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Home , Achin District, Dawlat Shah District

The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office Issue: 07 July 16th to 31st

ANSO and our donors accept no liability for the results of any activity conducted or omitted on the basis of this report. THE ANSO REPORT -Not for copy or sale-

Inside this Issue COUNTRY SUMMARY Central Region 2 There has been a steady up- 4 ABDUCTIONS 2008 Eastern Region wards trend in abductions/ Northern Region 6 kidnapping countrywide this 30 year. The start of the up- 27 25 Western Region 8 swing in abductions follows 21 Southern Region 8 the early upsurge of AOG 20 activity reported in May, 16 ANSO Info Page 11 15 though this is not the only 12 10 cause. Incidents recorded 99 6 include those kidnappings 5 perpetrated for criminal pur- YOU NEED TO KNOW poses (primarily for financial 0 gain), as well as those that are JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL • Abductions remain a consis- conflict related. Conflict tent threat to NGO staff related incidents occur for a NGO have also been af- 2007-2008 year to date • Deteriorating security along broad range of reasons, in- fected by this trend, with totals. Kabul-Jalalabad road cluding financial gains and as abduction incidents up 29% an intimidation measure. in comparison between • Ongoing high volumes of AOG initiated incidents countrywide

• Destruction of bridges and NGO DATA & TRENDS culverts along primary routes in the SR Related to the above threat and as detailed the chart provided, abductions have accounted for 25% of all NGO ANSO is supported by related security inci- Armed Attacks dents recorded in 23% 2008. The recent Threats countrywide increase 29% of abductions and kidnappings have directly affected NGO staff, primarily na- Abduction tional staff members. 25% While abductions Armed Attacks IED/Explosives Arson Missile/Mortar have occurred both Abduction Threats Searches Beatings from facilities as well as during travel, in transit staff remain the highest at risk, both for targeted incidents as well as those that occur at illegal checkpoints. Fortunately, many of the recent incidents have been of the “catch and release” type and have resulted in positive outcomes, though the occurrence in Daykundi marks a new dynamic of this threat: that of a power broker utilizing international staff as leverage in order to resolve a local dispute. THE ANSO REPORT Page 2

NGO Incidents KABUL KABUL Year to Date 11 25 This Report Period 1 As of this writing, there were 18 20 AOG incidents in the province police and military check points or 15 this month, up from 14 in June. vehicles. For NGO these attacks 10 indicate deteriorating stability in The jump was mostly due to a 5 rash of attacks in Surobi, where the area, which can have significant security implications for 0 the incidents have more than dou- JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL bled compared to last month travel between Kabul and Jala- (from 4 to 9). Most of these inci- labad. AOG ACG dents were small arms attacks on Kabul city experienced two suicide bombings and one IED at- dents targeted specific NGO, as mentioned tack, both of which should be in a previous report, for all NGO such KEY THREATS & CONCERNS considered viable threats in the threats suggest increased vulnerability for !"Suicide/IED attack threat coming month. their operations. !"Deteriorating security in Surobi Threats to NGO staff are again NGO should also be conscious of the threat !"Spectacular attacks against high notable, with two occurring in the of crime in Kabul city, with abduction and profile targets province in July. While these inci- armed robbery being the primary threats.

NGO Incidents WARDAK

WARDAK Year to Date 4 50 This Report Period 1 Wardak remains volatile with high 40 incidence of small arm and IED dent in which two INGO local 30 attacks on military and police fa- staff travelling in a private car 20 were abducted on the road in cilities and convoys. 10 Nirkh. They were released after 24 For NGO, currently the most 0 hours, but the car was not recov- salient threat is abduction and JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL ered, suggesting a criminal rather hijacking. There have been six than political motivation behind AOG ACG abduction incidents so far in July, the incident. AOG are known to including one direct NGO inci- conduct surveillance along the have quieted as a resolution was recently road in Wardak and this likely also achieved. This resolution followed a dem- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS goes for criminals, who may be onstration in Kabul as well as a government !"IED working independently or with directive. Kuchis’ have agreed to agreed to !"Abduction AOG. follow the directive and continue moving on !"Armed clashes between AOG and to previous locations. security forces The Kuchi-Hazara incidents in the Bihsud Districts appear to

