Number 130 • Mar / Apr 2014 • $8.95

John Bew Illuminates Realpolitik’s Origins John B. Judis Debunks Maximalism Robert W. Merry Assesses America’s Destiny Bernard Wasserstein Appraises Zionism www.nationalinterest.org John J. Mearsheimer Warns Taiwan

THE GOP’S BALANCING ACT

Reinventing the Party Paul J. Saunders

Republican Fight Club Henry Olsen

Number 130 . March/April 2014

The Realist

5 Asia First by Robert W. Merry America’s Pacific position has long been intrinsic to its national character. For Washington to deal skillfully with China’s ascent will require more than rhetoric about a pivot to Asia; it will demand actual pivoting.

Articles

9 The GOP’s Identity Crisis by Paul J. Saunders It’s time to reinvent the Republican Party. Without corrective action, it may face yet another defeat in 2016. Still, there is a clear path that the gop can follow to regain its former luster. Finding the way ahead requires an honest assessment of where the party is today.

20 The Republican Battlefield by Henry Olsen The conventional wisdom is that the gop 2016 presidential race will boil down to a joust between the “establishment” and the “insurgents.” Not so. In fact, victory will likely go to the candidate who understands and exploits the true divisions between the party’s four factions.

29 Taiwan’s Dire Straits by John J. Mearsheimer Farewell Taiwan. Unless China falters, Taiwan is likely doomed. An increasingly powerful China will probably attempt to push the United States out of Asia, much the way the United States pushed the European great powers out of the Western Hemisphere.

40 The Real Origins of Realpolitik by John Bew Realism is back. But while realpolitik, which can be traced back to the doughty nineteenth- century German liberal Ludwig von Rochau, may be enjoying a new vogue, a look at the evolution of the term, down to the Obama administration, reveals that it is more often abused than accurately employed. True realpolitik is suspicious of utopianism, not idealism. 53 Frack to the Future by Leonardo Maugeri The U.S. shale-oil boom is not a temporary bubble but a long-term, transformational phenomenon. Yet while shale oil may bring more energy security to the United States, it cannot bring energy independence. Thinking otherwise can only lead to a rude reawakening.

61 Low-Tech Terrorism by Bruce Hoffman Terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda are continuing their efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction. But although this remains a threat we should take seriously, the greater danger comes from the same basic weapons systems terrorists have relied on for over a century: the gun and the bomb.

Reviews & Essays

72 Max Americana by John B. Judis Stephen Sestanovich provides an ambitious history of U.S. foreign policy since World War II in his new book Maximalist. His dichotomy between maximalism and retrenchment, however, ignores the fact that many administrations have practiced both when convenient.

78 The Enigma of Mr. X by Christian Caryl George F. Kennan was the wisest of the wise men, a profound thinker who had a tragic sense of history—particularly in the atomic age—that his coevals lacked. His newly published diaries reveal someone who was also morbidly suspicious of American democracy. But we condemn Kennan and those like him at our own risk.

87 Revisiting Zionism by Bernard Wasserstein John B. Judis offers a sweeping interpretation of Zionism in America. He decries Washington’s “pattern of surrender to Israel and its supporters” going back to Harry Truman. But his history overstates the sway and influence of the pro-Israel lobby, which is powerful but is not and has never been omnipotent.

Images Shutterstock: pages 11, 16, 24, 28, 32, 35, 37, 55, 58, 63, 70, 90, 93; Wikimedia Commons: pages 43, 46, 49, 51, 66, 74, 77, 80, 83, 86 Published by The Center for the National Interest

Charles G. Boyd Chairman Henry A. Kissinger Honorary Chairman James Schlesinger Chairman, Advisory Council

Jacob Heilbrunn Editor Dimitri K. Simes Publisher & CEO Harry J. Kazianis Managing Editor Paul J. Saunders Associate Publisher Alexa M. Poteet Associate Managing Editor Robert Golan-Vilella Assistant Managing Editor Advisory Council John Allen Gay Assistant Managing Editor Morton Abramowitz Graham Allison Political Editor Conrad Black Robert W. Merry Ahmed Charai Contributing Editors Leslie H. Gelb Aram Bakshian Jr. Evan G. Greenberg Ian Bremmer Gary Hart Ted Galen Carpenter Zalmay Khalilzad Christian Caryl Kishore Mahbubani Amitai Etzioni John J. Mearsheimer Nikolas K. Gvosdev Richard Plepler Bruce Hoffman Alexey Pushkov Michael Lind Brent Scowcroft Lewis E. McCrary Ruth Wedgwood Paul R. Pillar Kenneth M. Pollack J. Robinson West David Rieff Dov Zakheim

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“Great Britain must lose her commercial Asia First supremacy in the Pacific; and the portion of its commerce which forced its destination By Robert W. Merry there must pay tribute to us.” Cummins’s speech reflected a fundamental reality about America: its n February 7, 1845, Congressman quest for expansion and national grandeur John D. Cummins rose in the was pretty much irrepressible. There were, O House of Representatives to add as always, the naysayers and critics. Henry his voice to those clamoring for U.S. posses- Clay argued for confining American sion of the Oregon Territory, then occupied settlement to lands east of the Rocky jointly by the United States and Britain. He Mountains and postponing occupation declared that these opulent Northwest lands of Oregon for some forty years. But most were “the master key of the commerce of Americans recoiled at such a cramped view, the universe.” Put that territory under U.S. and Clay’s similarly blinkered opposition jurisdiction, he argued, and soon the coun- to the annexation of Texas probably cost try would witness “an industrious, thriv- him the presidency in 1844. If America ing, American population” and “flourishing was a country of vast designs, as Emerson towns and embryo cities” facing west upon said, then its westward push, known then the Pacific within four thousand miles of and now as Manifest Destiny, was never vast Asian markets. Contemplate, he added, destined to stop at the Pacific. ribbons of railroad track across America, This history is worth pondering in connecting New York, Boston and Philadel- the aftermath of China’s declaration last phia to those burgeoning West Coast cities November that its so-called air defense and ports. identification zone now encompassed most Furthermore, he said, the “inevitable of the East China Sea. U.S. secretary of eternal laws of trade” would make America defense Chuck Hagel promptly called the the necessary passageway for “the whole action “a destabilizing attempt to alter the eastern commerce of Europe.” European [region’s] status quo.” And Paul Haenle, goods, traversing the American continent, director of the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center could get to Asia in little more than for Global Policy at Beijing’s Tsinghua seven weeks, whereas the traditional sea University, warned that the move could routes generally required seven months. set China on a collision course with Japan “The commerce of the world would over disputed islands in the area. China’s thus be revolutionized,” said Cummins. provocation, he said, renders “the already dangerous area surrounding the islands even Robert W. Merry is the political editor of The more ripe for an inadvertent collision.” Such National Interest and an author of books on a collision almost inevitably would draw in American history and foreign policy. America, given its defense treaty with Japan.

The Realist March/April 2014 5 America has considered its Pacific dominance to be a national birthright almost from the time it first conceived of itself as a potential transcontinental nation.

It wasn’t surprising that commentators country struggled with the explosive issue of and analysts would see China’s action, and slavery, President Franklin Pierce’s secretary the tensions it could unleash, as a harbinger of state, William Marcy, negotiated an an- of growing hostility between China and nexation treaty with Hawaii’s King Kame- the United States over which country will hameha III, which was aborted only by the dominate East Asia. Many see the situation king’s untimely death. as a classic confrontation of the kind that After the Civil War, American officials ensues when a rising power challenges an renewed their interest in gaining dominance established power—as when, for example, over Hawaii. An 1876 effort to craft a Rome challenged Carthage, Britain reciprocal trade agreement hit a snag in challenged Spain, America challenged a the U.S. Senate until negotiators inserted reduced Spain and Wilhelmine Germany a provision that Hawaii could not lease or challenged Great Britain for preeminence. grant any “port, harbor, or territory” to a As the bbc’s Jonny Dymond put it, third-party nation. “For seven decades the US has been the Two decades later America’s interest dominant military power in the region. intensified with some big naval China has given Washington notice that developments—the advent of coal-fueled change is afoot. Peaceful management of steam power, armored ships and long- that change is one of the great strategic range guns with explosive shells. Hawaii, challenges of the 21st Century.” possessing the only protected harbor in the Dymond has a point. But it doesn’t North Pacific, suddenly became a “Pacific capture the extent to which America has Gibraltar,” as historian William Michael considered its Pacific dominance to be a Morgan put it in his book of that title. If national birthright almost from the time the United States could dominate Hawaii, it first conceived of itself as a potential which was the only feasible staging area for transcontinental nation. Cummins’s an Asian attack on America, it could greatly prophecy, in other words, was widely enhance its security; without it, menacing shared. raids and challenges would be a constant threat. Conversely, with Hawaii, America onsider America’s attitude toward Ha- could project power and influence far into C waii. Even before California entered Asia; without it, U.S. power projection the Union in 1848, President John Tyler would be infinitely more difficult. declared that no foreign power except the Alfred Thayer Mahan’s famous book, The United States should control Hawaii—what Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660– might be called the Tyler Doctrine. These 1783, laid out the lineaments of America’s strategically positioned islands, in effect, embryonic naval strategy. It was largely a belonged to America’s sphere of influence. historical treatise, but to enhance the book’s Presidents James Polk and Zachary Taylor sales potential Mahan added a section on affirmed this doctrine. Then, even as the the strategic challenges and opportunities

6 The National Interest The Realist of the United States as seen through the wanted empire and Washington ignored the prism of sea power. America, he wrote, adjurations of the anti-imperialists. A half could produce vast surpluses of goods. It century later, when it crushed Japan and its should pursue three goals: moving beyond sparkling navy, the United States emerged its traditional focus on domestic markets as the unchallenged regional hegemon. and protective tariffs by promoting overseas trade; developing a capacity to protect sea ince then, Americans have, by and large, lanes and trade routes; and creating a robust S credited themselves with handling the navy capable of projecting power into responsibilities of their country’s Pacific strategic areas of the world. dominance with moderation and wisdom, Few books have captured the American serving as a stabilizing influence, and pro- consciousness as powerfully as Mahan’s tecting the commercial and geopolitical in- volume, which was heralded as a blueprint terests of less powerful nations in a more or for the country’s future. Theodore less disinterested and fair-minded manner. Roosevelt proclaimed it “by far the most It’s a valid appraisal when placed in the per- interesting book on naval history which spective of history. has been produced on either side of the But China sees it differently. It views water for many a long year.” Overseas it the region’s international system as the was a sensation. Germany’s Kaiser Wilhelm baleful creation of an outside force whose ordered that a copy be conspicuously legitimacy as an Asian power is questionable displayed on every ship in his growing navy. and whose presence thwarts its own Mahan’s book, though not precisely a national self-realization. Thus, we are likely new strategic vision for America, brought to see further challenges similar to China’s coherence and power to strategic impulses declaration of its air defense identification and ambitions that had been percolating zone. Indeed, Beijing has signaled that within the American polity for generations. further declarations are coming. Ultimately, But the timing was propitious because a few it seems, China wants to push America years later, when America found itself at back—back to Hawaii. war with Spain over the destabilization of For America, the geopolitical stakes in Cuba under Spanish rule, the country was this face-off are big. But the psychological ready to exploit the war and seize strategic stakes are possibly even bigger. That’s territories according to Mahan’s formula. because the country’s position in the Pacific America was succumbing to the imperial is wrapped up in its national identity, in temptation. its destiny concept going back far beyond Of course, opposition voices, the mere seven decades of its regional including Mark Twain’s, decried the dominance following World War II. It goes new expansionism and warned of its back to America’s first stirrings of ambition consequences. Many of these arguments when Jefferson’s Louisiana Purchase, Tyler’s were salient and prescient. But the country annexation of Texas and Polk’s westward

The Realist March/April 2014 7 push to the Pacific helped to forge a such capacity to draw on financial reserves; budding superpower. Thus, it isn’t accurate any war it got into would have to be paid to say that, without its role in the Pacific, for with borrowed funds. America would be the same country, only Within a few months, Spain’s entire one shorn of a Pacific role. It would be an Pacific fleet had been destroyed, and it entirely different country, bereft of a central was kicked out of Asia (as well as the element of its national consciousness going Caribbean). Might it happen to America? back at least to the 1840s. Not if the Obama administration and its But, if America’s Pacific position is successors follow a carefully calibrated indeed intrinsic to its identity, Washington policy in which America shows some hasn’t conducted itself in recent years as empathy to legitimate Chinese security if it comprehends the challenge. Quite concerns, while also demonstrating that it the contrary. It has squandered blood will not simply wink at bellicose actions. and treasure, and sapped its economic Both countries have more to lose from strength, with civilizational wars in the confrontation rather than cooperation. lands of Islam, where the definitional and Areas of cooperation should include strategic imperatives are much less salient. proposing clearer rules of the game. A It has otherwise undermined its economic détente also needs to be encouraged fortitude by piling on public debt, much between China and its neighbors. Japan’s of it in the hands of China, and failing to nationalist grandstanding has unnecessarily generate significant economic growth. It has exacerbated tensions between Tokyo failed in its effort to transfer its focus from and Beijing. America should support its the Middle East to Asia. allies in South Korea, Japan and Taiwan, That’s not the way to protect America’s but it should also discourage reckless Pacific interests. A pertinent object lesson behavior that could drag Washington can be found in Spain back in 1898, into an unnecessary regional conflict. It facing war with that upstart nation on the won’t be an easy course to navigate, but American continent. Like many countries skillful navigation can put Sino-American on the wane, Spain remained oblivious relations onto a safer course without to its own internal decay. But it received sacrificing important U.S. interests. This a jolt of reality when it learned that the will require more than rhetoric about a U.S. Congress, anticipating conflict, had pivot to Asia; it will demand actual appropriated $50 million for national pivoting. If America wants to preserve defense, to be spent at the discretion of the dreams of its heritage, it will have to President William McKinley. Spain had no pursue an Asia-first strategy. n

8 The National Interest The Realist The GOP’s Identity Crisis

By Paul J. Saunders

n 1958, after the Republican Party suf- fine because the old man is not really interested fered a stinging defeat in the midterm in selling. He just likes to hold and to feel. I elections that compounded the 1954 loss of its briefly held control of Congress, If this sounds familiar, it should. Whittaker Chambers sent a letter to William Then, as now, the gop faced an identity F. Buckley Jr. Buckley, who had founded crisis. Then, as now, ideologues attacked National Review three years earlier, was try- pragmatists. In the late 1950s, the ing to create a conservative insurgency. Like trends seemed clear enough. Though the many other conservatives, including Ronald Democrats went into the 1958 election Reagan, he revered Chambers for his searing already controlling Congress, they won break with Communism and his exposure of a historically unprecedented fifteen seats Alger Hiss as a Soviet agent, which he chron- in the Senate (including two in a special icled in his memoir Witness. Chambers had election upon Alaska’s statehood) as well as warned the youthful Buckley against con- forty-nine additional seats in the House of sorting with the radical Right, arguing that Representatives. When the newly elected politicians such as Senator Joseph McCarthy Eighty-Sixth Congress started its first discredited rather than bolstered a fledgling session in 1959, the Democrats enjoyed conservative movement. Now Chambers di- a thirty-seat majority in the Senate and agnosed the woes of the gop: a 130-seat majority in the House. Republicans also lost thirteen of twenty-one If the Republican Party cannot get some grip of gubernatorial elections. the actual world we live in, and from it general- At the time, analysts attributed the ize and actively promote a program that means outcome to several factors, including a something to masses of people—why, some- recession, intra-Republican divisions and body else will. There will be nothing to argue. the Soviet Union’s successful Sputnik The voters will simply vote Republicans into satellite launch, which Democrats used to singularity. The Republican Party will become attack President Dwight Eisenhower. But like one of those dark little shops which ap- the gop’s message also had clearly fallen parently never sell anything. If, for any reason, short. After the election, the political you go in, you find, at the back, an old man, scientist Frank Jonas, an expert on the fingering for his own pleasure some oddments western states, pointed to the superficiality of cloth. Nobody wants to buy them, which is of Republican candidates’ “glittering generalities” and appeals to “faith and Paul J. Saunders is executive director of the Center freedom” when voters were more interested for the National Interest and associate publisher of in “their stomachs and their pocketbooks.” The National Interest. Rather than “recognizing and meeting

The GOP’s Identity Crisis March/April 2014 9 issues which arise from the needs and W. Bush memorably described as the par- desires of the people,” he wrote, “gimmicks ty’s 2006 midterm “thumping” in the Sen- were invented and straw men set up.” ate and the House of Representatives, fol- Since then, Chambers’s view has been lowed by President Barack Obama’s 2008 confirmed again and again. It occurred and 2012 presidential election victories, most immediately and dramatically in Barry the gop is engaged in a fresh bout of soul Goldwater’s dismal showing in 1964. And searching. Yet even after seven years, not it was repeated in congressional elections to mention losing the popular vote in five over the subsequent decades. As msnbc of the last six presidential elections, neither commentator and former Republican leaders nor rank-and-file Republicans have House member Joe Scarborough has managed to agree on the causes or cures of recently written in his book The Right Path: the party’s troubles, even as a new election looms. In the early 1950s the Republicans began a Obama may have handed the gop gradual but unmistakable shift from being a a powerful campaign issue in 2014 political institution that was a pragmatic collec- with Obamacare’s many problems, but tion of various factions to being an ideological party leaders should not allow optimism institution that would, when at its very worst, about 2014 to short-circuit Republicans’ choose nominees in state and national elections continuing reflection. Obamacare can who could check every box required to advance hardly form the basis of a political strategy an ideological agenda except one: winning. beyond this fall. Without corrective action, the Republican Party may face yet another In fact, a dispirited Republican Party strug- defeat in 2016. Still, there is a clear path gled to define an agenda throughout the that the gop can follow to regain its former 1960s and would not win control of the luster. Senate until 1980. Republicans would not Finding the way ahead requires an honest prevail in the House until the revolution of assessment of where the Republican Party 1994. Though Republican Richard Nixon stands today. In fairness, much of the was seen as the biggest loser of the 1958 speculation is overblown—voters’ rejection election—an assessment strengthened by his of the war in Iraq, the 2008 financial 1960 defeat, which he discussed at length crisis and a few weak but high-profile in his book Six Crises—he absorbed the po- Republican candidates do not necessarily litical lessons of these losses as well as Gold- add up to a struggling party. Further, there water’s and won the presidency in 1968. is no shortage of commentators who have a Nevertheless, neither Nixon’s election nor vested interest in generating a sense of crisis, his landslide reelection in 1972 would sig- including ratings-driven media outlets, nificantly shape the Democrat-dominated liberal activists and pundits rallying their Congress. The gop’s later success on Capitol own supporters, and political insurgents Hill took place only after a fresh generation seeking to overturn the gop’s established of conservatives had emerged, with a new hierarchy to win roles for themselves and agenda and message. the candidates they support. Still, it would be reckless to wave away nce again, Republicans are energeti- the divisions inside the party. They exist, O cally debating the reasons underly- they are serious and they could bring it ing the gop’s recent electoral losses. In the down. The Tea Party faction has crystallized aftermath of what then president George widespread disenchantment with the

10 The National Interest The GOP’s Identity Crisis mainstream Republican Party—and fear so today. Now FreedomWorks and similar of the Democrats’ policy agenda—to raise groups are commonly led by professional millions of dollars and mobilize millions political operatives and funded by wealthy of voters. Though sympathy with the donors as well as the ordinary individuals Tea Party faction in the gop has fallen who first defined the Tea Party, a sharply, some 38 percent of Republicans combination that allows them to employ continue to support it, according to a fall sophisticated and expensive methods to 2013 Gallup poll. The movement has also expand their organizations and increase had a demonstrable impact, moving taxes influence. Whether one interprets this and spending to the top of the national change as a necessary step in the Tea Party’s political agenda and contributing to major maturation or, conversely, as evidence confrontations over Obama’s health-care of its capture by a new segment within law, the budget and the debt ceiling in the process. Perhaps most important to Republican politicians and Republican- leaning donors, Tea Party activists have demonstrated that they can defeat long- term incumbent gop legislators. To paraphrase the eighteenth-century English essayist Samuel Johnson, the prospect of losing a primary election concentrates the mind wonderfully. It has visibly shaped the conduct of many Republicans on Capitol Hill. What the Tea Party movement really represents is less clear, though some of its self-appointed leaders profess great ambitions. Speaking during the fall 2013 dispute over the debt ceiling, Matt Kibbe, president of the Tea Party group FreedomWorks, argued that the Republican Party was experiencing “a disintermediation in politics” in which “grassroots activists have an ability to self-organize, to fund candidates they’re more interested in, going right around the Republican National America’s political establishment is a matter Committee.” Party leaders want to control of perspective. Michael Medved and John this but can’t, he continued, and if they Podhoretz, for example, suggest the latter keep trying “there will absolutely be a in Commentary, writing that “the incentive split” in which Kibbe and his allies “take to engineer and profit from conflict is even over the Republican Party” and the party greater for those who are not running for establishment and its supporters “go the office but who are making a name and an way of the Whigs.” increasingly good living”—“a new class This is grandiose language. But while of political activists” that is “remarkably the Tea Party may have emerged as a self- entrepreneurial” and “aggressively seeks organized movement, it seems much less marketing opportunities.”

The GOP’s Identity Crisis March/April 2014 11 Standing athwart history yelling “stop” may sound like a glorious cause, but history almost always wins.

On the other hand, could Tea Party gop officials can also influence the voters have had a similarly significant selection of candidates and seem newly and sustained role without this new class? motivated to do so. Charged with securing Probably not. The activist-operatives a Republican majority in the Senate, Rob provide a critical link between political Collins, executive director of the National leaders and a national constituency without Republican Senatorial Committee, has which neither could be as effective. Senator implicitly rebuked Tea Party groups. He Ted Cruz and other politicians identified said, “The path to getting a general election with the Tea Party have had outsized impact candidate who can win is the only thing we in no small part because they have appeared care about”—a clear reference to the failed to be riding a rising wave—and sympathetic and sometimes loopy Republican Senate voters are empowered by organizations candidacies in the 2010 and 2012 election that are far more well connected than most cycles, including Nevada’s Sharron Angle, grassroots groups could hope to be. Indiana’s Richard Mourdock and Missouri’s Of course, any new class must contend Todd Akin. Other Republican officials have with the current order—and establishment expressed similar sentiments. figures, not to mention many Republicans Influential outside groups are also on both Wall Street and Main Street, aligned with the establishment. One seem newly motivated to fight to pillar of Republican politics, the U.S. preserve the status quo. Notwithstanding Chamber of Commerce, recently helped the hype surrounding the Tea Party, the an establishment Republican defeat a establishment has many advantages in Tea Party candidate in a special election such a contest precisely because it is the for an Alabama seat in the House of establishment and thus largely controls the Representatives and, according to the Wall organizational levers of power within the Street Journal, has committed at least $50 Republican Party, including the Republican million to support establishment candidates National Committee as well as state and in 2014 Republican primaries, particularly local party bodies and a lot of political the Senate, with the goal of “no fools on money. In Congress, establishment-oriented our ticket.” State and local business leaders leaders control the allocation of committee are reportedly supporting establishment posts—which Republican House leaders candidates as well, including a Republican have now reportedly linked to votes in challenger to incumbent Michigan Tea support of the party’s House leadership. Party star Representative Justin Amash. Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell By comparison, FreedomWorks reported and House Speaker John Boehner have consolidated total revenue of just $20 also each publicly expressed frustration million in its unaudited 2011 annual with outside groups exhorting members report, the latest disclosed. The like- of Congress to vote against leadership minded Senate Conservatives Fund, which preferences. does not provide an annual report on its

12 The National Interest The GOP’s Identity Crisis website—audited or otherwise—and states he bigger problem facing the Repub- that it limits donations to $5,000, spent T lican Party lies outside rather than in- $16 million in the 2012 election cycle, side, in defining an agenda to win elections according to federal records. beyond red-state Senate seats and gerry- So is the gop nearing a truly historic mandered House districts. Intraparty divi- collapse brought about by this internecine sions exacerbate this problem by forcing warfare? Probably not. candidates to make statements and adopt Until now, establishments in both major positions that alienate potential supporters political parties have prevailed far more (a regular problem in gop primaries) and frequently than insurgent movements. by muddling the party’s national message America’s winner-take-all elections (as with the varied formal responses to the structurally privilege a two-party system president’s last State of the Union address), and marginalize niche groups that cannot but disunity is not the main challenge. As build a winning coalition—meaning that Whittaker Chambers wrote of the party emerging political forces can become in 1958, the real threat to the gop is that one of the two dominant parties only by despite its widely supported principles, the destroying an existing party or, alternatively, Republican Party has failed to define a con- by transforming one from within. The structive agenda that can win national sup- Whigs disappeared over 150 years ago, port. As a result, according to a December and no major party has disintegrated since. 2013 Gallup poll, just 32 percent of Ameri- Though the Republican establishment has cans have a favorable view of the Republi- thus far failed to co-opt the Tea Party and can Party—ten percentage points below the channel its energy—an intensely valuable share that see the Democrats positively. resource—it may yet succeed. If the Tea Though the reasons for these attitudes are Party simultaneously redefines the gop, it widely discussed, and Republican pollsters might too. and political operatives have studied them However, if the two groups continue to extensively, the Republican Party as a whole fight rather than merging, time favors the has been unable to draw shared lessons or Republican establishment. Eventually, Tea come to agreed conclusions about how Party groups will need not only rhetoric but to proceed. Until recently, Republicans also practical accomplishments to maintain have devoted more time to debating how the support of their donors and voters, and conservative the party and its candidates they will need them even more so if they should be than to defining what it means hope to win sufficient power to determine to be a conservative in America today and or heavily influence the Republican Party’s proposing policies that apply conservative agenda, strategy and tactics over time. In a principles to public concerns. Republicans divided party within a divided government, must change this if they want to be seen positive accomplishments will require the as something other than the party of “no.” kind of compromise that many Tea Party Standing athwart history yelling “stop” may figures have thus far rejected. The gop’s sound like a glorious cause, but history fall 2013 surrender on the debt ceiling almost always wins. after poor handling of an ill-chosen fight Nothing illustrates Republicans’ failure to and its early 2014 support for a budget “promote a program that means something compromise illustrate just how difficult it to masses of people,” as Chambers put it, is to sustain a strategy of governance by as clearly as the gop’s abysmal handling obstruction. of the Affordable Care Act, also known as

The GOP’s Identity Crisis March/April 2014 13 Obamacare. Simply put, Republicans have level political trifecta in 2016 by taking been fighting a losing battle to overturn the presidency and winning majorities the law because they were not able to in both houses of Congress, gop leaders make a meaningful health-care proposal may quickly find that repeal is much of their own of sufficient appeal either to more attractive as a campaign issue than force compromise or to create a deadlock a legislative program. A newly elected on Capitol Hill by putting real public Republican president would be sorely pressure on moderate Democrats. In that tempted to discourage repeal, as the divisive environment, the president’s imperfect effort could easily dominate and define a effort was for many Americans better than first term much as the law’s passage did no effort at all. for Obama. Blue-state Republicans, who The gop’s inability to produce an would mathematically have to make up attractive alternative to Obamacare was an important part of any gop-controlled particularly unfortunate because the Congress, would probably be even less law’s clear weaknesses provided a very enthusiastic. It seems likely that a new real opportunity for practical reforms. Republican president and Congress would Leaving aside conservatives’ philosophical have bigger priorities—starting with the concerns, as a policy and political matter economy and jobs. the Affordable Care Act may well expand access to health care in the future but has he Republican Party is ceding con- been decidedly mixed in its impact on T siderable territory to the Democrats costs, particularly for those who already had in other policy areas as well—some much insurance. This group makes up a much more promising than post-Obamacare greater share of the voting population than health care. While Republicans have been the uninsured. more successful in blocking flawed legisla- Finally, while the jury is still out on tion on energy and climate change (like a the public’s eventual attitudes toward cap-and-trade bill to set limits on green- Obama’s health-care plan—and many house-gas emissions) and have continued to Republicans clearly hope that its flawed press the Obama administration to approve implementation will be a potent weapon in the Keystone XL pipeline, they have other- the 2014 midterm elections—Obamacare’s wise offered little on energy, a potent issue fundamentals appear likely to stick that routinely leads surveys of the public’s regardless of the election outcomes in 2014 domestic and international policy priorities. or even in 2016. Like health care, energy touches Americans Consider whether a Republican- deeply in daily life—as we heat or cool our controlled Congress could actually repeal homes, drive to work or to shop, and plug Obamacare in the real world as opposed in more and more new electronic gadgets. to the fantasy world of direct mail and Because Republicans have offered little on online fundraising appeals. If Republicans energy policy, Americans believe the Demo- win the Senate and keep the House crats do a better job on energy; a 2013 nbc in 2014, or win control in both houses News/Wall Street Journal poll showed 36 while a Democrat follows Obama in the percent preferring the Democrats and 26 White House in 2016, this would require percent the Republicans, with 18 percent a veto-proof majority at both ends of the saying that they were “about the same” and Capitol Building—a remote prospect. But 15 percent suggesting that neither would even if Republicans achieve a national- do well. The 33 percent who today see no

