This policy included limiting the

number of political parties, restricting the activities of social and religious

organizations, and above all, imposing the same ideology on all social and

political organizations in the country. The gwernment's plan to concentrate

on the development of the national economy also contributed to this policy of political containment. Thus, political and democratic issues were

considered secondary to economic ones. Those in power teali#d that the

economy had been the mllin political weapon of the Communist party in the

earlier period and that poor economic conditions were a fertile field for anti-

government groups to prosper in.

In this section, I will focus on these policies and their influence on the

attitude of social and religious organizations, spea;ticdy the Nahdlatul

Ulamu In addition, I will ucamine the problems of Indonesian nationalism

before 1984, when the Nahdlatul Uloma decided to return to the 1926

khhh, or the spirit of 1926, the year of its foundation. The Rise of the New Order and Ita Yodel of Natbnd Development The rise of the New Order government began with the fall of Soekamo's

Old Order amid political and economic instability and an unsuccessfhl and

bloody revolt by the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI, Rirtai Komunis

Indonesia) in 1965. Quite clearly, the presidential succession did not take

place constitutionally, i.e. through the nmal and dynamic mechanisms of

government 1

The attempted coup has since btea subject to a wide range of conflicting

interpretations; to cife but one example, the army-backed New Order

government's version differsgreatly from that of Western scholars. For some

Western scholars, such as Benedict Andermn and Ruth McVey, a strong

argument for the PKI's playing an offiaal role in planning the coup attempt

cannot be made. 2 They argue that the coup attempt was actually an internal

affair of the Army. Thus, the PKI served as a convenient scapegoat for the

Army to cover up the real source of the conflict. But Harold Crouch has

argued that the Latter thesis (the m-called 'Cornell Papef) is very di&ult to defend in its original form, in Iight of the testimony of the PIU leaders at the

1 According to the 1945 Constitution, tbs lndohPnsidcat in cbctsd evey five ytats following a general elccth. Neither of the mmt recat presidcatrr, me& Soeharto and Habibie, hwe mcceadd in bdqe el4after a general ekction. The collapse of Soehaito's New Order lpvcmment waa, to some extent, a repetition of IndMlesian history. Mabmilub (Mahkamah Militer Luar Biasa, or Special Militay Court) Ws, as well as in view of the opinions expressed by PKI emigri groups in Europe

and elsewhere. The 's version, on the other hand, which

gained general public acceptance in Indonesia, identified the PIU as the

dalang (puppet master) of the coup attempt, a conclusion that seemed clear-

cut? This version was used later on by the New Order regime to suppress

any movements trying to criticize the government, by accusing them of

proliferating Communist teachings. All published materials containing

Communist ideas and even academic works showing the Communist

movement in a positive light wmprohibited. One proposition of the New

Order that strongly influenced the Indonesian people at every level was that

the Indonesian Communist Party had betrayed the state and nation by

attempting to replace the state ideology of Pancasila with Communist

ideology.

For Muslim groups, the issue of replacing the Pancasila idcolow with a

Communist one meant applying an atheist ideolagy that was strongly

opposed to their beliefs and their commitment to the nation. This is why

Muslims, especially the NU, worked tbgcther to establish good relations with

the army and other forces that supported the New Order government and

accepted the state ideology of Pancasila. This was a period that wilnesscd

the rise of a number of movements against the continuation of the

Soekarnoist political system. Among these were KAMI (Kesatuan Aksi

3 Harold Crouch, 27u Amy and lWitb in Indoll~~~hQtheEa and Imadon: Cornell Univusity RWO,1978), 101-102. Mahasiswa Indonesia, or Action Front of Indonesian University Students),'

KAPPI (Kesatuan Aksi Ptmuda Pelajar Indonesia, or Action Front of

Indonesian Youth and Students), and KAP Gestapu/PKI (Kesatuan Aksi

Penggayangan Gestapu/PKI, or Action Front for Dmtroying the

Gestapu/PKI). Among the Mush figures who played significant roles in

these movements were H. Husni Tharnrin, M. Zammni, and Subhan Z.E.,5

who led KAMI, KAPPI and the KAP Gestapu/PKI, respectiveIy; signdhntly

some of them were NU members. Their efforts should be viewed as coming

from a commitment to uphold the agreement of Indonesian nationalist

leaders who were committed to founding the Indonesian state on the basis of

religious pluralism, i.e. not on a single faith, and certainly not on atheism,

like the PKI. These movements, later collectively knob as the 1966

generation, put forward three demands to the Soekarno government: that

Soekarno dissolve the PKI, that he purge the cabinet of all leftist elements,

and that he reduce prices in order to imprwe economic life.6 These demands

contained three dimensions of national interest: (1)ensuring the stability of

national politics; (2) saving people from starvation; and (3) attaining uni~

based on the same goal of nationalism.

The NU'S formal role in the rise of the New Order was not as transpatent as its informal role; however, the NWs support for the formation of the New

4 For further accounb of KMI, w,fbr example, Rosihan Anmar, Birth of KAMI,' Quadnurt (Mstch-April1%7), 5560; BakbGhosahal, 'Stdmts and Pblitica in Indonesia. The Birth of MMf? China ReporS voL 6, no 5 (Sepbcmber-October 1970), 39-47. Both M. Zamn,ni, and Subhan wwe activists in NU at that time.

6 See Team Perabinaan Rcnatar dan Baban kutamn Rgawd RcpubEk Indonesia, &than Phatmm Paloman dun pCnBmnalm Pamasik, Order seemed stranger than that of any other social group in Indonesia at

that time. Nonetheless, the doctrine of tawassuth (middle way)' espoused by its leaders, coupled with the negative publicity attracted by various radical Islamic movements, such as Kartosuwijo's revolt in of Bandung, Kahar Muazakkar's insurgency in South SuIawesi, and the Aceh Merdeka movements, have caused many to forget the contn'bution made by Muslims to the formation of the New Order. Writing on the situation as it stands today, Voll remarks: 'Such continuing militant opposition means that the country's leaders, especially those in the military, maintain a general mistrust of Islamic movements." This was true for the entire New Order period prior to 1980. In identifying its enemies, i.e. so-called anti-

government entities, anti-Pancasila and Islamic state forces, the New Order ignored certain significant segments of the nation-state, which included Muslim groups. The New Order government identified Communists as 'extreme left"9 and Muslim fundamentalists as 'cxtremc right? By the early 1990s, the army had identified a new threat: 'extreme centrists'.lo

Undang-undang DaJat 2 945 dun Besar Holuan New(Jakarta: Sekretariat Team Pembinaan Penatar dan Behan Pmataran Pegawai Republik Indoaesia, 1978). 9 1

7 K.H. Ahmad Sidk Khittah NahdIiyah (JamPcrsahran Ban& 1980) and Islam, PMCQSJa dm Ukhwcrh IsMyr3u Warvancrvo dengan Rois AmPBW KH. AhdWdiq (Jakarta: Lajnah Talif wan Nasyr, 1985). I am much indebted to Greg BartonwhohasrrprodudthrJr,twomrkainhbbook. Hegiveatwonesonsfor the repduciq than with tranaation and ~tu36tatioaone ia that Siddiq'a thought d@t be brougXlt to tho atteation ofa wider audience, and Om,it ia howthat thia may led to a better undus&ndine of tbc dpambof xeform witbin NahdZahll UIamcr, see, Greg Barton, Nbhdztul Vltma, Tkddhd Istarn 4 Modenrity in Ind4ncsia (Clayton, Ausmh ModAsia Iassitute, 1996). 110-128. Compere with CWotd M,Thc Rwonof Jam (Chi-: Unimof Chicago b,1970).

8 John Okrt Vdl IsIm C%fim@ und Change in the Modem Wald (Syracuse: Syracuse UmtyPrtss, 1994), 344. As for the NU, which is usually considered by its own members and

outside observers as upholding the doctrines of Ahl al-Sunnnh um al- Jarna'ah, to distinguish themselves fiom the Shia, its general political attitude has been atpressed as Tawassrdh, or middle path, moderate as opposed to extremist (tatharmj, neither in favor of the extreme right, (understood by the New Order to refer to Islam) nor the extreme left (understood to refer to ). Literally, AM al-ihnmh wa alJarna'ah means the people of the Sunna (the tradition of the Prophet Muhammad) - thus the community and its members remain strict followers of the Sunni tradition.1 In practice, this community of Muslims follows the practice of the prophet's Companions According to K.H. Bisri Mustofa, an NU ularna from Rembang, Ah1 al-Sunnah wa alJarna'ah refers to that of Muslims who hold fast to the following tradition:

1. In the I&dc law, they follow one of the four great Muslim jurists, ie., Hanafite, MaWdte, Shafi'ite and Hanbalite. In practice, most of Indonesian traditiondisc MuslimJ follow the ShaiEte. 2. In ~logv,they follow the wachbgs of Imam Abu Hasan al-Ash'ari and Imam Abu Mansur al-hdaturidi. 3. Ln TasatKUf, they follow the basic teachiqa of Imam Abu Qosim alJunaidi.12

The above characteristics of Ah1 al-9wvmh w crtJama'ah have made the NU different from other Muslim groups, such as the Muhammadiyah, which

also claims to be the followers of AN alfluvrah wcl alJama'ah Another characteristic that makes the NU Merent from the Muhammadiyah is that

-- ~- - - Schwarz notes that the foamdin# of ICMI watl an alteraativc force desigmtd by Soehaao to deal with %xbeme centrists.' But, aa AMtudmmm Wahid ba~pointed out, ICMl may later bscomc the annll aocadJe that o~nton toeat it8 owner. It am be argued that tk . . for dmhg scats in the 1997 dabkt bcfPROLl the ICMf faction and Soeharto aorrics irarlted in nepotism in the formation of tbe cabinet. But, the blame was later attnitcd to bharto him& Thin would k an in- quhn to investigate. See aim Liddle, The Iabdc,..', 613-634, wpedsny page 617 and Doughs E. Rcmage, Wcsin lhdurdcr eemoemCy, Islm Md the qf Tolm(London and New Y* Rouw, 1995), 17 in practicing the above principles the NU adjust to the local traditions and cultures of Indonesia This is one of the reasons that the NU is accused by other groups of practicing bid'ah or innovation.'3 The NU'S informal yet active role under the New Order gwemment began on October 1, 1966, when the NU'S leaders sought information about the kidnapping of six army generals (later found dead). Actually, although the mounting rivahy between the army and the PKI was clear to everyone, the announcement made by the coup leaders on October 1 had not indicated any PKI involvement but stated, saying instead that it was 'a movement within the army' aimed at protecting Sukamo from an army plot sponsored by the CIA.14 After successfully restoring order and scattering the dissident, the new government led by Sochartols was inspired to take action on political consolidation.16 Interestingly, the economy was used to justify every single policy implemented. In addition, Fcderspiel notes that, as the basis for its political system, the New Order restructured itself on five principal platforms:

(1) to psition the military aa the a* for state security and give them the moat important features of national W. (2) to hnn the mnitery, s&te employees and peaeant group into the backbone of a govenrment-assisted party that moldkd much of the electorate, o&nd pro-go-t candidates for election, aad gave I#inlntive support to garern- v (3) to tbe task of aqiqg out a natbaal ecwmmit development plan to a group of highly mpcted technocrats, mostly trained in the West. (4) to mss agricuhural prahdon and di~'butionof fidamBs throughout the dm. (5)to decide, mostly by fait accompli, that PancaaUa was the lzatioaal phiiosophical orientation of the cmant1y,'7

Furthermore, in an attempt to distinguish itself from the Old Order, the New Order regime defined itself as: (4 an order of the mte and netion, bad an the imptmrntation of the Pancaaila and the 1945 wnstitutioa h a pure and consistent manner. (b) an order that aspind to the ideals of indcpadenct, that is, a just and prosperous Indot#sian PJOciety baaed on the Pancasila. (c) an order which wished to establish the system of state and society badon thecoastitutioa,duMaacyaadlaw. (d) an order of dtutIonand an otdu of developmcntl*