NGO Incidents KAPISA KAPISA Year to Date 1 20 This Report Period 0 The western districts of Kapisa 15 have not received any recent re- remain relatively quiet. While 10 there was a rare rocket attack di- ports of problems for NGO op- rected at the police headquarters erations. 5

in Hisa-i-Awaili Kohistan, we Tagab and Nijrab continue to ex- 0 perience the most incidents. While JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL Alasay is reported to be heavily KEY THREATS & CONCERNS AOG ACG !"Abduction infiltrated by AOG, it rarely has recorded incidents; though it !"Rocket attacks should be noted the low incident rity presence, not a safe environment. !"Attacks against DC’s levels are indicative of a low secu- THE ANSO REPORT Page 3

NGO Incidents BAMYAN

BAMYAN Year to Date 1 10 This Report Period 0 There has been little notable re- 8 porting from Bamyan in recent time were isolated incidents rather 6 weeks. There were no further epi- than initial trend indicators. 4

sodes of IED attacks or robberies In the beginning of the reporting 2 period, there were fears that the since the last report, indicating (as 0 suspected) that those reported last violent Kuchi-Hazara conflicts in JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL Wardak would spill into Bamyan, AOG ACG KEY THREATS & CONCERNS and there were reports of inter- nally displaced families entering !"Isolated incidents of highway ban- now appears quiet, as the Kuchi have re- ditry Shibar District because of the fighting. However, the situation portedly begun moving out of the area.

NGO Incidents DAYKONDI DAYKUNDI Year to Date 1 10 This Report Period 1 Two French NGO workers kid- 8 napped on 18 July were released harbour a significant AOG pres- 6 ence, but the northern part of the on 2 August. It is likely the NGO 4 province has generally been con- was targeted because it had inter- 2 national staff. The workers were sidered relatively safe for NGO operations (with the caveat that 0 reportedly abducted by Com- JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL mander Sedaqat, a local warlord the area is isolated with a minimal who was using them for political security presence). The “safety” of AOG ACG leverage in a dispute with the dis- the north should be viewed as trict government. delusive. While in this case the Daykunde (as well as any other regions that politics may be local, the prov- Southern Daykunde is known to are readily accessible to AOG due to a lim- ince’s isolation and the potential ited security presence) should assess their KEY THREATS & CONCERNS for AOG movement make it risky environment and should conduct a thor- !"Abduction for NGO operations, in particular ough threat to benefit analysis in regards to for international staff. !"Limited security force presence operations and staff safety. NGO with operations in

NGO Incidents LOGAR LOGAR Year to Date 4 30 This Report Period 1 AOG activity remains extremely high, with over a dozen incidents attacked district centres in Mu- 20 reported in just the last week hammad Agha and Khushi, and alone. While most incidents target hijacked two Ministry of Educa- 10 police and military, they are geo- tion trucks in Azra. In some incidents—such as in the cases of the 0 graphically dispersed and tactically JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL diverse. In addition to recent se- NGO and MoE vehicle hijack- curity force-focused attacks, over ings—there appear to be a blend- AOG ACG the last two weeks AOG hijacked ing of AOG and criminal activity. an NGO vehicle in Puli Alam, NGO should consider the threat NGO staff of a local de-mining NGO. The of abduction and/or vehicle hi- staff were released shortly after the abduc- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS jacking to be very high in Logar. tion, but their vehicles were not returned. !"Abduction There have been three abductions Such incidents are almost surely targeted !"Roadside IED in July and five since June. The and seem to confirm reports of significant AOG/ACG monitoring of the roads in !"Decreasing stability province-wide most recent abduction was of Logar. THE ANSO REPORT Page 4

