From Fome Zero to Bolsa Família: Social Policies and Poverty Alleviation Under Lula
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Anthony Hall From Fome Zero to Bolsa Família: social policies and poverty alleviation under Lula Article (Published version) (Refereed) Original citation: Hall, Anthony (2006) From Fome Zero to Bolsa Família: social policies and poverty alleviation under Lula. Journal of Latin American studies, 38 (4). pp. 689-709. DOI: 10.1017/S0022216X0600157X © 2006 Cambridge University Press This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/21244/ Available in LSE Research Online: September 2012 LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE Research Online website. j Lat. Amer.Stud 38, 689-709 ? zoo6 Cambridge UniversityPress 689 doi:Io.IoI7/SoozzzI6Xo6oox 57X Printedin the United Kingdom FromFome Zero to BolsaFamilia: Social Policiesand PovertyAlleviation underLula* ANTHONY HALL Abstract.Under the administrationsof Fernando Henrique Cardoso (I995-2002) andespecially President Lula (2003-),conditional cash transfer (CCT) programmes havebecome adopted as mainstreamsocial policy in Brazil.This followsa marked trendsince the 1990sin LatinAmerica towards the settingup of targetedsafety nets to alleviatepoverty. Lula consolidatedand expandedCCTs, firstlyunder FomeZero and later Bolsa Familia, now the largest such scheme in theworld. Its four sub-programmes(educational stipends to boost school attendance,maternal nutrition,food supplements and a domesticgas subsidy)benefit some 30 millionof Brazil'spoorest people, with a targetof 44 millionby 2006. Since 2003, spending on BolsaFamilia has risensignificantly to consume over one-third of thesocial assist- ancebudget for the poorest sectors and it remaineda flagshippolicy in therun-up to thepresidential elections of October2006. Although coverage of BolsaFamilia is impressive,however, systematic evaluation of its social and economicimpacts is stilllacking. Evidence from other CCT programmesin LatinAmerica suggests thatpositive results may be achievedin termsof meetingsome immediate needs of thepoor. However, there have been many implementation problems. These include poor beneficiarytargeting, lack of inter-ministerialcoordination, inadequate monitoring,clientelism, weak accountabilityand allegedpolitical bias. Given the heightenedprofile of cash transfersin Brazil'ssocial policy agenda, key questions need to be asked.These concern,firstly, the extentto whichBolsa Familia does indeedcontribute to povertyalleviation; and secondly,whether it createsgreater dependenceof thepoor on governmenthand-outs and politicalpatronage at the expenseof long-termsocial investment for development. Introduction When PresidentLuis Inicio Lula da Silva took officein January2003, Fome Zero (Zero Hunger) soon became the defining flagshippolicy of his government.Inspired by the MillenniumDevelopment Goals, which call AnthonyHall is Reader in Social Planning, Department ofSocial Policy, London School of Economicsand Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK. a.l.hall@ lse.ac.uk * Thisarticle is basedon a paperpresented at theLASA 2004 conference,Las Vegas,NV. The authoris indebtedto severalanonymous JLAS reviewerswho providedvaluable commentson a firstdraft. 690 AnthonyHall forhalving hunger and extremepoverty by zoI 5,the ambitious programme was intendedto bringregular supplies of food and cash aid to Brazil's estimated44 millionliving below the officialpoverty line. Building upon policiesalready established under the administrationof President FernandoHenrique Cardoso, Fome Zero sought to expandand consolidate the social safetynet programme.'It also representeda heartfeltpersonal commitmentby Brazil's first working class president to addressthe country's seeminglyintractable problems of povertyand severeinequality. At his inauguration,Lula famouslypledged: 'If, by theend of myterm of office, everyBrazilian has foodto eat threetimes a day,I shallhave fulfilledmy missionin life.' Brazil's enthusiasmfor constructingsocial safetynets has followed a markedinternational trend in policy-makingsince the late I98os.2The freemarket ideology developed under the Reaganand Thatcheradminis- trations,amongst others, was transferredto the developingcountries throughprogrammes of economicstabilisation and structuraladjustment via theIMF andWorld Bank. Under a varyingpackage of measuressome- timesloosely referred to as the 'WashingtonConsensus',3 moves towards marketderegulation and increasedcompetition would lead to the dis- mantlingof statemachinery, growing privatisation of serviceprovision