The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office Issue: 07 July 16th to 31st ANSO and our donors accept no liability for the results of any activity conducted or omitted on the basis of this report. THE ANSO REPORT -Not for copy or sale- Inside this Issue COUNTRY SUMMARY Central Region 2 There has been a steady up- 4 ABDUCTIONS 2008 Eastern Region wards trend in abductions/ Northern Region 6 kidnapping countrywide this 30 year. The start of the up- 27 25 Western Region 8 swing in abductions follows 21 Southern Region 8 the early upsurge of AOG 20 activity reported in May, 16 ANSO Info Page 11 15 though this is not the only 12 10 cause. Incidents recorded 99 6 include those kidnappings 5 perpetrated for criminal pur- YOU NEED TO KNOW poses (primarily for financial 0 gain), as well as those that are JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL • Abductions remain a consis- conflict related. Conflict tent threat to NGO staff related incidents occur for a NGO have also been af- 2007-2008 year to date • Deteriorating security along broad range of reasons, in- fected by this trend, with totals. Kabul-Jalalabad road cluding financial gains and as abduction incidents up 29% an intimidation measure. in comparison between • Ongoing high volumes of AOG initiated incidents countrywide • Destruction of bridges and NGO DATA & TRENDS culverts along primary routes in the SR Related to the above threat and as detailed the chart provided, abductions have accounted for 25% of all NGO ANSO is supported by related security inci- Armed Attacks dents recorded in 23% 2008. The recent Threats countrywide increase 29% of abductions and kidnappings have di- rectly affected NGO staff, primarily na- Abduction tional staff members. 25% While abductions Armed Attacks IED/ExpLosives Arson MissiLe/Mortar have occurred both Abduction Threats Searches Beatings from facilities as well as during travel, in transit staff remain the highest at risk, both for targeted incidents as well as those that occur at illegal checkpoints. Fortunately, many of the recent incidents have been of the “catch and release” type and have resulted in positive outcomes, though the occurrence in Daykundi marks a new dynamic of this threat: that of a power broker utilizing international staff as leverage in order to resolve a local dispute. THE ANSO REPORT Page 2 NGO Incidents KABUL KABUL Year to Date 11 25 This Report Period 1 As of this writing, there were 18 20 AOG incidents in the province police and military check points or 15 this month, up from 14 in June. vehicles. For NGO these attacks 10 indicate deteriorating stability in The jump was mostly due to a 5 rash of attacks in Surobi, where the area, which can have signifi- cant security implications for 0 the incidents have more than dou- JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL bled compared to last month travel between Kabul and Jala- (from 4 to 9). Most of these inci- labad. AOG ACG dents were small arms attacks on Kabul city experienced two sui- cide bombings and one IED at- dents targeted specific NGO, as mentioned tack, both of which should be in a previous report, for all NGO such KEY THREATS & CONCERNS considered viable threats in the threats suggest increased vulnerability for !"Suicide/IED attack threat coming month. their operations. !"Deteriorating security in Surobi Threats to NGO staff are again NGO should also be conscious of the threat !"Spectacular attacks against high notable, with two occurring in the of crime in Kabul city, with abduction and profile targets province in July. While these inci- armed robbery being the primary threats. NGO Incidents WARDAK WARDAK Year to Date 4 50 This Report Period 1 Wardak remains volatile with high 40 incidence of small arm and IED dent in which two INGO local 30 attacks on military and police fa- staff travelling in a private car 20 were abducted on the road in cilities and convoys. 10 Nirkh. They were released after 24 For NGO, currently the most 0 hours, but the car was not recov- salient threat is abduction and JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL ered, suggesting a criminal rather hijacking. There have been six than political motivation behind AOG ACG abduction incidents so far in July, the incident. AOG are known to including one direct NGO inci- conduct surveillance along the have quieted as a resolution was recently road in Wardak and this likely also achieved. This resolution followed a dem- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS goes for criminals, who may be onstration in Kabul as well as a government !"IED working independently or with directive. Kuchis’ have agreed to agreed to !"Abduction AOG. follow the directive and continue moving on !"Armed clashes between AOG and to previous locations. security forces The Kuchi-Hazara incidents in the Bihsud Districts appear to NGO Incidents KAPISA KAPISA Year to Date 1 20 This Report Period 0 The western districts of Kapisa 15 have not received any recent re- remain relatively quiet. While 10 there was a rare rocket attack di- ports of problems for NGO op- rected at the police headquarters erations. 