NGO Incidents LAGHMAN LAGHMAN Year to Date 3 20 This Report Period 0 Laghman saw an increase in seri- 15 ous incidents this period. AOG from across the Kabul River) and attacks on Highway 1 continued an attack on the small Naghlo 10 hydro-electric dam on Highway 1 with an ambush of a fuel convoy 5 in Qarghayi on the 20th of July near Sorubi. The chances of a low profile NGO vehicle being 0 that resulted in the death of a JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL driver and six other people who attacked are still slim but collateral were passing by in a farm truck. damage is a risk. AOG have not AOG ACG This attack is one of a spate of established illegal check points yet incidents along the highway with probably due to the high chances of the district CID and another policeman most occurring in Kabul Province they would quickly be discovered were killed by a detonation. Five suspects have east of Sorubi. These attacks, by security forces. Although been arrested and admitted the details of their which occur roughly every other ANSO has not advised against all plan. Both Alishing and Alinghar Districts also day, have included ambushes on travel on Highway 1, it would be reported IED attacks on security forces near fuel convoys, harassing small arms prudent for NGOs to reduce the DACs. Dawlat Shah District was quiet this attacks on police posts (often travel whenever possible. period following several incidents during the Laghman also saw an increase in last which may have been warnings to local activity in Qarghayi District with a security forces not to interfere with AOG KEY THREATS & CONCERNS direct fire attack on the DAC and movement through the district. !"Increased threat of attack along also a foiled AOG plot to kill the The security situation in Laghman for NGOs Hwy 1 provincial governor using three remains manageable. Travel in low profile to !"Increased attacks on DAC IEDs planted along the road lead- Mitharlam remains medium risk but the south- !"Increased IED deployment in ing to the facility. During opera- ern district DACs should be avoided and travel DAC vicinities tions to clear these IEDs the chief to Dawlat Shah is not advised.

NGO Incidents KUNAR

KUNAR Year to Date 2 80 This Report Period 0 70 Kunar remains the most violent 60 province in the region with 68 metal from a previous attack on 50 an IMF fuel convoy, the group of 40 serious security incidents re- 30 ported. The Manogai area of Dari- civilians were engaged by an IMF 20 Pech was the most volatile district helicopter. AOG activity is heavy 10 in all districts except Asadabad 0 in the country. AOG-IMF clashes JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL occur in the district daily with 20 and NGO international staff are AOG ACG serious AOG initiated incidents advised not to leave Asadabad reported. Most incidents in the City or travel off the main Jala- district are attacks on IMF bases labad- Asadabad Highway. and the home to an IED cell, as indicated by and convoys. Armed clashes often Reports of AOG infiltration are the number of devices located on the road to result in harm to civilians and constant with numbers of fighters the DAC. Road building efforts are being their property. This included the totalling in the hundreds sited for hampered in Chawkay and Chapa Dara Dis- killing of six locals on 27 July in most districts. These figures are tricts by IEDs and frequent attacks on con- Ghaziabad. While salvaging scrap probably exaggerated but never- struction companies. AOG attempts to infil- theless the rural districts of Kunar trate suicide bombers into Asadabad City con- are very dangerous. Ghaziabad is tinue with their targets being the police and KEY THREATS & CONCERNS the site of numerous attacks on Governor. Reports have been received of !"Ongoing AOG infiltration convoys, particularly supply con- “foreign” IED experts coming in to the prov- !"Increased IED use in Sirkanay voys for the IMF base located ince to build bombs and provide training. An !"Clashes between AOG and secu- there. Sirkanay, in contrast, is the increase in the use of IEDs can be anticipated. rity forces focus of most of the rocket fire THE ANSO REPORT Page 5

