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THE ROLE 01' MU8LIM GROUPS IN CORTBIIPOURY IRDOIfBSIAIf NATIONALISM: • A STUDY OF TBB NABDLATUL ULAMA mmBR THE HW ORDER 1980.·1990.

Su'aidlAsy'arl

A til_la sabmittecl to the J'.cult, ofGnduate Studla ud Reseucb • iD partial faJfJJJmeat ofthe req1lkemeDu fOI' the de..._ ofMut. ofArt

lutltute ofl8bmlc Sm'" .camualvenlt1 .oatnaleuada

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0-612-54977-1

Canadrl ABSTRACT

• Author : Su'aidi Asy'ari Title : THE ROLE OF MUSLIM GROUPS IN CONTEMPORARY INDONESIAN NATlONALISM: A STUDY OF THE NAHDLAT'JL UI.AMA UNDER THE NEW ORDER DURING THE 1980s AND 199Os. Department : Institute of Islamic Studies Degree : Master ofArts

This thesis investigates the role played by the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), a

traditionalist Islamic organization established by K.H. Hasjim Asj'ari in 1926, in the development of Indonesian nationalism, elaborating in particular on its

activities under the New Order (1980s and 1990s) after it implemented the

Pancasila as the sole foundation for all political parties, social and mass

organizations. As the largest Muslim traditionalist organization in Indonesia,

the NU was originally founded to protect and promote the interests of Muslim • traditionalists, who loyally followed the school of Ahlu al-&mnah wa al­ Jama'ah. The doctrines of the latter school are shown here to have largely influenced the organization's dealings both culturally, religiouslyand politica11y.

In order to fully understand the NU's view of Indonesian nationalism, this thesis examines the three phases of Indonesian nationalism, beginning

with the rise of this organization, its involvement in the formation of the Indonesian state and its ideolog,Y, and the period after the country stipulated the sole foundation of Pancasüa. It is from these three phases of Indonesian

nationalism that this thesis shows the significance role played by the NU during

the 1980s and 199Os. The NU's example in accepting the Pancasila as its sole

basis gelVed as an inspiration to other social and mass organizations in the country and represented one ofits major contributions to the nation's welfare•

• ü Auteur : Su'aidi Asy'ari • Titre : Le rôle des groupes musulmans dans le nationalisme Indonésien contemporain: Une analyse de la Nahd1atul Ulama sous l'Order Nouveau durant les annéss quatre vingt et quatre vingt dix. Departement : Institut des Études Islamiqus, Université McGill Diplome : Maîtrise és Arts

Ce mémoire explore le rôle joué par le NabdIatul Ulama (NU), une organisation islamique traditionalle fondée par K.H. Hasjim Asj'ari en 1926,

dans le développment du nationalisme indonésien. La recherche élaborera particuliérement sur les activités de l'organisation durant l'Order Nouvau

(1980s-199Os) suite à l'instauration de la Pancasila comme l'unique fondement de tous les partis politiques et autres organisations sociales de masse. En tant

que la plus grande formation musulmane en Indonésie, le NU a été fondée afin de protéger et de promouvoir les intérêts des musulmans traditionalistes, qui • suivaient loyalement l'école de pensée Ahlu al-Sunnah wa al-Jama'ah. Les doctrines de cette école sont montrées ici comme ayant largement influencé les

intérêts de l'organisation qui sont à la fois culturels, religieux et politiques. Afin de mieux comprende le point de vue du NU concernant le nationalisme indonésien, ce mémoire examinera les trois phases du nationalisme indonésien, en commencent par l'essor de cette organisation, son

implication dans la formation de l'état indonésien et de son idéologie ainsi quel l'époque suivant l'instauration de la Pancasila comme fondement unique du

pays. De ces trois phase du nationalisme indonésien, ce mémoire démontre le

rôle significatifjoué par le NU durant les années quatre vingt et quatre vingt dix. L'example du NU dans son acceptation de la Pancasila comme son fondement

unique a servi d'inspiration a d'àutres organisations sociales de masee di pays et a représenté une de ses contnbutions majeures au bien-étre de la nation. • fi • ACKKOWLBDGMEKTS With the completion ofthis thesis, 1 find myself in the position of having

to express my indebtedness to a number of people whose materia! and moral

have certainly contributed the realization of this project. First and foremost, 1

would like to acknowledge the readiness of my thesis supervisor, Professor

Howard M. Federspiel and my co-advisor, A. Oner Turgay, who have giYen me

such valuable advice, comments and criticism throughout the entire course of

my research. 1 have relied. on their advice, guidance and all-round assistance,

bath personal and academic. 1 count myself been fortunate to have benefited

from their kindness and patience.

1 am also grateful to Ms. Wendy Allen, Director of the McGill-Indonesia

Project, and aIl the project staff, in both Jakarta and Montreal, who have helped

me during the course ofmy studies. Special thanks are due to Professor Ahmad • Nur Fadhil Lubis for having had the kindness to read the draft proposa! for this project, and Professor Faisal Ismail, who read the first draft of the thesis itself.

Thanks are also due to the Canadian Intemational Development Agency (CIDA)

for awarding me a scholarship to study at McGill University. My deep gratitude

is aIso due to Dr. Tarmizi Taher and Dr. Abdul Malik Fajar, the former and

present Ministers of Religious Main during my two years of study at McGill

University. They provided me with the opportunity to pursue my studies at this

institution. My gratitude aIso extends 10 Prof. Dr. H. Sulaiman Abdullah and

Prof. Dr. Asafri Djaya Balai, the former and present Rectors of the State

Institute of lslamic Studies (IAIN) Sulthan Thaha Saifuddin Jambi. for granting

me permission to set aside my duties as lecturer for two years.

• iv Thanks are also due to the staff of the McGill Indonesia Project and the

Institute of Islamic Studies for their assistance toward the completion of my

• work. 1 would especially like ta thank Susi Ricciardelli, Joanna Gacek, Lori

Novak, and Anne Yaxley, for their administrative and moral support. My thanks

also go out to the helpful staffof the Library of the Institute of Islamic Studies,

e'ipecially Sa1wa Ferahian and Wayne St. Thomas, for their readiness to offer

assistance at every stage of my research. 1 would also like to express my

appreciation to Steve Millier and Andrei Pancu for their tireless help in editing

mywork.

It was vety often the case that ideas emerged !rom impromptu

discussions with my colleagues, especially my Indonesian colleagues, but it is

impossible to mention every one of them here. 1 should mention, however, four

of those whose support was exceedingly important: Masdar Hilmy, Asep • Saifuddin Jahar, Mujiburrahman and Muhammad Munir. DifTerent opinions among us on certain ideas actually broadened my lmowledge, which in tum

also influenced me to reassess previous judgements or conclusions. 1 believe

that every one of us has gained ûom the discussions we had; nevertheless, any

statement in this thesis ultimately remains my own persona! responsibility.

Finally, 1 must acknowledge that the successfu1 completion of this thesis

and the MA program at McGill University are due in large part to the StroDg

encouragement 1 received !rom my family and relatives. Therefore. 1 humbly

dedicate this thesis to my beloved we. Chodijah Su'aidi, my daughter,

Fadhilatul Hikmah, and my son, Haekal al AsYari. The patience of my wife, who

has taken over the respollSlbility of looking after our two children during my

absence, is a great sacrifice that 1 cannot repaYe 1 am al. indebted to my • v mother, Rogayah, and my parents-in-law, Hj. Hamidah and H. Kuris, who • supported my decision to leave my family for such a long time. Montreal, May 1999 sasyar

•

• vi ROTE Off TRA!l8LITBRATIOli • In transliterating the Arabie names and tenns in this thesis 1 have used the transliteration scheme employed at the Institute of Islamie Studies, McGill University. In dealing with the problem of variations in the spelling of

Indonesian names and words, 1 have adopted the following system: Indonesian

words, terms and place-names Dot in quotations are spelled in two ways: those which are derived !rom Arabie are transliterated according to the n.ùes for Arabie; the remainder are written employing the new Indonesian spelling use

example: Boedi Oetomo). For proper names, in quotation or not in quotatiOD,

this thesis employs the spelling used by the individual him/herself. The

following is a transliteration table from Arabie to English and Indonesian.

• Arabie English Indonesia Arabie English Indonesia ~ d dl/db

'-! b b j, , th

~ t t ~ ~ zh

..:" th ts t

j ~ j t gh gh

c J, h ...; f r

t th kb J q q

,) d d .d k k

j db dz J

r r r m m • vii j z z ~ n n

w W • If S S J ~ sb sy b b

I.J" ~ sb IS y Y

Long vowels (~ ~j) are indicated by placing a macron above the characters: i, j., \L

•

• viü TABLE 01' CONTENTS

• Abstract ii Résumé ...... •...•...... •....•...... •....."'...... fi

AckIlowledgements iv

Notes on Transliteration vü

Table of Contents. ix

Introduction 1

Chapter 1: THE RlU BD DBVBLOPlDRT 01' IfATIOIfAtISIl IRDOIfBSIA: The Role or Social. Btlmic ..4 Reli1ioua Group. 6

A. The Fouaclatloas of11I4oB.alaD RatioDalis. 6

- Establishing A Broader Collective ldentity 18 B. JIU uel ••ÜoDallua prlOI' to the 1980s . 23 - The First Phase: Establishing a First Characteristic...... 24 • - The Second Phase: Hand in Hand in Building a new sovereigtl nation .. ...•...... •...... •... 29 - The NU under the Soekarno's Old arder .•. 36

Chapter n: RUts WlTBDRAWAL FROM POLITICS 43

A.. Tbe Soclo-Polltlcal Sltuatioa ia 18401le. Prtor to 19.8Q...... •...... •... 43

- The Rise ofthe New Order and Its Model of National Dev'el.opment •..•..•.•..•..•...... •.••••..••..•...•....".• •.•... •.• •.. ..• # - The New Order's Political PoHcies 50

Be To.... tIIe Sltallo"o Co aD a Ice ICIat~ 1~" 6()

- The Failure ofNU political Leadership . 60 - Retreat from Politics as a Solution .. 65 - Historica1 Consideration for Retuming to the Khittah of 1926 •.•...... •...•...... ••....•.•••.•....•...... •.....•.•....• 69 -A New Sense ofPLlrpose •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 73 • ix Chapter III: THB RU'S RBSPOffSB AlID POLICY TO THE • NATIONAL IDBOLOGY AlID POLITIC8 . 76 A. The Soclo-PoUtlcalBacIlpoUJl. ofthe ieleolo., Aacli ~gal Palacatla .. 76

- The New Order's Motives ofImplementing Pancasila as the Sole Foundation ...... •. 79 .. Applying the Asas 7Unggal Pancasila 85 - General Responses to the Proposai ofAsas 'Ii.Dtggal, ••••••.•...... ••• 86 - The NU's Response to the Asas 7Unggalldeology .. .•.... 90

B. The 'olitical Partlcipatioa 01 the RU Post the 1926 KbittaJa: Roa-Politieal PoUcle. 01 Polities 01 the NU ...... •••....••....•...... ••...... •.•...... ••...•..•... ..•.... 94

- The Significant ofthe Rapat Akbar, March l, 1992 .. 102 - Reorientation of Political Islam 104

Conclusion 105 • Bibliography . 108

• x • INTRODUCTION The year 1984 marked the onset ofthe third phase in the development of

Indonesian nationalism, a1ready more than 75 years old. The third phase can

be seen as a step towani a -mature- nationalism, one more befitting a nation­

state. This phase was characterized by the policy of stipulating Pancasila as the

sole foundation (asas tunggal) for aU political parties and social and mass

organizations. The third phase was reached only alter the country had passed

through two other very ditlicult phases, beginning at the tum of the 20th

century. The first phase represented a period of some 37 yeats during which

nationalist consciousness among the indigenous people flourished. It was aIso

characterized by the emergence of a number of cultural movements, such as

those of Raden Ajeng Kartini (1902) and Boedi Oetomo (1908). • The first phase (1902-1945) was also colored by the youthful spirit of the above movements. The period after 1909 saw an extraordinBIY proliferation of

youth organizations among the educated elite, even though most of them

represented ethnie identities, indicating a narrower idea ofnationaliSDl. Ricldefs

lists a number of examples of these youth movements: Pasundan (a sort of

Boedi Oetomo for the Sundanese, founded 1914); Jong Java (Young Java, the

first student body, 1918); Sarekat Ambon (Ambonese Union, 1920); S8rekat

Sumatra (Sumatranen Bond, Sumatran Union, 1918); Jong Minabasa (Young

Minahasa of Celebes); and, Perkumpulan Poltik Katolik Jawi (Political

Association of Javanese Catholics, an ethno-political..reJigious association,

founded 1925). These groups refiected organizational enthusiasm, and &190 a • strong desire for national unity• 2

ln the same period, there appeared modem and traditionalist religious • movements. These religious movements used reJigious teachings to encourage their members to promote and protect their interests, ultimately developing a

sense of nationalism among their followers. However, the existence of a number

of Muslim groups in Indonesia and other MuSÜJD countries ideologica11y

affiliated with the idea of Pan-Islamism, spread by Muslim scholars like

Jamaluddin Al-Afghani, bas led many scholars to conclude that there appears

to be a dichotomy between nationalism. and lslamie movements. The latter have

been dismissed as baving little, or no, sense of nationalism vis-â-vis nationalism

îtself. Regardless ofwhich ideology is the better one, however, the daim that the

Islamic movements had less of a sense of nationalism cannot be aeeepted.

There are a number of ls1amic movements that were key to the development of

this sentiment in bath Indonesia and the Muslim world as whole; in this thesis, • for example, 1 take the Nahd1atul Ulama as a case study. Other scholars have recognized this faet as welle John L. Esposito, for instance, in bis study of the

Tole played by Islam in some Muslim countries argues:

Two major political trends, often interrelated, predomjnated: mti-colonial independence movements and the emeqenœ of modem œlÏcmaJjsm Illam played an important role in eadl. Fu., indepeodenœ movements in North Africa and the Indian subcoDtiœnt, Islam 8el'Ved as a lIDifYiaI ralJ.yiDs cry. providiDc an ideDtity and a11eIianœ, ideology and symbota. leaderabip and mosque.baaed communications center& Second, the deve10pmmt of modem Muslim nationalism waa iDdebtecl to Islamic modemiat as -U as eecu1ar nabonalist 1eaden. Given the traDmatioDal reJiBioua ideolOlY oC Islam, the sbift in loyalty state requhed a proœ8a of ideoIogical redefiDitioo and 1esitimarion. Islam wu integra1 10 tbe deveJopment ofnatioDaIist ideolOlie& 1

The second phase of Indonesian nationalism (194Os) was the period

when nationalist leaders. making use of the already-established forces reCerred

l John L. Esposito. Islam and Politics (New York: Syracwe UDivenity ~ • 1984),62. 3

to above, prepared the country for Indonesian independence and, at the same • time, established an ideology for the countIy. The ideology itself was founded only after they had reached a consensus on establishing a religious state,

although not a theocratic one explicitly based on a certain belief. It was during

this phase, however, that Soekarno, supported by other nationalist leaders,

succeeded in winning over those who opposed the idea of any Corm of religious

state. Soekarno persuaded them instead to accept the Pancasila as the

philosophical basis for the newly established nation. Pancasüa simply means

Five Prineiples, and although they consist of religiously inspired values, they

are not derived from any specifie religion. In both phases of this formative

period J in faet religion, and specifically Islam, played a significant role, one that

respected fol1owers of other religions and moreover included them in the system

of the nation-state. There was no conception of a minority or a majority where • religion was concemed. As mentioned earlier. the third phase (1980s-present) wu one leading

towards a more -mature- nationalism, marked by the reaftirmation of the

Pancasila as the oo1y ideology in the life of the nation-state. During this phase,

the New Order govemment succeeded in -persuadingtt virtually an elements in

the nation-state to accept the Panœsila as the sole foundation for an politica1

parties and social and mus organizations.

This thesis is concemed with the rote played by the Nahdlatul Ulama, a

socio-religious orpnization founded in 1926 by K.H. Hasjim Aasj'ari, in the

evolution of Indonesian nationalism as described 8OOve. Special attention will

he paid to the third phase, in which the NU played such a significant role. Prior • to this, however, the thesis examines the social background of the emergence of 4

the NU, its basic character and its socio-politica1 contribution to the second • phase of Indonesian nationalism, when the nation's leaders struggled to define their idea of the new state. The main objectives of this thesis are: (1) to show

the development of Indonesian nationalism in which the NU played its role; (2)

to examine to what extent the NU views Islamic ideology as an important force

in building nationalism; (3) to show the significance of the Pancasila in uniting

the various religions, ethnie groups and cultures in the country; (4) to show, by

presenting the above three objectives, the important role played by Islam in the

Indonesian nationalism; and (5) fmally, to contribute to the study of Islam,

nationalism and national ideology in the country.

As far as academic work on the NU is concemed, there were no specifie

studies on the NU written prior ta the early 1970s, when foreign scholars rU'St

began to take an interest in this religious organization. Even then, studies of its • nationalist contribution would have been premature. According to Greg Barton, the lack ofacademic interest in the NU,

ref1ected. the ideo1o&ica1 and preoccupations of 8CboIars of Indonesian Islam dUl'ing this period. Most were either modemist MWIlima or western reeearchers who Cavored investigatiDg and promoting thoee e1ements in lDdonesian SDCie1y wbich were seen as 'modem-minded', «rational' and technical1y or proœsaionally skDled. TraditionaHst MusUmS;, \Vith their emphallis on the classica1 Islamic leaming and obaerving cultural tradition, tended to be regarded \Vith skepticism and disdain They \ftre portrayed as political1y naïve 8Dd opportuDistic, administrativeJy inept, and venal For most acholars at thia period, NU's traditional leaders were dismisecl as 1aJp1y irrelevant to the task of modemizing Indonesia.2

Thus it was only after 1971, the year of the first general election under

the New Order, that foreign scholars bepn to study more seriously the NU. Its

thini-place finish in the election and the fact that it had defeated six other

2 Grea Fealy and Sarton. Nah41atul UlamtJ, T1adititmll11slam. and Modemity in • Indonesia (Clayton: Monash Aaia In8titute, 1996), xxi. s

political parties was sufficient ta awaken the interest of these scholars. Among • those who undertook a doser investigation of the NU during the 19705 were Ken Ward, author of The 1971 Election in Indonesia: An East Java Case Study,

and Mitsuo Nakamura who wrote -Radical Traditionalism of the Nahd1atul

Ularna in Indonesia: A Persona! account of its 26th National Congress. June

1970,· a reworking of the conclusion he had earlier reached in bis dissertation

entitled The Crescent Arises over the Banyan Tree. 3 Nakamura's treatment ofthe

NU, it must he noted, is by and large negative in tone.

The quantity and variety of research on NU-related topies by foreign

scholars has grown rapidly since it became the tirst social/mass organization to

accept the Pancasila as its sole foundation in 1983. There is no doubt that the

NUls decision to go along with the policy while other groups continued to reject • it was an added motivation.

• 3 See the bJ."bliography. CBAPTEROlŒ • THE RlSB ABD DBVBLOPIŒRT 01' RATIORALIS. œnmormslA: The Role ofSocial, Btludc ancl ReUPou Groa,.

A. The FOtUldatioas oflacloaeslaa .atloaaUsm Nationalism is a human sentiment that has had a significant impact on

world affairs ever since the eighteenth centwy, yet nonetheless defies

defmitive and permanent definition. 1 Most scholars agree, however, that the French Revolution gave the movement the momentum it continues to

possess today.2 While this may he so, it is nonetheless the case that nationalism has grown beyond its original character, evolving over time and

in different places into an ideolo&y that is widely inclusive. Nationalism, or

nationhood, exists when Ca significant number of people in a community

consider themselves ta he a nation, or behave as if they be one.-3 Benedict • Anderson rewords 'consider themselves' as 'imagine themselves'. He reasons that the condition is imagined because a.ute members of even the smallest nation will never lmow Most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them. yet in the mind of each lives the image of their communion!4 When this theory is applied ta Indonesia, as is done in this chapter, it can

be argued that, although it is impossible for many Indonesians to have faϥ to-face contact, they build contacts and relationships by sharing certain

1 For a variet;y of c:1e&Ditiona of DatianaHsm, eee: Seton-WatBon Huah, Nations and States: An Inquiry mm the Origin of Nations and the Politics of Nationmïsm. (Boulder, Cola.: Westv.iew Press, 1977); Benedict ADder8on, 1mIJginIJd Cornmuniùea (New York: Verso, 1991); Elie Kedourie, Natio1UJlism. (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1994); and Ernest GeUner, Nations and NationtJlisrn (Ithaœ and NewYork: ComeR University Press, 1994).

:;z G.P. Gooch, Studies in Modem history (London: Longmens, 1931)

3 Seton-WatIon, Nation and States, S. • .. Benedict Anderson, /magined Communïties, 6. 7

fundamental aspects of life in common: language, culture, territory, etc. For • Ernest Gellner nationalism is a political principIe, wbich ho1ds that the political and the national unit should be congruent. National;sm as a .entïmeDt, or as a movement, can best be defined in terms of this principJe. Na!ionalist sentiment is the feeliDg of anpr aroused by the violation ofthe principle, or the feeIins or satisfaction aroused. by its fulfillment.5 Cultural, religious, ethnic, geographic and social factors in each country have frequently. if not always, infiuenced the nature oC nationalism as it is

understood locally.6 In a country like Indonesiat which was under foreign govemments for more than three centuries, the term nationalism seems to

have been comprehended as the manifestation of patriotism in the face of imperialism. It is bath a dream and a matter oC pride for such a countly ta have its own identity, and to manage its own national development. It reflects the willingness of the people to sacrifice whatever is necessary for this sovereignty and for its preservation. Besides the nationalist views of reügious and ethnie groups it is also • important to consider individual perceptions of nationalisme For a secular Indonesian nationalist like Mobammad Hatta - one of the two founding fathers of the country, nationalism was the means of achieving the brotherhood of aIl nations. For him this meant that a nation should identify its own national sovereignty and identity in order ta bave fun and profitable relations with other nations. Another prominent nationalist pioneer worth

mentioning here is Haji Agus Salim, who, at one point became a key figure

5 Ernest Gel1Der, Nations and NtltiOlUlIi..(Itbac:a, New Yodc: ComeD Univasity Press. 1994>, 1.

6 Albert Hourani, Anzbic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939 (Cambrld&e: Cambrid8e University Pras, Melbourne, 1993), 341~. In bis cle&DitioD of nationaJjsm, Ernest GeUœr 8tre..S the existence of a princip1e acœptecl by a group of people, and says that the f'eeJiDB ofanaer will he aroueed wben the priDciple ia violated. See Emeat GeDœr, Nations and N~ 1-2. Inaquite -nr'. 8Dd more elaboraœ sena, Elie Kedourie caUs it natimüsn as coustitutional polities. It impJies atœDding • ta the common conœma ofa particular 8OCÏety, eaft!IUardiDI it apiDst foœip UIIIW1t, 8

in the Partai Sarekat Islam. For him, Indonesian nationalism needed to be

based upon Islamic socialism, i.e. on freedom, equality, and brotherhood.7 • From bis ideas and activities in Sarekat Islam, Jong Islamiten Bond (JIB) and other institutions, he made it clear that the concept means freedom

from alien domination, and equality of rights between men and women. the

haves and the have-nots, n.l1ers and the IUled.1 Another prominent nationalist figure of the 1920'9 and 19305 was Ahmad Hassan, the founder

of Persatuan Islam. As an Islamic -fundamenta1is~ figure, Ahmad Hassan felt that Indonesian nationalism should he based on Islamic principles, seeing that the majority (90010) of Indonesians were Muslims. He stated that "like it or not, a Muslim must always employ Islam in all places and in aIl things.-g Secular nationalist figures like Soekarno, Muhammad Hatta and Soetomo, on the other hand, believed that a national culture free of

dependence on religious beliefs and ethnie associations would he stronger than a system built simply on Islam. 80th view5 certainly had the same goal • of uniting the -Indonesian people- in arder to Coster national identity. Thu~. both views. to difTerent degrees, have significantly contributed 10 the foundation of Indonesian nationalisme

Many believe that it is difIicult to determine where and when Indonesian

nationalism was barn as an ideologica1 movement. There are many

and mediating disagreements and conflict amOlli VariOU8 groupa thtouah politica1 institutions, legislation and the admjnistrabon ofjuatice (Nationalism, xiii).

7 SubatnlO. Darto Hamoko, TaMadj, and Suratmîn. Tokoh-tokoh Pemikir Pahœn Kebangsaan: Hoji Agus SGlim dan Nu1r.atn.mad Thœnrin (Jakarta: Dwi Jaya lCaIya, 1995),44.

8 For more iDformadon GD hia tbol1gbt and contnbu1ion to Indonesien nationalism, see Suhatmo, Tokoh-tokoh, Suradi. Hqji Agus Salim. dan Knflik Politüc dalam. Soreka Islam (Jakarta: Pustaka Sînar harapan, 1997), and PaDitia Buku Perlnptan, ecL Seratus Tahun Haji Agus S41im (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar barapan, 1996).

9 Ahmad H~ Islam dan Kebangsaan (BaDp: Penatwm Islam, 1941), 41. For • further discussion on Ahmad Hassan'. thought, 8fJe the entirety of Howard M. 9

circumstances to be eonsidered in formulating an answer to thi9 question. • Kahin10 identifies four contributing factors to the Indonesian nationalist consciousness. The most important factor, he says, wu the degree of

religious homogeneity that prevailed in Indonesia. 11 At the time bis research

was conducted (the 19609), ninety percent of the population was Muslim. According ta scholars such as Bahtiar Effendy and Federspiel, this number may not represent the number who actually fulfilled an the requirements of Islamic law (syœi'ah lslamiyah) as put forth historically by Sunni Muslim theologians and scholars requirements which stipulate -in the Oneness of

God, confess that Muhammad is His Prophet, perform the fast of Ramadhan. undertake prayer every day and obseJVe the commands and

prohibitions listed in the Qur'an and Sunnah.-12 Nevertheless, this narrow definition of what constitutes a Muslim does not necessarily limit an individual's sense of heing Muslim and or deny positive support to impulses • of a nationa1ist charaeter. Kahin aIso mentions the integrative in1luence of the development of the

old lingua frarwa of the Indies, i.e. bazaar Malay, into a national language, transcending the bazaar and serving, along with Islam, to break down regional loyalties and forge an Indonesian identity. In addition, the

integration of Indonesian nationalism. is seen by Kahin as being, to some

extent, indebted to the existence of the Volksraad (People's Councü), a

representative council deve10ped under the Dutch and designed to give a

Federspiel's The Perscltuan Islam.: Islamic Re/oTm in Ttuentieth Century Indonesia (Ithaca: New York: ModemIndonesia Project, SoutheastASa Propun, 1970).

10 Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution. in lndonesia (Ithaca: ComeD UDiversit;y Pœ8&, 1966) 4l.

Il Kahin, NaticmGlism., 38•

12 Howard. M. Federspiel, JIuslimln1ellectuals tmd NaDotuJl Deuelopment in lndonesia • (New York: Nova ScieDœ Pubübenl, 1992),65. 10

voice ta local inhabitants, 'foreign Asiatics' , as weU as Dutm. The idea may

have been to provide a forum for the expression of local concems; instead, • however, it had the eifect of instilling in the population a sense of their identity, and a consciousness of unity which consolidated nationalist feeling. Finally, the growth and spread of Indonesian nationalist consciousness was

advanced by means of ideas disseminated by a newly created vemaeular press and radio, as weil as by a great inerease in the geographica1 mobility of people and ideas. These factors were a consequence of the twentieth­ century pattern of economic organization in Indonesia, and the

transportation facilities which it entailed.13 Kahin therefore concludes that there was a kind ofself-awareness which gradually developed into a sense of

unity among the Indies people. Nevertheless, this awareness didn' necessarily take the fonn of practica1 action. ln fact, modem Indonesian

nationalism only just began to emerge at the tum of ~e twentieth century,

due primarily to the lack of any organized attempts at unifying the people in • the national course. This is, however, in contrast to Benedict Anderson's conclusion that modem Indonesian nationalism did not emerge until the

nationalist youth congress of 1928,14 a conclusion that he justifies by pointing to the contents orthe SUmpah Pemuda (Oath ofYouth).