The New Order's Politid PoUder In the process of consolidating his power and to @vc himaelf mter by implementing thc deytIopment ideals outlined above, Soehdo delayed the htgeneral election of his presidency, despite the fact that there were strong demands to hold it as 3oon as possi'ble. At an Army (Anglrotruz Darat) seminar held in Bandung in 1966, it was decided that, in order to enable the New Order to win the next general election, the armed foms (ABRI) &odd these iasuea, ase also William R tiddle, 4ndoneaia in 1987: The New Order at the height of its Power: Asian Suw28 (Fcbruaay 1988). guarantee security through a constitutional approach. In order to do so, ABRI, through its spokesperson Major General , formulated the concept of the 'Middle Way', according to which the army neither sought to take wer the government nor remain politically inactive. Its dual role, known as ' ABRI'19 was enshrined with the passage of constitutiod amendment number 15 (1969) concerning general elections. Once ABRI had made sure that it could participate in the New Order government, the government declared that Indonesia was 6ndy ready to hold the voteP Both Abdul Aziz Thaba, and Harold Cmuch state that them arc two opposing views tegEarding the dual function of ABRI, one internal to ABRI itself, and one held by civilians. The fomer can be Merdivided into a structural perspective and a point of view stemming from personal opinion. Both see citizens as essentially too weak to maintain nationd stability on their own, thus requiring ABRl to hold key strategic positions in the government. ABRI leaders believe that, throughout the history of Indonesia and until the concept of dual function was applied, only ABRl was capable of creating and maintaining political stability and economic development. Hence, the military cxpected to hold such key positions in the govenuamt as Mcnko Pollcarrr (Mmteri Kooniinator hlitik dan Keamanan, or Coordinator of the Ministry of Politics and Security),Menhankam (Menteri ~~clan Kcamanan, or Minister of

19 The dactrine of Dwifbpi (the military doctrine ~~ a dual potitid and aecuxity role) habeen blamed Srr a numk of the Wta of the New Order d- itstimc.Oneofthe raulta that sbrouldbeamitiontdhen, rrsEarasthenationalinWwt is wnanrcd war, the appointment of 75 elite m#nberr of the aomed k,nm by Saharto to the MPR (Feopk's Conarltative Aztaemhiy). This hwe was the facw af student demonstrations duriug the Spdal Bktiq(SI) of the DPR, on 10.13 November 1998. ThatthepractiahadbecPinplaceforthirty-~yearsdidPotdiao~~ altboughtheydidultinretr~fkiitoaUaintheirgpel.Thcpolicywat~~tao strongfor MPRn#mknr to break, ~oppositionhmatmodcvaykvclof dty.A qamte study muld k ncsded ta imdptenhmmt issue8 hding to the colkrpac of theNeW0nk.r. Defense and Security), Mcndagri (Mentcri Dalam Negeri, or Minister of Internal Affairs), and BPK (Badan Pcrnetiksa Keuangan Negara, or National Auditor), as well as the governorships of strategic provinces such as Jakarta, West Java, East Java, and several nondavanese arcas. ABRI repreaentativts were also supposed to be appointed to the Council of People's Representatives (DPR) and the People's Consultative Assembly WR).These polides have drawn criticism both from within ABRI as well as from without The long-standing tradition of militaq personnel enjoying such special privilegca has made difticult to progr~ssto a more democratic system of government. The general election was hally held on July 3, 1971, with 9 parties participating, one of them Golongan Karya (Galkar) allied to the government itself. The result held few surprises, Oblkat won a landslide victory, taking almost two-thirds of the popular vote (62.80 per cent). It collected 34,348,673 of the 54,699,509 votes cast The NU received 10,213,650 votes, or 18.67 per cent, the PNI 3,793,266'~~6.94 per cent, and the PMI 1,930,746 or 5.36 per cent, while the remaining 6.21 per cent was divided betwetn minor parties like PSII, Parkindo, Partai Katolik and Perfi.21 Of the 351 seats available, Goh won 227, the NU 58, 24, the PNI 20, the PSU 10, Rukhdo 7, Partai Katolik 3, and Perti 2. Murba and IPKI received no seats at all.= The results showed that, accept for thc NU, none of the other parties poda threat to the regime. Galkar bad such strong support tbat, even if all the other parties bad ford a coalition (a remote pocmi'bility at beat), would still have garnd the most votes. AU such assumptions huwever were

~Ni~Mambi,~MblllCI~Et~af1972(Itaeca: CodModem Indoneda Reject, Mollosraph Series No. 56,1972). 63,Tdc W. contingent on the vote having been fairly recorded.= Two very important political measures taken by the government after the election showtd that this may not have been the case. These political measures fueled criticism of the election process, which was deemed undemocratic fmm the bcghbg.24 This reality was even acknowledged by Lt. General Ali Moutopo, a fomer spokesman for the New Odcr

Some circlets axe of tbe opinion that the triumph of Gallrar waa acbwd due to tbe fobwing factors: the av- of fun& the support of the om, particularly hm ABRI (Armed Fbnra. . of tbe Republic of Indw, the formation of Kor@'s within various muustnt' 4 iastituthns and 6rms, and alsb various farms of intimidation. All of thee conkhtd to the triumph of the Golkar.26

Furthermore, commenting on the results of the election, Crouch states: Despite the electoral auccesA the Gdkar was -tially a creation of the military authoritits and bed Pttk of identity. Lackbq both a . . am and - gocitly, Gdhw a Party 0- of its mats in the temporary f;ederaton of hetuogcp#,,us organizations mobilitsd by the army witla the intenrim of flll~akcniugthn pwcks Canceivcd as an ekctural machine dw&md to urrdcrmine the stxcngth of opponents rather tban ueate a new hus of loyalty and identification, the Gollkar sbdno s@s of developing into a means of chamcling dikn upward. The Gdkar Ibulldozcf had done its job of levathe ground pxwioudy occupicd by the parties, but it waa an unsuitable tool tor c0ustructhn.n

a L3re mom than 200 thouammi NU suppo*rs at the National Mee- af the E%E, AWumbmu Wahid rsi&d the isrruc of the New Ode91 tmatmmt d NU supportem cbiqtk 1971 ctnd 1977 general &&ma He add th* due to A more dtmcmtic systrm of ekction, it was the for NU to um its voice in th: upcoming election of June, 1999. See Kanpas, Me1,1999 and Jaw Pos, March 1,1999. In acknowledging Golkar's election victory, Socharto declared that the process had been 'luber,' meaning lansung (direct), uwm (general), &bus (free), and rahasia (confidential).He thanked the people for having exercised their voting rights and for the orderly conduct of the election. , the vice-president, stated that the election results guaranteed the successfitl implementation of the New Order development program and announced that

political and economic stability had finally come to Indonesia.%Despite the fact that I& was to become a motto in almost every election held during the Soeharto era, the reality was quite the opposite. With their victory in the 1971 election, in which Soeharto and ABRI extended their "handsn to each other through Gob,these three powerfUl

forces were successful in finally eliminating all opposition groups: Muslim groups, on the one hand, and Christian and other nationalist groups on the other. In order to cover up their undemocratic lrcatment of other partits and, at the same time, create parties that would come under the government's control, pressure was exerted on parties to either dissolve or revert to earlier non-political roles. In January 1973, two new parties were

formed to challenge Oo1kar.s The PPP (Fbrtai Persatuan Pembaagunan, or Development Unity Party), under the leadership of Idham Cbalid (of the NU) and Mintareja, replaced the old Muslim parties, and the PDI (Rwtai Demolcrasi Indonesia, or Indonesian Democratic Party) was fonaed as a

For more ;nhmmtimr on the 1971 election, see Nmaz B. Mody, Indonesia Under Soehmb (New York: Apt Boob, 1987), 296-324 a& Hamld Crouch, The Army m2d Politics in Id& (Ithaca and kmdozt Cornell University &ma, 1978),246-272. result of tht fusion of former nationalist and Christian parties. The PPP, formally established on Januasy 5, 1973, was an amalgamation of four Islamic parties, namely the NU, PSII, Perti, and Pannusi. The PDI, officially founded on January 10, 1973, was itself a fusion of the PNI, hrkhdo, Partai KathaIik, IPKI, and Partai Murba Bath parties were under leadership largely amenable to the government's wishes and received subsidiw hm

the latter to hnance their opcrations.m Since then, government interference in both parties has been easily aecomplishcd, as Laode Ida notes,

The pmss of depoliticizing society and emasculating political parties, begun in 1973, culminated in the idca of the Yloating messes.' used this theoretical concept in June 1971 when he advocated the closure of party bmches below the repncy level. The concept of floating masses was subsequently taken up by the Commander of Diponegom Mdor General Widdo, who declared that there was no need for party organizations in villages. He echoed Madjid'a belief that parties should not

disturb the people below the regency level [Iremmatans or sub-districts), except during election campaigns. Thus, them a no ndfor any

permanent dtment to par@ raembwship. Dcspitt th+ gowmmcnt'~ justification of the idca of the floating mmmon the muds that it did not tiofatt' any constitutional ptwrisions, and its condemnation of all opposition to it, the Nahdlatul UEamu, which had amalgamated with the PPP, faced the bitterest consequences, since most of its members were from villages. Nawaz

B. Mody states that the floating masses concept divided society into two major groups; the urban dwellers, who couid main involved in politics; and small town and village-dwellers, who could enjoy that lwcury only during elections. The New Order regime undermined the rival masses by terming them masih bodoh, or 'still uneducated,"and hence in need of being depoliticized and protected fmm the cormptivc influence of political participation and control.= Following the success of the ruling government in eliminating opposition groups by legitimizing only two political parties other than Golkar until the

1977 general cletion, several issues arose that are relevant to the discussion in this paper. The htissue was a new bill proposing a uniform mfvriage law for all Indonesians. The desire of some Muslim groups to impose Islamic law on all Muslim cauples had been proposed since 1967, but had never been officially introduced. The main barrier to its implementation seems to have been the fear that it would subsequently affect other groups in 90Ciety. In August 1973, tht Oovernment introduced a bill proposing a uniform marriage law for all Indon- The bill recognized Islamic courts under the Ministry of Religious A&irs as merely playing a minor legal role compared to that of the civil courts., Without any clear justification for such a law, namely without referrityt to any spdcnligious teachings, the bill required may marriage to be registered in order to be valid and required Muslim men to obtain the permission of a civil court before taking a second wife or obtaining a divorce. The Muslim faction in parliament of course rjected this bill on religious grounds. But for the PPP, including the NU politicians, to vote against any bill in parliament would have bun futile, since they were in the minority. They therefore threatened to walk out if a vote was held and rallied the Muslim community to protest such an assault on the fundamentals of Islam. The dissatisfaction of the PPP was subsequently heard by Muslim groups outside the parliament through a press corps that still enjoyed limited freedom to publicize these kinds of issues. in the face of widespread protest, especially by Muslim youth groups, the bill was finally redrafted by a committee of the DPR and finally passed without a vote. The powerlessness of the PDI and PPP from 1973 to 1975 was not enough to reassure the New Order gwernment that it controlled all aspects of life in Indonesia or that it was guaranteed to take the next general election. In August 1975, the Government passed the Bill on Political Parties and Golkar, in which political parties could not carry out their activities among people living in jurisdictions below the level of regency. This bill clearly showtd that Oalkar felt threatened by fact that the majority of PPP minister of the Interior, Amk Machmud, stated that guidance of the nual population should be in the hands of Govmmcnt officials. This bill seems to have been meant only to render the other political. parties impotent9 The nsult of the 1977 general election showed that the new law had achieved the desired pal. Golkar naturally won a majority of the vote. In reviewing the breakdown of cabintt membership after the 1977 election, Michael R J. Vatikiotis notes that, general and 84 per cent of mbbt&d ssnetarie8 wen ABRI appointees. Wen in the diplomatic acrvicc, dmod haAf the country's ambaswka were hmthe mdihq in 1977. In the early 1980% a hmer US diplomat estimated that active and retired military men occupied bplf tbe positions in the 'hi#her central bureaucracy'. Man -, the d&aq dominated the of evay cabinet department. Some of the appointments, espddy to the diplomatic service were favm panted tu o~~ The Nority was on the active list and valued the wider publicity d pater opportunities for renumuation [sic] offered by thcir posts.34

The above picture of the political representatives and government clitc, who were the secondary decision-makers below the president, clearly shows that there was little balance in the democratic nprestntation of the majority of the country's population. As can be sen, the government was largely made up of miiitaxy men, who inevitably adopted a military approach to any situation they faced. The army's almost impregnable position made it nearly impossible for civil and non-governmental officers to become real forces in making policies for developing the state. This is, of course, not to neglect certain elements of the ruliag government, such as BAPPENAS (Badan Perancang Pembangunan Nasional, or the Office of National Development