NGO Incidents NANGAHAR NANGARHAR Year to Date 2 This Report Period 0 30 The security situation in Nan- 25 garhar remains stable but there In Chapahar District on 23 July 20 were several serious incidents this the Chief of Police was assassi- 15 period. The most notable was the nated with an IED as his convoy 10 invasion of an office of an organi- drove to Jalalabad. This event is 5 zation involved in road construc- one of an increasing series of at- 0 tion in Landi Saber Village in Pa- tacks on government supporters JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL chir Wagam District on 29 July at and officials in the districts south AOG ACG 2230 hrs. 12-15 armed men at- west of Jalalabad: Chapahar, tended the office, announced they Khogyani and Pachir Wagam. crease in the number of armed clashes with were Taliban, and demanded en- There appears to be a slow escala- security forces one would expect to accom- try. The guards refused which lead tion of intimidation in the low pany such an increase in fighters, however, the to the gate being battered in. lying areas of the districts around chances of encountering AOG are increasing. Some local staff escaped but four Jalalabad with an IED found and ANSO recommends that international staff guards and an engineer were ab- an attack on ANP even reported avoid the southern districts as much as possi- ducted. At the time of writing, in Rodat, a district recently noted ble. one staff member had been re- for being quiet. Jalalabad City has been quiet with no increase leased the following day. This Reports of large numbers of in risk to NGOs. Highway 1 to Kabul has be- matter remains under investiga- AOG infiltrating the province come worrisome with the number of attacks tion with local elders working to continue with Achin District be- on fuel tankers and police posts having risen secure the release of the hostages. ing the destination of many. The significantly in the Kabul and Laghman Prov- numbers of AOG reported range inces (see the Laghman report for more detail). KEY THREATS & CONCERNS into the hundreds and although The risk to low profile NGO traffic is still !"Suicide attack threat some reports are exaggerated or small but ANSO recommends limiting road !"Increasing attack frequency along perhaps even false reports planted moves if possible. Highway 1 to Torkham has Hwy 1 by AOG, the number of AOG in not seen an increase in attacks but NGOs are !"Increased AOG presence in the province does appear to be advised to avoid road travel in Pakistan due to south/south–east of province rising. As of yet this has not the unstable security situation in NWFP and translated into a significant in- FATA.

NGO Incidents KHOST KHOST Year to Date 5 40 This Report Period 0

Khost continues to be extremely 30 volatile with IED incidents being ployees. The bomber bluffed his the predominant method of AOG way into the compound with a 20 sedan rigged as a VBIED by say- attack. 16 separate IED incidents 10 were recorded this period including he was delivering a rental vehicle. Once inside he detonated the 0 ing the use of a SVBIED to attack JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL a road construction compound in bomb. Nine other civilians were Sabari District on 27 July that re- killed in the province in other AOG ACG sulted in the deaths of four em- IED attacks with the devices detonating in approximately half panying the convoy. It is too early to make a the total IED incidents. A UN pronouncement as to whether AOG in this KEY THREATS & CONCERNS convoy was also attacked, without province now consider the UN a legitimate !"Increasing IED attacks casualties, in Gurbuz District on target. Sabari District saw the highest number !"Ongoing AOG infiltration 21 July. It is not known if this of serious security incidents recording eight of !"Intimidation against NSP related attack was directed at the UN or the provinces 20 for this period including activities the armed police escorts accom- seven IED incidents. THE ANSO REPORT Page 6

NGO Incidents NURISTAN

NURISTAN Year to Date 1 15 This Report Period 0 13 Nuristan remains highly danger- 11 ous for NGO operations due to and Way Gal Districts have re- 9 the large number of AOG at cently been close to being 7 “captured” for short durations by 5 large, IMF air strikes in response 3 to AOG activity, and a general the AOG and an IMF base has 1 been abandoned in Way Gal after -1 lack of government control out- JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL side of DACs. Both Bargi Matal the element posted there took very heavy casualties during a AOG ACG KEY THREATS & CONCERNS large scale AOG attack earlier in !"High threat environment to inter- the month. Reports of AOG ac- not appear that sufficient security forces are national NGO staff tivity, including the first attacks in available to create a stable enough situation in !"AOG migration to west of prov- years in Parun, have been received the province for NGO operations. ANSO ince from Wama District which may continues to advise NGOs to employee only !"Frequent AOG/IMF clashes indicate the migration of AOG local people in Nuristan. forces west. At present it does

NGO Incidents PAKTYA PAKTYA Year to Date 0 40 This Report Period 0 Paktya continues to see AOG 30 activity increase and expand ANP occurred in Sayid Karam within the province. Although District. Both these latter districts 20 the majority of incidents occurred border Logar Province and these 10 in Gardez District, five serious events may be connected with increases in violence there. 0 events happened in Jaji District JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL and a fatal IED attack on security Gardez District DAC remains a forces and the kidnapping of two high priority target for the AOG AOG ACG with direct fire, rocket, and IED KEY THREATS & CONCERNS attacks this period. Swak and been no NGO incidents reported this year, !"IED along Gardez-Khost road Zurmat Districts remain volatile during this period there was an attempt to !"Spread of AOG operations to Jaji with two successful IED attacks burn a school in Jaji on 27 July but locals pre- and Sayid Karam Districts against security forces occurring vented the arson and chased the AOG away. in Zurmat. Although there have