14 The National Interest The GOP’s Identity Crisis The gop’s inability to produce an attractive alternative to Obamacare was particularly unfortunate because the law’s clear weaknesses provided a very real opportunity for practical reforms.

difference between the parties provide a funded research projects before being huge opportunity for Republican ideas and combined and commercialized by energy policies, especially when combined with the companies. collapse of President Obama’s misguided There is an important role for “green jobs” agenda. government here, though it must be The central lesson of America’s energy precisely defined. Needless to say, a sector over the last several years is that conservative energy agenda should not government programs to subsidize existing increase the size of government—and it technologies like solar and wind have need not, if Republicans can reallocate not delivered on their promises even as resources away from subsidies to existing a private-sector revolution in oil and gas technologies that can’t compete in the production has created enormous new marketplace in favor of research to economic activity and huge numbers of produce genuinely new ways to generate jobs. The contrast powerfully demonstrates and transmit energy. When necessary to both the critical role of technology in avoid disruption, the gop can apply creative generating growth and jobs and the validity approaches like reverse auctions to phase of conservative economic principles. out tax credits or other subsidies over time, Republicans can and should find a way to asking those who seek U.S. government combine these two facts to develop a strong support to compete in part on the basis of energy program. how little federal funding they seek. This will require more than quoting The Republican Party’s approach to Adam Smith or Ronald Reagan and then immigration reform is worse than a missed standing back to see what happens—it opportunity; it is a significant political means writing policies to promote genuine liability. Many in the gop have taken the energy innovation, with respect to both first step toward recovery by admitting fossil fuels (which generate enormous that the party has a problem, but too often benefit and will be with us far longer the intra-Republican policy debate on than some seem to think) and other immigration conflates two separate issues— sources. Many Republicans are tempted U.S. policy toward illegal immigrants and by the myth that hydraulic fracturing and the Republican Party’s political appeal horizontal drilling, the key technologies to America’s expanding population of of the energy revolution, spontaneously Hispanic voters—and misunderstands the burst out from America’s energy companies relationship between them. The gop’s future like the ancient Greek goddess Athena electoral prospects depend in no small part springing from the forehead of Zeus. on understanding each challenge separately As a result, some think, there is no need and redefining their connection. for government-supported research. The core misunderstanding is the idea This is wrong. In reality, both fracking that supporting an immigration-reform and horizontal drilling began as federally bill can fix the gop’s weak support among

The GOP’s Identity Crisis March/April 2014 15 Hispanic voters. This is unlikely to prove Hispanic voters for its policy consequences true for three reasons. First, it is not clear than for the gop attitudes they believe it how much credit the Republican Party reveals. Thus, a political strategy to attract and individual gop legislators would Hispanic voters should focus first and receive for supporting an immigration foremost on avoiding hostile rhetoric and bill, especially because they are unlikely on repudiating those who continue to use to outdo the Democrats in rhetoric. it. This includes Republican politicians Second, and more seriously, congressional who publicly decry Hispanic immigration, Republicans appear unlikely to be unified which essentially tells Hispanic on immigration reform—particularly in Americans—twenty-three million eligible the current environment inside the party— voters, and possibly forty million by 2030, and bitter debate is entirely possible. This accounting for 40 percent of the growth debate is bound to include precisely the in the electorate—that the gop doesn’t like kind of nasty rhetoric that has alienated them and doesn’t consider them to be true many Hispanic voters in the past. Third, Americans. It’s hard to win votes that way. immigration reform is not in fact the top After it stops some individuals from policy priority for Hispanic voters, who, repelling potential supporters, the like other Americans, are more concerned Republican Party should reach out by about issues that affect their daily lives. concentrating on the same concrete, real- This is regularly demonstrated in polls; for life issues that the party needs to address example, a 2012 Gallup survey showed anyway—and doing it in a way that draws a stark contrast between Republicans and Democrats. The gop can have a clear message: while Democrats approach Hispanic Americans and other minority groups on the basis of their ethnicity and propose collective solutions that make few distinctions among those in diverse circumstances, Republicans care about individuals and are pursuing policies to generate jobs and expand opportunities for that among Hispanic registered voters, real people rather than applying labels so immigration ranked fifth in importance that they can easily check a political box. after health care, unemployment, economic Republicans themselves must recognize the growth, and the gap between rich and fundamental fact that appealing to group poor—and only slightly above the federal interests rather than individual interests budget deficit. means ceding the terms of debate to This suggests that America’s immigration- Democrats. Conversely, if Republicans have reform debate may well be less important to a policy that appeals to Americans—no

16 The National Interest The GOP’s Identity Crisis hyphenation needed—and avoid offending positions on abortion and other social potential voters in whatever social group, issues clearly turned off some Republicans. they can do quite well. Like McAuliffe’s election, Colorado’s voter- From a political perspective, Republicans driven legalization of recreational marijuana on Capitol Hill may do best by deferring was made possible by an alignment of legislative action on immigration; in the libertarians with Democrats against social current situation, pursuing a bipartisan conservatism. Watch this space. bill may actually damage the gop brand The answer to this, as many have rather than improving it. And waiting need argued, is for Republican Party leaders to not have damaging political consequences de-emphasize social issues as campaign if Republicans take other needed steps issues—they are too polarizing and may to appeal to Hispanic and other voters. push libertarians and many independents Meanwhile, congressional Republicans into the Democrats’ arms or into staying should consider policies to offer an extra home on Election Day. By 2011, two- helping hand to recent legal immigrants thirds of Americans under thirty-five who need it (whatever their origin) in supported gay marriage, a share that has finding jobs and integrating themselves into grown significantly over the last decade and American society; this is important both continues to rise. Perhaps most significant, in ensuring that new immigrants do not policy on social issues tends to follow public become long-term recipients of government opinion rather than the reverse—suggesting assistance and in assimilating them. It could that social-conservative activists should work also help in demonstrating sympathy to harder to shape opinion and strengthen the those who follow the rules when they enter values they care about from the bottom up the country. rather than looking for rule-based answers Controversial social issues, and that may not last beyond the next election, particularly gay marriage, seem likely to referendum or judicial appointment and remain a problem for the Republican contradict the Republican Party’s overall Party. Socially conservative positions limited-government philosophy. appear increasingly to be alienating many younger voters, who see the gop as not t will be very difficult to define a new only the party of “no” but also the party of I agenda for the Republican Party that can “don’t”—a major factor in the appeal among simultaneously unify a divided party and the young of libertarianism and libertarian appeal to new voters in the wider electorate, candidates inside or outside the Republican but some of the ideas above could be com- Party. The libertarian desire for a ponents in such an effort. Of course, this combination of less government with social agenda must include other key areas as well, permissiveness is already draining support starting with a jobs plan that goes beyond away from Republicans in general elections. tax policy—an issue that despite its great This trend may become worse; Virginia’s importance has fueled considerable cyni- 2013 gubernatorial election demonstrated cism. There may also be opportunities in the cost starkly, when Democrat Terry education policy, particularly in vocational McAuliffe prevailed over the state’s socially education; two-thirds of Americans between conservative Republican attorney general, twenty-five and twenty-nine do not have a Ken Cuccinelli, by only 2.5 percent of the college degree and many are unemployed. vote even as Libertarian Party candidate Finally, Republicans must build a foreign Robert Sarvis won 6.6 percent. Cuccinelli’s policy that establishes a clear strategic

The GOP’s Identity Crisis March/April 2014 17 framework, sets priorities and advances U.S. Third, Republicans should take heart in national interests without relying excessively the fact that Democrats have their own on military force. divisions and flaws. In a mirror image of Republican political leaders must the gop, the Democratic Party is divided redefine the party as a home for principled between a liberal activist wing and a more but pragmatic problem solvers rather pragmatic establishment faction—and left- than ideologues. In a left-leaning echo of wing rhetoric and policy turn off many Whittaker Chambers, former Democratic American voters, whatever its advocates Leadership Council policy director Will may think. In addition, despite the obvious Marshall argued that in the 1980s, “voters benefits of controlling the executive branch, had heard what Democrats were selling. President Obama is constantly torn between They just weren’t buying.” The dlc’s new satisfying and disappointing the party’s ideas and practical approaches helped most progressive elements. Since some of propel Bill Clinton to the presidency and the steps necessary to placate them may also set the stage for much of what followed. mobilize broad opposition, this is a lose-lose No less important—as Clinton’s case choice. demonstrates—the Republican Party will Finally, the elections of 2014 and need a presidential candidate who can 2016 will inherently be referenda on the personify and persuasively articulate its president’s policies, at least in part, and message. Obama’s record has been mixed. This may Moving forward, the gop does have many be enough for Republicans to do well in the important strengths. First, America remains midterm elections. It will probably not be a center-right country in many respects. enough to win the White House in 2016. This provides favorable terrain. Second, In considering the longer term, some congressional Republican leaders— Republicans should also pause to compare including strong conservatives and even Tea growing populist sentiments in the Party favorites—now see the need to respond Democratic Party to those in the gop and to what voters want. Speaking to Virginia to reflect on both the origins and possible Republicans in the wake of his party’s destinations of these trends. Although the failure to secure any of the state’s top three Occupy movement may have quickly lost offices in November 2013, House Majority steam in the streets of Washington and New Leader Eric Cantor said this clearly: “If we York, left-wing populism in general has want to win, we must offer solutions to been on the rise in parallel with the Tea problems that people face every day. We have Party’s populist messages. In both cases, the not done this recently and it has allowed sentiments likely stem from a combination Democrats to take power.” Likewise, Senator of rage at politicians and frustration with Mike Lee, who deposed Utah’s Republican the country’s slow economic recovery after establishment Senator Robert Bennett in the 2008 financial crisis. 2010, recently argued that “there is a hole The fact that some have abandoned within the Republican Party that is exactly the Tea Party or its analogues on the left the size and shape of a conservative reform because of their ineffective tactics should agenda.” The recognition that it is not not blur the reality that Americans are enough for Republicans to fight higher taxes, angry and that statistics across the political spending and borrowing when Americans spectrum are disturbing. In a September want solutions that help them in their daily 2013 Gallup survey, just 42 percent of lives is a significant step. Americans had a great deal or a fair amount

18 The National Interest The GOP’s Identity Crisis Republican political leaders must redefine the party as a home for principled but pragmatic problem solvers rather than ideologues.

of confidence in the federal government’s a crisis of legitimacy. Politicians of both ability to handle domestic problems; a parties who don’t want to see the same in Pew Research Center poll earlier that year America’s future should stop trashing their found only 28 percent had favorable views own country every day in the media— of the federal government. Congress enjoys Democrats assailing its lack of fairness and historically low, single-digit approval ratings Republicans its government. After decades in several polls. of attacks on our government and society Even as Americans see the federal by our own elected leaders and what many government as less and less effective, they see as growing dysfunction, who can be also rate our economy and society as less surprised that the American people are and less fair. A Rasmussen poll found that starting to believe what they hear? How just 32 percent of likely voters see the U.S. long can a situation like that endure? economy as fair to the middle class, while Republicans, who often claim special pride a Fox News poll found only 62 percent of in our form of government, should have no Americans professing to believe that with less commitment to maintaining it. Public hard work, it is possible to achieve the frustration can be an indispensable force American Dream—down from 72 percent in improving policy and governance—or in 1997. A 2012 Pew Research Center a wrecking ball tearing through American study showed that 77 percent of Americans, society. including a majority of Republicans, say From this perspective, defining a that big corporations and a small number of positive agenda that builds on conservative wealthy people have too much power. Here, principles to address widespread public the Tea Party and the Occupy movement concerns could help not only to improve appear to agree on the problem, though not the Republican Party’s electoral prospects, the solution. but also—with some policy successes—to A critical question is whether today’s direct and defuse rising populist anger. The resurgent populism is a natural and gop’s little shop needs some new products, ultimately ephemeral reaction to events or better lighting and a welcome mat if party something more. While the former seems leaders want to attract new customers. If more likely, anyone seeing statistics like the proprietors instead argue loudly on the these for a foreign country in the news sidewalk, pausing occasionally to insult would not be surprised to hear about onlookers, they should not be surprised by massive strikes, violent demonstrations falling sales—or, eventually, a brick through and widespread instability, or even the window. n

The GOP’s Identity Crisis March/April 2014 19 The Republican Battlefield

By Henry Olsen

he common wisdom holds that not divide neatly along establishment- the gop 2016 presidential race will versus-conservative lines. Rather, the gop Tboil down to a joust between the contains four discrete factions that are based “establishment” and the “insurgents.” The primarily on ideology, with elements of former will allegedly be more moderate class and religious background tempering and the latter more conservative. Since that focus. Open nomination contests most polls for two decades have shown that during this period are resolved first by around two-thirds to 70 percent of self-de- how candidates become favorites of each scribed Republicans call themselves conser- of these factions, and then by how they are vative, this elite narrative will focus on just positioned to absorb the voting blocs of the how much the establishment candidate will other factions as their favorites drop out. need to be pulled to the right in order to This analysis allows us to explain what fend off his insurgent challenger. And since we consistently observe. It explains why the Tea Party has clearly become a vocal and a conservative party rarely nominates the powerful insurgent element in the gop, the most conservative candidate. It explains narrative will focus on two other questions: why the party often seems to nominate Who will gain Tea Party favor and emerge the “next in line.” And, perhaps most as the insurgent candidate? And can the es- importantly, it explains why certain tablishment candidate escape becoming Tea candidates emerge as the “surprise” Partyized during the primary season and candidate in each race. therefore remain a viable general-election Analysts and advisers who understand candidate? this elemental map of the Republican The common wisdom has the advantage electorate will be better positioned to of being a neat, coherent and exciting story. navigate the shoals of the Republican It also allows political journalists to do what nominating river and bring one’s favored they like to do most, which is to focus on candidate safely home to port. the personalities of the candidates and the tactics they employ. It has only one small epublican voters fall into four rough problem. It is wrong. R camps. They are: moderate or liberal Exit and entrance polls of Republican voters; somewhat conservative voters; very primaries and caucuses going back to 1996 conservative, evangelical voters; and very show that the Republican presidential conservative, secular voters. Each of these electorate is remarkably stable. It does groups supports extremely different types of candidates. Each of these groups has also Henry Olsen is a senior fellow at the Ethics and demonstrated stable preferences over the Public Policy Center. past twenty years.

20 The National Interest The Republican Battlefield The most important of these groups is the between 45 and 49 percent of the gop one most journalists don’t understand and electorate between 1996 and 2012), ignore: the somewhat conservative voters. Florida and Michigan. They are, however, This group is the most numerous nationally surprisingly numerous even in the Deep and in most states, comprising 35–40 South, the most conservative portion of percent of the national gop electorate. While the country. Moderates or liberals have the numbers of moderates, very conservative comprised between 31 and 39 percent of and evangelical voters vary significantly the South Carolina electorate since 1996, by state, somewhat conservative voters are outnumbering or roughly equaling very found in similar proportions in every state. conservative voters in each of those years. They are not very vocal, but they form the Moderate and liberal voters prefer bedrock base of the Republican Party. someone who is both more secular and less They also have a significant distinction: fiscally conservative than their somewhat they always back the winner. The candidate conservative cousins. In 1996, for example, who garners their favor has won each of the they preferred Tennessee senator Lamar last four open races. This tendency runs Alexander over Bob Dole. In 2000, they down to the state level as well. Look at the were the original McCainiacs, supporting exit polls from virtually any state caucus a candidate who backed campaign-finance or primary since 1996 and you will find regulation, opposed tax cuts for the top that the winner received a plurality of or bracket and criticized the influence of ran roughly even among the somewhat Pat Robertson. In 2008, they stuck with conservative voters. McCain, giving him their crucial backing These voters’ preferred candidate profile in New Hampshire and providing his can be inferred from the characteristics of margin of victory in virtually every state. their favored candidates: Bob Dole in 1996, In 2012, they began firmly in Ron Paul’s or George W. Bush in 2000, John McCain in Jon Huntsman’s camp. Paul and Huntsman 2008 and Mitt Romney in 2012. They like combined got 43 percent of their vote in even-keeled men with substantial governing Iowa and 50 percent in New Hampshire. experience. They like people who express Once it became clear that their candidates conservative values on the economy or could not win, however, the moderate or social issues, but who do not espouse radical liberal faction swung firmly toward Romney change. They like people who are optimistic in his fights with Newt Gingrich and Rick about America; the somewhat conservative Santorum. voter rejects the “culture warrior” motif that This latter movement is perhaps most characterized Pat Buchanan’s campaigns. indicative of their true preferences. The They are conservative in both senses of the moderate or liberal voter seems motivated word; they prefer the ideals of American by a candidate’s secularism above all else. conservatism while displaying the cautious They will always vote for the Republican disposition of the Burkean. candidate who seems least overtly religious The moderate or liberal bloc is and are motivated to oppose the candidate surprisingly strong in presidential years, who is most overtly religious. This makes comprising the second-largest voting bloc them a secure bank of votes for a somewhat with approximately 25–30 percent of all conservative candidate who emerges from gop voters nationwide. They are especially the early stages of the primary season in strong in early voting states such as New a battle with a religious conservative, as Hampshire (where they have comprised occurred in 1996, 2008 and 2012.

The Republican Battlefield March/April 2014 21 The common wisdom holds that the gop 2016 presidential race will boil down to a joust between the “establishment” and the “insurgents.” This story has only one small problem. It is wrong.

The third-largest group is the moderates’ such as gay marriage and abortion, and bête noire: the very conservative see the United States in decline because evangelicals. This group is small compared of its movement away from the faith and to the others, comprising around one-fifth moral codes of its past. Their favored of all gop voters. They gain significant candidates tend to be economically strength, however, from three unique more open to government intervention. factors. First, they are geographically Santorum, for example, wanted to favor concentrated in Southern and border states, manufacturing over services, and Buchanan where they can comprise a quarter or more opposed nafta. This social conservatism of a state’s electorate. Moreover, somewhat and economic moderation tends to place conservative voters in Southern and border these candidates out of line with the center states are also likelier to be evangelical, of the Republican Party, the somewhat and they tend to vote for more socially conservative voter outside the Deep South. conservative candidates than do their Each evangelical-backed candidate has lost non-Southern, nonevangelical ideological this group decisively in primaries in the cousins. Finally, they are very motivated to Midwest, Northeast, Pacific Coast and turn out in caucus states, such as Iowa and mountain states. Indeed, they even lose Kansas, and form the single largest bloc of them in Southern-tinged states like Virginia voters in those races. and Texas, where McCain’s ability to win These factors have given very the somewhat conservative voters, coupled conservative, evangelical-backed candidates with huge margins among moderates and unusual strength in Republican presidential liberals, allowed him to hold off Huckabee contests. The evangelical favorite, for in one-on-one face-offs. example, surprised pundits by winning The final and smallest gop tribe is the Iowa in 2008 and 2012, and supplied the one that dc elites are most familiar with: backing for second-place Iowa finishers Pat the very conservative, secular voters. This Robertson in 1988 and Pat Buchanan in group comprises a tiny 5–10 percent 1996. Their strength in the Deep South nationwide and thus never sees its choice and the border states also allowed Mike emerge from the initial races to contend in Huckabee rather than Mitt Romney to later stages. Jack Kemp and Pete DuPont emerge as John McCain’s final challenger in 1988; Steve Forbes or Phil Gramm in in 2008, and that strength combined with 1996 and 2000; Fred Thompson or Mitt their domination of the February 7 caucuses Romney in 2008; Herman Cain, Rick in Minnesota and Colorado allowed Rick Perry or Newt Gingrich in 2012: each of Santorum to emerge as Romney’s challenger these candidates showed promise in early in 2012. polling but foundered in early races once This group prefers candidates who are voters became more familiar with each very open about their religious beliefs, of the candidates. Secular moderates and place a high priority on social issues somewhat conservative voters preferred

22 The National Interest The Republican Battlefield candidates with less materialistic, factions. Sometimes no one is competing sweeping economic radicalism while with a candidate for that favor, which fre- very conservative evangelicals went with quently happens on the moderate or liberal someone singing from their hymnal. Thus, side. Other times, though, there is intense these voters quickly had to choose which competition and the preseason maneuver- of the remaining candidates to support in ing determines if someone survives until subsequent races. the actual early contests. We can see this in This small but influential bloc likes the maneuvering between Steve Forbes and urbane, fiscally oriented men. Thus, they Phil Gramm in 1996, George W. Bush and preferred Kemp or DuPont in 1988, Forbes Elizabeth Dole in 2000, a number of people or Gramm in 1996, Forbes in 2000 and in 2008, and between Mitt Romney and Romney in 2008. In 2012, this group was Tim Pawlenty in 2012. tempted by Rick Perry until his lack of The Gramm-Forbes battle centered sophistication became painfully obvious on who would lead the secular, very in the early debates. It then flirted with conservative forces. Gramm focused Newt Gingrich until his temperamental on shrinking government, Forbes on tax issues resurfaced in Florida. After that, cuts. Despite Gramm’s strong national faced with the choice of Rick Santorum or presence and Forbes’s complete lack of Mitt Romney, it swung behind Romney en one, it became clear by December 1995 masse. that the issue of cutting taxes stirred this The latter example is in fact this group’s group’s voters much more than shrinking modus operandi. They invariably see their government. Forbes, not Gramm, therefore preferred candidate knocked out early, and became the secular, very conservative hope they then invariably back whoever is backed and presented a serious challenge to other by the somewhat conservative bloc. Forbes’s candidates before becoming the focus of early exit from the 2000 race, for example, attacks in January. was crucial to George W. Bush’s ability to The 2000 Bush-Dole battle (with win South Carolina against the McCain sideline competition from Lamar onslaught. In New Hampshire, Bush won Alexander and Dan Quayle) was for only 33 percent of the very conservative who would be favored by somewhat vote; Forbes received 20 percent. With conservative voters. Bush could not Forbes out of the race, however, Bush compete with Forbes on taxes, although was able to capture 74 percent of the very his own tax-cut plan crucially cut into conservative vote in South Carolina. Forbes’s advantage. Nor could he dominate The fact that these factions have evangelical conservatives in the early races, remained very similar in preferences and being challenged by the more overtly in strength over the past twenty years religious and fiery Alan Keyes and Gary provides a clear guide to anyone who wants Bauer. So his chance to win rested on to understand how the 2016 Republican his ability to win enough votes among nomination contest will unfold. both groups of very conservative voters to supplement a strong advantage among he first thing a prospective analyst somewhat conservatives. Dole was his only T needs to understand is the crucial role serious competition here, and to that end that the year preceding the actual contests Bush poured resources into the Ames straw plays. In this “preseason,” candidates com- poll in an effort to drive her from the race pete to become favored by one of the four by showing donors she could not win.

The Republican Battlefield March/April 2014 23 He succeeded, defeating her by a large lacked the instinct to win. His poor Ames margin. She dropped out shortly thereafter showing also doomed his effort, causing with her bank account nearly dry, giving a nearly broke candidate to drop out Bush the leadership role for the largest gop within a week. With every other candidate faction. competing for the two very conservative 2008 saw three separate subprimaries: groups, and with Paul and Huntsman Kansas senator Sam Brownback versus competing for moderates, Romney sailed Mike Huckabee for the very conservative, into the early contests. evangelical vote, McCain versus Rudy The 2016 field is still developing, but Giuliani for the moderate or liberal vote, it’s already possible to discern which and Romney versus Thompson for the very candidates are focusing on which factions. conservative, secular vote. In each case the Ohio governor John Kasich is staking out off-year preseason gave one man a clear ground in the moderate-to-liberal wing early advantage. Thompson’s lackadaisical with his focus on expanding Medicaid and effort caused him to lose ground to the rhetorically supporting active government. less ideological but more focused Romney; New Jersey governor Chris Christie is trying Brownback dropped out in the summer, to make himself the mainstream, somewhat being unable to excite the evangelical conservative favorite by eschewing fiery grassroots like Huckabee; and Giuliani rhetoric, emphasizing commonsense failed to capitalize on an early lead, giving governing and attacking Washington. If McCain time to reestablish his support. they run, this will also be Representative The early races simply confirmed what polls Paul Ryan’s and former Florida governor in December 2007 were already showing Jeb Bush’s faction. If neither of those among each faction. two run and Christie falters, Wisconsin The 2012 Pawlenty-Romney primary governor Scott Walker stands to benefit, was short, with Pawlenty trying to as Walker is displaying a similar approach show somewhat conservative voters and to his competitors. Rick Santorum and donors that he was more electable than Mike Huckabee could face off for the very Romney. His effort fizzled, with large conservative, evangelical nod. Santorum’s donors unconvinced and his poor debate 2012 support in primaries and caucuses performances showing voters Pawlenty came in the same areas and from the

24 The National Interest The Republican Battlefield same people who backed Huckabee in or caucuses in eighteen states from both 2008. There would not be room for both 2008 and 2012. The share of gop voters candidates in 2016, so the preseason identifying themselves as very conservative jockeying between these two could be did rise between those years, but only by intense. about three and a half percentage points. Virtually everyone else in the race is It shrunk or rose less than two points in competing for the favor of the smallest, Virginia, Alabama, South Carolina, New least influential group: the secular Hampshire and Massachusetts. Moreover, conservatives. All focus on some sort of some of that gain seems to have come from fiscal issue as their primary focus, and most those who were previously somewhat con- also try to adopt an anti-Washington tone. servative becoming slightly more intense Some have secondary messages designed to about their conservatism. The overall share appeal to other factions, much as George of the electorate calling themselves any W. Bush did in 2000. Senator Rand Paul’s brand of conservative rose only two and a focus on civil liberties and limiting overseas half percentage points. The total number of military actions would hold some appeal conservatives shrunk or stayed even in Iowa, for gop moderates and liberals, as would South Carolina, Alabama, Wisconsin, Mas- Senator Marco Rubio’s occasional forays sachusetts, Virginia, Nevada and Tennessee. into antipoverty efforts. Rubio’s backing 2012 candidates who banked on a change of immigration reform is of interest to of the gop electoral map were thus cruelly somewhat conservative donors, and his disappointed. authoring of federal antiabortion legislation Nor do the Tea Party Senate primary creates some support among the socially victories appear to presage a sea change conservative wing. But Paul’s, Rubio’s and in gop attitudes. They generally have two Texas senator Ted Cruz’s hope must be that characteristics unlikely to pertain in the the secular, very conservative wing is in fact 2016 presidential race. First, they occurred much larger in 2016 than it has been in the primarily in smaller states in the South and past. West. While these states hold the balance Tea Party–backed victories in senatorial in the Senate, they do not elect most of and congressional primaries give them some the delegates needed to win a presidential reason for hope. In race after race in 2010 nomination. Larger states, especially and 2012, a populist conservative focusing California and those in the Midwest and on fiscal issues upset a more establishment Northeast, still have substantial power candidate from the somewhat conservative to influence the nomination contest. As or moderate-to-liberal wings. Many importantly, these victories tended to occur observers say this has pushed the national in one-on-one races or races with only two party to the right, something that also serious candidates. Tea Party candidates should help a Tea Party fiscal conservative. fared much worse in multicandidate races. A careful analysis of the data and of these In presidential contests, multicandidate races, however, shows that these hopes are races are the norm until well into March, likely unfounded. suggesting a Tea Party candidate will find it difficult to win in the early stages. he national data suggest that any Re- Most observers accept that Florida T publican move to the right after the (Rubio), Utah (Mike Lee), Nevada (Sharron election of Barack Obama was muted. We Angle), Colorado (Ken Buck), Alaska (Joe have exit polls from Republican primaries Miller), Delaware (Christine O’Donnell),

The Republican Battlefield March/April 2014 25 Texas (Cruz), Kentucky (Paul) and Indiana are heretofore indisposed to elect Tea (Richard Mourdock) represent clear cases Partiers will retain a substantial voice in the of a Tea Party candidate defeating a more Republican race. conventional, “establishment” Republican. Careful observers will note that I Of these, only the Texas and Florida excluded Representative Todd Akin’s win victories occurred in states that will matter in the 2012 Missouri Senate primary from except in a protracted 2016 fight, and it’s the above list. That’s because it was a race worth noting that Rubio prevailed without with three serious candidates, and as such a contested primary vote as his opponent, is more indicative of the circumstances then governor Charlie Crist, dropped any fiscally focused Tea Partier will face out before the primary. O’Donnell’s win in 2016. Akin drew his support from came against the most liberal Republican social conservatives; Lieutenant Governor in Congress, someone far to the left of John Brunner was the conventional, anyone who is expected to run in 2016. “establishment” candidate; and Sarah Buck’s and Miller’s wins were in one-on- Steelman, the state treasurer, ran as a one races and very narrow; Lee’s was in a populist fiscal conservative. Akin came out convention, not a primary; and Mourdock’s on top with 36 percent to Brunner’s 30 came against a thirty-six-year senatorial percent and Steelman’s 29 percent. This is veteran with residency issues. None came in quite similar to the state’s 2008 Republican circumstances likely to resemble those in a presidential primary, which was also a three- seriously contested presidential contest with way race between social conservative Mike the sort of field that is so far assembling. Huckabee, conventional Republican Mitt Ted Cruz’s victory appears impressive, but Romney and John McCain. Comparing it too is less so upon further examination. these two races yields a cautionary tale for Cruz won only because Texas requires a any Tea Party candidate. candidate to receive 50 percent in a A county-by-county analysis shows multicandidate primary to avoid a runoff. that Akin’s vote tracked Huckabee’s quite Cruz finished second in that first race with closely in most areas of the state. Where a mere 34.2 percent. He won handily (by a Huckabee did well so too did Akin, and 13 percent margin) in a one-on-one runoff vice versa. Steelman’s support also tracked in which nearly three hundred thousand Huckabee’s, although not as well: the rural fewer votes were cast than in the first race, a evangelical vote was split between the two setup that nearly all observers said benefited outsiders. Akin’s margin, though, came the most conservative candidate. from suburban St. Louis, where he won Note that successful Tea Party challenges handily while Huckabee lost big. This have yet to occur in statewide races in large is easily explained by the fact that Akin states that do not reliably vote Republican. represented a suburban St. Louis district The purple and blue states touching the for many years. In 2008, these counties Great Lakes will select a combined 398 provided John McCain’s victory margin, delegates to the 2016 Republican supporting the most moderate of the convention, all by primaries. California three serious contenders. While Akin’s will select another 172 delegates through constituents knew him and supported him, its primary, and the New England states a nonlocal, populist conservative is unlikely of Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island to do well enough here to avoid relying, as and Connecticut will select another 104. Akin did, on evangelical votes elsewhere in States whose Republican electorates, then, the state.

