Peter Caddick-Adams. Snow and Steel: The , 1944-45. : Oxford University Press, 2014. 928 pp. $34.95, cloth, ISBN 978-0-19-933514-5.

Reviewed by Kevin Hymel

Published on H-War (April, 2015)

Commissioned by Margaret Sankey (Air University)

On December 16, 1944, three German armies people’s) belief that Wagnerian music harkened to burst out of the Ardennes forest along the border folklore about the strength Germans derived from of Belgium and Luxembourg and drove a wedge their country’s dark forests, and a belief that Ger‐ in the American lines. Through heavy snow‐ many had their enemies right where they wanted storms and fog, German forces clashed with the them once they entered the German lair. Americans in a series of battles soon thereafter While most historians refer to the German referred to the as the Battle of the Bulge. The code name for the operation as Wacht am Rhein month-long campaign tested the Americans as (Watch on the River), a defensive-sounding never before, and they came out victorious. title to prevent the Allies from concluding this British historian Peter Caddick-Adams’s book on was an ofensive operation, Caddick-Adams re‐ the battle, Snow and Steel, is a triumph of re‐ veals that Hitler actually changed it two weeks be‐ search and narrative. fore the campaign to Herbstnebel (Autumn Mist) The author delves into a thorough examina‐ as a swipe at his generals who wanted a smaller tion of the events, people, and motives for the attack. Caddick-Adams uses the Herbstnebel title campaign, not reaching the commencement of the throughout the book. battle until page 265, but the information is im‐ There are too many battles in this book to be portant and satisfying to anyone wanting to un‐ easily categorized, yet Caddick-Adams does an ex‐ derstand Adolf Hitler’s last gasp to win World War cellent job of following each and their contribu‐ II in the west. Caddick-Adams provides full bi‐ tions to the larger campaign. As the narrative de‐ ographies of the German army commanders from velops, Caddick-Adams reveals the winners and Adolf Hitler to the division commanders—and losers on both sides of the battle line. For the Ger‐ sometimes a few echelons below. Of particular in‐ mans, Hitler is the biggest loser, not just because terest is Hitler’s (and subsequently the German H-Net Reviews he dashed Germany’s youth in a hopeless cause, changed the time of his artillery barrage to catch but because he denied his generals any kind of re‐ the Americans while they were groggy, and connaissance to prepare the battlefeld in their fa‐ bounced searchlights of low-hanging clouds to il‐ vor. A perfect example of his paranoid desire for luminate the battlefeld. Poor Erich Bran‐ secrecy was Operation Stosser, a parachute drop denberger, commanding the Seventh Army, had behind American lines to secure bridges for the the thankless task of defending the southern fank onrushing panzers. Caddick-Addams compares of the ofensive. He rightly worried that General the night drop conducted in a blinding snow George S. Patton’s Third Army would quickly storm, with some paratroopers who had never counterattack his penetrations, but received only jumped out of an airplane before, with pilots they a handful of armored vehicles, which had little did not know, and given only a week to prepare to chance against Patton’s armored divisions. the American airborne divisions who trained for Eisenhower emerges as the Allies’ biggest six months before their D-Day drop. Operation winner. He correctly interpreted Hitler’s opening Stosser was doomed before the planes left the moves as a counterofensive and immedi‐ ground. ately maneuvered reserves into the fray. He also Otto Skorzeny’s Operation Greif met with nudged General , the 12th Army more success. His commandoes, who spoke Eng‐ Group commander, to deploy two armored divi‐ lish and wore American uniforms over their Ger‐ sions to cut the Bulge’s waist—something that man ones, penetrated the American lines and would end their long friendship. Finally, Eisen‐ wreaked havoc tenfold to their numbers. Rumors hower made the hard decision to put Field Mar‐ of their presence spread through the American shal Montgomery in control of the northern sec‐ ranks. Allied commanders, most notably General tion of the Bulge, taking it away from Bradley. Dwight D. Eisenhower, were virtual prisoners in While some historians argue this was a mistake, their headquarters as MPs guarded them against Caddick-Adams sides with Eisenhower’s decision, assassination at a time when they should have mostly because Bradley was out of touch with been touring the troops. The author reveals that General Courtney Hodges’s First Army. Where the real tragedy of the mission was American sol‐ Eisenhower had previously been accused of hold‐ diers’ shooting of many of their own over fear ing the reigns of his armies too loosely, he com‐ that any soldier with an accent or wearing enemy manded this campaign with a tight grip. equipment was a German commando. Of Eisenhower’s lieutenants, Patton comes The book also reveals the strengths and weak‐ out on top with his quick thrust north and relief nesses of Hitler’s three army commanders. Gener‐ of Bastogne, as well as his vision to cut of the al Sepp Dietrich, commanding the 6th Panzer Bulge at its base, even though Bradley forbade it. Army, comes of as an amateur who was in over Caddick-Adams includes an interesting story his head. The author illustrates his lack of formal about the importance of Patton insisting his of‐ command staf training, quoting an ofcer who cers wear their ranks on their helmets. The gener‐ claimed “He’d say ‘you attack this, you that, and al also contributed to naming the campaign, then sort it out’” (p. 238). Not exactly a technical telling reporter Larry Newman how the Germans battlefeld genius. General Hasso-Eccard Freiherr attacked and how the Americans reacted. New‐ (Baron) von Manteufel, commanding the 5th man used Patton’s words for his next article, call‐ Panzer Army, does come of as an intelligent, pro‐ ing it for the frst time the Battle of the Bulge. Gen‐ fessional soldier. He defed orders by scouting the eral Courtney Hodges, the First Army comman‐ American lines prior to the launch. He also der, is almost a nonfactor in the campaign be‐