5 in Hisa-i-Awaili Kohistan, we Tagab and Nijrab continue to ex- 0 perience the most incidents. While JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL Alasay is reported to be heavily KEY THREATS & CONCERNS AOG ACG !"Abduction infiltrated by AOG, it rarely has recorded incidents; though it !"Rocket attacks should be noted the low incident rity presence, not a safe environment. !"Attacks against DC’s levels are indicative of a low secu- THE ANSO REPORT Page 3 NGO Incidents BAMYAN BAMYAN Year to Date 1 10 This Report Period 0 There has been little notable re- 8 porting from Bamyan in recent time were isolated incidents rather 6 weeks. There were no further epi- than initial trend indicators. 4 sodes of IED attacks or robberies In the beginning of the reporting 2 period, there were fears that the since the last report, indicating (as 0 suspected) that those reported last violent Kuchi-Hazara conflicts in JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL Wardak would spill into Bamyan, AOG ACG KEY THREATS & CONCERNS and there were reports of inter- nally displaced families entering !"Isolated incidents of highway ban- now appears quiet, as the Kuchi have re- ditry Shibar District because of the fighting. However, the situation portedly begun moving out of the area. NGO Incidents DAYKONDI DAYKUNDI Year to Date 1 10 This Report Period 1 Two French NGO workers kid- 8 napped on 18 July were released harbour a significant AOG pres- 6 ence, but the northern part of the on 2 August. It is likely the NGO 4 province has generally been con- was targeted because it had inter- 2 national staff. The workers were sidered relatively safe for NGO operations (with the caveat that 0 reportedly abducted by Com- JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL mander Sedaqat, a local warlord the area is isolated with a minimal who was using them for political security presence). The “safety” of AOG ACG leverage in a dispute with the dis- the north should be viewed as trict government. delusive. While in this case the Daykunde (as well as any other regions that politics may be local, the prov- Southern Daykunde is known to are readily accessible to AOG due to a lim- ince’s isolation and the potential ited security presence) should assess their KEY THREATS & CONCERNS for AOG movement make it risky environment and should conduct a thor- !"Abduction for NGO operations, in particular ough threat to benefit analysis in regards to for international staff. !"Limited security force presence operations and staff safety. NGO with operations in NGO Incidents LOGAR LOGAR Year to Date 4 30 This Report Period 1 AOG activity remains extremely high, with over a dozen incidents attacked district centres in Mu- 20 reported in just the last week hammad Agha and Khushi, and alone. While most incidents target hijacked two Ministry of Educa- 10 police and military, they are geo- tion trucks in Azra. In some inci- dents—such as in the cases of the 0 graphically dispersed and tactically JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL diverse. In addition to recent se- NGO and MoE vehicle hijack- curity force-focused attacks, over ings—there appear to be a blend- AOG ACG the last two weeks AOG hijacked ing of AOG and criminal activity. an NGO vehicle in Puli Alam, NGO should consider the threat NGO staff of a local de-mining NGO. The of abduction and/or vehicle hi- staff were released shortly after the abduc- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS jacking to be very high in Logar. tion, but their vehicles were not returned. !"Abduction There have been three abductions Such incidents are almost surely targeted !"Roadside IED in July and five since June. The and seem to confirm reports of significant AOG/ACG monitoring of the roads in !"Decreasing stability province-wide most recent abduction was of Logar. THE ANSO REPORT Page 4 NGO Incidents LAGHMAN LAGHMAN Year to Date 3 20 This Report Period 0 Laghman saw an increase in seri- 15 ous incidents this period. AOG from across the Kabul River) and attacks on Highway 1 continued an attack on the small Naghlo 10 hydro-electric dam on Highway 1 with an ambush of a fuel convoy 5 in Qarghayi on the 20th of July near Sorubi. The chances of a low profile NGO vehicle being 0 that resulted in the death of a JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL driver and six other people who attacked are still slim but collateral were passing by in a farm truck.