26 The National Interest The Republican Battlefield The likely outcome will be a repeat of the traditional gop three-way war between its somewhat conservative center and the two ideological wings: the moderate secularists and conservative evangelicals.

Missouri shows that an identifiable social conservative Iowa winner will not do conservative will eat into the support for a well there unless he is Catholic (New more fiscally oriented Tea Party populist. Hampshire’s gop electorate is plurality Ted Cruz did not face a serious candidate to Catholic) and the non-social-conservative his social right in his Texas multicandidate field is split between at least three serious race; the only other serious candidate, candidates (which allowed Catholic social Dallas mayor Ted Leppert, campaigned as conservative Pat Buchanan to eke out a a more moderate, establishment candidate. narrow win in 1996). The challenge for the If Tea Party populism overlaps substantially somewhat conservative favorite will likely with social conservatism for its voter be to forestall a challenge from his left, as support, and if social conservatives will Romney did successfully in 2012 but which prefer one of their own when given that he and Bush failed to do against McCain in choice, then Tea Party presidential hopefuls’ 2000 and 2008. chances rest upon the social conservative South Carolina and Nevada then round getting knocked out of the early races. out the first four states to vote. Newt Unfortunately for them, the early races Gingrich’s breakthrough victory in South tend to favor the candidates coming from Carolina in 2012 gives hope to a Tea Party the moderate-to-liberal or the evangelical conservative, but it is worth noting that factions of the party. the Palmetto State is an evangelical state that also has large numbers of moderates owa is the first state to vote, and its pref- and somewhat conservatives. Nevada’s I erence for evangelical candidates is clear. caucuses are perhaps the most fertile Not only did Huckabee and Santorum win ground for a Tea Party fiscal conservative their races but, going as far back as Pat to win early. In both 2008 and 2012, the Robertson’s surprise second-place finish in electorate was wealthy (28 percent or more 1988, culturally conservative candidates make $100,000 or more), secular (only have always done very well. The state has about a quarter are evangelical) and very traditionally “winnowed” the field to at conservative (between 40 and 49 percent). most three candidates and usually two, a The one caveat is the strong Mormon social conservative and a somewhat conser- presence (25 percent), but it is not clear vative. Iowa, therefore, is a crucial first test that Mormons will turn out in such large for a fiscally conservative Tea Partier. numbers without a coreligionist among the New Hampshire, the next state to vote, top flight of candidates. is not an easier challenge. New Hampshire’s The next states to vote have not yet been primary is open to registered independents determined, but it’s worth noting two and is one of the most moderate or liberal patterns that have held for three cycles. gop electorates in the country. It also has First, Arizona, Michigan and Florida tend one of the lowest shares of evangelicals to vote early. Arizona is another secular, of any Republican electorate. A socially conservative state with a strong Mormon

The Republican Battlefield March/April 2014 27 Southern primaries on March 13. Rick Santorum won six of these seven states, dropping only Virginia, where he was not on the ballot. If this pattern continues in 2016, the Tea Party favorite is again likely to stumble if faced by a strong religious conservative. In sum, a Tea Party candidate either needs to clearly deny any breathing space to a more evangelical candidate or he must emulate George W. Bush in 2000 in minority: Steve Forbes won here in 1996. having enough appeal to other factions to Michigan has a strong social-conservative gain enough strength to survive the early element among Catholics and Dutch states. The likelier outcome will be a repeat Calvinists in the western part of the state, of the traditional gop three-way war between but it is also one of the more moderate states its somewhat conservative center and the in the gop electorate. Florida also tends to two large ideological wings: the moderate the moderate side (39 percent in 2008 and secularists and conservative evangelicals. 31 percent in 2012) and is the home to the only significant Hispanic Republican ast need not be prologue, however. In community in the early states, Miami’s P the movie Lawrence of Arabia, Peter Cubans. These voters broke sharply for John O’Toole’s Lawrence decides to go back into McCain in 2008, giving him his margin a hellish desert to rescue a straggler. His of victory over Mitt Romney. It is also close aide, Sherif Ali, tells him not to both- unfavorable to evangelical candidates, who er, that the straggler’s fate is foreordained. tend to do well only in the rural counties “It is written,” Ali tells the Englishman. in the northern part of the state. Marco “Nothing is written,” Lawrence angrily yells Rubio or Jeb Bush would clearly be viewed back. He then goes into the desert and re- as home-state favorites should either run. turns with his man. Second, Southern states dominated by Lawrence could conquer the desert and socially conservative evangelical voters its heat through his will, but he could also tend to cast their ballots shortly after not will the desert away. gop aspirants the first four states and Florida. In 2008, would do well to emulate Lawrence’s six Southern states voted on February 5. will and resourcefulness, but they too Mike Huckabee won or came in a close cannot will away their surroundings. second in all of them, establishing him Whichever candidate from whichever rather than Mitt Romney as John McCain’s faction emerges, he or she will have done final challenger. In 2012, when fewer states so by understanding the four species of overall voted early, four Southern states gop voters and using their wiles and the voted on March 6, followed quickly by the calendar to their advantage. For truly, as Ali Kansas caucuses, which were dominated by said of Lawrence, for some men nothing is religious conservatives, and by two more written until they write it. n

28 The National Interest The Republican Battlefield Taiwan’s Dire Straits

By John J. Mearsheimer

hat are the implications for essence: a world in which China is much Taiwan of China’s continued less constrained than it is today. That world Wrise? Not today. Not next year. may seem forbidding, even ominous, but it No, the real dilemma Taiwan will confront is one that may be coming. looms in the decades ahead, when China, It is my firm conviction that the whose continued economic growth seems continuing rise of China will have huge likely although not a sure thing, is far more consequences for Taiwan, almost all of which powerful than it is today. will be bad. Not only will China be much Contemporary China does not possess more powerful than it is today, but it will significant military power; its military forces also remain deeply committed to making are inferior, and not by a small margin, to Taiwan part of China. Moreover, China will those of the United States. Beijing would be try to dominate Asia the way the United making a huge mistake to pick a fight with States dominates the Western Hemisphere, the American military nowadays. China, in which means it will seek to reduce, if not other words, is constrained by the present eliminate, the American military presence in global balance of power, which is clearly Asia. The United States, of course, will resist stacked in America’s favor. mightily, and go to great lengths to contain But power is rarely static. The real China’s growing power. The ensuing security question that is often overlooked is what competition will not be good for Taiwan, no happens in a future world in which the matter how it turns out in the end. Time is balance of power has shifted sharply not on Taiwan’s side. Herewith, a guide to against Taiwan and the United States, in what is likely to ensue between the United which China controls much more relative States, China and Taiwan. power than it does today, and in which China is in roughly the same economic n an ideal world, most Taiwanese would and military league as the United States. In I like their country to gain de jure inde- pendence and become a legitimate sover- John J. Mearsheimer is the R. Wendell Harrison eign state in the international system. This Distinguished Service Professor of Political outcome is especially attractive because a Science at the University of Chicago. He serves strong Taiwanese identity—separate from a on the Advisory Council of The National Interest. Chinese identity—has blossomed in Taiwan This article is adapted from a speech he gave in over the past sixty-five years. Many of those Taipei on December 7, 2013, to the Taiwanese people who identify themselves as Taiwan- Association of International Relations. An updated ese would like their own nation-state, and edition of his book The Tragedy of Great Power they have little interest in being a province Politics will be published in April by W. W. Norton. of mainland China.

Taiwan’s Dire Straits March/April 2014 29 According to National Chengchi Hong Kong enjoys today. Chinese leaders University’s Election Study Center, in refer to this solution as “one country, two 1992, 17.6 percent of the people living systems.” Still, it has little appeal to most in Taiwan identified as Taiwanese only. Taiwanese. As Yuan-kang Wang reports: By June 2013, that number was 57.5 “An overwhelming majority of Taiwan’s percent, a clear majority. Only 3.6 percent public opposes unification, even under of those surveyed identified as Chinese favorable circumstances. If anything, only. Furthermore, the 2011 Taiwan longitudinal data reveal a decline in public National Security Survey found that if one support of unification.” assumes China would not attack Taiwan In short, for Taiwan, de facto if it declared its independence, 80.2 independence is much preferable to percent of Taiwanese would in fact opt for becoming part of China, regardless of what independence. Another recent poll found the final political arrangements look like. that about 80 percent of Taiwanese view The critical question for Taiwan, however, Taiwan and China as different countries. is whether it can avoid unification and However, Taiwan is not going to gain maintain de facto independence in the face formal independence in the foreseeable of a rising China. future, mainly because China would not tolerate that outcome. In fact, China hat about China? How does it think has made it clear that it would go to war W about Taiwan? Two different logics, against Taiwan if the island declares its one revolving around nationalism and the independence. The antisecession law, which other around security, shape its views con- China passed in 2005, says explicitly that cerning Taiwan. Both logics, however, lead “the state shall employ nonpeaceful means to the same endgame: the unification of and other necessary measures” if Taiwan China and Taiwan. moves toward de jure independence. It is The nationalism story is straightforward also worth noting that the United States and uncontroversial. China is deeply does not recognize Taiwan as a sovereign committed to making Taiwan part of country, and according to President China. For China’s elites, as well as its Obama, Washington “fully supports a one- public, Taiwan can never become a China policy.” sovereign state. It is sacred territory that Thus, the best situation Taiwan can hope has been part of China since ancient times, for in the foreseeable future is maintenance but was taken away by the hated Japanese of the status quo, which means de facto in 1895—when China was weak and independence. In fact, over 90 percent of vulnerable. It must once again become an the Taiwanese surveyed this past June by the integral part of China. As Hu Jintao said Election Study Center favored maintaining in 2007 at the Seventeenth Party Congress: the status quo indefinitely or until some “The two sides of the Straits are bound later date. to be reunified in the course of the great The worst possible outcome is unification rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” with China under terms dictated by Beijing. The unification of China and Taiwan is Of course, unification could happen in a one of the core elements of Chinese national variety of ways, some of which are better identity. There is simply no compromising than others. Probably the least bad outcome on this issue. Indeed, the legitimacy of the would be one in which Taiwan ended up Chinese regime is bound up with making with considerable autonomy, much like sure Taiwan does not become a sovereign

30 The National Interest Taiwan’s Dire Straits The continuing rise of China will have huge consequences for Taiwan, almost all of which will be bad.

state and that it eventually becomes an of the world, while making sure that no integral part of China. rival great power dominates another region. Chinese leaders insist that Taiwan must To be more specific, the international be brought back into the fold sooner rather system has three defining characteristics. than later and that hopefully it can be done First, the main actors are states that operate peacefully. At the same time, they have in anarchy, which simply means that there made it clear that force is an option if they is no higher authority above them. Second, have no other recourse. all great powers have some offensive The security story is a different one, and military capability, which means they it is inextricably bound up with the rise have the wherewithal to hurt each other. of China. Specifically, it revolves around Third, no state can know the intentions of a straightforward but profound question: other states with certainty, especially their How is China likely to behave in Asia over future intentions. It is simply impossible, time, as it grows increasingly powerful? The for example, to know what Germany’s answer to this question obviously has huge or Japan’s intentions will be toward their consequences for Taiwan. neighbors in 2025. The only way to predict how a rising In a world where other states might have China is likely to behave toward its malign intentions as well as significant neighbors as well as the United States is offensive capabilities, states tend to fear with a theory of great-power politics. The each other. That fear is compounded by the main reason for relying on theory is that fact that in an anarchic system there is no we have no facts about the future, because night watchman for states to call if trouble it has not happened yet. Thomas Hobbes comes knocking at their door. Therefore, put the point well: “The present only has a states recognize that the best way to survive being in nature; things past have a being in in such a system is to be as powerful as the memory only; but things to come have possible relative to potential rivals. The no being at all.” Thus, we have no choice mightier a state is, the less likely it is that but to rely on theories to determine what is another state will attack it. No Americans, likely to transpire in world politics. for example, worry that Canada or Mexico My own realist theory of international will attack the United States, because relations says that the structure of the neither of those countries is strong enough international system forces countries to contemplate a fight with Uncle Sam. concerned about their security to compete But great powers do not merely strive to with each other for power. The ultimate be the strongest great power, although that goal of every major state is to maximize is a welcome outcome. Their ultimate aim its share of world power and eventually is to be the hegemon—which means being dominate the system. In practical terms, the only great power in the system. this means that the most powerful states What exactly does it mean to be a seek to establish hegemony in their region hegemon in the modern world? It is almost

Taiwan’s Dire Straits March/April 2014 31 impossible for any state to achieve global dominate Asia the way the United States hegemony, because it is too hard to sustain dominates the Western Hemisphere. It power around the globe and project it onto will try to become a regional hegemon. In the territory of distant great powers. The particular, China will seek to maximize the best outcome a state can hope for is to be a power gap between itself and its neighbors, regional hegemon, to dominate one’s own especially India, Japan and Russia. China geographical area. The United States has will want to make sure it is so powerful

been a regional hegemon in the Western that no state in Asia has the wherewithal to Hemisphere since about 1900. Although threaten it. the United States is clearly the most It is unlikely that China will pursue powerful state on the planet today, it is not military superiority so it can go on a global hegemon. a rampage and conquer other Asian States that gain regional hegemony have countries, although that is always possible. a further aim: they seek to prevent great Instead, it is more likely that it will want powers in other regions from duplicating to dictate the boundaries of acceptable their feat. Regional hegemons, in other behavior to neighboring countries, much words, do not want peer competitors. the way the United States lets other states in Instead, they want to keep other regions the Americas know that it is the boss. divided among several great powers, so An increasingly powerful China is also that those states will compete with each likely to attempt to push the United States other and be unable to focus their attention out of Asia, much the way the United States and resources on them. In sum, the ideal pushed the European great powers out of situation for any great power is to be the the Western Hemisphere in the nineteenth only regional hegemon in the world. The century. We should expect China to come United States enjoys that exalted position up with its own version of the Monroe today. Doctrine, as Japan did in the 1930s. What does this theory say about how These policy goals make good strategic China is likely to behave as it rises in the sense for China. Beijing should want years ahead? Put simply, China will try to a militarily weak Japan and Russia as its

32 The National Interest Taiwan’s Dire Straits neighbors, just as the United States prefers shifting the balance of power in Asia even a militarily weak Canada and Mexico on its further in China’s direction. Second, Taiwan borders. What state in its right mind would is effectively a giant aircraft carrier sitting want other powerful states located in its off China’s coast; acquiring that aircraft region? All Chinese surely remember what carrier would enhance China’s ability to happened in the previous two centuries project military power into the western when Japan was powerful and China was Pacific Ocean. weak. In short, we see that nationalism as Furthermore, why would a powerful well as realist logic give China powerful China accept U.S. military forces operating incentives to put an end to Taiwan’s de facto in its backyard? American policy makers, independence and make it part of a unified after all, go ballistic when other great China. This is clearly bad news for Taiwan, powers send military forces into the especially since the balance of power in Asia Western Hemisphere. Those foreign forces is shifting in China’s favor, and it will not are invariably seen as a potential threat to be long before Taiwan cannot defend itself American security. The same logic should against China. Thus, the obvious question apply to China. Why would China feel safe is whether the United States can provide with U.S. forces deployed on its doorstep? security for Taiwan in the face of a rising Following the logic of the Monroe China. In other words, can Taiwan depend Doctrine, would China’s security not be on the United States for its security? better served by pushing the American military out of Asia? et us now consider America’s goals in Why should we expect China to act any L Asia and how they relate to Taiwan. differently than the United States did? Regional hegemons go to great lengths to Are Chinese leaders more principled than stop other great powers from becoming American leaders? More ethical? Are they hegemons in their region of the world. The less nationalistic? Less concerned about best outcome for any great power is to be their survival? They are none of these the sole regional hegemon in the system. It things, of course, which is why China is is apparent from the historical record that likely to imitate the United States and try to the United States operates according to this become a regional hegemon. logic. It does not tolerate peer competitors. During the twentieth century, there were hat are the implications of this secu- four great powers that had the capability W rity story for Taiwan? The answer is to make a run at regional hegemony: that there is a powerful strategic rationale Imperial Germany from 1900 to 1918, for China—at the very least—to try to sever Imperial Japan between 1931 and 1945, Taiwan’s close ties with the United States Nazi Germany from 1933 to 1945 and the and neutralize Taiwan. However, the best Soviet Union during the Cold War. Not possible outcome for China, which it will surprisingly, each tried to match what the surely pursue with increasing vigor over United States had achieved in the Western time, would be to make Taiwan part of Hemisphere. China. How did the United States react? In each Unification would work to China’s case, it played a key role in defeating and strategic advantage in two important dismantling those aspiring hegemons. ways. First, Beijing would absorb Taiwan’s The United States entered World War economic and military resources, thus I in April 1917 when Imperial Germany

Taiwan’s Dire Straits March/April 2014 33 An increasingly powerful China is likely to attempt to push the United States out of Asia, much the way the United States pushed the European great powers out of the Western Hemisphere.

looked like it might win the war and rule The bottom line is that the United Europe. American troops played a critical States—for sound strategic reasons— role in tipping the balance against the worked hard for more than a century to Kaiserreich, which collapsed in November gain hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. 1918. In the early 1940s, President Since achieving regional dominance, it Franklin Roosevelt went to great lengths has gone to great lengths to prevent other to maneuver the United States into World great powers from controlling either Asia or War II to thwart Japan’s ambitions in Europe. Asia and Germany’s ambitions in Europe. Thus, there is little doubt as to how The United States came into the war American policy makers will react if China in December 1941, and helped destroy attempts to dominate Asia. The United both Axis powers. Since 1945, American States can be expected to go to great lengths policy makers have gone to considerable to contain China and ultimately weaken it lengths to put limits on German and to the point where it is no longer capable Japanese military power. Finally, during of ruling the roost in Asia. In essence, the the Cold War, the United States steadfastly United States is likely to behave toward worked to prevent the Soviet Union from China much the way it acted toward the dominating Eurasia and then helped Soviet Union during the Cold War. relegate it to the scrap heap of history in China’s neighbors are certain to fear its the late 1980s and early 1990s. rise as well, and they too will do whatever Shortly after the Cold War ended, they can to prevent it from achieving the George H. W. Bush administration’s regional hegemony. Indeed, there is already controversial “Defense Planning Guidance” substantial evidence that countries like of 1992 was leaked to the press. It boldly India, Japan and Russia as well as smaller stated that the United States was now the powers like Singapore, South Korea most powerful state in the world by far and Vietnam are worried about China’s and it planned to remain in that exalted ascendancy and are looking for ways to position. In other words, the United States contain it. In the end, they will join an would not tolerate a peer competitor. American-led balancing coalition to check That same message was repeated in China’s rise, much the way Britain, France, the famous 2002 National Security Germany, Italy, Japan and even China Strategy issued by the George W. Bush joined forces with the United States to administration. There was much criticism contain the Soviet Union during the Cold of that document, especially its claims War. about “preemptive” war. But hardly a word How does Taiwan fit into this story? The of protest was raised about the assertion United States has a rich history of close that the United States should check rising relations with Taiwan since the early days powers and maintain its commanding of the Cold War, when the Nationalist position in the global balance of power. forces under Chiang Kai-shek retreated

34 The National Interest Taiwan’s Dire Straits to the island from the Chinese mainland. reputation as a reliable partner. This means However, Washington is not obliged by they will be inclined to back Taiwan no treaty to come to the defense of Taiwan if it matter what. is attacked by China or anyone else. While the United States has good reasons Regardless, the United States will have to want Taiwan as part of the balancing powerful incentives to make Taiwan coalition it will build against China, there an important player in its anti-China are also reasons to think this relationship balancing coalition. First, as noted, Taiwan is not sustainable over the long term. For has significant economic and military starters, at some point in the next decade or resources and it is effectively a giant aircraft so it will become impossible for the United carrier that can be used to help control the States to help Taiwan defend itself against waters close to China’s all-important eastern a Chinese attack. Remember that we are coast. The United States will surely want talking about a China with much more Taiwan’s assets on its side of the strategic military capability than it has today. balance, not on China’s side. In addition, geography works in China’s Second, America’s commitment to favor in a major way, simply because Taiwan Taiwan is inextricably bound up with U.S. is so close to the Chinese mainland and so credibility in the region, which matters far away from the United States. When it greatly to policy makers in Washington. comes to a competition between China and Because the United States is located roughly the United States over projecting military six thousand miles from East Asia, it has to power into Taiwan, China wins hands work hard to convince its Asian allies—especially Japan and South Korea—that it will back them up in the event they are threatened by China or North Korea. Importantly, it has to convince Seoul and Tokyo that they can rely on the American nuclear umbrella to protect them. This is the thorny problem of extended deterrence, which the United States and its allies wrestled with throughout the Cold War. If the United States were to sever its military ties with Taiwan or fail to defend it in a crisis with China, that would surely send a strong signal to America’s other allies in the region that they cannot rely on the United States for protection. Policy makers in Washington will go to great lengths to avoid that outcome and instead maintain America’s

Taiwan’s Dire Straits March/April 2014 35 down. Furthermore, in a fight over Taiwan, China will at some point have the military American policy makers would surely be wherewithal to conquer Taiwan, which will reluctant to launch major attacks against make war even more likely. Chinese forces on the mainland, for fear There was no flashpoint between the they might precipitate nuclear escalation. superpowers during the Cold War that This reticence would also work to China’s was as dangerous as Taiwan will be in a advantage. Sino-American security competition. Some One might argue that there is a simple commentators liken Berlin in the Cold way to deal with the fact that Taiwan will War to Taiwan, but Berlin was not sacred not have an effective conventional deterrent territory for the Soviet Union and it was against China in the not-too-distant future: actually of little strategic importance for put America’s nuclear umbrella over Taiwan. either side. Taiwan is different. Given how This approach will not solve the problem, dangerous it is for precipitating a war and however, because the United States is not given the fact that the United States will going to escalate to the nuclear level if eventually reach the point where it cannot Taiwan is being overrun by China. The defend Taiwan, there is a reasonable chance stakes are not high enough to risk a general that American policy makers will eventually thermonuclear war. Taiwan is not Japan or conclude that it makes good strategic sense even South Korea. Thus, the smart strategy to abandon Taiwan and allow China to for America is to not even try to extend its coerce it into accepting unification. nuclear deterrent over Taiwan. All of this is to say that the United States There is a second reason the United is likely to be somewhat schizophrenic States might eventually forsake Taiwan: it about Taiwan in the decades ahead. On one is an especially dangerous flashpoint, which hand, it has powerful incentives to make could easily precipitate a Sino-American it part of a balancing coalition aimed at war that is not in America’s interest. U.S. containing China. On the other hand, there policy makers understand that the fate are good reasons to think that with the of Taiwan is a matter of great concern to passage of time the benefits of maintaining Chinese of all persuasions and that they close ties with Taiwan will be outweighed will be extremely angry if it looks like the by the potential costs, which are likely to United States is preventing unification. But be huge. Of course, in the near term, the that is exactly what Washington will be United States will protect Taiwan and treat doing if it forms a close military alliance it as a strategic asset. But how long that with Taiwan, and that point will not be lost relationship lasts is an open question. on the Chinese people. It is important to note in this regard that o far, the discussion about Taiwan’s fu- Chinese nationalism, which is a potent S ture has focused almost exclusively on force, emphasizes how great powers like the how the United States is likely to act toward United States humiliated China in the past Taiwan. However, what happens to Tai- when it was weak and appropriated Chinese wan in the face of China’s rise also depends territory like Hong Kong and Taiwan. greatly on what policies Taiwan’s leaders and Thus, it is not difficult to imagine crises its people choose to pursue over time. There breaking out over Taiwan or scenarios in is little doubt that Taiwan’s overriding goal which a crisis escalates into a shooting war. in the years ahead will be to preserve its After all, Chinese nationalism will surely independence from China. That aim should be a force for trouble in those crises, and not be too difficult to achieve for the next