The deep-rooted feeling of inferiority imposed on Indonesians by the Dutch and the sense that they needed Outm protection in the form of a

system of govemment, economy, poütics. agriculture, and society, began slowly to be eroded, not only by Western political ideas. but also by political events occurring in neighboring countries and other parts of the world

13 Kabîn, Nationalism. 41 . • 1.. BenedictAndereon. IrruJgined Communities, 119. 11

where conditions were sîmüar. The efforts of FilipinoslS to end Spanish and

then American occupation, the success enjoyed by Kemal Ataturk16 against • Western military power, and the activities of the Congress Party in India all contributed to making Indonesians rea1ize that they were neither inferior to the Dutch nor unable to govem themselves without foreign help. Confidence

in their ability to govem themselves grew gradually as did a countl)-wide

sense of building their own identi~ without Dutch help.17 Scholars, however, point out that, practica1ly speaking. Indonesian

nationalism lay dormant until it was awakened by the establishment of the

Boedi Oetomo (Noble Endeavor) organization in 190811 (Penders includes

STOVIA (School fat Opleiding van lnlandsche Attsen, Training School for Native Doctors) as another essential element in the genesis of the modem lndonesian nationalist movement). The formation of Boedi Oetomo was the result of the efforts of Mas Wahidin Soediro, who spent three years (1906­ 1908) raising funds for the education of children of Indonesians employed in • the colonial govemment administration. The first fnlit of bis efforts was the graduation of Raden Soetomo and Raden Goenawan Mangoenkoesoeno, two

sons of aristocrats who attended the medical school at Batavia. Boed.i

1:5 See C.R. Sardesai, SoutheGst Asia: Pest and. Present (San Franri!!lCO: We8tView

Presst 1994). Althoush Sardesai doea DOt 10 into detail or deep aualysia, tbis book is very helpful in CODlpaJ'Ù21 aatjonatist movementa in Soutbeaat Asia. It covers almost an countries in that region.

16 For Kemal Ataturk'a approacll to ruliDI Turkey lIee William L. Cleveland, A History oflM Modem. JIidd1B ~ (San FraDd8co: We8tView Pras, 1994) 220-263, 165­ 166 and 143-264, aeorae S. Harris -Republie of1'urkeY' in nae Gouemment œad Politic of the JIidd1e East and North Afriœ, EcL David E. LoDI and Bemard Reich (San Franciaco: WestviewPraa. 1995) 8-40, ToDpS G°erard. Ataturit and t1u!!nie Nature 01 Modem Tur1œy (London: L~, 1939).

17 Kahin, NGtiontUism, SO.

IS See Chr. L. M. Pendera. 1n4otutJaitJ: Selecfed .Doaunents on ColoniGlism G7Id Nationalism. 1830-1942, (Queen-and: UDiver8ity or Queensland Pre_ 1977) 225-228; John ""'&Ieaan. Perhimpunœt Indoneaia and the1ndonesian NatioMIist Jlowment 19:23­ 1928 (Monash: MOD88h UDiRnity, 1975) 1-2, Kahin, NationGlistn, 64-65 ~ • Woodman, 17IB Repub6c, 152·165 and 314. 12

Oetomo's importance, however, becomes clearer when we consider the • influence it had on subsequent developments, th.ree of which stand out in particular: first, it played a role in raising native peoples' awareness of their

common interests, expressed in the organization's mission statement by the words ·our people-: second, Boedi Oetomo broke the ground for two new

organizations; and third, it introduced a new organizational StruCture.19

As regards the first of these influences, it must be noted that it was the students of STOVIA who, well aware of the privileFs they enjoyed over their

feUow Indonesiens in the areas of education, the economy, and politics,

originally founded Boedi Oetomo. Their intentions were clearly stated in the

first paragraph orthe letter published by Soewamo in 1908: they wanted to

improve the quality of life of the native population.20 It was a generational

movement, the founders belieYing that the oIder generatiGn was too

concemed with the possible Ioss of prestige in doing sueb work, and too • absorbed with matters or formality associated with the priyayi21 (gentry) class. Therefore. tbis group ofstudents avoided recruiting anyone who could

not sympathize with the ideals of the orpnizatioD. Thus, they first

approached students hm scbools such as the Native Agricultural and

Veterinary Science School at Buitenzorg, the Training Schools fOI' Native

OfficiaIs at Banduna, Magelang. and ProboIingo. and the Native Teacl1ers'

Training CoUeges. The founders of Boedi Oetomo believed that these

students recognized the problems caused by the continued presence of the Dutch colonialist government.

.lQ It bail an oIicial board, members, ... and pJannq. It ... bMed upaIl the app1ied CODIItitutioD ofthe pemmmt. ~ Cm. L. M. PeDden, Indonesia, 225-226•

21 Priay; iathe tlûnl ofGeert&'a eatepriea ofMue1im 1DdoDeailD& The otber twQ are the abanganand santri. See CJiI'ord Geerta, 1beReligion ofJGœ (DIinAs· The Pree Press • ofGlencoe, 1960), pp. 121-130. 13

It was inevitable that Boedi Oetomo should have first tried to raise the

awareness of the -native Javanese- towards their cultural unity. Z2 It sought • ways of reconciling itself with the needs of the modem world. Though its membership and leadership wu mainly aristocratie and its early support

mainly from medica1 school students, it attracted members from the ranks

of the civil service as weB as from the priayi. Nevertheless, it was saon

outstripped in membership and leadership by more politically motivated organizations which included other ethnie groups.:z3 an initiative which was

later on developed by Sarekat Islam and the Indische Partij (see below) in a broader sense. Nonetheless, Boedi Oetomo is considered to have beell the

fU"St stone laid in the foundation ofthe Indonesian nationalist movement. For Kahin however, the emphasis of Indonesian nationalism prior to

1912t thougb. often political in overtone, was essentially cultural rather than

politiœl.24 In addition to the above movement, Kahin cites the example of the school established by Raden Ajeng Kartini (1879·1904), the daughter of • a Javanese regent in Jepara. Kartini's activities represented the first manifestation of the important role which women came to play in the

lndonesian nationalist movement.~S The first clearly Muslim effort wu to establish the Sarekat Islam. It was at first named Sarekat Dapng Islam (lslamic Trade Association), a group established by H. Samanhudi in 1911 in Solo. The name wu later on

changed to Sarekat Islam for politica1 reasDns. Qrisina1ly, Sarekat Islam was

22 ln a sense, tbis fita the tbird eateFry in Hounmi'. eateFrizatioD of aaticmeJism, i.e., that aU who speak the IllIDe 1aDcuaIe COD8titute a SÏJ1Ile Dation and lIhouJd form a single independent political unit. See Hounmi. Arabie Daought in the Libetal Age, 341­ 343.

23 J.D. Lege, SukamD: A PolitiœJ Biography(London: ADen LaDe The Pt:DIuin PIe., 1972),44-45.

24 Compare tG Benedict Ander8on. 1mtJgin.ed C'ommunmes. • ~ See Kahin, Na1ionalism.64 and Ricldefa, A HisfDry. 157. 14

established for two purposes: religious and economic. Many Muslim scholars realized that the Christian missionaries, with support from the

• having in Dutch Indies govemment, were considerable success propagating

their faith. The strong foundations of the societies behind these Christian

missions made Muslims realize that they had to he better organized if they

wanted to develop themselves and the local Muslim community. In addition,

Muslim traders felt that Chinese merchants were gaining an advantage

throl~.oh their own connections. This feeling encouraged them to form an

association that would allow them to compete with their commercial rivaIs. Christine Dobbin points out that one of the main problems of local Muslim

entrepreneurs was lack of credit, which was met by cooperatives that offered

interest-free loans to indigenous merchants in need ofcredit.26 At the f1I'St congress ofthe SI in January 1923, Tjokroaminoto unveiled a

clearly defined program designed to ensure that the association would not become a politica1 party. He declared that the goals of Serekat Islamt s • programs were: (a) to promote commerce among Indonesians; (b) to encourage mutual support among members who encountered economic difficulties; (e) to promote the intellectual development and material interests of Indonesians; and (d) to oppose the incorrect interpretation of

religious dogma and promote a more religious liCe among Muslim

Indonesians.27 These goals seem to bave met with a positive response from Muslims because oftheir focus on the eurrent problems orthe society.

There are a number of scholars, among them Kahin and Rick1efs t who agree that the period after 1912 saw a great expansion in the number of

26 For more uœrmation 011 the business competition in batik between ChiDe. and local entrepœneun, Bee Chris✠Dobbin, -AcœuntiD& for the Faure of the Mull1im Javanese Business C1aIIa: Exemples hm PoDGroIo and '1'u1uD&a8uIJ8 (c.1880-1940): Archipel 48 (1994),87-101. • zr Kahin. Nati~68. 15

modem organizations and movements founded by educated people and members of the elite. Most of these groups boasted strong ethnie identities. • Some of the organizations that feU into this category were Pasundan (founded 1914), a sort of Boedi Oetomo for Sundanese; Sarekat Sumatra, or Sumatranen Bond (founded 1918), a student group; Jong Minahasa (Young

Minahasa), founded in the same year as Sumatranen Bond; Sarekat Ambonese, founded two years later in 1920; Timorsch Verbond (Timorese

Alliance, founded 1921); Kaum Betawi (People of Batavia), founded in 1923 and claiming to represent the 'original' Indonesian citizens of Batavia; and Pakempalan Politik Katolik Jawi (Politica1 Associaiton ofJavanese Catholics, founded 1925).28 Religious nationalist organizations and movements were, to some extent, different from the ones we encountered earlier. Generally speaking, religious organizations and movements in the Indonesian context expected Islam to play a major role in unifying members and in giving them the sense • of a common purpose, one of the characteristies of nationalist sentiment. It can be argued, on this basis, that feelings of unity can be traced back as far

as the coming of Islam to the archipelago. In addition to the general circumstances underlying the latent politica1-nationalism of the masses,

there were other important factors involved as well.29 The greatest of these,

28 Ricklefs, A History, 166-168.

29 Kahin, Nationalism., 66. • 16

for Many scholars, such as Kahin, Rick1efs,30 Hany J. Benda31 and Deliar • Noer,32 was the impact ofmodemist Islamic thought.33 One year after the foundation of Sarekat Islam, the Muhammadiyah, the second largest Islamic organization in present-day Indonesia, was

established by K.H. Ahmad Dahlan. After having previously been involved in Boedi Oetomo and Sarikat Islam, Ahmad Dahlan was inspired ta establish an association which could accomplish what the two main existing organizations were not doing: propagating Islam and working for the improvement of education· two goals which were ofgreat importance to him personally.34 Ultimately he transformed these persona! goals wider into

educational effort and then into a large social we1fare association, whose influence is still felt at the end orthe twentieth centuIY. Following this period, nationalist ideas began ta flourish on the basis of

different interests or objectives. It would he impoSSlble to mention every one

of these, and so only a general account of them will be offered here, dividing • them according to the decades in which they emerged, i.e. the 1910s, the 19209, and the 1930.. 19408. Ideology was, for instance, served by a political

30 Rickl~ A. History, 168.169.

31 Harry J. Benda. The Cre.scen.t and the Rising Sun: 1ndJJnBsian. IsltJm under the Japanese Occupation (The Hague and Banduna: W. van Hoeve, 1958).

32 Deliar Nuer, The Rlse and Developmen.t of the MoeüJmist AIuslim. Movement in Indonesia (Michigan: University Microfilma, 1963).

33 See the motivation behind the establiabment ofMubammadiyah above. 3~ Mitsuo Nakamura, The Cresœnt Arises Ouer the Banyan Tree: A Study of the .Muhammadiyah Movement in Cl Cent7Gl JtJVtIIleSte Town (Yogyakarta: Gajah Mada University PmI&. 1983), 47. For more iDformatjon on Muhammadiyah. Bee 'Abdul Mu'ti 'Ali -rbe Mubemmadiyah Movement: A Bi'b1iotrplricallntroduetïon,· (MA t.besis, McGm Universit;y~ 1957). In thia \VOtk Mu~ 'Ali pravides a meaninaful introduction to a study orthe complete bistory ortbe Mnbemmadiyah movement hm 1912 to 1956. See aJao ~ Muhœnmadiyah: The Political Behavior 01a Muslim Modemist Organization Under Dutch ColoniGlism (Y0I)'llkarta: Gajah Mada Univenity PmIs. 1989). In this work A1fian prioritizes the politica1 aspect of tbis orpnization durîI2I the &nt three decadea. See a1so Mubammaety Idris, lIJüyai Haji Ahmad Dab1an: Hia üfe and Tho\1lhts.· (MA thesis, • McGill University, 1975). 11

party advocating racial equality, socioeconomic justice, and ultimately, • independence. This was the National Inclische Party (Nationallndies Party), founded in December oC 1912 through an Eurasian-Indonesian cooperative

effort. In the years that followed, another ideology emerged when a branch of

Sarekat Islam in Semarang led by Semaoen and Darsono launched the

Communist Part of the Indies (Perseritaktan Komunis di India) or PKI, on

May 23, 1920.35 Even though the PKI, on account oC its official atheism, faced considerable opposition from Islamic forces, both before and after

independence, it cannot be denied that the PKI contributed to the

establishment of nationalism.36 During the colonial and Sukarno eras, the PK! founded a number of branches across the country, particularly in the form of labor parties and unions,37 with the sim oC achieving national

independence and Indonesian unity.

Three years later, there appeared Persatuan Islam (Islamic Union),38 founded by a group of Muslims interested in religious study and • propagation. The very first leaders and members of this group came from Sumatra, Palembang and Java, with two leading figures being Hadji

Zamzam and Hadji Muhammad Junus. Persatuan Islam WU formally

estab1ished on September 12, 1923 as a forum for Islamic activists 10

discuss Islamic teachings. It wu al90 often referred to as Kaum Muda

3SKahïn, Nationallsm., 74, Bernard KM. VleJdœ, Nusantœa, A Histmy of the East lndian Archipelago (l'he Hague and Bandu:ng W. van Hoeve, 1969), 353 and 356 and Ricklefs, A Hisfory, 173-178.

36 See Carlton J.H. Hayes, Natiotu2lism: A ReIigitm. (New York: The MannDJan Company, 1960) 4-5 and James Andenon -Natioualist IdeolOlY and Tenitory- in ReJ. Johnston, David B. KDiBht and Eleonore "ohan, NationDJism, SelfDetennitu:l.tio and Political Geography(NewYork: Croom He1m, 1988) 18-37.

37 See Kahin, Nafiont.llistn, 86 and Ricklefs, A History, 174-175.

38 See Howard M. Fedenpiel. ThB Persczfuan Islam.: Islamic Relorm in 7Wm1ieth Century Indone:sia (lthata: New York: Modem IDdoaesia Projed. Soutbeaat Asia Program, 1970). See ahIo, DeJiar Noer, The Rise and Deuelopment, 132-169. See al80 • Ricklefs, A Histmy, 177,182 and 190.. 18

(Young Group). as opposed to Kaum Tua (Old Group) which promoted the • more traditional practices of Islam.39 Religious movements having on important role in the development of

Indonesian nationalism also grew rapidly in Sumatra. especiaDy in West

Sumatra. In 1906 the Malay-language paper al-Imam began to he published

in Sïngapore. which, according to Ricldefs, was the first really serious

presentation of the modemist analysis of social, religious and economic

issues...a Among those involved in al-Imam was the Minangkabau scholar

Skaikh Tahir hin Jalaluddin (Muhammad Tahir bin Jalaluddin al..Azhar, 1869-1957). Following in bis steps, were Shaikh Muhammad Djamil

Djambek (1860-1947) and Haji Rasul (Haji Abdul Karim Amnillah. 1879­ 1945). These three scholars had been students of Ahmad Khabb (c.1855­ 1916) in Mecca for many years. When they retumed to Indonesia, they built a number of modem schools such as the Adabiyah School in Padang and the Thawalib School in Padangpanjang. These schools had a strong • influence on the deve10pment ofsociety there - an in1luence that is felt there even today. The establishment ofthe NU. which is at the core ofthis discussion, will he descnbed more fu1ly in the next section ofthis chapter.

EstabUsIaba. At. 8,..d... eolleetlft Id••ütJ

On July 4 th, 1927. Sukarno. along with the members of bis Bandung Study Club, took the initiative of founding the Perserikatan Nasional Indonesia (lndonesian Nationalist Association), with himself as chairman.

39 For further detaila eee Federspiel, The Persa1uœt Islam. In this work, Federspiel e1aborates on almost ttvery event and issue that bu ariaen sinœ the foundq of this association. • .tO Ricldefs, A History, 169... 170). 19

Their secular nationalist approach, as Sukarno expressed in bis articles published the previous year, tended to subordinate ideologies such as Islam

• and Marxism ta that nationalism.41 Sukamo's politica1 acumen, supported by a modem education and a strong nationalist sentiment, provided the impetus which eventually allowed

him ta lead the countJy ta independence in 1945. At that time, however,

Sukarno wanted to capita1ize on the support tbat could he offered by such

groups as the Partai Serekat Islam, Boedi Oetomo, the Surabaya Study Club

and the main regional and Christian organjzations. By the end of 1927, he

was able ta unite most existing nationalist organizations in a body lmown as

PPPKI (Permufakatan Perhimpunan-perhimpunan Politik Kebangsaan Indonesia, Agreement of Indonesian People's Political Associations).

Nevertheless, while Indonesians welcomed this development, the Dutch

govemment regarded it as a threat to tbeir authority in the archipelago• Sukarno. along with Many other Indonesian politicians, was put in jail,42 an • action which prompted a popular acceptance of nationalism, rather than the reverse.

In the same deœde, there emerged new litenuy works employÎDg new terms and uSÎDg Roman script and modem terminology; the Indonesian

"1 The doctziDea refJectecl in the De priDdpIea of PaDc-la did DOt and do IlOt maJœ Indcmesia liIœ modem-day Turlœy. wbere reJiIioua affaira are Jœpt 8eparate &am thaee of the state; aM is the country an J-.mic 8tate wbeJe ail deciIioDa baYe ID be buecl upan Islamic teacbinp. 'Jbe c:ombination or both tendrnciN maJœa Inckmrtia UDique, in that it C8DD0t he ~_ a puœ1y eecular 8tate. aa ia foUDd iD most Western countries; DDr cmit be caUed 811 IIÙIIÛC âte. Theee ideaa wae promoted. d1uiIJI the 19408 by K.H. Wahid HujûD, tbe CbiefofPBNU, anclllUVive to tbia clay. At the tilDe of the WI'it:ing of thia theâa. Abdw:rabmaI1 Wabid wu active1y eoDlpG8ÙJI a number of articles pnamotin& the same idea; 8ee for esample AhdurrabmaD Wabid, "l'enerah Suara Rakyat.- Medi4 fndoru!JsitJ" 22 October 1998 aad ?Jœ, Syari'ah dan Ntr JtIUJG Pas, 29 October 1998. 4~ There have beeD maay war.IaI deaHrw wJth tbia pbranmeDou, eee for eumple Jan Pluvier, South-&Jst Asia fram ColtmitJism 10 I~ (Kuala Lumpur: OJâord • University Press. 1974), RjcJrJeIl, A HistDry and KaIûD, 1iGtionGlism. 20

language (Babasa Indonesia) grew out of the Malay language, which was

heavily literary, written in Arabie script and tied to a nuaI lifestyle. It was • chosen over Javanese because Malay's roots as a trade language were spread throughout the arclùpelago. The liDguistic vehicle of national unity

was thereby hom.43 The use of Indonesian was to grow rapidly though the media of newspapers, weekly and monthly magazines and other

publications, including navels and poetry. One of the most famous

publishers at the time - and still exists today - wu Balai Pustaka (Office for literature).44 Balai Pustaka pedormed three main functions: the publication of oider classical works and popular staries in regional languages, the translation of Western literature into Indonesian and the publication of the new lndonesian literature. This office at one and the same tilDe helped to keep regional cultures alive even whüe exposing Indonesia to more universal literary values, a process that contributed to the creation of an all·

Indonesian culture.45 • Three very important ingredients of nationalism were established by Indonesian youth in October 1928 at a congress held in Batavia (now Jakarta). In its Youth Pledge (Sumpah Pemuda), the Congress adopted three ideals: one fatherland, Indonesia; one nation, Indonesia; and one language,

Bahasa Indonesia, the language of unity. This event, lmown as the Hari

Sumpah Pemuda (the Youth Pledge Day), bas ever since been

commemorated in l'eCOllÙtion of the importance of the event ta the growing

..3 Ricldefs, A History, 185-6 and HOUI'8Di, Anzbic. 342. Hounmi claima tbat language ia al the root ofthe stro._1dDd ofDatioDaHsm.

44 It was (Of6.ce Cor LiteratlUe; in Dutch: Comm;-;. - der 1917 ICaDtoor -voor de Volkslecturr, Committee/Oflice for PopuJar LiteratuJe). wbich wu publi8hed iD 1908. • 45 Ricldefs, A History, 185-186. 21

consciousness of Indonesian unity.~ In making this statement, young

Indonesian intellectuals made it clear that they recognized themselves as • Indonesians first, and only secondly as Batak, Minangkabau, Buginese,

Javanese, Muslim, Christian and 50 on.47

The general trend in the evolution of political organizations continued

with the establishment of Parindra (Partai Indonesia Raja. Greater Indonesia

Party). This party was formed in 1935 through a federation of study clubs,

such as Persatuan Bangsa Indonesia, Boedi Oetomo and other sma11er Javanese and non-Javanese nationalist organizations. Among the leaders of

this party were Dr. Raden Soetomo, Mohammad Hoesni Thamrin and Mr.

Susanto Tirtoprodjo.48 One of the final developments in the building of Indonesian nationalism prior to the end of the Dutch occupation was the

formation of Gapi (Gaboengan Politiek Indonesia, Federation of Indonesian

Politica1 Parties) in 1939. This was principally accomplished through the

efforts of Mohammad Hoesni Thamrin of Parinda. Among the parties • involved were Gerindo, Parindra, Pasoendan, Persatoean Minahasa, Partai Katolik lndonesia. Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia, Partai Islam Indonesia,

46 A1J far as the deveJopment of IDdooesian nation.Ji.. ia concemecl, it abou1d be noted that eome ethDic groups were aot involved in tbat important event; groupa froID Irian Jaya (West Irian) 8Ild East Timor, wheœ a cli&reDt eeue of nadonaJiMl' is impliecL TmeateDed by the CommuNat ideo101)' wbich waa 8ideepread in Eut Timor, the US supported Indcmem. in iu efforst al efh1i"l ~IndonetlÎ8ll integration in 1976. Smce fhen, Eut Timor bas been UDder lDdonesi" administration. With the coUapse of the USSR in 1989, and tbat of Commuai..~ iD the wurld, the threat bas dimjni""ed aDd the œlUlOD8 for 8U.ppottÎDI IndoDellia became le8a significant. Due to the IndDDeejpn Army's poor tlNtment of the people in the 27tb province oC Indoaesia. lDdoœsia often raœ. IlUIDaOUS diIicultie8 iD. poIidcal and economic negotiationa with otber countries. DuriDI the writiDg oftbia tbesia, the world wu surptised to bear the InctemellÎ8Jl pvenuDeDt dedare the po.ibility of East Timor regaining its independenœ. Wbetber or DOt it will become reality cIepeDds on the outcome of the curreDt lItrU8e between pro-lDdouesian iDtegration groupa and pro­ independence groupa iD the reaion.

<47 Ricklefs. A HistDry, 186• • ..8 Kahin. NatiOtU2lism. 95 and Ricldefa, A HistDry, 191• 22

and Partai Arab Indonesia. Gapi's goals were directed towards the shaping of • lndonesian nationalism in 1945, even though the coming of the Japanese in 1942 interrupted this process temporarily. The principal aima of Gapi were: (1) the right of self-determination for Indonesia; (2) national unity founded upon ·political, economic and social democraCY-; (3) a democraticaUy e1ected Indonesian parliament responsible to the people of Indonesia; and (4) solidarity between Indonesian political groups and the Netherlands in order

to maintain a strong anti-Fascist front.49

In 1939, at the Indonesian People's Congress sponsored by Oapi and

attended by ninety difTerent nationalist, political, religious, social and economic organizations, the Indonesian language (Babasa Indonesia) wu

officially adopted as the national language, the red e.nd white flag as the

national tlag, and the song Indonesia Raya (Oreater Indonesia) as the national anthem. The commitment of Indonesians ta nationalism made tirst in 1928 through the adoption of the Youth Pledge was rea1Iirmed. Although • the three-year-long Japanese occupation wu to have an impact on attitudes towards the nation, Indonesian nationalism bad certain1y been developing steadily sinee 1908 when Boedi Oetomo wu founded. Indonesian nationalism was full flower in the 19308 and early 19409, when aU politica1

factions that existed at the tilDe and other social organizations were amalgamated under umbrella groups. And, while the role of individuals

cannot be di~edas a factor in shaping Indonesian nationalism, tbat of

social, ethnie, and religious organj 7ations and movements seems to have had the strongest impact. A brief summary oC nationalist progress during the Japanese occupation is presented in the next chapter.

• "9 Kahin, NationGlism, 97. . 23

B. The RU and X.ÜoaaUsm prlor to tlae 1980s • The intention in this section is certainly not to give a complete survey of the histoty of NU from its establishment in 1926 to the early 1980s.

Nonetheless. in order to better understand what the NU accomplished in

1984 by returning to its 1926 khittah (standard),50 one bas to have a general sense of what the NU stood for. the issues surrounding its establishment, who was involved. and how the group evolved over the course of the period in question.

In bis study of Persatuan Islam. Howard Federspiel divides Indonesian nationalism into three main streams of politica1 thought: the Muslims who

followed Tjokroaminoto and the Sarekat Islam; the Secularists led by

Soekarno; and the Communists led by Semaun, Tan Malaka and Alimïn.51

Although the NU was not initially founded as a politica1 party. and had no apparent politica1 alliance at that time. its later development is

unquestionably relevant to the current study. Ifthe NU could be categorized • as merely a Muslim organization, it would be enough to place it in the tirst stream. i.e.• the Muslim nationalists. If it were considered a traditionalist52 group, as opposed to a modemist one, Persatuan Islam might be put in this

category, and then the first stream JDÏlht need two further divisions: Muslim

modemists and Muslim traditionalists. Actually, in order tg evaluate the

NU's contribution to the Indonesian nationalist movement prior to 1984, we must look at the three phases of its existence since its establishment. The tirst of these represents its initial period as a mainly rural-based socio-

50 The literal meaIÙDI ofreturDinl ta the 1926 kbittath meus a retum ID the 8pirit ofthe foundation of the NabeUautl UJama in 1926. See intlOduction above and chapter three below for more detaiL • 51 Federspiel, The Ptnatuan, 84. 24

religious organization,53 a period which lasted from its founding in 1926 • until the onset of the Japanese occupation. The second extends from the coming of the Japanese in 1942 until the collapse of the Old Order in 1967.

The third stage comprises the New Order period under Soeharto (1968­

19805). This 1a9t phase will be discussed in the next chapter.

The Fint Phase: Establisbing a Fint Cbaracteristic

With the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, the number of pilgrims

travelling from Indonesia to the Hijaz increased dramatically. Islamic

literature and thought gained through study in Mecca and other areas of the

Middle East was brought to Indonesia by these pilgrims, encouraging younger Indonesian intellectuals to malee the same joumey to the MusHm

holy places. Among those in this early generation to go were Syekh Nawawi

Al-Bantani from Banten in west Java, Syekh Mahfudz Al-Tarmisf from • Pacitan in east Java, and Syekh Ahmad Chatib Sambas from Kalimantan. AU these of figures became inDuential in their respective regions and some had reputation in the broader Islamic world.

Those among the second generation ta go were K.H. Hasjim Asj'ari,54 K.H. Abdul Wahab Hasbullahss and K.H. Bisjri Sjamsuri, ail or whom

~ See, Mitsuo Na kamllra, The Cresoent Arises Overthe Banyan Tree: A SI.udy 01tM Muhammadiyah MorJement in a Central Jewc:zttese TOtUn (YQ&Yakarta: Gajah Mada University Press, 1983).