NGO Incidents TAKHAR TAKHAR Year to Date 2 This Report Period 0 10 Takhar continues to express the 8 same rate of incidents as at this and the occasional RPG are the 6 main motifs for AOG expression, time in previous years. Unlike 4 this month saw a complex attack some other areas in the north, the 2 mounted on an ANP checkpost. province is distinguished by the 0 relative lack of ACG activity in Although the attack on the ANP JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL favour of that of AOGs, and fur- was attributed to the Taliban, it is thermore this has been a continual more likely a product of local or- AOG ACG feature in past years. While IEDs ganisation. The difficulties inherent in accessing Takhar from reporting rate unless there were a major up- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS other areas of the country mean surge in AOG activity in Baghlan and Kunduz, !"IED that such AOG incidents will con- which would allow AOGs to move further !"Low level AOG activity tinue this at this slow and steady afield. THE ANSO REPORT Page 7

NGO Incidents JAWZJAN

JAWZJAN Year to Date 5 10

This Report Period 0 8 The number of incidents in Jaw- zjan for the period of July has targets chosen have remained rela- 6 continued in a slow and steady tively constant—in this case, poli- 4 upwards trend—two in July 2006, ticians and police check points. 2 four in July 2007, and five this The recent reshuffling of district 0 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL year. While the attack volume has governors has produced perceived increased, the tactics utilized and winners and losers resulting in AOG ACG violence that is related to these KEY THREATS & CONCERNS outcomes. Although such inci- operating in a politically charged environment as well as the risk of being targeted due to a !"Political conflict dents don’t target NGOs directly, perceived political polarity. !"Criminal activity there remains the inherent risk of

NGO Incidents SAMANGAN S AMANGAN Year to Date 1 10 This Report Period 0 Along with the continuing threat 8 of abduction in Samangan, the in “circular reporting”, something 6 which in turn has amplified peo- climate of fear surrounding this 4 ples impression of the scope of threat has been creating its own 2 dynamic. As intelligence has fil- the threat. Having said this, the threat has been reinforced by the 0 tered from one source to another, JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL various elements of the threats kidnapping of a local man, though having been altered and reinter- this incident is more likely the AOG ACG preted, and in some cases resulted result of criminality and not tied to the more complex threats of ever, and recently resulted in the longer-than- late which have targeted NGOs. normal detention of one NGO worker. In KEY THREATS & CONCERNS The abduction threat of the last addition, it has resulted in requests by local !"Abduction/kidnapping threat reporting period has had an im- authorities for NGOs to declare their intended pact on local security forces how- whereabouts.

NGO Incidents BAGHLAN BAGHLAN Year to Date 0 10 This Report Period 0 The fact that Baghlan has been 8 almost free of incidents during the NR. The main suicide attack 6 this period (the one incident being threat was aimed not at IMF but 4 the confiscation of a weapons rather at a large local gathering 2 where it would have featured 0 cache) belies the reality that it has JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL been the subject of numerous prominently in the international threat warnings. These threats, media. Abduction threats are like- AOG ACG including suicide attacks and ab- wise constructed so that the event duction, share the commonality would be both complexly exe- order legitimize their claim that they are able to that they are intended to be more cuted and attention grabbing. Of operate throughout the entire country, a real- high-impact and high-profile inci- greater significance and concern is ity that would add legitimacy to their more dents than what is usually seen in that the stability of Baghlan repre- political goals. It is exactly the relative inability sents a gateway to the north, both of AOGs to mount such high-profile incidents KEY THREATS & CONCERNS literally and figuratively. AOGs that makes Baghlan an especially tempting tar- !"Suicide attack threat need to maintain the plausibility get and the possible target of future efforts. !"Abduction threat that they can strike the north in THE ANSO REPORT Page 8