2 H-Net Reviews cause of his lack of action, not to mention his lack but Patton did contact him the night before and of presence on the battlefeld. Bradley comes out made sure Devers could cover his southern fank poorly. He does not recognize the German attack if he turned north to relieve Bastogne. While the and chafes under Eisenhower’s correct handling book does an amazing job incorporating so many of the campaign. He also seems petty when he de‐ stories, it would have been nice to see a para‐ nies Patton’s request to cut the Bulge of at its base graph or two about the daring jump made by the after the relief of Bastogne, instead wanting to cut 101st Airborne Division pathfnders—the famed it of at the waist in order to regain control of Filthy Thirteen—into surrounded Bastogne to de‐ Hodges’s First Army liver communications and signal equipment for The book is at its best when Caddick-Adams future airdrops. ofers his own insights on the battle or explodes a The book extends past the end of the war. The myth or two from his own extensive research, like author explores the campaign’s infuence on suc‐ the famous one concerning an infantryman with ceeding campaigns. Tactics such as the use of sur‐ the 106th Infantry Division who refused to sur‐ prise, commandoes behind the lines, and an ar‐ render and fought a lone battle against the Ger‐ mored thrust were considered by Winston mans in the forest. Caddick-Adams proves he did Churchill after the war to attack the not exist. Usually, the use of the frst-person voice as early as December 1945, and were used by the in a history book is a drawback, but it works here. NATO Allies in response to a Soviet Bulge-like Caddick-Adams interviewed veterans and walked strike through the Fulda Gap and in Egypt and the battlefelds, giving him an insight other books Syria’s surprise attack (with the help of German and articles lack. He gives an added depth by ex‐ advisors) on Israel in the 1973 Yom Kipper War. plaining memorials and chance encounters with Caddick-Adams also explores the historiogra‐ warriors from the old battlefeld. phy of the campaign, explaining the slew of books One might expect a British author approach‐ and movies that followed, particularly the frst ing the Bulge to argue that Field Marshall Bernard books: S. L. A. Marshall’s Bastogne: The First Eight Montgomery saved Americans with his masterful Days; Robert Merrium’s Dark December (1947); leadership, just as most Americans are quick to and Charles B. MacDonald’s A Time for Trumpets. point out his shortcomings. Caddick-Adams The movies included 1949’s Battleground and strikes an excellent balance, writing as a profes‐ 1965’s Battle of the Bulge, which was so bad even sional historian who has weighed all the informa‐ Eisenhower, in his retirement, denounced it. It tion, not as a national defending one of his own. would have been nice if he had included Patton. Montgomery did perform well, yet his unwilling‐ The reader almost gets the feeling that other ness to rush to the ofensive, or act as a team play‐ historians urged Caddick-Adams to write this er constantly grated on Eisenhower’s, and the book. His knowledge of the battlefeld, combined American commanders’, nerves. with the plethora of personal interviews with The book’s weaknesses are few. Caddick-Ad‐ players from both sides, created such an expan‐ dams claims that the 7th Armored Division was sive personal understanding of the campaign that “newly arrived” to the front, while it had been on it seems almost wrong for him not to fnally put it the front since August and contributed to closing all (or at least most) down on paper. We are lucky the (p. 392). The author also claims he did. Snow and Steel is one of the most thor‐ that General Jacob Devers attended Eisenhower’s ough tellings of the Ardennes Campaign and de‐ December 19 conference at General Bradley’s serves a place on any historian’s shelf. It is a mag‐ Luxembourg headquarters (p. 406). He did not,

3 H-Net Reviews nifcent achievement of research, oral history, and staf ride experience.

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Citation: Kevin Hymel. Review of Caddick-Adams, Peter. Snow and Steel: The Battle of the Bulge, 1944-45. H-War, H-Net Reviews. April, 2015.

URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=42999

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