53 See BartoIl, NU, 199t. But BnÙD,.,.em'. study of the8e periode reprd theae events as significant. Thu~ political iasuee are reprded as more importaDt tbaD other types. Bnlinenm, NUpassim.. ADdrée FeiD8nl appr08dlea it by way ofa IDOle apeci&c aspect. She re1aœa it fuDy tG ABRI (Armed Forœs of the Republic of~.. Se! Andrée FeD.ard, Islam et ~ Dans L'indtmesie Contemparaime (L'HarmattaD, 1995) and Panitia Deklaraai, Men.yœnbut Dek1arasi Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (Jakarta: Panitia DeJdaraà PJœ, 1998).

54 For bis biopaphy Bee Solibin Salam, Kiyai Hqji H~ Asj'ari, lJlœna BesGr Indonesia (Djakarta: Djaya Mumi, 1963)•

55 Grea Fealy devotea a apecial.ection to Hea1MdJah as a cofouDder of the NU and • an influential traditionaJjat ulama in tbia ceIlnuy. See Sarton, NU, 16. 25

became involved in the discussion of Islamic reform promoted by

Jamaluddfn al-Afghâni (1839-97).56 bis follower Muhammad Abduh (1849­ • 1905),57 and Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, founder of the Wahhabi

movement.58 Many scholars, however, have drawn different conclusions in

analyzing the response of Hasjim Asj'ari and bis companions ta these three reformist thinkers, and have consequently misunderstood how the term traditionalist applies to the NU in particular. Sînce the early 19805,

however, other scholars, among them. Mitsuo Nakamura,59 Greg Sarton.

Mark Woodward.60 Choinll Anam.61 and Martin Van Bruinessen.62 have

56 Jamil al-Dïn al-Afgbinï was a Muslim achalar who promoted the idea of Pan­ Islarn;sm, i.e., the universaJitJ oC Islam, in the 1ate 19th century. Hourani, Arabie, 103­ 129. See aIso HAR. Gibb, Modem 1Tends in Islam (ChiC8lO: The University ofCbicaso Press, 1946); and Fazlur Rahman, Islam (Chicago and !.Dndon, 1979) in the sections -rhe Philosophical Movement" and -Modem Development".

57 For more ideas on bis thought and contribution, see a1so Mu"ammad Rasbid RiQa: Ttirikh al-Ushttidh al-lnuim al-Shaykh.MuhtuntnGd rAbduh (Cairo: 1931), 31 and Muhammad Abduh. Al-Islam wa al..Nasranïyya (Cairo: 1367 (1947-8D. • 58 For moIe OD the Wabbabj movement, Bee Ira M. Lapidus. A HistoTy oflslamic Societies (New York: Cambridp Universi1;y Press, 1988), 258, 673-675. See alao Hourani, Arabie. 37-38; Marsbal G.S. Hodpon, The Venrure ofIslam. voL 3 (Cbicap: The University ofChiC8F Pœ., 1974), 160-161, 229-230; HAR. Gibb, Modem Trends in Islam (Chica&o: The UDiversity of Chicap PlesI. 1946), 26-32; Jpaz Goldziher, Introduction to Islamic 1'hItology and Law (Tnm8lated by Andras and Ruth Hamon. Prinoeton: Princeton UDiversity Press, 1981), 241-245.

59 see Mitsuo Nakamura, -rhe Radical Tradition-IiND, in Sarton. Nahd1atul Ult:una.

60 Mark R Woodword bas contnbuted a Dumber of worD draH". with Islam in Indonesia. In the introduction 10 one of bis 1atest worka, a compilalion of 8leVeraJ articles writteD by 1DdaDesiaDiata, he pula fonvard a new paradipl or Modem llIIamic Thought in Indonesia. See Mark R. Woodward, TtTWtII'd a New Parodigm: Rtœ1lt ~/OJI'Mnts in IndolleJ1an Isll11tlic 1'IJofIght (Arlzaaa: ArizoDa SIlle UDhasiIy Press. 1996), ln the fasbjon of many other 9Chalara who study lalam in YOfY8karta. bis Islam in Java roeu..on the specifie place where the study ..eonductecl (Bee al80 Nakamura, 1983). See Mark R. Woodward, Islam. in Java: Nomu:ztive Piety and Mysticiam in the Sultanate 01 Yogyakt.uta (Arizona, Tuc..n: The UDiversiW ofArimDa PlesI. 1989); and Mîtsuo Nakamura. nae CrescentRises ouet' the Banyan Tree (Yokyakarta: Gajabmada UDiversit;y Press, 1983).

61 ChoinûADam. Penumbuhan dtm l'erIœtnbtmgan. NUSala: Jatayu. 1985).

62 In bis work, BnùDeMeD lista a n\Ullber of ac:holara with academic biuea that caused NU to be ~ by later scholanL AmcmI the *'bo1... are Pluvier (1953), Kahin (1952), Benda and Wertbeim (1958, 1959) and Geertz (1960, 1968). Geertz lIeeJIUI • ta have beeD responllible 10r creatÎIJ8 the biued and neptive ima&e ofthe NU and the 26

approached the NU from a di1ferent perspective and have come to new conclusion, taking into account the original idea behind Hasjim Asj'ari's

• decision to form the NU upon bis retum!rom Mecca in the early 19209.63 Hasjim Asjcari and bis eoUeagues were not in faet opposed to the reform

of Islam; what they basically disagreed with, in spite of their düf'erent

interpretations, wu the idea of breaking away from the four schools of fiqh

which the modemists felt were too rigidly based on the Qur'aÏ1 and the

traditions of the Prophet.64 Looking at the basic doctrine of the NU promulgated at the time of its establishment, it appears that there were two

main reasons why Hasjim Asj'ari and bis colleagues decided to found the

organization.65 First, they were not convinced that the average Indonesian Muslim was able to study the Qur'an and the traditions of the Prophet directly without the benefit of the accumulated knowledge of previous

generations of scholars, such as was offered by representatives of the four

schools of law. Indonesian MUSÜD1S therefore should not he denied the • benefit ofthis body ofleaming in trying to anive at their own understanding

pesant:ren wben he defined them as anti-modemist. But 1 thiDk this is more a result of the fact that Geert& adopted the subjective impressions of those who wae anti­ tractitiona1ist. This latter eue needa special treatment and study. FollowiDI tbia Hat, Bruinessen provides a number of QoJara wbo have contributed. va1uable reeeareh on this association of ulama --e.l., Benedict Andenon (1972 and 1977), Ken Ward (1974), Sidney Jones (1985), Deliar Noer (1973), Choinù ADam (1985), Zubri (1987) and. Haidar Bagir (1991) Van. BmÎJw880D, NU Tradisi, Relasi-Relt:asi Kuasa, Penœrian Wacana Sant (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 1994).

63 See alao ChoiNl ADam, Pettumbuhœt dtm Per1œmbGngœl NaIttlNltul L'lama (Sala: Jatayu, 1985); A. Gaffar Karim, Metom.orposi.s NU dGn Politisasi Islam. di Indonaia (Yugyakarta: Pustaka Pe18jar, 1995); and Kac1mI Marijan. Quo Vadis NU seteltùl Jœmbalj 1œ khitfoh 1926 (Jakarta: Penerbit Erie,.,.. 1992). Choirul ADam is the Chief of the PBK (a new potitical party f'ounded by NU leaders in July 1998) in East Java province.

6'4 On the NU'. viewa CODeearina ijtibad and taqlid, Bee K.H.Mustofa Bisri. RisGlah Idjtihad Taqlid (Kudua: Menara KuduSt 1379 AeH.) and K.H. MA. Sahal MabAldh, Nuansa Ffqh Sosia1 (Y0If8karta: LkiS, 1994.

65 On the ri8e and early deNeJopment of NU froID varioua ...besidea Daticma1iat sentiment, Re Farichjn CbJ1maim A. -rhe Jammm Nabdlatul clJlam.« The Ri8e and • Early Development (1926-1945), MA tbesia, Mc:Gül Universi~. 1976). 27

of the Qur'an and the traditions of the Prophet.66 Second, as Muslim • scholars, they felt that they were responSlble for preventing other lay Muslims in Indonesia !rom going too far in implementing reformist ideas.

lt is therefore understandable that Bruinessen should argue that the establishment of the NU was due ta intemational factors rather than local ones, i.e., the downfall of the Ottoman caliphate and Muslim coneem with replacing that institution as a representation of the world Muslim community.67 This is not, however, to deny the faet that local issues played

a role in the emergence of the NU. One such factor was the desire of Indonesians to align themselves with a group that avoided the aggressiveness and militancy shown by so-ca11ed reformist groups, such as the Serekat Islam and Muhammadiyah. Another was the controversy that led to the founding of the Komite Hijaz,68 which was again a response to the

activities of reformists in the country. In response to these problems and • others - the problems of ummat or nation, in the sense that Benedict Anderson treats the question in bis seminal work69 Wahab Khasbullah, Hasjim Asj'ari and other prominent traditionalist ulama established the NU

on JanuQIY 31, 1926.70

66 See Statuten ofNUp8I'8Il"Bph 3.

68 The Komite Hijaz or Hijal Committee wu a committee tbat wu foWldecl in Surabaya by the Nahd1atu1 Wathan's leaders for enabUna tbem to send their deleptee ta King Ibn Sa'ud to deal \Vith the pro1*m of the AIW al~ wa Gl.JG1IUI."'7Gh and Wahhabi movement in tbat country. They ctid 80 bec:ause the 8O-ea11ecl refotmist Jeadera ignored the flJDstenœ of the ronner. For IDOle iD»rmation on Hij. Committee, tIee Bnlinessen, NU. For modemist and traditiOD8Jiat approachea, Re Deliar Nuer, 'DIe Rise and Deve10pment ofthl! Modemist Muslim Movements in Indonesia (Michwm· Universi1y NUcrofihns, 1963),326~.

• 69 See BenedictAndenon. ImtJgined Communities (New York: Verao, 1991).

1Q See MaJœoem Macbfoeda, Kebangk:itGn Ulcuna dœl Bt1ngkitnya Ulama (Surabaya: Kesatu8l1 Ummat, 1982) 33-34. 28

The NU undertook considerable activity in at least four areas prior ta

independence:71 The first of these was the foundation, during the first two • years of its existence, of 27 branches throughout East Java. This number doubled over the course of the following eleven years.. Branches were soon ta

be round not only in Java, but also on the three other large islands:

Sumatra, Kalimantan (Borneo), and Sulawesi (Celebes).72 The second accomplishment was spreading the view - retlected in the statement made

by Hasjim Asj'ari in Banjarmasin (1936) - that it was better for people to concem themselves with important problems, such as the struggle with the Dutch, than with polemics between the NU, the Muhammadiyah and Partai

Serikat Islam.73 The third was the agreement by NU leaders ta become involved in the MIAI (Al-MadjUs al·Islami al-A'la lndonesia), an association which allowed Islamic organizations to debate amang themselves issues of

common interest.74 And fourth, there was the decision by NU leaders to

round pesantrens which would Iater on provide the strongest foundations of • the traditionalist camp. The pesantren is a traditional system of Islamic education found mostly in Java and Madura in its early development; it later spread to other islands,

such as Sumatra and Kalimantan (Bomeo). On the one band, due ta the traditionalist image of the system and ta certain weaknesses, sueb as

71 Compare ta BNjnes&On, NU badisi, Re1Gsi-ReIGsi KuGSG, Pencari01l Wacana Bœu (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pebiar, 1994).

72 M. Ali Hadar, -Nabdatll1 'tnama dan Islam di Indcmeaia- pendrJeatan Jikih da1am poli~ (PILD. disaertation, IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah, Ciputat, 1991), 140-141 and H. Aboebakar Aceb, &djœah Hidup K.H.A. Wahid Hasfim. dan Karangan Tersiar (Jakarta: Pani~aBuku Perinptan, 1957),477.

73 See, among otbera Barton, NU, and BruitJessen, NU, and Bee al80 NUJ'Cbolia Majid, -NU dan PerJœmbanpn Pemikiran Islam Indonesia,· Aula,(Sepœmber 1994), 62... 77.

71 Theœ isa receat MA thesis (1998) writt.m br Mizan Sy'aroDi on the MIAI tbat wu • Dot avai1ab1e to me al the time ofwritiJJl. 29

limited access to modem literature, and on the other, ta limited knowledge

of the pesantren itself.75 Most studies of the institution have in faet ignored • the huge contribution they made to the development of ummat, both before and after independence. On the other band, there are studies that have

recognized this faet.76

As a sub·cultural system, the pesantren in its later development contributed to a number of areas of nationallife. The majority of students in

the IAINs (Institute Apma Islam Negeri, or State Institute of Islamic

Studies), for instance, have a pesantren background. In today's Muslim

intelleetual circles, Many are likewisc graduates of a pesantren. A number of studies of such circles have uncovered a new phenomenon: since the late

1970s, there have begun ta appear ·neo-modemisr- scholars who make use of their traditionalist background and modem Western knowledge in order

ta develop the Indonesian ummat.77

• Tbe "COD. '11_: Cooperatloa iD 8uDdlDi • Sovenlp Ratio. The second phase of the NU's development corresponds to the period leading up to the declaration of independence in 1945 and the subsequent administration under Soekarno as the first president of Indonesia. To understand the NU's raie in this phase, it is more helpful ta divide it into two periods: the period of Japanese occupation up to 1945, during wbich time

75 As quoted by Zamakbsyari Dhofier, A.H. Johns admita tbat many people have a very 1imited knowledae of pesontren. Bee bia work, Ali.. John, -I.tam iD Southeut AsisJ.,- in Indonesia, C.IUP., 19, 408Dd Zamalcbsyari Dboœr, 1'nJt:Iisi PesœttIen: Studi tentang Pandangan Hidup Ki4i (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1985), 16.

16 Bee footnote 75.

77 Sec for exampIe Mark R. Woodward, ed. TowtJrd Q NrI PIII'IMligrre. Grec BIrtoa -n.e lqa1 ofNeo-Modemign GD. 1ndgnesj. IsIamic ~" iaDIvid Boan::bicr ad JobD Lege, Datot:rat:y in /ndoneJia 19506 llItd 1990s. (C8yIon, VICtOria: Caller œSoudIeIst AsiID Studies. Moaasb UaMnity, • 1994) and Cires Barun "Neo-ModaDism: A VdaI Symbesis," SlIItia blGllliIaJ 2, DO 3 (1995), 50. 30

the NU joined Masjumi:78 and the period during which it became an

independent political party under Soekarno. In terms of the Indonesian

• to nationalist movement, this latter phase bas be viewed separately !rom the

athers, because it marked a period of NU concentration on the pureIy political aspects of nation-building.

There were two aspects to the NU's role during the three and a halfyears of Japanese occupation. One was to protect the country from foreign

attack,79 while the other was to answer society's needs by providing

education and essential semees. In protecting the country from foreign

artack, in this case ta anticipate the invasion of Java by Allied forces

(including the Dutch), the NU's leaders became actively involved in PETA

(Tentara Sukarela Pembela Tanah Air - Volunteer Army of Defenders of the

Fatherland), a volunteer armed force formed by the Japanese govemment in

1943. It was PETA which was to became the baekbone of the Indonesian Republic's Army.80 Upon fineling out that PETA81 was, in faet, more • nationalistic than supportive of the Japanese, the Japanese replaced it with Perhimpoenan Kebakttian Ralejat (People's Royalty Organization) or Djawa

Hokokai. In this new organization the role of the ulama was more apparent

78 Masjumi (Madjelia Sjwo MusJimin IJJdoDNia - Consultative Counci1 of Indonesian MOIIema) is an ulOCÎmon compo&ed of .,PDer Muslim .--aatioDa - the NU, the MubammacUyah and Saœkal Islam - to f"aciJit8te tbeir cIiff'aeDt afraira under the Japanese aovemment. Tbia 8M"Ciation wu re-estab1i8bed on November 7, 1945. For more information about Maajumi eee Asyarl Muhammad, -rhe l&e of:Mugumi Party in 1ndonesia 8Dd the Rote of the cUlœn4 in ita Early Deve1opment, 1945-1952,­ (MA thesis, McGül University, 1976).

79 See Andenon, ItnGgitaaJ. 7. See a1Bo Hayee' exp18 natiou on patriotism, Carlton J. Hayes, Nationalism: A Religion (New York: The Mecmj11an Company, 1960),9·10.

80 For more iDfbrmatïon on how Soekarno, Hatta 8Dd othe!' Poetra 1eaden tumed PETA into a more nefjmutHst, -apro-Iudoaesjan point ofview only" movemmt and how the Japanese repllad it \Vith Perbimpoenan Kebakttian Rakjat (People'. Royalty Organization) or DjawaHokokai, Bee Kahin, NationaIism, 108-110.

81 See, Nupobo NotO"uspnto, The Peta Arm.y during the Japanese occ:upation of • Indonesia (Tokyo: WuedaUniversity Press. 1979). 31

than in PETA because the Japanese wanted ta win support from Muslims • with the objective of arousing resistance ta the Allies on the basis of defense of Islam against infidels bent upon &gain enslaving the Muslim population of the country. Saon after the Japanese announced their promise to allow Indonesia to declare its independence, another armed force or home guard, Hizbullah

(Army of Allah) was founded which drew directly on the santri Muslim

community and was attached to Masjumi, the Muslim unity association

conceived by the Japanase. Wahid Hasjim, an NU leader, who was also the vice president of Masjumi, was the first Muslim leader ta pay an official visit ta Hizbullah. Actually, during this period, Muslim nationalists used this paramilitary project and other activities as a means of preparing for

independence.82 Because the /dais who tee! pesontrens had strong connections ta Muslims in the villages, the Japanese govemment made

them propagandists in promoting Japanese initiatives with the • compensation that these traditionalist Muslims would obtain services from the Department of Religion (Shumubu) more easüy83. The relationship between the kiais and Muslims at the village levelled to cooperation in other aspects oftheir life. The NU's involvement in Masjumi and in the Shumubu are further evidence of its role in promoting nationalist sentiment during this period. Masjumi wu a symbol of unity for Indonesian Muslims which ultimately

made a great contribution ta the Indonesian drive for independence.l " Un1ike

82 BruiDeaaen, NU, 52-54.

83 The Shumubu .... a reJiIPous afain of6œ fouDded by the Japaneee aovernment ta provide re1iIioua.mœa ta Mneljm& This wu, ofcourae, ODe ormany political toola used by the Japaaese to maintain their occupatÎOa. • 84 See Kahin, Nationalism., 111 and M.e. RickJeCs, A HisfDry, 206·209• 32

the Masjumi that was to he founded in 1945, this Masjumi was a council

designed by the Japanese govemment to channel the voices of aIl • Indonesian Islamic organizations or groups. The Masjumi supported the existence of Dai Nippon, the Japanese armed forces because they were seen

as a bulwark against the 5O·called Asia Timur Raya (Greater East Asia).

Although Masjumi was founded by the Japanese, its supporters were not necessarily affiliated to them. Rather, its members were often nuaI based, and while they came !rom every corner of the archipelago, they retained

strong feelings of unity. The officers of Masjumi were members of the Muhammadiyah and the NU. Kiai Hasjim Asfari wu president and bis son,

Wahid Hasjim (NU), and Mas Mansoer (Muhammadiyah) served as the vice­ presidents who were in charge of activities in Jakarta. Kiai Wahab

Chasbullah and Ki- Bagus Hadikusumo, chiefs of the NU and Muhammadiyah respectively, were appointed as advisors to the executive board. The Shumubu, which was part of the forma! govemment • administration on the other hand, wu nm by Hasjim Asj'ari and Wahid Hasjim together with leaders !rom the Muhammadiyah, also played an important role in uniting Muslims. Accordingly this policy of cooperation with the Japanese administration allowed Muslims to gain considerable experience in govemment and administration, produced. para·milibuy force and allowed the further deve10pment ofa rural national-political network on Java. AU of these would later on become important in the Indonesian nationa1life.

The NU's leader at this tîme, K.H. Wahid Hasyim, played a crucial role in the establishment of Indonesia when he became involved in the OPIO (Badan Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesïa, or the Committee oC Preparation of

Indonesian Independence), which was established on 29 May 1945 by the • Japanese before they left Indonesia. The founding ofthis committee wu one 33

of the Most important events in the histoty of Indonesian nationalism

because it officially produced the foundations of Indonesian nationalism, • i.e., Panca.sila and the 1945 Constitution. At first Hasyim chose to be in the group which sought to establish an Islamic State in Indonesia, while the other camp opte«! for a secular state.as Mer the first meeting, the Committee founded Sub Komile BPKI (a smaller commission) consisting of 9 members, namely Soekarno,

Muhammad Hatta, A.A. Maramis. A. Wahid Hasyim, Abikoesno Tjokrosuyoso. Abdula Kahar Muzakkar. Haji Agus Salim, Ahmad Subardjo, and Muhammad Yamin. This committee succeeded in reaching a decision dealing with fast draft of the Indonesian Constitution signed on 22 June 1945. This draft is now best-lmown as the Piagam Jakarta or Jakarta Charter. In the next meeting, held on June 10-16, 1945, the committee concentrated on discussing the reluctance of some members about the • phrase -dengan kewajiban menjalankan syari'at Islam btlgi pemeluJe­ pemeluknya,. or -with the obligation of practicing Islamic law for Muslims."

As an ulama, Hasyim played an important role in mediating the dHferent views. In the meeting of June 13, 1945, Hasyim proposed phrases for articles 4.2 and 29. Article 4.2 says that -those who are eligible to be the candidates for president and vice-president must be an Indonesian by origin

and must be Muslim.· Article 29 says that ~e religion ofthe .tate is Islam, but guarantees that believers of other religions may practice their

religions.·86

~ The emerpaœ olallUlllber ofJdiIicaI pIdies with Jdi&ious ftluDdalioas cUiDc the .eb"ODal ofHabibie, 1998-1999," iDvited poIemics oa the same isaJc ofaseadar..or~... 16 See H. MuM'D'ned V..... NœktlIt PenùJpt6t ~ Dtaw 194'. 1 (JaIIada; YayRIl Prapanca, 19S9~ 259. see aIID KM. SIaIIeh Hanm lDd Abdul MuIIil MaIba, Latar &1IIbmg l1mINIl • Islam Mene,;rrIQ PlIItC4Sila ~btlllQi A.sœ Trmggal (Y0I)'Ibna: Aqœrius, 1986), 141-144. 34

On August 18, 1945, one dayalter Indonesian independence, the PPKI • (Panitian Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia, or the Committee of Preparation of Indonesian Independence) was founded. It consisted of 27

members, one of whom was Wahid Hasyim; Soekarno was the principal while Muhammad Hatta was the vice-principal. In the first meeting of this committee, the members discussed a number of important changes ta the

Constitution which would later play an important role in shaping the foundation of Indonesian nationalisme The changes were: (1) the word

fCMukaddimah· (an Arabie tenu) was replaced with ·Pembukaan· (a Malay

word) or ·opening-; (2) the phrase -Berdasarkan kepada Ke-Tuhanan, dengan kewajiban menjalankan syari'at Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya,· or

~ased on the Divinity, with the obligation of practicing Islamic law for

Muslims· was replacecl with -berdasar atas Ke-Tuhanan Yang Moha Esa,· or

-based on the Oneness of God-; (3) !rom the phrase -Presiden ialah orang Indonesi.a asli dan beragama Islam· (-those who eliglble to be the candidates • of President and Vice..President must be an Indonesian by origin and Muslim), the words 'dan bergama Islam' were deleted; and (4) in line with. the

above points, article 29 wu revised to read -Negara berdasarkan Ke­

Tuhanan Yang Moha Esa,· or -the state is based on the Oneness of God.-87

The CUITent Indonesian Constitution is still based on the work done by this

committee. In genetal, the changed were apparently intended to produce language that reOected the Indonesian context in language and meaning.

References to God were clearly related to Islam, but specifie mention of Islam or things MusIim wu avoided. Otherwise Islam wu awarded no favors, but neither was it paralyzed in any way.

• r'7y~ Nasbb, 400-410. 35

After independence was declared on August 17, 1945 the NU committed • itself to defending Indonesia's status as an independent and sovereign state. This was dramatica11y demonstrated when British troops supporting the retum of the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration (N1CA) to Batavia

(Jakarta) landed in the country. Following a pattern tbat they had demonstrated in the past and still do today, NU members rallied in defense oftheir land. Once the British military action plan to occupy the major cities in preparation for a return of Outch administration was made lmown and the reluctance of the Central Government to take action clearly noted. the

NU's members gathered together in Surabaya on October 21 ...22, 1945 to discuss the issue. The gatheringss was held in order to produce a fatwo (a

statement made by religious scholars base

Traditions) 50 that any fight undertaken by Indonesians against such

occupation could he interpreted as a jihad. According to Bnùnessen, this NU meeting was an implicit criticism of the new Indonesian govemment's • leadership, which had not acted very forcefu11y in dealing with the Briitsh action which imperiled Indonesian independence. This fatwti or declaration came to he lmown as the Resolusi Jihad (Holy War Resolution). The Resolusi

Jihad was announced for a second time by the NU in March 1946. It stated that every Muslim was obüged to defend the countly's tenitorial integrity (which at this time extended only to Java and Madura) as the Allied action posed grave consequences for the MusUm community. In the ensuing battle of Surabaya November 1945, NU members participated in large numbers.

88 The practice of Ïffi!J1vistaJ]. ~ taaethert is a UDique feature of thia assoclarion.1bia aeema to be the practiœ ofthe Ataaran Da8ar (statuteD), paraaraph 1, Article 2 ofthe coDStitution.. In additioo, ilmay a1so he iDflueDœcl by the !Kt that it is based on the 8Chool ofAlIZ aJ-Bunnah WG o1~tmltj·~ah, wbich Co'" the comp8DÎODS of the Prophet, such - the tradition ofptheriDa teJ8etber iD mAkînB 8I1Y po!icy. This attitude cannat alw8p be undentoocf as 8I1pport for politiœl purpoeea, as is usuaDy • the case. 36

Throughout the Revolution NU leaders participated in the govemment while • younger NU members selVed in the armed forces.. Tbe !lU aDder tb. 8oebnao·. 01cl Or•• Generally speaking, the period of Soekarno wu divided into two eras, namely Parliamentary Democracy (1949-1957) and Guided Democracy (1957-1965). During these eras, the NU's politica1 activity took two forms: as a component of Masjumi (1945-1952) and as an independent political party

(1952-1966). As was mentioned earlier, Masjumi was reestablished after lndonesia had won its freedom. This time it had more members than before, and included such new members as the PUll ( Persatuan Ummat Islam

Indonesia) and PUI (Persatuan Ummat Islam) from West Java and the psn. 89 This time, however, the NU received a reduced proportion of representatives compared ta other organizations, both within the Masjumi and in ministerial

positions.. The usual reason that many scholars cite is that the NU did not • have enough educated people ta fill positions of responsibility. There may have been subtle, cultural reasons at work as weil. In this case NU leaders preferred ta be offered positions of responsibility, rather than ask for them. Theyexpected leadership role on the buis of their standing. but ifthey were

not given a post. then they tended to step back and let others take it without protes!. Wben not pen posta they expected they were privately disappointed and. sometimes. ullY. This was one of the reasons why the NU withdrew !rom Masjumi in 1952 and beœme a poUtical party on its

own.90 i.e.• they were ignored as potentialleaders and were seldom given positions by acclamation. Culturally. they were out of step with the times

19 For more mrarmaôaa, sec MnJwmD"'d Asyad "The R.ise fithe Masjumi PMty iD IDCbaia" and the • Role ofthe U1ama in Ils Eady DMI~" (MAtbesis, McGiU UDiverisly, 1976). ~9. 37

where open and direct competition was an important factor in choosing people. The NU·s adherence to the legal maxim dJJT' al-maftisid rnuqaddam • 'ala jalb al-~a1iJ:z, ta avoid disadvantages befote considering the advantages. may pOSSlbly explain this attitude. It was better in their eyes ta avoid conflict among Muslims than to gain positions of in1luence in the

govemment. Furthermore, ideological tessons may also have contnbuted to this phenomenon.

