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34 ARMY August 2011 U.S. Army U.S. 34 ARMY I August 2011 By COL Cole C. Kingseed U.S. Army retired n the 70 years since the United States tion for the postwar world. embarked upon World War II, the repu- Two years from the day when Japan at- tations of many senior field comman- tacked Pearl Harbor, President Franklin ders have ebbed and flowed. None has Roosevelt informed Eisenhower that he was withstood the judgment of history more to command the Allied Expeditionary Force. so than that of GEN Dwight D. (Ike) Though the President had considered Army Eisenhower, Supreme Commander of Chief of Staff GEN George Marshall for the the Allied Expeditionary Force. Over appointment, Roosevelt felt he could not the course of the European war, Eisen- spare Marshall from Washington, D.C. Con- hower made numerous critical decisions in- sequently, he appointed Eisenhower, whom volving the selection of subordinates, mili- he considered “the best politician among tary strategy, and the cohesion of the the military men. He is a natural leader who Western Alliance, but three controversial de- can convince other men to follow him, and cisions stand out and mark Ike as a great this is what we need in his position more commander: the decision to launch D-Day, than any other quality.” Ike proved an in- the broad front strategy and the redirection spired choice. of Allied forces from Berlin toward the On February 12, 1944, Eisenhower re- Southern Redoubt in April 1945. Ike’s three ceived the formal directive from the Com- critical decisions as Supreme Commander bined Chiefs of Staff (CCS): “You are hereby not only dictated the course of the war in designated as Supreme Allied Commander northwest Europe, but also laid the founda- of the forces placed under your orders for August 2011 I ARMY 35 The Eisenhower Presidential Library The Eisenhower Presidential Top commanders of the Allied Expeditionary Force meet in London in 1944 to discuss the cross-Channel invasion, code- named Operation Overlord. Left to right are: LTG Omar Bradley (U.S. First Army), Adm. Bertram Ramsay (Allied Naval Ex- peditionary Force), Air Chief Marshal Arthur Tedder (deputy commander), GEN Eisenhower, Gen. Bernard Montgomery, Air Chief Marshal Trafford Leigh-Mallory (Allied Expeditionary Air Force) and LTG Walter Bedell Smith (chief of staff). operations for liberation of Europe from Germans. … You Montgomery, commanding the ground forces, recom- will enter the continent of Europe and, in conjunction with mended proceeding with the invasion. Air Chief Marshal the other United Nations, undertake operations aimed at Trafford Leigh-Mallory, who feared excessive casualties the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed among the airborne troops, remained pessimistic. Ramsey forces.” This mission statement formed the foundation of opined that if the invasion were to go forward on June 6, an Ike’s wartime strategy as he organized Supreme Head- order had to be given immediately. Ike weighed all the alter- quarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF). Given com- natives and said, “I am quite positive we must give the or- plete latitude by the CCS, Eisenhower defined operations der. I don’t like it, but there it is. … I don’t see how we can aimed at the “industrial heart” of Germany, the Ruhr and do anything else.” the Saar, concluding that such operations would lead to The Allied commanders convened one last time at 4:15 the destruction of the German armed forces because the A.M. on Monday, June 5, for a final update. Again Ike Germans would defend the industrial heart with maxi- polled his commanders and again he received an opti- mum forces available. mistic assessment from Stagg. The decision to designate Though the British provided the details of D-Day and Tuesday, June 6, as D-Day now rested on the shoulders of the proposed site of the landings, only the Supreme Com- the Supreme Commander. After final careful consideration mander could make the fateful decision to launch the inva- and deep reflection, Eisenhower announced his decision: sion. On June 1, Ike transferred SHAEF (Advance) to “OK, we’ll go.” Southwick House, Adm. Bertram H. Ramsay’s headquar- With those three words, Ike launched the largest am- ters north of Portsmouth. Weather and meteorological data phibious invasion in history and took the initial steps on dictated that the invasion must occur between June 5–7 or the road to Berlin. There could now be no turning back. the next possible period in mid-June. In Eisenhower’s own Having witnessed the lead-up to Ike’s decision, his chief of words, he felt that the only remaining great decision to be staff, Walter Bedell Smith, later recalled being struck by faced before D-Day “was that of