36 The National Interest Taiwan’s Dire Straits decade, mainly because Taiwan is almost suit, but also because American policy certain to maintain close relations with the makers abhor the idea of an ally being in United States, which will have powerful a position to start a nuclear war that might incentives as well as the capability to pro- ultimately involve the United States. To tect Taiwan. But after that point Taiwan’s put it bluntly, no American wants to be in strategic situation is likely to deteriorate in a situation where Taiwan can precipitate significant ways, mainly because China will be rapidly approaching the point where it can conquer Tai- wan even if the American military helps defend the island. And, as noted, it is not clear that the Unit- ed States will be there for Taiwan over the long term. In the face of this grim future, Taiwan has three options. First, it can develop its own nuclear deterrent. Nuclear weapons are the ultimate deterrent, and there is no question that a Taiwanese nuclear arsenal would markedly reduce the likelihood of a Chinese attack against Taiwan. Taiwan pursued this option in the 1970s, when it feared American abandonment in the wake of the Vietnam War. The United States, however, stopped Taiwan’s nuclear-weapons a conflict that might result in a massive program in its tracks. And then Taiwan nuclear attack on the United States. tried to develop a bomb secretly in the China will adamantly oppose Taiwan 1980s, but again the United States found obtaining a nuclear deterrent, in large out and forced Taipei to shut the program part because Beijing surely understands down. It is unfortunate for Taiwan that it that it would make it difficult—maybe failed to build a bomb, because its prospects even impossible—to conquer Taiwan. for maintaining its independence would be What’s more, China will recognize that much improved if it had its own nuclear Taiwanese nuclear weapons would facilitate arsenal. nuclear proliferation in East Asia, which No doubt Taiwan still has time to acquire would not only limit China’s ability to a nuclear deterrent before the balance of throw its weight around in that region, power in Asia shifts decisively against it. but also would increase the likelihood But the problem with this suggestion is that that any conventional war that breaks out both Beijing and Washington are sure to would escalate to the nuclear level. For oppose Taiwan going nuclear. The United these reasons, China is likely to make it States would oppose Taiwanese nuclear manifestly clear that if Taiwan decides to weapons, not only because they would pursue nuclear weapons, it will strike its encourage Japan and South Korea to follow nuclear facilities, and maybe even launch

Taiwan’s Dire Straits March/April 2014 37 There was no flashpoint between the superpowers during the Cold War that was as dangerous as Taiwan will be in a Sino-American security competition.

a war to conquer the island. In short, it There are a number of problems with appears that it is too late for Taiwan to this form of conventional deterrence, which pursue the nuclear option. raise serious doubts about whether it can Taiwan’s second option is conventional work for Taiwan over the long haul. For deterrence. How could Taiwan make starters, the strategy depends on the United deterrence work without nuclear weapons States fighting side by side with Taiwan. in a world where China has clear-cut But it is difficult to imagine American military superiority over the combined policy makers purposely choosing to fight forces of Taiwan and the United States? a war in which the U.S. military is not The key to success is not to be able to only going to lose, but is also going to pay defeat the Chinese military—that is a huge price in the process. It is not even impossible—but instead to make China clear that Taiwan would want to fight such pay a huge price to achieve victory. In other a war, because it would be fought mainly words, the aim is to make China fight a on Taiwanese territory—not Chinese protracted and bloody war to conquer territory—and there would be death and Taiwan. Yes, Beijing would prevail in the destruction everywhere. And Taiwan would end, but it would be a Pyrrhic victory. lose in the end anyway. This strategy would be even more effective Furthermore, pursuing this option would if Taiwan could promise China that the mean that Taiwan would be constantly in resistance would continue even after its an arms race with China, which would forces were defeated on the battlefield. The help fuel an intense and dangerous security threat that Taiwan might turn into another competition between them. The sword of Sinkiang or Tibet would foster deterrence Damocles, in other words, would always be for sure. hanging over Taiwan. This option is akin to Admiral Alfred Finally, although it is difficult to predict von Tirpitz’s famous “risk strategy,” which just how dominant China will become in Imperial Germany adopted in the decade the distant future, it is possible that it will before World War I. Tirpitz accepted the eventually become so powerful that Taiwan fact that Germany could not build a navy will be unable to put up major resistance powerful enough to defeat the mighty Royal against a Chinese onslaught. This would Navy in battle. He reasoned, however, that certainly be true if America’s commitment Berlin could build a navy that was strong to defend Taiwan weakens as China morphs enough to inflict so much damage on the into a superpower. Royal Navy that it would cause London Taiwan’s third option is to pursue what to fear a fight with Germany and thus be I will call the “Hong Kong strategy.” In deterred. Moreover, Tirpitz reasoned that this case, Taiwan accepts the fact that it this “risk fleet” might even give Germany is doomed to lose its independence and diplomatic leverage it could use against become part of China. It then works hard Britain. to make sure that the transition is peaceful

38 The National Interest Taiwan’s Dire Straits and that it gains as much autonomy as here is one set of circumstances under possible from Beijing. This option is T which Taiwan can avoid this scenario. unpalatable today and will remain so for Specifically, all Taiwanese should hope there at least the next decade. But it is likely to is a drastic slowdown in Chinese economic become more attractive in the distant future growth in the years ahead and that Beijing if China becomes so powerful that it can also has serious political problems on the conquer Taiwan with relative ease. home front that work to keep it focused So where does this leave Taiwan? The inward. If that happens, China will not be nuclear option is not feasible, as neither in a position to pursue regional hegemony China nor the United States would accept and the United States will be able to protect a nuclear-armed Taiwan. Conventional Taiwan from China, as it does now. In es- deterrence in the form of a “risk strategy” sence, the best way for Taiwan to maintain is far from ideal, but it makes sense as long de facto independence is for China to be as China is not so dominant that it can economically and militarily weak. Unfor- subordinate Taiwan without difficulty. Of tunately for Taiwan, it has no way of influ- course, for that strategy to work, the United encing events so that this outcome actually States must remain committed to the becomes reality. defense of Taiwan, which is not guaranteed When China started its impressive over the long term. growth in the 1980s, most Americans and Once China becomes a superpower, it Asians thought this was wonderful news, probably makes the most sense for Taiwan because all of the ensuing trade and other to give up hope of maintaining its de facto forms of economic intercourse would independence and instead pursue the make everyone richer and happier. China, “Hong Kong strategy.” This is definitely according to the reigning wisdom, would not an attractive option, but as Thucydides become a responsible stakeholder in the argued long ago, in international politics international community, and its neighbors “the strong do what they can and the weak would have little to worry about. Many suffer what they must.” Taiwanese shared this optimistic outlook, By now, it should be glaringly apparent and some still do. that whether Taiwan is forced to give up They are wrong. By trading with China its independence largely depends on how and helping it grow into an economic formidable China’s military becomes in powerhouse, Taiwan has helped create a the decades ahead. Taiwan will surely do burgeoning Goliath with revisionist goals everything it can to buy time and maintain that include ending Taiwan’s independence the political status quo. But if China and making it an integral part of China. In continues its impressive rise, Taiwan appears sum, a powerful China isn’t just a problem destined to become part of China. for Taiwan. It is a nightmare. n

Taiwan’s Dire Straits March/April 2014 39 The Real Origins of Realpolitik

By John Bew

n 1934, a young British historian British aristocracy for doing nothing in the published his first book, The Italian face of Nazi terror and aggression, but, then I Problem in European Diplomacy, 1847– again, it also underlay Winston Churchill’s 1849. In it, he announced that a nation’s declaration that he would sup with the foreign policy “is based upon a series of as- devil to defeat Hitler, which is what he did sumptions, with which statesmen have lived in forming a wartime alliance with Stalin. since their earliest years and which they Now that this elastic term is once again regard as so axiomatic as hardly to be worth coming back into vogue, it is worth taking stating.” It was the duty of the historian, up Taylor’s challenge again. he wrote, “to clarify these assumptions and For what does this portentous Teutonic to trace their influence upon the course of word actually mean and what implications, every-day policy.” if any, does it hold for the assumptions By that apodictic verdict A. J. P. Taylor, of contemporary Western statesmen? As who soon became one of the greatest realpolitik undergoes a renaissance in the British historians of the past century, English-speaking world, it is surely worth meant realpolitik, which he believed was investigating what the word, coined in the true motor of international relations, 1853, was originally supposed to entail. The with moralism serving at best as a pious answer to that question might surprise but smokescreen for a battle for power, or, as he will also enlighten. Real realpolitik has been put it in the title of one of his best books, used and abused beyond all recognition for the struggle for mastery in Europe. over the last 160 years. But the original Since then, realpolitik has had its ups and concept is still relevant to the challenges downs, both in Britain and America. In of the twenty-first century, if not quite the late 1930s, for example, it became a in the way one might expect. It contains convenient excuse among much of the notions within it that both bolster and act as a useful counterweight and corrective to John Bew currently holds the Henry A. Kissinger the mantras of modern American realism. Chair in Foreign Policy and International Real realpolitik, you could say, is ripe for Relations at the John W. Kluge Center at the excavation and rediscovery. Library of Congress. He is a reader in the War The reasons for the most recent return of Studies Department at King’s College London realpolitik are no mystery. The optimism and director of the International Centre for the and sense of triumph which crept into Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence. His Anglo-American political culture following Castlereagh: A Life (Oxford University Press, 2012) the end of the Cold War and which peaked was named a book of the year by the Wall Street with the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s Journal, Sunday Telegraph, Spectator and Total Politics. statue in Baghdad’s Firdos Square just over

40 The National Interest The Real Origins of Realpolitik The creation of the concept of realpolitik was an early attempt to answer an enduring conundrum: how to achieve liberal, enlightened goals in a world that does not follow liberal, enlightened rules.

ten years ago have been replaced by the realist,” said Obama’s then chief of staff “return of history” and the “end of dreams.” Rahm Emanuel in April 2010. “If you had As periodically happens when the world to put him in a category, he’s probably more becomes a more challenging place, a slew realpolitik, like Bush 41 . . . you’ve got to be of new books on Niccolò Machiavelli have cold-blooded about the self-interests of your appeared on both sides of the Atlantic, nation.” including offerings by Jonathan Powell In the 1990s, some regarded realpolitik (Tony Blair’s former chief of staff) and as a thing of the past—a relic of the Cold Philip Bobbitt. Last December, in a review War and a “needs must” approach to the of four recent books on the Florentine world which could now be tossed into statesman in the Atlantic, Michael the dustbin of history. Even at the height Ignatieff announced the coming of the of their influence, Western realpolitikers latest “Machiavellian moment” (a phrase have often faced resistance and criticism introduced by the historian J. G. A. Pocock from within their own societies. As a in 1975). By that he meant “an instance foreign import, lifted from the heart of when public necessity requires actions that the great Anglo-American bogeyman of private ethics and religious values might the two world wars, the word does not condemn as unjust and immoral.” Other sit comfortably alongside such soothing familiar heroes of realpolitik—such as Lord terms as “enlightenment,” “morality” Castlereagh and Count Metternich (the and “virtue.” In a world where great- focus of Henry Kissinger’s A World Restored) power rivalries have returned, however, and Otto von Bismarck and George F. realpolitik is once more discovering Kennan—are also enjoying a return to a receptive audience. The chastening of prestige. American ambitions in the Middle East This time around, realpolitik also has also allows realpolitikers to point out, with some new friends and unlikely advocates. some justification, that idealism can lead The most liberal president to inhabit the to worse moral outcomes than the cool, White House in many years has been as circumspect approach to statecraft that they realist as any of his predecessors in the purport to employ. conduct of foreign affairs, with a zero-sum So the exponents of realpolitik have security policy in which “interests” are rediscovered their voice and their swagger. paramount. Last May, the German weekly Yet realpolitik is one of those words Der Spiegel ran an article declaring that borrowed from another language that is President Obama was the heir to “Kissinger’s much used but little understood. Its true realpolitik,” quoting National Interest meaning remains occluded by the fact that editor Jacob Heilbrunn to the effect that it has so often been caricatured—but also he “may even start speaking about foreign because realpolitikers caricature the naive affairs with a German accent.” “Everybody idealists whom they set themselves up always breaks it down between idealist and against. “I will leave it to the self-described

The Real Origins of Realpolitik March/April 2014 41 realists to explain in greater detail the origins to Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes and and meaning of ‘realism’ and ‘realpolitik’ Richelieu, though, as Jonathan Haslam to our confused journalists and politicos,” points out in No Virtue Like Necessity: Real- said Robert Kagan in 2010, in a discussion ist Thought in International Relations since of President Obama’s realist credentials. In Machiavelli, it has a place within it. It is fact, few satisfactory definitions exist, largely something distinct from raison d’état, stra- because international-relations theorists tegic thought or Machiavellianism—though have remained uninterested in its historical all played a part in its formulation. origins. Realpolitik is of more recent vintage. The In picking up the gauntlet thrown down neologism was invented by the German by Kagan, then—to explore the origins thinker Ludwig August von Rochau in his and meanings of realpolitik—one discovers 1853 treatise Grundsätze der Realpolitik some surprising answers. Both realists and (The Principles of Realpolitik). Rochau, who their critics should take heed. Rediscovering added a second volume in 1869 and wrote a real realpolitik is, in fact, a more useful total of eleven books, is a largely forgotten exercise than simply dusting off a copy of figure today. His work has attracted Machiavelli’s The Prince. We can do better comment in his homeland, including than revert to Renaissance-era statecraft Natascha Doll’s perspicuous 2005 study, every time we get our fingers burned. That but has never been translated into English is because real realpolitik was born in an and there are no extended discussions of era that more closely resembles the one in his life and work in the English language which we find ourselves today. It emerged (notable exceptions here are brief mentions in mid-nineteenth-century Europe from in Jonathan Haslam’s history of realism the collision of the Enlightenment with and James Sheehan’s work on nineteenth- the realities of power politics: a world that century German liberalism). was experiencing a unique combustion of So who was Rochau and what did he new ideas about freedom and social order mean by the word realpolitik? Rochau, to alongside rapid industrialization, class war, borrow a loaded phrase, was what might sectarianism, great-power rivalry and the be called a “liberal mugged by reality.” rise of nationalism. In other words, it was The illegitimate son of an officer of the a response to the quintessential dilemmas Braunschweig hussars, he was a publicist, of modernity, some of which we are still journalist and radical participant in the grappling with today. Vormärz, the movement for liberal political Above all, the creation of the concept of reform in the German states. The efforts realpolitik was an early attempt to answer of this liberal movement—like those a conundrum that has been at the heart of of its sister movements across Europe— Anglo-American foreign policy ever since: culminated in the rebellions of 1848, which how to achieve liberal, enlightened goals were intended to establish constitutional in a world that does not follow liberal, and representative government. Rochau, enlightened rules; and how to ensure who had been forced into exile before the political and social progress in an unstable uprising, tried to attain a seat in the liberal and unpredictable environment. Frankfurt Parliament, which was established that year. Although he failed, he became a ealpolitik is not, as is often assumed, well-known figure in the National Liberal R as old as statecraft itself. Nor is it Party and eventually became a deputy in the part of a seamless creed stretching back German Reichstag in 1871.

42 The National Interest The Real Origins of Realpolitik In some respects, the 1848 revolutions were nineteenth-century Europe’s equivalent of the Arab Spring. Uprisings that began in the name of freedom and constitutional rights quickly fell victim to other political phenomena. The liberal gains of 1848 were soon lost as the would-be revolutionaries were swatted down by coercive governments who restored their authority or were overtaken by more powerful social forces such as class, religion and nationalism. The liberal dream of a united Germany under the rule of law was thwarted. In the multifarious states and principalities of Germany, autocrats, monarchists and the landed classes quickly reestablished their control and scattered the revolutionaries into prison or exile. Over the following two decades, Germany was indeed to be united but not by the means that the men of 1848 as tragedy, the second time as farce.” In envisaged. Rather than constitutionalism Italy, meanwhile, where Rochau also visited, and representative government, it was the a series of local rebellions were swiftly “blood and iron” of the Prussian chancellor, suppressed. Otto von Bismarck, that forged the creation As Rochau watched the dreams of the of the German Empire in 1871. liberals dissipate in smoke, he thought it Nor was this all. In France, the Second time for some hard thinking. Liberals had Republic was established in early 1848 and to get real. “The castles that they have built the French people were granted universal in the air have evaporated into blue mist,” suffrage. But democracy did not prove to be he wrote. “A work that had begun with a vehicle for liberalism, as might have been aimless enthusiasm and carried out with an expected. The people (chiefly the peasants) overestimation of one’s capabilities ended in elected Napoleon’s nephew Louis, who used dishonour and injury.” this mandate to abolish the representative It was as an antidote to their failure to assembly, marginalize the liberals and understand the nature of power and politics install himself as emperor in 1852. It that this budding realist invoked the need was the implosion of the 1848 French for a new realpolitik. This was juxtaposed revolution that Karl Marx wrestled with with “idealpolitik,” which had inspired four years later in The Eighteenth Brumaire Rochau and his comrades but won them of Louis Napoleon, noting—referring to no real gains. “Realpolitik does not move the resurrection of Bonapartism—that in a foggy future, but in the present’s field history tends to repeat itself, “the first time of vision,” he wrote. “It does not consider

The Real Origins of Realpolitik March/April 2014 43 For those watching the rise of the German nation from outside, realpolitik soon became a byword for German dastardliness.

its task to consist in the realisation of ideals, The strange afterlife of realpolitik but in the attainment of concrete ends.” showed just how difficult it was for Rochau was far from ready to give up on liberals to balance their ideals with a true the ideas he had held so far. In his view, the understanding of means and ends. After great achievement of modernity had been Rochau, the concept became entrusted to undermine the notion that might is right into the hands of the historian and fellow in politics—or that kings or certain classes National Liberal politician Heinrich von had a God-given right to rule because they Treitschke, a virulent anti-Semite—his were strong. But that did not mean liberals credo was “the Jews are our misfortune”— could simply dismiss the laws of politics. In who set out to show the German people making such progress, they had mistakenly “how brilliant Realpolitik is.” But assumed that the “law of the strong” had Treitschke’s influence—and his ideas of simply evaporated overnight. In reality, racial struggle and war—represented an this law was as unavoidable as the “law increasingly rightward turn in German of gravity over the material world.” The liberalism. Among the National Liberals, foundational truth of politics was the link liberal values were increasingly subordinated between power (Macht) and dominance to the German national cause, which (Herrschaft). had been seized upon and exploited by Rather than abandoning his liberalism, Bismarck. Rochau had regarded anti- he challenged his fellow liberals to Semitism as repugnant, absurd and think of smarter ways to achieve their delusional. goals. They had much to fight for. The Rochau remained a fierce critic and regimes that had been restored after opponent of Bismarck until his death in 1848 were “anachronisms” because they 1873. Bismarck’s government banned did not adequately reflect the balance of the publication of the weekly journal social forces within German society. The that Rochau edited in the 1860s. By a only viable government for Germany, strange twist of fate, however, the phrase he argued, was one that was constructed that Rochau coined became increasingly around and harnessed the full potential associated with Bismarck himself. Detached of the Mittelstand (the middle classes). from its original meaning, it was used to But the intellectual progress made by the describe Bismarck’s brand of practical and Enlightenment had hit the brick wall of ruthless statecraft in the domestic and reality. To get through that wall, it needed international arena: his astute management more than ideological purity. When it of different social forces within the state became “a matter of trying to bring down and his ability to combine diplomacy with the walls of Jericho, the Realpolitik thinks the threat of force. Thus the true meaning that lacking better tools, the most simple of realpolitik began to be drowned out as pickaxe is more effective than the sound of it was harnessed by conservatives for a very the most powerful trumpets.” different cause. For those watching the

44 The National Interest The Real Origins of Realpolitik rise of the German nation from outside, had not been superseded by what is now therefore, realpolitik soon became a byword called ‘realpolitik.’” By 1904, as German for German dastardliness. naval rearmament gained pace, the Fortnightly Review noted how the German rom its German origins, realpolitik state “works exclusively upon a science of F seeped into the English language (and self-interest, more definitely methodized the Anglo-American conscience) in two than in any other Foreign Office, and ways, and in two distinct waves. The first applied with more tenacious consistency.” was in the slow buildup of Anglo-German Not everyone accepted the implication antagonism in the late nineteenth cen- that realpolitik was a uniquely German tury. For Britons, increasingly conscious condition. In 1902, the English radical of threats to their position as the leading economist J. A. Hobson published global superpower, realpolitik—as practiced Imperialism: A Study, in which he suggested by Bismarck and then the kaiser—was an that the growing ambitions of the great unpleasant and disconcerting discovery. It powers—reflected in colonialism and huge was taken to imply cynical and uncivilized military and naval rearmament programs— conduct on the international stage—a lack were all symptoms of the same sickness. It of respect for the treaties and laws that pro- was a vided some semblance of order in global affairs and a fetishization of naked self- greedy type of Machiavellianism, entitled “real- interest as an end in itself. politik” in Germany, where it was made, which The first mention of realpolitik in the has remodelled the whole art of diplomacy and English language came in 1872. It was in has erected national aggrandisement without a translation of an attack on Rochau by pity or scruple as the conscious motive force of the Prussian nationalist Constantin Frantz, foreign policy. who believed that the very notion of realpolitik betrayed the Christian spirit of What Hobson called “earth hunger”—the benevolence that was central to the essence scramble for markets and resources and the of liberalism. After this, the word was repudiation of treaty obligations—was re- barely mentioned again until the 1890s, flected in the “sliding scale of diplomat- when it began to seep into the press with ic language” and words like “hinterland, growing frequency, as Wilhelmine Germany sphere of interest, sphere of influence, para- became an increasingly aggressive and mountcy, suzerainty, protectorate.” Even the assertive actor on the international stage. Americans, too, were being drawn into the Following Frantz, realpolitik was identified imperial game, engaging in what the Ger- as the source of a sort of gangrene in mans now called Weltpolitik (world politics). German philosophy and intellectual life. In India, the philosopher Sarvepalli The traditions of Goethe and Kant, which Radhakrishnan, a future president of the had been so admired in England, had been country, echoed Hobson’s views: marginalized by what seemed to be a neo- Machiavellian obsession with power and the Realpolitik, which has for its principle, “It is interests of the state. good when I steal your cow, and bad when you In 1895, the Times, for example, steal my cow,” has been the governing force of bemoaned the fact that there were few European relations all these four or five cen- “survivors of a period when the old- turies. Self-interest is the end; brute-force, the fashioned idealism of the German character means; conscience is taboo.

The Real Origins of Realpolitik March/April 2014 45 The Great War, he added, was “the penalty spaciousness, and self-absorption, until which Europe pays for its steadfast loyalty from very boredom they are forced to to a false ideal.” make international mountains out of molehills, a diversion which by itself is f all the great powers, America came proof enough of their unique immunity O late to realpolitik. It was, after all, in from the serious realities of Weltpolitik,” Rochau’s pithy description, one of those Brooks wrote. nations that “have hardly stepped out of The exponential growth of American the shoes they wore as children.” Before power soon caused Europeans to adjust its entry into the Great War, America was their opinions about the American capacity often chided in the English press for its lack for realpolitik. As pressure grew on the of understanding of the true nature of real- United States to enter the war in 1916, politik, much as Rochau rebuked his liberal Walter Weyl, the editor of the fledgling colleagues for their naïveté about the nature New Republic and one of the intellectual of politics after 1848. fathers of the progressive movement, In 1911, the British writer Sydney returned from a trip to Europe with some Brooks—a regular contributor to advice for his countrymen. “They ascribe Harper’s—suggested that America was a to us more foresight than we possess, geographically cosseted nation and that its not realizing how often we have happily understanding of international politics was blundered into success, how often we blunted by its relative security (a theme have pursued Realpolitik in our sleep.” recently revisited by John Mearsheimer in To illustrate the point, he recounted The National Interest). Americans “live in a conversation he had with a German an atmosphere of extraordinary simplicity, academic about America’s position: “‘We Germans,’ a Berlin professor recently assured me, ‘write fat volumes about Realpolitik but understand it no better than babies in a nursery.’ ‘You Americans,’ he added, I thought enviously, ‘understand it far too well to talk about it.’” When Woodrow Wilson did eventually take America into war in 1917, some of his supporters began to style his support for democracy and liberal values as a direct assault on realpolitik. The word had begun to seep into the American press in preceding years. Like in England, it was used interchangeably with Machiavellianism, for which the El Paso Herald provided a helpful definition in 1918: “Michiavellianism [sic]— pronounced ‘mak-ee-ah-vel- eean-izm.’ A term descriptive of

46 The National Interest The Real Origins of Realpolitik unscrupulous diplomacy. Derived from the Liberal Germans, Rochau’s true heirs, name of Machiavelli, a Florentine statesman also joined in the criticism. Father W. . . . Michiavellianism has been revived by Foerster, an exiled German pacifist, the Prussian military autocracy, and is called educationalist and ethicist, said the country Realpolitik.” had succumbed to “hallucinations of Wilson’s vision of politics—along ‘Realpolitik’” that were brought on by a with his emphasis on liberal values—was destructive sense of national superiority: presented as a powerful alternative to the shortsighted cynicism that realpolitik In spite, therefore, of all our talk of “Realpoli- seemed to denote. Wilsonianism was no tik,” we have remained altogether incapable of longer seen as naive; it was a potent weapon assessing the surrounding world objectively, or in the international arena in its own right. of emerging from our own drunken egoism; “How curious it is that these professors and this especially because, in addition, a fun- of realpolitik in European chancelleries, damentally false political philosophy has taught who lately saw nothing in the President but us to look upon egoism as the only true world an academist, and nothing in his phrases policy. but dreamy vaporings of the millennium, should be changing their tune at this time!” By the end of the Great War, therefore, declared the Washington Herald in April realpolitik was already taken to mean a 1917. “Of course diplomats and militarists variety of sins—which were long removed who deal exclusively in ‘facts’ and the from anything that Rochau had written realities of force never see much farther in 1853. These included militarism, than their own noses.” illiberalism, imperialism, naked self-interest The irony of this was that Wilsonianism and recklessness in the international was closer to Rochau’s version of realpolitik arena. Realpolitik was understood not than anyone imagined. as a science of realism but, rather, as a glaring symptom of what had gone wrong s the Great War turned in the Allies’ in Germany. Insofar as other nations had A favor, and they began to write the vic- participated in it, they had contributed to tor’s version of its origins, realpolitik fea- the unprecedented death and destruction of tured heavily in their explanations. the Great War. Sir Charles Waldstein, an Anglo-American First Wilsonianism, and later the academic with extensive experience of construction of the League of Nations, were Germany, reiterated the common view conceived as an antidote to the realpolitik that it had been part of the poisoning of that had seeped into international affairs German philosophy and political culture in in the years before 1914. Realpolitik was to the years preceding the war: “Real-Politik remain a dirty word in the Anglo-American and Interressen-Politik were constantly in world in the interwar years. the mouths of its leaders, from the Kaiser down to the political stump-speaker.” Even he second way Central European re- the British foreign secretary, Arthur Balfour, T alism—and realpolitik more specifi- stated in 1918 that “Realpolitik . . . has cally—seeped into Western political con- been the true and dominating doctrine of sciousness was through the wave of German every important German statesman, emigrant intellectuals who arrived in Amer- German soldier, and German thinker for ica before and after the Second World War. two generations at least.” This brought a raft of uniquely talented

The Real Origins of Realpolitik March/April 2014 47 historians and theologians such as Reinhold of realpolitik.” In 1952, he was attacked Niebuhr, Hans Morgenthau, Fritz Kraemer, by the Austrian American theorist Frank Felix Gilbert and Henry Kissinger. In addi- Tannenbaum, who stated that “the tion, the Dutch American Nicholas J. Spyk- advocates of Realpolitik would sweep away man, who taught at Yale, made an impor- all of our old beliefs as foolish, sentimental, tant contribution to the establishment of and moralistic.” Carl J. Friedrich, another classical realist thought in postwar America. émigré and a theorist of totalitarianism, By the outbreak of the Second World called Morgenthau’s book “an American War, realpolitik was sufficiently established version of the German Realpolitik.” in the American political lexicon to no Even by the time Morgenthau expanded longer need elaborate definition. It had his views in 1960 in The Purpose of crept into discussions about Hollywood in American Politics, which he defined as the 1930s, as some called for an “awakened “the achievement of freedom,” yet another sense of Realpolitik” in the movie industry émigré, the Marxist intellectual Herbert as a corrective to the “sugar-coated” Marcuse, wrote to him asking what “might endings that contributed to the decline have driven the theorist of Realpolitik to of cinema audiences in the period of the transcend Realpolitik.” Great Depression. In 1940, the journal Typically, it was President Obama’s American Speech included it in a list of loan favorite philosopher, Reinhold Niebuhr, words from Germany that had become who in 1944 came closest to finding a increasingly prevalent in the American press happy medium between what he called in the preceding years, alongside some other “the most rarified heights of constitutional unfortunate imports: Reich, gestapo and idealism” and “the depths of realpolitik.” putsch. For the most part, however, anything As those who had been trained in the way resembling traditional German raison d’état of German realism recognized, it was not a was seized upon by the critics of the realist word with which one would typically want school as the most recent incarnation of to associate oneself in this period. Despite realpolitik. Leo Strauss, another German the fact that they were entirely cognizant émigré, was perhaps the most vigilant of the Mitteleuropean origins of realpolitik, of all, comparing Machiavelli, whom he the German émigrés generally steered clear believed had lowered men’s sights, to the of using the term. “teacher of evil.” In The Road to Serfdom, In his 1951 In Defense of the National Friedrich Hayek wrote that if the West Interest, for example, Hans Morgenthau were to convince Germans that there was largely concealed the German influences an alternative to Nazism, it would “not in his thought and emphasized an English- be by concessions to their system of language canon of realist thinking, which thought.” According to him, “We shall not included the Federalist Papers and Lord delude them with a stale reproduction of Castlereagh’s work as British foreign the ideas of their fathers which we have secretary at the time of the Congress of borrowed from them—be it state socialism, Vienna. Realpolitik, ‘scientific’ planning, or Morgenthau’s critics recognized the corporativism.” sleight of hand. A review in the Economist The label was hard to shake. “The declared his book to be the latest addition advocates of a realist foreign policy to the now “considerable American are caricatured with the German term library of sermons based on the theology Realpolitik,” noted Kissinger many years