Agency), especially after 1985 wfim the technocrats appeared to rival the army as a power center. Their role, however, was limited to carrying out

national programs and only as long as the anny did not see them as a threat to their existence. One of the policies which ptlyinfluenced the structure of Lndontsian nationalism after the 1970s and enabled the New Order regime to mainrain conmi of the country through GoJkat and ABRI, was the institution of the Pancadla as the sole basis for all political parties and mass organizations? Studying the Muslim response to and their acccptana of the Pancasiln,

34 Michael RJ. Vatildotis, Mortcsicm Mcs Under Soeharto (New Yo* Routledge, 1994),70-7 1, Faisal Ismail notes three factors motivating the New Order goverament's policy in this regard. The factors were fear of the re-emergence of Communist ideology, the rise of Mush fundamentalist movements in the in the late 19709, particularly in , and a rise in Muslim 'separatist' and 'fundamentalist' movements within the countxy.36 The bottom line was that these three factors, politically manipulated by the New Order gwernment, indicated that it did not want any rival power to exist. In reality, the religious movements accused of disturbing the country were responding to the unfair distribution of economic resources, and political positions in the parliament. Pressure and security concerns were appliad by the government to achieve the goals of the Pancasila throughout the New Order regime. The close cooperation of ABRI and Gallrar in structuring and maintaining the political order proved formidable and other political actors had difficulty exerting much pressure on it. The current course for many, including the NU, was simply to cooperate with it. B. Toward the Sitnbondo Coagreru mb KembuZi ke mittah 1926

The Failure of NU Political Lendei.hfp As I mentioned in the previous section,.govement pressure on social organizations, presented secondary political actors, such as Muslim groups

with a dilemma On the one hand, Muslim groups wanted to participate in programs that enhanced national development and unity. On the other, they wanted to help formulate the policies themselves and to be influential in establishing goals. Shut out as they wen, it was not easy for them to express their ideas in any meaningful way. A direct confmntation with the government would certainly mean going against nation-state in the eyes of the ruling party, LC., to be identitied as anti-Pancasila and anti-gwernment,

while other approaches, such as calling for greater appreciation of

'democracy" seemed still to be beyond the thinking of the duma themselves. The ability to improve the political situation was beyond their ability when compared to the power of Golkar and the ABRI-supported New Order regime. As the situation concerned the NU spcci6cally there wen additional problems involving the leadership of the NU and thm were of qua1 consequence in decting the wider NU political effort. One of the main intad problems of the NU during the period in question was the failure of its leaders to maneuvering politically. Importantly after the NU amalgamated with the PPP in 1973,n its politicians and representatives seemed unable to promote the interests of NU members and supporters within the PPP, espccidy in gaining a just proportion of the officers and delegatts within the party. Again, as in Masjumi, this failure seemed to rest on the NU'S doctrine of tasamuh (tolerance),i.e., of expecting certain offices and representation to be granted without negotiation, while other factions believed that open competition should be observed: consequently NU'S expectations were not mett.~ In addition, the government pressure against having former members of the Sakarno government active in the party lad to the resignation of K.H. Saifuddin Zuhri, a leading NU figure widely respected in Muslim circles, fkom the PPP leadership. This removed a person who might have effectively given the NU the position and representation in PPP that would have satisfied the NU members and leadership. Kacung Marijan notes that, basically, there appeared a shift of political reality from the Old to the New Order. In the former era, conflicts occurred between parties, whereas in the latter, crises arose not only between parties but also within each party.39 This was probably natural in view of the fact severd parties were fomd into umbrella pups and integration had to take place under difllcult conditions. The conflicts within the PPP began after the 1977 general election. Prior to this date, all factions within the PPP appeared to be coopera* resulting in an increase in the number of scats held, i,e., hm94 seats ia 1971 to 99 seats in 1977. The conflicts took place immediately afterward, in 1978, when the gavemment proposed legalizing formal training for pamment officials in a program ded P4 (Pedoman Penghayatan dau Ptngnmalan Paacada, Guidance for the Understanding and tmplementation of PanEanitn) and the afimn kepexuyaan (Javanese mysticism). Within the PPP, the NU and MI (Muslimin Indonesia) factions each had their own positions on the issue,

MAgoodilhrstration afthisumstbe deOcPtofIdbam Chalid, ahadto e~cept the list of candimprepared by J. Naro for tb 1987 ekctbn. See Syamrddin Haris, Mslggugat IbWk Orrtt Bmu (Jalcarta. GreMi. 1998), 85. even though both effectively opposed the proposal. When the issue was voted in the Peoples Consultative Congress (MPR), the Majelis Syum Board of the PPP, made up mostly of NU leaders, reacted by walking out of the room when the votc was taking place, leaving only three representatives from the PFT left in the room. AU three of the latter, who were from the MI, chose to abstain rather than be identified with the losing side while the issue was passed.

The PPP's opposition to the P4 program rested on the assumption that it would thereafter be considered the official interpretation of the Pancasila itself, thereby undermining Muslim interpretations which Mered on some substantive points. Similarly, there was opposition by the PPP to recognition of followers of Javanese mystical societies, the Ahan Kepercayaan, as a distinct religious or social grouping, based on the perception that it would divide the Muslim ummat along the lines of sanai (devout Muslims) and abangun (nominal Muslims who also adhere to pro Islamic spiritual beliefs). For the PPP, such a dichotomy was seen as divisive, when, for them, Muslims could only be differentiated on the basis of their performance of religious practices.a Internal conflict in the PPP often arose whenever the PPP responded to government policy initiatives. in 1979, the New Order government issued a proposal for the Election Law. Sbme important points criticized were the involvement of political parties in the LPU (Lcmbaga Pemilihan Umum, or Thc Institute of General Elections), the number of reprwentatives appointed by the government to parliament, and the interpretation of the Momto votc. As a reaction both major factions in the PPP calkd for the gwcmment

39 Marijas Qwo YdsNU, 11 1. Mtu@m, Quo Vadk 112. to reduce the number of appointed representatives from 100 to 75.41 They e also generally opposed the other's concepts. The PIT sent two delegates, H.J. Naro and K.H. Masykur, to meet President on this matter. Out of all the counter-proposals put forward by the PPP representatives, Suharto accepted only one, which was

to allow the PPP to adopt as its emblem the Ka'bah (the square structure in the of Mtcca toward which Muslims face during pmyers). Later, on Februq 25, 1980, after reviewing Suharto's rejection of the proposals, the Central Board of the PPP decided to instruct the parliamentary delegation to simply vote for the government's proposal.a

At this point, internal disagmment arose, for the MJ faction in the PPP felt that the Central Board did not have the authority to decide such an important issue on behalf of the entire party. The NU leaders, represented by KH. Saifuddin Zuhri, reasoned that, according to the moral principles held by the NU, the goal of an endeavor cannot be separated bm the method of its achievement. '&en if you have a good goal, if you use a wrong or illegal way to achieve it, it means that you reach your goal by means of an illegality."a Thus, when parliament voted on the govemmcnt's proposal only 38 members of PPP, all hm factions other than the PN, wted for the measure NU members while a number of other PPP parliamentarians abstained. Another dispute took place in pnparations far the 1982 election when the ?PP met to ae1ect candidates for pariiament who were to be divided among the three leading factions. The MI kction argued that the 1975

42 Set also Tempo,March (l980), 10. consensus on the division of scats was no longer valid since it applied to the

1977 election only; the MI, SI, and Rrti therefore wanted more seats for the 1982 election. The NU insisted on adhering to the original consensus. In commenting on the conflict, KH.Saifuddin Zuhri nays,

In the mica of meetings between the NU, W, SI, and Rrti, the forum was not us& to prove stroager agumurta rather it waa only udto tho NU into reducing its share of the number of bm 56 to 49, The main ream for this was clearly to deny the NU a majority in the PPP faetion over the MI, SI aud Rrti when thee three parties =re united.*

Although the Centra3 Board held more than 20 meetings to deal with the issue, there was no resolution by the time of the deadline for submitting the list of candidates to the election committee. Even though no agreement had yet been reached, the Board Chairman H.J. Naro, submitted a list to

the general election committee with the distribution of seats set at 48 for the NU, 30 for the MI, 15 for the SI, and 5 for Perti. The NU protested Naro's submission, but it was too late since the list had already been officially accepted by the election committee. In analyzing the conflict among the factions within the PPP, Mahrus Irsyarn points out two main sources of disagreement; distriiution of positions within the PPP, and the resulting

distribution of seats within pariiament4s A number of the NU ulama began to criticize Idham Chalid, the NU General Chairman, who was regarded as having failed at b- with other factions in the PPP. An important faction led by KH As'ad Syamsul Arifin, K.H. Ali Maksum and L.H. Machrus Ali, urged Cholid to resign; he agreed signing the let-of resignation which had been prepared for this

* Dhlq ICH. Scdfirdctin W, dkk, PPP, NU dm hfE Gjdak Wactah Pditik Islam (Jalauta: In-ta Fkwq 1984), 10 as also quoted by wan,Quo Vadis, 116. purposes.' This in itself became a controversial issue, since it had not been decided E it an official meeting of the NU. Those who supported the resignatio,n appealed to the symM'&insisting that Cholid's signature on the letter pro ved that he had agmd to mign, while those opposed it used organizati'ox& reasoning (AD/ART)47 to argue that the resignation would be valid only if decided in an official meeting. Cholid used the dispute to stay in his position until the 1984 congress when he was not reelected to his position. 'The ability of Chalid, to stay in office after resignation indicates a serious la ck of harmony among NU leaders and a lack of direction that has manifested itself at several periods in its history. This also seems to be the strongest reason for the NU'S retreat from politics in 1984.

Retreat 6rom Politics u a Solution The ga wemment's political policies on the one hand and the failure of the MJ's lead lership to gain control of the PPP (which it should have casily dominatedl led to a historical decision, namely, to leave practical politics. The NU'S 17th Congress which was held in Situbondo fmm December 8-12, 1984, har i for its theme, 'the NU'S 1926 khittah to cultivate togehmes and mtkipation in c?euelopmentce for the improvement of services to religion, the nation and the country.' In amrdance with the theme and in response to cumnt events, the congress issued four important decisions,

among ot:hers:

ntum t~ the 1926 AMzdt, fbr the 0011111)Ydation of the role of ich is of a coktive nature in Idam; 2. that NahdWd Ulamn, as an assodation, not k tied to any other mdal or polificalo~ 3. to give its membcm the &ee&m to cktmnh thcir own wtical *ti-; 4. to accept Pauradtn as its sole prinapk in its orgauhtional Me.", Literally, Wclh means the basis of thought, actioa and behavior for NU members in every aspect of Me, as well as in making any decision. This

was sen as in keeping with the spirit of the NU'S foundation, namely as a forum for promoting Sunni religious precepts. According to thc platform of

the NU, an attempt was to be made to maintain close relations among those

who followed the four imams or Islamic jurists, to examine all textbooks for

use in schools to enmthat they were free hm the influence of bid'ah

(innovation) teachings, to promote the teachings of the four madhabs in aU possible ways, make every effort to build madras& (Islamic Schools), to build masques and (Islamic barding Schools), to help fatherless

children, , and the poor, as well as to establish institutions for developing agriculture. Basically, this platform implicitly excluded politics.% As Bruincssen notes, the term Wah was actually not used until Kiai Achmad Siddiq used the term in a book advocating a ramphasis of basic values that he belicvtd were followed at the time of the association's founding in 1926.51 The term had not ban wcprcssad in written form by the beNU was founded late in that year. As developed by Siddiq, the khithh was seen to cunsiat of educational (mn'mij), social wcKare (mabartcrq,

'9 See Greg Barton, Irhm, PPncPsila and Mid& Path of Ta-th: Tbe Thought of Ahmad Siw in Greg Barton and FeaIy Barton, Nohmatul UI~M, zhuwond Islam rmd Mackdy in brdolrtoia (csayton,viebria: Mod448h In8titute, 1996),11G128, Douglas E. Ramap, Panoerahsabon,. Reli@ous Toleranoe and Panamih The Poiitid Thought of AWtudunm Wabid," in Greg Battnn 4Feelp Barton, Barton, Nahdlabl Ulomq Zhdtkmd Ishunti Modernity in hdm&a [Clayton, Victoria: Manaah A& Institute, 19%). 227-256 adHM. Sbaleh Hfuull and Abdul Munit Mutlran. ImM BeloieMg Urrmt fslmn Marerima Jbncusr1u &b@ Asas fin@ (Yogyakatta:ww 19861. religious teaching (dakwah), and economic (mu'amalah) components. In addition, Ahmad Siddiq held that political participation was only one way of applying the Wahand saw other methods consistent with the Qw'an and as valid; he left these concepts abstract and thus open to interpretation. The core of the book emphasized the non-radical character of the traditional Sunni , based on the concepts of tawassuth (middle way), i'tidai (balance)and tawtikin (moderation, or non-extremism). To bring the concept of khittah up to date, he saw the NU as having to incopcrate the foilowing political guidelines:

(1) The Nation-state (founded by the popkj must be maintained, and its existence defended. (2) The constitutional power-hol& of the country must be held in respect and must be obyed, as long as he or she docs not break the constitution, or lead society against the national canstitutiw and the Law of God. (3) In case the power-holder makes a mistake, it must be corrected in the best pos91bte way.=

The NU'S 'return to the 1926 kh&& drew a reaction from several quarters outside the organization. Some looked at the advantages and disadvantages of the move to the NU itseIr; others viewed it in the national context. Some analyzed the decision from the standpaint of the current situation, while others carefully looked at it in a historical context. For Lukman Harun, leader of the Muhammadiyah, for example, the decision was a logiwl step for NU after its frustration in the political arena and its difficulties in the PPP. Muhammad DamRahardjo stated that NU had taken an opportunistic approach to politics that was unconsciously cultural in nature. opined that NU'S decision was an wer-emotional act, hastily made due to over-enthusiasm." These opinions reflected a view that

KH. Ahmd Siddiq, Mtittcrh NaMh'ycJl {Surabaya:Balai Buht, I=), 51.

