Legislative Party Institutionalization in New Democracies: the Case of Poland

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Legislative Party Institutionalization in New Democracies: the Case of Poland LEGISLATIVE PARTY INSTITUTIONALIZATION IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: THE CASE OF POLAND DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Natalie Ann Kistner, B.A., M.A. ***** The Ohio State University 2007 Dissertation Committee: Dr. Goldie Shabad, Adviser Approved By Dr. Timothy Frye Dr. Anthony Mughan _________________________________ Adviser Dr. Kazimierz M. Slomczynski Graduate Program in Political Science ABSTRACT Legislative parties are largely absent from discussions of party institutionalization in the extant literature; yet the ability of legislative political parties to become institutionalized directly affects the success of newly established democracies by fostering governmental performance and stability and ensuring greater representation and accountability. Drawing upon the literature on organizational culture, I develop a theory that argues legislative parties institutionalize when party leaders create, and legislators subsequently adopt, party culture, or the rules and norms guiding a party’s behavior. I employ a multi-methodological approach to test the theory, combining an in-depth examination of legislative parties in Poland with a comparative study of new democracies in East Central Europe. First, based on in-depth interviews, I find that Poland’s legislative party leaders have taken steps to establish party culture. Second, utilizing data from two surveys of parliamentarians and an original dataset of roll call votes, I conclude that legislators themselves have by and large adopted this culture. Lastly, I analyze existing studies of parties in the Czech Republic and Hungary for evidence of legislative party institutionalization and find that Poland’s legislative parties are more institutionalized than those of either the Czech Republic or Hungary. This finding clearly challenges the conventional wisdom, which portrays Poland’s parties as weak and poorly institutionalized. ii Dedicated to my parents, whose love and support over the years has given me the strength to do anything. And to Amy, Glad you’re my sister . iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS First and foremost, I offer heartfelt thanks to my adviser and friend, Goldie Shabad, for her unwavering support and encouragement over the years, in matters professional and personal. I am thankful to Tony Mughan for making me the writer I am today and for challenging me to push the envelope, even when doing so meant starting from scratch. I thank Tim Frye for his many insights on this project, his invaluable advice and guidance in becoming a scholar, and for the use of his office. I am particularly grateful to Maciek Slomczynski, whose generosity never ceases to amaze me. Without him this project would not have been possible. I owe a special debt of gratitude to Kuba Zielinski. It was in his graduate seminar that I first developed an interest in political parties, and it was Kuba who inspired me to undertake this project. I want to thank The Mershon Center for International Security Studies at The Ohio State University for its financial support, as well as The Institute for Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences, which provided me with an institutional affiliation during my time in the field. Many thanks to Krzysztof Dzieciolowski for his help gaining access to the party officials I interviewed for this project. I owe a particular debt of gratitude to Michal Bojanowski, who proved to be an excellent interviewer, translator, tour guide and friend. iv To my colleagues at Denison University, thank you for your continued patience and support over the last two years. I have learned a great deal from all of you and am leaving Denison a better teacher, scholar and colleague as a result. I also want to thank Claire Kelly, an undergraduate student at Denison, for her research assistance. Lastly, I thank my friends and family for their love and support throughout this very long and sometimes difficult process. Ray Block, Bridget Coggins, Anna Shadley and Brent Strathman proved incredibly helpful colleagues and even better friends. I am eternally grateful to Johnny, Amy and Jack Peel and to Becky, Seth and Samuel Ackerman for making me laugh, keeping me sane, and most of all for making me a part of their families. And to my parents, Brian and Cindy, and my sister, Amy, I never could have done this without you. v VITA August 30th, 1974 ……………………………… Born – Killeen, Texas 1996 ……………………………………………. B.A., magna cum laude, International Affairs, James Madison University 2000 ……………………………………………. M.A., Political Science, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee 2000 – 2002 …………………………………… Graduate Teaching and Research Assistant, The Ohio State University 2002 – 2005 …………………………………… Graduate Teaching Associate, The Ohio State University 2005 – 2007 …………………………………… Visiting Instructor, Denison University FIELDS OF STUDY Major Field: Political Science vi TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Abstract…………………………………………………………………………….. ii Dedication………………………………………………………………………….. iii Acknowledgements………………………………………………………………… iv Vita…………………………………………………………………………………. vi List of Tables………………………………………………………………………. x List of Figures……………………………………………………………………… xi Chapters 1. Introduction………………………………………………………………… 1 1.1 Defining Institutionalization……………………………………….. 