NGO Incidents HERAT

HERAT Year to Date 8 20 This Report Period 2 Abduction has now firmly estab- 15 that they have happened in both lished itself as a regular ingredient 10 in Herat’s diet of predominant Herat city and other districts, ACG activities. While abductions mostly to the south and west of 5 the province. The spread-out in the past have targeted private 0 companies and individual nation- nature of the threat makes it diffi- JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL als, an NGO recently suffered the cult for NGOs to calculate the AOG ACG abduction of two of its staff mem- risk in a specific area, therefore bers in Farsi. Previous abductions making it prudent for NGO to south of Herat have become more unstable, have been rather widespread in review their movement and anti- ACGs in Herat have been utilizing bolder and kidnap protocols and procedures. more lucrative tactics (kidnapping vs. theft). KEY THREATS & CONCERNS The large amount of ACG activity This activity has also included the hoarding of !"Abduction in Herat strongly suggests a sym- a considerable number of weapons and illegal !"Criminal activity biotic relationship between ACGs substances, as highlighted by the frequent dis- and AOGs. As the provinces coveries of weapon and drug caches.

NGO Incidents GHOR GHOR Year to Date 0 This Report Period 0 10 Reporting from Ghor remains 8 limited. The primary source of runs through the heart of the 6 concern for NGOs remains the province. Although this road has 4 scene few incidents, sections of it Chaghcheran-Heart road, which 2 west of Shahrak remain of con- 0 KEY THREATS & CONCERNS cern as a result of tribal and local JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL !"Internecine conflict conflicts. AOG ACG

NGO Incidents HELMAND HELMAND Year to Date 0 50 This Report Period 0 The volatility and instability 40 within the districts of Nahri Sar- sess the full scope of this situa- 30 raj, Sangin, Kajaki, Nawa, Musa tion, this reality is common 20 Qala and Nad Ali continues. It enough throughout the SR and 10 had been previously identified that should considered an accurate 0 only the DCs of the abovemen- description when taken into the JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL context of NGO access and safety tioned districts fall under direct AOG ACG governmental control, with the in these areas. Supporting this surrounding areas under the direct assessment was the recent deploy- or indirect control of AOG element of ANA into Nad Ali with command network. While this will likely have ments. While it is difficult to as- the focus of reestablishing gov- a short term effect on AOG capacity, trends ernmental control in the area as indicate that the presence throughout Hel- well as dislodging AOG elements mand is extensive and tenacious and neither of KEY THREATS & CONCERNS insitu. In addition, there have these initiatives will have any particular mid to !"Significant AOG presence been frequent utilization of air long term impact on the overall security within throughout the province strikes, primarily targeting AOG the province. !"BBIED safe havens, specifically, the AOG THE ANSO REPORT Page 9

NGO Incidents ZABUL ZABUL Year to Date 1 This Report Period 0 40

The security situation within this 30 province remains unstable and intent of disrupting these activi- volatile and GoA/security force ties. Reports from the follow on 20 control of Hwy 1 (particularly engagements between the two 10 forces indicate that significant between Ghazni and Qalat City) 0 continues to be precarious. In casualties have been inflicted JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL response to this situation, it has upon AOG elements. While this been reported recently that there will likely have a short term affect AOG ACG is an intent to increase the num- on AOG capacity in the area, the ber of security forces patrolling long term effects remain to seen. first being that these locations allow for ease of along Hwy 1, though it is un- The methods of deployment of deployment as well as the secondary effect of known the effect these forces will IED in this province continue to destroying important infrastructure following have. In addition, as AOG ele- develop. Present trends have the detonation. The primary targets of these de- ments have continued to exhibit a potential of having a deteriorating vices remain security forces, both directly and singular confidence in the vicini- effect on both travel security and indirectly through the disruption of move- ties of Shahjoy, a recent joint op- freedom of movement. One of ments. This will also impact NGO staff move- eration was launched with the the primary placement areas of ments and safety in the same way. By-pass these devices has become bridges areas (generally traversing the soft shoulders or KEY THREATS & CONCERNS and culverts along Hwy 1, with stream beds) are also common placement sites !"Regular IED deployment several detonations as well as dis- for secondary devices (including victim oper- !"Abduction/kidnapping coveries and seizures reported in ated types) and pose a direct risk to those utilizing the by-pass. !"Incidents along Hwy 1 the past few weeks. The purposes of this tactic is likely twofold; the