The rise of the Masjumi party in 1945 was a positive response by Muslim

leaders to the govemment's declaration of politica1 plurality and its

willingness ta allow freedom to establish politica1 parties.91 This declaration was a sign ofvictory for the younger generation who had called for a multi­

party system as opposed ta a single party. The idea of having a single national party, Fartai National Indonesia (Indonesian National Party) had

actually been proposed by President Soekarno at the national address of August 23, 1945. He argued that in such revolutionary tilDes, it was • necessary to unite an elements in the nation. Ultimately pressures !rom various quarters cause

Hatta, led to a historiea1 moment for Indonesian Muslim involvement in politics. On November 7-8, 1945 a number of Indonesian Muslim leaders

held the Ummat Islam congress in Yogyakarta. This congress 81TÎVed at three important decisions. FUst. the decision wu taken to form a poHtical party

called Masjumi. in conscious imitation of the name given to the council formed under the Japanese occupation. This Masjumi. however, wu

90 The nen cbapter considers tbe politiad reuons for tbe NU'. withdrawal from the ppp in early 1984. • 91 Kementerian Peneranpn RI, Kepœ1Dian tlGn Pariementœia, (1954), 9. 38

different in that, it clearly saw itself as a political party, while the former was • not. Second, the congress decided that Masjumi was to he the sole Muslim political party in the country. The original hope was that it would serve to unite politically the Muslim ummat, even thought in the end it became more a source of division than unity. Third, the congress made it clear that there

were certain düTerences of view among Muslim leaders as to the character of the natïon-state they wanted to build.

Wahid Hasjim's lack of success in managing the hajj transportation for the 1952 season gave rise to the first sign of conflict between NU leaders and

other members of Masjumi, conflict which wouId lead to the NU's withdrawal from it one year later. Instead of trying to explain the problems in managing the hajj transportation, Wahid Hasjim, demonstrating the attitude typical of NU leaders,92 chose to resign from his position as Minister of Religious

Affairs rather than explain the problems and fight for bis position. • Chasbullah's attempt ta replace him with other NU candidates, such as Masjkur or FathUrTahman, wu not acceptable to the general Masjumi

leadership. The appointment of Faqih Usman of the Muhammadiyah to the

cabinet post frustrated the NU leadership - they apparentJy regarded the

position as belonging to them- and they saw it as a violation of an

understanding they had with Masjumi in general.93 A proposaI by the NU to

92 See Paae 38 on the maslahat and tnIJ{$tJd4h and chapœr n on the politica1 attitude of the NU. For moœ œmpreheDsive approacb, eee Muhammad Xba1id Masud, IsIamicLegal PIulosophy (Jslem1bact: Islamic Re8earchlDStitute, 1977) andAbü Isl)a al­ Sbitibî, Al-Muwaw8 qat fi UfUl al-Shati'a. 4 vols (Beirut Dar al-Kutub al-Dmiyyi, n.d.)

93 See BnJine-rn, NU, 64-70. More detai1a auroundq the re88Dns for NU'. withdrawa1 from. MlUlumi are foUDd in Nsim. Mochtar, -mI Party, 1952-1955- (MA thesis, McGitl Univeraity, 1960). See bihIioIraPhy. Naim is more iDte!ested in tbis topie than in the riae of NU. However, tbis JlÙlht be due to the fact that Naim's work wu fiDished only 1ive yean der the NU hall witbdrawn !rom Majumi. In otber 1IUrds, it wu a re1evan1 issue for cti"'MÎOD. Sisteen yeara later, Acbmad Farichin Cbumaidy (1976) felt the need to understaDd the riee and deveJopmeDt ofNU until 1945. Bee the bJ.DIiography. Sînœ then the NU basDOt beeD toucbed by &Dy studeDt al the IDstitute of • Islamic Studies McGi11 Univerai~, altboup aD IlUlDY aspects remlÙned unexamined. It 39

federate with Masjumi, a responsible compromise given the needs of both

groups was rejected by the Masjumi leadership. At an NU conference in

• Palembang, South Sumatra, not long alter this event, the decision by the NU executive to become an independent political party was approved. The

unsympathetic stance of Masjumi leaders and the inability of association leaders to articulate their organizational expectations a190 led the PSU to leave Masjumi. The NU invited the PSU and Perti, a political party connected the West Sumatra which had earlier left Masjumi, to establish the lndonesian Muslim League. This organization came into being in August 1952.

The general election of 1955, which is believed by many to have been the most democratic election in the histoty of Indonesia ta date, showed the NU to have strong backing on Java, Madura and Southem Kalimantan. Overall, the NU won the third largest share of the vote after the PNI and Masjumi. The following table shows a break-down of the voting and seat distnbution • in this election:

Part, V.... "wall. ParU....u %parU....tu 'Nt. wota y ••• y.at. PNI 8434653 22.3 57 22.2 Masjumi 7903886 20..9 57 22.2 NU 6955141 18.4 45 17.5 PlO 6176914 16.4 39 15.2 PSU 1091160 2.9 8 3.1 Parkindo 1003325 2.6 8 3.1 P. Katholik 770740 2.0 6 2.3 PSI 753191 2.0 5 1.9 Murba 199588 0.5 2 0.8 Others 4496701 12.0 30 Il.7 Total 37785299 100.0 257 100.0

bas been given littJe attention in the study or IaJpmjc movemeJ1ta, political parties or • organizations in the country. It is hoped that the preaent studywill fiIl the pp. The figures are even more striking when we compare the number of seats • held by the NU before and aCter the election. Put, seat. Belore ".t. Atter Total mectloll Blectloll PNI 42 57 22.301'0 Masjumi 44 57 20.9% NU 8 45 18.4% PIa 16 39 16.4% The above figures show us that the number of seats gained by the NU increased dramatically !rom 8 to 45 seats and raised the NU's position from

tenth to third in overall share of the vote. The PlO (Partai Komunis Indonesia, or

Indonesian Communist Party) aIso made considerable gains, increasing its share

of seats by over fifty percent compared to previously. This also indicated that the

PK! played a role during the period in question.

During the periods of Parliamentary and Guided Democracy under

Soekarno's Old Order between 1950 and 1965, the NU participated in all but one • cabinet, that of Wilopo.94 In view of the many crises that look place during the transition from Parliamentary to Guided Democracy, sueb as the installation of

the extra-parliamentaly Kabinet Karya (working cabinet) in April 1957, the

establishment of the National Council in May and the proclamation by Presidential Decree of the 1945 Constitution. and tinally the dissolution of the elected parliament in March 1960, the NU decided against defending the existing

system of hberal parliamentary democracy, prefming instead ta back the

90t N~ the NU ..... COIDIDODIy portJIyed as 0IIIJ0fbIDÏSIÏC poIiticalIy 'msnphjstjeatecl, VCIIII, and iDOrdiDateIy acœmmocllJljœja" Keddie DOles 1l1li the aca+nK De&Iect of traeItioIIWIt Is1am is oommonplace aaoss tbe MusIim \IOdcl See GJe& FeaIy. ~ iD a TypbooD. NabdIalul UûIIfttJ ..die Decline of Partiamcatay Democt&y,ft ÎD David Boun:bier and John Le!Be, DemDt::tacg in Indonesia 1950a and 19908 (Clayton, Victoria: Center of Southeast AsiaD Studies, Monash U~, 1994), 88 and N.R. Keddie, ed., SchtJlœ's. Saints, cwl Sujis: Muslim Religions Institutions in the JIiddle Bast sinœ 1500 (BerJœJey and Los AD&eles, • University ofCa1ifomiaPreaa, 1972), 5-6. , 41

proposaIs of Soekarno and the military.9S This attitude to the state and the ruling govemment in power was justified on the basis of precepts set forth by • prominent medieval Sunnî thinkers such as al-Miwardi, al-Gha%iIi and al­

Baqillëni, who regarded de facto govemmental authority as the determinant of politica1 conditions with an obligation on the part of Muslims to aceept it and work with it. For these types of ulama, the ummat must be obedient to the state, even a despotic one, for authority was vastly preferable to anarchy.

During this period the NU leadership was dominated by kiais and politicians noted for their willingness to compromise with the govemment leaders. The Most

influential figure leading the NU at this period was K.H. Wahab Hasbullah, one of the founding fathers of the organization. He seems to have had a flexible and

highly practica1 approach to poUties. The other influential figure was Idham Chalid, who occupied the post of general party chairman !rom 1956 until 1984. These two key figures, together with the secretary general of the NU Saifuddin

Zuhri, K.H. Masjkur, Z8inal Arifin and Djamaluddin Malik, were in charge of • conceiving policies and tactics for the NU. What was the theoretical buis for the actions taken by NU leaders during

the period in question? As wu later on admitted by Abdurrahman Wahid, the

NU usually based its actions on references tg fiqh (law). especiaUy ta the twin principles oC mtlSlahat (benetit) and mafsadah (hum). Acconfing to al-Ghazali any actions to protect religion, life, intellect, lineage and property constituted maslahat; anything inimica1 ta tbem was mafsadah. Preventing 90mething that

led ta mafsadah was &180 considered to be mtJSlahat. Thus, befote arriving at a decision, the ulamtJ should ca1culate what was the benefit or harm that would

occur from a particular action.96 This gave the NU leadership an opportunity to

95 Greg FeaIy, MRowiD&" 92- • Sl6 H. Eœyat, ModmI bltlltlic PoiitiCtll1'lKnlglrt (LoDdon: Macmillan 1912), 339-Sl. 42

he eclectic, reactive and innovative in response to problems confronting it. Ultimately, this -good-bad- approach to political difticulties allowed the NU

• leadership to withdraw it supports from the Soekarno regime in 1966 and 10 give

its allegiance 10 the new govemment headed by Soeharto. The NU leadership at

that time understood that structural changes were to occur in the political

system. To reject those proposals \VOuld he extremely dangerous. Any party that

did sa could be labeled 'counter...revolution81Y' and subjected 10 intimidation and

oppression. This politica1 policy of the NU, however, led the NU ta its being labeled opportunist and not a real contributor to Indonesian democracy. One might argue, however, that in certain situations, political opportunism remained important.

The second reaso~ as Abdurrahman Wahid admitted, was that in any continuation of

the Soekarno govemmen~ the Communist Party would certainly have gained in power and

that NU would have lost influence accordingly. A change of allegiance was therefore a • political necessity. The unœrtainty ofthe economic and political situation and the fact that President Soekarno wu seriously il), plus the bloody revoit engineered by the PKI in September 30, 1965, aliled ta a major historicaJ tuming point for Indonesia. The Soekarno

period ended when the young General Soeharto took over and began bis mie over the country - one which would last for 32 years. Thus began the New Order phase of Indonesian history.

• CHAPTERD • RU'8 WlTBDRAWAL FROM POLITICS

A. The Socio-PoUtlcal Sltaatloa ID lad08'" PrIe. to 1980

lndonesian nationalism during aImost the entire first ha1C of the New

Order period centered on maintaining national stability and promoting

national economic development. One of the poücies of the New Order

Government for maintaining national stability (and to he1p the govemment

itself remain in power) was to curb any social movement which the

govemment could not directly control. 'Ibis policy included limiting the

number of political parties, restricting the activities of social and religious

organizations, and above all, imposing the same ideology on an social and

politica1 organizations in the country. The govemment's plan ta concentrate • on the development of the national economy aIse contributed ta this policy of political containment. Thul, politica1 and democratic issues were

considered secondary to economic ones. Those in power realized that the

economy had been the main political weapon of the Communist party in the

earlier period and that poor economic conditions were a fertile field for anti­

govemment groups ta prosper in.

In this section, 1 will focus on these policies and their influence on the

attitude of social and religious organizations, specifica11y the Nahd1atul

Ularna. In addition, 1 will examine the problems of Indonesian nationalism

before 1984, when the Nahd1atul Ulama decided to retum to the 1926 • khittoh, or the spirit of 1926, the year of its foundation. The RlM orthe Ke. Ord.r ..dIt••ode1 or••tlo... DeYelopmeat • The rise of the New Order government began with the raIl of Soekamo's Old Order amid politica1 and economic instability and an unsuccessful and

bloody revoIt by the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI, Partai Komunis

Indonesia) in 1965. Quite clearlyJ the presidential succession did not take

place constitutionally, i.e. through the normal and dynamic mechanisms of

govemment. 1

The attempted coup has since been subject to a wide range of conflicting

interpretations; to cite but one example, the army..backed New Order

govemment's version differs greatly from that of Western scholars. For some

Western scholars, such as Benedict Anderson and Ruth McVey, a strong

argument for the PKI's playing an official role in planning the coup attempt

cannot be made. 2 They argue that the coup attempt was actually an internai • affair of the Army. Thus, the PKI served as a convenient scapegoat for the Army to cover up the real source of the con1lict. But Harold Crouch bas

argued that the latter thesis (the so..cal1ed ·Comen Paper1 is very difficult 10

defend in its original fOrDl. in light of the testimony of the PKlleaders at the

1 Accordin& tg the 1945 ConstitutioD, the lDdoaeùn President is elected every live years ColloWÏDI a general electioD. Neitber ofthe two moat reœnt presidents, namelf Soeharto and Habibie. bave 8UCœedecl in beins e1ected der a .-ral election. The collapae of Soehatto'. New OrcIer govemment wu, to aome extent, a repetition of Indonesian history.

2 Anderson and McVey'a ecademic work GD t!ùa su1iect, writteD in Janwuy of 1966, wu considered a very controverllial stucly; it was not published UDtil five years 1ater, and became kDown as the -COmell Paper'. The study DU\Y baYe had stroD& influence on the perœpâoDs of Weaœm acbolara, but it bu DOt bad a very stroD& intluence within the COUDtIy, eveD with the co11apae of the Soebarto rePœ. ADdereon, B.R. O'R., and Ruth MeVey, A Preliminœy Analysis 01 the Odober 1, 1965, Coup in Indonesia (lthaca: Modem hxfnneU. Pmject. Come! UDivenIity, 1971). For a simi1ar argument and more iDformatioD on tbiaÏ8ale. Re Harokl Crouch. The Army and Politica • in 1ndonesia (lthaca and London: Comel1 UnivenIi1y Press, 1978) aad Rex Mortimer, 45

Mahmilub (Mahkamah Militer Luar Biasa, or Special Military Court) trials, • as weIl as in view of the opinions expressed by PKI émigré groups in Europe and elsewhere. The Indonesian army's version. on the other band. which

gained general public acceptance in Indonesia, identified the PKl as the

dalang (puppet master) of the coup attempt, a conclusion that seemed clear-

cut.3 This version was used later on by the New Order regime to suppress

any movements trying to criticize the govemment, by accusing them of

proliferating Communist teachings. AlI published materials containing

Communist ideas and even academic works showing the Communist

movement in a positive light were prolubited. One proposition of the New

Order that strongly influenced the Indonesian people at every level was that

the Indonesian Communist Party had betrayed the state and nation by

attempting to replace the state ideology of Pancasila with Communist • ideology. For Muslim groups, the issue of replacing the Pancasila ideology with a

Communist one meant applying an atheist ideology that wu strongly

opposed to their beliefs and their commitment to the nation. This is why

Muslims, especial1y the NU. worked together ta establish good relations with

the army and other forces that supported the New Order government and

accepted the state ideology of Pancasila. This wu a period that witnessed

the rise of a number of movements apinst the continuation of the

Soekamoist political system. Among these were KAMI (Kesatuan Aksi

CJndonesïa: Empire Post-Mortems on the PIa: Au.straliœt 0utl00Ic. 22 (December), 347­ 359.

3 Harold ClOuch, 77Ie Army and PoIitics in lndonesia (Itbaca and Lcmdon: Comell • University Press, 1978), 101-102. Mahasiswa Indonesia. or Action Front of Indonesian University Students).4 • KAPPI (Kesatuan Aksi Pemuda Pelajar Indonesia, or Action Front of Indonesian Youth and Students), and KAP Gestapu/PKI (Kesatuan Aksi

Penggayangan Gestapu1PKI, or Action Front for Destroying the

Gestapu/PKI). Among the Muslim figures who played significant raies in

these movements were H. Husni Thamrin, M. Zamroni, and Subhan Z.E.,5

who 100 KAMI, KAPPI and the KAP Gestapu/PKI, respectively; signilicantly

some of them were NU members. Their efforts should be viewed as coming

from a commÎtment to uphold the agreement of Indonesian nationalist

leaders who were committed to founding the Indonesian state on the basis of

religious pluralism, i.e. not on a single faith, and certainly not on atheism,

like the PlO. These movements, later collectively lmoWn as the 1966

generation, put forward three demands to the Soekarno govemment: that • Soekarno dissolve the PKI, that he purge the cabinet of all leftist elements, and that he reduce priees in order ta improve economie life.6 These demands

contained three dimensions of national interest: (1) ensuring the stability of

national polities; (2) saving people from starvation; and (3) attaining unity

based on the same goal ofnationalisme

The NU's fonnal role in the rise of the New Order wu not as transparent as its informaI roie; however, the NU's support for the formation of the New

.. For further accounta ofKAMI, SIee. for eumple. RosUwn An.... -rhe Birth of KAMI,· Quadrant (March.April 1967), 55-60; Baladas GbosabaJ• -Studenta and PoJitica in Indonesia: The Birth oflCAMI,- ChinG Report. voL 6, no 5 (September-october 1970). 39·47.

5 80th M. ZamroDi, and Subban wa'e activista in NU at tbat âme.

6 See Team. Pembjnaan PeDatar dan Baban Peaataran PepWRi Republik • Indonesia. Bahtm Penatœan Pedoman Pengahyatt:m clan PengamtJlan Ptmct:&sala, 47

Order seemed stronger than that of any other social group in lndonesia at

that time. Nonetheless. the doctrine of tawassuth (middle way)7 espoused by

• by its leaders, coupled with the negative publicity attracted various radical Islamic movements. such as Kartosuwùjo's revolt in of Bandun& Kahar Muazakkar's insurgency in South Sulawesi, and the Aceh Merdeka

movements, have caused Many to forget the contnbution made by Muslims

ta the formation of the New Order. Writing on the situation as it stands

today. Voll remarks: ·Such continuing militant opposition means that the

country's leaders, especially those in the military, maintain a general

mistrust of Islamic movements.-8 This was truc for the entire New Order

period prior to 1980. In identifying its enemies, i.e. so-called anti­ govemment entities, anti-Pancasila and Islamic state forces, the New Order ignored certain significant segments of the nation-state, which included

Muslim groups. The New Order government identified Communists as

cextreme lefr'9 and Muslim fundamentalists as -ext.reme right': By the early

• 19905. the army had identified a new threat: ·extreme centrists-.10

Undang-undang Dasar 1945 dan Gœis-garis Besar Haluan Negara (Jakarta: Sekretariat Team Pembinaan Penatar dan Behan Penataran Pegawai Republik Indonesia, 1978), 91

1 K.H. Ahmad Siddiq, Khittah Nahdliyah (Jakarta: Persatuan BaDIil, 1980) and Islam, Pancasila dan UkhuxJh Islamillah: Wawanc::œu dengan Rois Aam PBNU KH. Ahmad Siddiq (Jakarta: Lajnah Ta'lif wan Naayr, 1985). 1 am much iDdebted to Gres Barton who bas reproducecl thae t\W worka in bis book. He IÏves two leUOua (or the reproduein& them with tzanslarion and anDOtation: ODe is tba1 Sïddiq'. thoUlbt JDÏlbt be bro~ to the attention ofa wider audience. and two, it ia hopecl that tIùa may lead to a better understandiq ofthe dynamica of reform within Nahdlatul UltJmG. See, Gœs Barton, NahdD.tJJ.I UlamG, 1nJdit:ionDl IslGm and Jlodemity in IndoraesitJ. (Clayton, Australia: Mouaah ABia Institute, 1996), 110-128. Compare with Ctifl'ord Geeru, '!'he Religion a/Java (Chicago: University ofCbicago Press, 1970). a John Obert Vou. Islam Contitwity and Change in the Modem Worid (Syracuse: Syracuse University Pœ.. 1994),344.

9 Fora di1ferent view on the ame tope Bee R. William Liddle, -rbe Islamic Tum inIndonesia: A PoIitical Exp1enatio1l,· Joumol 01Asian Studies. 55, no. 3 (Auauat 1996), 620-621.613-634. EapeciaI1y pese 617•

10 tIExtrezDe CentriBt" rdmecl tG tboee who promotecl bWlUUl ri&hta. • democratizatioD, justice and otber ÙJ8Uea we1l-known iD Westem countrie& Adam As for the NU, which is usually considered by its own members and

outside observers as upholding the doctrines of Ahl al-Sunnah wa al·

• Jama'ah, to distinguish themselves from the Shia, its general political

attitude has been expressed as Tawassuth, or midd1e path, moderate as

opposed to extremist (tatharruA, neither in Cavor of the extreme right,

(understood by the New Order to refer ta Islam) nor the extreme left

(understood to refer to Communism). Literally. Ahl al..Sunnah wa al~ama'ah means the people of the Sunna (the tradition of the Prophet Muhammad) ­ thus the community and its members remain strict followers of the Sunnî

tradition.ll In practice, this community of Muslims follows the practice of the prophet's Companions According ta K.H. Bisri Mustofa, an NU ulama

from Rembang, Ahl al-SUnnah wa al.Jama'ah refers ta that of Muslims who hold fast ta the following tradition:

1. ln the Islamic law, they CoUow one of the four great Muslim jurists, i.e., Hanafite, Malikite, Shafi'ite and Hanbalite. ln practice, most of Indonesïan traditionalist Muslims follow the Shafi'ite. 2. In tbeolo&y, !bey fonow the teacbings of Imam Abu Hasan al-Ash'ari and • Imam Abu Mansur al-Maturidi.. 3. In Tuawut they foDow the basic teachinp ofImam Abu Qosim al..Junaidil~

The above characteristics ofAN al-Sunnah wa al.Jama'ah have made the

NU different !rom ather Muslim groups. such as the Muhammadiyah, which

also claims ta be the followers of AN al-Sunnah wa al~ama'ah. Another characteristic that makes the NU different from the Muhammadiyah is that

Schwarz notes that the foundi.,. of leMI \VU an altema1ive force deRÎl"ated by Soeharto to deal with -extreme œntrista.· Bult sa Abdurrabaman Wahid bas pointed out, leM! may 1ater become the smal1 crocodile !batweIlt on ta eat ita 0WIIeI".. It can be argued that the b8IpiDiDa lor sbarilw Beata iD the 1997 cabiDet betweeD the ICM! faction and Soebarto croDiea resulted in œpotism in the formation ofthe cabinet. But, the blame wu later altributeel to Soeharto bimself This woulcl be an iDterestiD& question tg investipte. See al80 LiddJe, -rbe 11Iamie...•• 613-634, espeàaDy P9 617 and Douglas E. Remaae, Politics in Indonesia: DemDcracy. Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), 17

11 Sec SirM1iuddiD AbbIs.I'rlqtJdAhlllSSlUllUlll Will JtIIIUMIIt (Jakana: PaasIIka Tarbiyab, 1913). 16.

12 Zarœkh$yari Dbofier, Tl'tIIisi PUQIII1en: Slutl Te"tœg Parr"gan Hidrlp Kiai (Jakarta: • LP3ES), 1982), 149. 49

in practicing the above principles the NU adjust to the local traditions and cultures of Indonesia. This is one of the reasons that the NU is accused. by • other groups ofpracticing bid'ah or innovation.13 The NU's informai yet active role under the New Order govemment began on October 1. 1966. when the NU's leaders sought information about the kidnapping of six army generals (later round dead). Actually. although the mounting rivaIry between the armyand the PIa was clear to everyone. the

announcement made by the coup leaders on October 1 had not indicated

any PK! involvement but stated. saying instead that it was la movement

within the army' aimed at protecting Sukarno from an army plot sponsored

by the CIA.14 After suecessfully restoring arder and scattering the dissident,

the new govemment led by Soeharto1S was inspired to take action on

political consolidation.16 Interestingly, the economy was used to justify every single poHey implemented.

• 13 Sec Zamakbsyari Dbo6cr, " BebcIIpl Aspet)'lOlMcDjadi Dasar Kda...œa PaIpruh NU," in S. Siuansarî Ecip cd., NU do/am Tœrltmgtlll (Jakarta: AI·Kaulsar, 1989), 54.

14 Crouc:h. The Anny and Mûes. 97. There are severa! theories 011 the oriliDa of the coup. Crouch carefWly analyzea them, pointiDI out the 'tft8kneaes and streneth of each. The cAt version, preaented by Ben ADclenon and Ruth NcVey from Come11 University bas received sipificant attention in thill respect, becau. il ofl'ers a Yety controversial argument compared tu that oC the New Order pYemm.eDt. See aleo my pmrious expJanation. Afœr IookiDI at the aqument preented dealiD& with Sukarno'. fal1 and compariDg it to the eveDtII bappeDiDc priM tG aDd eeverallD011tha der the end of Soeharto el'&, 1 suspect tbat the United States, the IMF and tbe CIA may have alao been involved in fon:ÎIJI Soebarto to end bis pœsidency. It is interestiDI tG compare the connection betweel1 Amien Rais'. aetivi1iea and. US iDvolvement. It ia very intel'e8ti:D& tbat 6 daya after 1 wrote thia footnotet Soebarto dedared tba! the -vies,- wbich W8I1ted him to sœp down aided the conspiraq by forcing bim to 1eave the oflice of the Presidency CUnCODStitutionaDy.·

l:5 On Soebarto's acœssion to tbia position, Bee, Harold Cl'Ouch, 7lIe Army and Politics; and William Lida1œr, SoehœtD JfVada the DirJine YISion: PoIiticGl BiographJI (Honolulu, Hawaii: The SeJnanpt PIe8s. 1990). In tbia book, Lidalœr al80 preeeDta a comprehensive llD8tveis of the political ptOIreSS of Soebarto until 1990. Bee aleo Hamish McDona1d, SoehœtD's Indonesia (HollOlulu: UDivemâty oC Hawaii PIe8s. 1981) and. O.G. Raeder, Tht! Smilîng General, Pre:ritIent Soe1rlJttD of Indonesia (Jakarta: GunungAauDlt 1969).

16 Howard M. Fedetapiel. Jluslim Intelleduals œad NâonGl Deuelopment in • Indonesia (New York: Nova ScieDœ Publiaher, 1992). 1·3. For furtber dilcussion of In addition. Federspiel notes that. as the basis for its political system• the New Order restructured itself on five principal platforms:

• (1) to position the military 88 the apnt for state security and give them the most important featurea oC natioD8l1ife. (2) to form the military. state employees and peasant groupa mto the backboœ ofa govemment..assisted party that mobiliaed Dluch ofthe e1ectorate. oII'ered pro-govemment candidatea for election. and gave 1egis1ative support to government programa. (3) 10 aasip the task ofcanyiag out a Dational eœnomie deYe10pment plan to a group or biIbIY respected tecbnocrats. moatly trained in the West. (4) to stress earicu1tura1 production 8Dd dfstlibution of foodstu1fa througbout the natio~ (5) to decide, mostly by fait accompli, tbat Pancasila wu the national philosopbical orientation oC the country.17

Furthermore. in an attempt to distinguish itse1f from the Old Order. the

New Order regime defined itself as:

(a) an arder of the state and nation, bued on the imp1emmtation oC the Pancasila and the 1945 constitution in a pure and consistent IIl8IU1er. (h) an arder that aspiftd to the ide&ls of ïndepeDdence, that is, a just and prosperousIndonesian IOciety bued on the PaŒUila. (c) an order whicb wisbed to estabtish the system of state and society based on the constitution, democracy and Iaw. • (d) an order ofconstitution and an order ofdevelopment.18 Tbe Hew Order'. PoIitica1 Pollale.

In the process of coDsolidating bis power and to live himself greater legitimacy by implementing the development ideals outlined above, Soeharto delayed the tint general election of bis presidency, despite the faet that there

were strong demands to hold it as saon as p08S1ble. At an Army (Angkatan

Dorat) &eminar held in Bandung in 1966. it W8S decided that, in order to enable

the New Order to win the next general election, the armed forces (ABRI) should

theae issues, Bee aJao WiUiam Re Lidcl1e, alfndonesia in 1987: The New arder st the height olita Power,- Asiœl Suruey, 28 (Februaly 1988).