2 1.2 The Argument……………………………………………………… 4 1.3 Case Selection, Methodology and Data……………………………. 7 1.4 Contribution to the Literature……………………………………… 11 1.5 Project Overview and Chapter Outline…………………………….. 13 2. A Theory of Legislative Party Institutionalization………………………….15 2.1 Defining Culture…………………………………………………….16 2.2 Party Culture……………………………………………………….. 19 2.2.1 Actors, Preferences, Strategies and Outcomes…………….. 20 2.2.2 Factors Affecting Strategies………………………………... 24 2.2.3 The Means for Dealing with Challenges……………………28 2.2.4 Reacting to these Mechanisms……………………………...31 2.2.5 Additional Elements of Party Culture ………………………32 2.3 Explaining Party Culture……………………………………………35 2.3.1 Elite Commitment…………………………………………..35 2.3.2 Alternative Explanations: Systemic Factors………………..38 2.3.3 Alternative Explanations: Party Level Factors…………….. 40 2.4 Summary and Conclusions………………………………………….44 vii 3. Poland’s Party System………………………………………………………47 3.1 Historical Overview…………………………………………………48 3.2 Parliamentary Elections……………………………………………. 51 3.3 Party Profiles………………………………………………………. 56 3.3.1 Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS)………………………… 56 3.3.2 Freedom Union (UW)……………………………………… 59 3.3.3 Democratic Left Alliance (SLD)……………………………61 3.3.4 Polish People’s Party (PSL)………………………………... 62 3.3.5 Labor Union (UP)………………………………………….. 64 3.3.6 Civic Platform (PO)………………………………………... 65 3.3.7 Samoobrona…………………………………………………66 3.3.8 Law and Justice (PiS)………………………………………. 67 3.3.9 League of Polish Families (LPR)…………………………... 68 3.4 Conclusion…………………………………………………………. 69 4. Creating Party Culture……………………………………………………... 70 4.1 The Structure of Discipline………………………………………… 72 4.1.1 Establishing the Party Line………………………………… 73 4.1.2 Deciding When to Invoke Discipline……………………….77 4.1.3 Monitoring Compliance…………………………………….79 4.1.4 Rewards and Punishments…………………………………. 83 4.2 Factors Influencing Commitment to Party Culture………………… 91 4.2.1 Ideology……………………………………………………. 91 4.2.2 Party Size…………………………………………………... 94 4.2.3 Government or Opposition………………………………… 98 4.2.4 Coalition Membership………………………………………99 4.3 Elite Commitment…………………………………………………..102 4.4 Assessing Alternative Explanations………………………………... 106 4.4.1 Committees………………………………………………… 107 4.4.2 Locus of Power…………………………………………….. 110 4.4.3 The Party’s Founding………………………………………. 114 4.5 Conclusion…………………………………………………………. 117 5. Party Culture and the Rank and File: Legislator Attitudes………………… 120 5.1 Data………………………………………………………………… 122 5.2 Measuring the Party’s Influence…………………………………… 123 5.2.1 Differences of Opinion…………………………………….. 123 5.2.2 Advice on Economic Issues………………………………... 127 5.3 Attitudes Toward Discipline……………………………………….. 130 5.4 Explaining Party Discipline……………………………………....... 134 5.4.1 Objectives Achieved Through Discipline………………….. 135 5.4.2 Cooperation and Defiance…………………………………..138 5.5 Conclusion…………………………………………………………. 140 viii 6. Party Culture and the Rank and File: Legislator Behavior………………… 148 6.1 Data………………………………………………………………… 149 6.2 Rates of Attendance, Abstention and Voting Cohesion……………. 154 6.2.1 Attendance…………………………………………………. 154 6.2.2 Abstention………………………………………………….. 155 6.2.3 Voting Cohesion…………………………………………… 156 6.3 Factors Affecting Voting Cohesion………………………………... 159 6.3.1 Party Size……………………………………………………160 6.3.2 Ideology……………………………………………………..161 6.3.3 Government or Opposition………………………………….163 6.3.4 Discipline……………………………………………………163 6.4 Voting Cohesion Over Time……………………………………….. 167 6.5 When the Price of Discipline is Too High………………………….171 6.6 Conclusion…………………………………………………………. 175 7. Poland in Comparative Context…………………………………………….181 7.1 Parties and Party Systems in the Czech Republic and Hungary…… 183 7.1.1 Czech Republic…………………………………………….. 183 7.1.2 Hungary……………………………………………………. 184 7.2 Legislative Party Institutionalization in the Czech Republic……….186 7.2.1 The Role of Party Leaders…………………………………. 187 7.2.2 The Role of Legislators…………………………………….. 189 7.3 Legislative Party Institutionalization in Hungary………………….. 193 7.3.1 The Role of Party Leaders…………………………………. 194 7.3.2 The Role of Legislators……………………………………. 195 7.4 Comparing Legislative Party Institutionalization………………….. 201 7.5 Placing the Analysis Within the Literature…………………………
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