48 The National Interest The Real Origins of Realpolitik later, “I suppose to facilitate the choosing to dominate the international-relations of sides.” field. But it is realism that holds the oldest pedigree and attracts the most ire. he Cold War—and perhaps above The Frontline Diplomacy archive T all, the association with Kissinger— demonstrates that usage of realpolitik peaked breathed new life into realpolitik and meant in the 1970s in the Nixon-Carter era. that the term outlasted the vituperative de- About half of diplomats viewed it positively, bates of the 1940s and 1950s. To this day, and about half used it unfavorably, as the word also enjoys a unique position in something with which they preferred not contemporary political discourse in that to be associated. By the 1990s and with it is one of the few terms in international- the fall of the Soviet Union, perspectives relations theory that practitioners and dip- were changing. In 1991, at the end of the lomats both recognize and use. Gulf War, a provocative editorial in the Wall In the Frontline Diplomacy archive at Street Journal suggested that the power of the Library of Congress, which contains twenty-four-hour news television presented transcripts of 1,743 interviews with senior a serious challenge to traditional notions American diplomats from the postwar era of realpolitik. “We recognize that there to the present day, the word realpolitik are significant dangers in trying to create appears in fifty-seven of those interviews, a foreign policy that must incorporate the often with expansive expositions as to what imperatives of national interest, a common it means to the interviewee. national morality and the information In truth, in contemporary usage, stream of global communications,” it noted, realpolitik has become interchangeable with “realism” or “realistic.” Simply speaking, it denotes an unflinching and nonideological approach to statecraft and the primacy of the raison d’état. It involves an intuitive suspicion of grandstanding and moralizing on the international stage. In theory, it most closely resembles Morgenthau’s contention that a nation could not “escape . . . into a realm where action is guided by moral principles rather than by considerations of power.” More recent versions of this creed include the neorealist theories advanced by the prominent political scientist Kenneth Waltz, who died recently. Weighty disputes between the champions of liberal institutionalism, rational- choice theory and realism continue

The Real Origins of Realpolitik March/April 2014 49 Much of what masquerades as modern realpolitik has strayed quite far from the original essence of the term.

but “Realpolitik is not so readily separated eyes and retreats to its own set of tropes and from national values, from a country’s doctrines. common idea of itself.” Realpolitik does “not entail the But in its journey from 1853 to the renunciation of individual judgement and modern day, it has been purged of much it requires least of all an uncritical kind of its original meaning. It has become a of submission,” he wrote. It was more label or a badge of identification. In that “appropriate to think of it as a mere sense, the hand-wringing about realpolitik measuring and weighing and calculating of is, as much as anything, part of an internal facts that need to be processed politically.” monologue in Western liberalism rather Above all, it was not a strategy itself, but than a fully developed view of world affairs. a way of thinking: an “enemy of . . . self- For both its critics and its advocates, it is delusion” and “the misguided pride which used to denote a philosophical disposition— characterises the human mind.” an instinct or an inclination—rather than What Rochau was attempting to a hardheaded way of analyzing political articulate was not a philosophical position circumstances on a case-by-case basis. but a new way of understanding politics President Obama’s imaginative use and the distribution of power. “Experience of Reinhold Niebuhr’s work—the subtle has shown that treating it along abstract- strains of which crept into his Nobel Peace scientific lines, or on the basis of principles Prize speech in 2009—to explain his liberal is hardly useful,” he wrote. One had to realism does not, in that sense, represent contend “with the historical product, the true spirit of realpolitik. It is, like much accepting it as it is, with an eye for its before it, an attempt to square the circle— strengths and weaknesses, and to remain to articulate an intellectually coherent otherwise unconcerned with its origins and worldview. Like much of the scholarly the reasons for its particular characteristics.” practice of international relations, this is Here, once again, his work is distinct theology rather than realpolitik. from the Renaissance statecraft of Machiavelli because of its attempt to hat, then, would Rochau have made incorporate the conditions of modernity W of all this? Going back to his original into his analysis. Sovereignty was not the definition, it appears that much of what natural property of God, the king, the masquerades as modern realpolitik has people or the aristocracy. It was simply a strayed quite far from the original essence reflection of the balance of different societal of the term. forces. The best forms of government were The first thing to note is that he was an those that mediated between them most enemy of lazy thinking. He would have effectively; for this observation Rochau was been unimpressed with those versions of indebted to the Scottish Enlightenment, realism that resemble a knee-jerk reaction Edmund Burke and the French social that responds to idealism with a roll of the theorist Charles Fourier. In the race among

50 The National Interest The Real Origins of Realpolitik nations, the most successful state would fleeting and unfocused. From this starting be the one that harnessed the energies and point, however, the more “consolidated it industry of its most productive classes to becomes, and the more it transforms itself the cause of the nation. By this he chiefly into a firm conviction, the more important meant the middle classes, by virtue of their it becomes for the state.” The most “education, wealth, entrepreneurial spirit, important expression of public opinion and appetite for work.” In the Renaissance was “Volksglaube” (popular belief), which era it had been easier to suppress new should always be treated with “care and societal forces that challenged the authority protection, not blandishment.” of the state, but the “increased mobility of While the popular belief was the highest the more recent centuries” had made this “peak” of popular opinion, the zeitgeist impossible. At the same time, however, modernity also presented social and political forces— such as sectarianism or ignorance—which also had to be taken into account. A true realpolitiker could not ignore “those latent forces of habit, tradition and sluggishness” such as “poverty, lack of knowledge, and prejudice” and even “immorality.” Here again, modernity intervened. The “great masses,” too, which “formerly appeared only in exceptional situations in the political arena,” were now an established fact of political life. Above all, however, in a lesson that modern realists often miss, Rochau refused to dismiss the power of ideas and ideology. “Things like bourgeois class consciousness, the idea of freedom, nationalism, the idea of human equality are completely new factors of social life for many of today’s states,” he wrote, and good policy should not “deny these forces the appropriate recognition.” Such manifestations of “public opinion,” as Rochau called it, “can be potentially very influential and a force that was its broadest foundation and a central even oriental despotism has to bow to.” component of realpolitik. The zeitgeist Indeed, it was as a theorist of public amounted to the “consolidated opinion opinion that Rochau was perhaps at his of the century as expressed in certain most original. He painstakingly laid out principles, opinions and habits of reason.” different gradations of it, in ascending An opinion transformed itself into the order of importance. In the first instance, zeitgeist to the extent that it stood the test he believed that the “feeble self-conscious of time. And the zeitgeist represented “in all opinion of the day is not entitled to claim circumstances the most important influence political consideration,” as it was merely on the overall direction of politics.” For a

The Real Origins of Realpolitik March/April 2014 51 state to “enforce its own aims in defiance of which the human soul renders homage,” the zeitgeist” was to court serious trouble. he wrote. The political importance of Realpolitik, therefore, was much more ideas was not dependent on how rational than raison d’état. In fact, Rochau made or noble they were. On the one hand, it this distinction clear: “Statecraft, as its was common that “the most beautiful name suggests, is nothing more than the ideal that enthuses noble souls is a political art of success, applied to the specific ends of nullity.” When it came to “phantasms” like the state.” “eternal peace,” international fraternity and Realpolitik was about the art of politics equality, with “no will and no force” behind in the post-Enlightenment world. He wrote them, “Realpolitik passes by shrugging its in an age of mass ideological awakening, shoulders.” On the other hand, he noted— economic transformation, social upheaval casting his eyes to the socialist movement and international rivalry. The job of emerging in Germany at the time—“the statesmen was not to remain studiously craziest chimera may become a very serious aloof from these forces but rather to realpolitical matter.” manage and mediate them. For Rochau, “Formless ideas, impulses, emotional too, patriotism and nationalism were not surges, melodic slogans, naively accepted delusions and distractions from raison d’état catchwords . . . [and] habitual self- but one of its most effective tools. A shared delusions”—these were the targets that sense of national purpose was a “natural Rochau had in mind when he published conciliatory force” between conflicting The Principles of Realpolitik in 1853. By parties within a state. This was why “human the time he wrote the second volume of judgement has been very firm regarding his book fifteen years later, however, he the view that it is the utmost sacrilege to had already recognized that the word question the national spirit (Nationalgeist), he had coined had taken on a life of its the last and most valuable guarantee of own: liberals condemned it out of hand; the natural order of society.” Any policies conservatives adopted it without actually designed to break this spirit, or ignore it, understanding what it meant. Looking “thereby descend to the lowest ranks of at the way realpolitik has been used since despicability.” that time, one can see that old habits die Most importantly, Rochau was a critic hard. For some the word has become a of utopianism, not idealism. As befitted a synonym for evil; for others it has been an man of the Enlightenment, he understood accoutrement of sophistication. “I reject that ideology played the “role of a harbinger at this occasion the criticism which has and trailblazer of events.” “Realpolitik been levelled at the title of my book from would contradict itself if it were to deny different directions,” Rochau wrote, with a the rights of the intellect, of ideas, of hint of exhaustion, “if not so much against religion or any other of the moral forces to the content itself.” n

52 The National Interest The Real Origins of Realpolitik Frack to the Future

By Leonardo Maugeri

he world has been caught by sur- rise of oil supply, and the inner volatility prise by the United States’ shale-oil of oil prices due to temporary outages Tboom. Analysts and experts are still and political crises—provide a somewhat clashing about both its true extent and the contradictory picture of the global oil possibility of extending a shale revolution market. These contradictions may, in turn, beyond North America. In just a few years trigger unexpected changes in the direction shale oil could make the United States the of the oil market. All of these changes world’s top oil producer. But a shale revolu- may have deep and sometimes paradoxical tion is unlikely in the rest of the world, due consequences for U.S. energy security. to some unique factors that characterize the U.S. oil and gas patch. The single-minded here are several issues in the current focus on the future of shale oil, however, T debate over the boom in so-called U.S. risks obscuring another evolving dimension tight and shale oil (hereafter referred to as of the global oil picture that defies the past shale oil) that serve to reinforce extreme pessimism spread by peak-oil theorists who and seemingly irreconcilable attitudes. One claimed that shortages loomed: beyond the of the central questions revolves around United States, the world’s oil-production the real potential of this boom and can be capacity is also growing much faster than formulated simply as follows: Is oil produc- demand. tion from shale formations just a temporary So far, this imbalance has been offset bubble, or is it capable of significantly alter- by two things: continuous outages of ing the U.S.—and possibly global—energy existing oil supply affecting several Arab outlook? To answer this question, I studied and African countries, and the recurring more than four thousand shale wells, along fears of escalating crises in the Middle East. with the activities of about one hundred oil But supply capacity is bound to grow in companies involved in shale-oil exploita- the future as well, so that unless demand tion. The main results of this analysis are rebounds strongly in the next few years, a multifaceted. On the one hand, the large re- significant downturn of oil prices may well source size and the ability of the industry to occur. The connections among a number develop it through steady improvements in of factors—the U.S. shale boom, the global technology and cost suggest that the United States may become the largest global oil Leonardo Maugeri is a senior associate at the producer in just a few years, and maintain Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for a high output for many years to come. The Science and International Affairs and chairman of U.S. shale-oil boom is thus not a temporary Ironbark Investments llc. He was formerly a top bubble but a long-term, transformational manager of the Italian oil and gas company Eni. phenomenon.

Frack to the Future March/April 2014 53 The U.S. shale-oil boom is not a temporary bubble but a long-term, transformational phenomenon.

However, the unique characteristics Among the fourteen main oil-producing of shale oil—the drilling intensity in states or areas of the United States, so far particular—make it vulnerable to both nine have already witnessed a reverse of price drops and environmental opposition their declining oil production. What’s more, in new and populated areas. What’s more, the relative decline in the Gulf of Mexico shale development benefits from some is just a result of postponed development specific factors that are especially present in following the Deepwater Horizon incident the United States but not worldwide, and in 2010. Yet the driving force behind the that makes the global extension of a shale U.S. oil boom—namely, its huge shale-oil boom unlikely, at least in this decade. Even potential—depends crucially on the U.S. with a steady decline of crude-oil prices (for oil industry’s ability to bring on line an example, from $85 per barrel in 2013 to astonishing number of wells each year. In $65 per barrel in 2017), the United States fact, the extremely low porosity of shale could be producing 5 million barrels per day reservoir rocks limits the recoverability (mbd) of shale oil by 2017. With the present of oil from one single well. On average, output of 1.5 mbd, that would more than each loses 50 percent of its output after triple the current production. More than 90 twelve months of activity; by the end of percent of such production will come from the fifth year of production, output almost just three large shale-oil formations: Bakken- stabilizes around 8–10 percent of initial Three Forks (North Dakota), Eagle Ford production. To offset this dramatic decline (Texas) and Permian Basin (Texas). Together in production, an oil company must thus with a relatively resilient production of drill an ever-increasing number of wells. conventional oil, an increasing production For example, in December 2012 it of natural-gas liquids (ngls) and a steady was necessary to bring ninety new wells output of biofuels (ngls and biofuels are on stream each month to maintain the considered part of the overall oil production production rate at Bakken-Three Forks (so in most statistical sources), the United States far, the largest shale-oil play in the United could become the leading oil producer in the States)—770,000 barrels per day. But as world by the end of 2017, with an overall production grows in North Dakota, the oil production of about 16 mbd and a sheer number of producing wells also must grow crude-oil production of 10.4 mbd. exponentially. Given the current state of Reinforcing this prospect is the resilience knowledge and technology, the growth of of U.S. conventional-oil production, once shale-oil production is based on a “drill deemed bound to decline irreversibly. In or die” logic that is not that easy to apply fact, thanks to the extensive application of elsewhere. The large and less populated advanced technology to mature and once- areas of North Dakota and Texas are declining oil fields, U.S. conventional- capable of sustaining such ever-increasing oil production is also doing better than drilling intensity for many years to come— generally expected. to over one hundred thousand active shale-

54 The National Interest Frack to the Future oil wells, compared to around ten thousand to date. This relies on an approach called “down spacing,” which means increasing the density of wells within an area. Oil companies are realizing that it is possible to drill more wells in the same area without provoking a negative interference between one well and another. Nevertheless, the “drill or die” logic will probably represent a major obstacle to the expansion of drilling rigs (compared to 180 in North shale activity even in most areas of the Dakota alone), and only one-third of them United States that—unlike Texas, North are capable of doing horizontal drilling. Dakota and a bunch of additional And it’s not only a problem of drilling rigs. states—are densely populated, and have Shale activity also requires highly specialized neither vast territories nor a long history tools and people that are in short supply in of drilling intensity. In fact, in the eye the world—and all this also requires years of public opinion and local residents, to be built up. Moreover, no other country drilling intensity will likely emphasize the has ever experienced the drilling intensity environmental problems associated with that has always characterized America’s oil shale activity, triggering in several states a and gas history. vigorous opposition to the expansion of In 2012, the United States completed such activities. 45,468 oil and gas wells (and brought 28,354 of them on line). Excluding hile drilling intensity may prove a Canada, the rest of the world completed W limiting factor in expanding shale only 3,921 wells, and brought only a activity in the United States outside of fraction of them on line. To my knowledge, its core areas, it will likely prove an in- Saudi Arabia brings on line no more than surmountable obstacle for the rest of the two hundred wells per year. Other factors world—for several reasons. First, the United will contribute to prevent the development States holds more than 60 percent of the of shale resources in the rest of the world. world’s drilling rigs, and 95 percent of these One is the absence of private mineral rights are capable of performing horizontal drill- in most countries. In the United States, ing that, together with hydraulic fractur- landowners also own the resources under ing (fracking), is crucial to unlocking shale the ground—and have a very strong production. No other country or area in the incentive to lease those rights; in the rest of world has even a fraction of such “drilling the world, such resources usually belong to power,” which takes several years to build the state, so that landowners often receive up. For example, all across Europe (exclud- nothing from drilling on their lands apart ing Russia) there are no more than 130 from the damage created by such activity.

Frack to the Future March/April 2014 55 Also absent outside North America are on an increase of its domestic crude-oil independent oil companies with a guerrilla- production, but also on energy-efficiency like mind-set, a crucial aspect of the U.S. measures that could curtail crude-oil boom. Until now, the development of consumption. Together with a structural shale resources has not proved to be Big shift in consumers’ behavior, the latter has Oil’s strength—since shale oil requires already played a role in reducing American companies capable of operating on a small addiction to oil—and that occurred well scale, pursuing a number of objectives and before the economic crisis erupted in 2008. leveraging short-term opportunities. Only The yearly total vehicles-miles traveled by the United States (and partly Canada) the American people peaked in 2006 at 3.1 possesses a plethora of such aggressive billion, and is now down to less than 2.9 companies. It is no accident that they have billion. On a per capita basis, the mileage been, and still are, the avatars of the shale peak was reached in 2004 at around ten revolution. Finally, we don’t even know thousand miles per year and then dropped with any reasonable accuracy either the real to the current 9,100 miles annually. Nor is size of the shale formations in the world or this all. Americans are not only consuming the cost associated with their development. less, but they are also consuming better— Indeed, the geology of the United States choosing smaller, more efficient vehicles is by far the best known, explored and or alternative modes of transportation, assessed with respect to any other country. whereas many among the younger seem to As a consequence, global shale deposits have turned their backs to cultural patterns outside North America are still just a matter which regarded the car as the embodiment of pure speculation. of emancipation. In short, it’s no longer a caddy for daddy. The change is evident uge as it may be, U.S. crude-pro- both in the urban landscapes—which are H duction potential is still insufficient now punctuated by a large number of to allow for the much-sought-after goal midsize cars once abhorred by consumers— of U.S. crude-oil independence—the only and in the numbers: according to the missing point in the overall equation of University of Michigan Transportation U.S. energy independence. America is al- Research Institute, in 2013 the average fuel ready largely self-sufficient in terms of all efficiency of passenger cars and light trucks other primary-energy sources (coal, nuclear, sold in the United States was close to 24.8 natural gas, ngls, etc.), while it still im- miles per gallon, up from 20.1 in October ports about half of its daily consumption of 2007. crude oil, which is now a little more than Although it’s highly probable that 15 mbd. True, imports have plummeted demand for oil has already peaked in the steadily from their peak in 2007 (when they United States, as it did in Europe in the outpaced 10 mbd), and they will continue mid-1990s, and will follow a pattern of to decline in the next few years. However, secular decline, the economic recovery even in the most favorable scenario out- will surely be accompanied by a rebound lined above, 25 percent of U.S. crude-oil in consumption of both cars and oil—a requirements will have to be imported in phenomenon that is already showing up. the future. This, in turn, could reduce American This implies that if the United States energy security. That’s why a sound wants to target the highest degree of approach to energy security cannot look oil security, it should rely not only just to supply, but also to consumption.

56 The National Interest Frack to the Future Whatever the degree of energy security and independence the United States can achieve through the shale revolution, it will always be inextricably linked to what happens across the global oil market.

What’s more, in terms of security it’s likely also endanger its own oil boom. The latter that a lower rate of U.S. crude-oil imports possibility involves a careful consideration would have paradoxical consequences for of both global oil-production capacity and U.S. energy security. In fact, among the demand, as well as the price of oil. most endangered foreign sources of supply would be countries traditionally considered he continuation of the current U.S. to be “safe.” The most important of these is T oil boom will require, at least in the Canada, because it relies almost completely next few years, adequately high prices of on the U.S. market as an export outlet for oil that, in turn, would allow for escalat- its oil. ing shale activity. Such a scenario, however, A shrinking U.S. market implies a cannot be taken for granted because, almost short- and medium-term blow to the unnoticed, the world too is facing a produc- development of the massive potential of tion boom. By December 2013, actual oil Canadian oil sands that currently have no production reached almost 93.5 mbd. On alternative markets. This also explains why top of this, there were more than 2.5 mbd the construction of additional pipelines that couldn’t be produced or marketed ei- to the United States—such as the highly ther because of different kind of disruptions debated Keystone XL—is key for Canada (mainly due to political tensions, strikes or if it wants to expand its oil production. accidents in countries such as Libya, Egypt, To a lesser extent, lower U.S. crude-oil Nigeria and Sudan), or because of interna- imports will pose challenges for Venezuela tional sanctions against Iran. What’s more, and Mexico: along with Canada, these there were 3 mbd of voluntarily shut-in “safe” oil exporters to the United States production—what the oil-industry jargon will need to secure new, reliable markets calls “spare capacity”—mostly concentrated and partners for their crude in the future in Saudi Arabia.1 When actual production, so as not to be overly dependent (as in the supply disruptions and spare capacity are past) on the shrinking U.S. oil market. This combined, the world seems to possess a po- potential shift will represent an opportunity tential oil-production capacity in excess of for U.S. energy competitors like China, 99 mbd—also an all-time record. and it will make the United States a bit more vulnerable in the future to an oil 1 Spare capacity is defined as the difference between crisis because it will no longer be able to the total oil-production capacity (usually within a count on the Western Hemisphere’s oil as country, or the world) that can be reached within its almost-exclusive domain. Finally, even thirty days—and sustained for ninety days—and the highest degree of oil independence the actual production. Generally, it’s voluntarily will not insulate the United States from shut in by a country (or group of countries) either the global oil market. To the contrary, any to avoid depressing the oil price, or to preserve a major event concerning the world’s oil will cushion of additional production to be used in case always affect the United States and could of a major market crisis.

Frack to the Future March/April 2014 57 Conversely, oil demand is growing The impact of these investments on new sluggishly, as a consequence of the troubled production capacity could be particularly global economic situation, the slowdown in acute by 2015. In particular, if the United China, India and other emerging economies, States, Iraq, Canada, Brazil and Venezuela the unsolved problems of the euro zone and could deploy their full oil potential, the impact of energy-efficiency legislation supported by investments already under across the world. Due to all these factors, way, global oil-production capacity could according to the International Energy reach 110 mbd by 2020. This evolution Agency world oil demand was just 91.2 could be helped by a lower decline rate mbd in 2013 on average, meaning that by in aging oil fields, whose maturity is now December of last year almost 8 mbd of oil contrasted by means of either massive formed stocks or simply were not produced redevelopment plans (such as in the case or marketed. This imbalance is not only of Iraq), or by the application of more big, but it’s also growing, as a consequence advanced production technology. In of a bullish investment cycle in global addition, the world’s current production leaders, Russia and Saudi Arabia, are continuing to increase their production capacity—defying the dire predictions of most pundits, who deemed those countries destined to face an irreversible decline of their oil output. For over a decade, year after year, most experts have been predicting an immediate decline of Russian output. However, the country’s oil production has continued to rise, and it’s now at around 10.6 mbd, with the potential to grow more if the fiscal system is modified to incentivize the redevelopment of mature oil fields. As for Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom has been a preferred target of oil doomsters since the 1980s, when it was first accused of manipulating the exploration and production that started real extent of its oil reserves. Since then, in 2003 and dramatically escalated from according to the “peak oil” theorists, the 2010 onward. High oil prices, the need of country should have been producing less most companies and countries to replace and less. This bogus perception earned a their reserves, and the extensive application revival in the middle of the last decade, of new technologies to oil recovery are the when Matt Simmons’s book Twilight in major factors driving this unprecedented the Desert recast doubts on the Kingdom’s spending spree that in just four years has effective oil potential, predicting a sudden totaled almost $2.4 trillion in upstream fall of its production. By the time of investments. Simmons’s book, however, Saudi Arabia

58 The National Interest Frack to the Future announced a plan to expand its oil- the Organization of Petroleum Exporting production capacity by about 2 mbd— Countries (opec) has been relying on two or the equivalent of Brazil’s production pillars: first, Saudi Arabia’s willingness not today—in just four years, and in late 2009 to inundate the market with its full produc- it reached its target. tion capacity, which is obliging the King- Furthermore, last year the Kingdom dom to preserve a spare capacity of at least brought on line another big oil field, 2.5 mbd; and second, Iran’s inability to ex- Manifa, which in 2014 will reach its full port a sizable amount of its oil-production production at nine hundred thousand potential—more than 1 mbd—due to in- barrels per day. Then, by 2017, Saudi ternational sanctions. In the coming years, Arabia plans to add another 550,000 however, opec’s ability to manage growing barrels per day by expanding the capacity global oil supplies will continue to decline, of two additional oil fields, Khurais and due to an Iraq struggling to become one of Shaybah. Apparently, this expansion the world’s top producers, African coun- should not add new net capacity to the tries looking for new outlets for their oil, country’s potential, because the Kingdom’s the great potential of the United States, decision makers want to relax older Canada and other countries—and an oil fields’ production as the fresh capacity demand still stagnating due to a global comes on. If this is the case, Saudi Arabia economic crisis that shows little prospect of will just preserve its current production improvement. capacity of about 12.3 mbd (including What’s more, the recent interim the output from the “neutral zone” shared agreement between Iran and the group of with Kuwait), the largest in the world. countries—including the United States— As a consequence of the upward trend in that are negotiating a solution to the long- global oil production, unless a substantial debated Iranian nuclear program is now rebound of oil consumption takes place raising the prospect of the full return of across the world in the next few years, the Iran’s oil production to the international gap between global oil supply capacity and markets, perhaps as soon as the second half demand will widen. This phenomenon may of 2014. All these elements will likely put not affect oil prices so long as new political opec under stress in the next few years, and crises scare market operators and threaten Saudi Arabia in particular. Due to its spare the stability of the entire Middle East. capacity, the Kingdom remains the central But the basic truth remains: in the long bank of the world’s oil market, and holds term, a growing imbalance between supply the capability to stabilize or destabilize it. capacity and consumption will turn into Faced with an effective oil-production surge a prerequisite for a collapse of oil prices. from opec’s countries that hold the highest Because the full development of shale oil potential to grow, namely Iraq and Iran, in the United States requires an oil price and an overall rise of global oil production, higher than $80 per barrel in the short Saudi Arabia will have to consider two term, and higher than $65 per barrel in the opposite policy options. longer term (five years), the above scenario On the one hand, it could opt to act could have a dramatic impact on the U.S. as the world’s swing producer, reducing oil boom. its output dramatically to make room for others’ in an attempt to support oil prices, n order to manage the growing imbal- as the Kingdom did in the early 1980s. I ance between supply and demand, so far But if such a reduction became an endless

Frack to the Future March/April 2014 59 retreat, the Saudi government could also These scenarios show that it would be a consider producing at full capacity to get mistake for the United States to confuse rid of more expensive oil producers and notions about energy security and energy oblige other opec members to taper their independence and, above all, to envisage own output, as it did in 1986. In this case, the possibility of abandoning its historical a mild version of the 1986 oil-price collapse involvement in Persian Gulf affairs, not to could not be ruled out, and that would put mention turning its back on Canada and in danger both U.S. shale oil and the more other secure oil suppliers. Whatever the expensive Canadian oil sands. The final degree of energy security and independence result would be highly detrimental to U.S. the United States can achieve through energy security. the shale revolution, it will always be This is not the only Persian Gulf scenario inextricably linked to what happens across that may negatively affect the United States. the global oil market, and particularly in Needless to say, if a major political crisis the Persian Gulf. This is also true when endangers the oil production of Saudi it comes to the evolution of its relations Arabia or another big oil producer in the with suppliers of oil such as Canada. Shale short term, oil prices would skyrocket, oil may bring more energy security to the no matter how much oil America could United States, but it cannot bring energy produce. This could be good for U.S. shale independence. Thinking otherwise can only but awful for the U.S. and world economy. lead to a rude reawakening. n