17 Howard Federapie1, Jluslim Intellectuels 180-191.

18 Team PembiDNm Penatar dan B8ban PeDatanm Pte.W. Republik IndoDelia, Bahan Penataran Pedomœl PenfJahyatœl dan Pengœruzlan Pancasaa, Undang-undtmg .Dasar 1945 dan GcJris.garis Besar Haluan Negata (Jakarta: Sekœtariat Team • Pembinaan Penatar dan Behan Penatanm Pepwai Republit1Dclonesi., 1978), 167. '1

guarantee security through a constitutional approach. In arder to do SOI ABRI, through its spokesperson Major General Abdul Haris Nasution, formulated the

• to concept of the -Middle Wa,/, according which the army neither sought to take over the govemment nor remain politica1ly inactive. Its dual role, known as

a Cdwifungsi ABRI t9 was enshrined with the passage of constitutional amendment number 15 (1969) conceming general elections. Once ABRI had made sure that it could participate in the New Ortier govemment, the

govemment declared that Indonesia wu finany ready to hold the vote.~ 80th Abdul Aziz Thaba, and Harold Crouch state that there are two opposing views regarding the dual function ofABRI, one internal to ABRI itself,

and one held by civilians. The former can be further divided into a stnlctural perspective and a point or view stemming from persona! opinion. 80th see citizens as essentially too weak to maintain national stability on their own, thus

requiring ABRI to hold key strategie positions in the govemment. ABRI leaders believe that, throughout the history of Indonesia and until the concept oC dual • function was applied, only ABRI wu capable of ete8tÎDg and maintaining political stability and economic development. Renee, the military expected to

hold such key positions in the govemment as Menko Polkam (Menteri

Koordinator Politik dan Keamanan. or Coordinator of the Ministry of Politics

and Security), Menhankam (Menteri Pertahanan dan Keamanan. or Minister of

19 The doctrine of DwifuDpi (the militai)' doctrine 8tÏpn1etïnl a dual poIitica1 and security role) bas been bJpmed for a number ofthe faulta of the New OrcIer durùJI its tïme.. one ofthe f'au1ta that sbo\lld be IDeDtioned beIe, as far ..the D8IioDal iDte1e8t is concemedwu the appointmeDt of15 e1ite membera ofthe 8ftDeCl forœe by Soeharto to the MPR (People'. Conmltative As8embly). This iame wu the focua of studeDt demonstrations durinl the Special MeetiDc (SI) of the DPR, on 10-13 November 1998. That the practice had been in p1aœ for tbirty-two yeam did DOt diIcounae them, although they did ultimately fait to attIûD tbeir aoel. The poIicy wu stiJl too stroD8 for MPR members 10 break. clespite atroDI oppolitioll hm e1m_ evay 1eve1 of eodety. A separate stucly would be needed to invatipte relevant iaeuea Jeaclini to the coUspee of the NewOrder. • 20 Umadi Radhi. Strategippp(Jakarta: Intefpita Prua.. 1984). 73• 52

Defense and Security). Mendagri (Menteri Dalam Negeri. or Minister of Interna!

Affairs), and BPK (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan Negara. or National Auditor). as

• of wel1 as the govemorships strategie provinces such as Jakarta, West Java, East Java, Central Java and severa! non-Javanese areas. ABRI representatives were aIso supposed to be appointed to the Council of People's Representatives

(DPR) and the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR). These polides have drawn criticism both from within ABRI as well as from without. The long·standins

tradition of military personnel enjoying such special privileges has made diflicult to progress to a more democratic system of govemment. The general election was finally held on July 3, 1971. with 9 parties

participating, one of them Golongan Karya (Golkar) allied to the govemment

itself. The result held few surprises. Oolkar won a landslide victory, taking almost two-thirds of the popular vote (62.80 per cent). It collected 34,348.673 of the 54.699,509 votes cast. The NU reœived 10.213.650 votes. or 18.67 per cent, the PNI 3,793.266 or 6.94 per cent, and the PMI 2,930,746 or 5.36 per • cent, while the remaining 6.21 per cent was divided between miaor parties Iike PSU, Parkindo. Partai Katolik and Perti.:21 Of the 351 seats available~ Oolkar won 227, the NU 58, Parmusi 24, the PNl 20, the PSU 10. Parkindo 7. Partai

Katolik 3, and Perti 2. Murba and IPKI received no seam at all.22 The resu.lts showed that, except for the NU. none of the other parties posed a threat to the regime. Golkar bad such strong support that. even ü an the ather parties had rormed a coalition (a remote possibility at best). Golkar would still have gamered the most votes. AU such assumptions however were

21 To pt more iDCormIIiOll about die Iisaory. tœ risc. lDd 1bc poIiti<:al aIIitude of Pmi. sec AIaiddin Koto, Pmkirarr Politlk Pmi: PmlaQII TtII'biyQh ls/Qmi)'tlh (Jabna: Nims MuIIiDII. 1997)•

22 Njabihara. Ma,eN, GolktJr and the IndonesiGn Elections of 1971 (Ithaœ: • Comel1 Modern IndoneIia Projeet. Moœpaph Seriee No. 56, 1972), 63. Table VU. 53

contingent on the vote having been fairly recorded.23 'l'wo very important • political measures taken by the govemment after the election showed that this may not have been the case. These political measures fueled criticism of the election process, which was deemed undemocratic from the beginning.24 This

reality was even aclmowledged by Lt. General Ali Moertopo. a former spokesman for the New Order:

Seme circles are of the opinion that the biumph of Golkar wu achieved due ta the foUowing factors; the avaiJa bt1ity of funds, the support of the oflicera. particularly from ABRI (Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia), the formation of Korpn'25 within various ministries, institutions and fimls, and also various forma of intimidation. AD. of these contnDuted to the triumph of the Golkar.26

Furthermore, commenting on the results of the election. Crouch states:

Despite the e1ectoral suœess, the Golkar wu esaentiaJly a creation of the militaly authorities and had little sense of aeparate identity. LacJeins both a party organitaJiou of its own. and roots in society. the Golkar wu a temponuy federation of heteropneous orgaoïzations mobi1ized by the army with the intention offtakening the parties. Conceived as an electoral machine desilnecl ta undemùœ the strensth ofopponents rather than aeate a new focus ofloyaltr and identification, the GoJkar ahowed no signa of deYe10pmg into a means of clwmeling civi1iaD aspirations upward. The Golkar ~uIldoaer" had done its job • of leveliDg the ground previously occupied by the parties, but it wu an unsuitable taol Cor construction.27

~ Belote more than 200 thoulI8I1d NU supporters al the National Meeq ofthe PKB. Abdurmbman Wabid raûIed. the issue of the New Order'. treatment. of NU supportera during the 1971 and 1977 senerat eJectiona. He said that, due to a more democratic system ofelection. it waa lime for NU to use itavoice freeJy iD tbe upcoming election ofJUDe, 1999. See Kompu, Merdll. 1999 and Ja&UCl Po&, Mareh l, 1999.

2" One ofthe prominent NU politic:iaas who stroDIt.Y criticized the reau1ts of the eIection wu SUbban Z.E. The protest wu DOt taken ioto consideration by the govemment-supportecl Golkar.

25 Korpri ia an aaooym for Korpa Pepwai Republik IndDneaia (CMl Se!vants of the Repu.blic of1DdoneIial. Aa a corps ofaovemmeDt oliœra cluriDI the New arder era, Korpri ofIiciaJ1y stated tbat itsmembera, at a11leveJa, voted Cor Golkar. Golkar M.tebrd victory tbrougb any meaaures avaiJabte. The fa:t tbat many pemment of&œra al80 worked for Go1kar made it cuy for the latter to coDtlol ~ iDformatioll wbich milht uncover ita m;edeeda ln my OWll experienœ, ciuriac the 1987 geueral e1ect:iaD. 1 witnessed an ofIidal repre8eDt8Iîve ofPDI preventecl from entenDs a poJIiDI station for no justifiable reuon. It.... UJÛOI'tUDate tbat the lD8Ds who appeared UDeducated. wu not able to give aaw arpmentepiDattbia UDfair trea.tment.

26 Ali Moertopo. Strategi PolitJ1t Nasiortal (Jakarta: CSIS. 1974),82-83. • 'ri Croucb, nae AmI, and Polifks, 271. • In aclmowledging Golkar's election victory. Soeharto decIared that the process had been -tuber,· meaning lansung (direct). umum (general). bebas (free), and rahasia (confidential). He thanked the people for having exercised

their voting rights and for the orderly conduct of the electioD. Adam Malik,

the vice·president, stated that the election results guaranteed the successful

implementation of the New Order development program and announced that

politica1 and economic stability had tinally come ta Indonesia.2I Despite the

fact that luber was to become a motto in almost every election held during

the Soeharto era. the reality was quite the opposite.

With their victory in the 1971 election. in which Soeharto and ABRI

extended their "bands" to each other through Golkar, these three powerful

forces were successful in 6nally eliminating ail opposition groups: Muslim

groups. on the one hand. and Christian and ather nationalist groups on the

other. In order to coyer up their undemocratie t:reatment of other parties • and, at the same time, create parties that would come under the govemment's control, pressure was exerted on parties ta either dissolve or

revert to earlier non-poütical roles. In JanuaJY 1973. two new parties were

formed to challenge Golkar.29 The ppp (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan. or

Development Unity Party)>> under the leadership of Idham Cbalid (of the NU)

and Mintareja. replaced the old Muslim parties. and the PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, or Indonesian Democratie Party) wu formed as a

28 For more intbrma1ion on the 1971 e1ectioD, see Nawaz B. Mody, Indonesia Under Soehœto (New York: Apt Boolal, 1987). 296-324 and Harold Croucll, ~ Army and Politics in Indonesia (lthaca and LoDdoD: ComeJl Universitr Pnaa. 1978l. 246-272.

29 In order to distiD&uiah itae1f !rom the otber patâes, aDd pin additional politica1 adv8l1taF. Golkar doea DOt caU it8eJf a politica1 prrty. [t daims to be a -runctional p1Up.· This tactic waa baclœd up by ~ !el'J1ati"l the poJitical parties and the GoJkar (Law DO. 3/1975 and Law DO. 3/1985 CODCemÙJI politiœl parties and Golkar). Sinee the in8taDetian oC the RelOrmation Cabinet of Habibie, GoIIœr bu been • renamed Partai GoJonpn Katya or GolDupn lC8rya Party. 55

result of the fusion of former nationalist and Christian parties. The PPP, • formally established on January 5, 1973, wu an amalgamation of four Islamic parties, namely the NU, PSU, Pero, and Parmusi. The POl, ofticially founded on Januauy 10, 1973, was itself a fusion of the PNI, Parkindo. Partai Katholik, IPKI, and Partai Murba. 80th parties were under leadership

largely amenable to the govemment's wishes and received subsidies from

the latter to finance their operations.JO Since then, govemment interference in both parties has been easily accomplished, as Laode Ida notes,

Thexefore, many expertI are of the view tbat the proeesa of amaJpmating Islamic parties with the ppp waa the Golkar pvemment's strate&v to perpetuate intemal con1lict, wbich would diecouraae their pininl any political sympathy from the ma.... 1bus at the same time their sympathy would &0 to Go1kar whose leadership (at thet time) W8S matuJe and whose intemal conditions were stabile. When c.:OD1lictl appeared, it would be euy for the political guides, the bureaucracy and ABRI, to întervene. basically amounting to Go1kar's înterference.31

The process of depoliticizing society and emasculating politica1 parties, begun in 1973, culminated in the idea of the Cfioating masses.- Nurcholish • Madjid used this theoretiœl concept in June 1971 when he advocated the closure of party branches below the regency level. The concept of fioating masses wu subsequently taken up by the Commander of Diponegoro, Major General Widodo, who declared that there wu no need for party organizations in villages. He echoed Madjid's belief that parties sbould not

disturb the people below the regency level (keaunatans or sub-districts), except during election campaians. 'lbus, there wu no need for any permanent commitment to party membersbip. Despite the govemment's justification of the idea of the tloating masees on the grounds that it did not Violate' any constitutional provisions, and its condemnation of an opposition

30 Crouch, The Anny. 271•

31 Laode Ida. Anatomi Kon/Iik: NU. Elit Islam dan. Negœa (Jakarta: Pu..ka SiDar • Harapan, 1996),42. to it. the Nahd1atul marna, which had amalgamated with the ppp. faced the • bitterest consequences. since most ofits members were from villages. Nawaz B. Mody states that the floating masses concept divided society into two major groups; the urban dwellers. who could remain involved in politics; and small town and village-dweUers. who could enjoy that luxwy only

during elections. The New Order regime undermined the rural masses by tenning them masih bodoh, or ·still uneducated,· and hence in need of being depoliticized and protected from the corroptive influence of poütical

participation and control.32 Following the success ofthe ruling govemment in eliminating opposition groups by legitimizing only two political parties other than Golkar until the 1977 general election. severa! issues arose that are relevant to the discussion in this paper. The first issue wu a new bill proposing a uniform maniage law for an Indonesians. The desire of some Muslim groups to impose lslamic law on ail Muslim couples had been proposed since 1967.

• but had never been officially introduœd. The main banier ta its implementation seems to have been the fear that it would subsequently affect other groups in society. In August 1973. the Oovemment introduced a bill proposing a uniform marriage law for aU Indonesians. The bill recognized

Istamic courts under the Ministry of Religious AfIàirs as merely playing a

minor legal role eompared to that of the civil courts., Without any clear

justification for sueb a law. namely without refening to any specifie re1igious

teachingst the bm required every marria&e to be registered in order to be valid and required Muslim men ta obtain the permission of a civil court before taking a second wiCe or obtaining a divorce.

• ~ M~. lndonesia, 313. 57

The Muslim faction in parliament ofcourse rejected this bill on religious

grounds. But for the ppp. including the NU poüticians. to vote against any

• bill in parliament would have been futile, since they were in the minority. They therefore threatened ta walk out if a vote was held and rallied the

Muslim community to protest such an assault on the fundamentals of

Islam. The dissatisfaction of the ppp was subsequently heard by Muslim groups outside the parliament through a press corps that still enjoyed limited freedom to publicize these kinds of issues. In the face of widespread

protest, especia1ly by Muslim youth groups, the bm wu finally redrafted by a committee of the DPR and finally passed without a vote. The powerlessness of the POl and ppp !rom 1973 to 1975 was not enough to reassure the New Order govemment that it controlled an aspects of life in Indonesia or that it was guaranteed to take the next general

election. In August 1975. the Govemment passed the Bill on Political Parties and Golkar. in which political parties could not cany out their activities • among people living in jurisdictions below the level of regency. This bill c1early showed that Golkar felt threatened by fact that the majority of ppp

voters were Nahd1atul Ulama members who lived in rural areas. The

minister of the Interior. Amir Machmud. stated that guidance oC the rural

population should be in the hands of Government officials. 'Ibis bill seems

to have been meant only 10 render the other politica1 parties împotent.33 The result of the 1977 general election showecl that the new law had achieved the desired goal Golkar naturally won a majority oC the vote. In

revïewing the breakdown oC cabinet membersbip after the 1977 election.

Michael R. J. Vatikiotis notes tbat.

By the late 197oe. ha1f the cabinet anel over two tbirda of the J'eIÎOD81 govemorabipe weœ miIitaJy appointeea. At the district Jeve1, 56 pet cent of district oflicel'8 weœ miIitaJy men. ID the buRaumu:y, 78 pet cent of diftctors • 33 Mody, 1ndtmcfitI, 317. 58

general and 84 per cent ofmiDisterial aecretariea were ABRI appointees. Even in the diplomatie aeMee, almotlt bal! the country'. ambueadon were !rom the militaIy in 1977. In the early 19808, a former US diplomat estimated tbat active and reti:red militaly men occupied ha1f the positions in the 'bigber central • bureaucracy'. More importantJy. the military domlnated the affaira oC every cabinet department. Some of the appointmeDts, especia1ly to the diplomatie service \Vele favors gamtedto œtiriQI otliœra. The DUiority was on the Ktive list and valued the wider puhlici~ and pater opportunities for mlumeration [sic) offeœd by their posts.34

The above picture of the political representatives and govemment elite, who were the secondary decision-makers below the president. clearly shows that there was little balance in the democratic representation of the majority

of the country's population. As can be seen, the govemment was largely

made up of military men, who inevitably adoptee! a military approach to any situation they faced. The army's almost impregnable position made it nearly

impossible for civil and non-governmental officers to become real forces in making policies for developing the state. This i5. of course, not to neglect certain elements of the ruling govemment. such as BAPPENAS (Badan • Perancang Pembangunan Nasional. or the Office of National Development Agency). especially after 1985 when the technocrats appeared to rival the

army as a power center. Their role, however, was limited to canying out national programs and only as long as the army did not see them as a threat to their existence. One of the policies which gru.tly influenced the structure of Indonesian nationalism after the 19708 and enabled the New Order rqime to maintain control of the countly through Golkar and ABRI, wu the institution of the Panca..ll1iila as the sole buis for an political parties and mus orpnj zations.35 Studying the Muslim response to and their acceptance of the Pancasi1a.

34 Michael R.J. Vatikiotia. Indonesiœt PoIitics Under SoehDrto (New York: • Routledge, 1994}.70-71• 59

Faisal Ismail notes three factors motivating the New Order govemment's • poliey in this regard. The factors were fear of the re-emel'Bence of Communist ideology, the rise of Muslim fundamentalist movements in the Muslim world in the late 19709, particularly in Iran, and a rise in Muslim -separatist' and

·fundamentalis~movements within the country.36 The bottom line was that these three factors. politically manipulated by the New Order govemment, indicated that it did not want any rival power to exisl. In reality. the religious movements accuse

~ For e1aboration ofdJi.isale, aee the pemment motives ofimplmen1iDl8Ole basis of the Pancuila and baclqpouncl to the NU', acceptance of ita IOle buis in the next chapter.

36 Faisal IIIIDtIiI. CJaIam in lDdcmaian PlOIitica: A Stwly of MU8Iim ReIpODle to and Acœptanœ of the PaneaaDa- (Ph.D. diaeertation. McGi11 University. 1995), 200. • See below in chapter three for more clebIiL • B. Toward the SltuboDdo Conp_..4 KemINIH le. IDatttah J66 The FaJlure or RU PoUtlca! Le.d.nh1p As 1mentioned in the previous section, "govemment pressure on social organizations. presented secondary poütical actors, such as Muslim groups

with a dilemme.. On the one band, Muslim groups wanted ta participate in

programs that enhanced national development and unity. On the other, they wanted ta help formulate the policies themselves and ta be influential in

establishing goals. Shut out as they were. it was not easy for them to

express their ideas in any meaningfu1 way. A direct confrontation with the government would certainly mean going against nation...state in the eyes of the ruling party. i.e., to he identified as anti... Pancasi1a and anti-govemment, while other approaches, such as ca1ling for greater appreciation of

-democracY' seemed still to be beyond the thinking ofthe uIama themselves. The ability to improve the political situation was beyond their ability when • compared to the power of Golkar and the ABRI ...supported New Order regime.

As the situation concemed the NU speci1ically there were additional problems involving the leadership of the NU and there were of equal consequence in affecting the wider NU political effort. One of the main internai problems of the NU during the period in question was the failure ofits leaders to maneuvering politiœlly. Importantly

after the NU amalgamated with the ppp in 1973.31 its politicians and representatives seemed unable to promote the interests of NU members and

supporters within the PPP, especially in gaining a just proportion of the ofticers and de1egates within the party. Again, as in Masjumi, this faîlure

3i OfficiaUy, the f'&1ioDI of Ibe ppp MIe MI (MP'limjaolftdcwsia), SI (SaiblIsIIm), PatLIDd the NU itse1f. PracticalIy, bDwever, we also fOUDd 1bat thae Vr'CIe leaders CI' -*ri of the • Muhammadiyah. 61

seemed to rest on the NU's doctrine of tasamuh (tolerance), i.e. t of expecting • certain offices and representation to be granted without negotiation. whüe other factions believed that open competition should he observed:

consequently NU's expectations were not meet.3I In addition. the govemment pressure against having former members of the Soekarno govemment active in the party led to the resignation of K.H. Saifuddin Zuhri. a leading NU figure widely respected in Muslim circles, from the ppp

leadership. This removed a person who might have e1fectively given the NU the position and representation in ppp that would have satisfied the NU

members and leade~p. Kacung Marijan notes that. basically, there appeared a shift of

political reality from the Old to the New Order. In the former era, con11icts occurred between parties, whereas in the latter. crises arose not only

between parties but also within each party.39 This was probably natura! in

view of the fact severa! parties were forœd into umbreUa groups and • integration had to take place under difficult conditions. The conflicts within the ppp began after the 1977 generai election. Prior to this date, an factions within the ppp appeared to be cooperating. resulting in an increase in the num~r of seats held, i.e., !rom 94 scats in 1971 to 99 seats in 1977, The

con1licts took place immediately afterwardt in 1978. when the govemment proposed lega1izing formal training for govemment officials in a program

called P4 (pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasilat Guidance for the Understanding and Implementation of Panœsila) and the alinm 1œpercayaan (Javanese mysticism). Within the PPP, the NU and MI (Musümin Indonesia) factions each had their own positions on the issue.

38 Agood alustration of tbia wu the defiW ofIdham Cha1id. who had to accept the list ofcandidates prepared by J. Haro for the 1987 electioD. See Syamsuddin Haria, • Menggugat Politi1cOrde Bœu (Jakarta: Gra&1Ît 1998), 85. 62

even though both etTectively opPOsed the proposaI. When the issue was • voted in the Peoples Consultative Congress (MPR), the Majelis Syuro Board of the PPP, made up mostly of NU leaders, reacted by walking out of the room when the vote was taking place, leaving only three representatives !rom the ppp left in the room. AIl three oC the latter, who were (rom the MI, chose to abstain rather than be identified with the losing side white the issue was passed.

The PPP's opposition to the P4 program rested on the assumption that it would thereafter be considered the official interpretation of the Pancasila itself, thereby undermining Muslim interpretations which differed

on some substantive points. Similarly, there was opposition by the ppp to

recognition of followers of Javanese mystical societies, the Aliran Kepercayaan, as a distinct religious or social grouping. based on the perception that it would divide the Muslim ummat along the lines of santri • (devout Muslims) and abangan (nominal Muslims who aI90 adhere to pre­ Islamic spiritual be1iefs). For the PPP, such a dichotomy was seen as divisive, when, for them, Muslims could only be differentiated on the buis of

their performance of religious practices.40 Internai contlict in the ppp often arase whenever the ppp responded

ta govemment poücy initiatives. In 1979, the New Order govemment issued a proposaI for the Election Law. Some important points criticized were the involvement or politiœl parties in the LPU (Lembaga Pemj1jban Umum, or The Institute of General Elections), the number ofrepresentatives appointed

by the government to parliamentt and the interpretation oC the fteedom to vote. As a reaction both major factions in the ppp ca11ed for the govemment

J9 Marijan, Quo Vals NUt Ill. • 40 Marijan. Quo VCICÜ, 112. 63

ta reduce the number of appointed representatives from 100 to 75.41 They • also generally opposed the other's concepts. The ppp sent two delegates, H.J. Naro and K.H. Masykur. to meet President Suharto on this matter. Out of a11 the counter-proposals put forward by the ppp representatives, Suharto accepted only one. which was

ta allow the ppp to adopt as its emblem the Ka'bah (the square structure in the Haram masque of Mecca toward which Muslims face during prayers). Later, on FebruaIY 25, 1980, after reviewing Suharto·s l'ejection of the proposais, the Central Board of the ppp decided to instruct the

parliamentary delegation to simply vote for the govemment's proposa!.4~ At this point, interna! disagreement &l'Ose, for the NU faction in the

ppp felt that the Central Board did not have the authority to decide such an

important issue on behalf of the entire party. The NU leaders, represented

by K.H. Saifuddin Zuhri, reasoned that, according to the moral principles

held by the NU, the goal of an endeavor cannot he separated !rom the • method of its achievement. -Even ifyou have a good goal, ifyou use a wrong or illegal way to achieve it, it means thatyou reach your goal by means ofan

illegality."43 Thus. when parliament wted on the govemment's proposai only

38 members of PPP. ail hm factions other than the NU. voted for the meas~ NU members while a number of other ppp parliamentarians abstained. Another dispute took place in preparations for the 1982 election when

the ppp met to select candidates for parliament who were to be divided

among the three leading factions. The MI faction argued that the 1975

41 See Marijan, Quo Vadis, 114.

42 See a1ao Tempo, Mareh (1980). 10•

13 Bee Sai1ilddin ZUhri. Kn1edeskqJ PolitJ1c 1tJIJDnI:aia 1(Jakarta: GUDUDl1cUD& • 1982),86. 64

consensus on the division of seats was no longer valid since it applied to the • 1977 election only; the MI, SI, and Perti therefore wanted more seats for the 1982 election. The NU insisted on adhering to the original consensus. In

commenting on the con1lict, K.H. Saifuddin Zuhri says.

In the series of meetiDp between the NU, MI, SI, and Perti. the COl'\Ull wu not used to prove stronpr arsuments. rather it wu omy used ta force the N1J into reduciDg its sbaœ of the number of seals !rom 56 to 49. The main reason for this wu clear1y ta deny the NU a majority in the ppp faction over the MI, SI and Perti when theee tbree parties 'Nere united.44

Although the Central Board held more than 20 meetings to deal with

the issue, there was no resolution by the tinte of the deadline for submitting the list of candidates to the election committee. Even though no agreement

had yet been reached, the Board Chairman H.J. Naro, submitted a list to

the general election committee with the distribution ofseats set at 48 for the NU, 30 for the MI, 15 for the SI, and 5 for Perti. The NU protested Naro·s submission, but it was too late since the list had already been oflicially • accepted by the election committee. In analyzing the con1lict among the factions within the PPP, Mahrus Irsyam points out two main sources of disagreement; distribution of positions within the PPP, and the resulting

distribution ofseats within parliament.45

A number of the NU ulama began ta criticize Idham Chalid, the NU

General Chairman. who wu regarded as having failed at barpining with other factions in the PPP. An important faction led by K.H As'ad Syamsul

Arifin, K.H. Ali Maksum and L.H. Machrus Ali, urgee! ChoUd to resign; he agreed signing the letter of resignation which had been prepared for this

44 Dialos KoH. Saifilddin Zu.hri, dkk.. PPp, NU dDn. Ml: GejoI4k WGdah PolitDc Islam (Jakarta: IntepitaPress, 1984), 10 as aleo quoted br M&rij8D, Quo Vadis. 116• 4~ Mahrus Irsyam., [Rama dan Panai PolitDc 4Jakarta: Yaya.D Pel'khidmatan, • 1984}.69. purposes.46 This in itselfbecame a controversial issue, since it had not been • decided at an official meeting of the NU. Those who supported the resignation appealed ta the syari'ah, insisting that Cholid'8 signature on the

letter proved that be had agreed to resign. white those 0PPosed it used

organizational reasoning (AD1ART)47 to argue that the resignation would he valid only ifdecided in an official meeting. ChoUd used the dispute to stay in

his position until the 1984 congress when he was not reelected to bis position. The ability of Chalid, to stay in office after resignation indicates a

serious lack of hannony among NU leaders and a lack of direction that has manifested itself at severa! periods in its history. This also seems to be the strongest reason for the NU's retreat from politics in 1984.

Retreat &om PoUtle.... 801utloll The government's politica1 policies on the one band and the fallure of the NU's leadership to gain control of the ppp (which it sbould have easily • dominated) led to a bistorica1 decision, namely, to leave practica1 politics. The NU's 17th Congress which wu held in Situbondo from Deœmber 8-12, 1984, had for its theme, -the NU's 1926 khittah to cultivate togetherness and expand participation in developmerU48 for the improvement of services to religion, the nation and the country.- ln accordanœ with the theme and in

response to CWTeI1t events,. the cong:ress issued four important decisions,. among others:

1. ta Mtum 10 the 1926 lthit:ttû4 for the mnaoHdation of the raie of ulama, - wbîCh ia or a collective nature in Islam;

46 ne issue ofChaUd's JaipaliOD bas hem disC'Iswd by IDIIIYt IIDODI aIben by MalijaD, Quo Vadis NUt 120-125.