53 The I- Qumkw&, 8, w.2 (1984). the NU was not a very effective political actor either on the national stage or in a political party. Nurcholish Madjid and Douglas E. Ramage consider the NU'S decision to leave the political arena as representing a depoliticisation of Islam, or a de-Islamisation of the party. In similar tones, Greg Barton attributes the NU'S decision to leave foxmal politics to a recognition of the fact that 'party- politid activity in the name of Islam is both counter productive for the

urnat, and, in as such activity gives rise to sectarianism, is unhealthy for society at large.D54Most scholars agree that the decision to withdraw from politics was mostly influenced by Abdurrahman Wahid's wish that the NU

be able to take part in the national development of Indonesia, as further noted by Barton,

By the mid 1970s Abduftahman and his colleagues wen urp~ssingthe conviction that the interest of the umma& and of broader sodcty, would be better served by the umrrcat tudqaway hm party-political mtivity and U-3 the nrin-=tarinn state philosophy of Pancash fiftteP years before it became popular, or even acceptable, to urpress such th0ught.~5

Doughs Ramage notes that, For many reamas, particularly cleavagu, within the Ilnmic movement, and mmjphtion of Ialanlic politics and patties by the Soeharto govemmcnt, as mU as internal oxpukdhnal disputes over doctrines and politics, es a prog;nssive NU faction wn control of the organization at its 1984 Congress. arethe ted by AWurrahman Wahid end Ahmed Siddiq succeeded in convincing the membership that NU should withdraw and redirect its energies away tiom aatioaat politica towarda educational cultural, spiritual, and economic activities &*ed to improve the situation of the urnmot=

Greg Barton, The Impact of Neo-MManon Indonesian Ida& Th~ught,~ in David Bourchin and John Lqgp, Dsnoaacy in IndOlLCSiO 19502 Md 1990s (Cla,yton, Victoria: Center of Southeast Asien Studies, Monash University, 1994), 147. ss Baurchier and John teggt, bncumq, 147. Dou@ Ramqp, Poh'tics in Indonesia. DmuKJrscy, Islam and thc kleolqjy of Tolerance (Lon&n and New Yotk Routkdp, 1997),55. Historical Conriderrtbn for Rehdngto tb Khlttah of 1926

Historically, the decision to return to the 1926 khittah was not, in fact, due to emotional over-enthusiasm, as claimed by many, but rather the result of a long process of self-introspection on the past of its leaders which had begun at the 22nd congress of the NU, held in Jakarta in 1959. The move to go back to the spirit of 1926 was proposed by local leaders directly involved in society. Direct experience and knowledge not shared by leaders and politicians in big cities like Jalcarta had encouraged them to find other solutions for the urnmat. It was a matter of concern that NU members, whose votes had been used in every election for the purpose of electing NU representatives to parliament, had been neglected by those samc representatives. It was beliwed by those doing the introspection that they no longer used their presence in parliament to promote NU members' interests,

but rather their own; or perhaps they had been co-opted by 0- fk~ti0n.s within the party. At the 22nd congress, K.H. hadKhalimi, from the Mojokerto

branch, fitst proposed the idea of going: back to the 1926 p~~ (he did

not use the term 'kMaK).The central leaders and politicians argued that they could have the spirit of 1926 written into the NU platform, but that they did not want the NU to leave the political arena just yet. In his general response to the congf'ess, lnhnm Chalid, Chairman of the Central Executive Council, Tanfidziah stated, After 12 years (1959-1971)of struggle in the pozitid arena, the same idea of going back to the 1926 Wahwas raised a@~by Rois Aam (the Chief of Suriyah Board of the Central Board of the NU) KH. Wahab Hasbullah in his opening address to the 25th congress, held in Surabaya He said that, although they struggled in the year 1971, they should be animated with thc spirit of the year 1926. They should always be committed to the q'dah, namely promoting religious beliefs and the him& (spirit) of the Ahl al-fluvrah wa alJamaJah~In response to this idea, H.A Syaichu replied that the spirit of the founding of the NU 47 years earlier had nothing to do with 'politics.' However, he then conceded that, in the modern era, Muslims could not abandon politics, even though politics was not the only way to promote certain interests. Still there was an awareness that the NU had contributed to the building of the nation-state,but that it was time for the NU to pay mom attention to its members.

The view that the NU failed in promoting the interests of the wnmat through the medium of politics is not redly accurate. hungMarijan points to the NU'S contribution during the period 1952 to 1973 in two important domains. First, in the religious sphere, the NU succtcdcd in promoting religious subjects as a compulsory component of the curriculum in public schools. This objective was in lint with the idea that, as a Panmilamilabased nation, Indonesia encouraged its people to understand and practice their religious tcadngs. Second, a number of IAINs (Institut Agama Islam Negeri, or State Institutes for Islamic Studies) were founded by the Department of Religious Mairs (Departemen &ma) while it was under the *tion of NU leaders; thesc have become an important part of the Indonesian system of higher educatio~~sIt was likewise under NU leadership that the National Ragram of the lWQ, the (Musabaqah Tilawah al-Qur'an, or Festival of Reciting the Qur'an) was dcve1oped.m Moreover, in the political sphm, the NU had been represented by its politicians in ministerial positions charged

with instituting development polices in the country. Marijan notes that these accomplishments wcre cited by NU politicians to cmphasizc the organization's contributions through political involvement.

Support for the idea of going back to the spirit of 1926 snowballed, however, by the 26th congress, held in Semarang June 5- 11, 1979, where it was presented in a more advanced form. One of the results of the congress was a Five-year Basic Program (Ptogmm Dasar Pengembangan Lima Tahun)

with three main targets: (1) full and total comprehension of the meaning of the appeal of going back to the 1926 &.hatah; (2) consolidation of intd efforts at fulfilling the appeal; and (3) consolidation of the scope of thc NU'S contribution to the development of the nation in more realistic terms. During the next five years, the NU'S social, economic, and rcligiou9

programs and activities were aimed at reaching these three pals. It was at

. . SPReslicine~challcqaprwcn~by~~~glO-afi&mah&the economy, science and techno-, in its next step of development, the IAIN is to be traasformtd into the UIN or UNIN (UPivctsites Islam Negeri, or !State Wdc University). Three IAINa, Syarif Hidayatullah of Jalcarta, Sunan Kndm of B8aduug ad Sunan Elalijaga of Yogy&mta have been ddgaa!d br tmdbnnatian into univcrdtiea in their omright, in which various disciplines of knoftlicdec othr thtm digion wiIl be provided. The program ofamiing IALN lecturtrs to McGill Univvrity fbr PcczediWen is part of thie hndonnation pmgram. For mom idonnation, aee, Sludia Islamjku, VN: ibc an SyIltcm of lhwkd&, voL S no. 2, (1998), 76-82.

KJ OrjgbRy the MTQ was &&wd only for m&hg the Qur'an; it ham since becndcvelopdtoidudemarrthanfiimccn~durhgtbcevcat,~ understaPdifle~czhmd-Qw'an)theQur'an,I.rlandc.~Ialamandmodcm.lrrrncr and technology, the Qur'an and educatian_ Qur'Pnic cpegei4 Arabic ca&pphy$ memoiiting the Qur'an, and mon. this congress that thc AD/M (Platform) was transformed in status from a e political party to a social organieation.6, The critical response from local leaders grew more aggressive, however, as illustrated by Nakamuta:

Although the general conam of NU leaders was consistmt, namely to

protect and promote the intcfests of the ummnt, the way b solve the problems facing them was perceived differently. One group, loyal to Idham

Chalid, wished to continue promoting Nu's interests through a political party. The privileges they had enjoyed for over 10 years may have insp*

them to defend this position. Another pupwished that NU would tttuni to

the 1926 C;hittuh, ix., leave politics altogether. The latter group ~~~~sisttdof K.H. Abdul Hamid, K.H. Ahmad Siddiq, Abdurrahman Wahid, K.H. Ali Maksum, and others. They were not politicians by d&nitim, but being closer to the urnmat, they were gmatly conceraed for its . Declitling representation for NU politicians and a wish to contribute mare through the organirration may have ~11coUIOLgddthis group in its efforts. Finally, there was also a group that might have wished that the NU return to tbe ichittcrh because they had been removed Erom the list of candidates for e representation in the 1977 election by the Naro gr0up.a

A Rer Sense of Rupoae

As I mentioned earlier, the period on which I am focusing my study is the third phase of Indonesian nationalism (1980s-1990s), especially when we study it from an ideological perspective.M For the NU, the year 1983 appeared to be a propitious time for the younger generation to take the

initiative of realizing the return to the 1926 Wahin a fundamental, i.e., politically, socially, economically, and organizationally. As a member organization of the PPP, the NU had been politically ineffective; as an organization with supporters from rural ateas, it had been socially and economically disadvantaged by the economic system of the New Order, and as an association of ulama, its religious leaders had virtually no role at the organizational level and had beta disregarded and considered unimportant. That is why many cxpcrts have studied the Situbondo Congress from the perspective of these three phenomena: (1) the leadership crisis in mid-1982

which led to the fall of Idham Chalid; (2)the acceptance of Fbncasila as aslrs

63 Together with hia nephew, Salahuddin Wahid, a brother d Abdurrahman Wahid,YuarfHasyimfbUllClEdPIN(Partai&bPagldtan Ummrrt, orTheReayFDceof tbe Urnmu9 aftu hi8 ideaa ~f Syasi'sh and Aqidah Abl el-Sunnah Wa al- Jama'ah failed to be accepted by thorn involved in fbundine the PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Banpa, or tbc Natid A- Party). That he war a cbm dative of Abdutrahman Wahid was pn,baMy tk main naarn why WWdid not aak both of themtoleadthe Pa. Polemicsbets~cnrhunconarniaghawI8lamic~and values ahould be applied in IndbiltaiP appartd in vafbun rmmppa, whje po2itical parties m-mtd thug&out the auntxy. Surrni's tokmnt atritude ~a8 nflectcd in this event Su eto, Meksocm Ma6, Kebtangm Uama darc Bcurgkitnw UIama (Surrbrya: Y- Kesmtuau hmd, 1982), 269. twzggal (sole foundation); and (3) the formation of the Siddiq-Abdumhman leadership team wihtin the NU itself.= Following its decision to return to the 1926 khittah and to making it the oficial policy of the organization, the delegates to the 27th congress finally succeeded in formulating the basic ideas in the khittah As quoted by van Bnhessen, the statement reads: Political right is a right for an the citizen% including those who affiliabed with Nahdlatul Ulamd But Nadhlabl Ulruna is not a place for poh'ttoal acCiuities. Application of political right should be based on the existing constitution and -ced with akhlakul kafimah (good morality) in according to Islamic teachings, so that there appear a healthy political civilization. Nahdlatul Uama appreciates all citizens who use their political right well, seriously and rll of responsi'bitity.