NGO Incidents GHAZNI G HAZNI Year to Date 2 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL This Report Period 0 80 The overall incident volume, and concomitant volatility of this counted for the second highest 60 province has continued unabated overall incident volume from 40 since the initial upsurge in activity within the SR. beginning in April. Since that As in other provinces within the 20 time, Ghazni has consistently ac- SR, AOG in Ghazni are fre- quently deploying IED at bridges 0 KEY THREATS & CONCERNS and culverts, with at least three AOG ACG !"Attacks along Hwy 1 being destroyed in the last week continue. For further information and analysis !"Attacks on DAC alone. The spread of this tactic on this issue, please refer to the Zabul provin- !"Destruction of bridges and cul- represents typical tactic migration verts in the south, and due to the suc- cial analysis section. cess witnessed thus far, will likely

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly. Contact details of ANSO staff are provide on the last page.

ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..” THE ANSO REPORT Page 10

NGO Incidents KANDAHAR

KANDAHAR Year to Date 9 100 This Report Period 1 80 On the 31st of July, 5 to 6 masked men carrying AK 47s gained entry The area in which this incident 60 to an NGO guesthouse and sub- occurred is a relatively isolated in 40 sequently bound, blindfolded, and the southern portion of the city 20 which has been utilised multiple beat the night guard. The victim 0 stated that the perpetrators times previously by both ACG JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL claimed to be Taliban and were and AOG elements to infiltrate/ AOG ACG constantly asking about the exfiltrate into Kandahar City lim- whereabouts of the female expa- its. In addition, this area was the triates. The perpetrators spent location of the previous INGO counter-surveillance and anti-kidnap proto- only a short time insitu and subse- international staff member abduc- cols. Due to the heightened threat of kidnap- quently robbed the guard, though tion in January as well as a previ- ping and abduction presently within the city it is unlikely that this was the ous attempt on an International NGO are advised to limit all movements of prime motivation as this incident Organisation in October of last international staff within the city, as well as followed a recent report indicating year. This incident also illumi- cease any planned site visits for the immediate an AOG element recently de- nates further the nexus that exists future. ployed to the city with the express between ACG/AOG and the use This incident marks the 9th separate direct purpose of abducting INGO staff by AOG of criminal groups to NGO security incident reported in 2008(not members. conduct directed operations and including the detention of an INGO staff the complexity of the threat as it member by IMF in March). Kandahar now KEY THREATS & CONCERNS exists within the southern context. accounts for the second highest NGO incident !"High NGO incident volume NGO are advised to review their volume countrywide. Of note, Kabul, which !"Ongoing AOG infiltration site physical security meas- hosts the highest concentration of NGO staff, !"Heightened abduction threat ures. In addition, NGO should in the country, accounts for the 1st (with 11 within Kandahar city ensure that they continue to ob- incidents). This fact highlights the significant serve all previously advised risks incurred with operating in Kandahar.

NGO Incidents NIMROZ NIMROZ Year to Date 1 20 This Report Period 0 While there has been no signifi- 15 incidents had been occurring at a cant shift in overall incident vol- 10 ume, the conclusion of the road frequency previously unseen be- construction efforts in Khash Rod fore in this province. 5 has resulted in a shift in AOG It is assessed that this represents a 0 efforts and the nature of incidents short to mid term situation how- JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL reported. The primary targets of ever, as AOG elements insitu are AOG activity had previously been likely in a period of redirection of AOG ACG the road construction crews (and efforts and focus. While attacks escorting security forces), and against ANP will continue, AOG the nature of these attacks will include suicide AOG elements had deployed am- will probably shift resources onto attack vectors, as there have already been two bushes, IED, as well as suicide attacking GoA personnel and fa- suicide attack attempts against the Governor attack vectors. These types of cilities, targets which they have and third one against a senior police official. shown previously willing to en- These three event all occurred within Zaranj City. KEY THREATS & CONCERNS gage. If this proves correct, it will !"Decreased volatility in Khash Rod represent a challenge to NGO NGO are advised to reduce their exposure to operating in this province as most this threat by minimising their presence in the !"Suicide attacks against high profile targets of these targets are concentrated vicinity of such high profile targets. in Zaranj City. It is also likely that THE AFGHANISTAN NGO OFFICE - CONTACTS AND INFORMATION