60 The National Interest Frack to the Future Low-Tech Terrorism

By Bruce Hoffman

mong the more prescient analyses of indisputably captured the gist of that the terrorist threats that the United prophetic assertion. A States would face in the twen- The report was also remarkably accurate ty-first century was a report published in in anticipating the terrorist organizational September 1999 by the U.S. Commis- structures that would come to dominate sion on National Security/21st Century, the first dozen or so years of the new better known as the Hart-Rudman com- century. “Future terrorists will probably mission. Named after its cochairs, former be even less hierarchically organized, and senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman, yet better net-worked, than they are today. and evocatively titled New World Coming, Their diffuse nature will make them more it correctly predicted that mass-casualty ter- anonymous, yet their ability to coordinate rorism would emerge as one of America’s mass effects on a global basis will increase,” preeminent security concerns in the next the commission argued. Its vision of the century. “Already,” the report’s first page motivations that would animate and lamented, “the traditional functions of law, subsequently fuel this violence was similarly police work, and military power have begun revelatory. “The growing resentment against to blur before our eyes as new threats arise.” Western culture and values in some parts It added, “Notable among these new threats of the world,” along with “the fact that is the prospect of an attack on U.S. cities by others often perceive the United States as independent or state-supported terrorists exercising its power with arrogance and using weapons of mass destruction.” self-absorption,” was already “breeding a Although hijacked commercial backlash” that would both continue and aircraft deliberately flown into high-rise likely evolve into new and more insidious buildings were not the weapons of mass forms, the report asserted. destruction that the commission had in Some of the commission’s other mind, the catastrophic effects that this visionary conclusions now read like a tactic achieved—obliterating New York retrospective summary of the past decade. City’s World Trade Center, slicing through “The United States will be called upon several of the Pentagon’s concentric rings frequently to intervene militarily in a time and killing nearly three thousand people— of uncertain alliances,” says one, while another disconsolately warns that “even Bruce Hoffman is a contributing editor to The excellent intelligence will not prevent all National Interest, a senior fellow at the U.S. surprises.” Today’s tragic events in Syria Military Academy’s Combating Terrorism Center, were also anticipated by one statement and a professor and director of the Center for that addressed the growing likelihood Security Studies at Georgetown University. of foreign crises “replete with atrocities

Low-Tech Terrorism March/April 2014 61 and the deliberate terrorizing of civilian killed more than a hundred people, and populations.” until September 11 no terrorist operation Fortunately, the report’s most breathless had ever killed more than five hundred prediction concerning the likelihood of people in a single attack. Viewed from an- terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction other perspective, more than twice as many (wmd) has not come to pass. But this is not Americans perished within those excruciat- for want of terrorists trying to obtain such ing 102 minutes than had been killed by capabilities. Indeed, prior to the October terrorists since 1968—the year widely ac- 2001 U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan, Al cepted as marking the advent of modern, Qaeda had embarked upon an ambitious international terrorism. quest to acquire and develop an array of So massive and consequential a terrorist such weapons that, had it been successful, onslaught naturally gave rise to fears that a would have altered to an unimaginable profound threshold in terrorist constraint extent our most basic conceptions about and lethality had been crossed. Renewed national security and rendered moot fears and concerns were in turn generated debates over whether terrorism posed a that terrorists would now embrace an potentially existential threat. array of deadly nonconventional weapons But just how effective have terrorist in order to inflict even greater levels of efforts to acquire and use weapons of death and destruction than had occurred mass destruction actually been? The that day. Attention focused specifically September 11, 2001, attacks were widely on terrorist use of wmd, and the so- noted for their reliance on relatively low- called Cheney Doctrine emerged to shape tech weaponry—the conversion, in effect, America’s national-security strategy. The of airplanes into missiles by using raw doctrine derived from former vice president physical muscle and box cutters to hijack Dick Cheney’s reported statement that “if them. Since then, efforts to gain access to there’s a one percent chance that Pakistani wmd have been unceasing. But examining scientists are helping Al Qaeda build or those efforts results in some surprising develop a nuclear weapon, we have to treat conclusions. While there is no cause for it as a certainty in terms of our response.” complacency, they do suggest that terrorists What the “one percent doctrine” meant in face some inherent constraints that will be practice, according to one observer, was that difficult for them to overcome. It is easier “even if there’s just a one percent chance to proclaim the threat of mass terror than to of the unimaginable coming due, act as if perpetrate it. it’s a certainty.” Countering the threat of nonconventional-weapons proliferation— he terrorist attacks on September 11 whether by rogue states arrayed in an “axis T completely recast global perceptions of evil” or by terrorists who might acquire of threat and vulnerability. Long-standing such weapons from those same states or assumptions that terrorists were more inter- otherwise develop them on their own—thus ested in publicity than in killing were dra- became one of the central pillars of the matically swept aside in the rising crescendo Bush administration’s time in office. of death and destruction. The butcher’s bill In the case of Al Qaeda, at least, these that morning was without parallel in the fears were more than amply justified. That annals of modern terrorism. Throughout group’s interest in acquiring a nuclear the entirety of the twentieth century no weapon reportedly commenced as long more than fourteen terrorist incidents had ago as 1992—a mere four years after its

62 The National Interest Low-Tech Terrorism creation. An attempt by an Al Qaeda agent claimed that bin Laden’s foremost interest to purchase uranium from South Africa was in developing a nuclear weapon. was made either late the following year or The movement’s efforts in the early in 1994 without success. Osama bin biological-warfare realm, however, were Laden’s efforts to obtain nuclear material far more advanced and appear to have nonetheless continued, as evidenced by the arrest in Germany in 1998 of a trusted senior aide named Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, who was attempting to purchase enriched uranium. And that same year, the Al Qaeda leader issued a proclamation in the name of the “International Islamic Front for Fighting the Jews and Crusaders.” Titled “The Nuclear Bomb of Islam,” the proclamation declared that “it is the duty of Muslims to prepare begun in earnest with a memo written as much force as possible to terrorize the by al-Zawahiri on April 15, 1999, to enemies of God.” When asked several Muhammad Atef, then deputy commander months later by a Pakistani journalist of Al Qaeda’s military committee. Citing whether Al Qaeda was “in a position to articles published in Science, the Journal of develop chemical weapons and try to Immunology and the New England Journal purchase nuclear material for weapons,” bin of Medicine, as well as information gleaned Laden replied: “I would say that acquiring from authoritative books such as Tomorrow’s weapons for the defense of Muslims is a Weapons, Peace or Pestilence and Chemical religious duty.” Warfare, al-Zawahiri outlined in detail his Bin Laden’s continued interest in thoughts on the priority to be given to nuclear weaponry was also on display at developing a biological-weapons capability. the time of the September 11 attacks. One of the specialists recruited for this Two Pakistani nuclear scientists named purpose was a U.S.-trained Malaysian Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood and Abdul microbiologist named Yazid Sufaat. A Majeed spent three days that August at former captain in the Malaysian army, a secret Al Qaeda facility outside Kabul. Sufaat graduated from the California Although their discussions with bin Laden, State University in 1987 with a degree his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri and other in biological sciences. He later joined Al senior Al Qaeda officials also focused on the Gamaa al-Islamiyya (the “Islamic Group”), development and employment of chemical an Al Qaeda affiliate operating in Southeast and biological weapons, Mahmood— Asia, and worked closely with its military the former director for nuclear power at operations chief, Riduan Isamuddin, better Pakistan’s Atomic Energy Commission— known as Hambali, and with Hambali’s

Low-Tech Terrorism March/April 2014 63 As mesmerizingly attractive as nonconventional weapons remain to Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations, they have mostly proven frustratingly disappointing to whoever has tried to use them.

own Al Qaeda handler, Khalid Sheikh British courts in 2004 and 2005 for the Mohammed—the infamous ksm, architect murder of a British police officer and of of the September 11 attacks. “conspiracy to commit a public nuisance In January 2000, Sufaat played host by the use of poisons or explosives.” The to two of the 9/11 hijackers, Khalid al- school’s director was an Egyptian named Midhar and Nawaf Alhazmi, who stayed Midhat Mursi—better known by his Al in his Kuala Lumpur condominium. Qaeda nom de guerre, Abu Kebab—and Later that year, Zacarias Moussaoui, the among its instructors were a Pakistani alleged “twentieth hijacker,” who was microbiologist and Sufaat. When U.S. sentenced in 2006 to life imprisonment military forces overran the camp in 2001, by a federal district court in Alexandria, evidence of the progress achieved in Virginia, also stayed with Sufaat. Under developing chemical weapons as diverse as ksm’s direction, Hambali and Sufaat set up hydrogen cyanide, chlorine and phosgene shop at an Al Qaeda camp in Kandahar, was discovered. Mursi himself was killed in Afghanistan, where their efforts focused on 2008 by a missile fired from a U.S. Predator the weaponization of anthrax. Although the drone. two made some progress, biowarfare experts Mursi’s death dealt another significant believe that on the eve of September 11 Al blow to Al Qaeda’s efforts to develop Qaeda was still at least two to three years nonconventional weapons—but it did not away from producing a sufficient quantity end them. In fact, as the aforementioned of anthrax to use as a weapon. senior U.S. intelligence officer recently Meanwhile, a separate team of Al commented, “Al Qaeda’s ongoing Qaeda operatives was engaged in a parallel procurement efforts have been well- research-and-development project to established for awhile now . . . They haven’t produce ricin and chemical-warfare agents been highlighted in the U.S. media, but at the movement’s Derunta camp, near that isn’t the same as it not happening.” the eastern Afghan city of Jalalabad. As In 2010, for instance, credible intelligence one senior U.S. intelligence officer who surfaced that Al Qaeda in the Arabian prefers to remain anonymous explained, Peninsula—widely considered the “Al Qaeda’s wmd efforts weren’t part of movement’s most dangerous and capable a single program but rather multiple affiliate—was deeply involved in the compartmentalized projects involving development of ricin, a bioweapon made multiple scientists in multiple locations.” from castor beans that the fbi has termed The Derunta facility reportedly included the third most toxic substance known, laboratories and a school that trained behind only plutonium and botulism. handpicked terrorists in the use of chemical Then, in May 2013, Turkish authorities and biological weapons. Among this select seized two kilograms of sarin nerve gas— group was Kamal Bourgass, an Algerian the same weapon used in the 1995 attack Al Qaeda operative who was convicted in on the Tokyo subway system—and arrested

64 The National Interest Low-Tech Terrorism twelve men linked to Al Qaeda’s Syrian than 1 percent (five thousand) of the six affiliate, Al Nusra Front. Days later, another hundred thousand Iranians who died in the set of sarin-related arrests was made in Iran-Iraq war. The Japanese cult Aum Shin- Iraq of Al Qaeda operatives based in that rikyo succeeded in killing no more than country who were separately overseeing the thirteen people in its attack on the Tokyo production of sarin and mustard blistering underground in 1995. And, five years earli- agents at two or more locations. er, no fatalities resulted from a Tamil Tigers Finally, Israel admitted in November assault on a Sri Lankan armed forces base 2013 that for the past three years it had in East Kiran that employed chlorine gas. been holding a senior Al Qaeda operative In fact, the wind changed and blew the gas whose expertise was in biological warfare. back into the Tigers’ lines, thus aborting the “The revelations over his alleged biological attack. weapons links,” one account noted of Biological weapons have proven similarly the operative’s detention, “come amid difficult to deploy effectively. Before and concerns that Al Qaeda affiliates in Syria are during World War II, the Imperial Japanese attempting to procure bioweapons—and Army carried out nearly a dozen attacks may already have done so.” using a variety of germ agents—including Indeed, Syria’s ongoing civil war and the cholera, dysentery, bubonic plague, anthrax prominent position of two key Al Qaeda and paratyphoid, disseminated through affiliates—Al Nusra Front and the Islamic both air and water—against Chinese forces. State of Iraq and the Levant—along with Not once did these weapons decisively other sympathetic jihadi entities in that epic affect the outcome of a battle. And, in the struggle, coupled with the potential access 1942 assault on Chekiang, ten thousand afforded to Bashar al-Assad’s chemical- Japanese soldiers themselves became ill, and weapons stockpiles, suggest that we have nearly two thousand died, from exposure likely not heard the last of Al Qaeda’s to these agents. “The Japanese program’s ambitions to obtain nerve agents, poison principal defect, a problem to all efforts so gas and other harmful toxins for use as far,” the American terrorism expert David mass-casualty weapons. Rapoport concluded, was “an ineffective delivery system.” onetheless, a fundamental paradox The challenges inherent in using germs N appears to exist so far as terrorist ca- as weapons are borne out by the research pabilities involving chemical, biological and conducted for more than a decade by nuclear weapons are concerned. As mesmer- Seth Carus, a researcher at the National izingly attractive as these nonconventional Defense University. Carus has assembled weapons remain to Al Qaeda and other perhaps the most comprehensive database terrorist organizations, they have also most- of the use of biological agents by a wide ly proven frustratingly disappointing to variety of adversaries, including terrorists, whoever has tried to use them. Despite the government operatives, ordinary criminals extensive use of poison gas during World and the mentally unstable. His exhaustive War I, for instance, this weapon accounted research reveals that no more than a total for only 5 percent of all casualties in that of ten people were killed and less than a conflict. Reportedly, it required some sixty thousand were made ill as a result of about pounds of mustard gas to produce even a two hundred incidents of bioterrorism single casualty. Even in more recent times, or biocrime. Most of which, moreover, chemical weapons claimed the lives of less entailed the individual poisoning of

Low-Tech Terrorism March/April 2014 65 specific people rather than widespread, of the clever adaptation or modification of indiscriminate attacks. existing tactics—such as turning hijacked The formidable challenges of obtaining passenger airliners into cruise missiles—or the material needed to construct a nuclear in the means and methods used to fabricate bomb, along with the fabrication and and detonate explosive devices, rather than dissemination difficulties involving the in the use of some new or dramatically use of noxious gases and biological agents, novel weapon. perhaps account for the operational conservatism long observed in terrorist errorists have thus functioned mostly tactics and weaponry. As politically T in a technological vacuum: either aloof radical or religiously fanatical as terrorists or averse to the profound changes that have may be, they nonetheless to date have fundamentally altered the nature of modern overwhelmingly seemed to prefer the warfare. Whereas technological progress tactical assurance of the comparatively has produced successively more complex, modest effects achieved by the conventional lethally effective and destructively accurate weapons with which they are familiar, as weapons systems that are deployed from a opposed to the risk of failure inherent in variety of air, land, sea—and space—plat- the use of more exotic means of death and forms, terrorists continue to rely, as they destruction. Terrorists, as Brian Jenkins have for more than a century, on the same famously observed in 1985, thus continue two basic “weapons systems”: the gun and to “appear to be more imitative than the bomb. Admittedly, the guns used by innovative.” Accordingly, what innovation terrorists today have larger ammunition ca- does occur tends to take place in the realm pacities and more rapid rates of fire than the simple revolver the Russian revolutionary Vera Zasulich used in 1878 to assassinate the governor-general of St. Petersburg. Sim- ilarly, bombs today require smaller amounts of explosives that are exponentially more powerful and more easily concealed than the sticks of tnt with which the Fenian dynamiters terrorized London more than a century ago. But the fact remains that the vast majority of terrorist incidents continue to utilize the same two attack modes. Why is this? There are perhaps two obvious explanations: ease and cost. Indeed, as Leonardo da Vinci is said to have observed in a completely different era and context, “Simplicity is the ultimate sophistication.” The same can be said about most terrorist—and insurgent—weapons and tactics today. Improvised explosive devices (ied) and bombs constructed of commercially available, readily accessible homemade materials now account for the lion’s share

66 The National Interest Low-Tech Terrorism of terrorist—and insurgent—attacks. The environment ripe for explosions. . . . Even with use of two crude bombs packed in ordinary a cheap stove, it’s easy to simmer water out of pressure cookers that killed three people hydrogen peroxide, leaving behind something and injured nearly three hundred others at more potent. It takes time, and he had plenty last April’s Boston Marathon is among the of that. more recent cases in point. Others include the succession of peroxide-based bombs Preparing the explosive initiator was that featured in the July 2005 suicide only slightly more complicated, but attacks on London transport, the 2006 plot considerably more dangerous. Hence, Zazi to blow up seven American and Canadian had to be especially careful. “He added the airliners while in flight from Heathrow muriatic acid and watched as the chemicals Airport to various destinations in North crystallized,” the account continues: America, and the 2009 attempt to replicate the London transport bombings on the The crystals are known as triacetone triperox- New York City subway system. ide, or tatp. A spark, electrical current, even a The account of the construction of the bit of friction can set off an explosion. . . . bombs intended for the New York City attack presented in the book Enemies The white crystal compound had been popular Within vividly illustrates this point. Written among Palestinian terrorists. It was cheap and by two Pulitzer Prize–winning journalists, powerful, but its instability earned it the nick- Matt Apuzzo and Adam Goldman, the name “Mother of Satan”. . . . book describes how the would-be bomber, an Afghanistan-born, permanent U.S. When he was done mixing, he rinsed the crys- resident named Najibullah Zazi, easily tals with baking soda and water to make his purchased the ingredients needed for the creation more stable. He placed the finished device’s construction and then, following product in a wide-rimmed glass jar about the the instructions given to him by his Al size of a coffee tin and inspected his work. Qaeda handlers in Pakistan, created a crude There would be enough for three detonators. but potentially devastatingly lethal weapon: Three detonators inside three backpacks filled with a flammable mixture and ball bearings— For weeks he’d been visiting beauty supply the same type of weapon that left 52 dead in stores, filling his carts with hydrogen peroxide London in 2005. . . . and nail polish remover. At the Beauty Supply Warehouse, among the rows of wigs, braids, He was ready for New York. and extensions, the manager knew him as Jerry. He said his girlfriend owned hair salons. There These types of improvised weapons are was no reason to doubt him. not only devastatingly effective but also remarkably inexpensive, further accounting On pharmacy shelves, in the little brown plastic for their popularity. For example, the House bottles, hydrogen peroxide is a disinfectant, a of Commons Intelligence and Security sting-free way to clean scrapes. Beauty salons Committee, which investigated the 2005 use a more concentrated version to bleach hair London transport attacks, concluded that or activate hair dyes. At even higher concentra- the entire operation cost less than £8,000 tions, it burns the skin. It is not flammable on to execute. This sum included the cost of a its own, but when it reacts with other chemi- trip to Pakistan so that the cell leader and cals, it quickly releases oxygen, creating an an accomplice could acquire the requisite

Low-Tech Terrorism March/April 2014 67 bomb-making skills at a secret Al Qaeda a thousand others and gouged a 180-foot- training camp in that country’s North-West wide crater six stories deep, but also caused Frontier Province; the purchase of all the an estimated $550 million in damages needed equipment and ingredients once and lost revenue to the businesses housed they were back in Britain; the rental of an there. The seaborne suicide-bomb attack apartment in Leeds that they turned into a seven years later on the uss Cole, a U.S. bomb factory; car rentals and the purchase Navy destroyer anchored in Aden, Yemen, of cell phones; and other incidentals. reportedly cost Al Qaeda no more than The cost-effectiveness of such homemade $10,000 to execute. But, in addition to devices—and their appeal to terrorists—is of claiming the lives of seventeen American course not new. Decades ago, the Provisional sailors and wounding thirty-nine others, it Irish Republican Army (pira) demonstrated cost the U.S. Navy $250 million to repair the disproportionate effects and enormous the damage caused to the vessel. damage that crude, inexpensive homemade explosive devices could achieve. In what was his trend toward the increased use of described as “the most powerful explosion in T ieds has had its most consequential London since World War II,” a pira fertilizer and pernicious effects in Iraq and Afghani- bomb made with urea nitrate and diesel stan during our prolonged deployments fuel exploded outside the Baltic Exchange in there. As Andrew Bacevich, a retired U.S. April 1992, killing three people, wounding Army officer and current Boston Univer- ninety others, leaving a twelve-foot-wide sity professor, has written, “No matter how crater—and causing $1.25 billion in badly battered and beaten, the ‘terrorists’” damage. Exactly a year later, a similar bomb on these and other recent battlefields were devastated the nearby Bishops Gate, killing not “intimidated, remained unrepentant, one person and injuring more than forty and kept coming back for more, devising others. Estimates put the damage of that tactics against which forces optimized for blast at $1.5 billion. conventional combat did not have a ready Long a staple of pira operations, in the response.” He adds, “The term invented for early 1990s fertilizer had cost the group this was ‘asymmetric conflict,’ loosely trans- on average 1 percent of a comparable lated as war against adversaries who won’t amount of plastic explosive. Although after fight the way we want them to.” adulteration fertilizer is admittedly far less In Iraq and Afghanistan, both terrorists powerful than plastic explosives, it also and insurgents alike have waged low-risk tends to cause more damage than plastic wars of attrition against American, British, explosives because the energy of the blast is allied and host military forces using a more sustained and less controlled. variety of ieds with triggering devices as Similarly, the homemade bomb used in simple as garage-door openers, cordless the first attack on New York’s World Trade phones and car key fobs to confound, if not Center in 1993—consisting of urea nitrate hobble, among the most technologically derived from fertilizer but enhanced by advanced militaries in the history of three canisters of hydrogen gas to create mankind. “The richest, most-trained army a more powerful fuel-air explosion— got beat by dudes in manjammies and produced a similarly impressive return on A.K.’s,” an American soldier observed to a the terrorists’ investment. The device cost New York Times reporter of one such bloody less than $400 to construct. Yet, it not engagement in Afghanistan five years ago. only killed six people, injured more than Indeed, terrorists and insurgents in both

68 The National Interest Low-Tech Terrorism Terrorists continue to rely, as they have for more than a century, on the same two basic “weapons systems”: the gun and the bomb.

Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated curbsides or secreted along the guard rails the effectiveness of even poorly or modestly on the shoulders of roadways, put in boxes, armed nonstate adversaries in confronting or disguised as rocks or bricks strewn by superior, conventional military forces and the side of the road. As military vehicle waging a deadly war of attrition designed armor improved, the bomb makers adapted in part to undermine popular support and and adjusted to these new force-protection resolve back home for these prolonged measures and began to design and place deployments. Equally worrisome, these ieds in elevated positions, attaching them battle environments have become spawning to road signs or trees, in order to impact the grounds for continued and future violence: vehicles’ unarmored upper structure. real-life training camps for jihadis and The method of detonation has also varied hands-on laboratories for the research as U.S., allied and host forces have adapted and development of new and ever more to insurgent tactics. Command-wire deadly terrorist and insurgent tactics and detonators were replaced by radio-signal techniques. “How do you stop foes who kill triggering devices such as cell phones and with devices built for the price of a pizza?” garage-door openers. These devices were was the question posed by a Newsweek remote wired up to one hundred meters cover story about ieds in 2007. “Maybe from the ied detonator to obviate jamming the question is,” it continued, “can you stop measures. More recently, infrared lasers have them?” been used as explosive initiators. One or At one point, ieds were responsible more artillery shells rigged with blasting for nearly two-thirds of military fatalities caps and improvised shrapnel (consisting caused by terrorists and insurgents in Iraq of bits of concrete, nuts, bolts, screws, and a quarter of the military fatalities in tacks, ball bearings, etc.) have been the Afghanistan. According to one authoritative most commonly used, but the makeshift account, there was an ied incident every devices have also gradually become larger as fifteen minutes in Iraq during 2006. And, multinational forces added more armor to after the number of ied attacks had doubled their vehicles, with evidence from insurgent in Afghanistan during 2009, this tactic propaganda videos of aviation bombs of accounted for three-quarters of military 500 lb. being used as ieds. In some cases, casualties in some areas. these improvised devices are detonated These explosive devices often were serially—in “daisy chain” explosions— constructed using either scavenged designed to mow down quick-reaction artillery or mortar shells, with military or forces converging on the scene following commercial ordnance, or from entirely the initial blast and first wave of casualties. homemade ingredients. They were then By 2011, the U.S. Defense Department buried beneath roadways, concealed among had spent nearly $20 billion on ied roadside refuse, hidden in animal carcasses countermeasures—including new or telephone poles, camouflaged into technologies, programs, and enhanced and

Low-Tech Terrorism March/April 2014 69 constantly updated training. A “massive authorities in April 2004. It involved the new military bureaucracy” had to be created toxic release of chemicals into a crowded to oversee this effort and itself was forced urban environment and was orchestrated to create “unconventional processes for by the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the introducing new programs,” as a 2010 New founder and leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq. America Foundation report put it. Yet, as The Amman plot entailed the use of some the British Army found in its war against twenty tons of chemicals and explosives Jewish terrorists in Palestine seventy years to target simultaneously the prime ago, there is no easy or lasting solution minister’s office, the General Intelligence to this threat. ied attacks had in fact Department’s headquarters and the U.S. become so pervasive in Palestine that in embassy. Although the main purpose of December 1946 British Army headquarters the coordinated operations was to conduct in Jerusalem issued forced-entry attacks a meticulously by suicide bombers detailed thirty-five- against these three page pamphlet, heavily protected, complete with high-value targets, an photographs and ancillary intention is diagrams, describing believed to have been these weapons, their the infliction of mass emplacement and casualties on the their lethal effects. surrounding areas by Even so, as military the noxious chemical commanders and agents deliberately civilian authorities released in the blasts. alike acknowledged An estimated eighty at the time, ieds thousand people, were then as now Jordanian authorities virtually impossible claim, would have to defend against been killed or completely. seriously injured in Perhaps the most the operation. novel and innovative The above attacks use of ieds, however, in Iraq and the has been when they foiled incident in have been paired with toxic chemicals. Amman all underscore the potential for Much as the Iraq conflict has served as a terrorists to attack a domestic industrial proving ground for other terrorist weapons chemical facility with a truck bomb or other and tactics, it has also served this purpose large explosive device, with the purpose of with chemical weapons. Between 2007 triggering the release of toxic chemicals. In and 2010, more than a dozen major truck- this respect, the effects of prior industrial bomb attacks occurred in Iraq involving accidents involving chemicals may exert conventional explosions paired with a profound influence over terrorists. chlorine gas. In 2005, for instance, a train crash and The most serious incident, however, derailment in South Carolina released was one that was foiled by Jordanian some sixty tons of liquefied chlorine into

70 The National Interest Low-Tech Terrorism the air, killing nine people and injuring figures such as bin Laden and Anwar al- 250 others. Considerably more tragic, of Awlaki—along with some forty other senior course, was the 1984 disaster at a Union commanders and hundreds of the group’s Carbide chemical facility in Bhopal, India. fighters—have sufficiently diminished the Some forty tons of methyl isocyanate were threat of terrorism to our war-weary, eco- accidentally released into the environment nomically preoccupied nations. and killed nearly four thousand people But before we simply conclude that the living around the plant. Methyl isocyanate threat from either Al Qaeda or terrorism has is one of the more toxic chemicals used in disappeared, it would be prudent to pause industry, with a toxicity that is only a few and reflect on the expansive dimensions of percent less than that of sarin. Al Qaeda’s wmd research-and-development efforts—and also to consider the continuing he war on terrorism today generates developments on the opposite end of T little interest and even less enthusiasm. the technological spectrum that have A decade of prolonged military deploy- likewise transformed the threat against ments to Iraq and Afghanistan has drained conventionally superior militaries and even both the treasuries and willpower of the against superpowers. Like it or not, the United States, Great Britain and many war on terrorism continues, abetted by the other countries, as well as the ardor and technological advances of our adversaries commitment that attended the commence- and thus far mercifully countered by our ment of this global struggle over a dozen own technological prowess—and all the years ago. The killings of leading Al Qaeda more so by our unyielding vigilance. n