Many scholars view the NU'S decision to return to the 1926 khittah, and to leave politics as a new strategy for the Indonesian traditionalist Muslims to pmmote their interests in facing new &ties of a modem nation-state. This new strategy was actually a culmination of three important leading factors: its historical discourse since its leaders began to engagc in self- introspection; conflicts or arguments prior to and during the congress and public discourse when the issue was prcsenttd for in public discussion through the mass mediae7 This new strategy also showed that, on the one

See, for cxampk, Mitsuo Nakamura, Tvahdlatul Ulrmra'a Lcdc&ip Cri& and Search hr ldcntity in the Edy 1980s: Fkom the 1979 Scmarary~Con~prcss to the 1984 Situbcmdo Conpas,' in Greg and Feaiy BaitDn, Nalamahrl UIam, Mtionnl Islam and Modsnay in Indonesia (Clqton, Victoria: Mona& Asia Institute, 19961, and Martin van B- Nahdlatul Ulama: 'Itodlsi, Relasi-nfasi, PenaM'an Waamrr &nu (Yo~akarta:IICiS, 1994), 115-149. Most of the appmacka to the Situbondo Coqenss, h-r, viewed the rhne bra as causes that hed made the aa such, but I think the thrtc issues wwe much more a rrsponae to, or a result of, the political, economic and aocial situation in Indoataia prior to the amgrass FBNU, Had MUtdMICLt NMohJ: Uhake 27 Sihrbondo: NahdIrdul Umnu Kanbah' ke K)rittcr)r 2 926 (- Sumber bamkah, 1985),44. The itaiica were added by Martia van Bruni+lwen in Martin van Bnmiessaq Ncrhmahcl Ul~mp' Rdcrsi- teIasi, Pencadan Wacctna Bmu (Yoggalearta: IELiS, 1994). 128. Muhamnrtd AS. Hi- YKldndNU dan Civil Socictp." in EUyYa KH. Dbrrwis, Gus Dur, NU don Mksym& Slpll (Y- UiS, 1994), 136. hand, the NU was trying to solve its internal problem and on the other, it also showed that the NU had the ability to discuss and make decisions that would later on have a great impact on the religious life of the country. THE HU'8 RESPOIWE TO AND POLICY TOWARDS POLITICS MDTEE IOAT1ONAL IDEOLOGY

Nationalism and ideology often go hand-in-hand. Once nationalist movements succeed in managing the forces needed to confront such opponents as colonialism and imperialism, the next task is to set the national ideology in order to maintain the ideals of nationalism. One defnition of ideology is, 'a set of ideas that form the b~sisof an economic or political theory or that are held by a particular group or person.'l It is indeed vital to the sumival of a nation, as it unites people through a common national identity, shared pride, and mutual strength. It in turn inspires the people of the nation to acbiem their social, economic and political goals and prompts them to produce laws that reflect their image of themselves as a society. Thus, in developing and maintaining 'nationalism,'

national ideology bcrves as an important tool that should be based upon universal values2 which arc, at kast, widely accepted by the people. In addition, 'the goal of ideology is to muse feelings and incite action, and the power of an ideology derives fiom its capacity to capture the human imagination and mobilizt end unleash human energiea83

2~~,~m'~~~~d~~rad~~#lc~~aivasi~~19wx L~statcsthat~nstio~priPcipleank~mpnahicol,'univas;rlisticspirir".~ at the five~plesdtkRaadt,~sscmurbecm~desaipcioadloal~nlpcs in Indoaesia lad tbe krt mean dtdq the varioPr duna8s in tbt mha In the first chapter I discussed the characteristics of NU and its contribution to the formation of the country and the establishment of the national ideology. In the second I have elaborated the Wsdecision to leave the political arena with its signilicaxlce to the natiodkn of the NU members. In this chapter I will examine both the NU'S commitment to the nation-state by holding fast to the national ideology and its rtsponsts to political developments in the last few decades. Prior to World War 11, hrst under Dutch deand then under Japanese occupation, Indonesia's national ideolagy was only in an incipient or latent stage, emerging as it was from a widely shared goal of ridding the country of alien rule. Therefore, the foundation of the Communist Party and other ideological pups was not considered a threat to other iddogits, such as Islam,4 after all, they wee allies in the struggles against the Dutch. When the preparations for independence began to take shape, the issue of national ideology took as much mom meaning since each group wanted concepts that reflected its own outlook and direction.s The ensuing war of words resulted in a rough consensus finally being reached whereby the Pancasila was chosen as the national ideology, or philosophical basis for the country.6 The Pancasila represents the five principles on which the state is founded: (1) Ketuhanan gang Miaha Esa (Belief in One Ood); (2) Kernanusinan yang ad &n bemdab (A Just and civSizcd humanitarianism); (3) RmaIuan lidmesh Ifadoncsian national unity); (4) Kemkydan yung t@hph deh hhuh kebi-n ddam pennusyawaratcrn dm penuotciron (Indonesian dem- -ugh consultation and consensus); and (5) KeaidiIan sasial bagi selvrr)t mkyclt Indoh ( for all Indonesian atizcns). The initid spirit of Pancasila was to create a common ground for the foundation of an independent, tadid, and modern state eoncumnt with the former Nethalands East Indits.7 Although the majority of Indonesians identified with Islam, here was no decision to form an 'Islamic state.' By referring to the Pancasila a3 an ideolw, Indonesian nationalism makes every religious pup and ethnic group equal before the law. This willingness to make nationalism paramount seems t reflect the great concern at the timt of its inception with the necessity for unity in ortier to protect the independcna of the new state they were mating. The discourse on Pancasila, its meaning, interpretation, manipulation and implementation has colored the Indonesian political landscape since it was fust introduced in 1945. An important tool for uniting more than 200 million pmple, tive oEcial religions, hundreds of local languages and 300 ethnic groups, Pancasila is clearly of paramount importance. In the beginning, there wme in fact scvexal m4or difficult-to-reconcile ideological positions advocated by the members of the Investigating Committed when the philosophical basis of the state (dasar rtegarcr) was under discussion. Them were two major camps invohrd: those who wished to establish Islam as the basis of the state and those who sought to establish a secular, constitutional demacmcy. In order to briw these two stiong positions, Ir. Sockarno addressed the committee on June 1,1945 (now rccogaized as the day of 'Lohirngp Aruroasild (the birth of Panda) confirming Pancash as the philosophical basis of the state.9 Despite the fact that since then many partits, and especially the ruling government, have given their own inteqretations, it always smed as the primary force behind Indonesian national unity.

The New Order's Motive. br Imweathg PIIIClUUm u the Sole Foundation

After campaigning as the protector of the Pancasila and confronting (SO- called) anti-Pancasila elements on a number of historical occasions, the New Order, backed-up by ABRI and Golkar, began in 1982 to promote the importance of the application of Paucasila as the sale foundation for all political parties and social orgaukations. The main aim of this policy was to safeguard the PancasiIa as the state's national ideology and eliminate any other ideology that threatened its authority; Communist and Islamic ideologies were to varying degrees seen as falling into this category. As far as the political situation of the time was concerned, there seem to have been thrte main factors behind the decision by Suharto's government to take this step. The first of thw aras the traumatic events of the 1977 election campaign, in which clashes offen broke out between rival party supporters. Suharto reasoned that the violence betwetn Golkar and PPP suppoxters had its roots in their mtrasting ideological outlooks.~o His reasoning was not so much that religious sentiment or teamwere themselves to blame, but that emphasizbg them in an excessive manner could lead to open conflict between supporters. huthamore, by relying on religious arguments, which appealed solely to verses of the Qur'an and the Hadith, the parties tended to lose sight of the more important issues in an the election, such as current economic and social developments. Looking at this experience, Suharto perceived that religion was, in fact, the main source of the conflict and that, therefort, an alternative basis for reasoning should be provided, namely, the asas lbggal Pancasila. Tht phrase osas hurggal meant simply to make the Pancasila the sole foundation for all social or mass organizations and political parties. The second factor behind the New Order government's decision to establish the Pancasila as the sole basis for all political parties was the fact that the PPP was still based on Islam. having both Pancasila and Islam as its basis, the PPP was conaidered to have a 'double' basis. In dealing with the gavcmment, the PPP appdto follow government policy; in its campaigns, however, it used Istamic rhetoric and ideology more than the Pancasila. This was an unwarranted intrusion of religion into the political realm as well as challenging the New Order itself to remove tbis two- pronged threat, Suharto decided to make awts tunggal (sole foundation) the basis for all political partics and included all social organizations in the country to close11 off any means of avoiding the measure by having such associations take a political activities themselves that reflected other values. The thid factor leading to the application of the asas hurggal was the intention of the government to encourage every party to be 'more program- oriented" instead of %colag~~ritllted.'Thus, it was expected that a party's appeal would stem from the pmpms offered and not from the sentiment of

- - --- . - "Sk~aisiJ~~~~didsologyh~rrtpdyafthepa~asdM& aaqmna d the -" mD.dbmWh, McAXl UaIvctdty, 1995). 11. A ppn d tbis dissrtetioa~~~replbliSbbdPadatbetirk-athcSdtMhdRdiricalWmdbptrll. - Mass- An Ao#nmt dhUid bpm,"6ie MaIsiwdb 3.4 (1996), 1-92. a particular religious belief, such as Islam. This argument wa~actually an ideal application of the democratic systzrn; however, the fact that no other existing political party had ever held power meant that Golkar could claim the credit for all cmntprograms of national development. Officially,the issue of applying the sole basis was raised by Resident Soeharto in a welcoming speech at Rapim ABRI (Rapat Pimpinan ABRI, or Armed Forces Commanders' Meeting) in Pekanbaru+on March 27, 1980. The same issue was emphasized once again when he delivered a speech at the 28a anniversary celebration of the Kopassandha (Korps Pasukan Sandi Yudha, or Army Pats-Commando Unit) at Cijantung, Jakarta, on April 16, 1980, On both occasionsi Soeharto explicitly referred to the national consensus reached by ABRI and socio-political forces in 1968, by wbich decision all had agrecd to apply the Pancasila as their sole basis. The year 1%8 was the first to see confrontation between other political parties and the New Order, a fact which might have led to the decision itselfilz He then went to point out that the ageement had not been fully implemented since 'there was still one political party which held principles in addition to

Although Suharto did not explicitly name the party in question, he most certainiy meant the PPP, which officially regarded Islam as ib second basis after the Pancasita This wm clear from politid behavior in the two sessions of the MPR snd DPR As noted earlier, in 1978, the PPP rejected the legalization of the P4 (Pedoman Penghayata. clan Fkngamalan Pancasila, or Guidanc+ for the Understanding and Implemmting of Panda), with many of ita members walking out of the meeting mm because they favored an 'fslamic' rendition of Pancada &cause the votes were against them, the PPP Icadcrs had chosen to leave the muting dramatidy as a means of showing their disapproval. In 1980, the PPP used the same tactic in showing its dispieasure with the decision reached by the DPR in changing the general election law. The law was, according to PPP leaders' opinions, in Golkar's favor only. In his speech, Saharto called for ABRI commanders to intensify their wariness with respect to the leaders of the PPP, admonishing them:

As long as we havc not yet succeeded in bringins them to the an-, ue must step up our vigilance, choose partners and fiends who truly dehd Pancagila and have no doubts about it. We do not mean to be hostile to a party or group which does not yet trust Pancasila 10W, no, but we are obligad to persuade them in such as way that all social and political forces will basc themsclvcs an out national ideology, Pancash, with no addition whatsaver.14