4'7 ADJART'"for An....n.rand An..- RumIh Tanga. This tenn or abbreviIliOD is used for both tbeoRùcallDd operaioaal plad'orm ofIOCiallDd poIiticaI orpnilJllionl iD lDdoaesia. • • Stress is addcd. 66

2. that Nahd1atul Ulama, as an association, not be tied to any other social or politicalorpn;l8tion; 3. to give its members the freedom to determine their own politica1 aspirations; • 4. to accept Pancasi1a as its sole principle in ils organizationallife.49 Literally, khittah means the basis oC thougbt. action and behavior for NU members in every aspect of life, as well as in making any decision. This was seen as in keeping with the spirit of the NU's foundation, namely as a forum for promoting Sunni religious precepts. According to the platf'orm of the NU, an attempt was to be made to maintain close relations among those

who followed the four imams or Islamic jurists, to examine al1 textbooks for use in schools to ensure that they were free from the influence of bid'ah

(innovation) teachings, to promote the teachings of the four madhabs in all

possible ways, make every effort to build madrasahs (Islamic Schools), to

build masques and pesantrens (lslamic Boarding Schools), ta help fatherless

child.ren, orphans, and the poort as weil as to establish institutions for

developing agriculture. Basica1ly, this platform implicitly excluded politics.5O • As Bruinessen notes, the term khittah was actually not use

tilDe NU was founded tate in that year. As developed by Siddiq. the lchittlÛl

was seen to consist of educational (maJarijJ, social welfare (mabarrat),

'49 See Greg Barton, 'a)am, PaDaw1a and Middle Path of Tawuauth: The Thougbt of Ahmad Siddiq,· in Gœs Sarton and Fealy Barton, Nahdlatul Ulama, 1Tad:itionallslam and Modemity in lndonesi4 (Clayton. Victoria: MoD88h ABia Institute, 1996),11()'128, Douc1as E. Ramage, ~ Relilious ToleraDce and Pancasila: The PoJitical Thoupt of Ahdurrabman Wabid,· in Greg Sarton and Fealy Barton, Berton, Nahd1atulUlamtl, TraditionallsltJm. and Modemity in In40Msia (Clayton. Victoria: Monaah ABia lnatitute, 1996), 227-256 8Dd HM. Sha1eh Banm and Abdul Munir Mulkan; Latar Bela1a:urg Umat Islam. Menerima 1'ancGsI1a Sebagai Asas Tunggal (Yogyakarta: Aquariua, 1986).

50 PBNO, Nahdlallli Ultmta K~mbai 1œ K/rilt/llr 1926(Buduns: RitIIab, 1985), 54. • 51 See aIso abc DCXI sa:ticm on bislorical coasidcnIiCII ordie Idtitlall, below. 67

religious teaching (dakwah), and economic (mu'amalah) components. ln addition, Ahmad Siddiq held that political participation was only one way of • khittah applying the and saw other methods consistent with the Qur'an and Hadith as valid; he left these concepts abstract and thus open to interpretation. The core of the book emphasized the non-radical charaeter of the traditional Sunni madhhab, based on the concepts of tawassuth (middle

way), i'tidal (balance) and tawcizun (moderation, or non-extremism). To bring the concept ofkhittah up to date, he saw the NU as having to incoperate the following political guidelines:

(1) The Nation-state (founded by the people) must he maintained, and its existence defended. (2) The constitutional power-holeler ofthe countJ:y must he he1d in respect and must be obeyed, as long as he or she does not bœak the constitution, or lead society against the national constitution and the LawofGod. (3) ln case the power-holder makes a mistake, it must be corrected in the best poSSlble way.52

The NU's -retum to the 1926 khittaH' drew a reaction from several • quarters outside the organization. Some looked at the advantages and disadvantages of the move to the NU itse1f; othels viewed it in the national

contexte Some analyzed the decision from the standpoint of the current situation, while others carefully looked at it in a historical context. For Lukman Harun. leader of the Muhammadiyah. for example, the decision wu a logiœl $lep for NU after its frustration in the political uena and its difticulties in the PPP. Muhammad Dawam Rahardjo stated that NU had taken an opportunistic approach to politics that wu UDconsciously cultural in nature. Amien Rais opined that NU's decision was an over-emotional act,

hastily made due to over-enthusiasm.S3 These opinions reflected a view that

52 K.H. Ahmad SiddiCIJ Khittah Nahdliyah (SUrabaya: Balai Buku, 1980),5l. • 53 The lndonesian Queuterly, 8, no. 2 (1984). 68

the NU was not a very. effective political actor either on the national stage or • in a political party. Nurcholish Madjid and Douglas E. Ramage consider the NU's declsion to leave the politica1 Brena as representing a depoliticisation of Islam, or a

de-Islamisation of the party. In simiJar tones, Greg Sarton attributes the NU's decision to leave formal poUties to a recognition of the faet that .party­

political activity in the name of Islam is both counter productive for the umat, and, in as such activity gives rise to sectarianism, is unhealthy for society at large.-S4 Most scholars agree that the decision to withdraw from

politics was mostly infiuenced by Abdurrahman Wahid's wish that the NU

be able to take part in the national development of Indonesia, as further

noted by Barton,

By the miel 1970s Abdurrahman and bis coUeagues were expressing the conviction that the inteIest of the ununat, and of broader society, would be better served by the ummat tuming away from party-political activity and embraciDg the oon-sectarian stale phil090phy of Pancasilar fifteen years • before it becam.e popular, or even acceptable, ta express such thought.S5 Douglas Ramage notes that,

For many reasons, particularly cleavaaea within the Islamic movement, and manipulation of Islamic politics and parties by the Soeharto govemment, as ~ll as intemal orpnizational disputes over doctrines and politics, as a progressive NU faction won control ofthe orpniration at its 1984 Congress. There the propessiveneM, Ied by Abdurrahman Wahid and Ahmad Siddiq sucœeded iD convincing the mem.bersbip that NU sbould withdraw and redirect its eDeJBies away !rom natioDal politica towanls educational, cultural, spiritual, and eœnomic activities desiped to improve the situation ofthe urnnutt.56

54 Greg Sarton. -rhe Impact of Neo-Modemism on IDdonesiaD taI.mie Thought,· in David Bourchier and John I.etme, Democracy in Inclonaia 19502 and 1990s (C~n, Victoria; Center ofSoutheast Asian Studies, Monaah University, 1994), 147.

55 Bourchier and John I.etme, DetrtDcracy, 147.

56 Douglas Rams., Politics in Indonesia: !JemDcTtlq, Islam and the Ideology 0/ • Tolerance (London and NewYork: RoutJed&e, 1997), 55. 69

Hlatorlcal CouldentioD lor RetunaID& to tlae Kblttab or 1926 • Historica1ly, the decision to retum to the 1926 khittah was not, in fact, due ta emotional over-enthusïasm, as claimed by many, but rather the result of a long process of self-introspection on the past of its leaders which

had begun at the 22nd cougress of the NU, held in Jakarta in 1959. The

maye to go back to the spirit of 1926 was proposed by local leaders directiy

involved in society. Direct experience and knowledge Dot shared by leaders and politicians in big cities like Jakarta had encouraged them to find other

solutions for the ummat. It was a matter of concem that NU members,

whose votes had been used in every election for the purpose of electing NU

representatives to parliament, had been neglected. by those same

representatives. It was believed by those doing the introspection that they no longer used. their presence in parliament to promote NU members' interests,

but rather their own; or perhaps they had been co-opted. by other factions

within the party. • At the 22nd congress, K.H. Ahmad Khalimi, from the Mojokerto

branch, first proposed the idea of going back to the 1926 program (he did

not use the term -khittaJi'). The central leaders and politicians argued that they could have the spirit or 1926 written into the NU platfarm, but that they did Dot want the NU to leave the politica1 arena just yet. In bis general response to the congress, Idham Chalid., Cbairman of the Central Executive

Councü, TanficlDab stated,

When Mojolœrto (repœeentative) propoaea bis idea. ta maIœ NU as jtJm.'iyah (asocial orpniration asit uaed to bel, he doea DOt mean a &tep backward. (lt wu) DOt al aD. ItmiIht he due tG dieati+ctionwith the fact tbat\ft alw8p focus our ~and iDteœ..mut1y on politicL We aU realize tbat in tbia respect ,. have ."era1 weakae.... 1 apee \Vith the idea of lOÎDlI back to the year 1926, tbat \ft 10 baclt to the apirit and tIOU1 of fa'Gbbudiyah (worsbip) of 1926, butin our~,,.~intheyear 1959.$1

~ Sboleh Hapt, trIde KembBli te KhiUGh 1926: Dilontarkan Sejak 1959- Aula, March 1990, p. 84. Thia ia &lm quoted by Kaams Marijan, Quo Vadis NahI:l1atul UlatruI: • 5etelah Kem.baIi 1œ Khittoh 1926(Jakarta: Edan... 1992), 133. 70

After 12 years (1959-1971) of struggle in the political arena, the same

• idea of going back to the 1926 khittah was raised again by Rois (the Aam Chief of Suriyah Board of the Central Board of the NU) K.H. Wahab

Hasbullah in bis opening add.ress to the 25th congress, held in Surabaya.

He said that, although they strugled in the year 1971, they should be

anjmated with the spirit ofthe year 1926. They should always be committed

to the aqidah, namely promoting religious beliefs and the himmah (spirit) of

the Ahl al-Sunnah wa al,Jama'ah.S8 ln response to this idea, H.A. Syaichu

replied that the spirit of the founding of the NU 47 years earlier had nothing

ta do with ·politics.- However, he then conceded. that, in the modem era,

Muslims could not abandon politics, even though politics was not the only

way to promote certain interests. Still there was an awareness that the NU had contributed to the building of the nation-state, but that it was time for

the NU to pay more attention ta its members. • The view that the NU failed in promoting the interests of the ummat through the medium ofpolitics is not really accurate. Kacung Marijan points

ta the NU's contribution during the period 1952 to 1973 in two important domains. First, in the religious sphere, the NU 8ucceeded in promoting religious subjects as a compulsory component of the cuniculum in public schools. This objective wu in line with the idea that, as a Pancasi1a-based nation, Indonesia encouraged its people to understand and practice their religious teacb;ngs. Second, a number ofIAlNs (Institut Agama Islam Negeri,

or State Institutes for Islamic Studies) were founded by the Department of Reügious Affairs (Departemen Apma) while itwu under the direction of NU leaders; these bave become an important part or the Indonesian system of

• sa Sho1eh Hayat, -Ide Kembali, 84. 71

higher education.59 It was 1ikewise under NU leadership that the National

Program of the Ml'Q, the (Musabaqah Tilawah al...Qur'an, or Festival oC

• 60 in Reciting the Qur'an) was developed. Moreover, the political sphere, the

NU had been represented by its politicians in ministerial positions charged with instituting development polices in the country. Marijan notes that an these accomplishments were cited by NU politiciens to emphasize the

organization's contributions through political involvement.

Support for the idea of going back to the spirit oC 1926 snowballed,

however, by the 26th congress, held in Semarang June 5... 11, 1979, where it

was presented in a more advanced forma One of the results of the congress

was a Five-year Basic Program (Program Dasar Pengembangan Lima Tahun)

with three main targets: (1) full and total comprehension of the meanjng of

the appeal of going back to the 1926 kltittah; (2) consolidation of internaI

efforts at fulfiJ1jng the appeal; and (3) consolidation of the scope of the NU's

contribution to the development of the nation in more realistic terms. • During the next five years, the NUs social, economic, and re1igious programs and activities were aimed at reacbing these three goals. It was at

59 Rea)jzinB the c:balJenae paented by the globalir.atjon of infbaDation, the economy, science and technotor.v. in its DeXt &tep of deve1opment, the IAIN ia to be transformed into the VIN or UNIN (Universitas Islam N~ or Stale Ialpmic University). Tbree IAlNa, SyamHidayatl1Dab ofJakana, SUDaIl JCuim oC Bamdu"I aad Sunan Kalijaga ofYoavakartahave beeD desipeted m tIaD8forma tïon inm UDivenities in tbeir own risht, in wbich varioua di8ciplines ofJmowted&e other than religion will be provided. The prosram ofMndinllAlN Jecturera tG McGill UDiveni1;y for accœditation ia part of thia transfOrmation pIOIr8IIL For more iDf'ormation, Bee, Studia Is1amika, -ulN: SearchiDB for anJntearated System ofKœwled&e-, volS DO. 2, (1998), 76-82.

60 0rigina11y tbe MTQ was desiFed oDly for recitiD& the Qur'an; it bas since been deve10ped tG iDdJade more tban &fteen festivaIa cluriD8 the eveDt, mchlCU", underst.andiDI ({ohm al-Qur'an) the Quèan, -rsJamjc- ~ Islam and modem wieDœ and teclmoJo&y, the Qur'an and education, Quranic aepIÛI, Arabie c:aIIi(pphy, • memorizins the Qur'an, and more. 72

this congress that the AD1ART (Platform) was transformed in status !rom a • political party ta a social organization.61 The critical response from local leaders grew more agressive, however, as illustrated by Nakamura:

(a)Tbe Central Executive Council was oot active in repreeenting and defending local branches whicb had been faœd with extreme 1ft8SWU !rom the outaide, pressures wbich in SOlDe cases had 1ed 10 the point of physic:al extinction, especially during the two pneral election periods of 1971 and 1977; (b) the Central Executive Council was aeaetive about its own adivities vis-a-vis the local branches, especiaJly with regard 10 &id and grants reœived from Muslim countries overseas; and (c) the format of the reports of the Central Executive Council was inadequate in that the program adopted at the 25th SurabayaCongress was not used to evaluate its performanœ.62

Although the general concem of NU leaders was consistent, namely to

protect and promote the interests of the ummat, the way ta solve the

problems facing them was perœived differently. One group, loyal to Idham Chalid, wished to continue promoting NU's interests througb a politica1

party. The privüeges they had enjoyed for over 10 years May have inspiretl • them ta defend this position. Another group wished that NU would return to the 1926 khittah, i.e., leave politics altogether. The latter woup coosisted oC K.H. Abdul Hamid, K.H. Ahmad Siddiq, Abdurrahman Wahid, K.H. Ali Maksum, and others. They were Dot politicians by definition, but heing

doser to the ummat, tbey were greatly concemed for its welfare. Declining

representation for NU politicians and a wish to contribute more through the organization MaY have encouraged this group in its efforts. Finally, there was also a group tbat might have wished that the NU retum to the khittah

61 PBNU, Program Da.stu Nahtl1G.t&d tnœnan PembapncJn linuJ. Tahun Nahdlatul Ularna: Keputu.san Muktamar Nah4latul Vlama 1ce-26. 12.

62 Mitsuo Nakamura, -rhe Radical TraditioDaJism or the N8bdletu1 lJlama in Indonesia: A PenonalAccouDt orthe 26th lfeticmal Ccqp8s. JUDe 1979, ~in Greg and Fealy Banon, Naht:l1Gtu.1 C1lamtJ, Tral1itiotJGl 1alGRl œuI. MotIJ8mity in IndDnesia • (Clayton. Victoria: Monaah A8ia IDatitute, 1996), 68-90. 73

because they had been removed from the list of candidates for • representation in the 1977 election by the Naro groUp.63

A Re. Bea_ ofPurpo.

As 1mentioned earlier, the period on which 1am focusing my study is the third phase of Indonesian nationalism (1980s-199Os), especially when we

study it from an ideologica1 perspective.6<4 For the NU, the year 1983 appeared to he a propitious time for the youngC'r generation to take the

initiative of rea1izing the retum ta the 1926 khittah in a fundamental, i.e.,

politically, socially, economically, and organizationally. As a member organization of the PPP, the NU had been politica11y ineffective; as an

organization with supporters from rural areas, it had been socially and

economically disadvantaged by the economic system of the New Order, and

as an association of ulama, its religious leaders had virtually no role at the organizationa11evel and had been disregarded and considered unimportant. • That is why Many experts have studied the Situbondo Congress !rom the perspective of these three phenomena: (1) the leadership crisis in mid-1982

which led ta the faIl ofIdham Chalid; (2) the acceptance of Pancasila as a.sas

63 Together with bis nephew, Salahuddin Wahïd, a brother of Abdurrabm8ll Wahid, Yusuf Hasyim. foUDded PKU (Partai Xeb8Dl1dtaD Ummat, or The Reaqenœ of the Umm.al) after bis ideaa of iDdudinc Syari'ah and Aqidah Ab! al-Swmah Wa al­ Jama'ah. failed to be acœpted by tho8e involved in foundinl the PXB (Partai KebaDpitan Banpa, or the National AwakeDi"l Party). That he ... a eIo8e œIative of Abdwrabman Wabid ... probably the main reuoD why Wahid dicl DOt ut both oC them to lead the PKB. Po1emica betweeD them CODœrDÎIII how lalamic teacbinp 8Dd values sbouJd be applied in Iadoœaia appeared. in v81'ÎOua uew.papetII, wbiIe political parties musbroomecl tbrougbout the country. ApiD, SuJmi'. tolerant attitude wu re1lected in thia evenL See ûot MeJmoem. Madlfoeda, KebGngId:tDn tnama dan Bangkitnya Ularna (Surabaya: Yayuan ICesatuan Ummat, 1982), 269. • 54 Sec my special cücassioD œdie PmcasiJa as the sole tIIsis or QSQ/ tllnggGl iD tbe aext cbapW" 74

tunggal (sole foundation); and (3) the formation of the Siddiq-Abdurrahman • leadership team wihtin the NU itself.6S Fallowing its decision ta retum to the 1926 khittah and ta making it the official palicy of the organization, the delegates to the 27th congress finally

succeeded in formulating the basic ideas in the khittah. As quoted by van Bruinessen, the statement reads:

Political right is a right for aD the citizens, including those who aftjJjated with NahdlatuJ Ulama.. But Nadhlatul Ulama is Mt a place for politicol activities. Application of political right sbould be based on the existing constitution and practiced with akhla1cul karfmah (good morality) in attOrding to Islamic teachings, 50 that thue appear a hea1thy politica1 civilization. Nahdlatul Ularna appreciates al! citiz.ens who use their poütical right well, seriously and fWl of responsibility. 66

Many scholars view the NU's decision to retum ta the 1926 khittah, and ta leave politics as a new strategy for the Indonesian traditionalist Muslims ta promote their interests in facing new realities of a modem nation-state. This new strategy was actually a culmination of three important leading • factors: its historical discourse since its leaders began to engage in sel!­ introspection; con1licts or arguments prior to and during the congress and public discourse when the issue was presented for in public discussion

thraugb. the mass media.67 This new strategy also showed that, on the one

6S See, for example, Mitsuo Nakamura, -riahdlatu1 Ulama's Leadership Cri.. and Search for ldentity in the Ear1y 1980s: From the 1979 SemaraDg Conaresa to the 1984 Sîtubondo Conpess,. in Greg and Fea1y Sarton, Nahdlatul UlGnUJ, TraditionGl Islam. and Modemity in Indonesia (C1aytGn, V1doria; MoD88h Asia Institute, 1996), and Martin van Bndnes'ftl, Nahdlatul Ulama: 7nIdisi, Relasi-relasi, PenœriG1l. Waœna &ru (Y0&Yakarta: OOS, 1994), 115-149. Most ofthe approadles to the Situbondo CoDFesa, however, viewed the thJee factors as cauaea that had made the coqpess 88 Slch, but 1 think the three issues were much moze a respoœe to, or a result of, the politica1. economic and social situation inIndoœsia prior to the c:onpesa.

66 PBNU, Hasil MuJctamar Nahd1a.tul Ulama 1œ 27 Situbondo: Nahd1atu1 Ulamtl Kemba1i Iœ Khittah 1926(SemaraDB: Sumber bmJJœh, 1985), 44. The italicawere added by Martin van Bnmieseen in Martin van BmJrieseen, Nahdlatul Ulama: 7nIdisi, Relasi­ relasi, Penœrian Wacana Bœu (YO&f8karta: 1KiS, 1994), 128•

61 Muhammad A.S. Hibm, MKhJItt1JI NU cIaD CMl Society," iD EDyua K.R DIunis. Gtu Du,., • NU don Ma.ryt1NIall Slpll (Y0I)'Ibrta: UïS, 1994). 136. 75

hand, the NU was trying to solve its internai problem and on the other, it • also showed that the NU had the ability to discuss and make decisions that would later on have a great impact on the religious üfe ofthe country.

•

• CBAPTERm • THE RU'S RBSPOIIU TO ABD POLIey TOWARDS POLITICS ABD TIŒ KATIORAL msoLOGY

A. The Socio-PoUtica1 .ackp01Uld of the Ideolo., of Aaal TI.uJggGJ pancastra

Nationalism and ideology often go hand-in-hand. Once nationalist movements succeed in managing the (orces needed ta conCront such opponents as colonialism and imperialism, the nm task is to set the national ideology in arder to maint8Ïn the ideals of nationalism. One defnition ofideology is, -a set of ideas that fonn the bpsis ofan economic or

political theoty or that are held by a particular group or persan"l 1t is indeed vital to the survival of a nation, as it unites people through a

common national identity, shared pride, and mutual strength. It in tum inspires the people of the nation ta achieve their social, economic and • politica1 goals and prompts them to produce laws that reflect their image of themselves as a society. Thus, in developing and maintaining -nationalism,· national ideology serves as an important tao! that should he based upon

universal values2 which are, at least, widely accepted by the people. In addition, -the goal of ideology is to arouse feelings and incite action, and the power of an ideology derives from its capacity to capture the human

imagination and mobilize and unleash human energies.·3

01 1 A.S. Homby, Orford AdwIItœl U..u·" DietiOlttlt'Y, 4 ed. (0xC0nt Oxford UDi'wniIy ~ 1989),616.

:2 Emcst GdIDcr, Naliou tIItd NtlllOIffIli_ (ItbIca lDd New York: ComeIl UaMnity Pœss. 19941 L GcDncr s1a1eS 1hIl ....Dllio"piDcipIe CID be aaeraecl iD an edûcal, CUIIÎ\'eISIÜSIÎC spirit". I.œkïnl al the tm: priDcipies of the PJncesiJa, tbey ..10 be III ICQIIIIC cIeIcripâon 01 local cdIical wl.. iD Indonesia and the best lIIC8D oC1UÙIiIII1bc wrious el....in die Dllion.

3 Reo M. CuisleDlon el al., Id«J1ogi~~ (IIf(J Modtm PoUlies (New York: Dodcl Mead a • Compmy, 1975), 6. 77

In the first chapter 1 discussed the characteristics of NU and its • contribution to the formation of the country and the establishment of the national ideology. In the second 1have elaborated the NU's decision to leave the political Brena with its significance ta the nationaJism of the NU members. In this chapter 1 will examine both the NU's commitment ta the

nation-state by holding fast ta the national ideology and its responses to politica1 developments in the last few decades. Prior to World War Il, first under Dutch rule and then under Japanese occupation, Indonesia's national ideology was only in an incipient or latent

stage, emerging as it was from a wide1y shared goal of ridding the country of alien rule. Therefore, the foundation of the Communist Party and other ideological groups was not considered a threat to other ideologies, such as

Islam,4 after aU, they wee allies in the struggles against the Dutch. When

the preparations for independence began to take shape, the issue of national ideology took as much more meaning since each group wanted • concepts that reflccted its own outlook and direction.s The ensuing war of words resulted in a rough consensus finally being reached wbereby the Pancasila wu cbosen as the national ideolo&y, or phllosophical baBis for the country.6 The Pancasila represents the five principlea on which the

state is founded: (1) Ketuhlman yang Maha Esa (Belief in One Ood); (2)

Kemarwsiaan yang adil dan berodab (A Just and civilized

humanitarianism); (3) 19'satuan lndonesia (lndonesian national unity); (4) KeraJcyatan yang dipimpin oleh hikmtJh IœbijaksaruuJn dalam

permusyawaratan dan perwaIàllm (Indonesian democracy tbrough

4 Sec for exIIDple, KeDji TSDCIdya, -Jndonesi'n N"Usm ÙlIIs SUife far I~"'," 77w Indonttian QutJl'1erly 20. 4 (1994). 48.

5 See cba&*r L

5 See aIsD CbaIMr 1ClP"ially -=dOIl B, wbere 1 diIœss the ClDdribuIicIa œabe NU to the • formulalion ofthe PancasU. _ the pbiIosopbicII buis oftbe COUIIIIy. 78

consultation and consensus); and (5) Keadilan sosial bagi seluruh rakyat • Indonesia (social justice for ail Indonesian amens). The initial spirit of Pancasila was ta create a common ground for the foundation of an independent, unified, and modem state concutTellt with the former

Netherlands East Indies.7 Although the majority of Indonesians identified

with Islam, there wu no declsion to form. an -Islamic state.· By referring to the Pancasila as an ideology, Indonesian nationalism makes every religious

group and ethnie group equal beiore the law. This willingness to make nationalism paramount seems t refiect the great coneem at the time of its inception with the necessity for unity in order to protect the independence

of the new state they were creating. The discourse on Pancasila. its meaning, interpretation, manipulation and implementation bas colored the lndonesian politicallandscape sinee it

was ftrSt introduced in 1945. An important too1 for uniting more than 200

million people, five official religions, hundreds of local languages and 300 • ethnie groups, Pancasila is c1early of paramount importance. In the beginning, there were in fact several major diBicult-to-reconcile ideological

positions advocated by the members of the Investigating Committee' when

the philosophical buis of the state (dasar negara) wu under discussion. There were two ml\Îor camps involved: those who wished to establish Islam as the basis of the state and those who sought to establish a secular,

constitutional democraey. In order to bridge these two strtmg positions, Ir. Soekarno addressed the committee on June 1, 1945 (now remgnized as the

day of •Lahimya Prmcasiltt (the birth of Pancasila) confirming Pancasila as

7 Submo, Poncœ1lt1: 77Ie B4si8 0/" &. 01" Rqub/lc o/IItlIotw!iQ (Jabrta: NaIioIll1 Commiuee for the Commemoration oClIIe Birtb ofpwas;". 1964), 13·31.

1 The membas oC Ibis emmriaee consisted ~ pRJIIIiDeDl1ncbwsians itpœntin& Ibe various • social, ethnie, 1eJi0Dal, lDd )k1Ii1ica1 PJPI in .. Ilp111C1eoOCCUpied NethcrIaD4t &st lDdies. ÂIDODI 79

the philosophica1 basis of the state.9 Despite the fact that sinee then many • parties, and especia1ly the ruling govemment, have given their own interpretations, it always served as the primary force behind Indonesian national unity.

The Xew Or....'. IIotlv.. tcw IJDpleaeatbal Paaculla .. tu 801. FOUDd.tioll

After campaigning as the protector of the Pancasila and confronting (80­

called) anti-Pancasila elements on a number of historical occasions, the

New Order, backed-up by ABRI and Golkar, began in 1982 to promote the importance of the application of Pancasila as the sole foundation for an political parties and social organizations. The main aim of this policy was to

safeguard the Pancasila as the state's national ideology and eliminate any other ideology that threatened its authority; Communist and Islamic

ideologies were to vaI)'Ïng degrees seen as falling into this œtegory. As far • as the political situation of the time wu concemed, there seem to have been three main factors behind the decision by Suharto's govemment to take this step. The first of these wu the traumatic events of the 1977

election campaign, in which clashes often broke out between rival party

supporters. Suharto reasoned thatthe violence between Golkar and ppp

supporters had its roots in their contruting ideological outlooks.10 His reasoning was Dot so much that religious sentiment or teachinp were

themselves to blame, but that emphasizing them in an excessive manner

could lead to open conflict between supporters. Furthermore, by relying on

secuJar nationalislleaders tben: wcre fOUDd Ir. Socbmo, the first PJaideat of lDdoœsia and Muhammad Hat1a, laIer Viœ Presideat.