CONTACT ANSO

CENTRAL REGION OFFICE (KABUL) MISSING ANSO is hosted by Deutsche Welthungerhilfe Blake Kehler - [email protected] - 0799 323 792 Hedayatullah - [email protected] - 0799 322 116 This report ANSO could not provide NORTH REGION OFFICE (MAZAR) analysis for the prov- Scott Bohlinger - [email protected] - 0799 404 617 inces of: Firoz Fahez - [email protected] - 0799 408 252 To Register with ANSO !" Parwan contact: EAST REGION OFFICE (JALALABAD) [email protected] !" Panjshir John Binns - [email protected] - 0799 248 362 !" Badghis Khisrow Shohar - [email protected] - 0798 778 014 !" Farah ANSO is managed by an NGO SOUTH REGION OFFICE (KANDAHAR) !" Sar-E-Pul Board. If you have any Nathan Ronaldson - [email protected] - 0797 414 100 !" Balkh feedback, good or bad, let Mohammadi - [email protected] - 0700 300 730 !" Badakshan them know on: !" Faryab [email protected] WEST REGION OFFICE (HERAT) !" Kunduz Vacant - [email protected] - 0799 322 192 !" Paktika ANSO ACRONYMS Najma Fazly - [email protected] - 0700 404 929 !" Uruzgan

IMF-International Military COUNTRY MANAGEMENT (KABUL) Forces / AOG-Armed Oppo- Nic Lee - [email protected] - 0799 325 349 This is because we sition Groups / GOA- Nathan Ronaldson - [email protected] - 0797 165 017 do not know enough Government of Afghanistan Chona Bollos - [email protected] - 0797-093-073 about the area to / ACG-Armed Criminal Groups / ANA-Afghan Na- tional Army / ANP-Afghan National Police / IED- HOW TO AMEND ADDRESSES ON Improvised Exploding De- ANSO MAILING LISTS vice / AEF-Afghan Eradica- (1) NGO – ANSO COUNTRY LIST: tion Forces / RPG-Rocket Propelled Grenade / IDF- !" TO ONLY DELETE AN ADDRESS: send an email to [email protected] requesting that your address be deleted. Indirect Fire (ex: mortars) / !" TO CHANGE ONE ADDRESS FOR ANOTHER: submit a hard-copy letterhead to the Operations Assistant at ANSO VBIED-Vehicle Borne Impro- HQ (House 3, St 5, Qala-e-Fatullah, Kabul) indicating the address to be removed along with the name, position, phone, and email of vised Exploding Device / the address to be added. PRP-Previous Reporting ! TO ADD AN ADDITIONAL ADDRESS WITHOUT DELETING ANY: If you have not used your maximum allow- Period / ANBP-Afghan Na- ance (5 emails per NGO) then submit a hard-copy letterhead to the Operations Assistant indicating the name, position, phone num- tional Border Police / SAF- ber and email of the address to be added. Small Arms Fire / NDS- National Directorate of Se- (2) NGO – ANSO REGIONAL LIST: curity (intelligence) / PSC- !" TO ONLY DELETE AN ADDRESS: send an email to your regional ANSO office requesting that your address be deleted. Private Security Company / DC-District Centre !" TO CHANGE ONE ADDRESS FOR ANOTHER: submit a hard-copy letterhead to the your regional ANSO office indicating the name and address to be removed along with the name, position, phone number and email of the address to be added.

!" TO ADD AN ADDITIONAL ADDRESS WITHOUT DELETING ANY: If you have not used your maximum allow- ance (5 emails per NGO) then submit a hard-copy letterhead to your regional ANSO office indicating the name, position, phone number and email of the address to be added.