This speech, especially the phrase in which he advised the pmple to choose their partners and friends with care, suggested an implicit desire to rid himself of opponents, and thus provoked negative reactions from both Muslim leaders and a number d prominent retired military officers. Two days after a second similar speech (18 April, 1980), Lt. Gen. (ret.) A.Y. Mokoginta - a North Sulawesi Mush who served as chief of the Sumatra Command between 1964 and 1967- sent a nine-page letter to Gen. Muhammad Yusuf [Zhc most respected of the generals) expressing his concern about Socharto's sptechos on both occasions. Expressing lPimilar concerns, the FKS Puma Yudha, an association of prominent retired my offiars, seat a letter on May 1980 to the Army Chief of M,Oen. Poniman. The letter was alsb signed by other retired gcncrals, including Lt. Gcn. (rct.) H.R Dharsono (former Commander-in-Chiefof the West Java based Siliwangi division of the army and farmer Secretiuy General of MEAN), and Lt. Gen. (rct.)Sudirmm (farmer Cornmender of the East Java Brawijaya Division) voicing the same scntiment,ls One month later, on May 13, 1980, the Group presented a one-page 'statement of concern' to all factions of the DPR, claiming that President Soth&ots interpretation of PancEtsila could cause new disputes within defy, It atso claimed that, through the addressi Saharto had helped to implement the goals of certain military leaders who wanted to harmonize the UUD 1945 (Constitution) with the Sap& Marga (the men- part soldier's oath) and remove dl other interpretations. Tht other main concern of this pup was Saharto's invitation to ABRI to monitor all social-political pups. Among the lading figarea of this pupWere generals, such as navy Lt Gcn. (former ), Gen. kH. Nasution (former Chid of Staff of the medforces and former head of the MPRS (Provisional People's Consultative A5scmbly)) and Gcn, Hugeng (former Chief of the Indonesian Police). Through the involvtment of acveral formcr leaders of Me,as well

Haahap, and Muslim activiate and prtachem such ae AMI Fa- a Muslim opposition group of a sort was born. Because of the names invohred who had been Masjumi activists, with same siding with the PRRl rcbcllion, the group wa4 considered by the New Order to be an Ialamic fimdamentalist movement and a distinct kt,lb The criticisms and arguments of outsiders did not affect the government's resobe to implement the asua tUnggat Notwithstanding the possibiiity of similar perspectives among Muslim groups and the military- backed gwemment of Soeharto, the application of the Pancasih as sole basis also had two dSercnt purposes and implications. From the government's standpoint, it could be partially dtscrz'bcd as an effort to consolidate the political power and privileges of dominant political factions and their vested interests, i.c. those of the army and Go-. Even same Muslim spokesmen regarded it as a positive step, seeing it as reducing or remaving all pressure hrn the government and the myhm Muslim groups and from Islam itself, This could also be interpreted to mean that, having nrnovtd religion as a threat, representations by Muslims on individual issues might more acceptable to government officials. It may, in fact, be said that Lndonesian mtionalism had entered a third phase by that time, As I mentioned in the fmt chapter, the first phase was concerned with hiemtion from colodsm by throwing off foreign power and struggling to establish mllectivc power within the various nationalist mwemcnts. The second phase concentrated on identifyiry the foundations of the new nationaliem, The third phase concentrated on reaffirming its foundation, which might have been perceived as ltss than solid. So, tht idea WRS that, in order to resist the government's interprttation of Pancada as the all-encompassing, d-dominating ideology, an alternative view of Pancadla had to be developedl And that viaion of Pan& could only be developed outside political7 Applying the A~cu-1 Aandla

As was the case when the New Order government had reduced the number of political parties after winning the 1971 election, an uncxpectcd move to say the least, those who paid attention to the policies of the New

Order were one again shocked by the government's proposal to implement the Panda as the sole foundation for all political parties. It was officially presented by Resident Saharto in his state speech preceding the DPR session of August 16, 1982. It was not long after this event that the policy was incarporated into MPR Enactment No. 11.1983. It dictated that the Pancasila be made the sole foundation of all parties. Gobobviously intended to maintain and strengthen the position of the asas tunggcrl in the social and national life of the nation in the face of a perceived threat from other ideologies. Since the PPP was "based on Islam" and the PDI on "Indonesian Democracy, Indonesian Nationalism and Social Justice,' these statements became a target of the drive.18 The government justified its decision in a number of ways, three of which were especially prominent First, the government wanted to establish a sense of unity among the ditlercnt elements of the nation. In other words, the government saw that the existence of different political iddogies meant that parties and organizations had less of a seasc of common purpose, which gave rise to the tensions between them. This sense of unity would lead .to the scabnd purpose of establishing national stability. h the eyes of the goocmment, national stability could be reached by recognizing the sole foundation of the Pancasila This echoed the principles of the Pancasila itself, cspedally the third principle, 'Persaban Indo&, or Indonesian Unity. Third, pembangunnn nasional,lg or national development was a high priority for the government. Whenever this issue was raised, it made it clear that the

ideologies of the above mentioned Wo parties in particular mitigated against its programs in this area. If the political parties implemented the Pancasila as their sole foundation they would be able to concentrate on the issue of national development, thc real problem faced by the nation9 The desire of the government to implement the mas tunggd sole

foundation targeted not only political parties, but all social or mass organizations. With the appmval of the DPR, on June 17, 1985, the government issued law No. $/I985 stating that all social or mass organizations had to implement the Pancasila as their sole foundation. Article 1 of the law states that a mass organization is an organization wbich is established by a group of Indonesian citizens motivated by similar aspirations, professions, ideals, religious interests, or beliefs in God, with the objective of pursuing certain goals within the state of Indonesia21 Since then, there has not been a single social organization or political party that has not applied the Pancash as the sole foundation. Any party that rehsed to obey the law was declared to have betrayed the state, not just the ruling government, and was to be outlawed.

General Responses fO tha Repod ofAIQI -1 The stipulation of the sole basis of PancasilA invited responses brn both individuals and social o~tions.Most did not recognize the need for

l9 Far a clam idp of pdmgmm mid or dd dcvclopaeat, s& Haward M. Fcdcrspid, lChrslh Intellccftrds und N'Mpmtmt in Ind-u (NewYork: Nova Science Publisher, 1992). the state to become involved with different religions and ethnic -ups. The majority of Muslim scholars disagreed with the government's pmposal and the arguments behind the policy, approaching it for diffmnt reasons and from different angles. Fachry Ali, for cxample, reeaoned that, by applying Pancasila as sole basis for all political parties, those that did not apply it already would have to re-write their constitutions, re-establish their political orientations, and re-formulate their programs in order to adjust to the current political situation, Above all, this would lead to confusion among a party's supporters, and would finally erode their loyalty to the party. He reasoned that this was a step backward in political development since diversity marks the mature political system.= One of the most interesting responses came from a highly principled Muslim scholar, Deliar Noer, who had been punished earlier by both the Soekarno and Soeharto governments for his stands on democratic actionsP Expressing strong disagreement with the policy of making the Pancasila the sole foundation, he compared the arguments of Soeharto and Soekano, asserting that Soekarno had offered a better policy as far as ideology was concerned. He painted out that, in the 1950~~Soekamo allowed each political party to apply its preferred ideology in addition to Pandain order to distinguish itself' fiom others. For instance, the NU took Islam as its additional basis, while Partai Katolik (Catholic Party) based itself on the principle of belief in 'One God in general, the Pancasila in particular, and action in accordance with Catholic doctrine,' and Parkindo based itself on the principle of 'Christianity." As for the PNI, they based themselves on the principle of Marhaenism (Roletarianism).24 After discussing several issues related to the Pancasila, such as religion and the nature of each political party, Noer arrives at several conclusions: 1. The sok foundation of Pancaaila for all political parties without stating its own basjs has ignored the diversity of the community that has developed according to their own beliefs. These beliefs might come from digion or othusouras. 2. The sole bundatian has blocked people of the same faith hm uniting themselves and having dialogue badon their beM. At this point, the sok foundation contains a violation, not a fmdom, which is the main characteristic of democracy. 3. The eok foundation has ignored the relations between religion and politics which for certain rrliglons, espdally Islam, is in contrast to their beliefs. This encourages the sccularitation of politics. 4. The mlc fbun&tinn has blodnrl the possibility of developing comprehension, such as that of retigion, that probably strengthens the Panda in the country. The result is that the community is ct;acw(van.tagedby geeher alternative wqm (or none at aU) to develop the country.25

In order to examine the siflcaflcc of the NU'S response as a religious movement to the implementation of the sole foundation, I will elaborate on that of Muhammadiyah, which has a similar status to the NU. The Mufiammadiyah,* the second largest Muslim group in Indonesia, accepted the sole foundation after long deliberation. Generally speaking, the attitude of the Muhammrridiyah toward the Pancasila was like that of the NU, considering the involvement of leaders ftom both groups in establishing the country in 1945, particularly in the series of leaders' meetings during the period in question. Both groups believed that their leaders had carcfulfy considered Isinmic values and teachings when they discusad the philosophical basis of the country and had arrived at the tive pn;ndples of the PancasiIam The decision to accept the solt foundation, however, took longer for the Muhnmmadiyah. Generally speaking, the leaders of the Muhammadiyah were divided into two camps, one 'fundamentalist,' which rejected the policy outright, and the other more open to consultation in finding a solution. Unlike the NU, handling the situation where the sole foundation was accepted before it was enacted as law, the Muhammadiyah took two steps: one step was to consult with Resident Suharto, and the other was to wait until the law was passed. Consequently the Muhammadiyah postponed its 41~national congress (originally scheduled for February 1984) until December 7, 1985 in order to incorporate the law of the sole foundation into its party statutes. At the congress, Resident Soeharto delivered a welcoming speech in which declared the following The wnof Paacaeila as the mle bash not only means upholding its principles, which are basically in apement with the teadhga of our religion, but also strengtheaias our unity and wtyas a nation. We an a phdidc nation in terms of ethnic group, rel@on, race and #Icial pup. Without a common philosPphy such as Pancatila, m will be in cantlict with one other and this will lead us to disunity*.. The declatation of PanCBgila as the sole baaia mt ody mean8 including it in the comdtutloa of an organbath, but alsD ob- us tn develop it in our social end national prollpamk We must endleaply make evvy effort to make Pan@ color all aspects of our socia and national liBeP

It was at this congress that the Muhammadiyah officially accepted the Pancasila as its sole foundation. According to article 2 of the Muhammadiyah's constitution, it is based on the Panda. However, in maintaining that Muhammadiyah is a mass Islamic o-tion, article 1 of the constitution states that 'it is a socio-religious movement with the objective of enjoining good a.prohibiting evil, subscribing to the Islamic creed in conformity with the teaching of the Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Prophet.' For H.A.R Fachruddin, the acceptance of the Paneas its sole foundation was for the Muhammadiyah, Wre a motorcyclist donning a 'safety helmet* Adopting a similar tone, Amkn Rais asserted that the Muhnmmadiyah 'easity' accepted Pan& principlcs,a on the grounds that 'Pancasila is a valid ticket with which we could take the 'bus' of Indonesia. Without this ticket we would not take that bus." Thus, as far as Indonesian nationalism was concerned, it seems that the Muhammadiyah's acceptance of Pancasila as its mIe basis was more a response to prcssun from the ruling government than a wholehearted acceptance of the Pancasila's message.

The ZWs Rerporue to the ku Tunggd fdeolow The NU'S commitment to Indonesian nationalism can be seen in the legal and religious arguments it cited when it accepted Pancasila as the sole foundation. It declared its acceptance of the sole foundation in 1983, one year before it withdrew from politics and two years before the law on the Pan& as sole foundation was passed by the government. In the same text in which it later announced its decision to withdraw hmpolitics the

1. Pancasilaasthebasisand~oftbCatateoftbCRcpub~cof ~ibmta~IItithet~~nitrcplaioe~nnorkdt6 ~thepoaitionofre~ 2. The principle of 'Belief in Om God' aa the buadation of the Republic of Indonesia, aa stated in articlt 29 pmqmph 1 of the 1945 ConMhtion On the surface, one could argue that the NU' s acceptance of the Panda as the sole foundation was caused by political pressure from the

New Order government, just as was the cast with the Muhammadiyah later on. It is true that during the first half of the New Order period, Muslims had suffered persecution. From the perspective of Indonesian nationalism, however, the policy was actually a reflection of the NU'S own commitment to Indonesian nationalism as a bulwark of the nation-state. This can be seen fiom a historical perspective. The NU'S leaders, represented by ICH. Wahid Hasjim,a were actively involvtd in discussing the formation of the Indonesian state, its philosophical foundation, and the preamble to the 1945 Constitution. In reply to criticism concrming the position of Islam and the foundation of the nation, Hasjim announced: religion in Free Indonesia? 1 thtnhrc oace again repeat What we need most of all at this time is the indiduble unity of the nation.33

In addition to this historical perspective, &H. Ahmad Siddiq notes:

1. Ind~sianMu~~to~tageinart~col~andto~tfor indepldmcc ~mthcit~a. has gpne on tor a long time. 2. When the stwggk Tor Indo- indtpcndcn~c approached ita goal, M& conhiiuted greatly in prepariag indepcndenct. Thmu& their leaders, Muslims =n inwlved in deciding the fom, tbundation, and the law of the state thatwouldadat 3. After bckpendmce, without hesitation, Muslims suppartEd and mainhbd independ-, not only aa their national duty but alsa as their religious (Islamic) duty uhad). 4. Afttr the physical revolution was over, Muslims contn'buted to the hard-wan indLpcndence in two main ways: a. They succeeded in main- the nation in the fact of separatist movements and other rebtllions; b. Dwthe Hew Urder's feign, Muslims fUy participated in national propma.34

In view of the above considerations, Siddiq concludes why Muslims havc

to maintain the Pancasila as follows

uu~~~~*br~~d~~rdcrta,r.3 (~ly~,1945~3. ~rsnlso quotadby Harry 3. Bcadainhismrk'Ilk CresenfmrdrlwWdng&m:Indonedmr Islcrmrur&rfhe J(TPO~~CS&aption 19424945 clbt HPgrw Pnd W.van H#W, 1958X 189.