fixing, definitely, the day “the isolation and loneliness of high command.” Historian and hour of the assault.” It was at Southwick House that Carlo D’Este said more eloquently in Eisenhower: A Soldier’s Ike made the decision that he was born to make. Life: “June 5 was a supreme test of [Ike’s] generalship and Following a one-day postponement due to severe his ability to keep his nerve under the most trying circum- weather conditions in the English Channel, the senior Al- stance he would ever face as a commander. There would lied commanders met to discuss the feasibility of designat- be other crises ahead, but none approached the magnitude ing June 6, 1944, as D-Day. Meeting on the evening of June of D-Day.” 4, Ike sought recommendations from his principal subordi- By late summer, the Normandy campaign was success- nates. First up was Group Captain James M. Stagg, the fully concluded with the liberation of Paris. As the Allied chief meteorological officer for Operation Overlord, who armies moved north through the Pas de Calais and into predicted a temporary slackening in the inclement weather Belgium and then east toward the German border, the size on the morning of June 6. of Ike’s forces and the extent of the Allied front dictated Then it was the commanders’ turn. Field Marshal Bernard that Eisenhower “take direct control of the land forces op- erating on the Continent.” In his report to the CCS, Ike COL Cole C. Kingseed, USA Ret., Ph.D., a former professor of stated that the “change in the command set-up was neces- history at the U.S. Military Academy, is a writer and consul- sary … due to the diverging lines of operation and the tant. need for having a commander on each of the main fronts 36 ARMY I August 2011 In late summer 1944, three Allied army groups and seven armies de- ployed in an arc from the North Sea to Switzerland to push the Germans to the border dur- ing the Siegfried Line Campaign. U.S. Army U.S. capable of handling, with a reasonable degree of indepen- According to the Supreme Commander’s grandson, dence, the day-to-day operation in each sector.” David Eisenhower, Eisenhower’s long-range thinking em- Consequently, Ike established his operational headquar- phasized two cardinal points. After securing ports suffi- ters on the Continent and Montgomery’s responsibility for cient to supply the Allied Expeditionary Force, all Ger- arranging the coordination between his 21st Army Group mans were to be cleared from areas west of the Rhine and LTG Omar N. Bradley’s forces terminated. Mont- before an invasion of Germany. A lesser objective of closing gomery’s command was now designated the Northern the Rhine in its entirety would be to overrun the Saar basin Group of Armies, while Bradley assumed command of and to seize the Siegfried Line defenses west of the river 12th, or Central, Group of Armies. Soon to come under behind which the Germans could concentrate at will for Eisenhower’s command was the Southern Group of strong counterattacks. Another would be to “preposition Armies under command of LTG Jacob L. Devers, whose Allied forces for two or more major thrusts across the river, armies had landed in southern France in late summer. An- which would enable the Allies to isolate the Ruhr while es- other significant change occurred on August 8 when all tablishing a wide front for the final advance into Germany British and American airborne forces were consolidated and linkup with the Red Army.” To achieve this, command and placed under the single command of Lt. Gen. Lewis unity would be paramount to Ike’s overall strategy as the Brereton to form the First Allied Airborne Army. This force Allied force advanced along a broad front. now constituted SHAEF’s strategic reserve. To compensate for Montgomery’s perceived “demo- Ike’s decision to advance on a broad front, vice a narrow tion,” Prime Minister Winston Churchill promoted Monty thrust, toward the heartland of Germany was entirely con- to the rank of Field Marshal. Chagrined that he now di- sistent with his belief that victory in Europe would be rected but a single army group, Montgomery argued vehe- achieved by an Allied effort rather than a British or Ameri- mently that the Allied advance be directed along a single can one. This decision proved one of the most controver- thrust by his 21st Army Group, but Ike disagreed. After sial of the war and brought the Supreme Commander con- V-E Day, Monty wrote, had we “run the show properly, the siderable criticism from Montgomery and Chief of the Im- war could have been finished by Christmas 1944. The perial General Staff Field Marshal Alan Brooke. Through- blame for this must rest with the Americans,” or, specifi- out the campaign in northwest Europe, both Montgomery cally, Eisenhower.
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