Low-Tech Terrorism March/April 2014 71 Reviews & Essays

Communism—but Sestanovich brings it up Max Americana to date and by the book’s end tips his hand about which course he would prefer. By John B. Judis He doesn’t say in so many words what maximalism and retrenchment are, but his meaning can be gleaned from his examples. Stephen Sestanovich, Maximalist: America Maximalists want to increase the military in the World from Truman to Obama (New budget; they want American power to shape York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), 416 pp., the world, with or without allied backing, $28.95. and are willing to risk war to get their way. Maximalists, Sestanovich writes, “assumed n Maximalist, Stephen Sestanovich, a that international problems were highly former official in the Reagan and Clin- susceptible to the vigorous use of American I ton administrations and now a profes- power.” Retrenchers, by contrast, believe sor of international relations at Columbia, that America must cut back its global reach has written a history of American foreign either for budgetary reasons or because of policy since World War II. Many of the opposition from other powers. They preach details are not original. Sestanovich relies the limits of power. They think America for the most part on published histories and needs to pay more attention to “nation memoirs rather than on archival sources. building” at home than overseas. But Sestanovich tells the story well and his Sestanovich arranges the cycles by interpretation of what the history means presidential administrations in the makes the book worth considering. following way: Following the lead of Arthur Schlesinger Maximalists: Harry Truman (after 1946), Sr., who divided American political history John F. Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson (after into cycles of liberalism and conservatism, 1965), Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush Sestanovich divides the history of post– (after September 11, 2001). World War II foreign policy into periods Retrenchers: Dwight Eisenhower, Richard of what he calls “maximalism” and periods Nixon, Jimmy Carter and Barack Obama. of retrenchment. It’s an old demarcation— Mixed: George H. W. Bush and Bill first voiced by Walter Lippmann and Clinton. George Kennan after World War II in a Sestanovich is critical of both maximalists debate over the extent to which the United and retrenchers, but he attributes the States should attempt to counter Soviet great successes of American foreign policy to maximalism. “The United States John B. Judis is a senior editor at the New Republic achieved a great deal precisely by being and the author of Genesis: Truman, American Jews, uncompromising and confrontational,” he and the Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Farrar, writes. “Had Truman accepted a graceful Straus and Giroux, 2014). exit from Berlin, had Kennedy found a

72 The National Interest Reviews & Essays way to live with missiles in Cuba, had driven the North Koreans out of the Reagan backed away from his zero option, South, Truman and Secretary of State the Cold War would have unfolded very Dean Acheson, discounting the Chinese differently—and in all likelihood, not threat, became determined to unify the nearly so well.” peninsula. Sestanovich suggests that if Sestanovich sees little virtue in General Douglas MacArthur, the American retrenchment. “Retrenchment can commander, had pulled his forces back go from being seen as a strategy for from the Chinese border at the first inkling averting decline to being seen as one that of China’s intervention, the United States accelerates and even embraces it,” he could have held most of North Korea writes. Sestanovich uses a passive, evasive against the Chinese. formulation (“being seen” by whom?), but Likewise, Sestanovich says that in he seems to be suggesting that the United Vietnam, Johnson should have accepted the States is always facing new challenges advice in 1966 of General Victor Krulak to for which retrenchment invariably leaves limit troop involvement in the South while it unprepared—Sputnik for Eisenhower, escalating the air war in the North. And in Soviet heavy missiles for Nixon and Iraq after the 2003 invasion, he argues, the Henry Kissinger, the Soviet invasion of U.S. strategy became hostage to Secretary Afghanistan for Carter and the Arab Spring of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s rejection of for Obama. nation building. “This early mishandling of the occupation,” Sestanovich writes, “had a estanovich is certainly right that maxi- lasting impact on U.S. policy.” S malism is responsible for notable for- But in most of these cases, Washington’s eign-policy successes, but he acknowledges strategy was probably irredeemable. The that it is also responsible for our greatest Chinese still could have created a stalemate failures, which brought forth periods of in Korea. During the Vietnam War, retrenchment. Truman’s abortive attempt Krulak’s advice to Johnson anticipated what to unify the Korean Peninsula, which pre- would become Richard Nixon’s strategy of cipitated a Chinese invasion, led to Eisen- escalation in the North and Vietnamization hower’s retrenchment; Johnson’s escalation in the South. At best, following this advice of the Vietnam War led to Nixon’s retrench- would have let Johnson achieve the kind ment; and George W. Bush’s invasion of of agreement that Nixon later signed with Iraq led to Obama’s retrenchment. The the North Vietnamese. But it certainly United States is still reeling from Bush’s de- would not have prevented the fall of South cision to invade Iraq. Vietnam. In Iraq, a larger occupation But Sestanovich blames these failures force and a more sophisticated occupation on what amount to correctable errors. strategy might at best have delayed the The Truman administration screwed up onset of the anti-American rebellion and in Korea because of overreach. Having the civil war between Sunni and Shia

Reviews & Essays March/April 2014 73 be called the North-South conflict. Two world wars had been fought over the spoils of empire. Woodrow Wilson and Vladimir Lenin had already endorsed self- determination for the colonized, and new anti-imperial movements and leaders had emerged that brooked no compromise. Take Sestanovich’s portrayal of John Kennedy as the arch maximalist. “John Kennedy and his team were probably the most activist group ever put in charge of American foreign policy,” he writes. Kennedy and his foreign-policy advisers became reluctant to act, however, because forces. The lesson I would draw is that they had difficulty making decisions. “They maximalism and retrenchment succeed or were exceedingly indecisive managers of fail depending upon the circumstances in policy, given to protracted and inconclusive which they are pursued. The real difference deliberation,” he writes. But where Kennedy is in the circumstances. most exhibited indecision was in choosing If you look at the different successes and whether, and to what degree, to intervene failures, Sestanovich’s instances of success in Southeast Asia, and that wasn’t just a came from America facing down the Soviet product of being indecisive, but also of the Union, and his failures from America special circumstances of the region. attempting to impose its will on nations Sestanovich depicts Kennedy as eager that had been the victims of European, to intervene in Vietnam, quoting him as American and Japanese colonialism. In the saying that the Roman Empire’s “success latter situations, the United States ended was dependent on their will and ability up replicating the strategy and assumptions to fight successfully at the edges of their of an imperial power, and it encountered empire.” But he recounts how Kennedy was a resistance that was based on a century- undecided about how to wage the fight. old nationalism, even if sometimes, as in That may have been because Kennedy Latin America or Asia, it came under the understood that he was getting into a banner of Communism. The United States situation that didn’t call for activism. failed in Vietnam as the French had earlier, In Lessons in Disaster, an excellent study and it encountered the same resistance in of the Kennedy era based on the papers of Iraq that the British had faced after World McGeorge Bundy, the president’s national- War I. These failures didn’t have to do with security adviser, Gordon M. Goldstein specific tactics, but with an unwillingness attributes Kennedy’s reluctance to escalate to accept basic facts about what came to American participation in the Vietnam War

74 The National Interest Reviews & Essays to his understanding of colonialism and that the loss of the former victim of nationalism: European and Japanese colonialism was tantamount to a defeat in a worldwide Kennedy had visited Vietnam as a congressman struggle against Soviet Communism. In in 1951 when 250,000 French troops, aided by 1950, they dismissed a British suggestion 200,000 pro-French Vietnamese, were fight- that they distinguish Chinese from Soviet ing the Vietnamese Communist forces. From Communism. Johnson, Nixon and Reagan the French defeat, he drew the lesson that if didn’t understand anti-imperialism in Latin the United States were to send troops, and not America or the Middle East, and George merely attempt to advise and train the South W. Bush and his neoconservative and liberal Vietnamese regime, it would turn what had boosters certainly didn’t understand Iraq. been a civil war against a Communist insur- Those failures, more than any commitment gency into a struggle between the U.S. and a to maximalism or retrenchment, doomed colonized people struggling for independence. the foreign policy of these presidents. The U.S., like France, would be bound to lose this kind of war. It wouldn’t be fighting com- ome presidents did make the appro- munism, but nationalism. S priate distinctions in relation to some countries. Nixon and Kissinger realized— Goldstein also writes that Kennedy told after almost fifteen years of open Sino-Sovi- his aides that if he were reelected in 1964, et conflict—that China was not a depend- he would withdraw from Vietnam. In this able part of the Soviet empire, and George respect, as in his accepting a neutral Laos, H. W. Bush understood that America’s mo- Kennedy may not have been such a maxi- tives in the Gulf War had to be limited to malist after all. ousting Iraq from Kuwait. These American The jury is still out on what Kennedy presidents understood that if the United would have done, and whether he really States didn’t want to incur a nationalist understood the perils of a neoimperial backlash, it would have to make clear that strategy in Southeast Asia, but there is no its aims were limited. question that Lyndon Johnson did not. One way to do this—going back to Johnson and his advisers saw nationalism Wilson’s attempt to dismantle imperialism and anticolonialism through the prism in 1919—has been for great powers to act of the Cold War struggle against Soviet through international organizations when Communism. Other presidents also failed intervening in other countries. George H. to distinguish East-West from North- W. Bush understood the need for collective South conflicts. Truman and Acheson action in the Gulf War. Five years before his were under enormous political pressure son invaded Iraq, Bush wrote: from Republicans charging that they had “lost” China, but still they seem to have I firmly believed that we should not march into accepted the false premise of this charge— Baghdad. . . . To occupy Iraq would instantly

Reviews & Essays March/April 2014 75 Sestanovich is right in saying that a policy of retrenchment can lead to failure. But the history of retrenchment, like that of maximalism, is studded with successes as well as failures.

shatter our coalition, turning the whole Arab Sestanovich is right, of course, in world against us, and make a broken tyrant saying that a policy of retrenchment can into a latter-day Arab hero . . . assigning young lead to failure. Carter’s attempts to reach soldiers . . . to fight in what would be an un- accords with the Soviet Union may have winnable urban guerrilla war. convinced Moscow that it could meddle in Africa without repercussions. In his Bill Clinton also understood the first two years, Clinton’s attempt to steer importance of collective action. That’s clear of international conflict contributed why he insisted on acting through nato to massacres in Bosnia and Rwanda that in the Balkans. If the United States had probably could have been avoided with a acted alone, it could have sparked a war of minimal show of American determination. national liberation that might still be going But the history of retrenchment, like that on. (The British military historian Michael of maximalism, is studded with successes as Howard is said to have remarked during the well as failures. Eisenhower’s winding down 2003 Iraq War that it was fortunate that the of the Korean War, Nixon’s opening to United States had lost the Vietnam War, China and his closing of the gold window, because if it hadn’t, it might still be there.) Reagan’s belated decision in his second term Sestanovich, on the other hand, points to wind down American intervention in with favor to Acheson’s skepticism Central America and George H. W. Bush’s about the United Nations and Reagan’s decision not to invade Iraq have to be dissatisfaction with his European allies. counted as successes that were based upon a And he misunderstands George H. W. recognition of the limits of American power. Bush’s commitment to collective security. He writes that Bush “managed to mobilize hat I would conclude from this a global coalition without really limiting W mix of successes and failures is that American freedom of action.” But in fact, the difference between maximalism and Bush’s collective commitment did limit retrenchment is not the most telling way American action—and greatly to America’s to divide the history of American foreign benefit. When America has abandoned this policy since World War II. American pol- strategy for some version of unilateralism, icy makers have debated what to do along as Johnson did in Vietnam or George W. these lines, but the debate has often been Bush did in Iraq (where Washington’s only muddled. The debate between Kennan and significant ally was the former imperial Lippmann over how to respond to the Sovi- power in the region), the United States has et threat—with Kennan initially prescribing provoked a nationalist backlash. Erstwhile aggressive “counterforce” around the globe, villains have been turned into martyrs. which Lippmann considered entirely un- And American forces, hopeful to be seen necessary and dangerous—was really about as “liberators,” have become seen instead as Soviet intentions. Lippmann and his succes- imperialists. sors did worry about America turning into

76 The National Interest Reviews & Essays a militarized society, interpreted as an act but they would not of retrenchment. have expressed these What Sestanovich concerns if they seems to have didn’t disagree with done is to project the prevailing “max- the difference he imalist” view of the sees in America’s kind of threat that approaches to the the Soviet Union, Soviet Union, Communist China, typified by the a Communist Viet- difference between nam or Saddam Carter before 1979 Hussein’s Iraq posed. and Reagan, onto It is also hard to the entire history draw a sharp line of foreign policy between administrations that practiced since World War II. He also seems to have maximalism and those that practiced endorsed the neoconservative excuse (it’s retrenchment. Sestanovich concedes all Rumsfeld’s fault) for the failure of the that George H. W. Bush’s and Clinton’s George W. Bush administration’s invasion administrations represented a mix of the of Iraq, as well as the neoconservative two approaches, but that is also true of critique of George H. W. Bush for not many other administrations as well. going to Baghdad and provoking a decade- Kennedy stared down the Russians during long guerrilla war. That leads Sestanovich— the Cuban missile crisis, but afterward without saying so in so many words—to signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty; he mount a one-sided defense of “muscular” also agreed to a neutralized Laos. Nixon, and sometimes unilateral foreign-policy the retrencher, tried to secure a graceful initiatives and to reject policies that suggest exit from Vietnam, but he attempted to the limits of American power. That’s not do so initially by winning the war—a helpful, particularly in guiding foreign strategy that Sestanovich himself describes policy now. as “maximalist.” Reagan is Sestanovich’s Sestanovich sees Barack Obama as an archetypical maximalist, but his courting advocate of retrenchment. That’s certainly of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and true in some respects. Obama has had to his advocacy of nuclear abolitionism can dig America out of the hole in the Middle be construed as retrenchment as well as East that George W. Bush’s invasion of Iraq maximalism. His withdrawal of support created. He has had to govern on behalf of for the contras in Nicaragua—which the an American public skeptical about the use conservative advocates of maximalism of American force overseas except in obvious loudly denounced—could also certainly be cases of self-defense. And he has had to

Reviews & Essays March/April 2014 77 face Republican opposition to government spending, including military spending. The Enigma These factors certainly reinforced Obama’s decision to withdraw from Iraq and to limit of Mr. X America’s intervention in the Arab Spring, most recently in Syria’s civil war. By Christian Caryl But Obama, like his predecessors, has also been faced with having to come to terms with situations in Iraq, Iran, Egypt, George F. Kennan, ed. Frank Costigliola, Syria, Afghanistan and Israel/Palestine, as The Kennan Diaries (New York: W. W. Nor- well as in China/Taiwan and North Korea, ton & Company, 2014), 768 pp., $39.95. where the scars from the long history of Western and Japanese colonialism are still friend recently described me in an visible. Sestanovich is critical of Obama for email as “irascible.” She meant it undermining the effort at nation building A in an offhanded, affectionate sort in Afghanistan by setting a deadline for of way—but I have to admit that her choice withdrawal, but Obama’s real mistake of adjective gave me a chill. Could it be may have been in listening too closely to that, unnoticed to myself, I had slipped the advocates of counterinsurgency (the into the ranks of the most tiresome group heirs of Maxwell Taylor in Vietnam) who of people in the United States? I refer, of wanted him to commit the United States course, to the Grumpy Old White Guys. to long-term intervention. And Obama’s You know the type. They’re the ones who greatest success may come in defying the corner you at a party to complain about the neoconservatives and America’s Israel lobby use of Spanish in official announcements by extending a hand to Iran’s rulers. on the bus, or cut you off in the super- Is Obama in these cases “retrenching,” market parking lot to compensate for early or is he displaying a better understanding retirement-induced rage. Their public mas- of the conflicts that have divided the cot is John McCain, that walking tantrum- world for a century? Sestanovich wants to in-waiting—but that doesn’t mean that all see American foreign policy in the light of of them are conservative. To the contrary: cycles of retrenchment and maximalism; you can also find plenty of crabby old lib- I prefer to see it as two long twilight erals out there, griping about the collapse struggles—one to wage the Cold War and of manufacturing or the hopeless egotism the other to come to terms with the turmoil of today’s materialist youth. (I’m actually unleashed by the age of imperialism and pretty sure that cantankerous boomers rep- nationalism. The United States has won the Cold War, but in the Middle East, Africa, Christian Caryl is a senior fellow at the Legatum South Asia and the Far East the other Institute in London and a contributing editor at struggle is far from over. n The National Interest and Foreign Policy.

78 The National Interest Reviews & Essays resent a core demographic for Rolling Stone and Eastern Europe, and a silky and ironic and the New Yorker.) It’s gotten to the point prose style, modeled partly on Edward where I automatically steer a wide berth Gibbon, that reflected his intense, private around any portly, bearded over-sixty wear- engagement with the great Russian writers. ing glasses on a lanyard. He was a rara avis in Washington, a I’ve tended to think of this as a strictly deeply cultured man who had an intuitive contemporary phenomenon, along with understanding of the European civilization Duck Dynasty, retiree Pilates and websites that disappeared in August 1914. He for Christian singles. How wrong I was. never ceased mourning its disappearance, It turns out that the Grumpy Old White dedicating his last books to analyzing the Guys actually have a venerable and quite diplomatic machinations of Germany, august pedigree—and among them was one France and Russia preceding the plunge of the most influential American foreign- into the abyss. policy thinkers of the twentieth century. I speak of George F. Kennan (1904–2005), pon his graduation from Princeton the man who provided the intellectual U University in 1925, where he never underpinnings of the Cold War concept of quite fit in, Kennan entered the State De- containment, who served as the first head partment, where he was posted to Riga, of the State Department’s Policy Planning Latvia. There he learned Russian and ab- Staff, and who made vital contributions to sorbed anti-Communist precepts. He never the Marshall Plan as well as the design of had any illusions about the thugs that sur- overall U.S. strategy toward Europe and rounded Stalin, and he served as an aide to the Far East in the wake of World War II. the first American ambassador to the Soviet He met with everyone from Joseph Stalin Union, William Bullitt, who entered his to Mikhail Gorbachev, from Harry Truman post sympathetic to Soviet aspirations only to Ronald Reagan. George H. W. Bush to become a virulent anti-Communist after awarded him the Presidential Medal of witnessing the depredations of Stalinism. Freedom. His friend Charles Bohlen, who Kennan went on to serve in posts in Berlin served as ambassador to Moscow, wrote a and Prague, where he saw the Nazi dictator- fine memoir called Witness to History. But ship firsthand. It would be difficult to think Kennan was truly it. of anyone who had a clearer understanding Few American public-policy intellectuals of totalitarianism in the past century. Ken- have been comparably lionized during their nan may have been somewhat maladroit lifetimes. But Kennan deserved it. There as a diplomat—he was banished from the weren’t many in Washington who could Soviet Union as ambassador after World compete with his remarkable breadth of War II for making the true but impolitic learning and experience, which included observation that the Soviet Union’s methods flawless knowledge of multiple languages, reminded him of those of the Nazis—but a deep immersion in the life of Central he was a remarkably clear-eyed observer.

Reviews & Essays March/April 2014 79 Indeed, it was his deftness as a writer that at the age of forty-nine—if “retired” is really helped to magnify the impact of both his the right word to use. (He was actually frog- “Long Telegram” of February 1946, which marched to the exit by the baleful John warned about malign Soviet intentions and Foster Dulles after Kennan dared, in one arrived like a thunderbolt in official Wash- of his public talks, to repudiate the idea ington, and his July 1947 Foreign Affairs of the rollback of Communism in Eastern article “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Europe as “replete with possibilities for which, appearing under the pseudonym misunderstanding and bitterness.”) The of Mr. X, posited that “the main element author of containment soon ended up at the of any United States Institute for Advanced policy toward the So- Study at his alma viet Union must be mater of Princeton. that of a long-term, There, he cemented patient but firm and his reputation by vigilant containment churning out a string of Russian expansive of histories, memoirs tendencies.” It neatly and analyses that summarized the fu- brought him two ture of Cold War National Book Awards strategy, setting up and two Pulitzer a lifelong, agonized Prizes (as well as an confrontation be- Einstein Peace Prize, tween Kennan him- in recognition for his self and the policy passionate opposition that he had helped to to the Vietnam War birth. A national-se- and the nuclear-age curity state, which en- balance of terror). It gorged itself on mas- quickly became clear sive budgets and per- that Kennan was the petual enemies, had supreme realist, almost emerged, and Kennan viewed it as wholly always skeptical of America’s intentions and inimical to true American republican tra- ability to effect beneficent change abroad. In ditions, a trend that was confirmed once 1957, when he delivered the Reith Lectures neoconservative triumphalism about the at Oxford, he caused an international stir end of the Cold War morphed into a global by advocating that the West work toward a crusade to crush America’s real and imag- neutral and unified Germany. He wanted ined foes. cooperation, not confrontation, with Despite his obvious intellectual integrity, Moscow. He was denounced by Dean Kennan retired from the State Department Acheson as espousing delusional pacifist

80 The National Interest Reviews & Essays Kennan was the wisest of the wise men, a profound thinker who had a tragic sense of history, particularly in the atomic age, that his coevals lacked.

views. But Kennan was the wisest of the wise bedeviled by a sense of his own inadequacy men, a profound thinker who had a tragic and grimly obsessed with the extent of his sense of history, particularly in the atomic clout. He was an unapologetic reactionary. age, that his coevals lacked. He despised the It was his neighbor J. Richardson Dilworth assumption, still embarrassingly common who put his finger on Kennan’s personality: among American politicians, that all you “George is ultra-conservative. He’s almost need to get a foreign leader to come around a monarchist.” Kennan was the ultimate to Washington’s position is a bit of personal realist about the country that he alternately quality time (just think of Clinton’s sauna loved and loathed. Like Henry Adams, with sessions with Boris Yeltsin or George W. whom he had much in common, he never Bush’s notorious soul gazing with Vladimir fully trusted it. He viewed democracy itself Putin). Kennan believed that foreign policy with profound misgivings, contemptuous should be based on a sober assessment of of gusts of public opinion, embodied in the national interest, not on the caprices of Red Scare and the rise of McCarthyism, that personality or temporary political advantage. could buffet foreign affairs and prevent elites At a moment when much of the foreign- from calmly steering the ship of state. Like policy establishment was championing war Acheson, he viewed apartheid South Africa with Iraq in 2002, Kennan, at the age of with indulgence and the lower orders with ninety-eight, vigorously decried the notion mistrust. that it would end in anything but disaster. To be sure, we’ve caught glimpses of this “Today, if we went into Iraq, like the Kennan over the years—like this brief bit of president would like us to do, you know 1952 self-analysis in the second volume of where you begin,” he said. “You never know his memoirs, where he berates himself for where you are going to end.” He was right. his abortive stint as ambassador to the ussr: All his life he liked to quote Gibbon’s passage in The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire I was probably too highly strung emotion- about the “unnatural task of holding in ally, too imaginative, too sensitive, and too submission distant peoples.” Not until 2005, impressed with the importance of my own when he died at the age of 101, was his opinions, to sit quietly on that particular seat. perspicuous voice stilled. For this, one needed a certain phlegm, a certain contentment with the trivia of diplomatic life, hat was the public Kennan. But it a readiness to go along uncomplainingly with T turns out that there’s a lot more to the conventional thinking of Washington, and the story. The man who reveals himself in a willingness to refrain from asking unneces- The Kennan Diaries is a compulsive grouser, sary questions—none of which I possessed in relentlessly downbeat about his personal adequate degree. prospects as well as those of his country, tor- mented by his nagging attraction to women Though Kennan’s contempt for his peers not his wife, plagued by intense loneliness, comes through loud and clear, this is still

Reviews & Essays March/April 2014 81 relatively restrained. When it was a matter perfection. Americanism, like Bolshevism, is a of public consumption he knew how to disease which gains footing only in a weakened keep his demons in check. To be sure, it was body. I have lost my sympathy for the Europe- widely understood around the Washington ans who protest against the influx of American of Kennan’s day that he was—how shall we automobiles and American phonograph re- put it?—a bit of an eccentric. Yet he also cords. If the Old World has no longer sufficient managed to eke out a pretty spectacular vitality, economic and cultural, to oppose these career over two decades in the State new barbarian invasions, it will have to drown Department, one of Washington’s most in the flood, as civilizations have drowned be- staid bureaucracies, and his subsequent fore it. triumphs in the academic stratosphere at Princeton suggest that he knew how to He was nothing if not consistent; his maintain his place in the establishment. views changed little throughout the eighty- Throughout his career his desperate urge eight years that he devoted to his diaries. to wield influence seems to have held him They are rife with ruminations about the back from expressing his most outré views horrors of unbridled democracy, vulgarian in public. The major exception, perhaps, culture and deracination. In 1930, he was his 1993 book Around The Cragged wonders whether a fascist party could Hill: A Personal And Political Philosophy, in ever arise in the United States. Probably which, among other things, he proposed not, he concludes: “Somehow, I just can’t dividing the United States into twelve conjure up an image of the American who more manageable minirepublics. But by is prepared to put the public good before then he was eighty-nine, and could afford their personal lives, including love and to indulge his inner curmudgeon without society.” Or take this characteristic entry much fear of the consequences. from 1977: “A lost people, we wasps, living Even so, these newly published diaries— out our lives, like displaced people, in a actually a smoothly edited sliver of the cultural diaspora, unrelieved even by any twenty-two thousand pages he produced consciousness of the existence, albeit far during eighty-eight years of writing—still away, of a lost homeland.” A 1969 visit to come as something of a shock. Kennan the National Portrait Gallery in London wasn’t just a Grumpy Old White Guy prompts him to express his astonishment avant la lettre; he was already deep into the that role just a few years after graduating from college. Here he is at age twenty-four: the obvious erosion of the genes, brought about over this past century by the effect of modern The Americanization of Europe, the flooding hygiene in keeping alive the weak, should be so of the continent with the cultural as well as the central a fact of our time, and yet never talked economic goods of the New World: all this is about, as though contemporary Western hu- something which Europe owes to its own im- manity were afraid of insulting itself.