UComparethistotbtpiincipkdartioaIisnhrdm~~,Nd0ru und Nm'ortatisnt (Ithaea and Bhv York Comcll Univtrdty ham, 1994), 1-2. His understanding of Indonesian history, of Muslims' rolt in the nation- state, and of the state's conception of religion (considered valid by Islam), leads Ahmad Siddiq to approve the MJ's attitude that 'the Republic of

Indonesia is the 6nal farm of the Indone- state, especially fgr thc Muslim wnmat'37 Using a legal analogy (~~),Siddiq likens the use of Pancasila as the basis and national ideology of the state to a fdt taten by Muslims every day for the past forty years. The question of whether eating it was lawful or unlawful for Muslims was strange and illogical9 According to Abdurrahman Wahid, historically speaking the Panasila is a product of Indonesians' struggle to disawer an appropriate foundation for their country when faced with a choice between a bewildering array ideologies: Islam, nationalism, , sodism and communism. Generally speaking, there were two universal ideologies popular in Indonesia prior to the establishment of the Panda. The first was which pmnttd religion hrn having the entire field to itself. According to this outlook, the state had to be neutral in dealing with religious &airs, indeed, some would say, had to stay out of religious matters altogether. The second idealogy was theocratic ideulogy, LC., the desire to make the Indonesian state resemble the system developed by Muhammad when he was ruling Medina. According to this view the president wouid also have to be a rciigious leader (trlama)who would decide everything as the Prophet Muhammad would have. Wahid reasons that because of the unlikelihood that either ideology could be fully implemented in Indonesia due to its pluralistic nature, Indonesian Icaders such as Agus Salim, Muhammad Natst, Sockamo, Wahid Hasjim, Tan Malaka, Muhammad Hatta and Syahrir all decided to accept the Pancasila as the philosophical basis for Indonesia39

B. The Political Puticipation of the 10U After the 1926 Khitt.h: Hen- P0Utkd P0Uch8 of Polltic8 of

Ever since the mid-1980s the New Order has gradually been changing its policy toward Islam. In commenting on this trend, William fiddle claims that

'Muslims point both to the many positive government actions taken since the mid-1980s and to the decline in heavy handed repression of activist Muslim individuals and groups as evidence that the government now has much better understanding of Islamic aspirations.' He also points out, however, that this likewise constitutes evidence that the government had fallen under the influence of advocates of an Islamic state.w Agreeing with the common Muslim view, Liddle then says,

that there has been a palpable daxath of tensions, an& that the reaem Lr the new policies is a more sophisticaad government attitude. . toward Idamic rlrmlnda Thia attiSude is in turn a product of the firlnmllahnn of Indozmesian sodetyanddturtovet&pasttbirty~mdoftbctirrlesaeffartoftbeneo- modemist mteUoetuala4~

William, R Liddk, 'Tht Ialamb Turn in Indonesia A Political aph&h,' in The Journal of Asian Studies, 55, no. 3 (August 1996), 625.

" Lidme, "Tbt Islasaic 625. Sarho Dough R;rmnge, bnmmy. ~~ mdfk fwogv of Tolerme (London and New Yok RinUlcdgrc, 1996), 4344. Pointing to the establishment of ICMl (Ikatan Cendikiawan Muslim Indonesia, or Indonesian Muslim Intellectual Association), Lid* reasons

that the change in hehato's policy toward Islam was caused by the fact that

It is reasonable to say that the change in political attitude on the part of

the New Order towstid Muslim groups dhgthe late 1980s and early 1990s

was the result of Suharto's wish to maintain conttal over the political system,

and continue to hold the position of president. There was, howwcr, no single

factor leading to this deasion being taken. The attitude of compmmisc shown

by prominent Muslim groups, like the NU, which accepted the Pancasila as

the sole foundation certainly contributed to an improvement. The above

change resulted in a Mmnt climate of state-Muslim puprelations, just as

it hpmvd the Muslim attitude toward nationalism. Subsequently, the

change also led Muslim groups to change their political behavior in order to

remain invohrtd in the national development of the countqb

The general conclusion is that Wspolitid discourse is reactive in

nature.- This is also true of other rtligious and social mmuncnts in the

country. it iudicatta that its nature is to respond to events, changes, and

tcndmdes OCCURing in the wuntxy. This characteristic ie, in fact, cammon

to sacial and rdigious mdvcmenta throughout the world. In the cast of the

"scc~~~jrnradda~"~~~~~odi~~mjdrng~rfulr~smsrke28"~ and Political Tunptaoicm 1& 28 -1, Kompar, 4hbcr 2,1989. NU, severa1 examples of this tendency can be cited in support of this

conclusior1.

The fir!st such example is in fact one of thc main reasons why the NU was initially fcmnded in 1926, namely, the problems Muslims were facing internatio~nally in the early 19209, the problem of khilafat,* and the local

problems (of traditional Muslims faced with colonialism and the emergence of

a refodst current. The NU'S reaction can also be seen in its withdrawal from Masyumi after realizing that the Masyumi leadership was dominated by modennists. Another instance of this behavior was its withdrawal from the PPP after being disappointed by the leadership of Naro, who was considerai authoritarian and inclined to work against NU intercsts.45 Since leaving party politics and accepting the Pancasila as the sole foundatio~n for all social organizations in the country, the NU has shown a slightly different behavior in politics. According to Abdurrahman Wahid, the shift in the NU'S political behavior, starting with the acceptance of the Pancasila as the sole foundation, has shown that it put the survival of the nation bc efore its own.* As a soda-political force, the NU'S political partkipation during the 1980s and 1990s can be examined in either of two ways. Onc e way is to look at how the NU motivates its politicians without any organizatiional connection to official party politics. Another way is to look at how the NU responds to the political policies passed by the New Order govemment. Abm aU, however, it is essential to understand the general trends oi r NU political behavior. In order to comprehend NU political

46~W4hi4~SWCgiZ~enjrdi~~(SorrrceicAppanch Becomes a C4asidaation fa NU), Aulu (July 1992), 26. See also Rnmaglc, Poliaics in Indoswsia, 53. behavior, it would be useful to elaborate on the NU'S doctrine of Ahl al-

Sum& wa aLJamu'uh

Ever since it was founded, the NU has clearly stated that it followa the doctrines of Ahl al-Swm& wa alJamu'a aqd that it recognizes as its sources the Qur'an, the Sunnah (Rophet Muhammad's traditions), the I*' (general consensus), and the (Analogy). EH. Mustofa Bisri interprets the concept of Ahl al-Sh.m& wa alJamaJahflas a doctrine that holds to the following doctrines:

1. h the kld of 1?Pislmic laws, it adbucs to the tcdingp of om of the four schools of tbaught (lk@Maliki, Sya6:'i and Hambaiii. In practice, however, as most Indoncsian Muslims do, the NU predorninanw adheres to the Sya6ia scbool of thought. 2. In (the doctrine of God's Onencse), the NU follows the tearching of Imam Abu Mansur al-Tdaturidi; 3. In the Wd of Tizstzwuf; the NU fohm tho basic t- of Lmam Abu Qoslm alJunaid.

The above relQpous tradition, also known as (Belief), Islam and ksun (Goad Conduct), gave birth to the normative attitude embodied in theses characteristics of the NU, namely: Even the NU'S attitude toward politics is generally influenced by Islam, which has a distinct approach to the concept other mtigions, like Christianity in the West. The domain of religion in the West, represented by the Church, and the domain of politics, rcprcscntcd by the state, arc separate and coexist with their own distinct laws and chains of authority.

This concept of separating church and state in the West follows the Christian maxim, 'Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and unto God the things that arc god's."^ Muslims, however, regard religion and politics as inseparable. This is probably what influenced Nakamura's conclusion regarding the study of to the dkct that: 'Religion cannot and should not be reduced to politics, nor perhaps, to culture.'*l The domain of Caesar and that of Allah (the religion of Islam) are mutually inclusive. Religion and temporal power seem to be Wins. Many beliewe that they are like two sides of the same coin. The nonnative attitude that characterizes the NU, and especially the quality of tatucrzlln (or fakjng a balance and solemn attitude toward AUah by human beings), and to harmonize the interests of the past, the prcsent and the future, the NU can neither ignort political trends nor bc fully involved in politics The political situation in Indonesian in the 1980s-1990s convinced the NU to take this attitude. The above reality and the NU'S policy of a return to the 1926 khittah, have forced the NU to redcfine its political orientation in order to uphold the interests of its members and the nation. In general, the &st decision takcn by the NU after returning to the 1926 khittah waa to givc NU members and politiaans the opportunity to participate in any &ad political party during the 1987 general election without officially having to declare structural or organizational links to any political party. Rior to the election, the NU released its own scvm-point political platform, namely:

1. NU officus are not allowed to hold podtions in both the NU and a political partyattlnsametime, 2. NUmullbusate&~tobecPndidatcsfortheDPRinthcelection, 3. Thoae who are candidates me aUOTKed to campaign for the political party tkyc~mpaignk. 4. NU members who an not officers of any political party nor candidaka of the DPR, arc not all& ta cam- 5. The above paint (4) is alao epplhd to the NU Mubotigh flslamic Reecher)/da'i or preachers, 6. NU officem cannot repreatat any political party in the clrctian committee. 7. All NU are ~cuuragedto participate in the election in ark to make it auccmdid~

Arbi Sanit concludes that the above policy of the NU shows that, as a social or mass organization, it kept open the possl'bility of using politics to promote the interests of members. At this point in time, however, the NU has chosen to do it through individual, rather than organizational involvement in politics.sJ The NU leaders in charge of mahaging the ddy activities of the organization arc not given permission to have dual positions during the election. As I mentioned earlier, the current NU leaders wmnot very happy with what had been done by Nara of the PPP when he removed most of the NU leaders hm the list of DPR candidates for the 1982 election. The ideals behind the Wspolicy say that the NU cannot leave politics completely; thenfore, the abme seven points show us that the NU wanted to keep its commitment to the national interest but, at the same time, tried not to show its disappointment with the PPP too clearly. Furthermore, Sanit sees the political behavior of the NU after returning to the 1926 khittah as pragmatic in its character. NU leaders wished to promote the urnmat's interests, which they felt they represented. This shows that thcy wanted to continue to uphold the basic ideas of the foundation of the NU, i.e., promoting the interests of the urnmat. Other examples supporting this argument included As'ad Syamstd Arifin,s meeting with Soeharto in order to discuss certain points of the PMP (Pendidikan Moral Pancasila, or Teachings of Panacasila Values),% Abdurrahman Wahid's position as a member of the People's Consultative Assembly or MPR, and the existence of NU politicians in the PPP.55 For Mitsuo Nakamura, the above conception of politics docs not necessarily mean that the NU ignored the various political wings of the organization; in fact the NU had opened the opportunity for them to join the

existing political parties, i.e., PPP, the Golkar and PD1.S The composition of the DPP (Dewan Pimpinan Pusat, or National Board) of PPP 1987 showed that there were a number of NU politicians given positions in the PPP and GoW. In the PPP were listed Mathori Abdul Djalil, Zarkasih Noer, Jenis Zahiruddin, Hamzah Haz, Anshari Syams, Zein Badjtber, H. ham Soh. Even Golkar's list included a young politician of the NU, Slamet Effcndy Yusuf.