9 See chaJICr n.

10 SusuœI AwanohIra, MA CbID&e iD ..Law?,· Far EasImt Eœnomic Revitw. 117,35 (Aupst • 27, 1982), 20. 80

religious arguments, which appealed solely to verses of the Qur·an and the • Hadith. the parties tended to lose sight of the more important issues in an the election, sueh as current ecoDomic and social developments. Looking at this experience, Suharto perceived that religion was, in fact, the main source of the conflict and that, therefore, an alternative basis for reasoning

should he provided, namely, the osas 'l'ung!Ja1 Panœsila. The phrase osas

tunggal meant simply to make the Pancasila the sole foundation for aU social or mass organizations and politica1 parties. The second factor behind the New Order government's decision to

establish the Pancasila as the sole basis for ail political parties wu the faet

that the ppp was still based on Islam. By having both Pancasila and Islam

as its basis. the ppp was considered to have a -double- basis. In dealing with the govemment, the ppp appeared to follow government policy; in its campaigns, however, it used Islamic rhetoric and ideology more than the Pancasila. T1ùs was an unwarranted intrusion of religion into the politica1 • realm as well as challenging the New Order itself to remove this two­ pronged threat, Suharto decided to make osas tunggal (sole foundation) the basis for an politica1 parties and included aIl social organizations in the

country to close1 1 off any means of avoiding the measure by having sueb associations take a political activities themselves that retlected other values. The third factor leading to the application or the asas tunggol wu the intention of the govemment to encourage every party ta be -more program­ oriented- instead of-xleology-oriented.- Thus, it wu expected that a party's

appea1 would stem from the programs offered and Dot from the sentiment of

11 Sce Faisal Ismail, I&~ politks lDd ideoIo&Y iD 1acIDneIia· a SIIIdy of1be JW'OCCII ofM.um aa:eptaoœ of the Puns1"," (Ph.D. diMertatiaD, Mc.

a particular religious belief, such as Islam. This BrlUD1ent wu actually an • ideal application of the democratic syst=m; however, the fact that no other ex:isting political party had ever held power meant that Golkar could claim

the credit for a1l cWTent PfOIfIUDS ofnational deve1opment. Officially, the issue of applying the sole buis wu raised by President Soeharto in a welcoming speech at Rapim ABRI (Rapat Pimpinan ABRI, or

Armed Forces Commandera' Meeting) in Pekanbanlt on March 27; 1980. The same issue wes emphasized once &Iain when he delivered a speech at

the 28th anniversary celebration of the Kopassandha (Korps Pasukan Sandi Yudha., or Army Para-Commando Unit) at Cijantung, Jakarta, on April 16, 19801 On both occasions; Soeharto explicitly refelTed to the national consensus reached by ABRI and soclo-politica1 forces in 1968, by which

decision aIl had agreed to apply the Pancasila as their sole buis. The year 1968 wu the first to see confrontation between other political parties and

the New Order; a fact which might have led to the decision itself.12 He then • went to point out that the qreement had not been fully implemented since -there wu still one political party which held principles in addition to

Pancasila.-13

Although Suharto did not explicitly name the party in question. he most certainly meant the PPP, which officially reprded Islam as its second buis

after the PanCS9'1e 'Ibis was clear from politiœI behavior in the two sessions of the MPR and DPR. As noted earlier, in 1978, the ppp rejected

the legalization of the P4 (Pedoman Penghayatan dan Peopm&1an

Pancasila, or Guidance for the Understandinl and Implemenq of Pancasila), with many of its members walking out or the meeting room

12 Sec DrlttJ Ma.JyrII'tlbIt, 21, 8, 1968.

13 Peœr Rodps, UlDdDDesiats FIitIIfid fIex Tbeir PoIiIicIl Mœde," FtII' &sfem EconotrIic • Revi~t 110••9 (NcMmber 21, l~)t 37. Sec aIJo Tempo, (JUDe 14 1980), 9. because they favored an -lslamic· rendition of Pancasila. Because the votes • were against them, the ppp leaders had chosen to leave the meeting dramatically as a means of showing their disapproval. In 1980, the ppp used the same tactic in showing its displeasure with the decision reached by the DPR in changing the general election law. The law was, according to ppp leaders' opinions, in Golkar's favor only. In bis speech, Soeharto calle

of the PPP, admonishing them:

As long as we have not yet succeeded in bringing them 10 the senses, we must step up our vigilance, choose partners and friends who truly defend Pancasila and have no doubts about it. We do not mean to be hostile to a party 01' group which does not yet trust Pancasila lOOOk, no, but we are obliged to persuade them in such as way that an social and politica1 forces will base themselves on out national ideology, Pancasila, with no addition whatsoever.1"

This speech, especially the phrase in which he advised the people ta choose their partners and friends with care, suggested an implicit desire to rid himself of opponents, and thus provoked negative reactions from both • Muslim leaders and a number oC prominent retired military officers. Two days after a second simùar speech (18 April, 1980), Lt. Gen. (ret.) A.Y.

Mokoginta - a North Sulawesi Muslim who selVed as chief of the Sumatra Command between 1964 and 1967· sent a nine-page letter ta Gen. Muhammad Yusuf (the most respected of the generals) expressing bis

concem about Soeharto's speeches on both occasions. Expressing simiJar concems, the FKS Puma Yudha, an association of prominent retired army officers, sent a letter on May 1980 to the Army Chief of Staff, Gen.

Poniman. The letter wu also signed by other retired genera1s, including Lt. Gen. (ret.) H.R. Dharsono (former Commander-in-Chief of the West Java

based Si1iwangi division of the army and former Secretary General of

• 14 Rodgers, "lnctonesian Faidaful," 37. 83

ASEAN), and Lt. Gen. (ret.) Sudirman (former Commander of the East Java • Brawijaya Division) voicing the same sentiment.1S One month later, on May 13, 1980, the Petition of Fifty Group presented a one..pqe ·statement of concem· to an factions oC the DPR. claiminS that President Soehartots interpretation of Pancasüa could cause new disputes within society, It also claimed that, through the addres8; Soeharto had helped to implement the goals oC certain military leaders who wanted to

harmonize the UUD 1945 (Constitution) with the Sapta Marga (the seven..

part 901dier's oath) and remove a.Il other interpretations. The other main concem of this group was Soeharto's invitation to ABRI to monitor aIl social..political sroups. Amone the leadinK figures of this Il'Oup were retired generals, such as navy Lt. Gen. Ali Sadikin (former Govemor of Jakarta), Gen. A.H. Nasution (former Chief of Staff of the armed forces and former head of the MPRS (Provisional People's Consultative Assembly)) and Gen•

Hugeng (former Chief of the Indonesian Police). • Tbrough the involvement of severa! former leaders of Masyumi, as well Muhammad Natsir. Sjarafuddin Prawira Nepra and Burhanuddin

Harahap; and Muslim activists and preachers such as ~M, Fatwa; a Muslim opposition group of a sort wu bom. Beœuse oC the names involved who had been Masjumi activists. with same sidinl with the PRRI rebeUion,

the group wu considere

movement and a distinct threat.l~ The criticisms and 8J'!WDents of outsiders did not afl'ect the government's resolve to implement the osas tunggGl. Notwith8tan~ the

15 David JeDkiDs. ~ witb GoIbr," Far EœImI Economie R~ftI 101, 27 (JuDe 27, 1980),25.

16 W'lth the caUape otSoebano's New Order, Ibe members ofPeIisi 50 WOIl '** 1bcir freedam 10 express tbcir viCWI in ~OIJÎIII .. QUdlyI Many of lM 1DImba's ba\" joiDId lJIWIy ...Ii.... • . -. ... . - . ..- 84

possibility of similar perspectives among Muslim groups and the military­ • backed government of Soeharto, the application of the Pancasila 8S sole basis also had two dift'erent purposes and implications. From the

govemment's standpoint, it could be partially descnDed as an effort to consolidate the political power and privileges of dominant political factions and their vested interests, i.e. those of the army and Golkar. Even some

Muslim spokesmen regarded it as a positive step, seeing it as reducing or removing aU pressure from the govemment and the army from Muslim groups and from Islam itself. This could al80 be interpreted to mean that, having removed religion as a threat, representations by Muslims on individual issues might more acceptable to government officiaIs. It may, in faet, be said that lndonesian nationalism had entered a

third phase by that timel As 1 mentioned in the fU"St chapter; the tirst phase

was concemed with beeration from colonialism by throwing off foreigrt power and strugling to establish collective power within the various • nationalist movements. The second phase concentrated on ident:ifyinc the foundations of the new nationalism. The third phase concentrated on reaftinning its foundation, which misht have been perceived as less than solide Sa, the ides. wu that, in order to remst the govemment's interpretation of Pancasùa as the all-encompassing. all-dominatins

ideology; an altemative view of Panœsila had to be developed. And that

vision ofPancasila muld only be developed outside politiCS. 17

political pBrtics, suc:h as MA. F...bas siDœ become ODe of the more pnminmI ftpns of PAN (Pdli A1I8I8l Nasional. Gr National MaadIte PIny), . . - 1'7 00"&1_ Ramqe. iDIaview widl AbcIan:IImal WaIIid, JUDe 18, 1992 as 'P*d iD DDups Rama•• PD/llics Ilf IltIlDItaia, 56. See aIIo ..-iatcrview witb AIâJmIIuaIa WIbïd. -Wc W..10 .,.. • the Society," A!iawd, MIrcb 20,1992, P. 37 .. 85

ApplylDl the A.-. nuag,al .Panca8t1a

As was the case when the New Order govemment had reduced the • number of politica1 parties alter winning the 1971 election, unexpected an move to say the least, those who paid attention to the policies of the New

Order were one again shocked by the government's proposai to implement

the Pancasila as the sole foundation for ail political parties. It was officia1ly

presented by President Soeharto in bis state speech preceding the DPR

session of August 16, 1982. It was not long aCter this event that the policy

was incorporated into MPR Enactment No. II. 1983. It dictated that the Pancasila he made the sole foundation of an parties. Golkar obviously

intended to maintain and strengthen the position of the osas tunggal in the social and national life of the nation in the face of a perceived threat from other ideologies. Since the ppp was "based on Islam" and the POl on "Indonesian

Democracy, Indonesian Nationalism and Social Justice: these statements • became a target of the drive. la The govemment justified its decision in a number of ways, three of which were especially prominent. First, the govemment wanted to establish a sense of unity among the different elements of the nation. In other words, the govemment saw that the

existence of difl'erent political ideologies meant that parties and organizatioDs had less of a sense of common purpose, which gave rise ta

the tensions between them. This sense oC unity would lead.tG the second purpose of establishing national stability. In the eyes of the govemment, national stability could be reached by remgnizing the sole foundation of the

Pancasila. This echoed the principles of the Pancasila itself, especially the third principle, -Persatuan 1ndDnesid', or Indonesian Unity. 'lbird,

Il RusIi KatiaI. Pnj.... P~ Po/ilik 1JuItJMsia.· ~bwIh PoInt P4StIIII SMI'fII (JUana: • Rajawali Press, 1983), 219. 86

pembangunan nasional,19 or national development was a high priority for the govemment. Whenever this issue was raised, it made it clear that the • ideologies of the abave mentioned two parties particular mitigated in against its programs in this area. If the political parties implemented the Pancasila as their sole foundation they would be able to concentrate on the

issue of national development, the real problem faced by the natioD.20 The desire of the government to implement the osas ttl.n9gal sole

foundation targeted not only political parties, but all social or mass

organizations. With the approval of the DPR, on June 17, 1985, the

govemment issued law No. 8/1985 stating that aU social or mass organizations had to implement the Pancasila as their sole foundation.

Article 1 of the law states that a mass organization is an organization which

is established by a group of Indonesian citizens motivated by similar

aspirations, professions, idea1s, religious interests, or beliefs in God, with

the objective of pursuing certain goals within the state of Indonesia.21 Sînce • then, there has Dot been a single social organization or politica1 party that bas not applied the Pancasi1a as the sole foundation. Any party that refused to ohey the law was declared to have betrayed the state, not just

the niling govemment, and was 10 be outlawed.

General ••po". to tla. Propo'" or Aaaa Tullflal The stipulation of the sole buis ofPanœsiJa invited responses from both individuals and social organizations. Most did not recognize the need for

19 For a della' idea of pem/JtIItgIUIIIII NlJiOfUll (1' Dati_ de\'elopmeat, _ Howard M. Federspiel, Muslim Inte11ectuaIs and National Development in Indonesia (New York: Nova Science Publisher, 1992).

20 Facbry Ali, YPacasiJa ScbIpi Kritit RcaIiIas JCcIr. Me. dia Sosial PoIiûk" iD bis lslœtt, PanCtlSila dan PerguJatan Politik (Jabna: PusIab AaIaII, 1914), 225, AIfiaD, IASuharto and QuestiOll of Politic:al Stability," PtldJcCtJIrrIrrIftty 2, 3 (April 1911), 536-537 and Faisal IsmaiI, ls/tIIIf, IS• • 21 IsmaiI, IAlsJam, PoIitics," 17 87

the state to become involved with different religions and ethnie groups. The

majority of Muslim scholars disagreed with the govemment's proposaI and

• policy, the arguments behind the approaching it for different reasons and from difl'erent angles. Facluy Ali, for example, reasoned that, byapplying

Pancasila as sole buis for all political parties, those that did not apply it already would have to re-wrîte their constitutions, re-establish their political orientations, and re...formulate their programs in order to adjust to

the current political situation. Above aIl, this would lead ta confusion among a party's supporters, and would finally erode their loyalty to the party. He reasoned that this was a step backward in political development

since diversity marks the mature political system.22

One of the Most interesting responses came from a highly principled

Muslim scholar, Deliar Noer, who had been punished earlier by bath the Soekarno and Soeharto govemments for bis stands on democratic

actions.23 Expressing strong disagreement with the policy of making the • Pancasila the sole foundation, he compared the arguments of Soeharto and Soekano, asserting that Soekarno had offered a better palicy as far as ideology was concemed. He pointed out that, in the 19509, Soekarno allowed each political party to apply its preferred ideology in addition to

Pancasila in order ta distinguish itself from others. For instance, the NU

took Islam as its additional buis, while Partai Katolik (Catholic Party)

based itself on the principle of belle! in -One Gad in general, the Pancasila in particular, and action in accordance with Catholle doctrine,· and

%Z Sec Kompos, September 3, 1982-

23 lDspùed by of lM poIiticai llmdI ia die Rd'0IIIUIi0D Ela fA PJesideIIl Habibie, Noer lias • fouDded PUI (Panai Umma Islam or MusIim Party). l'bis party appIies Islam • ils louDdation. Parkindo based itself on the principle of·Christianity.· As for the PNl, they

based themselves on the principle ofMarhaenism (Proletarianism).24 • After discussing severa! issues related to the Pancasila, such as religion and the nature ofeach political party, Noer &nives at sevw:ral conclusions:

1. The sole foundation of panca • la for an political parties without statin& its own basis bas ignored the diversity of the community that bas developed according 10 their own beliefs. These beJiefs might come from reJigion or other sources. 2. The sole foundation bas bloclœd people oC the same Caith from uniting themselves and baving dialogue based on their beJiefs. At tbia point, the sole foundation contaiDs a violation, not a freedom, wbich is the main characteristic ofdemocracy. 3. The sole foundation bas ignored the relations between religion and politics wbich Cor certain religions, espedally Islam, is in contrast to their beliefs. This encourages the secularimtion ofpolitics. 4. The sole foundarion bas bloclœd the possibility ofdeveloping comprehension, such as that of religion, that probably strengthens the Pancasila in the counay. The result is that the community is disadvantaged by gettiDg fewer alternative ways (or none at aU) 10 develop the countIy.25

In order to examine the significance of the NU's response as a religious

movement to the implementation of the sole foundation, 1 will elaborate on • that of Muhammadiyah, which bas a simUar status ta the NU. The Muhammadïyah,26 the second largest Muslim group in Indonesia, accepted the sole foundation alter long deliberation. Generally speaking, the attitude of the Muhammadiyah toward the Pancasila wu like that of the NU, considering the involvement ofleaders !rom both groups in establishing the country in 1945, particu1arly in the series of leaders' meetings during the period in question. 80th groups believed that their leaders had carefully considered Islamic values and teacl1ings when they discussed the philosophical basis of the country and had arrived at the five principles oC

24 Noer, Islam. PtIIIC4fila, S2.

25 Noer, Islam, Ptl1lCtl.fÎla, 60-61. • 2C5 For infOrD*iœ1bout ilS rise lDd laIer drMIopment 10 bIck to dIapIcr L 89

the Pancasila.27 The decision to accept the sole Coundation, however. took • longer for the Muhammadiyah. Generally speaking. the leaders of the Muhammadiyah were divided into two camps, one -fundamentalist.· which rejected the policy outright, and

the other more open to consultation in finding a solution. Unlike the NU. handling the situation where the sole foundation was accepted beCore it was

enacted as law. the Muhammadiyah took two steps: one step wu to consult with President Suharto. and the other was to wait until the law was passed.

Consequently the Muhammadiyah postponed its 411t national congress (originally scheduled for February 1984) until December 7, 1985 in order to incorporate the law of the sole foundation into its party statutes. At the congress, President Soeharto delivered a welcoming speech in which declared the following:

The assertion ofPanœsila as the sole basia not omy means upbolding its principles, which are basical1y in agreement with the teacbjnp of our religion, but also ~our UDity and iDœ&rity as a natioD. We are a pluralistic nation in tenDs of ethnie group. religion. race and aocial group. Without a • common philoaophy sueb as Pancasila, we will be in conftict with ODe other and this willlead us to disunity•.. The dec1aration ofPancasi1a as the &Ole beais DOt on1y means including it in the constitution of an organilation, but also obtips us ta deve10p it in our social and national programa. We must endlessly make every dort tg make Pancasila color all aspects ofour social and nationallifè.28

It was at this congress that the Muhammadiyah ofticia11y accepted the Pancasüa as its sole foundation. According to article 2 of the

Muhammadiyah's constitution. it is based on the Pancasila. However. in maintaining that Muhammadiyah is a mus Islamic organization. article 1 of the constitution states that -it is a socio-religious movement with the

%7 Sha1eh Hana 8Dd Abda1 Munir MuIbD, lAt. Bel'" U""". 1... AhttnitfftJ P.casi/Q Sebagat Asa.r TunggaJ: !Wbuah Kojit1ll In/omtQ/j/Pandllngan NU-MlllrtltrlllllMlytllr Y0I)'Ikarta: Aqœrius, 1986)t 1~152

21 LnJauan Harua, ~yoh tUt ÂSGS Trurggal PIllft:4fiIa (Jakana: PusIaka PaDjimas, • 1989)t 32. 90

objective of enjoining good and prohibiting evil, subscribing to the Islamic • creed in conformity with the teaching oC the Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Prophet.· For H.A.R. Fachruddin, the acceptance ofthe Pancasila as its sole foundation was for the Muhammadiyah, like a motorcyclist donning a

csafety helmet."29 Adopting a sjmiJar tone, Amien Rais asserted that the Muhammadiyah -easny- accepted Pancasila principles,JO on the grounds that ·Pancasila is a valid ticket with which we could take the 'bus' of

lndonesia. Without this ticket we would not take that bus.n Thus, as far as Indonesian nationalism was concemed, it seems that the Muhammadiyah's

acceptance of Pancasila as its sole basis was more a response to pressure

from the ruling govemment than a wholehearted acceptance of the Pancasila's message.

The Jn1'. aeapoue to tb. Mu TuDaai Ideolo.,

The NU's commitment ta Indonesian nationalism can be seen in the legal • and religious arguments it cited when it accepted Pancasila as the sole foundation. It declared its acceptanœ of the sole foundation in 1983, one

year before it withdrew Crom politics and two years before the law on the Pancasila as sole foundatian was passed by the govemment. In the same text in which it later announced its decision ta withdraw from politics the

NU declared:

1. Pancasila 88 the bais and philoeophy of the state of tbe Republic of Indoaesia ia DOt a reJiIion; neitber C8Il it replaœ religion Dor he ueed to replace the position ofl'elision. 2. The princ:iple of -setier in One Qod- as the foundation of the RepubJic of Indonesia, as statecl in article 29 parasraph 1 of the 1945 CoDatituâoD

29 Sec Amiat Rais. '1Caa Peupnear," iD M. RœIi ~ ed. ~}dt Da1IIIII Krillk .. KomentD1' (JakaIta: Rajawali. 1916), Dt.

:JO Sce M. Bambmg ~ MWbicb Islam and Which AmcasiIa?: lsIIm lIId tbe SIlle in lDdœcsia," in Me! BucIiDD. cd.. Slate and CMI Society ;11 Indonoa (CIayIœ, VICtOria: CeDter of Southeast AsiaD Studics, Moaath University, 1990), 488. Se aIso FaisII Ismail. lIPaIasiJa • the Sole • Basis," 46. 91

which gives ure to an otber principles, reflects -monotheiam- (tawhid) in accordanœ with the notion ofbelief(iman) inIslam. 3. For the NU, Islam. which teaehes oqidah and shœi'ah, eocompaaleS aspects of the relationsbip of human bein& \Vith bis/ber God and the • inteaelationabip between buman beinp. 4. The acœptaDœ and obaervanœ orthe Panc:asila constitutes a reaUzation of Indonesian Mus1im's aspiraticms to cany out tbeir shœi'ah. 5. As a consequence of this aeed, the NU bas on obliption to maintain the true notion of the Pancaw1a and its correct 8dd consistent observance by all.3i

On the surface, one could argue that the NU' s acceptance of the Pancasila as the sole foundation was caused by politica1 pressure from the New Order govemment, just as was the case with the Muhammadiyah later

00. It is true that during the first halfofthe New Order period, Muslims had suffered persecution. From the perspective of Indonesian nationalism, however. the poliey was actually a refiection of the NU's own commitment to Indonesian nationalism as a bulwark of the nation-state. This can be seen from a historical perspective. The NU's leaders, represented by K.H. Wahid

Hasjim,32 were actively involved in discussing the formation of the • Indonesian state, its philosophical foundation, and the preamble ta the 1945 Constitution. In reply to criticism conceming the position of Islam and the foundation of the nation, Hasjim announced:

Our put histoJy (he argued) bas sbown that \ft have IlOt ,et acbievecl unity. In the interest of tbia unit;y, which \ft most urpntly require in our endeavor ta establiah out IndoDesian State, in out mincis the most important qu~ÙI DOt, 'What ultimate1y abaJ1 be the place off Islam (iD that staœJ?' The important question should rather be, 'by wbat meaDS sbaIl 1ft .-ure the pt.:e of (our)

31 PeNO, Nalrdldd U/QIfItJ KDIIbd. Klrittoh 1926 (IJaDcIuD&: RisIIIb, 1985), 118.

32 Wabid Hasjim's lad Hasjim Asflri's scrviœdariDc die '...... mvIuIioDmy of the WU' 1940s weœ Iatcr CIl recopizecl by Ibe lDdonesiIn pal1lDeS wbich cIecIIIaI dM:a to be ..anal ~ heroes. For fardier ICCOUnts ofbis 1ife, car=, lD4 ....,H. Ahgebehr, SejQlYl/r Hi" K.H.A. Hasjilfl Asj'arl ..K1nftgtlll Tftar (Jabna: Plaida Bub PaiDpta K.H.A. WIbid HIsjim, 1957) DIZamakhsyari Dba6cr, -uLA. Wabid HIsjim, RallIai PallIa"" PeumRü cleDpa PerIdabID • Indodesia Modem," hiSIfIQ 8 (Aupst 1984), 7S. 92

religion in Free Indonesia? 1 therefore once spin repeat: Wbat we need most of • an at this time is the indissoluble unityoftbe nation.33 In addition to this historiœl perspective, ItH. Ahmad Siddiq notes:

1. Indonesian Muatims' 8trUIBle ta &gbt apinst the colonialists and to 6gbt for independenœ from their imperialism basgone onfor a long Ume. 2. When the str1.lIBle for Indonesi8n independenœ approached its pa!, Muslims contnbuted greatly in prepariog independence. Through their leaders, Muslims were involved in decidiDg the form, foundation, and the law ofthe state tha1 vvould exiat. 3. After indepenclenœ, without hesitation, Muslims supported and maintained independence, DOt ouly as their national duty but also as t.heir religious (Islamic) duty (jihadJ. 4. Alter the physical revo1ution WBS over, Muslims contributed to the hard-won independence in two main ways: a. They sucœeded in maintaining the nation in the face of separatist movements and otber rebellions; b. During the New Order's reign, Muslims fWly partidpated in national programs.34

In view of the above considerations, Siddiq concludes why Muslims have

ta maintain the Pancasila as follows:

1. Establish;ng the nation and its fonn of leadership to 1œep the existence 01 religious lile and managing worldly we1fare is wqfib (obligatory); • 2. The agreement [underJyiD& the above), of Indonesiens in estabtishing Indonesian State is ualid and binds all the àtizensJ including Muslims; 3. The valid agreement, that is NKRI (Nepra Kesatuan Republik Indonesia or the Republic of lndonesian States), is valid from an IlIIamic legel view, ao that it 1uJs 10 he 1œpt and ifs eisœnce htJs ta be mtzintGùted; 4. The vaJidity of the apeement which binda aD the citizens resulta in the followiDg obliptiema: a. beinl obliptol)' accordiD(l to ita fOtm and constitution of the state as what wu decided in the ~t; b. obHptory to Jœep and practiœ the foundation of the basic law as what had been dedded in the .,eement wbich mean ta lœep the foundation !rom beiDg vio1ated and mûJled,03S c. obliptoty to obey the olidal ru1er, nameJy Dot to enjoy the evil, apinst ADah (God) and the existiDI eviIa;

33 "Apma DaIam lDdaDesiI ~" iD l'''slo M~"1uJ, 1, 3 (May 25, 1945), 3. A5 aIao quoted by Harly 1. 8eDda in bis WOIt TIw Cn6œ1fl and lM Risi,., SfIII: IndoMsian IsltJ1II 1111" lM Japanese OccupatiDtl 1942·194' (1be Hape aDd Bandp... W. van ~ 1958), 189.

:M MukIamar SituboDdo, fiom bis work, 7radf.Ji PUQIIImI: Slutf tmttmg Pandargan Hi.p KytIi (Jakarta: LP3~ 1983).85.

3S Compare Ibis to the priacipIe of DItiœIIism CouDd in Emcsl GdIDer, Nations and • Nationalism (lthacaand NewYork: eomen Univeni1y Press, 1994), 1-2. 93

d. obligatoty tD cooperate aetiuely and COMtructively in the efforts ofgaining • the goals ofestablishing the state.36 His understanding of Indonesian history, of Muslims' role in the nation­

state, and of the state's conception of religion (considered valid by Islam), Ieads Ahmad Siddiq ta approve the NU's attitude that -the Republic of Indonesia is the final fonn of the Indonesian state, especially (or the Muslim

ummat.-37 Using a legal analogy (qiyas), Siddiq likens the use of Pancasila as the basis and national ideology of the state to a fnùt eaten by Muslims every day for the past folty years. The question of whether eating it was

lawful or unlawful for Muslims was strange and illogical.38 According to Abdurrahman Wahid, historically speaking the Pancasila is a product of Indonesians' struggle to discover an appropriate foundation for

their country when faced with a choice between a bewildering array ideologies: Islam, nationalism, œpitalism, socialism and communism.

Generally speaking, there were two universal ideologies popular in • Indonesia prior ta the establishment of the Pancasila. The first was secularism which prevented religion from having the entire field ta itself. According ta this outlook, the state had to be neutral in dea1ing with religious affairs, indeed, some would say, bad to stay out of religious matters altogether. The second ideology wu theocratic ideol0&V, i.e., the desire to make the Indonesian state resemble the system developed by Muhammad when he was niling Medina.. According to this view the president would also have to be a religious leader (ulcuna) who would decide everything as the Prophet Muhammad would have. Wahid reuons that

J6 MukIamar SituboDdo, 8S-86.1tolic empIwsjs adIt:d.