and cutbacksin publicspending, especially in the social sectors.This process helpedto destroymuch of the socialprotection infrastructure in a region whereeffective and universalwelfare systems had been developedin onlyfive countries (Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica,Cuba and Uruguay),and wherethe impactsof social policieshave generallybeen regressivewith negativedistributional consequences. Higher income groups have secured thelion's share of benefitsand subsidiesin keysectors such as education, healthand pensionsprovision. On cost grounds,universalisation has beendismissed as too expensivein thecontext of developingcountries. In particular,it was arguedthat such generousanti-poverty solutions were not affordableunder conditions of economicausterity. However, even more critically,the notionof universalcitizenship rights has (exceptin the case of Cuba) generallybeen eschewedin favourof selectivesocial 1 'Safetynets' is a broadlabel to describeshort-term, targeted interventions for vulnerable householdsdesigned to mitigate the immediate effects of poverty and other risks, providing assistancein the formof cash,food, housing, subsidies, fee waivers,scholarships and publicworks programmes. 2 A. Hall andJ. Midgley, Social Poliy for Development, Sage (London,2004). 3 J. Williamson,'What Washington means by policyreform', in J. Williamson(ed.), Latin AmericanAdjustment: How MuchHas Happened?Institute for InternationalEconomics (WashingtonDC, 1990). SocialPolicies and Poverty Alleviation under Lula 691 rightslinked to the politicallydetermined distribution of benefitsby the State.4 The solutionfor maximising both economicand politicalreturns from thedistribution of scarcesocial funding has been to targetthe poorest and mostvulnerable groups through the use of specificinstruments such as socialfunds implemented by a rangeof institutionsincluding government, civilsociety, international donors and, indeed, poor communities themselves. This reactionwas in parta pragmaticand understandableresponse for rapidlydealing with the increased suffering of some sectorsbrought about by the adversesocial and economicimpacts of structuraladjustment.5 However,it also representeda major ideological shift in thinkingtowards a moreselective and means-testedapproach for addressing mass poverty. This approachwas formalisedand endorsedat the highestinternational levelsthrough the conceptualisation of social safety nets. These nets would notonly 'catch' thepoor and 'protect'them from economic shocks in the shortterm; they would also providea 'springboard'for development, creatingemployment and income-earning opportunities through strategies of 'social riskmanagement'.6 In LatinAmerica, social safety nets have been enthusiasticallyembraced by manygovernments. In particular,conditional cashtransfer (CCT) programmesare increasingly regarded as a majorsocial policyinstrument in a numberof countries.Since the late 1990s, apartfrom Brazil,major CCT programmeshave been introducedin Mexico(Progresa, now knownas Oportunidades),Colombia (Familias en Accidn), Chile (Subsidio UnitarioFamiliar), Nicaragua (Red de Proteccio'n Social), Argentina (Jefes de Hogar) and Ecuador(Bono de Desarrollo Humano).7 Their underlyingprinciple is thathuman capital can be enhancedas a developmentvehicle by providing money to familiesto persuadethem to investin themselvesthrough greater participation in educationand health services.The technicalrationale is that,by focusingon children,long-term humancapital accumulation can help breakthe inter-generationaltrans- missionof poverty. Through stimulating effective demand for social services, it is also designedto counterthe shortcomings of supply-sideinterventions such as schoolsand clinicsthat often do not reachthe poor. This CCT approach,in theoryat least,contrasts with traditionalsocial assistance 4 C. Abeland C. Lewis,'A Diagnosisof SocialPolicy in LatinAmerica in theLong Run', in C. Abeland C. Lewis(eds), Exclusion and Engagement: Social Policy in Latin America (London, 2002), pp. 3-71. 5 See G. Cornia,et al.,Adjustment with a HumanFace (Oxford, 1987), and T. Conway,Social Protection:New Directions forDonor Agencies, DFID (London,2000). 6 WorldBank, Social Protection Strategy Paper: from Safety Net to Springboard (Washington DC, 2000). 7 L. Rawlings,A NewApproach to Social Assistance: Latin America's Experience with Conditional Cash TransferPrograms, World Bank (WashingtonDC, 2oo4). 692 AnthonyHall strategiesthat use short-termredistributive mechanisms to tacklepoverty duringtimes of crisis.It aimsto fosterjoint responsibility between