82 The National Interest Reviews & Essays A 1978 trip to California inspires a and hatred of the whites.” It’s tempting to soliloquy about how the intermingling of dismiss this sort of lazy bigotry as a product the state’s various regional groups inevitably of Kennan’s times; such views were, after leads to a “vast polyglot mass, . . . one all, quite common among white Americans huge pool of indistinguishable mediocrity born in the early years of the century. and drabness. Exceptions may be only the (Kennan’s biographer, the admirable John Jews and the Chinese, who tend to avoid Lewis Gaddis, makes just this plea for intermarriage, and, for a time, the Negroes clemency in his book.) But the thought does not entirely console.

ome of his crankiest observations deal S with the shortcomings of democracy. During his time as a government official Kennan had often witnessed how the prin- ciples of good policy were undermined by the short-term thinking of elected politi- cians, and he had concluded from the ex- perience that democracies were inherently incapable of devising and pursuing rational strategy. On some deeper level, the whole notion of popular rule simply rankled. In a 1984 diary entry, he sketches out his ideal vision of the United States. Plank number one: a national military “directed strictly to the defense of our own soil,” including an army “based on universal national service along Swiss lines.” This is followed by a set of policies for population control: “Men having spawned more than 2 children will be compulsively sterilized. Planned parent- hood and voluntary sterilization will be as well.” This could mean, Kennan reflects, in every way encouraged.” His economic that these three groups would ultimately model is based on a comprehensive re- subjugate the rest of the populace to their jection of all forms of computerization will—“the Chinese by their combination and mechanization: “Everything possible of intelligence, ruthlessness, and ant-like will be done to re-primitivize and local- industriousness; the Jews by their sheer ize the economic process: encouragement determination to survive as a culture; the of the handicrafts, restriction of elaborate Negroes by their ineradicable bitterness processing, break-up of the national dis-

Reviews & Essays March/April 2014 83 The man who reveals himself in The Kennan Diaries is a compulsive grouser, relentlessly downbeat about his personal prospects as well as those of his country.

tribution chains, maximum development he was at his most depressed, Costigliola of local resources, & local distribution.” writes. These diaries are the exercise ground Public transportation is to be actively en- of Kennan’s id, the one realm where he couraged, the use of cars and airplanes re- could allow himself to vent, to meditate, stricted to cases of hardship or emergency. to express his darkest fears—all of it with In agriculture he favors government sup- the greatest candor. Kennan did make some port of the “small family farm” (aided by of the diaries available to trusted historians dramatic reductions in the use of artificial while he was still alive, of course, and I’m fertilizers as a means of restoring the soil). sure he expected them to be presented He then concludes: to the general public after his death— but he certainly didn’t intend for them Well, enough of this nonsense. The question to be treated like his memoirs. So even if at once arises: could any of this, even if desir- the diaries can help us to illuminate the able, be done other than by the most ferocious wellsprings of Kennan’s thinking, we still dictatorship? The answer is obviously: no. It need to be careful to balance their content could never be done by popular consent. The with the polished products of the man’s “people” haven’t the faintest idea what is good mind and to situate his ideas in the broader for them. context of an impossibly complicated and eventful life. Indeed, there’s a distinctly There can be little doubt that Kennan unfinished quality to the diaries since was quite sincere in these opinions. They’re they often glide over the most important simply too frequent, and too zealously moments in Kennan’s life and career while expressed, to conclude otherwise. So is it dwelling at great length over marginal time for us to topple him from the policy events and momentary impressions—a Olympus, to dismiss him as a simple pattern entirely in keeping with the lunatic? Do his ugliest or most bizarre notion of the journals as an intellectual beliefs invalidate his worth as a strategist sketchbook. and historian? Yet illuminate the wellsprings they I think there are several reasons why the do—and Costigliola is quite right to see answer must be no. First, there’s the simple depression as one of the keys. The editor fact that these are diaries, not documents isn’t kidding when he suggests that Kennan for public consumption. Frank Costigliola, kept his diary as a way of responding to who edited the present volume, notes that onslaughts of melancholy. Pretty much Kennan’s diary entries tended to thin out anything can set the man off: a bad dream, when he was in the most productive phases sound films, a perceived slight, a passing of his career, and especially at the end of glimpse of an attractive woman. Political the 1940s, when he was at the peak of his events are a frequent trigger. Here’s Kennan influence in Washington. Kennan sought in 1956 after Dwight D. Eisenhower recourse to diary writing above all when announced his intention to seek a second

84 The National Interest Reviews & Essays term as president: “There can be, for nurses who perhaps served as the surrogate me, only one refuge: learn, at long last, mother he never met. (This isn’t just the art of silence, of the commonplace, of psychoanalytical license on Gaddis’s part— humor, anything but serious discussion.” Kennan himself often considered the Needless to say, Kennan followed this possibility that his longings for the opposite remark with another forty-nine years of sex had a great deal to do with the big speaking engagements, book writing hole in his life where his mother should and polemicizing. He frets when he isn’t have been.) He struggles with financial working enough, and whines when he’s too straits and the myriad complications busy. In 1968, he muses: of a fantastically peripatetic life (despite his contempt for modern transportation, The extreme unhappiness with which I con- particularly the automobile). Flashes of front the prospect of returning home arises not titanic arrogance alternate with spurts of just from the hopeless profusion of my obliga- virulent self-loathing. As Kennan himself tions and involvements there, but also from recognized in that remark about his lack of awareness of my own personal failings & the “phlegm,” his was not a personality entirely lack of success I have had in overcoming them. suited to the harsh give-and-take of high- My congenital immaturity of bearing and con- level politics. Isaiah Berlin, the British duct, my garrulousness, the difficulty I find philosopher who did a stint as a diplomat at rejecting hard liquor when it is offered to me as his country’s Moscow embassy in the 1940s, a part of hospitality, the uncontrollable wander- once said of his friend Kennan: “He doesn’t ing eye—all these things are unworthy of the bend. He breaks.” rest of me, & they limit what I could make out of myself and what I could contribute in these et these character traits can’t be seen final years of active life. Y in isolation from the rest of the pack- age. Kennan’s great virtue as an analyst was Despising his own era, he wishes that his ability to see things from the outside. he’d been born in a different century. He No one was better at tracing out the logi- ponders the sad mystery of his mother, cal implications of a particular policy in all whom he never knew because she died their elaborate permutations (even if, in so shortly after his birth. He endures nervous doing, he often ended up overlooking the breakdowns, ulcers and shingles. (The grubbier but no less important aspects of index of the book offers seven references to everyday politics). And this was not despite “Kennan, George Frost, intestinal problems but because of his own proudly cultivated of.”) Whenever Kennan was confronted sense of alienation, his persistent suspicion with a serious problem, as Gaddis notes in that he’d been born into the wrong era, or his biography, he would suffer some sort of that, above all, he was really a Russian at breakdown that would allow him to enter heart. In a famous interview with George a hospital and be cosseted by sympathetic Urban in Encounter, for example, Kennan

Reviews & Essays March/April 2014 85 melancholy reality, than at other times. It was, in other words, not the depression which was abnormal, but the irrational hopefulness, which prevailed at other times.

I think he’s on to something here (even if I’m a bit reluctant to fetishize the insight). For whatever reasons, Kennan certainly had a remarkable ability to step outside of himself and envision alternate realities. I was particularly moved by a moment in the diaries in 1949 when he contemplates the ruins of Hamburg, a city he had lived in before the war and which was obliterated by several days of Allied firebomb air raids. praised the Soviet Union for its ability to Kennan, who had a complete command of control pornography and expatiated upon German, is anguished by the destruction his horror at seeing a recent Danish youth of the noble Hanseatic city. He suddenly festival that was “swarming with hippies— feels “an unshakeable conviction that no motorbikes, girlfriends, drugs, pornogra- momentary military advantage . . . could phy, drunkenness, noise—it was all there. have justified this stupendous, careless I looked at this mob and thought how one destruction of civilian life and of material company of robust Russian infantry would values, built up laboriously by human drive it out of town.” (An early draft of this hands, over the course of centuries.” And sentiment can be found here in the diaries.) then this: The notion of “depressive realism,” which argues that sadder people are often better And it suddenly appeared to me that in these at judging situations for what they really ruins there was an unanswerable symbolism are, has become quite popular these days. which we in the West could not afford to ig- (Just think of books like Nassir Ghaemi’s nore. If the Western world was really going A First-Rate Madness: Uncovering the Links to make valid the pretense of a higher moral Between Leadership and Mental Illness and departure point—of greater sympathy and Joshua Wolf Shenk’s Lincoln’s Melancholy.) understanding for the human being as God But Kennan was already writing about it made him, as expressed not only in himself, (referring to himself in the third person) in but in the things he has wrought and has cared his diary in 1942, describing about—then it had to learn to fight its wars morally as well as militarily, or not fight them the conviction that when in a depression he at all; for moral principles were a part of its was nearer to reality, to a certain tragic and strength.

86 The National Interest Reviews & Essays This critique of the military and moral rationale of the Allied bombing campaign Revisiting Zionism during the war has, over the past decade or so, come into its own—not least, I’m By Bernard Wasserstein sure, thanks to the comfortable historical distance that has opened up between us and those who actually planned and John B. Judis, Genesis: Truman, American implemented the destruction. Yet one Jews, and the Origins of the Arab/Israeli Con- wonders how many U.S. government flict (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, officials during the 1940s would have been 2014), 448 pp., $30.00. able to behold the fruits of the policy with the sort of critical distance that Kennan he security outside my neighbor- demonstrates. His black, razor-sharp hood temple in Hyde Park, Chi- diagnosis of Stalinism—at a time when pro- Tcago, like that around many Jew- Soviet wartime propaganda in the United ish institutions throughout the world these States presented a diametrically opposed days, is conspicuous, though not as rig- picture of the regime—is of a piece with orous as at comparable buildings in Ger- this innate skepticism and independence many, France or Sweden. But in this case of thought. He viewed the mendacious there is a special reason: Temple KAM Isa- pro-Soviet ambassador to Moscow, Joseph iah Israel stands just across the road from Davies, who hailed the show trials and the residence of the Obama family. The Stalin, with undisguised contempt and house is rarely occupied now, but when the revulsion. As his diaries demonstrate, not Obamas lived there full-time they used to everything that he concluded was fruitful “pal around” (to use Sarah Palin’s felicitous or wise or perspicacious—and I have to expression) with the congregation’s notori- confess that some of the things I learned ously radical rabbi, the late Arnold Wolf. about the man from this book did diminish In Genesis, John B. Judis credits Wolf his image in my eyes. But I would still insist with providing the future president with that it was precisely Kennan’s ability to ask “his view of Israel.” The rabbi, he says, big questions, and his gift for transforming described himself as a “religious radical” his insights into powerful prose, that made and a “liberal activist.” As Judis writes, he him so unique. Has today’s Washington “supported Israel’s existence, but he wanted become more or less inviting to talents of the Israelis to pursue policies that fully his stature? I’m not entirely sure, though the recognized the rights of the Palestinians.” Kennan chair has yet to be filled and may Wolf’s view of Israel represented “a return well remain empty. What I do know is that we condemn him, and those like him, at Bernard Wasserstein is the Harriet & Ulrich E. our own risk. A dose of grumpiness in the Meyer Professor Emeritus of Modern European right place can work wonders. n Jewish History at the University of Chicago.

Reviews & Essays March/April 2014 87 to the universalism of nineteenth-century Of course, one does not need Reform Reform Judaism.” In a confessional passage Judaism, historical or current, as one’s at the outset of his book, Judis, a senior guide in order to arrive at this conclusion. editor at the New Republic and the author Others have reached the same destination of several well-regarded books on domestic by different routes. Perhaps the most and foreign policy, declares his own effective presentation of this point of view attraction to Wolf’s teaching “that the role was written a generation ago from a Marxist of Jews was not to favor Jews at the expense standpoint by the great French Jewish of other people but to bring the light of orientalist Maxime Rodinson in his Israel: ethical prophecy to bear upon the welfare of Fait Colonial? (published in English as all peoples.” Israel: A Colonial-Settler State?). Even those Reform Judaism, as Judis notes, was who disagreed with its basic contention historically opposed to Zionism. Yet several (among them the pro-Israeli Jean-Paul of the early leaders of American Zionism, Sartre, who commissioned the essay in May notably Stephen Wise and Abba Hillel 1967 for a special issue of his journal Les Silver, were Reform Jewish clerics. Judis Temps Modernes) had to recognize the power traces the awkward relationship between of Rodinson’s argument, which derived the universalist values of Reform Judaism from a scrupulous welding of theoretical and the nationalist cause that these men framework and historical data and from an espoused. He sees a profound contradiction aversion to unexamined moralizing. The between their liberal political outlooks same cannot be said for Judis’s enterprise. and their general failure to recognize the political rights of the Palestinian Arabs. He his book is divided into three parts. admits of only rare exceptions such as Judah T The first and weakest presents a his- L. Magnes, an American Reform rabbi tory of the Zionist enterprise in Palestine who became the first head of the Hebrew up to 1939. “The moral contours of that University of Jerusalem. early history,” he writes, “are remarkably In some ways this is an old-fashioned clear. From the 1890s . . . until the early book that might have been written by 1930s, the responsibility for the conflict a member of the American Council for lay primarily with the Zionists.” Judis here Judaism, an association of Reform Jews, develops the proposition that British impe- formed in 1942, that propagandized rialism and the Zionists, using the vehicle vigorously against Zionism in the early of the mandate for Palestine granted by the years of the Jewish state (it still exists, albeit League of Nations, “conspired to screw the in diminished form). The “main lesson” of Arabs out of a country that by the prevail- the book, Judis writes, is that “the Zionists ing standards of self-determination would who came to Palestine to establish a state have been theirs.” (The crude wording is trampled on the rights of the Arabs who not indicative of what is the generally el- already lived there.” egant prose style of this book.)

88 The National Interest Reviews & Essays Liberalism, viewed historically, was not at all incompatible with either nationalism or imperialism.

The League of Nations was itself but the New Zionist Organization. There the supreme contemporary arbiter, in are other bloopers: Saudi Arabia makes a international law and in general public premature appearance in 1915; Jordan, legitimacy, of international standards of formed in 1946, steps on to the stage in conduct. Judis is fully entitled to disagree, 1919; and Guyana, born in 1966, pops up albeit retrospectively, with those standards. in 1937. But these are all trivial mistakes. But he cannot simultaneously invoke and Of more substantial importance is condemn them. Yet that is, in essence, what Judis’s claim that the British attempted he does in this section of his book. “to stoke sectarian division” in Palestine. Judis’s historical knowledge is sometimes Such an allegation is often made against shaky: the Jews of Palestine, he maintains, the British in relation to Jews and Arabs. “suffered religious persecution” under It is erroneous. But we need not pursue Ottoman Turkish rule. He cites no that hare further here because what Judis examples; indeed, it would be hard for has in mind are relations between Muslims him to do so since this persecution is a and Christians, which he believes the figment of his imagination. Until the British deliberately sought to impair in mid-nineteenth century, it is true, Jews pursuit of a divide-and-rule policy. The in the empire labored under a number of sole proof that he offers for this contention irksome restrictions. But they also enjoyed is the fact that the British sponsored the some privileges, including freedom from creation in 1921 of a “Supreme Moslem conscription for military service and Council.” But there is no credible evidence protection by the millet system, which in the archives of the British or Palestine accorded them communal autonomy in governments, neither of which Judis has several important spheres of life. In the consulted, nor anywhere else, that would mid-nineteenth century, Jews, like substantiate such a characterization of the Christians, were accorded full legal equality motives of the British in establishing this with Muslims. Admittedly, this did not body. In reality, as all concerned recognized, bring immediate social equality. But to some such body was urgently required at describe their condition in late Ottoman the start of the mandate for straightforward Palestine as one of “religious persecution” is practical and legal reasons in order to quite misleading. administer Muslim religious endowments A number of other errors pepper and institutions in the wake of the demise Judis’s text. Earl Curzon would have been of the Ottoman state. surprised to learn that he was the House of Lords representative in the war cabinet. uch errors undermine the reader’s con- One might as well say that President S fidence in Judis’s historical understand- Clinton was the saxophonists’ representative ing and judgment, but they do not fun- in the White House. Vladimir Jabotinsky’s damentally shake his argument. The real political movement was not the National problem is that Judis’s thesis is based on

Reviews & Essays March/April 2014 89 unexamined principles. He lays great stress peacemakers at the Paris Peace Conference on the doctrine of national self-determi- of 1919 also thought that this concept was nation, which, he reminds us, was given a supreme guiding light. But what they memorable expression in President Wilson’s failed, for the most part, to reckon with Fourteen Points address of January 1918— was the hotchpotch intermingling of ethnic though, by the way, the precise term does groups in many of the areas in which they not appear there. Judis asserts that early were engaged in drawing borders. Just two American Zionists, who were mainly lib- decades later such certitude dissolved in erals, had a blind spot when it came to the crises over the Sudetenland, the Polish the political rights of Palestinian Arabs. Corridor and Danzig. The murder of six He points out that men like Justice Louis million Jews during the Second World Brandeis, champions of the rights of labor- War and the expulsion thereafter of twelve ing men and black people at home, tended million Germans from areas of Eastern to dismiss Arab rights in Palestine as of Europe where their ancestors had, for the no great account. As a matter of historical most part, lived for many generations,

description, he is quite right. But what he put paid to the idea that national self- draws from this is more questionable. determination, tempered by international In the first place, his argument rests on protection of minorities, was any kind the assumption that the doctrine of self- of panacea. If any confirmation of that determination offered a mechanical lesson were required, it was furnished by solution to all nationality problems. Here the events that followed the breakup of he is in good company, since many of the Yugoslavia in the 1990s.

90 The National Interest Reviews & Essays The trouble with self-determination on wrong was done to the Palestinians when a territorial basis was that the outcome they were denied by Zionism the ability to inevitably depended on the precise area to determine their own destiny in their own which it was to be applied. Irish nationalists land. demanded freedom from British rule over But are such rights heritable? Certainly, all of Ireland—ignoring the political rights most Palestinian Arab nationalists and their of the Unionist majority in the northern supporters think so. Third- and fourth- part of the island. One could point to generation inhabitants of Lebanon, Jordan similar problems in almost every region and Syria still think of themselves not only of the world, particularly in territories as Palestinians but also as refugees with an formerly under imperial control, among inherent right of return. them Palestine, that achieved independence How long do such rights inhere? The after the Second World War. great majority of so-called Palestinian Ethnic intermingling was not the only refugees were not, after all, themselves problem. There was the related difficulty driven out of their homes in 1948. If of defining the national group that was Palestinians’ rights as refugees are heritable to be granted self-determination. Take through the generations, is there some Scotland. If Scots have such a right, the end point, or does that right endure, as question immediately arises: Who is a Scot? Palestinian nationalists claim? Judis, while In the referendum on independence to be remaining silent on the issue of a right held in Scotland in September of this year, of return for the Palestinians, expresses all residents of that country over the age eloquent sympathy for their plight: of sixteen will be able to exercise a vote. But many—perhaps a majority—of those Israel’s Jews had gained a world of their own voters are settlers from England, Ireland but at the expense of another people. History, and Bangladesh, or descendants of such of course, often works that way. And if the peo- settlers over the past couple of centuries. Is ple who are vanquished disappear, or are rela- it reasonable that they should have a say in tively weak and few in number, the victors can this matter while most Scots living abroad eventually lay aside the memory of what they have no say at all? have done. Few Georgians today remember What that example shows is that there or regret having driven the peaceful Cherokee is a further difficulty contained within Indians off their lands. the concept of self-determination, that of indigenity. According to the principle of Perhaps the Cherokees and the national self-determination, as generally Palestinian refugees deserve to have understood by its advocates, a significant inherited rights recognized (let us leave criterion for the exercise of national aside, for the moment, which rights and political rights is place of birth. That is in what form). But if so, does that not pull why Judis believes that a great political the rug out from under one of the chief

Reviews & Essays March/April 2014 91 complaints that is made against Zionism imperialism. Herbert Samuel, the first by its critics, including Judis—namely, that British high commissioner in Palestine the Jewish claim to Palestine is based on under the mandate, was one of liberalism’s an illegitimate appeal to inherited ancestral foremost theorists at the turn of the last rights of residence and ownership? Does not century and yet a stout imperialist. Judis Judis—as much as those he attacks—want examines his record in Palestine, partly on to have it both ways? the basis of a reading of my biography of Samuel. He asserts (here in no way reliant udis thinks he has discovered the mote on my book) that Samuel “didn’t subscribe Jin the eye of the early American Zion- to the view of empire as an instrument of ists. He observes that while they were for subduing and civilizing barbarous peoples.” the most part liberals in American politics, Actually, Samuel came close to believing they were at the same time adherents of an exactly that. So much is evident from his ethnonationalist creed when it came to their earliest involvement in imperial issues, ancestral homeland. He thinks the two po- when he supported Roger Casement in his sitions are inconsistent. denunciation of King Leopold’s murderous They may be inconsistent, but they are policies in the Congo in 1904. As home not necessarily irreconcilable. What of secretary twelve years later, he gave further the Italian Americans who were part of expression to that view when he granted the Roosevelt coalition yet shamelessly final approval for the hanging of Casement, acclaimed Mussolini? One of the main who had evolved into an activist on behalf thoroughfares in Chicago is, to this day, of his version of national self-determination named after Italo Balbo, the fascist aviator, in Ireland. brutal squadrista and colonial governor The second and shortest part of Judis’s of Libya. (Conveniently for the purposes book explores the early history of American of political road naming, he fell out with Zionism, particularly in its relationship Il Duce and died in an air crash before to Reform Judaism. In some effective and the outbreak of the Second World War.) I psychologically perceptive passages, Judis doubt any appeal for renaming to Mayor portrays the conflict of personalities and Rahm Emanuel would meet with success. policies between Stephen Wise and Abba And what of those Irish Americans, Hillel Silver for control over the American a similarly solid Democratic voting bloc Zionist movement. for many decades, who funded and But then we quickly move on to part propagandized on behalf of the terrorists three, which focuses on the years 1945 of the ira, hardly liberals by any stretch of to 1948, with a special emphasis on the definition? influence of the Zionist lobby over the Contrary to Judis’s view, liberalism, policies of the Truman administration. In viewed historically, was not at all this period, Judis contends, after a brief era incompatible with either nationalism or of ethical uplift during the Second World

92 The National Interest Reviews & Essays War, the Zionists again descended into administration and that of the Obama moral turpitude. administration in their policies toward the President Harry Truman, he shows, flip- Middle East. The tergiversation last year over flopped repeatedly in his attitude toward intervention in the Syrian civil war is a case the Palestine question, as he gave way first in point. But Judis goes further, postulating to this, then that pressure group. There is not merely analogy but genealogy. some merit in this interpretation, but not Indeed, the central argument of his book much that will be new to readers familiar is that there is lineal descent: Judis traces with the existing scholarly literature; for the origin of the “pattern of surrender example, the works on the subject by Zvi to Israel and its supporters” back to the Ganin and Michael J. Cohen. Truman years. Truman’s failure to impose Judis applauds the efforts of American a just settlement in Palestine, he writes, Jews such as Magnes who opposed the “established a pattern that plagued movement toward U.S. support for the his successors.” This is extrapolation creation of a Jewish state. He suggests that masquerading as explanation. if, in 1946, the Truman administration The underlying argument does not carry had exhibited more resistance to Zionist conviction. After all, Israel received scant pressure, and if the United States had supported the peacemaking efforts in Palestine of the British foreign secretary Ernest Bevin and if the Zionist leadership had been ready to postpone any demand for independence, then “the Arab states might have been able to persuade their Palestinian colleagues to go along.” This chain of conditional clauses points, of course, to the improbability of such an outcome, which Judis himself is constrained to admit “may sound implausible.” Yet he is not discouraged. A little later he opines, writing now of the background to the 1947 partition vote at the United Nations, that “the Arab leaders might even have eventually accepted a small Jewish state.” There are many might-have-beens in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, but these two are among the more fanciful. Undeniably there are some parallels between the irresolution of the Truman

Reviews & Essays March/April 2014 93 support from the United States during the in central Sinai. President Gerald Ford, Eisenhower administration, when its main “mad as hell” at what he regarded as Israeli great-power protector and arms supplier was “stalling,” announced a “reassessment” of not the United States but France. Dwight American policy toward the Jewish state. Eisenhower himself was distinctly hostile to Over the next six months the Americans the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt refused to sign any new arms deals with in the autumn of 1956, and it was American Israel. The Israel lobby organized frantic pressure that compelled the Israeli prime activity on Capitol Hill. Seventy-six minister, David Ben-Gurion, to pull Israeli senators were strong-armed into signing troops out of every inch of Sinai as well as a letter of protest to the president. The the Gaza Strip by early 1957. The Kennedy episode is often cited as an example of administration began selling limited the power of the pro-Israel lobby. What quantities of advanced weaponry to Israel, is not so well remembered is that the but it was only after the 1967 Six-Day War U.S. pressure on Israel in fact worked. that the United States became Israel’s main In September 1975, further exhaustive diplomatic patron and armament provider. mediation by Kissinger produced an Israeli- Egyptian agreement on Sinai and the Suez he pro-Israel lobby, of which Judis Canal. Rabin ate his words and reluctantly T is highly critical, is unquestionably agreed to withdraw Israeli troops from powerful, but it is not and has never been Mitla and Gidi in return for face-saving omnipotent. Judis exaggerates, for example, U.S. commitments. This was no passing when he writes that the American Israel episode. The agreement paved the way for Public Affairs Committee (aipac) was “in- the secret talks that led ultimately to the strumental” in the defeat in 1984 of Illinois Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty of 1979. senator Charles Percy by his Democratic Judis tries conscientiously to analyze challenger Paul Simon; aipac’s hostility the different segments of opinion among was merely one element in Senator Percy’s American Jews but in the end he succumbs downfall. to the tendency to lump most of them in Moreover, aipac cannot always prevent the category of donkey-like followers of an American administration from applying guidance from Jerusalem central. unwelcome pressure on Israel. In March Yet, as a recent Pew Research Center 1975, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger survey has shown, American Jewry is announced the failure of his mission to differentiating, diversifying and, in secure a second agreement between Israel important ways, disintegrating further and Egypt regarding the Sinai Peninsula. and faster than ever before. Institutions Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin was like Hadassah, the Women’s Zionist refusing to budge from his position that Organization—once the largest Jewish an Israeli military presence must remain at membership society in the country—are the strategically vital Mitla and Gidi Passes shadows of their former selves. The once-

94 The National Interest Reviews & Essays The pro-Israel lobby, of which Judis is highly critical, is unquestionably powerful, but it is not and has never been omnipotent.

powerful Conference of Presidents of away for free.) He recently called for the Major American Jewish Organizations no United States to launch a nuclear weapon longer carries much clout. And the Jewish into the middle of the Iranian desert. Irving federations in major cities are declining in Moskowitz, a Miami real-estate developer, significance. has been an important financial backer When contemplating the declining of Jewish settlements in inflammatory figures for synagogue membership, I am locations, such as Arab-inhabited quarters reminded of the old joke about the editor of Jerusalem. (He also helped bankroll of a Yiddish newspaper in New York who, the “birther” movement against President looking out of the window and noticing a Obama.) The head of the Anti-Defamation funeral procession file past, calls out to the League, Abraham Foxman, has been so manager of his printing press, “One copy ardent an apologist for Israeli policies that fewer today!” a writer in the liberal Israeli newspaper Jewish institutionalism has given way Haaretz satirically recommended last year to Jewish individualism. This is true that he be appointed U.S. secretary of state. particularly among young adults who are (He is unlikely to accept any such offer: he ever less inclined to allow themselves to would have to take a significant cut in his be mobilized for causes over which they salary, which in 2012 was $688,280.) have no control and in which they show But such figures are not generally decreasing interest. representative of those for whom they claim Judis accords American Jewish influence to speak. There are plenty of American a heavy share of responsibility for Israel’s Jews who have played a positive role in the continued retention of occupied Arab search for Arab-Israeli peace. Even those territories. Yet according to the Pew survey, who like to malign Kissinger can hardly only 30 percent of American Jews describe deny the supple cunning of his diplomacy themselves as “very attached” to Israel. And in the first steps toward Israeli-Egyptian only 17 percent believe that continued rapprochement after the 1973 Yom Kippur building of settlements has a positive War. In recent years American diplomats effect on Israel’s security, while 44 percent who happen to be Jewish (and perhaps it is declared that it hurts that security. not just happenstance) such as Dennis Ross, Many American Jews do, of course, Aaron David Miller, Martin Indyk and support Israeli hawkishness, and some Daniel Kurtzer (a former dean of Yeshiva make noisy, self-advertising contributions College in New York) have tried to nudge to bolstering the occupation. Sheldon Israel toward more realistic policies. Adelson, a Las Vegas casino operator, has In fact, on every significant occasion given millions to far-right causes in Israel in its history when Israeli policy makers and is the owner of the ultranationalist have moved decisively toward more dovish Yisrael Hayom, perhaps the country’s most positions, the preponderant weight of widely circulated newspaper. (It is given American Jewish opinion has shown

Reviews & Essays March/April 2014 95 support, as, for example, when Israel and Does all this mean, then, that the basic the Palestinians signed the Oslo accords on thrust of Judis’s conclusions is wrong? Not the White House lawn in September 1993. at all. Israel must, in pursuit of her own interests as a democracy, withdraw from udis writes fluently and forthrightly, the stance of colonial occupier that she Jbut other authors have made a more has misguidedly adopted since 1967. The persuasive case of a similar sort. John United States has no interest in supporting Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt stole a those in Israel who wish to perpetuate march on him with their (flawed) 2007 on- the occupation. American Jews, insofar slaught against the American Jewish lobby, as they give their voices, their money or The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy. their political influence to help sustain the In The Crisis of Zionism, Peter Beinart pre- occupation, do neither themselves nor Israel ceded Judis’s call for a more critical view of any favors. But we did not need dubious Israeli policy on the part of American Jews. historical linkage between the Obama Most recently, last year Ari Shavit, in My and Truman administrations nor shallow Promised Land, produced an influential, invocations of liberalism, universalism and revisionist critique of Israel’s conventional national self-determination to arrive at these history and of what he calls “the abnormal- conclusions. Judis is right but for the wrong ity of occupation.” reasons. n

96 The National Interest Reviews & Essays