31 MlIkltJ1llQ1' Si'"bottdo. 94. • 31 ~ -Islam, politic:s. 37. 94

because of the unlikelihood that either ideology could he fully implemented • in Indonesia due to its pluralistic nature, Indonesian leaders such as Agus Salim, Muhammad Natsir, Soekarno, Wahid Hasjim, Tan Malaka, Muhammad Hatta and Syahrir an decided to accept the Pancasila as the

philosophical basis for Indonesia.39

B. The Politlcal Putlctpatloa of the JIU Ait. the 1926 Khittah: Boa­ PoUtlcal Pollet. of Politic. of RU

Ever since the mid-1980s the New Order bas gradually been changing its

poliey toward Islam. In commenting on this trend, William Liddle claims that

cMuslims point both to the Many positive govemment actions taken since

the mid-1980s and ta the decline in heavy bande

Muslim individuals and groups as evidence that the govemment now has much better understanding of Islamic aspirations.· He also points out, • however, that this likewise constitutes evidence that the govemment had fallen under the intluence of advocates of an Islamic state.4O Agreeing with

the common Muslim view, Liddle then says,

that there bas been a palpable relaxation ofter1sÏDns, and that the re&8OD for the new policies ia a more 8Opbist:icated pvemment attitude toward lalamic demanda This attitude is iD. tum a product of the la1amil8tion of lndonesiaD society and culture over the pattbirly yeara and ofthe tireleas el"ort ofthe neo­ modernist inteUectuala.41

39 K.R. Imron Hamzab lDd QoiIul ADam, cds., ~btltlh Dla/og McltCtll'i K~jt!ltJStm: Gus Dur Diadili Kiti-kiai (Surabaya: Iawa Pas, 1989), 52-53. ~ William, R Lidd1e, -rbe Ja1amic Tum in Indooesia: A Politieal exp1eDation.. in TheJourna1 ofAsian Studies, 55, no. 3 (August 1996),625.

41 Liddle, 64Tbe IsIamic Tan, 625. Sec aIJo Douctas Rama., ~ lslœtt QIId t1wld«Jlogy • ofTolerance (London and New York: Rauded&e, 1996), 43-M. 9S

Pointing to the establishment of leMI (Ikatan Cendikiawan Muslim • Indonesia, or Indonesian Muslim Intellectual Association), Liddle reasons that the change in Soehato's policy toward Islam wu caused by the fact that

it fits vety weU bis (Soeharto) strategie plan to maintain control over the politica1 system througb the 1997 parJiamentary e1ection and the 1998 convmiog of the super"'parliamentary People'. Consultative Asaembly (Maje1ia Permusyawaratan Rakyat), wbich bas the constitutional teSpOnsibility ofelecting the president and vice-president every five years...~

It is reasonable to say that the change in political attitude on the part of

the New Order toward Muslim groups during the late 19805 and early 19909

was the result ofSuharto's wish to maintain control over the political system,

and continue to hold the position of president. There was, however, no single

factor leading to this decision being taken. The attitude of compromise shown

by prominent Muslim groups, like the NU, which accepted the Pancasila as

the sole foundation certainly contributed to an improvement. The above • change resulted in a difTerent climate ofstate...Muslim group relations, just as it improved the Muslim attitude toward nationalism. Subsequently, the

change also led Muslim groups to change their political behavior in order to

remain involved in the national deve10pment of the country.

The general conclusion is that NU's politica1 discourse is reactive in

nature.43 This is also true of other religious and social movements in the

countIy. It in<ücates that its nature is to respond to events, changes, and

tendencies occUITing in the country. This characteristic is, in fact, common

to social and re1igious movements througbout the world. In the case of the

.Q Uddlc, "The lsIamic TlIm, 625.

43 See for example Sjamsudch HIriI. "NU dia

NU, severa! examples of this tendency can be cited in support of this • conclusion. The first such example is in fact one of the main reasons why the NU was initially founded in 1926, namely, the problems Muslims were facing intemationally in the early 1920s, the problem of khiIafat,44 and the local problems of traditional Muslims faced with colonialism and the emergence of a reformist current. The NU's reaction œn aIso be seen in its withdrawal from Masyumi after rea1izing that the Masyumi leadership was dominated

by modemists. Another instance of this behavior was its withdrawal !rom the ppp after being disappointed by the leadership of Naro, who was considered authoritarian and inclined to work against NU interests.-'s Since leaving party politics and accepting the Pancasila as the sole foundation for all social organizations in the country, the NU has shown a slightly different behavior in politics. According to Abdurrahman Wahid, the • shift in the NU's political behavior. starting with the acceptance of the Pancasila as the sole foundation, has shown that it put the survival of the

nation hefore its OWD.46 As a socio-political force, the NU's political participation during the 19808 and 1990s can he exarnined in either of two ways. One way is to look at how the NU motivates its politicians without any organizational connection to official party politics. Another way is ta look at

how the NU responds to the political policies passed by the New Order govemment. Above an, however, it is essential to understand the general trends of NU political behavior. In order to comprehend NU politica1

44 Sec my expIanaIioD in die fiJsI cbaJftr.

4S See aIso Kacuna MarijaD, "Ntrs Respoœe 10 the New OIder's PoIitical Dc:wlopmeDI," in The IndoocsiaD QuanerIy, XX/l, ~7.

46 AtdJnIhmID Wabid, ~ su.ep MeDjIdi Pedjmlw"P" NU"

behavior, it would be useful ta elaborate on the NU's doctrine of Ahl al­

Sunnah wa al~am.a'ah. • Ever since it was founded, the NU bas clearly stated that it follows the doctrines of Ahl aJ..SunntJh wa al.Jama'a a"'ld that it recognizes as its sources the Qur'an. the Sunnah (Prophet Muhammad's traditions), the ljma' (general consensus), and the Qiyas (Analogy). K.H. Mustafa Bisri interprets

the concept of Ahl al-Sunnah wa al~ama'CJh47 as a doctrine that holds to the following doctrines:

1. In the iield of ls1amic laws, it adheres ta the teacbings of one of the four schools ofthought (Hanafi, Maliki, Syafi'i and HamMhl. In practice, bo\ftVer, as most Indonesien Muslims do, the NU predominantly adheres ta the Syafi'i. schoolofthought. 2. In Tawhid (the doctrine of God's Oneness), the NU fonows the teaehing of ImamAbu Mansur al-Maturidi; 3. In the field of Tasawuf, the NU fonows the basic teachings of Imam Abu Qosim al.Junaid.

The above religious tradition, also known as Iman (Belief). Islam and

Ihsan (0000 Conduct), gave birth ta the normative attitude embodied in • theses characteristics ofthe NU. namely:

1. Tawassuth and i'tidal, aame1y to take a more moclerate attitude \Vith at its core the lite principle to esteem lû&hlY the obliption to bebave justly and rigbtly in the midst ofsociety. 2. Tasamuh, DaJDe1y to taJœ a tolerant attitude towant dül'erenœa of opiDion, both with reprd to reJi&ian, in particular que.na of a furu' cbarader or that bave become khilaftyGh (miDor difrereaœat. 3. Tawazun, DaJDe1y ta taIœ a belpnced aDd eoJemn attitude toward ADah, human beinp, and we'. enviromnent to barmom. inœreats of the pat, of the preaent, and or the tutLue;'" 4. Amar Ma'ruj Nahi munkar, D.8IDely ta be always eeasitive to atimulate pel, Wleful and advanfaleOUa deeda far eociety; and tg Jefue and pœvent aU that leads to a depadation oflife'. values.49

41 Mustbofa B~ Ristlldl AIIIILVIIII1tIIII WaJ.JtJIJUIttlll (Mcnara KDdus: YayISIIl AI.~ 1967), 9.

• K.R Ahmad S~ Khiaab, 38-40• • ~ PBNU, Kembali u Kltitoh 1916 (Band"ng: RisaIab, 1985), 119. 98

Even the NU's attitude toward politics is generally intluenced by Islam, which bas a distinct approach to the concept other religions, like • Christianity in the West. The domain of religion in the West, represented by the Church, and the domain of politics, represented by the state, are separate and coexist with their own distinct laws and chains of authority. This concept of separating church and state in the West follows the Christian maxim, -Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are Qod's.-so Muslims, however, regard religion

and politics as inseparable. This is probably what in1luenced Nakamura's conclusion regarding the study of Islam in lndonesia to the etIect that:

-Religion cannat and should not he reduced to politics, nor perhaps, to

culture"Sl The domain of Caesar and that ofAllah (the religion of Islam) are mutually inclusive. Religion and temporal power seem ta be twîns. Many believe that they are like two sides of the same coin. The normative attitude that characterizes the NU, and especially the quality of tawazun (or taking • a balance and solemn attitude toward Allah by human beings), and to harmonize the interests of the past, the present and the future, the NU can

neither ignore politica1 trends nor be fully involved in politics. The political

situation in Indonesian in the 19808-19908 convinced the NU to take this attitude.

The above reality and the NU's policy of a return to the 1926 khittah, have forced the NU ta redefine its politica1 orientation in order to uphold the interests ofits members and the nation. In general, the first decision talcen

by the NU after retuming to the 1926 khittah wu to give NU members and

50 LuIœ, 20:25.

51 MiISUO NaIammra. wrbe Radical TraditioDaIism of the Nadh"aI U1ama iD lDdoaesia: A Pcrsonal Acc:ouDt or the " NaliOllll Caqtess. JUDe 1m, SemaraD&Il iD Grea Bartœ lIId Ciœ& FcaIy, NahdJDbIl UlQllUJ" T,DdiIiOllllllnam t11rd Motàmity in11UlDnala (Caytoa: MaaIsb Asia ~ 1996), • 89. 99

politicians the opportunity to participate in any official politica1 party during the 1987 general election without officially having to declare • structural or organizationallinks ta any political party. Prior ta the e1ection,

the NU released its own seven-point political platform, namely:

1. NU oflicers are DDt aDowecl ta bold positions in bath the NU and a poIitica1 party at the seme time, 2. NU members are aDowed ta be candidetes for the DPR in the e1ection, 3. '!bose who are candidates are allowed 10 campaign for the political party they cam.paisn for. 4. NU members who are not oflicera ofany political party nor candidates ofthe DPR, are not aUowed to campaisn. 5. The above point (4) is also applied ta the NU Muboligh (lslamic Preacher)/da'i or preachers, 6. NU oflicers cannot .epresent any political party in the election committee. 7. AD NU members are encouraged to participate in the e1ection in arder to make il aucœssfuLS'J

Arbi Sanit concludes that the above policy of the NU shows that, as a

social or mass organizatioD, it kept open the poSSlbility of using politics ta promote the interests of members. At this point in time. however. the NU has chosen to do it through individual, rather than organizational

• S3 of daily involvement in politics. The NU leaders in charge managing the

activities of the organization are not given pennission ta have dual positions

during the election. As 1 mentioned earüer, the current NU leaders were not very happy with what bad bem done by Naro of the ppp when he removed

most of the NU leaders from the list of DPR candidates for the 1982

electioD. The idea1s behind the NU's policy say that the NU cannat leave

politics complete1y; therefore, the above seven points show us that the NU

wanted to keep its commitment to the national interest but, at the same time, tried not to show its disappointment with the ppp too clearly.

52 Sec WQl1Q NU 1Jamaary (1986)•

53 Alti Saait, ~tik NU sebqai (qaDisasi Masyarabt: MasaIab cIID ProIpet," in K..H. As'ad • Syamsul ArifiD, NU dDJam Tantangan (JakaIta: Al 1CauIsar, 1919), 86. 100

Furthermore, Sanit sees the political behavior of the NU after retuming to the 1926 khittah as pragmatic in its character. NU leaders wished to • promote the ummat's interests, which they felt they represented. This shows that they wanted to continue to uphold the basic ideas of the foundation of the NU, i.e., promoting the interests of the wnmat. Other

examples supporting this argument included As'ad Syamsul Arifin,s

meeting with Soeharto in order to discuss certain points of the PMP

(Pendidikan Moral Pancasila, or Teachings of Panacasüa Values),54

Abdurrahman Wahid's position as a member of the People's Consultative Assembly or MPR, and the existence of NU politicians in the PPP.55 For Mitsuo Nakamura, the above conception of politics does not necessarily Mean that the NU ignored the various political wings of the

organization; in fact the NU had opened the opportunity for them to join the existing politica1 parties, i.e., PPP, the Golkar and PDI.56 The composition of

the DPP (Dewan Pimpinan Pusat, or National Board) of ppp 1987 showed • that there were a number of NU politicians given positions in the ppp and Oolkar. In the ppp were listed Mathori Abdul Djalil, zarkasih Noer, Jenis

Zahiruddin, Hamzah Hu, Anshari Syams, Zein Badjeber, H. Imam Sofwan. Even Golkar's list included a young politician of the NU, Slamet Etrendy Yusuf. In explaining the redefinition of the politica1 role ofthe NU, Ahmad Sîddiq states that for the NU, politics means creating a healthy political culture

54 The PMP is ID obliptoly coune pa to studeDts; it coDSisls of P'CfIIIDCII ialeqfttatiOll of the PancaSila ID the fint proposais Cor tbiI course NU leaders fOUDd that Ibcre were 1 lIIIIDbcr or inteqrctDms which did DOt CODfonD to IsIamic 'cw:hinp. The medÏDI of ArifiD and SoebaIto WII in order ta molve these poiDts.

55 Sanit, ~ NU, 11..

56 Khoinal Fatboai aad M...... mad Zen, MJDtaview \Vith Mitsuo NabmuIa," in tbcir wort NU pQSCQ Khilttllt: Prospd C!kInnftIh ~ngœ MlllrGllUtlDllytlh (Yogyabna: Media W'1Clya MaDdaJa. 1992), • 114. 101

where every citizen can practice bis or her rights with full understanding

and responsibilityt respect the o.khlaJad karimah (good moral values) t • appreciate democratic rules, and prioritize the interests of the nation above those ofindividuals and groUps.57 This view wu later officially presented to

the 28th Congress held in Yogyakarta in 1990 in the Collowing wording:

l. Ta practice poIitics for the NU meens the participation of the dtil.eDa in the nation state totally according to the Panca.'a and the 1945 Constitution; 2. Politics for the NU is politics wbich shows nationalism and wbich is talpted st national integrarion with attempts to continually SUpport unity in arder to reach national goals, namely a ~ 1OCiety; 3. Politics Cor the NU is to develop values of actual freedom and democracyt educate a mature nation to be aware of rights, duty, responsibility, for the sake ofthe ~lfare ofan citilJens; 4. Politics for the NU should be practiced with good morality, ethics, and with the be1iefin God, with ajust, appreciate unity....; 5. Politics for the NU must be pract:iœd with honesty and retigious moralityt be constitutionally just, and according ta the values that have been made, as wen as being able ta develop cüscusaion in solving mutual prob1ema; 6. Politics for the NU is practiœcl in order to strengthen national consensus and must he œnducted with akIrlakul karitntJh (good morality) in as the practice ofthe concept ofMl al-Sunnah wa al.Jama'ah; 7. Politics for the NU. cannot for any œason he pursued by sacri1icing the collective inteœata or disintegratina the unity; 8. The dif!'erent views 8JDemg NU membera must be conductecl in a frienclly manner, and in mutual appreciation, 80 that in practicing politics the NU • members can 8ti1l maintain UDity.SI

The above conception of politics, according to Kacung Marijan, was in

line with the will of the New Order prior to the 19808, namely the idea of

floating masses.59 The difference~ however, wu that during the 1980s and

19909. the NU gave clear permission to its members and politicians in order to participate in the electi~n. 'with such a conception of politics, contacts

51 Delivered in bis opeIÙDl speech 10 die seminar GD -rbe ExisteDœ lDd 1be RoIc ofdie NU der Retumed 10 die kbittah," CODduded by DPW (Dewaa Pimpinan WaIayab, or l'be ProYiDciaI Board) or East 1a~ SMarch 1989.

SI PBNU, PtrJllQSQlQhtl/l dtmjll'tfQbQn M~ NU U 28 (Kudus: Mauua Kudus. 1990), 172· 173.

S9 Kacung MaridjaD. QIto VtJdIs NU: Sftt/QII K,,,,IJD/i b KNnDlr 1926 (1abrta: Edaaaat 1992), • 189. 102

between the NU and politica1 parties and between the NU and the ruling • govemment were canied out by individuals. The 8lplftcaDt orthe .RGjHItAMar. llucla 1, 1~

One of the traditions usually observed by the NU, by which it expresses its political attitude, is to hold gatherings or mus rallies. On March 1,

1992 the NU commemorated its sixty...sixtb anniversary by holding the

Rapat Akbar (tremendous mass rally) at the Senayan Sports Stadium in Jakarta. The apparent purpose of the Rapat Akbar was ta eelebrate the

organization'9 anniversary by publicly reiterating the NU's loyalty to the

Pancasila and to the 1945 Constitution. The same statement of loyalty was actually publicly decided at its National Conference in Situbondo in 1983.

The Rapat Akbar in faet bas particular importance as far as my thesis of

the NU's role in nationalism is concemed.

According ta Douglas Ramage, there were severa! reasons for the NU's • public reiteration of loyalty to the Pancasila.60 First, it was a way for Abdurrhman Wahid, chairman ofthe NU, to avoid approving Soeharto's bid

for a fifth five-year term in office. Wahid contends that the NU wanted to

avoid an explicit endorsement of Soeharto by Jimiting itself ta a public

reiteration of loyalty to the PancsS'la For Wahid, supporting Soeharto Cor

another five...year term would have been contrary to genuine democratic

principles, which should be expressed through Cree and fair poütiœ1 competition. Ramage continues:

Second, Wahid wu deeply c:tiabe••d by the formation 01 the DeW aovemment­ sponsored Is1amic orpnization, the Indonesien Mualim InteDectuala' ~8tion (ICMI). He wu &DXioUB to demoDstrate that the ummat wu atiIl united behiDd . mm and supportive ofhia vision ofBD iDduaive, clemocratic 1..... ICMI, Wabid be1ievea, 1e&itimi.. Ialamie exduàviam aDcl erodea 8DCia1 toIeraDœ for DOD­ Muslim Indoneajan- Wabid wiahecl to show tbat the NU supported a n 8 'CeDt

60 DoucIa E. R.aJDIIe, PoIitia III JIIdonaio: ~, J8kM tftl lite /."., ofToleranœ • (London and New York: Rouded&e), 1997. 57. 103

democratization process and would not he co-opted by the IOvernment in the manner ofMuslim inteDectuals who bad recently tbrown their Wt!ight bebind the govemment...backed lCMI.

• Third, Wahid perœived a rising tide of sectarianism and fundamentaJism in Indonesia and • he wanted to depict in the NU raJ1y a pluraHstic, non-eectarian Islam which remgniœd Panca_la as the re1igiously neutral basis of the state. Wahid perceived that aectarianism threatened one ofthe most positive aspects of the New Ortler sode" the aerving of direct links be~ oue'. reügion or ethnicity and bow one partidpates in politics. Wahid be1ieved that the New Order formula for de-1inldng reügion and other -primordial- a1Iinities !rom mass politics was under grave tbreat.

Fourtb, there was an internai NU purpose to the Rapat Akbar. Wahid sought to demonstrate the support of NU through a ra1ly of up to two million NU members.61

Douglas Ramage's analysis is based mostly on his view of Wahid as a person, yet when looking at the statements above and the sca1e of the event, the significance of the NU's commitment to the problems of the nation is aIso made

clear. This was admitted by Wahid himself, who said that ~s event (the Rapat

Akbar) is not persona! in its character.· He then added that Indonesia was facing a new phase with a new political setting, of which one aspect was the • need for a stabilizing force in the nation. No single force couId guarantee this stability, althougb the Pancaslla and the 1945 Constitution went a long way towards doing 90. Certainly, ABRI wu Dot enough and neither wu Golkar. 62 Thus, the event was meant as a preemptive attempt to avoid the instability of

the politica1 situation.63 According to Wahid, the Rapat Akbar wu also aimed at convincînl Muslims in the country that the NUs religious conception of Indonesia's pluralistic chameter needed to be developed. 'Ibis ran counter to the Islamic State ideology developed by certain sma1ler groups of Muslims in Indonesia.

51 Ramage. Potitics in IIMbIcsia, ~7·~8.

62 MOus Dur diaRapIt AkbIr NU," A"/ll (Marcb 1992), 34.

53 IlsbouId be DOt. bac1bal ODe or the possible rasons leadÎIJI &0 1be c:oIIai* œSuharto's New • Order govemmcnt tive years laIer may have beeD the implication ofthis same arpmeat. 104

Wahid maintained that widespread Muslim support would be usefu! as a momentum to start transforming the nation without interference from the

• 64 govemment.

ReorieatatloD orPoUtlcall8lam The NU's decision to retum to the khittah of 1926 tumed Islam towards a cultural strategy of community development. More importantly, it changed the nature of the state-citizen relationship, a change that has had a positive impact on the development of Indonesian nationalism. Islam is no longer regarded as an opponent of the state, but rather as a partner. This change was not simply

caused by the NU's leaving poütics: the govemment's wariness of Islamic-state ideology seemed to have been eliminated. The 1980s and the first halfof the 1990s (before the collapse ofSoehato's New Order govemment) represented an important period for political Islam; it was a period when Islamic forces in the countJy developed the momentum ta • overcome the negative image oC the Muslim community. It was a period during which professionals, intellectuals, and technocrats established a number of important bases of modem Muslim society. It wu also a period during which almost a11 segments ofthe soda-cultural (rather then socio-politica1) sector were profounclly affected by extensive activities of a vastly en1arged group of Muslim leaders who founded new businesses, established modem scbools and introduced new values and re1igious orientations. As a further positive outcome oC the above trend, there have been three factors determining the course oC the cultural Islamization oC the country. The first factor was the ongoing effort at hDerating Islam from political symbolism. It seemed clear that this wu the result of the -Islam yes but Islamic party no·

• 64 UGus DurdabpIt AkbIr NU," Ailla(MaIdll992), 36-37. 105

attitude that prominent Muslim leaders, among them Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid, had held since the late 19705. Nevertheless, it was not • until there was widespread acceptance of the Pancasila as the sole basis that this propaganda became a reality. The second Cactor was a rise in Muslim political articulateness, oriented

towards greater understanding oC Islam, democracy, human rights, justice and humanisme The Islamic symbolism of struggle, used before 1980, had become

less dominant. The third factor was the indirect involvement oC Muslims in the political arena of the New Order govemment. These three Cactors have made Islam, represented by the NU, a determining factor in developing nationalism in the country. One of the most significant recent developments Cor political Islam was the rise of ICMI (Ikatan Cendikiawan Muslim Seluruh Indonesia or AlI ... Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuels) on December 8, 1990. The formation of ICM! was initiated by a group of Muslim student activists from • Brawijaya University Malang. It was originally meant to be a social organization of Indonesian Muslim scholars. Prof. Dr. BJ. Habibie, who was Minister of Research and Technolo&V at the time, wu unanimously elected as ICMl's first chairman. ICMI's main objective wu to increase the participation of Muslim scholars in the elaboration of the strategy Cor national development. It is important ta note that, after the coUapse of Soeharto's New Omer govemment, Habibie came to replace him as the third President oC Indonesia. ICMI's leaders

immediately became more actively involved in the development of the nation.. state.

Although ICM! wu supposed ta he an alternative for developing society, its sudden political maneuvers seem ta have caused the -Cailure- oC the above

strategy. leM! was reprded as a distortion oC the step-by-step development • process of political Islam. Abdurrabman Wahid considered ICM! ta be sectarian 106

in character and declared that he neither supported nor opPOsed its creation, but refused to join because ·such an association would lead to the re­ • emergence of Islamic sectarianism and fundamentalism in the country. Also, as an independent entity of civil society, intellectuals should not organize themselves according to narrow categories such as their Islamic faith, let alone

themselves collaborate with the state.-6S

•

• 6S Stvdia IslaniluJ 3, 2, (1996). 99. CONCLUSION • The national spirit which took hold of Indonesia at the tum of the century bore the fruit of independence some forty years later. The Pancasila philosophy,

agreed upon as the philosophical basis for the country during the period

immediately following independence (1945-1949) and then implemented as the

ideology and sole foundation of an politica1 parties and social or mass

organizations in 1985, was a culmination of development in three important

areas: culture, ethnic identity and religious movements. It was very clear that,

as in many other countries that used to he under colonialist rule. the early

consciousness that emerged among Indonesians was a product oftheir desire to

proteet and promote their interests and he part of a sovereign country. At this

early stage, a universal collective ideology was not necessarily in place.

• Culture, ethnicity and religion were often used by Indonesian nationalist leaders to inspire unity in the face of both Dutch and Japanese occupation. The declaration of the Sumpah Pemuda, or Youth Pledge, in 1928 showed that the cultural nationalist movement dominated an other movements, including Islam. The most reasonable explanation for this can be traced back to the educational background of those who led the movements during the formative period of Indonesian nationalism. In the carly formative period. religious movements seemed to function in

a supporting role to cultural nationalism, in the sense tha.t explicit references to certain religious teachings were largely avoided by leader such as Raden Ajeng Kartini and movements like Boedi Oetomo. Religious movements becam.e more actively involved toward the midd.le period of this centwy, playing an important role during the revolutionary period and contributing to the conception of the • nation's ideologica1 basis. 108

Rather than simply establish an Islamie state in reeognizing of the county's • Muslim majority, secular and religious nationalist leaders arrived at a consensus making the Pancasila the ideologica1 basis of Indonesia. This

aclmowledged the unique pluralistic nature of Indonesian society, while at the

same tinte representing a great saerifice on the part of Indonesian Muslïms. It

was also an attempt ta establish universal values that were acceptable to eaeh

official religion in the country. In terms of national ideology, defined as

&universal spiri~ or value, the faet that Indonesian Muslims chose the

Pancasila seems to indicate that they were comfortable with this definition.

The Nahdlatul Ulama, with 50 many fol1owers, was both organizationally and

individually an integral part in the formation of the Indonesian national

ideology of the Pancasüa. The presence of K.H. Wahid Hasjim in the series of

discussions on the Pancasila was of great significanee to Muslims as weil as • followers of other religions in the country. There is no doubt that the NU's acceptance of the Pancasila as its sole foundation in 1983 was influenced by

the faet that Wahid's father, who was leader of the NU in 1945, had proposecl a

similar palicy for the interest of the nation...state. The historie decision made by

the NU in 1983 showed that the organiution was truly aware of itse1f as an

iû.tegra1 part in the development of Indonesian nationa Iism.

The NU's commitment to Indonesian nationalisme as the first orpnization ta

accept the Pancasila as its sole foundation, fully aclmowledged the pluralistic

spirit of the country. Binee its declaration, in Cact, the NKRI (Negara Kesatuan

Republik Indonesia, or the UnitaJy State of Indonesia), repreaenting the • strugg1e for an Islamic state, bas received little support from the majority of 109

Indonesian Muslims. The poliey represented the NU's endeavor to convinee • other Islamic parties to recognize the pluralistic reality of the countJy. The NU arrived at its acceptance of Pancasi1a as the sole foundation before

the enactment of the law which made this obligatory. It incorporated its

understanding of Islamic values into the real understanding of Indonesian

nationalism; it was not a reaction to pressure from above. This is in contrast to

other lndonesian Muslim organizations which accepted the policy only after

being forced to do 50 by law.

The NU's political behavior in relation to the question of national ideology,

determined by actual conditions and by its understanding of the doctrines of

Ahl al-Sunnah wa al.Jama'ah, has very often placed it at a disadvantage, even

though this May have had a positive effect on the nation. After accepting the

Pancasila as its sole foundation and leaving politics, the NU changed its • strategy of community development by adopting of cultural approach and strategy. This strategy wast moreover, the result of a long struggle by such

Muslim leaders as Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid.

Finally, one of the most significant outeomes of the above policy for

Indonesian nationalism, i.e., leaving politics, namely to retum to the khittah

1926 and accepting the Pancasila, wu the emergence of a new form of state­

citizen relationship in the country. This wu notjust a new phenomenon in the

histoty of Indonesian nationalism; it wu a historical event tbat sbould be

considered a valuable contribution by Indonesian Muslims to their counterparts

in other Muslim countries in the world. It wu Dot easy for Muslims. as a • majority. ta conceive ofsuch a strategy. but they did. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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