In explaining the redefinition of the political role of the NU, Ahmad Siddiq states that for the NU, politics means mating a healthy politid culture where every citizen can practice his or her rights with WI understanding and responsiiility, respect the ukhfalacl kan'mah (good moral values), appreciate democratic rules, and prioritize the interests of the nation abwe those of individuals and pupasThis view was later officially presented to the 28th Congresa held in in 1990 in the followiag wording: 1. To practice politics iar the NU mcmm the partidpation of the citiaeas in the nation state totalty according to the PanrclrPila and the 1945 Canstitution; 2. Politics for the NU is politica wbich ahom mtbabm and *ch is tergeted at natbdintqptbn with attempt* to contiauatly support unity in order to teach national gPals, dya wclfan skew, 3. Politics hr the NU is to develop values of actual Wornand demonary, educate a mature nation to be aftran of Wts, duty, rrspansi'bilty, for the sakeofthcwelheotalla~, 4. Politics for the NU should be practiced with good morality, ethics, and with the belief in God, with ajust, appreciate unity.... ; 5. Politics for the NU muet be practiced with honesty and religious morality, be constitutionally just, and according to the values that have been made, as well as being able to develop di9M198ion in solving mutual pr0bIe.m~ 6. Politics for the NU is practiced in order to strrngthw national con- and must be conducted with akhldwl krvimrrh (good morality) in as the practice of the eonapt of AN d-Sunnah lua alJamalah; 7. Politics for the NU, cannot for any reason be pursued by sacrificing the collective iarenats or disinkgdng the unity; 8. The &rent views among NU membem must be conducted in a fiencUy manner, and in mutual appreciation, ao that in practicing politics the NU memkcan atill maintain unity9

The above conception of politics, according to Kacung Marijan, was in line with the will of the New Order prior to the 1980s, namely the idea of

floating rnasse3.S The difkrence, however, was that during the 1980s and 19909, the NU gave clear permission to its members and politicians in order to participate in the electim. Kith such a conception of politics, contacts

n~clivcradinbis~spsseh(o~~m~~mdtbcR&oftheNUPAa Renrmedtok~~"~byDW(DewaaPimpinanW~opTht~Boud)of~ Java, 5 Marct! 1989. between the NU and politid parties and between the NU and the ling government were carried out by individuals.

The Sigdicmt of the RqW Akbar, March 1,1993 One of the traditions usually observed by the NU, by which it expresses its political attitude, is to hold gatherings or mass rallies. On March 1, 1992 the NU commemorated its sixty-sixth anniversary by holding the Rapt Akbar (tremendous mass rally) at the Senayan Sports Stadium in Jakarta. The apparent purpose of the Rapat Akbar was to celebrate the organization's anniversary by publicly reiterating the NU'S loyalty to the Pancasila and to the 1945 Constitution. The same statement of loyalty was actually publicly decided at its National Conference in Situbondo in 1983. The Rapat Akbar in fact has particular importance as far as my thesis of the NU'S roIe in nationalism is concerned. According to Douglas Ramage, there were severat reaaons for the NU'S public reiteration of loyalty to the Fancasila.60 First, it was a way for Abdurrhman Wahid, chainnan of the NU, to amid appmving Socharto's bid for a fifth fivc-year term in office. Wahid contends that the NU wanted to avoid an explicit endorsement of Socharto by limiting its& to a public reiteration of loyalty to the Pan& For Wahid, supporting Sot- for another &-year term would have been contrary to genuine democratic principles, which should be cxphsadd through fiee and fair politid competition. Ramage continues: democ~nprocese and would not be ~09ptedby tht government in the manner of Muaim intellectuals who bad recently tbmwn their weight behind the government-backed IClrdl.

Third, Wahid peraived a rising tide of mtarianism and fundamentalism in Indonesia and s6 he wauted to depict in the NU rally a pluralistic, non-sectarian Islamwhicb~Pancadaasthc~wlyneu~beaisofthestatt.. Wahid prccived that ae&mm8m thnatd one of the most paitivc a8pects of the New Order aocirty: the -wing of direct linlcs be- oat's rdgbn or ethnicity and how one participates in politics. Wabid believed that the New Order formula for de-linkjng religion and other 'piimordialg af6nities brom mass politics was under grave that.

Fourth, thee was an internal NU purpose to the Rapat Ab.Wabid sought to demonstrate the support of NU through a rally of up to nRo million NU members.61

Douglas Ramagc's analysis is based mostly on his view of Wahid as a person, yet when looking at the statements above and the scale of the event, the signdicance of the NU'S commitment to the problems of the nation is also made clear. This was admitted by Wahid himself, who said that 'this event (the Rap& rYcbar) is not personal in its character.' He then added that Indonesia was facing a new phase with a new political setting, of which one aspect was the need for a stabilizing force in the nation. No single force could guarantee this stability, although the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution went a long way towards doing so. Certainly, ABRI was not enough and neither was Golkar. 62

Thus, the event was meant as a preemptive attempt to avoid the instability of the political situation." According to Wahid, the Ropat Akbw was also aimed at convincing Muslims in the country that the Wsreligious oonception of Indonesia's pluralistic character needed to be developed. This ran counter to the IJnmic State idtology developed by certain smaller groups of Muslims in Indonesia.

""Gus Dm dm ILpPt Akbsr NU: Ado (March 1992). 34. Wahid maintained that widespread Muslim support would be useful as a momentum to start transforming the nation without inttrfcrence from the government.64

Reorientation sf P4Utlcal Wam

The NU'S decision to return to the khittah of 1926 tumed Islam towards a culhual strategy of community development. Morc impoltantly, it changed thc nature of the state-citizen relationship, a change that has had a positive impact on the development of Indonesian nationalism. Islam is no longer regarded as an opponent of the state, but rather as a partner. This change was not simply caused by the NU'S leaving politics: the gwemmcnt's wariness of Islamic-state ideology seemed to have been eliminated. The 1980s and the first half of the 1990s [before the collapse of Sothato's New Order government) represented an important period for ; it was a period when Ealamic forces in the country developed the momentum to overcome the ne@w image of the Muslim community. It was a period during which professionals, intellectuals, and technocrats esZablished a number of important bases of modem Muslim society. It was dso a period during which almost dl segments of the socio-cultural (tather then 60-political)sector were profoundly affected by extensive activities of a vastly enlarged group of Muslim leaders who founded new businesses, established modern schools and introduced new values and religious orientations. As a further positive outcome of the atme trend, there have ban thrce factors determining the course of the cultural of the country. The fhthctor was the ongoing effort at hiberating Islam hmpolitical symbolism. It seemed clear that this was the result of the 'Idam yes but Islamic party no'

kdsnI(rpot Akbr NU," Ada I=), 3637. attitude that prominent Muslim leaders, among them Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid, had held since the late 1970s. Nevertheless, it was not until there was widespread acceptance of the Pancasila as the sole basis that this propaganda bcrnme a reality. The second factor was a rise in Muslim political articulateness, oriented towards greater understanding of Islam, democracy, human rights, justice and humanism. The Islamic sylnboliam of struggIe, used before 1980, had become less dominant. The third factor was the indirect involvement of Muslims in the political arena of the New Order government. These three factors have made Islam, represented by the NU, a determining factor in developing nationalism in the country. One of the most significant recent developments for political Islam was the rise of ICMI (Ikatan Cendikiawan Muslim Selumh Indonesia or AU- Indonesian Association of Muslim IntcUectuals) on December 8, 1990. The formation of ICMI was initiated by a pup of Muslim student activists from Brawijaya University Malang. It was originally meant to be a social organization of Indonesian Muslim scholars, Prof. Dr. BJ. Habibie, who was Minister of Research and Technology at the time, wat~unanimously elected as ICMI's first chairman. ICMI's main objective was to increase the participation of Muslim scholars in the elaboration of thc strategy for national development. It is important to note that, aftcr the collapse of Socharto's New Order govnnment, Habibie mme to replace him as the third Pnsident of Indonesia. ICMI's leaders immediately became more actively involved in the development of the nation-

state. Although ICMI was supposed to be an alternative for developing society,

its sudden political maneuvers sbem to have caused the 'failure' of the above

strategy. ICMI was regarded as a distortion of the step-by-step development process of political Islam. Abdurrabman Wahid considered ICMI to be sectarian in character and declared that he neither supported nor opposed its creation, but refused to join because 'such an association would lead to the n- emergence of Islamic sectarianism and fundamentalism in the country. Also, as an independent entity of civil society, intellectuals should not organize themselves according to narrow categories such as their Islamic faith, let alone

themselves collaborate with the state.'= The national spirit which took hold of Indonesia at the turn of the century bore the fruit of independence same forty years later. The Pancasila phitosophy, agreed upon as the philosophical basis for the country during the period immediately following independence (1945-1949)and then implemented as the ideology and sole foundation of all political parties and social or mass organizations in 1985, was a culmination of development in three important areas: culture, ethnic identity and religious movements. It was very clear that, as in many other countries that used to be under colonialist rule, the early consciousness that emerged among Indonesians was a product of their desire to protect and promote their interests and be part of a savcreign country. At thia early stage, a universal collective ideology was not necessarily in place.

Culture, ethnicity and religion were often used by Indonesian nationalist leaders to inspire unity in the face of both Dutch and Japanese occupation. The declaration of the Sumpah Pemuda, or Youth Pledge, in 1928 showed that the cultural nationalist movement dominated all other movements, including Islam. The most reasonable explanation for this can be traced back to the educationd background of tho= who led the movements during the formative period of Indonesian nationalism. In the early formative period, religious mwements seemed to function in a supporting role to cultural nationalism, in the sense that explicit rtfcrcnces to certain religious teachings were largcly avoided by leader such as Raden Ajmg Kartini and movcments like Boedi Oetomo. Religious movements became more actively invohred toward the middle period of this century, ph.an important role during the molutionary period and contributing to the conception of the nation's ideological basis. Rather than simply establish an Islamic state in recognizing of the county's

Muslim majority, secular and religious nationalist leaders arrived at a consensus making the Pancasila the ideological basis of Indonesia This acknowledged the unique pluralistic nature of Indonesian society, while at the same time representing a great sacrifice on the part of Indonesian Muslims. it was also an attempt to establish universal values that were acceptable to each official religion in the country. In terms of national ideology, defined as

'universal spirit' or value, the fact that Indonesian Muslims chose the

Pancasila seems to indicate that they were comfortable with this detinition.

The Nahdlatul Ulama, with so many followers, was both organizationally and individually an integral part in the formation of the Indonesian national ideology of the Pancasila. The presence of K.H. Wahid Hasjim in the series of discussions on the Pancasila was of great signi!icancc to Muslims as well as followers of other relidons in the country. There is no doubt that the NU'S acceptance of the Pancasila as its sole foundation in 1983 was influenced by the fact that Wabid's father, who was leader of the NU in 1945, had proposed a similar policy for the interest of the nation-state. The historic decision made by the NU in 1983 showed that the organization was truly aware of itdf as an

&tegral pat in the development of Indonesian nationalism.

The NU'S commitment to Indonesian nationalism, cw the hrst organhation to accept the Pancasila as its sole foundation, fully acknowledged the pluralistic spirit of the country. Since its declaration, in tact, the NKRI (rucgara Kesatuan

Republik Indonesia, or the Unitaxy State of Indonesia), repreacnting the

struggle for an Islamic state, has received little support fiom the majority of Indonesian Muslims. The policy represented the NU'S endeavor to convince other Islamic parties to recognize the pluralistic rtality of the country.

The NU arrived at its acceptance of Pancasila as the sole foundation before the enactment of the law which made this obligatory. It incorporated its understanding of Islamic values bto the real understanding of Indonesian nationalism; it was not a reaction to pressure from abwe. This is in contrast to other Indonesian Muslim organizations which accepted the policy only after being forced to do so by law.

The NU'S political behavior in relation to the question of national ideology, determined by actual conditions and by its understanding of the doctrines of

Ah1 al-Sunnah wa alJamaJ& has very often placed it at a disadvantage, even

though this may have had a positive effect on the nation. After accepting the

Pancasila as its sole foundation and leaving potitics, the NU changed its strategy of community development by adopting of cultural approach and

strategy. This strategy was, moreover, the result of a long struggle by such Muslim leaders as Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wghid.

Finally, one of the most sigui6cant outcomes of the above policy for

Indonesian nationalism, i.e., leaving politics, namely to return to the khittah

1926 and accepting the Pand,was the emergence of a new form of state- citizen relationship in the country. This was not just a new phenomenon in the

history of Indonesian nationelism; it was a historical event that should be

considered a valuable contribution by Indonesian Muslims to their countcrpatts

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